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(1919—1938)

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III
Ocak - Eylül 1921

Hazırlayan
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Türk Tarih Kurumu Üyesi

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ÖNSÖZ

Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin ellinci yılında yayımına başlanan *İngiliz Belgelerinde Atatürk* dizisinin ikinci cildi 1975 yılında çıkmıştı. Üçüncü cilt daha o zaman hazırdı. Ama bunun baskı işi epeyce gecikti.

Dört yıllık bir aradan sonra çıkan bu üçüncü cilt, ikinci cildin devamıdır ve 1921 yılının ilk dokuz ayını kapsar. O yılın Ocak başından Eylül sonuna kadar gelir. Türk Kurtuluş Savaşının çok çetin bir dönemidir bu dokuz ay. Önemli olaylarla doludur. Bu dönemde askerî ve diplomatik gelişmeler birbirini izler. İçerde durumunu güçlendirmiş olan Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Hükûmeti, zorlu başarılara doğru gider. Türk ordusu, yeni zaferler kazanır; 1920 yılı sonbaharında doğuda Ermenilere karşı kazandığı kesin zaferden sonra, 1921 yılında batıya döner. Yunan ordularına karşı üstüste başarılar kazanır. Birinci İnönü, İkinci İnönü ve Sakarya zaferleri bu dokuz ay içinde yer alır.

Askerî başarılar diplomatik gelişmelere yol açar. Birinci İnönü zaferinin ardından Ankara Hükûmeti ile Afganistan ve Sovyetler Birliği arasında andlaşmalar imzalanır; normal diplomatik ilişkiler kurulur. Yeni Türk Devletinin Doğu'daki durumu güçlenir. Yine Birinci İnönü zaferi üzerine Ankara Hükûmeti, İstanbul Hükûmeti ile birlikte, Londra Konferansına çağırılır. Birinci Dünya Savaşının galip Devletleri, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Hükûmetini, hukuken değilse bile fiilen tanımak durumunda kalırlar; Ankara temsilcileriyle görüşmeye, masa başına oturmaya razı olurlar. İstanbul Hükûmetine dikte etmiş oldukları Sèvres barış andlaşmasının kimi hükümlerini bu kez kendi elleriyle değiştirmeyi önerirler. İkinci İnönü zaferinden sonra da Batılılar, Sèvres andlaşmasından biraz daha ödün verme gereğini duyarlar. Türk - Yunan savaşında "tarafsız" kalmaya yönelirler; Türkiye ile Yunanistan arasında arabuluculuk girişiminde bulunurlar. Bu girişimlerden olumlu bir sonuç çıkmaz. Yunan orduları yeniden saldırıya geçerler. Çağdaş Elen tarihinin bu en iddialı saldırısı da Sakarya'da boğulur.

Türk Kurtuluş Savaşının tartışmasız lideri Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın yıldızı bu dönemde iyice parlar. 1920 yılında İngilizler O'nu Merkezî Hükûmete başkaldırmış bir "çete başı" gibi görmek istemişler ve öyle

göstermek için çaba harcamışlardı. 1921 yılına girilirken İstanbul'daki İngiliz Yüksek Komiseri, Mustafa Kemal'i "çete başı" (brigand chief) gibi göstermenin artık bir yarar sağlamayacağını rapor eder. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Başkanı ve Türk orduları Başkomutanı Mustafa Kemal Paşa, Sakarya zaferinden sonra artık "Gazi"dir, "Müşir"dir. Batı emperyalizmine karşı bağımsızlık ve kurtuluş savaşı veren bir ulusun muzaffer lideri olarak, ünü giderek dünyaya ve özellikle Doğu'ya yayılır. Yabancı boyunduruğu altında inleyen Doğu ulusları O'nu bir kahraman olarak görmeğe başlamışlardır. Yürekten desteklerler.

İngilizler, Mustafa Kemal'i küçümsemek yerine adamakıllı önemsemek gerektiğine inanırlar artık. Güvenilmez derme - çatma Padişah güçleriyle O'na boyun eğdirilemeyeceğini görmüşlerdir. Ankara'ya "uzlaşma heyeti" yollayarak Anadolu'yu işbirlikçi Padişah yanına çekme, Türk Kurtuluş hareketini içerden çökertme denemesi de daha önce başarısızlıkla sonuçlanmıştı. Yunan ordularının, Boulogne konferansı kararı uyarınca, Mustafa Kemal'in üzerine saldırıları ise 1920 yılında sınırlı kalmış, Anadolu'daki ulusal hareketi dağıtmağa yetmemişti. İngiliz yöneticileri, Sèvres barış andlaşması Türkiye'de uygulanmazsa ilerde Batı sömürge düzeninin temelinden sarsılabileceğini görür gibidirler. Bunun için 1921 yılında Yunan orduları yeniden ve daha güçlü biçimde Anadolu içlerine saldırtılır. İngiliz Başbakanı Lloyd George, "Türk ayaklanmasını" bastırmak için Anadolu içlerine İngiliz orduları yollanamayacağına göre, Türklere karşı Yunanlıları sonuna kadar vuruşturmaktan başka çare kalmadığını söyler. Londra, bir taşla birkaç kuş birden vurmayı umar. Yunanistan, hesapça, hem kendi büyük emeli *Megali İdea*'ya, hem de İngiliz emperyalizmine hizmet edecekti. Ama Mustafa Kemal bu hesapları bozar. Dalga dalga Anadolu'ya saldırtılan Yunan orduları üstüste yüzgeri edilirler.

Lloyd George Hükûmeti, Birinci Dünya Savaşında pek yıpranmamış olan Yunan ordusuna epeyce umut bağlamış görünür. Ama Birinci İnönü ve özellikle İkinci İnönü savaşlarından sonra İngilizlerde düş kırıklıkları baş gösterir. Yunanlılar, Anadolu'da çeteler yerine düzenli Türk ordusuyla karşılaşmışlar, üstelik yenilgiye uğramışlardır. Yunan ordusu İngilizleri umut kırıklığına uğrattıkça, Batı'da "İngiliz barışı"na güven sarsılmağa başlar. Sèvres barış anlaşmasının Türkiye'de uygulanamayacağı anlaşılır. İngiliz Hükûmeti bocalar. 1921 yılında İngiltere, Sèvres andlaşmasından azar azar "ödün" vermeğe yönelir. Ne var ki bu ödünler Türkiye'de umut yaratmaktan uzaktır. İngiltere, Sèvres andlaşmasını uygulatmak için çetin bir direniş gösterir. İngiliz direnişini kırabilmek, Yunan saldırılarını kırmaktan çok daha zordur. Gerçi Türk ordularının kazandığı her zafer, İngilizlerin öngördükleri Sèvres barış düzenini azçok sarsar. Ama çökertebilmekten uzak kalır. Londra Hükûmeti, Sèvres andlaşmasını bütün kor-

kunçluğuyla yine ayakta tutabilmek için akılalmaz manevralara girişir. Türk askerinin savaş alanında kazandığını masa başında hiçe indirmek için çalışır. Birinci İnönü zaferi üzerine İngilizlerin Sèvres andlaşmasında yapmayı önerdikleri değişiklikler birer göz boyamadan öteye geçmez. Örneğin, Yunanistan'a vermek istedikleri İzmir bölgesinin "vilâyet" olarak adlandırılmasını, bu "vilâyet" gelirlerinden İstanbul Hükûmetine yıllık bir vergi ödenmesini, beş yıl sonra bu statünün Milletler Cemiyetince değiştirilmesini önerirler. Bölgenin Yunanistan'a katılması kapısını yine açık tutarlar. Birinci İnönü zaferinden sonra Sèvres andlaşmasında yapılmak istenen değişiklikler, buna benzer ufak tefek birkaç noktayla sınırlı kalır.

İkinci İnönü zaferinin ardından İngiltere, yeni bir barış taarruzuna kalkışır. Müttefikleriyle birlikte Türkiye ile Yunanistan arasında arabuluculuk girişiminde bulunur. Sèvres andlaşmasından bu kez vermeyi düşündüğü hemen hemen tek ödün İzmir konusundadır. Buna göre, İzmir bölgesi "özerk" olacak, Yunan işgalinden Müttefik kontrolüne geçecekti. Müttefik subaylarının kumandasında yerli jandarmalarca korunacaktı. Ama bölgenin Türkiye'ye geri verilmesi yine söz konusu değildi. Kısacası, bu gibi ufak tefek ödünler, Ankara Hükûmetinin "Misak-ı Millî sınırları içinde tam bağımsızlık" amacını karşılamaktan dağlar kadar uzaktı. Bu amaca ulaşabilmek için Türk ulusunun uzun ve çetin bir savaş vermesi gerekecekti.

1921 yılında İngiltere, Sèvres andlaşmasını ayakta tutabilmek için yine bütün gücüyle direniyordu. Ama Ankara Hükûmetinin kesin ve kararlı tutumu karşısında adım adım gerilemeğe de başlamıştı. Mustafa Kemal'in her yeni başarısı Londra'nın Türkiye politikasını sarsar. Türkiye karşısındaki Müttefik cephede çatlaklar yaratır. İngiltere ile Müttefikler arasındaki görüş ayrılıkları giderek büyür. Fransa ve İtalya, Türk Kurtuluş savaşını değişik biçimlerde değerlendirmeğe, İngiltere'den azar azar ayrılmağa doğru kayarlar. Yunanistan'da Venizelos'un iktidardan düşmüş ve Kral Konstantin'in geri dönmüş olması, özellikle Fransa'nın Yunanistan'a karşı tutumunu ayrıca etkiler. Fransa ve İtalya, Lloyd George Hükûmetinin aşırı Yunan dostluğunu ve koyu Türk düşmanlığını pek paylaşamıyorlardı artık. İngiliz diplomasisi, Türkiye karşısındaki Müttefik cepheyi ayakta tutabilmek için özel çaba harcamak zorunda kalıyordu. Müttefikleriyle ilişkilerinde İngiltere'nin karşılaştığı güçlükler artıyordu.

Mustafa Kemal başarılar kazandıkça İngilizlerin kendi aralarında da görüş ayrılıkları belirir. İngiliz askerleri ile sömürge yöneticileri kaygulanmağa ve gelişmeleri diplomatlardan değişik biçimlerde yorumlamağa başlarlar. İstanbul'daki İngiliz orduları Başkomutanı General Harington, Birinci ve İkinci İnönü savaşlarının sonuçlarını gördükten sonra, Yunan ordusundan hemen hemen umudu keser. Sèvres andlaşmasını Türkiye'ye

empoze etmeğe Yunanistan'ın gücünün yetmeyeceğini görür. Yunan ordusu konusundaki iyimser raporlara pek güvenemez. Yunanlıların Anadolu'da ezici bir zafer kazanamayacaklarını, kesin sonuç alamayacaklarını savunur. Yunanlıları yenilgiye uğrattıktan sonra Mustafa Kemal'in İstanbul üzerine yürüyebileceğini ve İngiliz kuvvetlerini pek güç bir durumda bırakabileceğini düşünür. Büyük Yunan saldırısı arifesinde General Harington, Mustafa Kemal ile görüşme yolu arar. Böyle bir görüşmeden İngiltere'ye zarar değil, belki yarar gelebileceğini savunur. Ama Harington'un bu girişimi İngiliz diplomatlarınca baltalanır. Görüşme gerçekleşmez.

General Harington'un görüşleri bir ölçüde İngiliz Genelkurmayınca da paylaşılıyordu. Ama İngiliz Hükûmetiyle diplomatları, askerler gibi düşünmüyorlardı. Onlara göre, Yunan ordusu belki başarı kazanabilirdi. Ankara'ya kadar yürüyebilirse Türk ordusu dağılabilir, Ankara Hükûmetine karşı ayaklanmalar patlak verebilir ve Türk ulusal hareketi içten çökebilirdi. Yunanistan kesin sonuç alamasa bile Türk ordusunu adamakıllı hırpalayacaktı. Ordusu bitkin düşünce Mustafa Kemal kolaylıkla boyun eğebilir ve ufak değişikliklerle Sèvres barış andlaşması uygulanabilirdi.

Gerçekte İngiliz Hükûmetinin içinde de görüş ayrılıkları vardı. Kabine'de Hindistan İşleri Bakanı Montagu, Mustafa Kemal ile bir an önce anlaşmak eğilimindeydi. Montagu, Hindistan bakımından kayguluydu. Mustafa Kemal, sömürge halklarını uyandırıyordu. Hinditan'da için için kaynaşmalar başlamıştı. Hindistan halkı Türk Kurtuluş Savaşını destekliyordu. Hindistan aydınları, Lloyd George Hükûmetini sert biçimde eleştiriyorlardı. Bu Hükûmetin aşırı Yunan dostluğu politikasının Büyük Britanya İmparatorluğunun kuyusunu kazacağını açık açık haykıranlar vardı. Kimi aydınlar İngiliz Hükûmetinin Birinci Dünya Savaşına girerken Hindistan'a verdiği sözü tutmadığını, Sèvres barış andlaşmasının verilen sözlere ters düştüğünü anımsatıyorlardı. Anadolu'daki boğuşma uzayıp gittikçe sömürgelerdeki kaynaşmalar artacak gibi görünüyordu. Bu bakımdan Hindistan İşleri Bakanı, vakit geçirmeden Mustafa Kemal ile anlaşarak sömürgeleri yatıştırabileceğini umuyordu.

Ama İngiliz Kabinesi içinde Başbakan Lloyd George ile Dışişleri Bakanı Lord Cuzron'un görüşleri ağır basıyordu. Onlar, Sèvres andlaşmasından büyük ödünler vererek Mustafa Kemal ile anlaşmanın, İngiltere için bir yenilgi sayılacağını düşünüyorlardı. Böyle bir anlaşma, İngiltere'nin, Birinci Dünya Savaşı sonunda kazandıklarını önemli ölçüde yitirmesi, sömürge halkları gözündeki saygınlığının sarsılması demek olacaktı. İngiltere'nin Mustafa Kemal karşısında yenik düşmesi, Büyük Britanya İmparatorluğunun geleceği bakımından daha büyük tehlikeler yaratabilecekti. İlerde sömürgeleri avuç içinde tutabilmek büsbütün zorlaşacaktı.

Onun için "Türk ayaklanması" karşısında dayanmak ve direnmek gerektiğine inanıyordu Lloyd George'lar ve Lord Curzon'lar. Herhalde İngiliz Hükûmeti son Yunan saldırısının sonucunu görmeden gerilemeye yanaşmıyordu ve yanaşmadı.

Temmuzda başlayan büyük Yunan saldırısı Londra'da soluk soluğa izlendi. İzlendi ve sonunda Yunan ordularının Sakarya'da yenilgiye uğradıkları görüldü. Türk Kurtuluş Savaşının bir dönüm noktasıdır Sakarya zaferi. O zaferden sonra artık roller değişmiştir. Anadolu'da inisyatif, Yunan ordusundan Türk ordusuna geçmiştir. Sakarya sonrasındaki gelişmeler, bu dizinin dördüncü cildinde görülecektir.

Bu üçüncü ciltte, yukarıda değinilen gelişmelerin yanısıra, daha birçok konudaki İngiliz belgeleri yer almaktadır. Türk Kurtuluş Savaşının dokuz aylık bir dönemiyle ilgili ayrıntılı bilgiler bulunmaktadır. Belgeler dikkatle okununca insanı düşündürür. Atatürk dönemi üzerine eğilecek araştırıcıların bu belgelerden yeni düşünceler üretebilecekleri umulur.

* * *

Bu dizinin ilk iki cildini, Yüce Makama sunulması dileğiyle, zamanında Cumhurbaşkanlığı Genel Sekreterliğine sunmuştum. Birkaç gün sonra Sayın Cumhurbaşkanımız Fahri S. Korutürk, kendi imzalarıyla bana bir mektup göndermek lütfunda bulundular ve kitapları memnunlukla aldıklarını bildirerek, "yararlı çalışmalarınızı başarı ile sürdürmenizi dilerim" diye buyurdular. Sayın Cumhurbaşkanımızın bu yakın ilgileri beni pek duygulandırdı ve çalışma heyecanıma yüce bir destek oldu. İçten bağlılık duygularımla sonsuz teşekkürlerimi kendilerine sunmayı görev biliyorum.

Türk Tarih Kurumunun Sayın Başkanı Ord. Prof. Enver Ziya Karal ile bütün Sayın üyelerine ve Sayın Genel Müdürüne bir kez daha açık teşekkürlerimi sunmak isterim. Onların anlayışlı desteği olmasaydı bu dizi gün yüzüne çıkmazdı. Kurumun Sayın Başkanı ile Sayın Genel Kurul üyeleri yalnız çalışmalarımı desteklemekle kalmadılar, ayrıca beni kendi aralarına almak ve Türk Tarih Kurumu üyeliğine seçmek inceliğini de gösterdiler.

Çalışmalarım ve özellikle bu kitaplarım dolayısiyle, yurt içinde ve yurt dışında, birçok saygıdeğer kimseden yakın ilgi gördüm. Tek tek adlarını anamayacağım bu aydın kişilerin ilgileri benim için pek değerlidir. Kendilerine ayrı ayrı teşekkür ederim.

Son olarak, kitaplarımın dizgi, baskı, cilt işlerinde emekleri geçen Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevinin bütün teknisyenlerine teşekkürlerimi yenilerim.

Lâhey, 23 Nisan 1979

BİLÂL N. ŞİMŞİR
Türk Tarih Kurumu Üyesi

BELGELERDE VE DİPNOTLARDA GEÇEN KISALTMALAR

A.C.	: Army Corps (Kolordu)
a.m.	: *ante meridiem* (öğleden önce)
Arty	: Artillery (Topçu)
B.M.A.	: British Military Attahé (İngiliz Askeri Ateşesi)
CAB.	: Cabinet (İngiliz Kabinesi Arşivi)
C.B.	: Companion of the Bath (İngiliz asalet ünvanı)
C.G.S.	: Chief of the General Staff (Genelkurmay Başkanı)
C.in-C.	: Commander-in-Chief (Başkomutan)
C.M.G.	: Companion of the order of St Michael and St George (İngiliz asalet ünvanı)
C.P.	: Cabinet Papers (İngiliz Kabinesi belgesi)
C.U.P.	: Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Komitesi)
D.B.F.P.	: *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, 1919-1939. First series. (İngiliz Dış Politikası üzerine Belgeler, 1919-1939, Birinci dizi).
Div.	: Division (Tümen)
D.S.O.	: Distinguished Service Order (Üstün Hizmet Nişanı)
E...	: *Eastern* (İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığı *Doğu* Dairesinin arşiv rumuzu)
F.A.	: Field Artillery (Sahra Topçusu)
F.O.	: *Foreign Office* Archives (İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığı Arşivleri)
—/371	: İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığı Arşivlerinin *General Correspondence* (Genel Yazışmalar) serisi...
—/406	: İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığı Arşivlerinin *Confidential Print* (Gizli Yayınlar) serisi...
G.C.B.	: Grand Cross Bath (İngiliz asalet nişanı)

G.C.M.G.	:	Grand Cross St Michael and St George (İngiliz asalet nişanı)
G.C.S.I.	:	Grand Commander Star of India (İngiliz asalet nişanı)
G.H.Q.	:	General Headquartes (Genel Karargâh)
G.O.C.	:	General Officer Commanding (Ordu Komutanı)
G.O.C-in-C	:	General Officer Commander-in-Chief (Başkomutan)
H.A.	:	Heavy Artillery (Ağır Topçu)
H.C.	:	House of Commons (Avam Kamarası)
H.L.	:	House of Lords (Lordlar Kamarası)
H.M.	:	His Majesty (Zatı Şahane, Haşmetlû, İngiliz Kral(lığ)ı)
H.M.S.	:	His Majesty's Ship (İngiliz Gemisi)
i.e.	:	*id est* (yani, şöyle ki, demek ki.)
K.C.	:	Knight Commander (İngiliz asalet ünvanı)
K.C.B.	:	Knight Commander of the order of the Bath (İngiliz asalet ünvanı)
K.C.M.G.	:	Knight Commander of St Michael and St George (İngiliz asalet ünvanı)
K.G.	:	Knight of the order of the Garter (İngiliz asalat ünvanı)
L.T.	:	Livre Turque (Turk lirası)
M.A.	:	Military Attaché (Askeri ateşe)
M.	:	Monsieur (Bay)
M.C.	:	Military Cross (Askeri Haç nişanı)
M.I.	:	Military Intelligence (Askeri istihbarat)
Misc.	:	Miscellaneous (çeşitli)
M.P.	:	Member of Parliament (Parlamento üyesi, milletvekili)
Mr.	:	Mister (Bay)
N.	:	North (Kuzey)
N.N.W.	:	North - North West (Kuzey - Kuzey Batı)
N.W.	:	North - West (Kuzey Batı)
O.C.	:	Officer Commanding (Kumandan Subay)
O.M.	:	Order of Merit (Liyakat nişanı)
p.	:	page (Sayfa)
p.m.	:	*post meridiem* (öğleden sonra)
P.R.O.	:	Public Record Office (İngiliz Devlet arşivleri)
P.W.	:	Prisoners of War (Savaş tutsakları)

R.E.	:	Royal Engineers
Regt.	:	Regiment
Rt. Hon.	:	Right Honorable (Sayın)
S.	:	South (Güney)
S. Sd. Sgd.	:	Signed (imza)
Sé.	:	Signé (İmza)
Sic.	:	Aslında yanlış
S.N.O.	:	Senior Naval Officer (Kıdemli Deniz Subayı)
S.S.	:	Steam Ship (vapur)
S.S.W.	:	South - South West (Güney - Güney Batı)
S.W.	:	South West (Güney Batı)
Vol.	:	Volume (Cilt)
W.O.	:	War Office (İngiltere Harbiye Bakanlığı)
W.T.	:	Wireless Telegraph (Telsiz telgraf)

BELGELERİN LİSTESİ VE ÖZETLERİ

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
	1921		
1	3 ocak	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDING'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A. TEL. No. 4	3
		Fransa Başbakanı, General Townshend ile Ahmet Rıza Beyi kabul etti. Sèvres andlaşmasının İzmir'le ilgili hükümlerinin değiştirilmesini savunduğu. Townshend de bu yolda basına demeç verdiği.	
2	4 ocak	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ LORD BAKANI CURZON'A. YAZI. NO. 10	3
		İstanbul'daki yabancı misyon şefleri hakkında bir rapor eklice gönderildi. Fransız ve İtalyan Yüksek Komiserleriyle ilişkiler özellikle önemli.	
Ek.	ocak	İSTANBUL'DAKİ YABANCI MİSYON ŞEFLERİ ÜZERİNE RAPOR.	4
		Fransa Yüksek Komiseri M. Defrance Mart 1919'da Mısır'dan İstanbul'a geldi, yakında İspanya'ya atanacak. İngilizlerle ilişkileri iyi. *İtalya Yüksek Komiseri Marquis Garroni* Kasım 1920'de geldi, büyük savaştan önce de İstanbul'da bulunmuş. Mustafa Kemal'e bir ajan gönderdi.	
		Amerikan Yüksek Komiseri Amiral Bristol'un 1919 başlarından beri İstanbul'da bulunduğu, İtilâf Devletleri Yüksek Komiserlerinin fiilen İstanbul'u yönetmelerini "kıskandığı" ve İngilizleri uyarmak ister gibi davrandığı.	
		Yunan Yüksek Komiseri Canellopoulos'un yunan seçimleri yüzünden güç durumda bulunduğu, İtilâf Yüksek Komiserleri ile iyi geçindiği.	
		İstanbul'da Belçika, İsveç, Danimarka, İspanya, Yugoslavya, Çekoslovakya, Polonya ve Romanya temsilcilikleri de bulunduğu, ama bunların pek rolleri olmadığı.	
3	6 ocak	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜSKEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CURZON'A. TEL. NO. 13	6
		Tiflis'ten İstanbul'a gelen ve yolda, Moskova'dan dönmekte olan Bekir Sami Beyle konuşan İtalyan Albayı Bodrevo'nun verdiği bilgiler: Kemalistlerle	

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		Bolşevikler arasında henüz bir anlaşma yapılmadığı, Kemalistlerin İtilâf Devletleri ile anlaşmak için açık kapı bırakmak istedikleri. Kemalistlerin, Afganistan'da bulunan Cemal Paşa'ya bir adam yolladıkları.	
4	7 ocak	DAILY EXPRESS GAZETESİ YAZISI.	7
		1. *Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın "Daily Express"e mesajı:* Türkiye'nin, ulusal sınırları içinde tam bağımsızlık için savaştığı, kapitalist ve emperialist ülkelerin saldırılarına karşı yaşama hakkı istediği. Türkiye B.M.M'nin başlıca amaçlarından birinin de reformlar yaparak halkın yoksulluğunu gidermek olduğu. Bu amaca ulaşmak için yeni bir örgüt kurulacağı. *Gazetenin yorumu:* Milliyetçilerin, İzmir ve Trakya ile ilgili isteklerinde direnmeye kararlı oldukları. Sèvres andlaşmasını kabul etmeyecekleri.	
		2. *Veliaht Abdülmecit Efendi'nin "Le Gaulois" gazetesine demeci:* Sèvres andlaşmasında bazı değişiklikler yapılması isteği: İtilâf Devletlerinin beş yıl için İzmir'i, 25 yıl için de Trakya'yı işgal etmeleri önerisi; Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın da buna razı olacağı, olmazsa devrileceği iddiası.	
5	7 ocak	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKAN YARDIMCISI SIR E. CROWE'UN FRANSIZ İŞGÜDERİ İLE KONUŞMASINA İLİŞKİN TUTANAK.	9
		Mustafa Kemal ile başedebilmek için: i) silahlı savaş, ii) beklemek veya iii) anlaşmak seçenekleri bulunduğu. Anlaşmak seçeneği üzerinde durulduğu. Fransa'nın Kilikya'yı boşaltmayı düşündüğü. Sèvres andlaşmasında bazı değişiklikler yapılabileceği. Sir E. Crowe'e göre, anlaşma isteğinin Mustafa Kemal'den gelmesi gerektiği.	
		Lord Curzon'un notu: Sèvres andlaşmasında yapılabilecek değişiklikler konusunda hazırlık yapmak gerektiği. İzmir, Trakya sınırı, askersiz bölge, kutsal yerler konuları.	

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6	8 ocak	İNGİLTERENİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CURZON'A YAZI No. 31. İngiliz istihbarat servisi İstanbul şubesince hazırlanan bir raporun ilişikte sunulduğu.	11
Ek.	30 Aralık 1920	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ HABERALMA ÖRGÜTÜ İSTANBUL ŞUBESİNCE HAZIRLANAN VE 1920 YILININ SON ONBEŞ GÜNÜNÜ KAPSAYAN RAPORLAR ÖZETİ. GİZLİ. Ankara'ya gönderilen İzzet Paşa heyetinin Mustafa Kemal ile anlaşmaya varamadığı. Kemalistlerin, uzlaşmaz tutumlarını sürdürdükleri, Sultan Vahdettin'in tahttan çekilmesini istedikleri, politikalarını 4 Aralık günü T. B. M. M.'de açıkladıkları, 8 Aralıkta Mecliste gizli bir toplantı yaptıkları. Bu konularda bilgiler. Sovyetlerle ilişkiler. İzzet Paşa heyetiyle görüşmeler. İzzet Paşa'nın İstanbul'a telgrafları. Kemalistlerin öne sürdükleri koşullar. İstanbul Hükûmetinin görüşü. İstanbul basını.	11
7	8 ocak	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A. YAZI. No. 40. İzzet Paşa heyeti konusu. 1. Ankara'ya giden İzzet Paşa heyeti hakkında iki belgenin sunulduğu. 2. Ankara liderlerinin, İzzet Paşa heyetinin amacını halktan gizledikleri ve heyeti, Ankara'ya sığınmış yurtseverler olarak tanıtmağa çalıştıkları. 3. İzzet Paşa'nın İstanbul'a gönderdiği söylenen raporlara göre, Ankara liderlerinin uzlaşmaz tutumlarını sürdürdükleri, Sèvres andlaşmasının kaldırılmasında direndikleri. 4. İstanbul Hükûmetinin ise İzzet Paşa heyetinden haber alamadığını söylediği ve zaman kazanmağa çalıştığı. 5. Heyet hakkında bilgi vermesi için Sadrazam ile Hariciye Nazırının sıkıştırıldıkları.	21
Ek. 1	6 aralık	"ANADOLU AJANSI"NIN BİLDİRİSİ. İstanbul'da zulüm gören ve İngilizlerce göz hapsinde tutulan yurtsever aydınlardan İzzet Paşa ile beş arkadaşının Anadolu'ya katıldıkları..,	23

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
Ek. 2	16 aralık	"YENİ GİRESUN" GAZETESİNİN YAZISI. DOĞU CEPHESİNDEN BİR TEL.	24
		1. İzzet Paşa ile arkadaşlarının Ankara'ya katıldıkları.	
		2. Türk ordusunun Doğuda'ki zaferi. İstanbul kabinesine alınan İzzet ve Salih Paşaların Anadolu'ya katılmalarının kutlandığı.	
8	8 ocak	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ HABERALMA ÖRGÜTÜ İSTANBUL ŞUBESİNCE HAZIRLANAN RAPOR. NO. 102	24
		Türkiye'nin askerî ve siyasal durumuyla ilgili haberler.	
		1. *İstanbul Hükümetinin kontrolü altındaki bölgede* malî bunalım. İstanbul'da Rus göçmenleri. 1894 kurası erlerinin terhisi. Bunların yurtlarına dönmelerine Yunanlıların engel olmaları. Yerli Rumlarla Yunan askerî misyonu arasında gerginlik.	
		2. *Yunan işgali altındaki bölgede,* Yunanlıların Yenişehir ve İnegöl yöresinde saldırıya geçtikleri.	
		3. *Milliyetçi bölgeden haberler:* Ankara Hükûmetinin İstanbul'la anlaşmayı reddetmesi, Yunanlılarla gizli görüşmeler yaptığı haberi. Çerkez Ethem'in Mustafa Kemal'e karşı ayaklanacağını Yunanlılara duyurması. Bu konularda yorumlar.	
9	10 ocak	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN ROMA BÜYÜKELÇİSİ SIR G. BUCHANAN'A YAZI NO. 27	29
		Mustafa Kemal'in Sèvres andlaşmasının Padişah tarafından onaylanmasını önerdiği. Londra'daki Italyan işgüderinin bunu sakıncalı gördüğü, Lord Curzon'un ise öneriyi olumlu karşıladığı.	
10	12 ocak	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A. TEL. NO. 25	30
		Türkiye'deki durumun özeti:	
		İzzet Paşa Heyetinden haber alınamadığı. Türk Hükûmetinin, İtilâf Devletleri Yüksek Konseyi görüşmelerinin sonucunu belkediği. Yeni Yunan saldırısının da İzzet Paşa Heyetinin hareketini etkilediği. 252.000 T. L. tutarındaki Türk altını üzerindeki ambargonun kaldırılmadığı.	

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11	12 ocak	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ GENEL KARARGAHINDAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA. ŞİFRE TEL. NO. 1. 9754 .... Kemalistlerin, Doğu halklarını Batılılara karşı birleştirmek amacı güttükleri, şimdilik askeri harekâta girişmedikleri. Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın, durumundan emin görünmek ve "birkaç oyunu birden oynamak" istediği.	31
12	14 ocak	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ GENEL KARARGAHINDAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL. NO. 1. 9769. .... Çerkez Ethem'in Yunanlılar tarafına geçmek istemesinin Mustafa Kemal ile Yunanlılar arasındaki gizli görüşmeleri kamufle etmek için bir tertip olabileceği. Mustafa Kemal'in İngilizlerle de görüşmek ve bu amaçla İngiliz karargahına bir adam göndermek istediğini söylediği, ama böyle bir kimsenin gönderilmediği. Mustafa Kemal'in "iki yüzlülüğü".	32
13	18 ocak	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ GENEL HARARGAHINDAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL. GİZLİ. NO. 1.9785. .... Mustafa Kemal'in bir yandan İtilâf Devletlerine ve İstanbul Hükümetine karşı Rus tehdidini kullanmak, öte yandan da Ruslara blöf yapmak niyetinde gözüktüğü. Milliyetçilerin, Mustafa Kemal ile İngilizler arasında aracılık yapması için İstanbul'daki Ukranya lideri Addisiovitch'in nabzını da yokladıkları.	33
14	18 ocak	SÈVRES ANDLAŞMASININ YENİDEN GÖZDEN GEÇİRİLMESİ KONUSUNDA İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ GÖREVLİLERİNDEN MR. NICOLSON TARAFINDAN HAZIRLANAN MUHTIRA. .... Fransa'nın, Sèvres andlaşmasının İzmir'le ilgili bölümünün değiştirilmesini istediği haberi. Bu muhtırada da andlaşmanın İzmir'le ilgili bölümü üzerinde durulduğu. Yalnız, İzmir bölgesinin (Ionia) Yunanistan ile gümrük birliği kurmasını öngören ve temel hükümlerden biri olan 76. maddeye yeni bir biçim vermenin güç olduğu. Böyle bir gümrük birliğini Mustafa Kemal'in kabul etmeye-	33

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		yeceği kuşkusu. Yunanistan'ın da İzmir bölgesindeki haklarından vazgeçmeye yanaşmıyacağı. İzmir konusunda Mustafa Kemal'e ödün verilince Milliyetçilerin daha da ileri gidebilecekleri ve başka isteklerde bulunabilecekleri kaygusu. Daha önemlisi, İngiliz emperyalist politikasının bir kozu olan Yunanistan zararına Türklere ödün verilmesinin İngiliz emperyalist çıkarları için de sakıncalı olabileceği kaygusu. Ödün vermeyen sert bir tutum izlenmesinin yerinde olacağı görüşü.	
Ek.		SEVRES ANDLAŞMASININ İZMİR'LE İLGİLİ BÖLÜMÜNÜN YENİDEN GÖZDEN GEÇİRİLMİŞ MADDELERİ (Md. 65-83) .... Andlaşmanın 66, 67, 75, 77, 78 ve 82. maddelerinin olduğu gibi bırakılması. 65, 68, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 76, 79, 80 ve 81. maddelerinde ufak bazı değişiklikler yapılması ve 83. maddenin büsbütün kaldırılması önerisi. *Muhtıra üzerine İngiltere Dışişleri Bakan Yardımcısı Sir E. Crowe'un yorumu :* Sèvres andlaşmasını onaylatabilmek için Mustafa Kemal'e ödün vermenin gerekli olduğu, ancak küçük değişikliklerle Mustafa Kemal'in tatmin edilebilmesinin de kuşkulu görüldüğü. Güçlü ve dost bir Yunanistan'ın İngiliz çıkarları bakımından gerekli olduğu. Yunan Kralı Constantine'in kabul edilmesine karşılık, İzmir konusunda kendisinin M. Kemal'e ödün vermesi istenebileceği, ama bu alanda pek ileri gidilmemesi gerektiği. Gümrük bakımından İzmir'in serbest liman haline getirilebileceği.	36
15	18 ocak	İNGİLTERE'NİN HİNDİSTAN İŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA. No. P. 8769/20.. GİZLİ.. Siyasi İstihbarat Subayı Binbaşı Bray'in hazırladığı bir raporun eklice sunulduğu.	41
Ek.	10 ocak	HİNDİSTAN HİLAFET DELEGASYONU'NUN FAALİYETLERİ ÜZERİNE RAPOR .... (Muhammed Ali Başkanlığındaki üç kişilik Hindistan Hilafet delegasyonunun Avrupa gezisi ve faaliyetleri) :	41

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1. Hilâfetle saltanatı birbirinden ayırma yönündeki belirtiler karşısında, Hilâfet delegasyonunun faaliyetlerini incelemek, Hindistan'daki siyasal durumun dış dünyadaki ihtilâlci örgütlerle ilişkisini araştırmak gerektiği. Muhammed Ali'nin 19.3.1920 günü İngiliz Başbakanı ile görüştüğü. Bu görüşmede özet olarak, Türkiye'ye savaş öncesi sınırlarının sağlanmasının istendiği, yoksa bütün İslam ve doğu dünyasının İngiltere'ye düşman olacaklarının belirtildiği. Hilafet delegasyonunun Avrupa gezisinin başlıca amacının Türk çıkarları olduğu. Ama Türk sorununun, Hindistan'da karışıklık yaratmak için kullanıldığı ve Hindistan'ın bağımsızlığının amaçlandığı.

2. Müslüman dayanışmasını gösteren çeşitli raporlar alındığı. Bunlardan parçalar: Talat Paşa'nın öneririsiyle, İsviçre'deki Türklerin Hind Hilafet delegasyonuyla ilişki kurmaya çalıştıkları. Muhammed Ali ile doğrudan doğruya haberleştikleri. 6. 8. 1920 günü Muhammed Ali ile Talat Paşa arasında uzun bir görüşme yapıldığı; İsviçre'de müslümanlararası toplantılar düzenlediği.

3. Cemal Paşa'nın Afganistan'da faaliyetleri ve Hindistan'la ilişkileri üzerine bilgiler.

4. Hilafet komitesinin Anadolu ile ilişkileri. Muhammed Ali'nin İstanbul'da Hamid Bey, Roma'da Galib Kemali Bey, Paris'te Dr. Nihat Reşat Bey aracılığı ile Anadolu ile ilişkileri bulunduğu. Roma'dan 70 milyon müslüman adına, Mustafa Kemal Paşa'ya bir mektup gönderdiği, Sèvres andlaşmasına karşı İslam dayanışmasından söz ettiği. 17 eylül 1920 günü Muhammed Ali'nin Mustafa Kemal'den bir mektup aldığı.

6. Hindistan Hilafetçilerinin Sovyet Rusya ile "entrikaları" üzerine ayrıntılı bilgiler.

6. Hilafet delegasyonunun İtalya'da faaliyetleri. Muhammed Ali'nin İyaltan Devlet adamları ve Papa ile görüşmeleri, Türk Hükümetiyle yazışmaları için İtalyan diplomatik kuryelerinden yararlandığı.

7. Hilafetçilerin Fransa'da faaliyetleri üzerine bilgiler.

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		8. Hind Hilafetçilerinin gelecekle ilgili planları. Ayrıntılı bilgiler. Muhammed Ali'nin Mustafa Kemal Paşa ile sürekli ilişkileri bulunduğu.	
		9. Hind Hilafet delegasyonunun 1 Şubat-13 Ekim 1920 tarihleri arasında Avrupa'ya yaptığı gezinin günce'si.	
16	20 ocak	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 43	59
		İtilaf Devletleri Başbakanları toplantısından önce Türkiye'deki durumun değerlendirilmesi:	
		1. Mustafa Kemal'e artık "Çete başı" gözüyle bakılamayacağı. Onun Anadolu'daki hükümetinin etkin olduğu.	
		2. Mustafa Kemal'in yakın bir gelecekte parasızlık yüzünden çökmesinin de beklenemeyeceği.	
		3. Ankara Hükümetinin Sovyetlerle ilişkilere önem verdiği.	
		4. Türklere bazı ödünler verilirse, ılımlı milliyetçilerin Batı yörüngesine çekilebileceği, ama kuvvet gösterisine de gerek bulunduğu görüşü.	
		5. Ankara Hükümetiyle Yunanistan arasında yakınlaşma olduğuna pek inanılamayacağı.	
		6. İstanbul Hükümetinin büsbütün Müttefiklere boyun eğmiş sayılamıyacağı.	
		7. Kısaca, Sèvres andlaşması temel alınınca Türkiye'nin durumunun içinden çıkılmaz olduğu. Andlaşmada değişilkik yapılınca bir çıkış yolu bulunabileceği görüşü. Mustafa Kemal Hükümetini tanımak zorunluluğundan da kaçınmak gerektiği.	
17	20 ocak	CİDDE'DE İNGİLİZ TEMSİLCİSİ BİNBAŞI BATTEN'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 9. GİZLİ.	62
		Bir istihbarat raporunun ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek.	19 ocak	MEKKE'DEN ALINAN İSTİHBARAT RAPORU. (KISMEN).	62
		Kral Hüseyin ile İbni Suud taraftarları arasındaki mücadelenin devam ettiği. Biribirini tutmayan raporlar alındığı. Türk milliyetçileriyle doğrudan	

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		doğruya ilişki kurduğunu söyleyen Emir Abdullah'tan alınan bir mesaja göre Mustafa Kemal'in, kral Hüseyin'i İngilizlere karşı açıkça savaşa teşvik ettiği. Kralın kararsız olduğu. Mustafa Kemal'den yana dönerse halife olmak emeline erişip erişemiyeceğini kestiremediği, ama herhalde islam dünyası karşısındaki kendi durumunu düzeltebileceği.	
18	21 ocak	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVİLLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 27 ... "Daily Telegraph" muhabiri Alb. Repington'u kabul eden Yunan Prensi Nicholas'nın, İngiltere uygun görürse Yunanistan'ın hemen Mustafa Kemal'le müzakerelere girişeceğini söylediği. Kral Konstantin'in ise M. Kemal'le müzakereye pek istekli görünmediği. Kral'ın Venizelos taraftarları için genel af istemediği.	64
19	21 ocak	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDINGE'E YAZI. NO. 243. .... Fransa'nın Londra İşgüderinin verdiği bilgilerin aktarılması: Roma'daki bazı Türkler, Mustafa Kemal Paşa ile İtilâf devletleri arasında arabuluculuk yapmağa çalışmaktadırlar. Bunlar son olarak Fransa'nın Roma Büyükelçisini de yoklamışlar ve Kilikya konusunda Mustafa Kemal ile Fransızlar arasında bir anlaşma yapılmasını önermişlerdir. Öneri Fransız Hükümetine de uygun görünmüştür.	66
20	25 ocak	İTILAF DEVLETLERİ PARİS KONFERANSINDA İNGİLİZ KATİBİNCE KALEME ALINAN TUTANAK .... Yunanistan ve Türkiye durumlarının görüşülmesi: 1. Venizelos'un düşmesi, Kral Kostantin'in geri dönmesi ve ayrıca Anadolu'daki Yunan ordularının durdurulması (Birinci İnönü Savaşı) üzerine, ortaya çıkan yeni durum. İtilaf devletlerinin politikasının değiştirilip değiştirilmeyeceği sorunu. 2. Fransa'nın Sèvres andlaşmasında değişiklik yapılmasından yana olması. İtalyan delegesinin de Mustafa Kemal ile andlaşma önerisi. Yoksa	67

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		Türklerin "denize düşen yılana sarılır" atasözüne uyarak Bolşevikleşebilecekleri kayguyu. Mustafa Kemal'le ilişkileri olan Türklerin Kont Sforza'ya verdikleri bir belge.	
		3. Lord Curzon'un, Yunan Kralı Kostantin'in tanınmasını, onun Anadolu'da girişeceği ileri harekâtın önlenmemesini savunması; Mustafa Kemal'i İstanbul dışında Türkiye'nin gerçek hakimi olarak kabul etmesi, ancak Sèvres andlaşmasında yalnız ufak tefek değişiklik yapılabileceğini öne sürmesi. Yunanlılar ile Ankara ve İstanbul Türklerinin de katılabilecekleri bir konferans fikrini ortaya atması.	
		4. Lloyd George'un da Yunan dostluğunu savunması. Mustafa Kemal yüzünden Yunanistan'a karşı izlenegelen politikadan vazgeçilmemesini istemesi. İzmir'de ödün verilmesinin Mustafa Kemal'i tatmin etmeyeceğini, onun aslında müttefiklerin zaferini yenilgiye çevirmek emeli güttüğünü, oysa ki Türkiye'yi yıkabilmenin İngiltere'ye pek pahalıya mal olduğunu, şimdi bundan vazgeçilemiyeceğini ve Yunanlıların Türklere feda edilemeyeceğini söylemesi.	
		5. 21 Şubatta, Londra'da bir konferans toplanmasına, buna Yunanistan'ın, İstanbul ve Ankara Hükümetlerinin çağırılmasına, konferansta Sèvres andlaşmasının esas alınmasına karar verilmesi.	
Ek. A	—	KONT SFORZA TARAFINDAN İTİLAF DEVLETLERİ PARİS KONFERANSINA SUNULAN BİR TÜRK BELGESİ:	77
		Türkiye'nin barış koşulları:	
		1. Türkiye'nin ulusal sınırlar içinde bağımsızlığının tanınması,	
		2. İzmir, Antep, Urfa, Mardin, Edirne ve Doğu Trakya'nın geri verilmesi.	
		3. Azınlıklar için öteki barış andlaşmalarındaki ilkelerin kabul edilmesi.	
		4. Boğazlarda geçiş özgürlüğünün, Düyunu Umumiyenin çalışmalarının Türk egemenliğiyle bağdaşacak biçimde olması.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
Ek. B	25 ocak	PARİS KONFERANSI BAŞKANINDAN İNGİLTERE'NİN (FRANSA'NIN) İSTANBUL VE ATİNA TEMSİLCİLİKLERİNE TEL. ÇOK İVEDİ. .... Londra'da bir konferans toplanmasına, buna Yunanistan'ın, Ankara ve İstanbul Hükümetlerinin de çağırılmalarına karar verildiği.	78
21	25 ocak	PARİS'TE İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDINGE ARACILIĞIYLE LORD CURZON'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDA SIR H. W. TYRRELL'E TEL. No. 59 .... Paris Konferansında İtalya'nın, Kemalistlerin görüşlerini yansıtan bir belge sunduğu, ancak bunun kesinlikle desteklenmediği. İngiliz temsilcilerinin, Yunanlılar zararına Kemalistlerle barış yapılmasına karşı çıktıkları. Fransız delegesinin de Sèvres andlaşmasının kökten değiştirilmesi için direnmediği ve Lord Curzon'un Konferans önerisine katıldığı. Bunların Krala ve Hükûmete sunulması isteği.	79
22	25 ocak	İNGİTERE'NİN WASHINGTON BÜYÜKELÇİLİĞİNDEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI No. 93. .... 1. Yüzbaşı Salter ve Teğmen İsaacs adlı iki İngiliz subayının Kasım 1919'da Sivas'ta Mustafa Kemal Paşa ile görüşme yaptıklarının bir Ermeni Derneğince Amerikan Cumhurbaşkanına haber verildiği. 2. Bu subayların hazırladıkları raporda, Fransızlarla İtalyanların Türk milliyetçi hareketini desteklediklerini gösteren bilgiler bulunduğunun söylendiği ve bu raporun Amerikan Hükümetine verilip verilmeyeceği. *İngiliz Dışişleri Bakanlığının notu:* Samsun'da kontrol subayı olarak bulunan Yüzbaşı Salter'in Mustafa Kemal ile görüşmüş olabileceği, ancak raporunun bulunamadığı. Şu sırada Fransızların Mustafa Kemal'i desteklediklerinin söylenemiyeceği, buna karşılık İtalyanların Mustafa Kemal'e askeri malzeme yardımında bulundukları.	80
23	26 ocak	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDINGE ARACILIĞIYLE MR. LLOYD GEORGE'DAN İSTANBUL	

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		YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'A, ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'E, (Foreign Office'e tekrar). TEL. No. 60.	81
		Paris Konferansının 25 ocak günlü kararları: 1. Doğu sorununu görüşmek üzere 21 Şubatta Londra'da bir konferans toplanacak ve buna Yunan ve Türk hükümetleri de katılacaklardır. 2. Konferansta, Sèvres andlaşmasında bazı değişiklar yapılması konusu ele alınacaktır. 3. Türk delegasyonunda Mustafa Kemal veya Ankara'nın yetliki bir temsilcisi de bulunacaktır. (Bu kararın Ankara'ya duyurulması işi İstanbul Hükûmetine bırakılacaktır). 4. Bu kararların Türk (Yunan) Hükûmetine duyurulması talimatı.	
24	26 ocak	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A. TEL. No. 57	82
		Londra'da bir konferans toplanmasıyla ilgili kararın Sadrazama bildirildiği, bir hafta içinde cevap vermesinin ve ayrıca Ankara ile temasa geçmesinin Sadrazam'dan istendiği.	
25	26 ocak	MR. M. EDWARDS'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDA MR. RANDALL'A. MEKTUP.	83
		Talât Paşa'nın İngiltere ile müzâkereye girişmek istediği, bu amaçla Davidoff adındaki bir adamını Londra'ya yolladığı, İzmir'in Türkiye'ye geri verilmesi halinde Mustafa Kemal Paşa ile İngiltere arasında görüşme sağlayacağını bildirdiği. *Mektup üzerine İngiltere Dışişlerinin yorumu :* İşleri daha da karıştırmamak için Talât Paşa ile müzâkereye girişmemek ve Davidoff'u yalnız dinlemekle yetinmek gerektiği.	
26	27 ocak	İTİLAF DEVLETLERİ PARİS KONFERANSINDA İNGİLİZ SEKRETERİNİN KALEME ALDIĞI TUTANAK. (Kısmen).	84
		Türkiye'nin ve Yunanistan'ın Londra Konferansına çağırılmaları ile ilgili telgrafın İstanbul'a ve Atina'ya ulaştığı. İstanbul Hükûmetinin bu çağırıyı Mustafa Kemal'e ileteceği.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
27	27 ocak	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ GÖREVLİLERİNDEN MR. NİCOLSON'UN PARİS'TE M. VENİZELOS'LA GÖRÜŞMESİNE İLİŞKİN TUTANAK .... Londra'da bir konferans toplanacağı ve Sèvres andlaşmasında değişiklik yapılacağı yolundaki İtilâf Devletleri kararlarının M. Venizelos'u kaygulandırdığı. Kendisine, İngiltere'nin Yunanistan'ı bırakmadığı ve Sèvres andlaşmasında köklü değişiklik yapılmayacağı yolunda yatıştırıcı sözler söylendiği. M. Venizelos'un, Mustafa Kemal'in çılgınca bir davranışta bulunacağı ve bunun da Yunanistan'ın işine yarayacağı kanısında olduğu. İlerde yine Yunanistan Başbakanlığına dönmeyi umduğu.	85
28	27 ocak	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A. TEL. NO. 37. .... Yunan Hükûmetinin Londra Konferansına çağırıyı kabul ettiği. Ancak Yunan Başbakanının, açıkca "âsi" ilân edilmiş olan Mustafa Kemal'in de Konferansa çağırılmasına şaştığı.	87
29	27 ocak	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A. TEL. NO. 59 .... İstanbul Hükûmetinin, Londra Konferansına çağırılmış olmaktan dolayı teşekkür ettiği ve Ankara'ya da hemen telgraf çektiği.	88
30	28 ocak	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVİLLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A. TEL. NO. 41 Yunan basınında düş kırıklığı: Kral Konstantin'in İtilâf Devletlerince tanınmasının gecikmesi ve Mustafa Kemal'in de Londra Konferansına çağırılmış olması üzerine bütün Yunan basınında düş kırıklığı ve karamsarlık görüldüğü.	89
31	28 ocak	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A. TEL. NO. 62 .... İstanbul Hükümetinin, Londra Konferansına çağırılmasıyle ilgili notaya cevap verdiği, Müttefiklere teşekkür ettiği, Konferansa katılmak için gerekeni yapacağını bildirdiği.	90

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
32	28 ocak	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ GENEL KARARGÂHINDAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL. NO. I. 9817. GİZLİ. Londra Konferansına çağırılması üzerine Mustafa Kemal Paşanın Sadrazam Tevfik Paşa'ya telefon mesajı: Türk ulusu adına yalnız T. B. M. M. Hükûmetinin konuşabileceği, İstanbul Hükümetinin Türk ulusu adına konuşmaya hakkı ve yetkisi bulunmadığı.	90
33	29 ocak	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 64. 1. (Türkiye ve Yunanistan'ın Londra Konferansına çağırılmalarına ilişkin) Paris konferansı kararlarının İstanbul'da heyecan yarattığı. 2. Rum gazetelerinin bu kararları "Elenizme bir darbe" olarak gördükleri. 3. Türk gazetelerinin ise kararı memnuniyetle karşıladıkları ve İtilâf devletlerinin Türkiye'ye karşı âdil politikaya dönüşleri gibi yorumladıkları. 4. Milliyetçi eğilimli gazetelerin ise çekingen davrandıkları ve kararları "umut ve kuşku" ile karşıladıkları.	91
34	29 ocak	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 108 1. Londra konferansına çağrı üzerine Osmanlı Hariciye Nazırı Sefa Beyle görüşme: 2. Sefa Beyin konferansa Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın gelip gelmeyeceği konusunda birşey söylemediği. 3. İstanbul Hükümetinin, Sèvres andlaşmasında değişiklik yapılacağını umduğu, Antep, Urfa ve Mardin-in Türkiye'ye geri verilmesini, Trakya'da Midye-Enez sınırının kabul edilmesini istediği, Ermenilere toprak verilmesini kabul ettiği, andlaşmanın askeri ve mali hükümlerinin yumuşatılmasını beklediği, kapitülasyonların da değiştirilmesini arzuladığı, Mali Komisyondaki Fransız temsilcisine güvenmediği ve ayrıca Türkiye'nin nüfuz bölgelerine ayrılışını da istemediği.	92

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		4. Safa Beye Türkiye'nin konferansa büyük iddialarla gitmesinin pek yanlış olacağı yolunda cevap verildiği. İngiltere'nin Türkiye politikası üzerinde görüşüldüğü. Ermeni sorununu ve Türkiye'nin Almanya safında savaşa girmiş olmasını İngiltere'nin unutmayacağının Safa Beye hatırlatıldığı. Osmanlı Nazırının Türkiye'yi savunmağa çalıştığı.	
		5. Türk basınının Londra konferansı önerisini sevinçle karşılamış ve büyük umutlara kapılmış olduğu.	
35	29 ocak	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ GENEL KARARGAHINDAN (GENERAL HARINGTON'DAN) İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL NO. I. 9821 GİZLİ .... Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın kişiliği hakkında derlenen bilgiler: Selânik ve Manastır'daki okullarda çalışkandı. Harbiye'de hararetli milliyetçi oldu. Arkadaşları arasında âsi yaratılışıyla sivrildi. Parlak kurmaylık sınavı verdi. Suriye'den Selânik'e atanınca, 1907'de İttihat ve Terakkiye ve İtalyan mason locasına girdi. Yetenekli bir kurmay subay ve yurtseverdi. Sofya'daki ataşemiliterliğinden sonra içkiye ve kötü alışkanlıklara kapıldı. Çanakkale savaşında Liman von Sanders'e itaatsizlik, Enver Paşayla kavga etti, bir gözünü kaybetti. Veliaht Vahdettin'le Avrupa'ya gitti. Mayıs 1919'da Anadolu'ya gönderilirken kendisine 40.000 lira verildi. İttihatçılar arasında yolsuzluk ile suçlanmamış hemen hemen tek liderdir. İyi bir hatip ve zeki bir politikacıdır, ama belki çok egoisttir. Avrupa'ya meydan okuma umutlarına liderlik etmeye tamamen lâyıktır.	96
36	31 ocak	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 70 ... Londra konferansına çağırılmayı milliyetçi hareket için bir zafer sayan Mustafa Kemal'in uzlaşmaz tutum takındığı. Ankara Hükümetinin Türkiye'yi temsil edecek tek hükümet olduğunu, İtilaf devletlerinin Ankara'ya doğrudan doğruya çağırıda bulunmaları gerektiğini ileri sürdüğü. İstanbul Hümetinin Mustafa Kemal'i yatıştırmağa çalıştığı. Sèvres andlaşmasıyla öngörülen Mali Komisyonun ku-	98

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		rulmasının şu sırada İstanbul Hükümetince kabul edilmeyeceği.	
37	1 şubat	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 71.	98
		1. Ankara Hükümetinin İtalyanlar aracılığıyla İtilâf devletlerine bir telgraf gönderdiği. Telgrafta, Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın Tevfik Paşa'ya çektiği telgraf metninin iletildiği.	
		2. Telgrafta T.B.M.M.'nin Türkiye'nin tek meşru otoritesi olduğu, İstanbul'daki siyasi gurubun ise meşru hükümet olmadığı ve yabancı devletlerle yurdun çıkarlarını müzakere edemiyeceğinin öne sürüldüğü.	
		3. Ayrıca Türkiye adına söz söylemeğe ve barış müzakerelerine girişmeğe yalnız Ankara Hükümetinin yetliki olduğunun ve İtilâf devletlerinin doğrudan doğruya Ankara'ya başvurmaları gerektiğinin de eklendiği.	
38	1 şubat	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 48 ...	99
		Anadolu'daki Yunan ordusu hakkında Albay Pallis-in verdiği bilgiler: sayısı 105 bin olan Yunan ordusu saldırıya hazırdır. Ancak askeri bakımdan Nisan'da saldırıya geçilmesi uygun olacaktır. Saldırı başlayınca Mustafa Kemal'in ordusu ikiye bölünecek, Ankara'nın zaptı kolaylaşacak, ondan sonra da Kemalist hareket çökecektir, kanısı. Çerkez Ethem 1000 kişiyle Yunanlılara teslim olmuştur.	
39	4 şubat	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 76.	100
		1. Ankara Hükümetinin Avrupa devletlerine bir telgraf göndererek Türkiye'nin tek meşru Hükümeti olduğu görüşünü tekrarladığı.	
		2. Ankara delegelerinin Londra Konferansına gönderileceğinin öğrenildiği.	
40	4 şubat	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A ŞİFRE TEL. NO. 54.	101

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		Yunanistan'ın Mustafa Kemal'le ayrı barış yapmağa hazır olduğu yolunda Kont Sforza'ya atfedilen demecin Yunanistan'da tepki yarattığı. Hükümetin haberi yalanladığı.	
41	5 şubat	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKAN YARDIMCISI SIR E. CROWE'IN İTALYA'NIN YENİ LONDRA BÜYÜKELÇİSİ SIGNOR DE MARTINO İLE GÖRÜŞMESİ ÜZERİNE TUTANAK.	101
		İtalya'nın Mustafa Kemal nezdinde gayri resmi ajan olarak Ankara'ya bir subay göndermeğe karar verdiği. Bunun, İngiltere tarafından da uygun görüleceğini umduğu. Sir E. Crowe'un, kişisel kanısı olarak İtalya'nın bu tutumunu uygun bulmadığını, konuyu Lord Curzon'a arzedeceğini bildirdiği.	
42	6 şubat	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL NO. 81.	103
	1.	Ankara Hükümetinin Londra konferansına katılıp katılmayacağının ve katılırsa İstanbul Hükümetiyle birleşip birleşmeyeceğinin henüz kesinlikle anlaşılamadığı.	
	2.	Ankara liderlerinin Türkiye'nin tek Hükümeti oldukları iddiasından halâ vazgeçmedikleri, belki Bolşeviklerle birlikte yürüdükleri, belki de zaman kazanmak istedikleri. Ahmed-es-Sunnisi'yi Halife ilân etmek gibi bir darbeye de kalkışabilecekleri.	
	3.	İstanbul Hükümetinin Ankara'ya yaklaşmak için çaba harcadığı. Padişahın gelişmeleri yakından izlediği ve kendi kişisel durumu bakımından kaygu içinde olduğu.	
	4.	Ankara'daki İzzet Paşa'nın Kemalistleri destekler göründüğünün sadrazam tarafından da kabul edildiği, fakat kendisinden tam haber alınamadığı.	
43	6 şubat	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL NO. 82.	105
		Bekir Sami Beyin Fransa, İtalya ve İngiltere Hükümetlerine bir telgraf göndererek, Türk heyetinin 7 Şubat günü Antalya-Brindisi yoluyla Londra'ya	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		yollanacağını bildirdiği, heyetin zamanında yetişememesi halinde konferansın birkaç gün ertelenmesini rica ettiği.	
44	7 şubat	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL NO. 84.	106
	1.	Londra Konferansına katılacak İstanbul Hükümeti delegasyonunun 12 Şubatta yola çıkacağı, Osman Nizami ve Reşit Paşaların da delegasyona katılalacakları.	
	2.	Mustafa Kemal ayrı delegasyon yollarsa, iki delagasyonun Londra'da bir çeşit uyuşmaya varabileceklerinin umulduğu.	
45	7 şubat	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKABNI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 139.	106
	1.	Mustafa Kemal'in temsilcileriyle "ılımlı" Türk milliyetçilerinin temsilcileri arasında Roma'da görüşmeler yapıldığı.	
	2.	İstanbul'da büyük yoksulluk ve açlık bulunduğu. Durumlarını sergilemek gibi bir yaradılışta olmayan Türklerin, yoksul evlerine çekilip sessisce açlıktan öldükleri. Bu acıklı durumun dışarıdan anlaşılamayacağı.	
	3.	İstanbul'u dolduran Rus mültecilerinin başkentteki yoksulluğu ve ahlâk düşüklüğünü bir kat daha arttırdıkları.	
	4.	Başkenti besleyen Anadolu kapalı kaldığı sürece durumun düzelemeyeceği.	
46	7 şubat	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 146.	108
	1.	Ankara'daki siyasal durumu anlamağa yarayacak birkaç belgenin sunulduğu.	
	2.	İngiliz ajanlarının anlaşmak için Ankara'ya yanaştıkları iddiasının asılsız olduğu.	
	3.	Mustafa Kemal'in Amerikan gazete muhabirine verdiği demeçte Kemalistlerle İtilâf devletleri arasındaki dengenin bulunması için Amerika'dan medet umduğu, Ermenilerin geniş kırım yaptıklarını ileri sürdüğü.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		4. Ankara'da yeni hazırlanan Anayasa'da ulus egemenliğinin esas alındığı, Padişahın durumunun nasıl belirlendiğinin henüz bilinmediği.	
		5. Ankara liderlerinin son telgraflarında, Londra konferansında Sèvres andlaşmasının esas alınmasının açıkça reddedilmediği, yalnız Ankara Hükümetini tek hükümet olarak tanıtma çabası görüldüğü, Tevfik Paşa'ya "Sadrazam" diye hitap edilmediği.	
		6. Ankara liderlerinin kendi aralarındaki ilişkilerin karanlık olduğu, Muhtar Beyin Bekir Sami Beyle değiştirildiğinin söylendiği, bazen Mustafa Kemal'in yerine Fevzi Paşa'nın imzasının görüldüğü.	
		7. Yeni anayasayla kurulan Devlet düzenine Halifeliğin nasıl intibak ettirileceğinin de önem taşıdığı.	
		8. Ankara Hükümetinin Londra konferansına katılmağa hazır oluşunun ilk bakışta cesaret verici görüldüğü.	
		9. Ankara ile İstanbul arasındaki görüş ayrılığının göz boyama olduğu görüşünün yanlış olduğu.	
Ek. 1		MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞA'NIN "UNITED TELEGRAM" ADLI AMERİKAN AJANSI MUHABİRİNE DEMECİ. ...	111
		1. İzmir'in Türk olduğu ve Türk kalacağı.	
		2. Doğu Trakya'nın da Türk kalacağı, Batı Trakya'da plebisitin kabul edileceği.	
		3. Sèvres andlaşmasının tanınmıyacağı, yeni bir andlaşma yapılması gerektiği.	
		4. Ermeni kırımı söylentisinin asılsız olduğu, tarafsız bir komisyonun araştırma yapabileceği, Ermenilerin Türklere karşı geniş kırım yaptıkları.	
		5. İstanbul'un Türk egemenliğinde kalması koşuluyla Boğazlardan geçiş özgürlüğünün düzenlenebileceği.	
		6. Türkiye'nin gelecek politikasının onarım ve kalkınma olacağı. Türk ulusunun bağımsızlık ve özgürlük savaşının insanlıkça takdir edileceği.	
		7. Ahmet Muhtar Beyin T. B. M. M.'ndeki konuşması:	
		— Türkiye'nin ulusal sınırları içinde siyasal bağımsızlık için savaştığı, hiçbir gücün Türkiye'ye Sèvres andlaşmasını kabul ettiremiyeceği.	
		— Türk ulusunun, Fransa, İngiltere ve Amerika'nın resmi olmayan önerilerine iyi gözle bakmadığı.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		— İngiltere'nin Kemalistlerle ilişki kurmak için Giresun'a, Trabzon'a v. s. adamlarını gönderdiği. — Ankara'nın Sovyetler Birliği, Gürcistan ve Ermenistan ile ilişkileri. — Batum'un aslında Türk olduğu, ama buranın uluslararası bir liman haline getirilmesine razı olunacağı.	
Ek. 2	—	MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞA'DAN SADRAZAM TEVFİK PAŞA'YA TEL. (ÇEVİRİ).	114
		Ankara'nın önerileri: 1. Padişahın, bir Hattı Hümayun ile Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisini resmen tanıması. 2. Şimdilik Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisinin Ankara'da kalması, Padişahın İstanbul'da oturması, İstanbul Hükümetinin yerini T. B. M. M.'nin bir mümessilliğinin alması. 3. Bu öneriler kabul edilir edilmez Sarayın ve Padihın emlâki ile memurların maaşları için gereken paranın ödeneceği.	
47	8 şubat	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARİS İŞGÜDERİ SIR M. CHEETHAM'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. İVEDİ. No. 464.	115
		Sèvres andlaşmasında öngörülen komisyonlar konusunda İngiliz - Fransız anlaşmazlığı: 1. Fransa Dışişleri Bakanlığından alınan bir notada, Sèvres andlaşmasına göre kurulacak Maliye Komisyonu Genel Sekreterinin bir Fransız olmasına İngiltere'nin yanaşmadığının ileri sürüldüğü. Bunun doğru olmadığı. 2. Fransızlara, Mustafa Kemal kuvvetlerinin İstanbul bölgesine saldırmaları ihtimalinin belirtilmiş olduğu. 3. Fransa'nın, Gümrükler Genel Müfettişi İngiliz olunca Mali Komisyon Genel Sekreterinin de Fransız olmasında israr ettiği, yeni yeni güçlükler çıkardığı.	
Ek.	7 şubat	FRANSA DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDAN İNGİLTERE'NİN PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDİNGE'E NOTA. ÇOK İVEDİ.	117
		1. Sèvres andlaşmasına göre Türkiye'de kurulacak Müttefiklerarası komisyonlar konusunda Fransız isteklerine İngiltere'nin karşı çıktığı, Mali komisyon genel sekreterinin bir Fransız olmasına yanaşmadığı.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		2. Fransa'nın kendi görüşlerinde direnmek durumunda olduğu. Askeri komisyon başkanı İngiliz olunca da İngiltere'nin İstanbulda güçlü bir duruma geçeceği.	
		3. Londra Konferansı arifesinde Mustafa Kemal'in İstanbul'a saldırması tehlikesi bulunmadığı, Maliye Komisyonunu bir an önce kurmak gerektiği.	
48	9 şubat	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 151.	119
		1. Türkiye'nin Londra konferansına çağırılması üzerine Ankara ve İstanbul Hükümetleri arasında yapılan tel yazışmalarının Kemalistlerce İstanbul'da dağıtıldığı ve Türk basınında yayınlatıldığı. Türk sansürünün göz yumduğu, İtilaf Devletleri sansürünün de bunu önleyemediği.	
		2. İngiliz Yüksek Komiserliğince, Osmanlı Dışişleri Bakanının dikkatinin çekildiği, ama İstanbul Hükümetinin pek bir şey yapmadığı. Mustafa Kemal'in büyük boy fotoğraflarının da İstanbul basınınca yayınlandığı.	
		3. Bütün olayın, Kemalistlerin bir basın darbesi niteliği taşıdığı. Kemalistlerin İstanbul'da bir Hükümet darbesi yapmaya kalkışmak yerine basın darbesi yapmayı yeğ tuttukları.	
Ek. 1	—	SADRAZAM TEVFİK PAŞA'DAN MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞA'YA TEL. (ÇEVİRİ).	121
		1. Hükümeti şahanenin Londra konferansına çağırıldığı.	
		2. Çağırıda Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın veya yetkili temsilcilerinin de İstanbul Hükümeti delegasyonuna katılmasının istendiği.	
		3. Kararınızın beklenildiği.	
Ek. 2	—	MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞA'DAN SADRAZAM TEVFİK PAŞA'YA TEL. (ÇEVİRİ).	121
		1. Türkiye'nin yetliki ve meşru hükümetinin Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Hükümeti olduğu, İstanbul'daki hiçbir kuruluşun hükümet olarak tanınmayacağı.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		2. Yurdun kaderiyle ilgili konularda İstanbul'un, T. B. M. M. ile yabancılar arasındaki aracılığının da kabul edilemiyeceği.	
		3. Türk ulusunun hakları tanınırsa, T. B. M. M. Hükümetinin müzakere önerisini kabul edebileceği.	
		4. İtilâf Devletleri, Doğu sorununu adalet ve eşitlik içinde çözümlemeye kararlı iseler, konferans çağrılarını doğrudan doğruya T. B. M. M. Hükümetine yapmalıdırlar.	
Ek. 3	—	MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞA'DAN TEVFİK PAŞA'YA TEL. ÖZEL. (ÇEVİRİ).	122
		1. Londra Konferansında Türkiye'nin tek bir delegasyonla temsil edilmesi gerektiği.	
		2. Padişahın resmen Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisini, millet idaresinin tek temsilcisi olarak tanımasının şimdi tam zamanı olduğu.	
		3. İtilaf Devletlerinin de İstanbul delegelerini Ankara Hükümeti delegeleriyle birlikte kabul edebileceklerini bildirmekle, konferansa ancak T. B. M. M. Hükümeti delegelerinin gönderilebileceği.	
		4. Bu bakımdan İstanbul'un Ankara'ya katılması gerektiği.	
		5. Bu önerinin reddedilmesi halinde sorumluluğun doğrudan doğruya Padişaha yükleneceği.	
		6. Cevap beklendiği.	
49	11 şubat	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. No. 91 .... General Harington'un Türklere karşı bir Yunan saldırısının kaçınılmaz olduğunu bildirdiği. Saldırının Londra Konferansını etkilemek amacı güdeceği ve zaten güç olan durumu büsbütün karıştıracağı.	124
50	11 şubat	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'A TEL. No. 91 .... Ankara delegelerini beklemek için Londra konferansının ertelenemeyeceği, zaten İstanbul delegasyonunun bir parçası sayılan Ankara delegelerinin	124

No.	Tarihi		Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
			İstanbul yoluyla Londra'ya gelmelerinin daha olağan sayıldığı.	
51	11 şubat		İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 93.	125
		1.	İstanbul delegelerinin 12 Şubatta Londra'ya yollanacakları. Heyet üyeleri.	
		2.	Ankara'nın ayrı delegasyon yollama tutumunu sürdürdüğü. Ankara delegasyonu hakkında henüz kesin bilgi alınamadığı.	
52	11 şubat		İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 161.	126
		1.	Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisince hazırlanan yeni Anayasa metninin henüz elde edilemediği, ama Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın Sadrazama çektiği bir telgrafının gizlice ele geçirildiği.	
		2.	T. B. M. M.'nin, İslamın dini kanunlarını da değiştirmeğe yetliki olduğu yolunda açıklama yaptığına pek inanılamadığı.	
		3.	Yeni anayasanın, Türkiye yönetimini bolşevikleştirmeğe çalıştığını söylemenin abartma olacağı. Aslında ulus egemenliği ile yönetimin bağdaştırılmasına çalışıldığı.	
		4.	"Vekil" sözcüğünün "Komiser" diye çevirilmesinin Avrupa'da, Ankara liderlerinin bolşevikleştikleri izlemini yarattığı. Oysa ki "Vekil"in "Komiser" anlamına gelmediği.	
53	11 şubat		İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 62.	127
		1.	Atina'daki İngiliz Ataşemiliterinin Fransız Askeri Heyeti Başkanı General Gramat ve Anadolu'daki Yunan Orduları Kurmay Başkanı Albay Palles ile konuşması.	
		2.	General Gramat'nın Yunan ordularının Mustafa Kemal'i yenilgiye uğratabileceğine inanmadığı. Albay Palles'in ise aksi görüşte olduğu.	
54	12 şubat		İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN ROMA'DA İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ SIR G. BUCHANAN'A YAZI. NO. 154.	128

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		1. İtalya'nın Londra Büyükelçisi ile bir görüşme yapıldığı. Kont Sforza ile Lloyd George'un Paris'teki görüşmelerinin söz konusu edildiği. 2. İtalya'nın, Üçlü Anlaşmanın da Sèvres andlaşmasının içine alınmasını istediği. 3. İtalyan isteği kabul edilirse Sèvres andlaşmasına elveda demek gerekeceği. Çünkü Türklerin bunu kabul etmeyecekleri. 4. Londra konferansında Ankara Hükümetinin ayrı bir Hükümet olarak tanınması yolundaki Mustafa Kemal'in iddialarının kabul edilmeyeceği. İstanbul delegasyonuna katılmazlarsa Ankara delegelerinin konferansa alınmayacakları. İtalyan Hükümetinin Kemalistler üzerinde nüfuzunu kullanması isteği.	
55	12 şubat	İNGİLTERE'NİN TİFLİS TEMSİLCİSİ ALBAY STAKE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. No. 43. ... 1. Bekir Sami Beyin, Ankara delegelerinin Londra'ya gideceklerini Çiçerin'e yıldırım telgrafla haber verdiği. 2. Telgrafta, konferansın başarısızlığından Batının zarar göreceği, başarısından ise Rusya'nın da yararlanacağının ileri sürüldüğü; Rusya'nın, Türkiye'nin müttefiki olduğunun hatırlanacağı ve konferans gelişmelerinden haberdar edileceğinin bildirildiği ve buna karşılık Krassin'in yaptığı müzakereler hakkında bilgi istendiği.	130
56	12 şubat	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. No. 165. .... 1. Londra konferansına katılacak İstanbul Hükümeti delegasyonunun Tevfik Paşa Başkanlığında yola çıktığı. 2. Mustafa Kemal'i yola getirmek için İstanbul Hükümetinin çabalarının başarısız kaldığı. 3. Bekir Sami Beyin başkanlık ettiği söylenen Ankara delegasyonunun yola çıkıp çıkmadığının anlaşılamadığı. 4. İstanbul delegasyonunun Ankara delegasyonu ile Londra'da anlaşmağa çalışacağının sanıldığı.	131

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
57	14 şubat	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A. TEL. NO. 101.	132
		Ankara delegasyonu hakkında bilgi:	
		1. Bekir Sami Bey daha önce tanıtılmıştı. Cami Bey, İzmir yöresindeki Milliyetçi harekette rol almış, sonra Ankara Hükûmetine girmiş ve oradan Roma'ya gitmiş eski bir subaydır. Yunus Nadi Bey zehirli, fütursuz, Bolşevik yanlısı bir kimsedir. Öteki üyeler az tanınmaktadırlar.	
		2. Delegasyon, 13 Şubatta Antalya'dan yola çıkmıştır, 17 Şubatta Brindisi'de olacaktır.	
		3. İstanbul Hükûmetinin, iki delegasyonun birleşeceği umudunu beslediği.	
58	14 şubat	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A. YAZI. NO. 173.	
		1. Kemalist kuvvetlerin Haçin'i (Salimbeyli'yi) zaptederken kırım yaptıkları. Mustafa Kemal'in, kırımı teşvik etmediği, ancak hristiyanların öldürülmesini önleyemediği kanısı.	133
		2. Yunanlılarla çarpışmaların yeniden başlaması halinde de böyle olaylarla karşılaşılabileceği.	
Ek.	10 şubat	AMERİKAN MİSYONERİ DR. W. PEET'TEN İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİNE MUHTIRA.	134
		Haçin'in zaptından sonra Türklerin kırım yaprıkları. Otuz kadar Hristiyan çocuğun Türklerin elinde bulunduğu.	
59	17 şubat	İNGİLTERE'NİN ROMA BÜYÜKELÇİSİ SIR H. BUCHANAN'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A. TEL. NO. 45	135
		Kont Sforza'ya göre, Ankara delegelerinin yüksekten pazarlığa başlayacakları, ama Yunan askeri İzmir'den çekilirse anlaşmaya yanaşacakları. 17 Şubatta Roma'ya varacak Ankara delegasyonu'nun bir İtalyan destroyerile zamanında konferansa yetiştirelebileceği.	
60	17 şubat	İNGİLTERE'NİN ROMA BÜYÜKELÇİSİ SIR G. BUCHANAN'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A. TEL. NO. 47.	136

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		1. İstanbul Hükûmetinin Roma mümessili Osman Nizami Paşa'nın söylediğine göre, Ankara delegeleri İstanbul delegeleriyle kaynaşmayacaklar; İzmir'in ve Trakya'nın boşaltılmasını isteyeceklerdir. 2. İtalyan Başbakanına göre ise iki delegasyon arasında gizli bir anlaşma vardır.	
61	18 şubat	İNGİLİZ BAŞBAKANI MR. LLOYD GEORGE İLE YUNAN BAŞBAKANI M. KALOGEROPOULOS ARASINDA YAPILAN GÖRÜŞME TUTANAĞI.	136
		1. Yunan Başbakanının İngiltere'ye teşekkürü. İngiliz Başbakanının, İngiltere'nin Yunanistan'a dost kalacağı yolundeki sözü. 2. Yunan Başbakanının kanısınca, Yunan orduları Mustafa Kemal'i ezecekler ve zaptettikleri yerleri koruyabileceklerdir. 3. Lloyd George, İzmir bölgesinin tıpkı Doğu Rumeli gibi ilerde ilhak edilmek üzere özerk hale getirilmesinin düşünüldüğünü açıklar. 4. Yunan Başbakanı, bu konuda Hükûmetine danışacağını söyler ve Yunan askeri çekilince İzmir'de karışıklık çıkacağını öne sürer. 5. Lloyd George, İzmir'i ve Trakya'yı geri isteyen Kemalistlere karşı kendi meşru haklarından vazgeçmemeleri için Yunan halkına güvendiğini söyler. Yalnız İzmir konusunda bazı ödünler verilmesinin uygun olacağını açıklar.	
62	18 şubat	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. 127.	139
		1. Mustafa Kemal'le anlaşmak için Sèvres andlaşmasında değişiklik istenmesinin Yunan basınında tepkiyle karşılandığı. 2. Birçok Yunan gazetesinin kuvvet yoluyla hemen Mustafa Kemal'in hesabını görmeyi savunduğu. 3. Gounaris'in gazetesinde ise Venizelos'un suçlandığı ve Yunanistan'ın Anadolu'da boğulduğunun ileri sürüldüğü.	
63	21 şubat	EMİR FAYSAL'DAN İNGİLTERE BAŞBAKANI MR. LLOYD GEORGE'A. GİZLİ YAZI.	139
		1. Hicaz Kralının temsilcisi olarak kendisinin (Faysal'ın) de Londra Konferansına katılmak istediği.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		Arapları konferans dışında bırakmanın haksızlık olacağı. Hicaz'ın Türkiye ile halâ savaş halinde bulunduğu.	
		2. Kral Hüseyin'e göre Sèvres andlaşmasında dinî sorunlarla ilgili boşluk bulunduğu.	
		3. Arapların duygularını gösteren bir belgenin sunulduğu.	
Ek.	17 şubat	GENERAL HADDAD PAŞA'DAN EMİR FAYSAL'A TEL.	140
		1. Londra Konferansına Mustafa Kemal çağırılırken Arapların ihmal edilmesinin Arap gençleri arasında tepki yarattığı.	
		2. Bu yüzden Suriye'de önemli olayların patlak verebileceği.	
64	21 şubat	İNGİLTERE BAŞBAKANI MR. LLOYD GEORGE İLE FRANSA BAŞBAKANI M. BRIAND ARASINDA LONDRADA YAPILAN GÖRÜŞME TUTANAĞI.	141
		İzmir sorunu:	
		1. Mr. Lloyd George, Yunan Başbakanıyla görüşmesine değinir, Yunanistan'ın İzmir'i boşaltmak niyetinde olmadığını anlatır.	
		2. M. Briand, İzmir bölgesine, Girit gibi özerklik verilmesini savunur.	
		3. Özerk İzmir bölgesinde kurulacak jandarma teşkilâtına değinilir.	
		4. Yunan Başbakanı ile görüşmeye karar verilir.	
		5. Mr. Lloyd George, Mustafa Kemal'in gücünün abartıldığını, Yunan ordularının Türkleri yenebileceklerini söyler.	
		6. M. Briand, Fransa'nın Kilikya'da 60.000 kişilik bir Türk ordusuyla savaştığını, M. Kemal kuvvetlerinin çok iyi olduklarını, Fransa'nın 1000 ölü verdiğini anlatır. Yunanlılar savaşı sürdürmek isterlerse bunun sonunun gelmeyeceğini ekler. Türk-Bolşevik ilişkilerine değinir.	
		7. Mr. Lloyd George, Bolşeviklerin ciddî bir tehdit olmadıklarını, şimdiye kadar Mustafa Kemal'e gerçek yardımda bulunmadıklarını, yalnız propaganda yapıldığını söyler.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
65	21 şubat	İNGILTERE, FRANSA VE YUNANİSTAN ARASINDA LONDRA'DA YAPILAN GÖRÜŞMELER HAKKINDA İNGILIZ KÂTİBİNİN KALEME ALDIĞI TUTANAK.	145
		İzmir sorunu:	
	1.	Mr. Lloyd George, İzmir konusunda söyleyeceği yeni bir şeyi olup olmadığını Yunan Başbakanından sorar.	
	2.	Yunan Başbakanı Kalogeropoulos bu konuda iki belge sunar.	
	3.	Mr. Lloyd George, Ankara delegasyonunun bugün Londra'ya ulaşamayacağını söyler.	
Ek. 1	—	ATİNA'DA YUNAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKAN VEKİLİ BALTAZZIS'DEN LONDRA'DA YUNAN BAŞBAKANI KALOGEROPOULOS'A. TEL. GİZLİ. NO. A. J. 254.	146
	1.	Yunanistan'ın (İzmir'den) geri çekilemeyeceği ve Kemalist orduları dağıtabilecek güçte olduğu.	
	2.	Barışın Türkiye'ye ödün vermekle sağlanamayacağı, kurtarılmış halkın (Rumların) yeniden Türk boyunduruğuna sokulamayacağı, yarım ve ara çözüm lerin (İzmir'e özerklik verilmesinin) kanlı çatışmaların sürüp gitmesi demek olacağı.	
	3.	Londra Konfarensının başarıya ulaşabilmesi için Mustafa Kemal hareketinin Türkiye'ye ödetilmesi gerektiği.	
Ek. 2	21 şubat	ANADOLU'DAKİ YUNAN ORDUSU ÜZERİNE YUNAN DELEGASYONUNUN MUHTIRASI..................	148
	1.	İtilaf devletlerinin kendilerine verdikleri yetki ve görev ile Yunan ordularının iki yıl kadar önce Anadolu'ya çıktıkları, Elen soyunun ve ortak Avrupa uygarlığının beşiği olan Batı Anadolu'ya özgürlük, adalet, sükûnet getirdikleri.	
	2.	İzmir bölgesine 126.000 Rum göçmeni getirilip yerleştirildiği, çiftçiye 20 milyon drahmilik kredi dağıtıldığı, sağlık tedbirleri alındığı; vakıfların, müftülüklerin, kadılıkların kaldırılmadığı, İzmir'de bir üniversite kurulmasına gidildiği.	
	3.	Bu işlerin yalnız başlangıç olduğu, ilerde İzmir bölgesinin doğal zenginliklerinin kullanılması, ticaretin ve endüstrinin geliştirilmesi için çalışılacağı.	

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		4. Yunanistan'ın Yakın Doğu'da Avrupa'nın barış ve uygarlık temsilcisi olduğu, Yunan ordusunun Anadolu'da barış ve özgürlük şampiyonluğu yapmakla kalmayıp Hristiyan halkın özgürlüğü için de bir güvence olduğu, üstelik İstanbul'u ve Boğazları da saldırılara karşı koruduğu.	
		5. İtilâf Devletlerinin, Sèvres andlaşmasından ve verdikleri sözlerden geri dönmeyeceklerine, Türk olmayanları Türk boyunduruğunda bırakmayacaklarına Yunanlıların kuvvetle inandıkları.	
		6. Sayısı 121.000 olan Anadolu'daki Yunan ordusunun, 30-34 bin kişiyi geçmeyen Kemalist orduya karşı ezici üstünlüğü bulunduğu. Kemalistleri darmadağın edebilecek Yunan ordusunun hedefinin, Adapazar-Eskişehir-Afyon demiryolunu ele geçirip bu çizginin doğusuna sapsağlam yerleşmek olduğu.	
		7. Kemalist kuvvetleri dağıttıktan sonra üç tümenlik bir Yunan ordusunun bu bölgeye yeteceği, Boğazların özgürlüğünü korumak için de bir miktar Yunan kuvveti bırakılacağı.	
Ek. 3	21 şubat	YUNAN GÖÇMENLERİNİN YERLEŞTİRİLMELERİ KONUSUNDA YUNAN DELEGASYONUNUN MUHTIRASI. A. J. 250. GİZLİ.	152
		1. Yunan yönetiminin, İzmir bölgesine 126.000 Yunan göçmeni yerleştirdiği, yerleştirmek için epeyce güçlüklerle karşılaştığı.	
		2. İzmir bölgesinde bulunan 35.000 Türk göçmeninden bir bölümünün ise, Yunan Yönetimince Makedonya'ya, Epir'e, Adalara yollandıkları.	
		3. Yunan göçmenlerinin yerleştirilmeleri sırasında sıkı tedbirler alındığı, önemli bir olay çıkmadığı.	
		4. Öte yandan Mustafa Kemal'den kaçan 64.500 kadar Rum, Ermeni, Yahudi göçmeninin de İzmir bölgesine geldiği. Aydın, Nazilli, Akhisar bölgesinde göçmenlere 842.534 drahmi yardım yapıldığı.	
66	21 şubat (Sabah)	İTİLÂF DEVLETLERİ LONDRA KONFERANSINDA İNGİLİZ KÂTİBİNİN KALEME ALDIĞI TUTANAK. (Bu oturumda Türk ve Yunan delegeleri yoktur). ...	153
		1. Mr. Lloyd George, oturumu açar, Ankara delegelerinin Londra'ya gelmediklerini bildirir ve Kont Sforza'dan açıklama ister.	

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2. Kont Sforza, Ankara delegelerinin Roma'da ayrı çağrı beklediklerini, bunları Londra'ya getirebilmek için çaba harcadığını, sonunda delegelerin yola devam etmeğe razı olduklarını, ancak Mustafa Kemal'in, İstanbul delegasyonuna asıl Türk delegasyonu gözüyle bakılmasını kabul etmediğini, Ankara delegasyonu içinde de ılımlı ve aşırı iki grup bulunduğunu anlatır.
3. Mr. Lloyd George, Yunan Başbakanı ile yaptığı görüşme konusunda bilgi verir, Yunanistan'ın, İzmir konusunda ödün vermek istemediğini, ordusuna çok güvendiğini, savaşmak kararında olduğunu söyler.
4. Sforza, Ankara Türklerinin de anlaşmaz tutum içinde olduklarını söyler ve Konferansın, Yunanlılarla Türklere bir çeşit uyuşma empoze etmesini önerir.
5. Curzon, Ankara ve İstanbul Türkleri arasında gizli bir anlaşma bulunabileceği kuşkusuna değinir, konferansta bunların birbirine zıt kalıp kalmayacaklarını sorar. Sforza, iki grubun yine birbirlerine zıtmış gibi görünecekleri düşüncesinde olduğunu söyler.
6. M. Briand, Türkler ve Yunanlılar karşısında Müttefiklerin birlik halinde davranmalarını önerir.
7. Esas konulara geçilir. Karşılıklı konuşmalardan sonra İtilâf Devletlerinin herhangi bir karar vermeden önce Türk ve Yunan delegelerini dinlemeleri ve öncelikle de Yunan görüşünü almaları kararlaştırılır.

Ek. — ROMA'DA BULUNAN ANKARA HÜKÜMETİ DELEGASYONUNDAN İTALYA DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI KONT SFORZA'YA. NOTA. 158

1. T. B. M. M., Türk barışı üzerine Londra'da yapılacak konferansa dolaylı yoldan çağırıldı.
2. Türk ulusunun tek meşru temsilcisi olan T. B. M. M., konferansa doğrudan doğruya çağırılması için ısrar etmek zorundadır.
3. İyi niyetini göstermek için 17 şubat günü Roma'ya gelen T. B. M. M. delegasyonu, burada çağrı bek-

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		lemektedir ve İtilâf Devletlerinin bu çağırıyı gönderecelerini ummaktadır.	
67	21 şubat (Öğleden sonra)	İTİLÂF DEVLETLERİ LONDRA KONFERANSINDA İNGİLİZ KÂTİBİNİN KALEME ALDIĞI TUTANAK. (Bu oturumda Yunan delegeleri var, Türkler yok) ...	158

1. Mr. Lloyd George oturumu açar ve durumu özetler: İki yıl kadar önce Yunanistan, Müttefiklerin çağırısı üzerine İzmir'i işgal etti. Sonra imzalanan Sèvres andlaşması, İzmir bölgesi ile Trakya'nın Yunanistan'a bırakılmasını kararlaştırdı. Ancak, Mustafa Kemal kumandasındaki büyük kuvvetler bu andlaşmaya karşı çıktılar. Bunun sonucu, andlaşmada bazı değişiklikler yapılması için genel bir arzu belirdi. Bu amaçla bu konferans toplandı ve Yunan ve Türk delegeleri de konferansa çağırıldılar. Şimdi konferans, bazı sorular üzerine Yunanistan'ın görüşünü dinlemek arzusundadır. (Yedi soru sorulur).
2. Yunan Başbakani M. Kalogeropoulos soruları cevaplandırır:

(i) *Askeri durum:* Kemalistlerin halen Ermenistan cephesinde 4-5.000, Kilikya'da 10.000 (ve ayrıca 5-7.000 kişilik çete), batı cephesinde 35.000 kişilik kuvvetleri var. Buna Karşılık Yunan kuvvetleri 121.000 kişiye ulaşmaktadır. Bu durumda Yunanistan, en geç üç ay içinde, Mustafa Kemal'in kuvvetlerini yokedebilecek güçtedir. (Bir soru üzerine Albay Sariyannis, Yunan kuvvetlerinin Ankara'ya yürümek kararında olduklarını ve hemen yürümeğe hazır bulunduklarını bildirir).

(ii) *Yunan ordusunun morali* son derece iyidir. Kemalistlerin moralinden çok üstündür. Atina'daki son siyasal değişiklikler (Venizelos'un düşmesi) askerin moralini bozmamıştır. Yunan ordusu her türlü özveriye hazır durumdadır.

(iii) *Kemalist kuvvetler dağıtıldıktan sonra* Yunanistan ciddî sorunlarla karşılaşmayacaktır. Yeni bir Kemalist saldırı olanağı kalmayacaktır. Mustafa Kemal, ulaşım olanaklarından yoksun kalacaktır.

(iv) *Mustafa Kemal geri çekilirse*, o zaman Yunan ordusu, Ankara'nın doğusunda da Mustafa Kemal'i

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		kovalayacak ve yine hedefine ulaşacaktır. Muhtemel bir gerilla savaşından da Yunan ordusunun hiçbir kaygusu yoktur. Yunanistan, 120.000 kişilik ordusuna ek olarak 200.000 kişilik bir ordu daha kurabilir.	
		(v) *Mali duruma gelince*, Yunanistan, kendi olanaklarıyla savaşı sürdürebilir, ancak para sağlanırsa daha çabuk sonuç alabilir. İç politika ayrılıklarına rağmen, İzmir konusunda bütün Yunanlılar birliktir.	
	3.	Fransa Başbakanı Briand, Yunan başbakanı kadar iyimser olmadığını, Mustafa Kemal kuvvetlerinin kolayca dağıtılamayacağını belirtir. Bir kez de General Gouraud'nun görüşünün sorulmasını ister.	
	4.	General Gouraud, Türk askerinin değerinin küçümsenemeyeceğini, Antep'teki deneylerine dayanarak, ayrıntılarıyla anlatır. Mustafa Kemal ordusunun Ankara'ya, Sivas'a çekilmesi halinde Yunan ordusunun ikmal üssünden 600-900 kilometre uzaklaşarak çok nazik bir durumda kalacağını söyler. Doğal bir kale gibi olan Orta Anadolu yaylasından Türk'ü söküp atabilecek hiçbir kuvvet bulunmadığı yolundaki Türk görüşünün doğru olduğunu belirtir. Türklerin silâh ve cephane sıkıntısı çekmediklerini de ekler.	
	5.	Çay için verilen aradan sonra Mr. Lloyd George, oturumu yeniden başlatır, Ankara delegasyonunun yarın Londra'ya geleceğini haber verir ve Yunan Kurmay Başkanı Albay Sariyannis'in görüşünü sorar.	
	6.	Sariyannis, Batı Cephesinde Türk askerinin pek savaşkan olmadığını söyler. Yunan ikmal hatlarının ilerde kısaltılacağını, harekât üssü olarak İzmir yerine Bursa'nın kullanılacağını, Mustafa Kemal'in Sivas'a çekilmesi halinde de Yunanlıların Karadeniz kıyısına çıkartma yaparak ikmal hattını yine kısaltabileceklerini açıklar. Kemalistleri dize getirebilmek için, Avrupa askerî otoritelerinin tahmin ettikleri kadar büyük kuvvetlere gerek olmadığını, Yunan-	

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		lıların Avrupalılardan daha iyi Türkleri tanıdıklarını, Yunan askerinin iyi savaştığını söyler.	
		7. Soru üzerine Fransız albayı George konuşur: Ankara'ya doğru ilerledikçe Yunan ordusunun daha çetin bir direnişle karşılaşacağını, Mustafa Kemal'in talimgâhlarda 40.000 askeri bulunduğunu, birçok Türk subayının durmadan Mustafa Kemal'e katıldığını anlatır. Bursa'nın üs olarak kullanılabileceğini kuşkuyla karşılar, yetersiz kuvvetlerle Mustafa Kemal'in üzerine doğru yürümenin, Ankara'ya doğru ilerlemenin çok riskli bir baht işi olduğunu, Müttefik Komutanlığının da bu görüşte olduğunu söyler.	
		8. Mr. Lloyd George, Bandırma harekâtı sırasında Müttefik komutanlığının karamsar tahminlerinin yanlış, Yunanlıların ise haklı çıktığını söyler. Oturum ertesi güne ertelenir.	
68	22 şubat	İTİLÂF DEVLETLERİ LONDRA KONFERANSINDA İNGİLİZ KÂTİBİNİN KALEME ALDIĞI TUTANAK. (Bu oturumda Türk ve Yunan delegeleri yoktur.)	173
		1. *Türk delegasyonları konusu:*	
		(i) Mr. Lloyd George, Ankara delegelerinin Londra'ya geldiklerini, Türklerin ne zaman görüşlerini açıklayacaklarının öğrenilmesine çalışıldığını haber verir.	
		(ii) Kont Sforza, Tevfik Paşa'nın rahatsız olduğunu, Ankara ve İstanbul delegasyonları arasında görüşmeler yapıldığını, Ankara delegelerinin kendilerini Türkiye'nin tek temsilcileri saymakta direndiklerini, sonunda iki delegasyon arasında bir uyuşmaya varılmış olduğunu açıklar.	
		(iii) Konferansın 23 Şubat sabah oturumunda Türk delegasyonlarıyla görüşülmesine karar verilir.	
		2. *Emir Faysal ve Konferans:*	
		(i) Mr. Lloyd George, Londra'da bulunan Emir Faysal'ın da konferansa katılmak istediğini açıklar ve Arap görüşünün de dinlenmesini savunur.	
		(ii) M. Briand, Faysal'ın konferansa alınmasına şiddetle karşı çıkar. "Fransızları arkadan hançer-	

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		lemiş bir hain ile aynı masaya oturamayacağını" söyler. (iii) M. Lloyd George, Mustafa Kemal'in Faysal'dan daha çok Fransız kanı döktüğünü söyler. M. Briand, Mustafa Kemal ile Faysal'ın kıyaslanamayacağını belirtir. (iv) Faysal yerine Haddad Paşa'nın Arap delegesi olarak kabul edilmesi kararlaştırılır. 3. *Konferans konusunun* geniş tutulması, Türk-Yunan sorunundan başka Boğazlar, Ermeniler gibi sorunların da görüşülmesi kararlaştırılır. 4. *Litvanya'nın hukuken tanınması* yolundaki dileğinin dikkate alınmasına karar verilir. 5. *Kemalistlerin elindeki İngiliz ve Fransız tutsakları:* (i) Curzon, Kemalistlerin ellerindeki İngiliz tutsaklarıyla Malta'daki Türk sürgünlerinden bazılarının değiştokuş edilebileceklerini açıklar. (ii) M. Berthelot, Kemalistlerin elinde 600 Fransız tutsağı, Fransızların elinde ise "binlerce" Türk tutsağı bulunduğunu söyler. (iii) Türk delegasyonu ile tutsak değiştokuşu işinin görüşülmesi kararlaştırılır. 6. Manda yönetmine ilişkin belgelerin ve Versailles konferansından beri yapılan Müttefiklerarası Konferans kararlarının özetle yayınlanmasına karar verilir.	
69	22 şubat	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ HABERALMA ÖRGÜTÜ İSTANBUL ŞUBESİNCE HAZIRLANAN RAPOR. NO. 37. .... İstanbul ve Ankara Hükûmetleriyle Londra Konferansı konuları: 1. Milliyetçi temsilcilerin Londra konferansına çağırılmaları üzerine Ankara ile İstanbul arasında ilginç ve önemli tartışmaların başgösterdiği. Mustafa Kemal'in, T. B. M. M.'nin Padişahça resmen tanınmasını istediği. 2. Ankara'daki İzzet Paşa'nın da Kemalistleri destekleyen bir telgraf çektiği. 3. Sadrazamın ise Mustafa Kemal'in isteklerini reddettiği.	180

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		4. Mustafa Kemal'in konferansa ayrı delegasyon göndermeğe karar verdiği.	
		5. Ankara-İstanbul çatışmasının gözboyama olmadığı. Mustafa Kemal'in, Halifeliği siyasal yetkilerinden sıyırıp Vatikanlaştırmağa ve Saltanatı milliyetçi politikanın pasif bir aleti durumuna sokmağa çalıştığı. Sovyetlerin de bunu istedikleri.	
		6. Konferansta Ankara'nın aşırı isteklerde bulunacağı ve İstanbul'un ılımlı tutumunu baltalayacağı.	
		7. Yunanlıların ise yakında Ankara'yı işgal etmek için bir saldırıya geçerek konferansı bir olup-bitti karşısında bırakmak isteyecekleri.	
70	24 şubat	İTİLÂF DEVLETLERİ LONDRA KONFERANSINDA İNGİLİZ KÂTİBİNİN KALEME ALDIĞI TUTANAK. (Oturumda Türklerle Yunanlılar yoktur).............	182
		Sèvres sorununun tartışılması:	
		1. M. Briand, İzmir bölgesiyle Trakya'da uluslararası bir komisyonca yapılacak nüfus incelenmesini Türkler kabul ederlerse, bu sorunların en iyi biçimde çözümlenmiş olacağını savunur. Bunun Türk delegasyonuna önceden kabul ettirilmesini önerir.	
		2. Mr. Lloyd George, bu nüfus incelemeleri sonuçları ne olursa olsun, bütün Sèvres andlaşmasını Mustafa Kemal'e kabul ettirmek gerektiğini savunur.	
		3. Sforza, Mustafa Kemal'e, "bizim kararımızı kabul ediyor musun?" diye sormayı önerir.	
		4. Lord Curzon bir öneri taslağı kaleme alır. Taslağa, tutsak değiştokuşu konusu da eklenir.	
Ek.	24 şubat	LORD CURZON'UN HAZIRLADIĞI TASLAK. A. J. 258..................................	187
		1. Devletler, aşağıdaki koşullar altında, Doğu Trakya ve İzmir bölgelerinde nüfus araştırılması yaptırılmasına karar vermişlerdir:	
		a) Türkiye ve Yunanistan, nüfus incelemesi sonuçlarını önceden kabul edeceklerdir.	
		b) Sèvres andlaşmasının öteki maddeleri, değiştirilmeksizin Türkiye ve Yunanistan tarafından uygulanacaktır.	

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		2. Ayrıca şu koşullar da vardır: a) Çarpışmalar hemen durdurulacaktır, b) Tutsak değiştokuşu yapılacaktır, c) Azınlıklara güvence verilecektir.	
71	25 şubat	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ GENEL KARARGÂHINDAN İNGİLTERE HARBİYE BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL. GİZLİ. YILDIRIM. No. 1.9885	188
		1. Mustafa Kemal'in, İstanbul'daki milliyetçi önderlere ve illere gizli bir genelge gönderdiği. 2. Genelgede, Mustafa Kemal'in Sovyetlerle ilişkileri üzerinde durulduğu.	
72	26 şubat	İTİLÂF DEVLETLERİ LONDRA KONFERANSINDA İNGİLİZ KATİBİNİN KALEME ALDIĞI TUTANAK. (Oturumda Türk ve Ermeni delegeleri de bulunmaktadır)	188
		1. Curzon, bu oturumda Ermenilerin de dinleneceğini bildirir. 2. Türkiye Ermenileri adına konuşan Boghos Nubar Paşa, Ermeni programının, Sèvres andlaşmasına dayandığını, Rusya Ermenistanı ile Türkiye'nin dört Ermeni vilâyetini birleştirmek amacı güttüğünü, Kemalistlerce işgal edilmiş bulunan bu dört vilâyetin boşaltılması için Türkiye'ye baskı yapılmasını, ayrıca Kilikya Ermenilerinin de Türk yönetiminde bırakılmamalarını, bu bölgeye özerklik verilmesini ister. 3. Erivan Ermeni devleti adına konuşan M. Aharonian, Kemalistlerin Ermenistan'a saldırmakla aslında Sèvres andlaşmasına ve İtilâf devletlerine saldırmış olduklarını, Erivan Hükûmetinin imzaladığı Gümrü andlaşmasını Avrupadaki Ermeni temsilcilerinin tanımadıklarını, Kafkasya'da Türkiye'den kaçmış 300.000 kadar Ermeni bulunduğunu, bunların Türk işgalindeki yurtlarını geri almak istediklerini anlatır, Sèvres andlaşmasının yürürlükte olduğunun ilân edilmesini ister ve bunun Bolşevik propagandasına da bir darbe olacağını ekler. 4. Curzon, Rus Ermenistanında Bolşevizm kurulması, Mustafa Kemal'in Ermeni topraklarının çoğunu iş-	

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gal etmiş olması, İtilâf devletlerinin buralara büyük kuvvetler gönderememeleri yüzünden ciddî güçlükler bulunduğunu söyleyerek, Ermenilerin hangi sınırları istediklerini ve bunu sağlamak için ne gibi kaynakları olduğunu sorar.

5. Boghos Nubar Paşa, Trabzon'u Ermenistan'a katmak istemediklerini söyler. Başkan Wilson'un kararını bilmediği için, kesin bir şey söyleyemeyeceğini ekler. Ahoronian ise, Gümrü andlaşmasıyla çizilen sınır hakkında kaba-taslak bilgi verir.

6. Soru üzerine M. Berthelot, Kilikya'da bir özel rejim kurulamayacağını, böyle bir rejimin Sèvres andlaşmasında da öngörülmediğini, ancak Fransa'nın, "Ermeni azınlığının güvenliğini sağlamağa kararlı olduğunu" söyler.

7. Kilikya'da Ermenilerin azınlık olmadıkları yolundaki Ermeni itirazı üzerine, Fransız delegasyonu, 1914 yılında Adana vilâyetinde 55.000 Hristiyana karşılık 314.000 Müslüman bulunduğunu ve Ermeni nüfusunun dörtte bir oranını hiç aşmadığını hatırlatır.

(Ermeni delegasyonu oturumdan ayrıldıktan sonra Türk delegasyonu oturuma alınır).

8. Curzon, Sèvres andlaşmasında Kürdistan ve Ermenistan ile ilgili hükümler bulunduğunu hatırlatarak Türk delegasyonunun görüşünü sorar.

9. Bekir Sami Bey, Kürdistan halkının Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisinde tam olarak temsil edildiğini, kendisinin T. B. M. M.ni temsil etmekle ayni zamanda Kürtlerin de temsilcisi olduğunu, ayrıca Kürtlerin Türkiye'nin bölünmez bir parçası olduklarını her zaman belirttiklerini, Şerif Paşa gibi bazı kimselerin daha ziyade kişisel saiklerle bağımsızlık isterlerken Kürtleri temsil etmediklerini, istenirse Ankara Hükûmetinin bir plebisit veya inceleme yapılmasına da hazır olduğunu anlatır. Sèvres andlaşmasının 62. maddesinde belirtilen sınırın gerçeklere uymadığını belirtir.

10. Curzon, T. B. M. M.'nde Kürt mebusların sayısını, genel sayıya oranlarını sorar.

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11. Bekir Sami Bey, kesin rakam vermenin güç olduğunu, sancakların istedikleri kişileri seçtiklerini, örneğin kendisinin Çerkez olduğu halde hiç Çerkez bulunmayan bir sancaktan mebus seçildiğini, bunun tersinin de görüldüğünü, ayırım yapılmadığını, esasen Türklerle Kürtler arasında İngiliz ile İskoç arasındaki ayrılıktan daha fazla bir ayrılık bulunmadığını belirtir.

12. Curzon, Ermenistan sorununu açar ve değişen koşullara rağmen Kars, Ardahan ve Gümrü'yü de içine alacak bağımsız bir Ermenistan kurulmasına İtilâf devletlerinin kesinlikle kararlı olduklarını, Gümrü andlaşmasının onaylanmamış olduğu için geçerli sayılamayacağını söyler.

13. Bekir Sami Bey, Ankara Hükûmetinin bağımsız bir Ermenistan kurulmasına karşı olmadığını, onaylanmamış bir andlaşmanın geçerli sayılmayacağı ilkesinin Sèvres andlaşmasına da uygulanacağına emin olduğunu, Türk nüfusunun ezici çoğunlukta bulunduğu Kars ve Ardahan'ın Ermenistan'a katılamayacağını, bu konuda bir plebisite hazır olduğunu söyler

14. Curzon, bu yerlerin elli yıldır Türkiye'ye ait olmadıklarını, savaştan yenik çıkan Türkiye'nin toprak kazanmasının düşünülemeyeceğini öne sürer.

15. Bekir Sami Bey, isteğinin milliyetler doktrinine dayadığını, ama kararı Yüksek Konseye bıraktığını açıklar.

16. Curzon, Yüksek Konseyin karar vermesini kabul eder ve sorunun ayrıntılarının ilerde görüşülebileceğini ekler.

73 2 mart İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'A YAZI. No. 206. 199

Lord Curzon-Tevfik Paşa görüşmesi.

1. Sadrazam Tevfik Paşa, Lord Curzon'u ziyaret eder ve Padişahın Türkiye ile İngiltere arasındaki eski ilişkileri canlandırmak istediğini bildirir.

2. Lord Curzon, İngiltere'nin müttefiklerden ayrı hareket edemiyeceğini söyler. Türkiye'nin İngiltere-

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ye karşı savaşa girmiş ve bu konferansta da İstanbul delegasyonunun boyun eğmiş olmasından yakınır.

3. Tevfik Paşa, İngiltere ile dostluk konusunda Bekir Sami Beyle aynı görüşte olduklarını ileri sürer.

4. Bunun üzerine Curzon, Ankara Hükümetinin Sovyetlerle ilişkilerini ve Fransa ile ayrı anlaşma yapma çabalarını hatırlatır.

5. Son olarak Tevfik Paşa, İstanbul'un mali durumunun umutsuz olduğunu bildirir ve gümrük resimlerinin arttırılmasını ister. Curzon, bunu anlayışla karşılar ve Sèvres andlaşmasının tezelden onaylanması için Ankara temsilcilerinin ikna edilmesini öğütler.

74 2 mart İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ GENEL KARARGÂHINDAN (GENERAL HARINGTON'DAN) İNGİLTERE ASKERİ İSTİHBARAT BAŞKANLIĞINA. ŞİFRE TEL. YILDIRIM. No. I. E. 357. 201

(Türkiye'deki İngiliz casus örgütü "Black Jumbo" nun ele geçirdiği gizli Türk şifresi):

Mustafa Kemal Paşa'dan Londra'da Bekir Sami Beye gönderilen 1 Mart 1921 günlü şifre telgraf: 26 Şubat günlü şifre telgrafınızla sorulan noktalar daha önce açık seçik izah edilmişti. Yine de görüşlerimi aşağıda belirtiyorum:

1. Ekonomik ve mali sorunlarla ilgili noktalar değişmez.

2. Kürdistan diye bir sorun yoktur.

3. Ermenistan ve Gürcistan sınırları bu ülkelerin Hükümetleriyle çözülmüştür, Londra konferansında bunlara değinmeğe gerek yoktur.

4. Tutsak değiştokuşu, barış andlaşması imzalandıktan sonraya bırakılacaktır.

5. Sèvres andlaşmasını kabul etmeniz yolundaki teklif, kesinlikle ve incelenmeden reddedilecektir.

6. Trakya ve İzmir'de nüfus incelenmesi yapılması, bu yerlerin Yunan askerlerince boşaltılması koşuluna bağlanacaktır.

7. Yunanlılar bu yerleri boşaltmamakta direnirlerse, buralardan eninde sonunda silah zoruyla atılacaklarının konferansa anlatmamız gerek.

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8. Güney sınırımız belirlenmiş ilkeye göre çizilecektir ve topraklarımızda bir tek Fransız jandarmasının bile kalmasına razı olunmayacaktır.
9. Devlet borçlarımızı kabul ediyoruz, fakat Türkiye'de yabancı düyunu umumiye kurumlarını, bunların yetki ve ayrıcalıklarını kabul edemeyiz.
10. İzmir ve Trakya'da inceleme bitinceye kadar geçici bir uluslararası yönetimi kabul etmeniz yanlıştır. Altıncı paragraf ilke olarak alınacaktır.
11. Yeniden imzalanacak barış andlaşmasının koşulları belirlenmedikçe bunun adı tartışma konusu yapılamaz.
12. Barış koşulları içinde, mali ve ekonomik maddeler, toprakla ilgili maddelere kıyasla pek büyük önem taşır.

Londra konferansından yararlanmağa çalışırken, aynı zamanda İngiliz onurunu gözetmek gibi gerekçelerle aldatılmaya kesinlikle dikkat etmeniz gerekir. Çünkü barışı sağlamak için İngilizlere görünüşte bazı zahiri ayrıcalıklar tanımak yolundaki görüşünüzü uygun bulmuyoruz. Zahiri bile olsa İngilize ayrıcalık tanımak, milli davamızın ruhu olan bağımsızlığımızı yok etmeğe yetecektir. Yetkiniz milli misakla sınırlıdır.

75 — 9 mart (sabah) — İTİLÂF DEVLETLERİ LONDRA KONFERANSINDA İNGİLİZ KÂTİBİNİN KALEME ALDIĞI TUTANAK. 203

(Bu oturumda Türk ve Yunan delegeleri yoktur).

Yunanlıların Anadolu'da yeniden saldırıya geçmeleri sorunu:

1. Mr. Lloyd George, Yunanlıların Anadolu'da harekâta geçmek niyetinde olduklarını açıklar ve İtilâf devletlerinin Yunanlıları durdurabileceklerini sanmadığını söyler.
2. Kont Sforza, hemen harekâta geçmek niyetinde olan Yunanlıların bunun sorumluluğunu yüklenmeleri gerektiğini belirtir.
3. Mareşal Foch, Yunanlıların büyük başarı kazanabileceklerini sanmadığını açıklar, küçük gösterilerine ise izin verilmesini söyler.

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		4. Lord Curzon, Yunanlıların küçük gösteri peşinde olmadıklarını, Eskişehir-Afyon demiryolunu elegeçirmek istediklerini açıklar.	
		5. Mr. Lloyd George, Yunanistan'ın İtilâf devletlerinden para yardımı istemediğini söyler, ancak kâğıt para çıkarmasına da müttefiklerce müsaade edilmesini savunur. Mustafa Kemal'in de kağıt para çıkardığını ileri sürer. Yunanlıların Mustafa Kemal'e darbe indirmelerinin tam zamanı olduğunu ekler.	
		6. M. Briand, Müttefiklerin, Türklerle Yunanlılar arasında arabuluculuk yapmalarını, ancak bu girişim başarısız kalırsa "ne haliniz varsa görün" demelerini önerir.	
		7. Mr. Lloyd George, Yunan ordusunun Mustafa Kemal'e karşı parlak başarı şansı oranının onda dokuz olduğunu söyler ve Yunanlıların önlenmemesini ister.	
		8. Yunan ordularının ileri yürümelerine İtilâf devletlerinin razı olduklarının 10 Mart sabahı Yunan delegasyonuna bildirilmesi kararlaştırılır.	
76	9 mart (öğleden sonra)	İTİLÂF DEVLETLERİ LONDRA KONFERANSINDA İNGİLİZ KÂTİBİNİN KALEME ALDIĞI TUTANAK. (Oturumda Türk ve Yunan delegeleri yoktur).	207
		1. Lord Curzon, Bekir Sami Beyle yaptığı görüşmeyi konferansa anlatır:	
		(i) *Trakya* konusunda Bekir Sami Bey çok konuşmamış, ama *Marmara* denizi ve *Boğazlar* üzerinde ısrarla durmuştur. Lord Curzon, Marmara kıyılarının Türkiye'ye bırakılamıyacağını söylemiş. (ii) Bekir Sami Bey, *İzmir* konusunda Türkiye'nin istekleri kabul edilirse öteki konularda anlaşmanın kolay olacağını söylemiş. Lord Curzon, Yunanlıların İzmir'de olduklarını hatırlatmış ve savaştan başka yapılacak bir şey olmadığını söylemiş. Bekir Sami Bey Yunanlıların yenileceklerini ve İzmir'den atılacaklarını söylemiş. Bu konuda Türkiye'nin ödün veremeyeceğini bildirmiş. Lord Curzon el sıkıp ayrılmış.	

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2. M. Briand da Bekir Sami Beyle görüştüğünü açıklar. Bekir Sami Bey, İzmir'de nüfus incelemesine razı olduğunu, Yunanlıların buna yanaşmadıklarını, Yunanlılar İzmir'de Türk egemenliğini kabul etmedikçe bir anlaşmaya varılamayacağını söylemiş.
3. Kont Sforza da Bekir Sami Beyle konuştuğunu, Lord Curzon'a söylediklerini Bekir Sami Beyin, kendisine de söylediğini bildirir.
4. Mr. Lloyd George, Yunanlıların İzmir'i boşaltmağa yanaşmayacaklarını, savaşacaklarını söyler. Belki Boğazlar bölgesinde ödün verebileceğini, örneğin Gelibolu Yunanistan'da kalacak biçimde, müttefiklerin, Çanakkale Boğazını Cebelitarık gibi, elde tutup İstanbul'u boşaltabileceklerine değinir. Böylece hem ödün verilmiş, hem de İstanbul yine müttefiklerin kontrolünde tutulmuş olacağını ekler. Kilikya'da da bazı ödün verilebilir. Böylece Mustafa Kemal, "şunu şunu elde ettim" diyebilir, diye ekler.
5. Kont Sforza ve Mr. Briand, İstanbul'un boşaltılması fikrini ilginç bulurlar.
6. Müttefik garnizonlarının İstanbul'dan ve İzmit yarımadasından çekilmeleri, Çanakkale Boğazında müttefiklerin asker bulundurmaları ve tahkimat yapmaları, Yunan garnizonu ile yönetiminin İzmir'de kalması, Anadolu'nun mali ve askeri kontrolünün hafifletilmesi konuları birer görüşme noktası olarak saptanır.
7. Mr. Lloyd George, Anadolu'nun mali ve askeri kontrolünün kâğıt üzerinde kaldığını, müttefiklere para sağlamadığını, anlamını yetirdiğini, bu nedenle bu kontrolün azaltılmasını önerir. Mustafa Kemal'e "ya bunları kabul edersin, ya da savaşırsın" denilebileceğini söyler.
8. Lord Curzon'un Yunan delegasyonu ile, Sforza ve Briand'ın da Bekir Sami Beyle özel olarak görüşmeleri kararlaştırılır.
9. Tutsak değiştokuşu konusuna kısaca değinilir. Lord Curzon, Bekir Sami Beyin, İngiliz tutsaklarına

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			karşılık Malta'daki Türk sürgünlerinin hepsinin salıverilmelerini istediğinden bir anlaşmaya varılmadığını bildirir.	
77	10 mart (sabah)		İNGİLİZ VE YUNAN TEMSİLCİLERİNİN LONDRA GÖRÜŞMELERİNDE İNGİLİZ KÂTİBİNİN KALEME ALDIĞI TUTANAK.	213
		1.	Mr. Lloyd George, Yunan ordularının İzmir'i boşaltmaları üzerinde Türklerin ısrar ettiklerini bildirir ve Yunan delegelerinin bu konuda bu kez son sözlerini söylemelerini ister.	
		2.	M. Gounaris, Yunanlıların Anadolu'dan çekilmelerini isteyen Türklerle anlaşmaya varılmasının imkânsız olduğunu, Sèvres andlaşmasını Türklere empoze etmek için Yunanistan'ın bütün fedakârlığa hazır bulunduğunu ve Kemalist ordularını üç ay içinde dağıtabileceklerini söyler.	
		3.	Lloyd George ile Lord Curzon, İzmir bölgesinde, özerk bir "Vilâyet" kurulmasını öneren bir tasarıyı Yunan delegelerine sunarlar, bu konuda açıklamalarda bulunurken ve bu tasarının incelenip öğleden sonra Yunan cevabının bildirilmesini isterler.	
Ek.		.	İZMİR BÖLGESİNDE ÖZERK BİR "VİLÂYET" KURULMASINI ÖNGÖREN İNGİLİZ PROJESİ.	218
		1.	İzmir şehrinde bir Yunan garnizonu bulunacak.	
		2.	Bölgenin güvenliği yerli halktan toplanacak ve müttefik subayların kumandasında olacak karma jandarmayla sağlanacak.	
		3.	Bölge yönetiminde de nüfus oranları gözönünde tutulacak.	
		4.	Bölgenin başında bir Hristiyan vali bulunacak.	
		5.	Bölgenin adına "Vilâyet" denecek.	
		6.	Bu "Vilayet" Türkiye egemenliğinde, fakat Yunan kontrolünde kalacak;	
		7.	Türk hükümetine vergi ödeyecek.	
		8.	Beş yıl sonra Vilâyetin statüsü yeniden değiştirilebilecek.	
78	10 mart		İTİLAF DEVLETLERİ LONDRA KONFERANSINDA İNGİLİZ KÂTİBİNİN KALEME ALDIĞI TUTANAK. (Türk ve Yunan delegeleri oturumda yoktur).	219

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		1. M. Briand, Kont Sforza ile birlikte Türk delegelerini gördüklerini bildirir. Müttefik önerileri Türk delegelerine verilmiş, ama henüz kesin bir cevap alınamamıştır.	
		2. Mr. Lloyd George da, Yunan delegeleriyle görüşmelerini anlatır. Yunan delegeleri, Yunan ordusunun Mustafa Kemal'i kolaylıkla yenilgiye uğratabileceği inancındadırlar.	
		3. Sèvres andlaşmasının askeri ve mali hükümlerinde bazı değişiklikler yapılmasını öngören bir taslak üzerinde görüşmeye geçilir. (Bkz. Ek). Türkiye'ye bazı ödünler verileceği söylenir. Ancak bunların karşılığında Türkiye'nin öteki isteklerinden, özellikle İzmir'le ilgili isteklerinden vazgeçmesi, Sèvres andlaşmasını kabul edip barışa yanaşması gerektiği belirtilir.	
		4. Sèvres andlaşmasında bu değişiklik önerileriyle hem Türkiye'ye ödünler verilmiş gibi olacağı, hem de, uzlaşmaz tutumdaki aşırı Türklerin yalnız bırakılacağı, hatta belki de Türkiye'de Mustafa Kemal'e karşı bir darbe yaratılabileceği de söylenir.	
		5. Tasarı metninin Yunan delegasyonuna gösterilmeden önce Bekir Sami Beye verilmesi kararlaştırılır.	
Ek.		SÈVRES ANDLAŞMASININ DEĞİŞTİRİLMESİ İLE İLGİLİ ÖNERİLER TASARISI	229
		1. Türkiye aşağıdaki değişikliklerle Sèvres andlaşmasını kabul eder ve uygularsa, Milletler Cemiyetine alınabilecek.	
		2. Müttefikler, Türklerin İstanbul'dan atılabilecekleri yolundaki tehdidi kaldıracaklar, Boğazlar Komisyonu başkanlığını Türkiye'ye bırakacaklar, Kapitülasyonlarla ilgili komisyonda Türkiye'nin üyeliğine razı olacaklardır.	
		3. Türk silâhlı kuvvetlerinin 75.000 kişiye çıkarılmasına izin verilecek.	
		4. Müttefikler, silahtan arındırılmış bölgeleri daraltacaklar, İstanbul ile İzmit yarımadasının boşatılmasına razı olabilecekler, Gelibolu ve Çanakkale'yi işgalle yetinebileceklerdir.	
		5. Mali komisyonda bir Türk üye bulunabilecek.	

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		6. Mali komisyonun hazırladığı bütçe Türk Parlamentosunda değiştirilebilecek, ancak değiştirildikten sonra mali komisyonca onaylanacaktır.	
		7. Türk Hükümeti imtiyazlar verebilecek, ancak imtiyaz anlaşmaları mali komisyonca incelenip karara bağlanacaktır.	
		8. Yabancı postaneler kaldırılabilecek.	
		9. Kürdistan'la ilgili hükümlerin değiştirilmeleri düşünülebilecek.	
		10. Türkiye, Ermenilere bir yurt verecek ve Milletler Cemiyetinin bu konuda alacağı kararı kabul edecektir.	
		11. İzmir bölgesinde özerk bir vilâyet kurulacak, İzmir şehrinde Yunan askeri kalacak, Vilâyetin başında bir Hristiyan vali bulunacak.	
79	12 mart	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ İSTİHBARAT SERVİSİ İSTANBUL ŞUBESİNİN RAPORU. No. 79 .... Milliyetçiler arasında bulunan ve İngilizler hesabına çalışan bir ajanın verdiği bilgiler. Büyük Millet Meclisinin 12 Mart günü yapılan oturumunda konuşulanlar.	231
		1. Mustafa Kemal Paşa, İngiliz-Rus rekabetinin yeni bir döneme girdiğini, İngilizlerin Türkiye'yi konferansına çağırdıklarını ve Türk delegelerinin Londra'ya yollandığını bildirir.	
		2. Bir soru üzerine Mustafa Kemal Paşa, İtilâf Devletlerinin Ankara delegeleriyle müzakereye girişmek niyetinde olduklarını, Ankara'ya çağırının İstanbul Hükümeti aracılığı ile yapılmış olmasının bir şekil sorunu olduğu yolunda İtalya'dan bilgi alındığını açıklar.	
		3. Paşa, Londra konferansından pek umutlu olmadığını da ekler.	
		4. Mustafa Kemal Paşa Sovyetlerle ilişkileri de anlatır. Rusların Anadolu'da bir Sovyet Hükümeti kurmayı arzuladıklarını, bu amaçla Anadolu'daki çeşitli komiteleri finanse ettiklerini, buna karşı gereken tedbirlerin alındığını bildirir.	
		5. Mustafa Kemal Paşa, Yunanlıların 28 Şubatta Afyon cephesinde saldırıya geçecekleri haberinin	

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		alındığını, Türk tümenlerinin güçlendirildiğini, Londra konferansının sonucunun beklenmediğini bildirmiştir.	
Ek.		MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞA'NIN BATI CEPHESİNDEKİ SÖYLEVİ.	232
		1. Aynı gizli kaynağa göre, Mustafa Kemal Paşa 16 şubat günü Eskişehir yakınındaki birlikleri teftiş etmiş ve bir söylev vermiştir.	
		2. Paşa, Türk süngüsünün Türkiye'ye yeni hayat verdiğini, Türk ulusunun hiçbir zaman köle olmadığını ve olamayacağını, İstanbul'un ve İngilizlerin entrikalarının boşa çıktığını söylemiştir.	
80	12 mart	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DENİZ KUVVETLERİ KUMANDANI TUĞAMİRAL R. V. TYRWHITT'TEN AKDENİZ İNGİLİZ DONANMA KOMUTANINA. DURUM RAPORU. No. 199/A. 10.	233
		1. Kafkaslar'da durum: Bolşevik kuvvetlerinin Ermenistan'dan sonra Gürcistan'da ilerledikleri.	
		2. Türklerin Artvin ve Ardahan'ı işgal etmek için Gürcistan'ın güç durumundan yararlandıkları. Kutais'taki Gürcü Hükümetinin Batum'u işgal etmelerini Ankara Hükümetinden istediği. Küçük bir Türk birliğinin Batum'u işgal etmek için ilerlediği, Batum'daki İngiliz vatandaşlarının boşaltıldığı.	
		3. "Yavuz" gemisinin İngilizlere verilmesi veya Haliç'e getirilmesi konusunun tartışıldığı.	
		4. Wrangel ordusundan 100.000 kadar mültecinin Marmara bölgesine yerleştirilmiş olduğu. (İstanbul yöresinde 33.000, Çatalca'da 15.000, Gelibolu'da 29.000 ve Limni adasında 21.000 mülteci).	
		5. Anadolu'ya silah kaçakçılığını önlemek için sıkı tedbirler alındığı.	
		6. 8 Mart günü Romanya kralının İstanbul boğazından geçtiği.	
		7. Beykoz yöresinde çetecilerle çarpışma olduğu.	
		8. Yunan işgal bölgesinden İstanbul'a hayvan ihracının kısıtlanmasının protesto edildiği.	
		9. Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın Batı cephesini teftiş ederek Ankara'ya döndüğü. Milliyetçilerin Batı	

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		Cephesinin, Eskişehirde İsmet Bey, Afyon'da Refet Bey olmak üzere iki bölgeye ayrılmış bulunduğu.	
		10. Ankara'da altın para basıldığının, paraların üzerinde Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın resminin bulunduğunun haber alındığı.	
		11. Çanakkale'de İngiliz askeri bölgesine Yunanlıların sokulmağa çalıştıkları.	
81	14 mart	İNGİLTERE BAHRİYE BAKANLIĞINDAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA YAZI. GİZLİ. Güney Kafkasya'da durumla ilgili bir raporun sunulduğu.	238
Ek.	17 şubat	GÜNEY KAFKASYA'DA GENEL DURUM ÜZERİNE RAPOR. GİZLİ. (KISMEN)	238
		I. *Gürcistan ile Milliyetçi Türkiye arasında ilişkiler.* Gürcistan Sosyal Demokrat partisinin bildirisi:	
		1. Partinin, Kemalist harekete sempati duyduğu, Pantürkist ve panislamist elemanlara karşı olduğu.	
		2. Bolşevizm ilkesine, İtilâf devletlerinin saldırganlığına karşı olduğu, ancak bu devletlerle iyi ilişkiler kurmak istediği.	
		3. Mustafa Kemal Hükümetini Türkiye'nin tek Hükümeti tanındığı, Ankara'nın Türkiye demek olduğu, Gürcüstan'ın Ankara Hükümeti ile iyi ilişkiler kurmak istediği.	
		II. *Ermenistan ile Ankara Hükümeti arasında ilişkiler:* Ermenistan Dışişleri Komiseri Behzadian'dan T. B. M. M. Hükümeti Dışişleri Bakanı Ahmet Muhtar Beye nota.	
		4. Sovyet Ermenistan'ının Anadolu ihtilalini desteklediği, ihtilalci Türkiye'nin arkasında olduğu.	
		5. Ancak, Türk işgali altındaki bölgelerde plebisit yapılmasını ve bu bölgelerin Türkiye'ye katılmağa karar verilmesini Ermenistan'ın doğru bulmadığı.	
		6. Türklerin Gümrü'den çekilmeleri gerektiği ve Moskova konferansında bu sorunun olumlu bir çözüme bağlanmasının umulduğu. Erivan'dan Ankara'ya bir telsiz mesajı.	
		7. Türk işgali altındaki Gümrü'de yağma, şiddet ve öldürme olaylarının sürüp gittiği, kamu ve özel mallara el konduğu, halkın zorla çalıştırıldığı,	

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		silahların teslim edilmesi ve nerede öldürüldüğü bilinmeyen Türk askerlerinin geri verilmesinin istendiği, ülkenin ekonomik yıkıntıya sürüklendiği.	
	8.	Türk askerlerinin Gümrü'den geri çekilmesinin beklendiği.	
	III.	*Genel haberler.*	
	9.	Türk ordusu Kars'a girdikten sonra Ermenilere karşı yağmacılık ve kırım yapıldığı, Amerikan Konsolosluk ajanı Mr. Fox'un Ermenilere yardım ettiği, silah, cephane ve makinelerin Kars'tan Erzurum'a taşındığı.	
	10.	Türklerin Gümrü'den de taşınabilen malları alıp götürdükleri, hergün yüklü 200 develik bir kervanın Sarıkamış'a yollandığı, kasabada kıtlık ve pahalılığın hüküm sürdüğü.	
	11.	Türk ve Ermeni delegasyonlarının Moskova'ya vardıkları, Azerbaycan delegeleri hakkında henüz bilgi alınamadığı.	
82	15 mart	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'A YAZI. No. 240	245
		Lord Curzon-Tevfik Paşa görüşmesi.	
	1.	Tevfik Paşa, vedalaşmak için Lord Curzon'u ziyaret eder. Padişahın İngiltere ile işbirliği ve ittifak yapmak istediğini hatırlatır, ama bunun şimdilik gerçekleşemeyeceğini anladığını söyler.	
	2.	Lord Curzon, İngiltere'nin şimdilik müttefiklerden ayrılamıyacağını söylemekle yetinir.	
	3.	Tevfik Paşa, Trakya'da Midye-Enez sınırının kabul edilmesini ister. Curzon, Sèvres andlaşması kabul edilirse, Trakya konusunda bir istisna yapabileceğini söyler.	
	4.	Tevfik Paşa, Bekir Sami Beyi ılımlı bulduğu için Ankara delegasyonu ile işbirliği yaptığını bildirir.	
	5.	Son olarak Tevfik Paşa, İstanbul gümrük resimlerinin arttırılmasını savunur ve görüşmeden umutlu ayrılmış görünür.	
83	16 mart	İNGİLTERE BAŞBAKANI MR. LLOYD GEORGE İLE TÜRKİYE B.M.M. HÜKÜMETİ HARİCİYE VEKİLİ BEKİR SAMİ BEY ARASINDAKİ GÖRÜŞME TUTANAĞI.	246

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		1. Bekir Sami Bey, Türk delegasyonuna karşı davranışından dolayı İngiltere Hükümetine teşekkür eder, ileride bir anlaşmaya varılacağını umduğunu söyler.	
		2. İngiliz Başbakanı, Türkiye ile eski dostluğu diriltmeyi arzuladıklarına değindikten sonra, Türklerin Musul bölgesinde karışıklık çıkartmak istediklerinden yakınır. Bundan vazgeçilmezse İngiltere'nin de Mustafa Kemal'e karşı savaşta Yunanlılara yardım edeceğini söyler.	
		3. Bekir Sami Bey, Türkiye'nin Musul'da karışıklık çıkartmak niyetinde olmadığını bildirir.	
		4. Mr. Lloyd George, Ankara Hükümetinin müttefiklerin önerilerine tezelden cevap vermesini ister. Şimdilik anlaşmaya varılamadığı için Türk-Yunan savaşının her an başlayabileceğini hatırlatır.	
		5. Bekir Sami Bey, Ankara Hükümetinin tezelden cevap vermesi için elinden geleni yapmaya söz verir.	
		6. Mr. Lloyd George, barış yapılmasının Türkiye'nin yararına olacağını söyler.	
		7. Bekir Sami Bey, Sèvres andlaşmasında değişiklik yapılması için İngiltere'nin Türkiye'yi destekleyip desteklemeyeceğini sorar, Trakya ve İzmir'den başka, mali ve iktisadi sorunlara parmak basar.	
		8. İngiliz Başbakanı, Türkiye'ye şimdikinden daha fazla ödün verilemeyeceğini bildirir. Türkiye'nin, bunları kabul etmezse Yunanlılarla savaşmak zorunda olduğunu hatırlatır.	
		9. Bekir Sami Bey, yine umutlu olduğunu söyler. Ayrıca Kuzey Kafkasya devletlerinin İngiltere tarafından tanınmasını ister.	
84	16 mart	İNGILTERE BAŞBAKANI MR. LLOYD GEORGE İLE OSMANLI SADRAZAMI TEVFİK PAŞA ARASINDA YAPILAN GÖRÜŞME TUTANAĞI.	248
		1. Tevfik Paşa, İngiltere Hükümetinin konukseverliğine teşekkür eder. Karşılıklı barış arzuları belirtilir.	
		2. İngiliz Başbakanı, müttefiklerin önerilerine Türkiye'nin bir an önce cevap vermesini ister. Yunan-	

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		lıların Mustafa Kemal'e saldırılarını önleme olanağı bulunmadığını öne sürer.	
		3. Tevfik Paşa, İstanbul Hükümetinin müttefilkere tezelden cevap verebileceğini, Ankara Hükümetinin cevabının ise gecikebileceğini bildirir.	
		4. İngiliz Başbakanı, savaşın yeniden başlamasını önlemek amacıyla Türkiye'nin tezelden cevap vermesi için ısrar eder, görüşme biter.	
85	17 mart	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 126.	249
		1. Londra konferansında müttefiklerin Türk ve Yunan delegelerine önerilerinin, İzmir'de nüfus araştırması konusu kadar kaygu yaratmamakla birlikte, Yunan basınında olumsuz yorumlandığı.	
		2. Basında, İtilâf devletlerinin Türkiye'yi güçlendirmekten kaçınmaları gerektiğinin belirtildiği.	
		3. Yunanistan'ın düşmanı Mustafa Kemal'e yanaşmağa çalışan Fransa'nın, Yunan basınında sert bir dille yerildiği.	
		4. Güçlü bir Yunanistan'ın İngiltere'nin yararına olacağının söylendiği ve İngiltere'ye büyük umut bağlandığı.	
		5. İtilâf devletleri önerilerini Yunanistan'ın olduğu gibi kabul edemiyeceğinin söylendiği.	
		6. Yunanlıların Mustafa Kemal'i yeneceklerinden emin bulundukları ve saldırıya geçmek üzere oldukları.	
		7. Yalnız bir gazetenin, savaşla başarıya ulaşılamayacağını ve Yunan ordusunun Anadolu'da sıkışıp kaldığını yazdığı.	
86	18 mart	İNGİLTERE BAŞBAKANI MR. LLOYD GEORGE İLE YUNAN DELEGELERİ ARASINDA YAPILAN GÖRÜŞME TUTANAĞI.	251
		1. İngiltere Başbakanı, Bekir Sami Bey ve Tevfik Paşa ile yaptığı görüşmeleri anlatır. Müttefiklerin önerilerine tezelden cevap verilmesze, Yunan ordusunun harekete geçmesinin önlenemeyeceğini söylediğini bildirir.	

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2. M. Gounaris, Müttefik önerilerine Türklerin henüz cevap vermediklerine göre Yunanlıların da hemen cevap vermek zorunda olmadıklarını söyler. Bu arada, Türkiye ile Fransa arasında ateşkes anlaşması yapılmış olmasını yerer, bunun Yunan ordusunun zararına olduğunu söyler. Yunan ordusunun hemen harekete geçmek zorunda olduğunu açıklar ve bunun Türklere boyun eğdirebileceğini söyler.
3. Yunan delegeleri, bir hafta sonra başlayacağını açıkladıkları Yunan taarruzunun nasıl hazırlandığını anlatırlar.
4. Ondan sonra M. Gounaris İngiltere'den mali destek ister. İngilterenin daha önce Yunanistan'a verdiği 16 milyon İngiliz lirası tutarındaki krediden başka Yunanistan'ın kâğıt para çıkarması, yeni operasyonun uygulanması için İngiliz ve Yunan Milli Bankaları arasındaki görüşmelerin sonuçlandırılması, Yunanistan'ın mali güçlüklerine çare bulunmasında İngiltere'nin yardımcı olması istenir. Mr. Lloyd George bunları olumlu karşılar.
5. Mr. Lloyd George, yeniden başlayacak savaşın sorumluluğunun Türklere yüklenmesini önerir. Mr. Gounaris, Türklerin bir tahrikini beklemeyeceklerini, Yunan ordusunun hemen saldırıya geçmek zorunda olduğunu bildirir. Mr. Lloyd George, Mustafa Kemal kuvvetlerinin güçlenmesi karşısında Yunan ordusunun hemen harekete geçmesinin önlenemeyeceğini söyler.
6. M. Gounaris, Yunanistan'a hareket serbestliği sağladığı için Mr. Lloyd George'a teşekkür eder. Mr. Lloyd George, Yunanistan'ın geleceği için umudunu belirtir ve İngiltere'nin kalbinde Yunan halkı için her zaman sıcak bir köşe bulunduğunu söyler.

87 22 mart İNGİLTERE'NİN HALEP KONSOLOSU MR. JAMES MORGAN'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI No. 7 256

Şubat sonunda İzmir'den Halep'e yapılan bir gezi izlenimleri.

1. Anadolu'daki Yunan işgal bölgesinde durumun sakin olduğu, Türk halkının kadere boyun eğmiş

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		göründüğü, Yunanlıların Mustafa Kemal kuvvetlerini yeneceklerine inandıkları.	
		2. Antalya'da İtalyanlarla Türklerin elele çalıştıkları, 200 kişilik İtalyan garnizonunun Türklerden ürkmüş göründüğü.	
		3. Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın Çerkez Ethem, Demirci Mehmet Efe gibi çetelere son verip düzenli ordu kurmuş olduğu, Antalya bölgesinden de gönüllü asker topladığı, Antalya'da 1000'den fazla kişinin gönüllü yazıldığı, kadınların bile gönüllü asker olmak istedikleri, İtalyanların Türklere asker elbisesi sağladıkları.	
		4. Gündüz sakin görünen Mersin'de güneş batar batmaz Fransız askerlerine ateş edilmeğe başlandığı, İskenderun limanının canlı olduğu.	
		5. Halep'teki Fransız komutanı General de Lamothe un kanısınca Mustafa Kemal bu yıl çok daha güçlüdür, Yunanlıları kolayca yenebilecektir. Her ne pahasına olursa olsun Kemalistlerle barış yapmak gerekmektedir.	
88	23 mart	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. No. 292.	260
		Rumbold - Sefa Bey görüşmesi:	
		1. İngiliz Yüksek Komiseri, Osmanlı Hariciye Nazırı Sefa Beyi ziyaret eder. Londra konferansında Türkiye'nin isteklerinin büyük ölçüde tatmin edilmiş olduğunu, bu ödünün İngiltere'nin desteğiyle verildiğini, İngiltere'nin gerçekten barış istediğini öne sürer.	
		2. Sefa Bey, İngiltere'nin desteğine Türkiye'nin muhtaç olduğunu, Türk hükümetinin de eski dostluğu canlandırmak istediğini, ancak entrikaların bu ilişkilere zarar vermemesi gerektiğini söyler.	
		3. Londra Konferansı önerileri konusunda Sefa Bey iki noktaya değinir: yeni rejiminde İzmir'e bir Yunan Vali atanmamasını ve İstanbul şehrinin Boğazlar bölgesi dışında tutulmasını ister.	
		4. Sefa Bey, Bekir Sami Bey ile İtalyanlar arasında yapılan andlaşmadan kaygu duyduğunu da söyler.	

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		5. İngiliz Yüksek komiserinin edindiği izlenime göre, Sefa Bey Londra konferansı sonuçlarından memnundur, İstanbul Hükümeti Trakya sorununu ortaya atıp güçlük çıkaracak gibi görünmemektedir.	
		6. İzmir bölgesinde Yunanlıların kendilerine güvenleri olduğu, Fransızların ise Kemalist direnişi karşısında şaşırmış kalmış oldukları, bu yüzden Kemalistlerle ateşkes anlaşması yaptıkları, kendileri başarı gösteremedikleri için Yunanlıların da yenileceklerini ileri sürdülkeri.	
89	23 mart	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 300, ...	262
		1. İngiliz Yüksek Komiseri 21 Mart günü Padişah tarafından kabul edildiğini, iki saat 15 dakika süren bir görüşme yaptığını anlatır. Görüşmede, İngiliz tercümanı Ryan'dan başka kimse bulunmamıştır. Padişaha bir muhtıra sunulmuştur.	
		2. Padişah, Ankara liderlerini İngiliz Yüksek Komiserine şikayet eder. Ocak ayında Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın Tevfik Paşaya gönderdiği üç telgrafı gösterir. Ankara liderlerinin tahtı tehlikeye sokmaya, kendisinin (Padişahın) otoritesini azaltmağa kalkıştıklarını söyler.	
		3. İngiliz Yüksek Komiseri Padişahın sözlerine katılır ve Türkiye'nin Padişah etrafında birleşmesini istediklerini söyler.	
		4. Padişah, teşekkür eder; Anadolu'da bir avuç eşkiyanın kuvvetlendiğini, 16 bin subay tarafından desteklendiğini, Bekir Sami Beyin makul bir kimse olduğunu, onu Londra'ya gönderenlerin ise şovenist olduklarını söyler.	
		5. Sultan Vahdettin, Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın Türk olmadığını, yanındakilerin de Türk olmadıklarını öne sürer. Bu eşkiyalar karşısında İstanbul Hükümetinin güçsüz kaldığını söyler.	
		6. İngiliz Yüksek Komiseri, dünya gerçeklerini kendilerine göstermek için Ankara temsilcilerinin Londra konferansına çağırıldıklarını, dağ başındaki bu insanların gerçeklerden uzak kaldıklarını öne sürer.	

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7. Padişah, Mustafa Kemal'i iyi tanıdığını, yirmi otuz yıl Londra'da kalsa bile değişmeyeceğini söyler. Ankara liderlerinin Londra konferansı önerilerini kabul etmeyeceklerini, hareketlerini sürdüreceklerini belirtir ve "kurt puslu havayı sever" der.

8. Sultan Vahdettin, elindeki notlara bakarak Saltanat ve Halifelik hakkındaki görüş ve kaygularını özetle şöyle sıralar:

   i) Ankara liderleri zoraki bir halife ilan edebilirler.

   ii) Hanedan üyelerinden birini tahta çıkarabilirler.

   iii) Saltanatla Halifelik bölünmez bir bütün olduğu halde Ankara liderleri bütün dünyevi yetkileri kendi ellerinde toplamak istemektedirler.

   iv) Halifeliğin İstanbul'dan doğuya kaydırılması felâketli sonuçlar doğurur, çünkü Halifelik, "puslu havayı seven kurtların" elinde bir alet olur.

   v) Mali durum İstanbul Hükümetini güçsüz bırakmaktadır ve memurlar yoksulluk yüzünden Anadolu'ya geçmektedirler.

9. Sir H. Rumbold, mali durumun iyileşmesi için askıdaki bazı sorunların çözümlenmesi gerektiğini söyler. Tütün Rejisi, Telgraf Kumpanyası, Gümrükler gibi konulara değinir.

10. Padişah, gümrükler konusundaki anlaşmazlığın giderilebileceğini söyler, parasızlık sorununa yine parmak basar.

11. Vahdettin son olarak, kendisinin büsbütün çaresiz ve yapayalnız olduğunu, ancak onurunu, tahtının çıkarlarını bir avuç âsiye teslim etmek istemediğini söyler.

90 — 23 mart — İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 134. — 267

1. Yunan Harbiye Bakanının Anadolu'da saldırıya geçmek üzere olduklarını bildirdiği ve Mr. Lloyd George'un Yunan harekâtını desteklemesine memnun olduğu.

No. Tarihi Kimden kime Yazıldığı ve Özü Sayfa

2. Yunanistan'da seferberlik ilânının pek heyecan yaratmadığı. Venizelos yanlılarının kuşkulu ve kaygılı oldukları, bu saldırının nereye varacağını, paranın nereden bulunacağını sordukları.

3. Görünüşün kaygı verici olduğu. Fransız askerî heyetine göre Yunanlıların Mustafa Kemal'i ezemeyecekleri, savaşın uzun ve yıkıcı olabileceği, İngiltere'nin de Yunanistan'ı yüreklendirmiş olmakla suçlanacağı. Öte yandan Yunanlıları durdurmanın pek haksız olacağı. Belki Türklerin frenlenebileceği.

91 23 mart İNGİLİZ GİZLİ İSTİHBARAT SERVİSİ İSTANBUL ŞUBESİNCE HAZIRLANAN RAPOR. NO. 137. 269

1. İzzet Paşa heyetinin birdenbire Ankara'dan İstanbul'a döndüğü. Çeşitli söylentiler dolaştığı. Heyet üyelerinden Fatin Efendiyle yapılan konuşma.

2. Fatin Efendiye göre, Heyetin dönüşünün amacı, Mustafa Kemal'in aşağıdaki programını Padişaha kabul ettirmektir:

i) Padişah, T. B. M. M.'ni resmen tanıyacaktır.

ii) Padişah İstanbul'da oturacak, Hükümet Ankara'da olacaktır.

iii) Bunların kabul edilmesi halinde Milliyetçiler yeni seçime gidilmesi ve bir "Kurucu Meclis" toplanmasını önermektedirler.

3. Bu planın Bolşeviklere danışılarak hazılrandığı iddiası.

4. Ölmeden önce Talat Paşa'nın monarşist Ruslarla ilişki kurmağa kalkıştığı, Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın bunu uygun bulmadığı.
Enver Paşa'nın Moskova'daki faaliyetini Mustafa Kemal'in uygun bulduğu.

92 26 mart İSTANBUL'DA GENERAL HARINGTON'DAN İNGİLTERE HARBİYE BAKANLIĞINA. ŞİFRE TEL. GİZLİ. NO. 99. 270

1. Bütün İngiliz tutsakları Türklerin elinden teslim alınmadan Malta'daki Türk sürgünlerinin serbest bırakılmamasının istendiği.

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		2. Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın Bekir Sami Beyin taahhütlerine uymayacağı. Önce İngiliz tutsaklarını bir Karadeniz limanında teslim etmesi gerektiği.	
93	31 mart	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 148.	271
		1. Yunan Başbakanının Londra Konferansından döndüğü ve diplomatik zafer kazanmış olarak karşılandığı.	
		2. Yunan kabinesinde değişiklik beklendiği.	
		3. Atina'da, Afyonkarahisar'ın alındığı yolunda haber çıkarıldığı, büyük sevinç görüldüğü, sonradan haberin doğru olmadığının anlaşıldığı.	
		4. Şimdi, Eskişehir'in ele geçirilmek üzere olduğunun söylenip yazıldığı.	
		5. Yunanistan'da üç kuranın askere alınması konusunda henüz güvenilir bilgi elde edilemediği.	
		6. Kralın cepheye gideceğinin söylendiği.	
		7. Cephede başarı haberlerinin Yunanlıların iştahını kabarttığı ve Yunan gazetelerinin artık Sèvres andlaşmasının Yunanistan lehine değiştirilmesinden söz ettikleri, açıkça İstanbul'un da söz konusu edildiği.	
		8. Bulgarlarla Sırpların Yunanistan'a saldırma ihtimalinin Yunanlıları sinirlendirdiği. Gelibolu yarımadasındaki Wrangel askerlerinin de aç kalınca Trakya'ya yayılma ihtimalinden Yunanlıların kaygı duydukları.	
		7. İtalya'nın Mustafa Kemal'e yardım etmekle suçlandığı. Atinadaki İtalya Elçiliğinin bu haberleri yalanladığı.	
94	5 nisan	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 339:	274
		1. Bursa cephesinde, İnönü'de Yunan kuvvetlerinin yenilgiye uğradıkları, beşbin kadar zayiat verip geri çekilmek zorunda kaldıkları.	
		2. Yunan Yüksek Komiserinin de bunu kabul ettiği, İtalya ile Fransa'yı Kemalistlere yardım etmekle	

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suçladığı, Fransa Yüksek Komiserinin bu hikâyeyi yalanladığı.

3. Yunan yenilgisinin nedenlerinden birinin Türklerin bu savaşta altı inç'lik Howitzers topları kullanmaları olduğu. Bir başka nedenin de Venizelos yanlısı oldukları gerekçesiyle yetenekli Yunan subaylarının yerlerine beceriksiz subaylar getirilmiş olmasının gösterildiği.

4. Askeri uzmanların kanısınca, Yunanlıların yeniden saldırıya geçmelerinin güç olacağı.

5. İstanbul Hükümetinin seyirci kaldığı, Türkiye ile savaşan Yunanistan'ın, İstanbul Hükümetiyle savaş halinde olmadığı. Rum Patrikhanesi Yunan ordusuna başarı dilerken, Eyüb camiinde de Kemalist orduların zaferi için dua edildiği ve son akşam, Türk zaferi şerefine bütün camilerin ışıklandırıldığı.

6. Bu durumun Devletler Hukuku bakımından da çeşitli sorunlar yarattığı.

95 5 nisan İNGİLİZ GİZLİ İSTİHBARAT SERVİSİNCE HAZIRLANAN RAPOR. NO. 151 (KISMEN) 276

Bolşevik-Kemalist ilişkileri.

Moskova'da bulunan Enver Paşa'nın bir mektubunun görüldüğü. Buna göre, Ankara delegelerinin Londra konferansına katılmalarından dolayı Çiçerin'in Mustafa Kemal'e sitem etmiş ve Sovyet silâh yardımının durdurulabileceğini söylemiş olduğu. Mustafa Kemal'in ise asıl silâh yokluğu yüzünden Türklerin Londra Konferansına katılmak zorunda kaldıkları yolunda cevap vermiş bulunduğu.

96 7 nisan İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A. YAZI. NO. 160. 277

1. Yunan bağımsızlığının yüzüncü yıldönümünün, Yunan ordusunun Anadolu'daki yenilgi günlerine (ikinci İnönü yenilgisi) rastlandığı ve Atina'da sevinçle kutlanamadığı. Kemalistlerin Afyonkarahisar'a da yürümelerinden korkulduğu.

2. Öteyandan güçlendirilecek Yunan ordusunun Türkleri yenilgiye uğratabileceği yolunda bir iyimserlik

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		de bulunduğu, yeniden 45.000 kişinin askere alınacağının açıklandığı.	
		3. Hükûmet yanlısı Atina gazetelerinin Fransızlara saldırdıkları, Fransız elçisinin bu kampanyayı protesto ettiği. Suçlamalara karşı İtalyan elçisinin de bir yalanlama yayınladığı.	
97	11 nisan	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ HABERALMA ÖRGÜTÜ İSTANBUL ŞUBESİNCE HAZIRLANAN RAPOR. NO. 196 (KISMEN).	278
		Şeyh Sünnisi hakkında haberler.	
		1. Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın Şeyh Sünnisi'yi propaganda için Arabistan'a ve Irak'a göndereceği söylentisi.	
		2. Şeyhin durmadan Anadolu içinde dolaştığı.	
		3. Başka bir habere göre ise Mustafa Kemal'in Şeyhi Arabistan'a yollamaktan caydığı, Irak'a yollamayı düşündüğü.	
		4. Şeyh Sünnisi'nin Hicaz'a ve Asir'e sokulmayacağının da haber verildiği.	
		Not: "Times" gazetesinin 21 nisan günlü sayısında, Şeyh Sünnisi'nin Ankara Meclisince Irak tahtına atandığı ve Musul'a gittiği yolunda bir haber görüldüğü.	
98	12 nisan	OSMANLI DÜYUNU UMUMİYE MECLİSİ BAŞKANI ADAM BLOCK'TAN İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'A YAZI. NO. 4/50.	280
		Kemalist Hükûmetinin malî durumu hakkında hazırlanan bir raporun ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek.	9 nisan	"KEMALİST ANADOLU'NUN DURUMU. 1336 (1920-1921) MALÎ YILI TAHMİNLERİ" BAŞLIKLI RAPOR	280
		1. Ankara Hükûmetinin 1920-21 yılı bütçe tahminlerinde 13.811.834 liralık açık bulunduğu. Gelirlerin 46.830.871 lira, giderlerin ise 60.642.705 lira tahmin edildiği. Yeni vergilerle bu açığın 2.500.000 liraya kadar düşürülebileceğinin umulduğu.	
		2. Giderlerin yalnız Ankara Hükûmeti toprakları için öngörüldüğü ve İstanbul Hükûmrtinin harcamalarının bütçe dışında bırakıldığı. Harbiye, Dahiliye, Hariciye Vekâletlerinin gizli harcama fasıllarının dikkat çekici olduğu. Dokuz kalem verginin arttırılmış bulunduğu.	

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		3. Türkiye'nin tam bağımsızlığı ve toprak bütünlüğü tanıncaya kadar beş kalem borcun ertelendiği. (Kalemler).	
		4. Düyunu Umumiye örgütünün çalışmaları için bütçede kısıtlı ödenek öngörüldüğü, ancak Düyunu Umumiye örgütünün Maliye Vekâletine bağlandığı.	
		5. Ankara Hükûmetin, Tütün Rejisinin lağvedilmesi görüşünde olduğu.	
		6. Bütçe tahminlerinin son Türk-Yunan muherebesinden önce yapıldığı.	
		Kemalist Hükûmetin 1920-21 ve 1921-22 yılı bütçelerinin dökümleri.	
99	13 nisan	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 368.	287
		İstanbul basını.	
		1. Londra Konferansından beri İstanbul basınındaki milliyetçi eğilimin daha açık ortaya çıktığı, dokuz gazeteden altısının açıkça Ankara'yı desteklediği ve Müttefik sansürün de bunun önüne geçemediği.	
		2. Son Türk-Yunan muharebesinin (İkinci İnönü), basını daha da kamçıladığı.	
		3. Camilerin Kemalist propaganda merkezi rolü oynadığı.	
		4. Basında malî ve adlî bağımsızlık, kapitülâsyonların kaldırılması, yabancı kontrolünden tam bağımsızlık üzerinde ısrarla durulmasının dikkat çekici olduğu.	
		5. İstanbul Rum basınının da hararetle Yunanistan'ı desteklediği.	
100	15 nisan	LONDRA'DA YAYINLANAN "MORNING POST" GAZETESİNİN, "TÜRKİYE'NİN KIZIL MÜTTEFİKİ" BAŞLIKLI YAZISI.	289
		1. Bir Türk heyetinin Rusya yoluyla Ankara'dan Berlin'e gittiği ve Almanya'dan silâh ve cephane almak için görüşmeler yapacağı.	
		2. Çiçerin'in de, Ankara Hükûmetine silâh ve cephane verilmesi için Alman Hükûmetine çağırıda bulunduğu.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		Çiçerin, mesajında, Sovyetlerin şimdiye kadar Kemalistlere silâh yardımı yaptığına, ancak taşıma güçlükleri yüzünden bu yardımları kısıtlamak zorunda kaldığına de değindi.	
	4.	İngiliz - Sovyet Ticaret anlaşması gereğince Sovyetlerin, İngiltere aleyhindeki propagandayı durduracakları, bundan böyle bu propagandayı Ankara Hükûmetinin sürdüreceği.	
101	16 nisan	İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanı Lord Curzon'dan Atina Elçisi Lord Granville'e. Tel. 71.	290
	1.	İtilâf devletlerinin tarafsız kalacakları ve Yunanistan'a ya da Türkiye'ye savaş malzemesi satmayacakları.	
	2.	İtilâf Devletlerinin Yunanlılar ve Kemalistlerle ilişkilerinin özellik taşıdığı. Mustafa Kemal'e silâh satılamayacağı, Yunanistan'a karşı da başka türlü davranılmayacağı.	
	3.	İtalyan firmalarının Kemalistlere silâh sattıkları iddiası üzerine, İtalyan Hükûmetinin dikkatinin çekildiği.	
102	19 nisan	İngiltere'nin Stokholm Elçisinden Dışişleri Bakanı Lord Curzon'a Yazı. No.230.	290
	1.	Türkiye İşgüderi Laik Mukbil Beyin Stokholm'e geldiği ve "Svenska Dagblad" gazetesine bir demeç verdiği, Türkiye'de çift Hükûmetin sürüp gidemeyeyeceğini, İstanbul'daki duyguların kuvvetle Kemal Paşa'dan yana olduğunu söylediği.	
	2.	Mukbil Beyin ayrıca, Kapitülâsyonların kaldırılmasının Türkiye için hayati önem taşıdığını, Türkiye'nin Türklerin oturmadığı bölgeleri bırakmağa hazır olduğunu, ancak İzmir'den ve Doğu Trakya'dan vazgeçmeyeceğini de söylediği.	
103	20 nisan	İstanbul'da İngiliz Yüksek Komiseri Sir H. Rumbold'dan İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanı Lord Curzon'a. Yazı. No. 401. .... Türk-Afgan ilişkileri.	291
	1.	Ankara Hükûmetiyle Afganistan arasında Mart ayında bir anlaşma imzalandığı ve bunun özetinin *Hakimiyeti Milliye*'de yayınlandığı.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		2. Azarbaycan ile İran'ı da kapsayacak bir federasyona gidileceği yolundaki raporların kuşkuyla karşılandığı.	
		3. Türk-Afgan andlaşmasının Moskova'da imzalanmış olmasının bu işte Sovyetlerin ve Cemal Paşa'nın ne gibi rol oynadıklarını düşündürdüğü.	
		4. Ankara ve Kâbil'de karşılıklı diplomatik temsilcilikler açılması konusunda henüz yeteri kadar bilgi bulunmadığı.	
		5. Ankara-Kâbil ilişkileri konusunda Londra'da bilgi varsa Yüksek Komiserliğe de bildirilmesi dileği.	
Ek.	24 mart	"HAKİMİYET-İ MİLLİYE" GAZETESİNDEN ÇEVİRİ: "TÜRK-AFGAN ANDLAŞMASI."	293
		1. Londra'ya gönderilen Türk delegasyonu eli boş dönerken, Moskova'da Türk-Sovyet ve Türk-Afgan andlaşmaları imzalandığı, Türkiye'nin artık Asya politikasına katıldığı, gücünü Doğu'dan alacağı.	
		2. 1 mart günü imzalanan Türk-Afgan andlaşmasının özeti: Doğu halklarının bağımsızlık hakları bulunduğu, emperyalist devletlerin taraflardan birine saldırısının öteki tarafa da bir saldırı sayılacağı, tarafların birbirlerine zarar verecek andlaşmalar yapmayacakları, iki taraf arasında Konsolosluk ve Ticaret anlaşmaları imzalanacağı, Türkiye'nin Afganistan'a yardımda bulunacağı.	
104	22 nisan	YUNANİSTAN'A SAVAŞ MALZEMESİ GÖNDERİLMESİ KONUSUNDA İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINCA HAZIRLANAN MUHTIRA.	294
		1. Kral Konstantin'e karşı bir müeyyide olmak üzere, Aralık 1920'de Yunanistan'a savaş malzemesi gönderilmesinin durdurulmuş, fakat yasaklanmamış olduğu.	
		2. Daha sonra İtilâf devletlerinin savaşan taraflara savaş malzemesi satılmayacağını bildirdikleri.	
		3. Ama, yalnız silah ve cephane satışlarının lisansa bağlı olacağı, öteki savaş malzemelerinin satışlarının ise serbest sayılacağı. Silah satışlarının yasaklanmasının başka ülkelerde de örnekleri bulunduğu.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
105	23 nisan	İNGİLTERE'NİN HALEP KONSOLOSU JAMES MORGAN'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. No. 20.	297
		1. Türk-Fransız ateşkes anlaşmasına rağmen Fransızların hep tetikte oldukları; Diyarbakırda Nimet adında birinin önderliğinde özerk bir yönetim kurulmuş olduğu.	
		2. Maraş'ta 10.000 kadar silâhlı Türk bulunduğu, bunların Mustafa Kemal'e bağlı olmakla birlikte ateşkes anlaşmasına pek aldırmadıkları. Maraştan çeşitli bilgiler.	
		3. Halep'teki Fransızların İngilizlere kuşkuyla baktıkları.	
106	25 nisan	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. No. 416.	298
		1. Ahmet Anzavur'un iki hafta kadar önce Karabiga yöresinde pusuya düşürülüp öldürüldüğü.	
		2. Anzavur'un ölümüyle anti-Kemalist Çerkezlerin başsız kaldıkları. Anzavur hareketinin aylar önce çökmesinden sonra bazı Çerkezlerin Yunanlılarla işbirliği yaptıkları.	
		3. Anzavur'un yardımcısı Şah İsmail'in de Bandırmalı iki Çerkezi İstanbul'da vurduğu.	
107	25 nisan	"MORNING POST" GAZETESİNİN "KEMAL'E BOLŞEVİK YARDIMI" BAŞLIKLI YAZISI.	299
		1. Bolşeviklerin Savaştan zarar görenlere yardım için Mustafa Kemal'e 30.000 altın ruble verdikleri.	
		2. Bu parayı verirken Sovyet Elçisinin Mustafa Kemal'e bir mektup göndererek, Türk ordusunun Batı emperyalizmine karşı zaferini kutladığı, Yunan yakıp yıkmalarını yerdiği.	
		3. Mustafa Kemal'in de Sovyetlerin cömertliğine teşekkür ettiği ve Yunan ordusunun geri çelilirken yaptığı vahşete değindiği.	
108	27 nisan	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. No. 200.	300
		1. Yunan Hükûmetinin, Yunanistan'a ve Kemalistlere savaş malzemesi satışlarının serbest bırakılma-	

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		sını Müttefiklerden istemeyi ve böylece daha fazla savaş malzemesi alabilmeyi düşündüğü.	
		2. Yunan Dışişleri Bakanının, Mustafa Kemal'e Novorossisk'ten bol miktarda savaş malzemesi gönderilmesinin önlenemediğinden yakınması.	
109	27 nisan	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLİZ DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A. YAZI. No. 426. GİZLİ	301
		Türk-Afgan ilişkileri.	
		1. Türk-Afgan andlaşmasının imzalanmasından sonra Ankara'ya bir Afgan diplomatik heyetinin gönderildiği, Misyonun başında Sultan Ahmet Han adında birisinin bulunduğu.	
		2. Ankara'dan Kâbil'e henüz bir diplomatik misyon yollanmadığı, çeşitli kimselerin, bu arada Cemal Paşa'nın Afganistan'ı ziyaret ettikleri. Cemal Paşanın da Ankara'nın adamı sayılamayacağı.	
		3. 9 mart günü *Hakimiyeti Milliye*'nin Afganistan'a bir askeri heyet gönderileceğini haber verdiği. Bu heyetin başında Nurettin Paşanın bulunacağının gizli kaynaklardan öğrenildiği.	
		4. Türk-Afgan andlaşmasının imzalanması dolayısile Ahmet Muhtar Beyin yaptığı konuşma çevirisinin eklice sunulduğu.	
Ek.	16 nisan	TÜRK-AFGAN ANDLAŞMASI ÜZERİNE AHMET MUHTAR BEYİN T. B. M. M.'NDE YAPTIĞI GİZLİ KONUŞMA.	302
		1. Ankara Hükûmetile Afganistan arasında İttifak andlaşması imzalanmasının büyük önem taşıdığı. Doğu dünyasının batı emperyelizmine karşı birleşmekte ve emperyalistlerin doğuda nüfuz kaybetmekte oldukları.	
		2. Londra Konferansının, Yunan ordularına zaman kazandırmak için toplandığı, Batılıların, özellikle İngiltere'nin, doğunun gücünü saptamağa çalıştıkları. Moskova'da yapılan andlaşmanın ise doğunun zaferine doğru atılmış bir adım olduğu. Afganistanın, Orta Asyanın Türkiye'si olduğu, İngiltereye karşı ayaklandığı, yakında emperyalizme karşı bir İslâm federasyonunun doğabileceğinin umulduğu..	

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110	27 nisan	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 248. .... Yüksek Komiserlikçe hazırlanan 1920 Türkiye Yıllık Raporu'nun eklice sunulduğu. Raporun önemli kişilerle ilgili bölümünün Mr. Ryan tarafından hazırlanmış olduğu.	303
Ek.		1920 TÜRKİYE YILLIK RAPORU. (KISMEN) .... Türkiye'de önemli kişilerden seçme: Padişah, Veliaht, Tevfik Paşa, Damat Ferit Paşa, Müşir İzzet Paşa, Mustafa Kemal Paşa ve Kâzım Karabekir paşanın kişilikleri.	304
	1.	*Padişah:* Şehzadeliğinde Vahdettin'in Avrupa'da hiç tanınmadığı, Türkiye'de ise İttihaatçılara karşı olmakla bilindiği. Zeki, Saltanatı korumak, ülkeye hizmet etmek isteyen bir kimse olmakla birlikte zayıf, pısırık ve temkinli bir kimse olduğu için hakim rol oynayamadığı, ancak İngiltere'nin lütfunun Türkiye'yi kurtarabileceğine inandığı. Aşırı derecede sinirli olduğu, yine de düşüncelerini açık seçik anlatabildiği. İki kızı, bir oğlu bulunduğu.	
	2.	*Veliaht:* Prens Abdülmecid'in öteden beri ılımlı bir kimse olarak tanındığı, şimdi büyük ölçüde Milliyetçilerin etkisi altında kaldığı, ama İngiltere ile işbirliğine inandığı. Padişahla Veliaht arasındaki ilişkilerin gergin olduğu.	
	3.	*Tevfik Paşa*'nin zekâ ve enerji üstünlüğünden yoksun olduğu, Nazırlıkta ve Sadrazamlıkta kalabilmesini yaşlılığına, tecrübesine, Padişaha sadakatine borçlu bulunduğu. Çevresinin etkisinde kaldığı, çevresinin ise Milliyetçi sempatisiyle dolu olduğu.	
	4.	*Damat Ferit Paşa*'nın aslında Mütâreke döneminin ürünü olduğu. Saraya damat olduğu dönemden beri yaşamakta olduğu fildişi kulesinden asıl Mütâreke döneminde çıkıp Türk tarihinin en kasvetli gerçekleri içine girdiği, vatandaşları arasında en çok nefret edilen kişi olduğu. Kusurlarına, yanlışlıklarına rağmen Ferit Paşa'nın büyük cesaretini kanıtladığı. İktidardan düşmüş olmakla birlikte Ferit Paşa'nın halâ dağınık anti Kemalist güçlerin mihrakı olduğu.	

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5. *Mareşal İzzet Paşa*'nın başarılı bir askerlik hayatından sonra Yemen'de asker-diplomat olarak ün yaptığı. 1913'te kısa bir süre Harbiye Nazırlığında, Büyük Savaşta aktif hizmette bulunduktan sonra Mütâreke döneminde Sadrazam olduğu, Milliyetçilere yakınlığı ile tanındığı, Milliyetçileri yatıştırmak için gönderildiği Ankara'dan başarısızlıkla döndüğü. Ama İzzet Paşa'nın "ılımlı Milliyetçiliğin merkezi" olabileceğinin hala umulduğu.

6. *Mustafa Kemal Paşa*, askeri öğrenciliğinde çalışkanlığıyle sivrildi. Arkadaşları arasında dikbaşlı bir subaydı. 1907'de Selânik'e atanınca İttihat ve Terakki'ye, İtalyan Mason locasına girdi. Sofya'da ataşemiliterken kötü alışkanlıklara eğilim gösterdi. Savaş içinde ölçüsüz cesareti ile tanındı. Enver Paşa ve Almanlar ile ilişkileri gergindi. 1919 yılı başlarında Milliyetçi hareketin tohumlarını attı. Genel Müfettiş olarak Anadolu'ya atlayınca Milliyetçi hareketin başına geçti ve bu hareketin tartışmasız lideri oldu. Konuşmaları hükmedicidir. Yurtsever ve dürüst olmamakla suçlanamaz.

7. *Kâzım Karabekir Paşa,* Milliyetçi örgütün içinde apayrı bir yeri vardır ve ilerde önemli rol oynayabilir. Bazı raporlara göre, Mustafa Kemal'den daha fazla Bolşeviklerle ittifaktan yanadır. Bazı kimselere göre ise Padişaha yürekten bağlıdır ve Ankara'nın politikasına güvenmemektedir. Herhalde potansiyel önem taşıyan apayrı bir faktördür.

111 1 mayıs İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL.. NO. 209. 311

1. İtilâf devletlerinin, Yunan Hükûmeti ile Ankara Hükûmetinin normal muharip devlet sıfatlarını tanımayacakları yolundaki notalarına Yunan Hükûmetinin cevap verdiği.

2. Yunan notasında, İtilâf Devletleri kararının Yunan Hükûmetini güç durumda bıraktığının belirtildiği ve Yunanistan'ın muhariplik haklarının güçlendirilmesinin istendiği.

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
112	2 mayıs	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA İŞGÜDERİ MR. BENTINCK'TEN İNGİLTERE DIŞIŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. No. 186.	312
	1.	İtilâf Devletlerinin tarafsızlığı ve Türkiye ile Yunanistan'ın muhariplik hakları konusunda Yunanistan'a verilen nota ile Yunan cevabının örneklerinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
	2.	Atina'daki İtalyan ve Fransız Elçilerinin de Yunan Dışişleri Bakanlığına aynı konuda bildirimlerde bulundukları.	
Ek. 1	22 nisan	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN YUNANİSTAN DIŞIŞLERİ BAKANI M. BALTAZZI'YE. NOTA. No. 60.	313
	1.	İtilâf Devletlerinin, Yunanlılar ile Mustafa Kemal Paşa taraftarları arasındaki ilişkilerinin özellik taşıdığı ve tarafların bu savaşta normal muhariplik hakları bulunmadığı.	
	2.	Bu savaşan tarafların abluka ilân etme ve gemilerde arama yapma haklarının İngiltere Hükûmetince tanınmayacağı.	
	3.	Kemalistlere savaş malzemesi gönderilmesine zaten müsade etmeyen Müttefik kuvvetlerinin varlığı yüzünden Yunan Hükûmetinin Ege'de muhariplik hakkını kullanmasına gerek bulunmadığı.	
Ek. 2	30 nisan	YUNANİSTAN DIŞIŞLERİ BAKANI G. P. BALTAZZI'DEN İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'E NOTA. No. 4229.	313
	1.	Yunan Hükûmetinin, İngiliz notasını en büyük dikkatle incelediği ve Yunanistan ile Mustafa Kemal taraftarlarının bu savaşta normal muhariplik hakları olmayacağı yolundaki İngiliz Hükûmetinin görüşüne katılamadığı.	
	2.	İtilâf Devletlerinin kendilerini bugünkü savaşta tarafsız saymalarının Yunan Hükûmetini güç durumda bıraktığı. Böyle bir durumda, tarafsızların bulunduğu fakat savaşan tarafların muhariplik haklarının bulunmadığı bir savaşın söz konusu olacağı.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		3. Sèvres andlaşmasının onaylanmaması yüzünden Osmanlı Devleti ile Müttefikler ve bu arada Yunanistan arasındaki savaş halinin devam ettiği.	
		4. Kemalist kuvvetlerin muhariplik haklarının bulunduğunun inkâr edilemeyeceği, çünkü Mustafa Kemal iktidarının Londra Konferansına resmen çağırılmakla uluslararası tanınmaya kavuşturulmuş olduğu.	
		5. Türkiye'nin hukuki kişiliğindeki ikiliğin de gerçeklere uymadığı, Ankara Türkiyesi ile İstanbul Türkiyesinin gerçekte bir bütün olduğu ve sorumluluğunu yüklenmesi gerektiği.	
		6. Müttefik kontrollerinin, Mustafa Kemal'e kaçak savaş malzemesi gönderilmesini önlemeğe yetmediği, bu ortak düşmanın direnme gücünü azaltacak kontrol tedbirleri alma hakkından Yunanistan'ın yoksun bırakılamayacağı.	
		7. Yunanistan'ın muhariplik hakkının zayıflatılması değil, güçlendirilmesi gerektiği.	
		8. Londra Konferansında İtilâf Devletlerinin Türkiye'ye ve Yunanistan'a barış önerilerinde bulunmuş olmalarının da bu savaşın hukuki niteliğini etkilemeyeceği. Mustafa Kemal'in güçlenmesine fırsat vermeden Yunanistan'ın saldırıya geçeceğinin Müttefiklerce de önceden bilindiği.	
		9. Yunanistan'ın Anadolu'daki harekâtının aslında Müttefiklerce kendisine verilmiş bir görev olduğu ve bu görevini yerine getirirken Yunanistan'ın Müttefiklerce desteklenmesi gerektiği.	
		10. Bu bakımdan Yunanistan'ın, sorunun İngiliz Hükûmetince yeniden ve hayırhahlıkla gözden geçirileceğini umduğu.	
113	4 mayıs	İSTABNUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. No. 446.	317
		1. Son Türk başarısından (İkinci İnönü zaferinden) beri *Hakimiyeti Milliye* gazetesinin ölçülü yayınlarından vazgeçtiği ve Londra Konferansından artık söz etmez olduğu.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		2. Gazetenin 3 nisan tarihli sayısında Ankara'daki zafer sevincinin anlatıldığı, bir hanımın kaleme aldığı başyazısında ise "Türk ordusunun yalnız Yunanlılara karşı değil, ayni zamanda Avrupa'ya ve özellikle İngiltere'ye karşı da zafer kazandığının" öne sürüldüğü.	
		3. *Hakimiyeti Milliye*'nin daha sonraki sayılarında İngiltere'ye saldırıldığı, Fransa ile İtalya'ya ise dil uzatılmadığı. Bu arada İstanbul Hükûmeti Hariciye Nazırının da eleştirildiği.	
		4. Talât Paşa'nın ölüm haberini *Hakimiyeti Milliye*'nin üzüntüyle karşıladığı, *Yeni Gün* gazetesinin ise bu konuda daha açık yazılar yayınladığı.	
		5. Zafer sarhoşluğu içinde bulunan Ankara liderleriyle yakın bir gelecekte anlaşmanın güç olacağı kanısı.	
114	6 mayıs	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A. YAZI. NO. 193.	319
		1. Mustafa Kemal ile anlaşmak için Yunan Hükûmetinde henüz bir arzu görülmemekle birlikte, kamuoyunu böyle bir anlaşmaya hazırlamak için Hükûmet gazetelerinin bazılarında yazılar görüldüğü.	
		2. Böyle bir anlaşma olursa bunun suçunun Venizelos yanlılarıyla İtilâf Devletlerine yükleneceği. Şimdiden Fransa'ya çok sert biçimde saldırılmakta olduğu.	
		3. Yunan Hükûmetinin Anadolu'da önemsiz de olsa bir başarı sağlayıp Türklerle anlaşmaya gitmek, ondan sonra da İtilâf Devletleriyle Venizelos'u suçlamak plânını izlediği kanısı.	
		4. Yunan basınında, eski olayları da deşip Fransa'ya karşı girişilmiş olan sert kampanyada Alman parmağının da bulunabileceği kuşkusu. "Yunanlılar Anadolu'da yenilirlerse Fransızlarla İtalyanların Yunanistan'da yaşayamayacakları" söylentisi.	
115	10 mayıs	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ KUVVETLERİ BAŞKOMUTANI GENERAL HARINGTON'DAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA. ŞİFRE TEL. NO. 284.	321
		1. Türkiye'deki durumu yeniden gözden geçirmek gerektiği. Yunan askerinin Yüksek Kumandaya	

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		güvenini yitirdiği, Kemalistlerin ise şimdi çok daha güçlü durumda oldukları.	
		2. Mustafa Kemal'in haşin olduğu, İngiltere'nin güçlüklerini iyi bildiği, Yunanistan'ı yeniden yenilgiye uğratacağından emin göründüğü, ondan sonra İngilizleri karşısına alacağı.	
		3. Yunan askerlerinin Bursa ve İzmit'ten çekilmeleri halinde müttefik kuvvetlerinin Kemalistlerle karşı karşıya ve güç bir durumda kalacakları.	
		4. Üç-dört hafta sonra Yunanlıların yeniden saldırıya geçeceklerinin haber alındığı. Zulümlerle ilgili raporların arttığı.	
116	11 mayıs	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞIŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 476. GİZLİ.	323
		Mustafa Kemal'e karşı Kürtleri ayaklandırma sorunu.	
		1. Kemalistleri silâhla dize getirmek için hazırlanan bir plânda, Kürtlerin de Mustafa Kemal'e karşı kullanılmalarının düşünüldüğü, şimdi Yunanlıların böyle bir olanak araştırdıkları.	
		2. Ancak toplu bir Kürt hareketinin gerçekleştirilmesinin kuşkulu olduğu.	
		3. Yunanlıların ilişki kurdukları bildirilen Kürt Mustafa Paşa'nın Damat Ferit Paşa zamanında İstanbul'da sıkıyönetim mahkemesi Başkanlığı yaptığı, pek ketum bir kimse olmadığı, iyi idare edilirse işe yarayabileceği, ancak Kürtleri Yunanlılarla işbirliğine sürükleyemeyeceği. Irak'a gönderilmesi için bir süre önce İngiliz Yüksek Komiserliğince Kürt Mustafa Paşa'ya izin çıkartıldığı.	
		4. Yunanlıların kullanmak istedikleri ikinci kişi olan Kürt Hakkı Beyin ise komiteci tipinde maceracı bir kimse olduğu, onun da bir süre önce Bağdad'a gitmek için İngiliz Yüksek Komiserliğine başvurduğu. Karar için Londra'dan talimat beklendiği.	
		5. Sivas'ın doğusunda bir süre önce patlak verdiği bildirilen kemalist aleyhtarı hareket hakkında kesin bilgi alınamadığı.	

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		Dipnot: Curzon'dan Rumbold'a Gizli Yazı. 21.4. 1921, *No.* 358.	
		Kemalistlere karşı Kürtleri ayaklandırmak için Yunanlıların Mustafa Paşa ve Hakkı Bey adında iki Kürt ile ilişki kurdukları.	
117	18 mayıs	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 493.	325
		Durum özeti.	
		1. Yeniden çarpışmaların başlamasından önce Anadolu'da geçici bir durgunluk bulunduğu, Kemalistlerin taarruza kalkışmak değil, Yunan taarruzunu beklemek niyetinde göründükleri.	
		2. Asıl acıyı savaş bölgeleri halkının çektiği, Yunanlıların kurdukları çetelerin zulüm yaptıklarının anlaşıldığı, Yunan nizami birliklerinin de yer yer çetelere katıldıkları.	
		3. Ankara'da sovenizmin ağır bastığı ve ılımlı Bekir Sami Beyin istifa ettiği.	
		4. Siyasal gelişmelerin Anadolu'daki savaşın sonucuna bağlı olacağı. Kesin Yunan zaferinin kesin Kemalist zaferden daha az fekâletli olacağı. İki tarafın yenişemeyerek birbirlerini tüketmelerinin ise en eyi sonuç alacağı umudu.	
118	15 mayıs	İTALYA DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDA M. LAGO'DAN İTALYA'NIN ANTALYA KONSOLOSUNA GÖNDERİLEN VE İNGİLİZ GİZLİ SERVİSİNCE ELE GEÇİRİLEN TEL. No. 4853.	326
		Roma'da Cami Beyin telgrafının Mustafa Kemal'e ulaştırılması.	
		1. İtalyan işgal bölgesindeki halkın İtalyanlara karşı silâha sarılmaları üzerine, İtalya Hükûmetinin (Türkiye'ye yollanacak) silâh ve cephane yüklü geminin gönderilmesini durdurduğu.	
		2. Gemi gönderilmezse İtalyanlara ödenmiş olan 30 milyon frankın ziyan olacağı, bu nedenle bölgedeki İtalyan aleyhtarı hareketin durdurulması ricası.	
119	19 mayıs	LONDRA'DA YUNAN İŞGÜDERİ RIZO-RANGABE'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A NOTA. No. 1693.	327

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		General Wrangel ordusu subaylarının Mustafa Kemal kuvvetlerine katılmakta oldukları yolunda Atina'dan alınan bir telgraf çevirisinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek.	19 mayıs	LONDRA'DA YUNAN ELÇİLİĞİNDEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA NOT. (YUNAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDAN ALINAN TELGRAF ÇEVİRİSİ).	327
	1.	Wrangel ordusundan 500 Rus subayının Mustafa Kemal ordusuna katılmak üzere Çanakkale boğazından geçtikleri.	
	2.	İki Fransız torpidosunun da Gelibolu'da görüldüğü.	
	3.	Mustafa Kemal'in böylece güçlenmesinin Yunan dâvasına pek zararlı olacağı, İstanbul'daki Fransız Yüksek Komiserinin dikkatinin çekilmesi.	
120	21 mayıs	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A. ŞİFRE TEL. NO. 363.	328
	1.	Ankara'da Kabine değişikliği olduğu.	
	2.	Siyasal havanın gergin olduğu anlaşılan Ankara'da, aşırıların duruma hakim oldukları ve Fevzi Paşanın Kabineyi kurduğu.	
121	24 mayıs	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A. TEL. NO. 370.	328
	1.	Ankara Kabinesindeki değişiklik üzerine çeşitli söylentiler dolaştığı.	
	2.	Dışişleri Komiserliğine, Sovyetler ve Afganistan ile andlaşmaları imzalamış olan Yusuf Kemal Beyin getirildiği.	
	3.	Ankara Hükûmetinin dış politikada uzlaşmaz tutumunun sertleşmekte olduğu.	
	4.	Mustafa Kemal diktatörlüğünde ve askerî liderler arasında bir çözülme bulunmadığı.	
122	25 mayıs	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 518.	329
		Padişahın İngiliz Yüksek Komiserini kabulü.	
	1.	Padişah, İngiltere'ye tatile gitmekte olan İngiliz Yüksek Komiserini 23 Mayıs günü kabul eder ve	

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		ona, tatil yaptığına göre Türkiye'deki durumu herhalde pek karanlık görmediğini söyler. Yüksek Komiser, durumun yakında karışabileceğini, o zamana kadar geri dönebileceğini bildirir.	
		2. Yunan zulümlerinden yakınan Padişaha İngiliz Yüksek Komiseri de hak verir. İzmit ve Yalova yöresindeki Yunan zulümleri için İngiltere'nin soruşturma açtırdığını, bunun da Yunanlıları yeni zulümlerden caydıracağını söyler.	
		3. Padişah, Ankara liderlerini suçlar. Bunların, kişisel emeller peşinde koştuklarını, Bolşeviklerle anlaştıklarını, ılımlı Bekir Sami Beyin yerine bile Moskova'dan yeni bir "Yoldaş" getirdiklerini söyler. Büyük Devletlerce adil barışın sağlanmasını ister. İzmir bölgesinin % 60-70 Türk olduğunu, Trakya'da ise bir tampon Devletin kurulabileceğini söyler.	
		4. İngiliz Yüksek Komiseri, İngiltere'nin durumu yakından izlediğini, Anadolu'ya Bolşevik sızması tehlikesinin farkında olduğunu, zamanı gelince duruma el atacağını söyler. Anadolu'daki Yunan savaşının ise bir iki aydan fazla sürmeyeceğini ileri sürer.	
		5. Padişah, Kemalistlerin Bolşeviklerden yardım aldıklarını söyleyerek bir kez daha Bolşevik tehlikesine parmak basar. Büyük Devletlerin arabuluculuk değil, baskı yapmalarını ister. Bolşeviklerin Kafkasların ötesine atılmasını, Trakya'da, Asya ile Avrupa arasında bir tampon devlet kurulmasını önerir. Türkiye'nin İngiltere'ye umut bağladığını tekrarlar.	
123	25 mayıs	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A. YAZI. NO. 521. GİZLİ. .... Mustafa Kemal'e karşı Kürtleri ayaklandırma projesi.	333
		1. Bedirhan Sülâlesi reisi Emin Ali Bey, oğlu Celâdet Beyle birlikte İngiliz Yüksek Komiserliğinde Mr. Ryan ile görüşür. Kemalistlere karşı Kürtleri ayaklandırmak için Yunanlılarla ilişki kurduğunu bildirir. Bu amaçla Musul'a gitme izni ister ve Kürt	

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		harekctinin İngiliz bölgesinde hazırlanıp hazırlanamayacağını sorar.	
		2. Mr. Ryan, şu sıralarda Kürt ayaklanmasını başlatmanın uygun olmayacağını söyler. Bedirhanlıların Musul'a gitmelerine engel olunmayacağını da bildirir.	
		3. Yüksek Komiser, Kürt ayaklanmasını idare etmenin pek zor bir iş olacağı, ancak İngiltere ile Kemalistler arasındaki çatışmada düşünülebileceği kanısındadır.	
		4. Tiflis'te oturan, kendi kendisine "Prens" sıfatını yakıştıran ve Kürdistan Kralı olmak için İngiltere'ye başvurmuş bulunan Kâmil Bey Bedirhani'den epeydir bilgi alınamadığı.	
124	25 mayıs	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. No. 523	334
		1. Ankara'daki kabine değişikliğinin dış politikayla ilgisi bulunmadığını izah etmekte İstanbul'un milliyetçi yanlısı gazetelerinin güçlük çektikleri.	
		2. T. B. M. M. içinde "Müdafaa-i Hukuk Grubu" adlı yeni bir parti kurulması üzerine son günlerde geniş yayın yapıldığı. Mustafa Kemal'in başkanlığında 170 mebusu içine alan bu grubun programının Millî Misak'a dayandığı.	
		3. Mustafa Kemal'in Millî Misak etrafında bütün güçleri seferber ettiği.	
		4. İzlenecek politikayı saptamak için T. B. M. M.'nin önemli bir toplantı yapacağı haberi.	
125	26 mayıs	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ HABERALMA ÖRGÜTÜ İSTANBUL ŞUBESİNİN HAZIRLADIĞI RAPOR. No. 242. (KISMEN). Arnavutluk'ta ve Trakya'da Kemalist faaliyetler.	335
		1. İsmail Ditsa adındaki bir Arnavut ileri geleninin 3 Mayısta Ankara'ya gittiği, etresi gün Mustafa Kemal Paşa ile uzun bir görüşme yaptığı ve Arnavut kuvvetleri komutanının bir mektubunu Paşa'ya sunduğu.	
		2. Bunun üzerine Kemalistlerle Arnavutlar arasında bir ittifak yapılması için görüşmelere başlandığı.	

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		3. Trakya'da bir ihtilâl örgütü kurulmasına ilişkin Kemalist programın T. B. M. M.'ne sunulduğu, ancak para sorunu yüzünden plânın onaylanmasının geciktiği. Bu konuda Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın gizli oturumda yaptığı konuşma.	
		4. İtalya'daki Trakya liderleriyle görüşmek üzere dört kişilik bir heyetin Ankara'dan İtalya'ya yollandığı, heyet üyelerinden ikisinin de Bulgaristan'a gittikleri.	
		5. Ankara'nın Roma temsilcisi Cami Beyin de Sofya'daki Cevad Abbas Bey ile yazışmakta olduğu.	
126	27 mayıs	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ HABERALMA ÖRGÜTÜ İSTANBUL ŞUBESİNCE HAZIRLANAN RAPOR. NO. 243. ...... Anadolu'da siyasal durum. Kemalistlerin dış politikası.	337
		1. Bekir Sami Beyin Avrupa'da bulunduğu sırada T. B. M. M.'de aşırıların güçlendikleri.	
		2. Bekir Sami Beyin Fransa, İngiltere ve İtalya ile imzaladığı ve T. B. M. M.'nin gizli oturumunda savunduğu anlaşmaların onaylanmadığı. Mustafa Kemal Paşanın da, bu anlaşmaların onaylanmasının Rus yardımının kesilmesine sebeb olacağını söylediği.	
		Bunun üzerine Bekir Sami Beyin istifa ettiği.	
		3. Fevzi Paşa'nın uzun bir telgrafla Bekir Sami Beyin istifasını orduya bildirdiği ve onun politikasının milletçe benimsenmediğini söylediği.	
		4. Batılılar aleyhindeki politikasında Mustafa Kemal Paşa'yı 140 mebusun desteklediği.	
		5. Bekir Sami Beyin istifasının ve 15 mayısta yapılan Kabine değişikliğinin dış politikada değişiklik anlamına gelmediğinin anlatılmasına çabalandığı. Aslında yeni Kabinenin Bolşevik taraftarı bir politika izleyeceği.	
		6. Mustafa Kemal Paşanın, Bolşevik doktrine ve Enver Paşa'ya karşı göründüğü, ancak İttihat ve Terakki dokritinine karşı görünmediği.	
		7. Eski bir İttihatçının verdiği bilgilere göre, İttihatçıların ilerde Türkiye politikasında önemli rol oyna-	

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		yacakları ve İttihatçı liderlerinin yeniden politika sahnesine çıkarılmalarında Cavit Beyin öncülük yapacağı.	
		8. Tanınmış İttihatçıların Ankara Hükûmetine sızma çabalarının başarısız kaldığı, bununla birlikte Milliyetçilerin malî politikası ile dış politikasında Cavit Beyin önemli rolünün bulunduğunun sanıldığı.	
127	28 mayıs	İNGİLİZ ASKERÎ İSTİHBARAT MÜDÜRÜNDEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKAN YARDIMCISINA YAZI. NO. 1209 - M. 1. 2 ... Türk Milliyetçi Hükûmetinin İngiltere'ye karşı tutumuna ilişkin olarak General Harington'tan alınan bir raporun eklice sunulduğu.	340
Ek. 1	16 mayıs	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ ORDULARI BAŞKOMUTANI GENERAL HARINGTON'DAN İNGİLTERE ASKERÎ İSTİHBARAT MÜDÜRLÜĞÜNE. YAZI. NO. G. R. 43084/2-'I'.	340
		1. Ankara Hükûmetinin İngiltere'ye karşı gerçek tutumunu aydınlatmak için hazırlanan bir raporun ilişikte sunulduğu.	
		2. İngiltere'nin kendi gücüyle Anadolu'da otoritesini kuramadığı sürece Türk Milliyetçileriyle anlaşma umudunun pek bulunmadığı.	
Ek. 2	—	TÜRK MİLLİYETÇİ HÜKÜMETİNİN BÜYÜK BRİTANYA'YA KARŞI TUTUMU ÜZERİNE GİZLİ RAPOR. (Aralık 1920 - Nisan 1921 dönemi). .... Milliyetçilerin İngiltere'ye karşı sürekli olarak düşmanlık duyguları besledikleri, bu tutumlarının aşağıda üç ayrı dönemde gözden geçirildiği.	341
		A- *İzzet Paşa'nın Ankara'ya gidişinden İnönü'de Birinci Yunan saldırısına kadarki dönem.* (*aralık-ocak* 1920).	
		1. Yunanistan'da Venizelos'un düşmesi, Kırım'da Wrangel'in yenilmesi ve doğuda Türklerin Ermenilere karşı zafer kazanmaları üzerine, Kemalistlerin Sèvres andlaşmasını değiştirme umutları artmıştır. İzzet Paşa heyeti Ankara'ya gitmiştir.	
		2. Ocak 1921'de Yunan saldırısının önlenmesini (Birinci İnönü zaferini) Kemalistler, yalnız Yunanistan'a karşı değil, aynı zamanda İngiltere'ye karşı da kazanılmış bir zafer saymışlardır.	

3. 25 ocakta İtilâf Devletleri, Mustafa Kemal'in veya yetkili temsilcisinin de Londra Konferansına çağırılmasına karar vermişlerdir.

B- *Londra Konferansı Dönemi (şubat-mart* 1921).

4. Yunan yenilgisinin hemen arkasından gelen Londra Konferansının, İngiltere'nin politika değişikliğine gideceği biçiminde görülmüştür.

5. Mustafa Kemal Paşa, Ankara Hükûmetinin Türye'nin tek gerçek hükûmeti olduğunu, doğrudan doğruya konferansa çağırılması gerektiğini İstanbul'a tellemiş, sonunda Ankara delegeleri ayrı olarak ve İstanbul'a uğramadan Konfaransa gönderilmişlerdir.

6. Bekir Sami Beye verilen talimatta, Türkiye adına Konferansta yalnız Ankara delegelerinin konuşma hakkı olduğu, İzmir ve Trakya'da nüfus araştırmasının ancak buralardan işgal kuvvetlerinin çekilmesi koşuluyla kabul edilebileceği belirtilmiştir.

7. Türk temsilcilerinin İngiltere'de iyi izlenim bırakmalarının, İngiliz kamuoyuna Türkiye'den yana bir değişme belirtisi gibi görülmüştür. Bekir Sami Bey Londra'dan iyimser telgraflar çekmiş, İngiltere ile Türkiye arasında sürekli bir anlaşma umudu bulunduğunu Mustafa Kemal'e bildirmiştir.

4. Ankara'daki milliyetçiler ise Bekir Sami Beyin umutlarını paylaşmamışlardır. Mustafa Kemal'in Bekir Samiye gönderdiği telgraflarda Ankara'nın tutumu açıkça görülür. (Telgraflardan parçalar).

9. Londra Konferansı kararları üzerine, Anadolu'daki İngiliz aleyhtarlığı hemen artmış ve Ankara, yardım için Rusya'ya dönmüştür.

C- *Yunanlıların ikinci saldırısından ve Türk delegelerinin Avrupa'dan dönüşlerinden sonraki dönem.*

10. 23 martta başlayan ikinci Yunan saldırısı, Anadoluda İngiliz aleyhtarlığını daha da arttırmıştır. Yunan yenilgisi de İngiliz politikasının başarısızlığı olarak yorumlanmıştır.

11. Londra Konferansının da İngiltere'nin Türk düşmanlığı yüzünden başarısız kaldığı öne sürülmüş,

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		Lloyd George'un Yunanlıları yeni saldırıya kışkırttığı söylenmiştir.	
		12. Londra dönüşü Tevfik Paşa, Ankara ile İstanbul'un anlaşmaları için Büyük Devletlerin baskı yaptıklarını Padişaha anlatmış ve bir anlaşma yolu bulunmasını önermiştir.	
		13. Ankara'da ise aşırı milliyetçiler güçlenmişler, bunun sonucu İngiltere'ye karşı düşmanlık artmıştır. Türkler, İngiltere'nin tarafsızlığına inanmamaktadırlar.	
		14. İngiliz düşmanlığında İttihatçıların ve Selânik dönmelerinin büyük payı bulunmaktadır.	
128	28 mayıs	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDINGE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A. YAZI. No. 1573.	349
		1. Bekir Sami Beyin Fransızlarla imzaladığı anlaşmanın onaylanması için Ankara Hükûmetinin öne sürdüğü koşullarla ilgili bir gazete yazısının gönderildiği.	
		2. Fransa Dışişleri Bakanlığının, Ankara'da aşırı kişilerin duruma hakim olduklarını, Fransa'nın anlaşma konusunda bir şey yapmayacağını söylediği ve Yunanlıların büyük bir zafer kazanmalarını dilediği.	
Ek.	27 mayıs	"ECHO DE PARIS" GAZETESİNİN YAZISI: "Ankara Hükûmetinin Koşulları".	
		Türk-Fransız andlaşmasının onaylanması için Ankara Hükûmerinin öne sürdüğü koşulların kabul edilebilecek gibi olmadığı, Fransa Hükûmetinin bu esaslarla müzâkereyi kabul etmeyeceği. (Ankara'nın öne sürdüğü koşulların listesi).	
129	30 mayıs	TÜRK-YUNAN SAVAŞI ÜZERİNE İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKAN YARDIMCISI SIR E. CROWE TARAFINDAN HAZIRLANAN MUHTIRA.	351
		1. Savunma Bakanlığının Hükûmete bazı belgeler sunduğu ve Yunan yenilgisi üzerine Müttefiklerin Boğazlar bölgesinden çekilmelerini savunduğu.	
		2. Oysa, Müttefiklerin Kemalistler önünde kaçmalarının, İngiltere'ye Büyük Savaşta kazandığı zaferin bütün meyvelerini kaybettireceği.	
		3. Ayrıca bu savaştan zaferle çıkacak bir Türkiye'nin Irak'ta, Mısır'da ve Hindistan'daki İngiliz çıkar-	

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larını sarsacağı; Sovyetler ve Afganistan ile birlikte İngiltere'nin Hindistan İmparatorluğunu yıkmağa yöneleceği.

4. Bu nedenlerle, bir politika değişikliğine kalkışmadan önce çok iyi düşünmek gerektiği.

5. Askeri bakımdan Yunanlılarının yenileceklerinin kesin olmadığı, buna bazı çareler araştırıp bulunabileceği.

6. Siyasal bakımdan Yunanistan'ın İzmir'den çekilmek istemesinin kuşkulu olduğu, çekilse bile Yunanistan'a Doğu Trakya'yı vermek gerektiği, İstanbul'a yunan askeri sokulmasının da düşünülebileceği, herhalde Türkleri Çatalca'nın batısına sokmamak, Türkiye'nin güçlenmesine fırsat vermemek gerektiği. İngiliz çıkarları bakımından, İstanbul'da İngiliz askeri bulundurmanın İrlanda'da asker bulundurmak kadar hayatî önem taşıdığı.

7. Ankara'nın İstanbul'u yutmasını önlemek için Fransa'nın da desteğinin aranabileceği, çünkü Türk dostu pozuna bürünmekle birlikte Fransa'nın da Türk imparatorluğunun diriltilmesine karşı olduğu. Fransızlarla pazarlığa girişebileceği.

130 | 31 mayıs | İNGİLİZ BAKANLAR KURULU TOPLANTISI TUTANAĞI. (Toplantıda General Harington da bulunmaktadır). Gizli 356

İstanbul'un boşaltılması sorunu.

1. İstanbul'un askerî durumuyla ilgili olarak İngiliz Savunma Bakanının Kabine'ye sunmuş olduğu muhtıra ile Genelkurmay Başkanlığının ve general Harington'un raporları ele alınır.

2. General Harington görüşlerini açıklar: Anadolu'da Yunan ordusu bozulmuştur, Mustafa Kemal'in durumu ise güçlenmiştir. Yunan orduları İzmir'e dökülebilir. İstanbul'daki Müttefik kuvvetleri Mustafa Kemal'e karşı koyabilecek durumda değillerdir. İstanbul'da kalmak yersiz ve tehlikeli olacaktır. Ayrıca Müttefik Kuvvetler, İngiliz Kumandanlığı altında toplanamamaktadır.

3. Lord Curzon, siyasî bakımdan Harington'a cevap verir:

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İstanbul'dan çekilmenin geniş ve felâketli yankıları olacaktır. İngiltere, zaferin bütün meyvelerini yitirecektir. Mustafa Kemal büsbütün güçlenecek ve İngiliz İmparatorluğu için tehlike olacaktır.

4. Sömürgeler Bakanı Churchill, Türkiye ile genel barış andlaşması yapılmadan İstanbul'dan çekilmenin Irak'ta ve Filistin'de İngiliz çıkarları için tehlikeli olacağını belirtir.

5. Hindistan İşleri Bakanı Mr. Montagu, Sèvres andlaşmasında köklü değişiklikler yapılarak barışa ulaşılmasını ve İstanbul'un boşaltılmasını savunur.

6. Kabine, Dışişleri Bakanlığınca ve askerî makamlarca birer rapor hazırlanmasına, askerî raporda, en az kuvvetle Boğazlar bölgesinde tutunabilme olanaklarının araştırılmasına karar verir.

131 3 haziran İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A. TEL. NO. 298. 359

1. Türk-Yunan savaşında "bekle, gör" politikasının çok tehlikeli olacağı, İngiltere'nin Yunanistan'ı desteklemesi gerektiği. Bu görüşün gerekçeleri.

2. Zafer kazanılırsa Kemalistlerin İzmir'le yetinmeyerek çok aşırı isteklerde bulunacakları. İstanbul kıyısında önlenemeyecekleri, Hristiyan halkın da yeniden Türk yönetimine düşeceği.

3. Yunanlıların savaş gücünü pek küçümsememek gerektiği, ama yardım görmezlerse çökebilecekleri, oysa Yunanistan'da İngiliz prestijinin yüksek olduğu.

4. Yunanistan'a yardım etmenin İslâm dünyasında belki kötü etkileri olabileceği ve ayrıca Konstantin'in durumunu perçinleyebileceği. Ama bu kayguları giderme yolunun da bulunabileceği.

5. Yunanistan'a uçak, tank vb. verilebileceği gibi özellikle malî yardımda bulunmanın çok yerinde olacağı.

132 5 haziran KAHİRE'DE MAREŞAL ALLENBY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A. ŞİFRE TEL. NO. 385. GİZLİ. 361

1. Kahire'deki Fransızların tanınmış bir Kemalist Mısırlı aradıkları, bunu, Fransızlarla Kemalistler

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		arasında arabuluculuk yapmak üzere Mustafa Kemal'e göndermeyi düşündükleri.	
	2.	Fransızların amacının, Mustafa Kemal'in dikkatini Kilikya'dan Mezopotamya'ya çevirmek olduğu.	
133	7 haziran	İNGİLTERE'NİN İZMİR BAŞKONSOLOSU SIR H. LAMB'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A. ŞİFRE TEL. No. 47.	362
	1.	Yunan Genelkarargâhını ziyaret eden İngiltere'nin Atina askerî ataşesinin Yunan makamlarından aldığı bilgiler: Anadolu'daki Yunan ordusunun 160.000 kişilik olduğu ve 175.000'e çıkarılacağı. Vurucu gücün ise 100.000 kişi olduğu. Buna karşılık Kemalisrletin Yunan cephesinde 60.000 kadar askeri bulunduğu.	
	2.	Yunan yetkililerinin Mustafa Kemal'e karşı zafer kazanacaklarından emin oldukları, ama ilerde Mustafa Kemal'in güçlenebileceğinden kaygulandıkları. Mustafa Kemal'in yardım almasını önlemek için Karadeniz limanlarının abluka altına alınmasını savundukları.	
134	8 haziran	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ HABERALMA ÖRGÜTÜ İSTANBUL ŞUBESİNCE HAZIRLANAN RAPOR. No. 255.	363
	I-	*Milliyetçilerin İngiltere'ye karşı politikası. İstanbul'un tutumu.*	
	1.	İstanbul Hükûmetinin Londra mümessili Mustafa Reşit Paşa'nın, Ankara Hükûmetinin İngiltere'ye karşı sert tutumunun sakıncalarını belirterek bu tutumun değiştirilmesi için Ankara'ya baskı yapılmasını önerdiği, İstanbul Hükûmetinin durumu görüşerek Mustafa Kemal'e gizli bir çağrıda bulunmağa karar verdiği.	
	2.	4 Haziranda Ankara'ya gönderilen gizli yazıda, T. B. M. M.'nin son zamanlarda İngiltere'ye karşı aldığı tedbirlerden vazgeçilmesinin istendiği, bu tedbirlerden doğacak sorumluluğun Ankara Hükûmetine yükleneceğinin belirtildiği.	
	II-	*Anadolu'da siyasal durum. İttihatçı muhalefet.*	
	3.	İttihatçıların Ankara Hükûmetine sızmak için kalkıştıkları başarısız girişim üzerine, Mustafa	

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Kemal Paşa'nın, Meclisteki çoğunluğun kendisi aleyhinde olduğunu birdenbire farkettiği. "Müdafaai Hukuk Grubu"nun kurulduğu ve Karabekir paşa aracılığıyle doğu illeri mebuslarının da desteği sağlanarak çoğunluğun ele geçirildiği.

4. İttihatçı tehlikesini gören Mustafa Kemal'in, Malta'dan kurtulacak sürgünlerin Anadolu'ya sokulmamaları için tedbirlere başvurduğu, çünkü bu sürgünlerin Mustafa Kemal'i devirmek için İngilizlere söz verdiklerinin söylendiği.
5. Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın Meclisi feshederek yeni seçimlere gideceğinin de söylendiği.
6. İttihatçıların yeniden iktidara gelmelerini kesinlikle önlemek isteyen Batı cephesindeki 140 subayın bu amaçla Mustafa Kemal Paşa'ya bir de yazı göndermelerinin durumu daha da zorlaştırdığı.
7. Subayları yatıştırmak için Fevzi Paşa'nın orduya gizli bir genelge gönderdiği, T. B. M. M.'deki olayların yanlış yorumlanmış olduğunu belirttiği ve subayların kendilerini ilgilendirmeyen işlere karışmamalarını istediği.
8. Mustafa Kemal'in Meclisteki İttihatçıları temizleyemeyeceği, ancak İttihatçı liderlerin geri dönmelerine karşı sonuna kadar direneceği. Yakın bir gelecekte Anadolu'da ciddî gelişmelerin beklenebileceği.

III- *Milliyetçiler ve Kürtler.*

9. Bir habere göre, Dersim'deki Kürt ayaklanmasından suçlu görülen iki Kürt şeyhinin asılmasının gerginlik yarattığı, bazı Kürt şeyhlerin Mustafa Kemal'e bir yazı gönderdikleri.
10. Konunun Mecliste görüşüldüğü ve doğuda bir bildiri yayınlandığı. (Bildiri metni).
11. Kâzım Karabekir Paşa'nın Kürtlere karşı kuvvet göndermeğe yanaşmadığı, ama Mustafa Kemal Paşa'yı desteklemeğe devam ettiği.
12. Buna karşılık Diyarbakır kumandanı Nihat Paşa ile Mustafa Kemal Paşa arasında sürtüşme bulunduğu.

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135	8 haziran	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ MR. RATTIGAN'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 570.	370
		Kemalist - İttihatçı İlişkileri.	
		1. Kemalistlerle İttihatçılar arasında çatışma bulunduğunun söylendiği.	
		2. Kemalistlerin, İtilâf Devletlerince tatmin edilince Bolşeviklerle işbirliğinden vazgeçebilecekleri; İttihatçıların ise sürekli olarak Bolşeviklere bağlanabilecekleri.	
		3. Enver Paşa'nın, Mustafa Kemal'in yerine geçmek istediği, Ankara'da da çok taraftarı bulunduğu.	
		4. Bekir Sami Beyin düşürülmesi nedeninin, Maltadaki sürgünleri kurtarıp İttihatçıları güçlendirmek için İngilizlerle anlaşmış olmasının gösterildiği.	
Ek.	—	İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERLİĞİ BAŞ TERCÜMANI MR. RYAN TARAFINDAN HAZIRLANAN MUHTIRA.	371
		1. Ankara'daki bunalımın, Bekir Sami tipindeki ılımlılar ile aşırılar arasındaki çatışmadan ileri geldiğinin sanıldığı.	
		2. Aslında ise işin iç yüzünün, İttihatçıların Millî hareketi ele geçirmek ve Mustafa Kemal'i devirmek girişimleri olduğunun bildirildiği. İttihatçıların başarısız bir Hükûmet darbesi girişiminde bulundukları.	
		3. Haberlerin yetersiz olduğu. Enver Paşa'nın Milliyetçi haraketi kontrolü altına almasının Bolşeviklerce de yeğ tutulabileceği.	
		4. İngiltere bakımından Kemalist-İttihatçı çatışmasını çok önemsemenin yersiz olacağı, her iki grubun da İngiltere'ye düşman olduğu ve her ikisinin de Irak'ta, Mısır'da, Hindistan'da karışıklık çıkartmak istediği.	
		5. Kemalist liderlerin, İttihatçılarla çatışmalarını abartarak Müttefikleri ürkütmek gibi bir taktik de gütmüş olabilecekleri. Ama bu taktiğin ters sonuç da verebileceği. Kemalistlerden daha aşırı ve daha Bolşevik yanlısı İttihatçılardan ürkecek Fransanın İngiltere'nin kollarına atılabileceği ve İn-	

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		giltere ile birlikte Yunanistan'ı desteleyebileceği. İtalya'ya gelince onun pek ağırlığı bulunmadığı.	
		6. Herhalde Ankara Liderlerinin İngiliz düşmanlığını, Yunanlıları yendikten sonra aşırı isteklerde bulunacaklarını gözden uzak tutmamak gerektiği. İngiliz - Fransız işbirliğiyle Yunanlıları destekleyerek Kemalistleri yoketmek ve Padişah yönetiminde bir Türkiye yaratmak lâzım geldiği.	
136	11 haziran	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ VEKİLİ MR. RATTIGAN'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A. ŞİFRE TEL. NO. 419.	373
		Malta sürgünleri, İngiliz tutsakları.	
		1. Osmanlı Hariciye Nazırının, Kemalistlerin 10 İngiliz tutsağını salıvereceklerini, öteki tutsakları ise Malta sürgünlerinin hepsi serbest bırakıldıktan sonra teslim edeceklerini bildirdiği.	
		2. Arkalarını Bolşevilkere dayayan Kemalistlerin tutsaklarla ilgili taahhütlerini yerine getirmediklerinin ve böylece İngiltere'ye karşı sürdürdükleri düşmanlığı doruk noktasına çıkardıklarının Nazıra anlatıldığı.	
		3. Nazırın, Kemalistlerin, yalnız yardım almak için Bolşeviklere döndükleri, İngiltere'nin Yunanistan'ı desteklemesinden kuşkulandıkları yolunda cevap verdiği.	
		4. Nazıra, İngiltere'nin tarafsız olduğunun söylendiği.	
137	11 haziran	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ MR. RATTIGAN'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A. YAZI. NO. 579.	374
		Malta sürgünleri, İngiliz tutsakları.	
		1. Osmanlı Hariciye Nazırı Sefa Bey, Mr. Rattigan'la görüşür, Kemalistlerin 10 İngiliz tutsağını serbest bırakacaklarını, öteki tutsakların ise Malta'daki bütün Türk sürgünleri serbest bırakılınca teslim edileceklerini bildirir. Türklerin Malta'ya sürülmelerinin Devletler Hukukuna aykırı olduğunu da ekler, İngiltere aleyhinde sert bir dil kullanır. İngiltere'nin Yunanistan'ı yeni bir saldırıya ittiğini söyler.	

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		2. Mr. Rattigan, Bolşeviklere dayanan Ankara Hükûmetinin İngiltere'ye karşı düşmanca davranışlarını sayıp döker. Tutsaklar konusunda da Kemalistlerin taahhütlerini yerine getirmediklerini söyler. İngiltere'nin tarafsız olduğunu öne sürer. Ama İngiliz sabrının da bir sınırı olduğunu ekler.	
		3. Sefa Bey, Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın aslında ılımlı bir kimse olduğunu, başka çaresi kalmadığı için Bolşeviklerden yardım aldığını, İngiltere'den anlayış görmediğini belirtir.	
		4. Rattigan'ın, Mustafa Kemal'i aşırı İttihatçılardan ayırt edemediğini ileri sürmesi üzerine Sefa Bey, İttihatçıların Ankara'da nüfuzları bulunmadığını söyler. İngiltere'nin Yunanistan'ı desteklemesinden, hatta Türkiye'yi yoketmeğe çalışmasından yakınır. Rattigan, Kemalistlerin küstahlıkları yüzünden barış yapılamadığını öne sürer.	
138	13 haziran	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN PARİS'TE İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDINGE'E. YAZI NO. 1634.	378
		1. Fransız Büyükelçisi, Lord Curzon'u evinde ziyaret ederek manda toprakları ve Şilezya sorunlarını görüşür.	
		2. Lord Curzon, Türkiye ve Yunanistan sorununu açar. Bugünkü durumun tehlikeli olduğunu, İngiltere Hükümetinin yeni bir girişime karar verdiğini, Türklere bazı ödünler vererek yeniden müzakerelere girişilmesini önereceğini, Kemalistler bunu kabul etmezlerse Yunanistan'a silâh, cephane, uçak vb. yardımlar yapılacağını ve Kemalistlerin Bolşeviklerden yardım almalarını önlemek için Karadeniz limanlarının abluka altına alınacağını anlatır.	
		3. Fransız Büyükelçisi, bunları sempatiyle karşılar. Venizelos'un İngiltere'de bulunup bulunmadığını ve kendisiyle görüşme yapılıp yapılmadığını sorar.	
		4. Lord Curzon, İngiltere'nin yeni girişim tasarısı hakkında Venizelos'la da görüştüğünü açıklar.	

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139	13 haziran	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN ROMA'DA İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ SIR G. BUCHANAN'A YAZI. No. 501.	381
	1.	İtalya'nın Roma Büyükelçisi, Lord Curzon'u ziyaret ederek Silezya sorununu görüşmüştür.	
	2.	Lord Curzon, İtalya'nın Mustafa Kemal ile ilişkilerini, Kont Sforza'nın Bekir Sami Beyle gizlice anlaşma yapmış olmasını uzun uzun yermiştir.	
	3.	Lord Curzon ayrıca, İtalya'nın Afganistan'la ilişkilerinden de yakınmış, Afganistan'ın İngiliz nüfuz bölgesinde olduğunu söylemiştir.	
	4.	İngiliz Dışişleri Bakanı, İtalya'nın Kemalist yanlısı politikasının felâketli bir başarısızlıkla sonuçlandığını da alaylı bir memnuniyetle belirtmiş ve İtalya'nın artık değişik bir politika izlemesinin kolaylaşacağını söylemiştir.	
140	13 haziran	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. No. 253.	385
	1.	Yunan Kralı Kostantin'in 11 haziran günü "Lemnos" savaş gemisiyle İzmir'e hareket ettiği ve "İstanbul'a" çığlıklarıyla uğurlandığı.	
	2.	Yunan gazetelerinin İstanbul'un Türklerin eline düşmesi ve Kostantin Paleologos'un ölümünün de yılın bu günlerine rastlamış olduğuna dikkati çekerek şimdiki Kral'ın İstanbul'u geri alabileceğini yazdıkları.	
	3.	Yola çıkarken Kral Kostantin'in Yunan ulusuna yayınladığı bildiri: "Elenizmin yüzyıllardır savaştığı o yerlerdeki (Anadolu'daki) ordunun başına geçmek üzere yola çıkıyorum. Kutsal görevini gerçekleştirmek üzere coşkunca ilerleyen bu Soy'un savaşları, Tanrı yardımıyla parlak zaferle sonuçlanacaktır"... (Bildiri metni).	
141	14 haziran	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDINGE'E YAZI. No. 1638.	386
	1.	İngiltere, Orta Doğudaki gelişmeleri ve Türk-Yunan askeri harekâtının yeniden başlaması ihtimalini artan bir kaygıyla izlemiştir.	

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		2. Müttefiklerin karşı karşıya bulundukları siyasal ve askeri sorunların yeniden gözden geçirilmesi gerekmektedir.	
		3. İngiltere, Anadolu'daki Yunan ordularının durumu hakkında yerinde inceleme yaptırmaktadır.	
		4. Bu arada kesin bir politika çizmeğe gerek vardır. Kemalistlerin zafer kazanmaları halinde, Müttefiklerin Suriye, Irak ve Filistin'deki durumları tehlikeye girecek, zaferin meyvaları müttefiklerin elinden gidecektir ve Orta Doğuda barış umudu kalmayacaktır.	
		5. Böyle bir felâketi önlemek için İngiltere, hemen gerekli tedbirlere başvurmak gerektiği sonucuna varmıştır ve Müttefiklerin onaylayacakları ve Türkiye ile Yunanistan'ın kabul edecekleri bir anlaşmaya varılmasını arzu etmektedir. Müzakerelerin başarısızlığı halinde Türklere karşı uygulanacak tedbirleri de düşünmek gerekmektedir.	
		6. Müttefiklerin önce Yunanistan'a öneride bulunmaları, Atina Hükümeti razı olduktan sonra da Türkiye'ye çağrıda bulunmaları uygun olacaktır.	
		7. İngiltere, bu girişimde Fransa ile ahenk kalinde hareket etmek arzusundadır. Lord Curzon da sorunu görüşmek üzere en kısa zamanda Paris'e gitmeğe hazırdır. Bu önerilerin Fransa Hükümetine duyurulması ve Fransa'nın desteğinin sağlanması talimatı.	
142	14 haziran	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ MR. RATTIGAN'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 425.	391
		1. Ankara Hükümetinin, İngiltere ve Fransa'nın tutumundan pek kaygılı olduğu, Bekir Sami Beyi yeniden Avrupa'ya yolladığı, ama Fransa ve İngiltere'ye pek ödün vermek niyetinde görünmediği, Yunanlılara yardım etmemeleri için Müttefikleri yatıştırma politikası izlediği.	
		2. Fransız Yüksek Komiserinin, Ankara'nın tutumundan hiç memnun olmadığı, ama Fransızlar arasında Mustafa Kemal ile anlaşmak yönünde güçlü bir	

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		eğilimi bulunduğu, Franklin-Bouillon'un da 9 haziranda Ankara'ya gittiği.	
		3. İtalyanların Antalya'yı boşaltmağa kesinlikle karar verdikleri.	
		4. Kâzım Karabekir Paşa'nın Mustafa Kemal ile ilişkisini kesip Padişah'a bağlılığını açıkladığı söylentisi. Daha önce de böyle söylentiler dolaştığı, ama bunların aslının çıkmadığı.	
143	15 haziran	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. No. 259.	393
		1. Yunan Kralı Kostantin'in 12 haziranda İzmir'e vardığı ve coşkuyla karşılandığı.	
		2. İzmir'e ayak basar basmaz Yunan ordusuna çağrıda bulunduğu. "Askerler, Vatanın sesi beni yeniden sizin kumandanınız olmağa çağırdı... Bu kutsal topraklar üzerinde, dünyanın hayran olageldiği eşsiz uygarlığı işte tam bu noktada yaratmış olan Elen ülküsü için çarpışıyoruz.. İleri. Kralınız sizinle beraberdir...."	
144	16 haziran	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A ŞİFRE TEL. No. 346.	394
		1. Mustafa Kemal'in önerilerinin göz boyama olduğu.	
		2. Yunanistan'a yardım yapılacaksa hemen yapılması gerektiği.	
		3. İngiliz yardımı geleceği umuduyla Yunan taarruzunun biraz geciktirilebileceği.	
		4. Müttefikler İstanbul'dan çekilirse, Yunanlıların buraya yürüyebilecekleri ve İstanbul'a yürümenin Kral Kostantin için pek çekici olacağı.	
		5. İtalyan Elçisine göre, İtalya'nın Menderes vadisinden çekilmek niyetinde olmadığı.	
145	16 haziran	LONDRA'DA ÇIKAN "ISLAMIC NEWS" (İSLAM HABERLERİ) DERGİSİNİN 16 HAZİRAN 1921 TARİHLİ, 33. SAYISINDAN PARÇA.	395
		"İngiltere uçuruma gidiyor. Yunanistan'ı kurtarmak için kendisini yokediyor".	
		1. Sözümona Türk-Yunan savaşı hızla Türk-İngiliz savaşına dönüşüyor ve İngiltere'nin "tarafsızlık"	

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maskesi yüzünden düşüyor. İngiltere, Türkiye'ye karşı yığınak yapıyor. İngiliz gemileri Mısır'dan ve başka yerlerden Yunanlılara savaş malzemesi taşıyor. İngiltere'nin amacı "Yunanlılara karşı kesin Türk zaferini" önlemektir.

2. İngiliz halkı, başlarındaki centilmenlerin bu felâketli yeni savaş çılgınlığının tam anlamını kavramalı ve İngiliz, son adımını atmadan önce iki kez düşünmelidir.
3. İngiltere'nin Türkiye'ye karşı savaşı, Hindistan'da Britanya İmparatorluğunun mezarını kazacaktır.

"*Ama İngiltere henüz savaş veya barış arasında seçim yapabilir*".

4. Ankara, Batılılarla uyuşmak için çaba harcıyor, değiştokuş işinde suçlanması gereken Ankara değil, Londra'dır. İlerde tutsak değiştokuşu yapılacaktır. Bekir Sami Bey yeniden Avrupa'ya geliyor, M. Franklin-Bouillon Ankara'ya gitti. Ama Mr. Lloyd George ile Lord Curzon, halâ görüşlerini değiştirmiyorlar, Britanya İmparatorluğunun çıkarlarını tehlikeye sokuyorlar.
5. Lloyd George ile Curzon, Yunan hayranlığı ile Britanya çıkarlarını feda ediyorlar. Bugünkü İslâm dünyası Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın önderliğinde yürüyor ve Ankara'ya savaş ilânının İslâm dünyasına savaş ilânı demek olacağını İngiltere farketmelidir.
6. Hindularla Müslümanlar artık birlikte yürüyorlar. 319 milyon Hindistanlı artık köleliği kabul etmiyor. İngiltere Yunan eşkiyalığını desteklerse Hindistan da İrlanda durumuna dönüşecektir. İmparatorluk konferansındaki Hind delegeleri bunu açıkça belirtmelidirler. Hindistan Müslüman delegasyonu, Kral Naibine çağırıda bulunmuş ve "İngiltere Türkiye'ye karşı Yunanistan'la birleşirse, Hindistan'da uyuşma çabaları boşa gidecektir" demiştir.
7. Bugün Hindistan'da en aktüel üç sorun vardır ve Türkiye sorunu hepsinin başında gelmektedir. Bu sorunun çözümü için Hindistan İşleri Bakanı Mr. Montagu'dan çaba harcaması beklenmektedir.

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		"Bir düş gerçekleşiyor"	
		8. "Islamic News", Türk-Afgan andlaşması üzerine Orta Asya Milletleri Birliği kurulması umudunu belirtmişti. Bu kutsal düş gerçekleşiyor gibidir. Türk-Afgan ittifakını görüşmek üzere bir İran heyeti Ankara'ya gitmiştir. Yabancı egemenliğine karşı direnecek büyük bir birlik doğmaktadır. Buna öteki Asya ve Afrika halklarının da katılacakları umulmaktadır.	
		Madame Gaulis'in İnönü cephesinde gördükleri.	
		9. Avrupalı kadın yazar Mme Gaulis, İnönü cephesini gezmiş ve gördüklerini yazmıştır: Süğüt kasabasından bir iskelet kalmıştır. Çekilen Yunanlıların vandalizminden Ertuğrul Gazi'nin türbesi bile kurtulamamıştır. Yunan tutsaklarından bazıları, "bunları bize İngilizler yaptırdı" demişlerdir.	
		Osmanlı Hristiyanları.	
		10. Aslen Türk olan Karaman hristiyanları Fener Rum Patrikhanesinden ayrılmaktadırlar. Fener Patrikhanesi, bu Türk hristiyanlarına benliklerini unutturmağa kalkışmıştır. Şimdi Karamanlılar bağımsız bir kilise kurmak istemektedirler. T. B. M. M.'ne 2747 imzalı bir dilekçe vermişlerdir. Ankara Hükûmeti Karaman hristiyanlarının bağımsız bir kilise kurmalarını kabul etmiştir.	
		11. Son zamanlarda Mustafa Kemal Paşa ile Papa arasında yazışmalar olmuş ve Papa, Türklerin Katolik kilisesine muamelesinden memnun kaldığını bildirmiştir.	
146	18 haziran	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A. ŞİFRE TEL. No. 350.	408
		1. Yunan Dışişleri Bakanının İzmir'e, Harbiye Bakanının da İstanbul'a gittiği.	
		2. Bu gezi üzerine çeşitli yorumlar yapıldığı; Mustafa Kemal Paşa ile müzâkereler yapıldığı, Yunanlıların İstanbul'da üs kurmağa çalıştıkları, Harbiye Bakanının Venizelos yanlısı subaylarla anlaşmağa çalıştığı gibi tahminler yürütüldüğü.	

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		3. Yunan taarruzunun birkaç gün geri bırakıldığı. Yunanlıların İngiltere ve Fransa'dan yardım umdukları, Kralın bütün cepheyi dolaşacağı. Yunan başarısı konusunda Atinada'ki Fransızlarla İtalyanların tahminleri.	
147	18-19 haziran	YAKIN DOĞUDA ARABULUCULUK KONUSUNDA İTİLÂF DEVLETLERİNİN PARİS GÖRÜŞMELERİ	409
		1. Lord Curzon, Türkiye ile Yunanistan arasında Müttefiklerin yeniden arabuluculuk yapmalarının tam zamanı olduğunu söyler ve müttefik önerilerinin hangi esaslara dayanacağını açıklar. İzmir'de özerk bir bölge, Trakya'da Çatalca sınırını önerir ve Türklere baskı yapılmasını ister.	
		2. M. Briand, Trakya'da bir uluslararası bölge, mali kontrol konusunda değişiklik önerir ve Türkleri tehdit etmeye karşı olduğunu söyler.	
		3. Curzon, Doğulularla iş yaparken "arkalarında bir değnek bulundurmanın çok yararlı" olduğunu ileri sürer. Ondan sonra Üçlü Anlaşma, azınlıklar gibi konular konuşulur. Briand, Trakya'ya bir inceleme komisyonu gönderilmesini ister.	
		4. Öğleden sonra toplantıya İtalya Büyükelçisi de katılır, İzmir ve Trakya komisyonu ile ilgili önerilere katıldığını söyler. Üçlü Anlaşmanın değişririlmesi konusunda çekince öne sürer.	
		5. 19 Haziran sabahı görüşmeler sürdürülür. Lord Curzon, Atina'daki Müttefik Elçilerine gönderilecek bir ortak talimat taslağı hazırlar. Bunun üzerinde konuşmalar yapılır. Trakya ve Üçlü Anlaşma konusunda ortak bir görüşe varılamaz. Atina'daki Elçilere talimatın tellenmesi kararlaştırılır.	
		6. General Harington'un İstanbul'daki Müttefik orduları Başkomutanlığına getirilmesine de karar verilir.	
Ek. 1	20 haziran (Alınışı)	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDINGE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI YARDIMCISI SIR E. CROWE'E TEL.	419
		Lord Curzon, Başbakan'a bildirilmek üzere, Paris görüşmelerini anlatır. Arabuluculuk konusunda anlaşmaya varıldığını, Yunan Hükümetine çağrı	

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		için Atina'daki müttefik elçilerine bir talimat tellendiğini, Yunan Hükümeti müttefiklerin arabuluculuğunu kabul ederse ondan sonra Türkiye'ye çağrıda bulunulacağını, Müttefiklerin birlikte hareket etmeleri için toplantı boyunca ısrar ettiğini anlatır.	
Ek. 2	19 haziran	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDINGE ARACILIĞI İLE LORD CURZON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI YARDIMCISI SIR E. CROWE'A. TEL. NO. 389.	420
		(Müttefiklerin Atina Elçilerine gönderilen telgrafın tekrarı).	
		–Müttefiklerin arabuluculuğunu kabul etmesi için Yunanistan'a çağrıda bulunulması talimatı.	
		–Çarpışmaların yeniden başlamasını önlemek amacıyla müttefikler arabuluculuk yapmağa karar vermişlerdir. Yunanistan bu arabuluculuğu kabul ederse barış müzakeresinin koşulları bildirilecektir. Kabul etmezse, savaşın sorumluluğu Yunanistan'a ait olacaktır.	
Ek. 3	19 haziran	LORD HARDINGE ARACILIĞIYLA LORD CURZON'DAN SIR E. CROWE'A TEL. NO. 386.	421
		General Harington'un hemen İstanbul'daki Müttefik kuvvetlerinin komutasını üzerine alması için Fransızlarla anlaşmaya varıldığı. İtalyan Büyükelçisinin bu konuda Hükümetine danışacağı. Ama İtalya'dan bir güçlük çıkacağının sanılmadığı.	
148	20 haziran	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN ROMA'DA İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ SIR G. BUCHANAN'A YAZI. NO. 515. ÇOK GİZLİ.	421
		1. İngiltere Dışişleri Bakan Yardımcısı Sir E. Crowe, Londra'daki İtalyan Büyükelçisiyle görüşür.	
		2. Sir E. Crowe, Türkiye-Yunanistan çatışmasında arabuluculuk yapılması amacıyla Lord Curzon'un Paris'te Fransa Dışişleri Bakanı ile görüşmeler yapacağını ve bu görüşmelere Paris'teki İtalyan Büyükelçisinin katılmasını da arzuladığını bildirir.	
		3. Ondan sonra Sir E. Crowe, İtalya'nın Mustafa Kemal Paşa ile ilişkilerinden yakınır ve İtalya Hü-	

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		kümetinin İngiltere ile daha sıkı işbirliği yapmasını ister.	
		4. Sir E. Crowe ayrıca İtalya'nın Afganistan ile yakın ilişkilerini ve Afgan-İtalyan anlaşmasının imzalanmasını protesto eder.	
		5. İtalyan Büyükelçisi, İtalya-İngiltere ilişkilerinin ahenkleştirilmesi için elinden geleni yapacağını bildirir.	
149	20 haziran	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ KUVVETLERİ BAŞKOMUTANI GENERAL HARINGTON'DAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL. GİZLİ. NO. 454.	426
		Mustafa Kemal-Harington görüşmesi konusu.	
		1. Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın, İnebolu'ya yollanmış olan Binbaşı Henry aracılığıyla, kendisine (Harington'a) bir mesaj göndererek görüşme isteğinde buduğu. Bunun olağanüstü bir olay olduğu.	
		2. İlk kez Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın doğrudan doğruya görüşme isteğinde bulunduğu. Bildirildiğine göre Paşa, Yunanlılara, Fransızlara çok kızgındır. Bolşeviklerden ise yardımdan başka birşey ummamaktadır. Milliyetçi hareketin moralini yükseltmek amacıyla İngilizler aleyhinde propaganda yaptırmaktadır, aslında ise ılımlı bir kimsedir, yalnız çevresinde aşırılar vardır. Görünüşe bakılırsa Mustafa Kemal Paşa, bir askerin bir başka askerle görüşmesi biçiminde görüşlerini (Harington'a) bildirmek istemektedir.	
		3. Hükümetçe uygun görülürse kendisinin (Harington'un) bir İngiliz gemisiyle İnebolu'ya gidip Mustafa Kemal'in görüşlerini kendisinden dinleyip rapor etmeğe hazır olduğu.	
		4. Kendisinin (Harington'un) politikaya karışmayı sevmediği, ama uygun görülürse Mustafa Kemal Paşa ile görüşeceği ve talimat beklediği.	
150	20 haziran	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ MR. RATTIGAN'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞIŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A ŞİFRE TEL. NO. 443.	428
		Mustafa Kemal-Harington görüşmesi konusu.	

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		1. Mustafa Kemal'in görüşme isteğinin Gerenal Harington ve Amiral de Robeck'le birlikte müzakere edildiği. 2. Görüşmeye izin verilirse Mustafa Kemal'in kıyıda bekleyecek İngiliz savaş gemisine çağırılması, yalnız söyleyeceklerinin dinlenmesi, görüşmenin İngiliz gemisinde yapılması ve İngiltere'nin Kemalistlerin peşinde konuşmadığının açıkça belirtilmesi gerektiği. 3. Aslında kendisinin (Rattigan'ın) bu görüşmeye karşı olduğu, ama General Harington'a güveni bulunduğu.	
151	21 haziran	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞI GÖREVLİLERİNDEN MR. D. G. OSBORNE'UN HAZIRLADIĞI MUHTIRA. Mustafa Kemal-Harington görüşmesi konusu. 1. Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın General Harington'la görüşme isteğinin Fransa ve İtalya'ya da haber verilmesi ve yapılacaksa görüşmede bu ülkeler temsilcilerinin de bulunmasının uygun olacağı. 2. Ama, İngiltere'yi müttefiklerinden ayırıp görüşmelere sürükleme amacı güttüğü sanılan bu isteğin, reddedilmesinin daha iyi olacağı. 3. Ayrıca, eğer aşırı kimselerin eline düşmüşse Mustafa Kemal'in artık Ankara'yı temsil edemeyeceği.	429
152	21 haziran	İNGİLİZ BAKANLAR KURULU GÖRÜŞMELERİ TUTANAĞI. (KISMEN). .... Mustafa Kemal-Harington görüşmesi konusu. 1. Mustafa Kemal'in Harington'la görüşme isteğine ilişkin olarak İstanbul'dan alının telgraflar üzerine Kabine'nin dikkatinin çekildiği. 2. Kabine görüşmelerinde Ankara'da Bolşevik nüfuzunu önlemek ve daha sonra yapılacak müzakerelere ortam hazırlamak amacıyla Mustafa Kemal önerisinin kabul edilmesinin istendiği. 3. Müttefiklerin arabuluculuk önerileri konusunda Yunanistan'dan cevap beklediği bir sırada Mustafa Kemal'le ilişki kurmanın zamansız olacağının da belirtildiği. 4. Fransa ve İtalya'ya haber verilmesi ve görüşmelerin ertesi güne ertelenmesinin kararlaştırıldığı.	430

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153	22 haziran	İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINDAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA YAZI NO. 0152/5875. (M. 1. 2), GİZLİ	431
		M. Kemal-Harington görüşmesi konusu.	
	1.	Mustafa Kemal'in görüşme önerisine ilişkin olarak General Harington'dan alınan telgraf örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğu. Bu konuda Dışişleri Bakanlığının görüşünün tezelden bildirilmesi ricası.	
	2.	Savunma Bakanlığının, buluşmanın kıyıda, bir İngiliz savaş gemisinde yapılmasından yana olduğu.	
154	22 haziran	İNGİLİZ BAKANLAR KURULU GÖRÜŞMELERİ TUTANAĞI (KISMEN).	431
		M. Kemal-Harington görüşmesi konusu.	
	1.	İngiliz kabinesi, M. Kemal-Harington görüşmesi konusunu yeniden ele alır ve önce Harington'a gönderilecek talimat üzerinde durur.	
	2.	Talimatta, görüşmenin yararlı olabileceği, ancak henüz tam zamanının gelmediği, bu arada Ankaranın Bolşevikler ve İtilâf devletlerine karşı tutumu hakkında bilgi toplanması, Türklerin Bolşeviklere karşı uyarılması noktalarına parmak basılır.	
	3.	Fransa ile İtalya'nın da rızalarının alınması istenir.	
	4.	Mr. Lloyd George, görüşme sırasında Harington'un yanında tecrübeli bir diplomatın da bulunmasını önerir.	
	5.	Durumun Fransa ve İtalya'ya duyurulmasına karar verilir.	
155	22 haziran	LORD CURZON'DAN İNGİLTERE'NİN PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDINGE'E VE ROMA BÜYÜKELÇİSİ SIR G. BUCHANAN'A ŞİFRE TEL. NO. 341 (267).	433
		M. Kemal-Harington görüşmesi konusu.	
	1.	General Harington'la görüşmek istediği yolunda Mustafa Kemal'den bir mesaj alındığının Fransa (İtalya) Hükümetine duyurulması.	
	2.	İngiltere, görüşme fırsatını kaçırmak istememektedir. Fransa (İtalya) hükümeti razı ise, Mustafa Kemal'le görüşmek üzere bir İngiliz temsilcisinin Karadeniz'e gönderileceği. Fransa (İtalya) Hükümetinin görüşünün öğrenilmesi talimatı.	
156	22 haziran	İNGİLTERE'NİN SOFYA ELÇİSİ SIR A. PEEL'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 84. ...	433

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		1. Mustafa Kemal ile Bolşevikler, Bulgar komitacılarıyla birlikte Trakya'da karışıklık çıkarırlarsa, bundan Bulgaristan'ın da sorumlu tutulacağı yolunda Bulgar Kralına yapılan uyarının etkisini gösterdiği.	
		2. Bulgar Başbakanının güvence verdiği, Cevad Abbas'la ilişki kurulmadığını, Komitelerle görüşme yapan Kemalistler olursa bunların hemen sınırdışı edileceklerini söylediği. Sovyetlerle de ilişki kurmadılarını bildirdiği. Varna ve Burgas'tan Trakya'ya silâh kaçakçılığını önleyici tedbirler almaya de söz verdiği.	
157	23 haziran	PARİS'TE İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDINGE'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A ŞİFRE TEL. NO. 411.	435
		M. Kemal-Harington görüşmesi konusu.	
		1. Mustafa Kemal ile görüşme yapılmasını, M. Briand-ın uygun gördüğü.	
		2. Ancak bu görüşmelerin, arabuluculuk önerisinin Yunanlılarca kabul edilmesinden önce başlamasının, Türklerle öngörülen resmi müzakereleri öne almasından kaygılandığı.	
158	23 haziran	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ MR. RATTIGAN'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A ŞİFRE. TEL. NO. 450. GİZLİ.	435
		M. Kemal-Harington görüşmesi konusu.	
		1. Kendisinin (Rattigan'ın) Ankara ile gizli müzakerelere girişilmesine şahsen çok karşı olduğu.	
		2. Harington'un M. Kemal ile görüşmesine de ancak Generale güveni dolayisiyle karşı gelmediği.	
159	23 haziran	YUNANİSTAN'IN LONDRA İŞGÜDERİ RIZO-RANGABE'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A NOTA.	436
		Yunanistan Başbakanı M. Gounaris'in İzmir'de, Kralın da onayıyla hazırladığı bir muhtıranın ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek.	20 haziran	YUNANİSTAN BAŞBAKANI M. GOUNARIS'İN İZMİR'DEN İNGİLTERE HÜKÜMETİNE GÖNDERDİĞİ MUHTIRA.	
		1. Yunanistan'ın Anadolu'da askeri harekâtı yeniden başlatması arifesinde, Yunan halkının giriştiği sa-	

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		vaşın temel nedenlerini İngiltere'ye bildirmeyi bir görev bildiği.	
		2. Londra konferansında Yunanistan uzlaşıcı bir tutum izledi, ama Ankara'dan aynı tutumu bulamadı. Türkler, Konferans önerilerine karşılık bile vermediler.	
		3. Kemalistler, Kilikya'dan getirdikleri kuvvetlerle cephelerini güçlendirmiş ve Yunan ordusunu tehdit etmeğe başlamışlardır. Bunun üzerine Yunanistan, 23 martta taarruza karar verdi. Türklerin elinde ağır toplar bulunduğu anlaşıldı. Yunan ordusu daha iyi hazırlanıp yeniden taarruza geçebilmek için geri çekildi.	
		4. Bu taarruz sırasında Yunan orduları, daha önceki disiplinsiz sürüler yerine düzenli bir orduyla karşı karşıya olduklarını gördüler.	
		5. Ortaya çıkan bu yeni durum karşısında Yunan Hükümeti yeni tedbirlere başvurdu. Savaş için 625 milyonluk bir ödenek kabul edildi. Yedi kura askere çağırıldı, yeniden 53 bin asker toplandı.	
		6. Yunan ulusu üç bin yıldır bu toprakların anısını yaşatmıştır. Elenizm, Ege'nin Anadolu yakasına da muhtaçtır. Bu yerleri elinde tutmakla Asya tehlikesine karşı Avrupa'yı koruma görevini de yerine getirmiş olacaktır. Bu toprakları Türk yönetiminden kurtarmadıkça, doğuda gerçek ve sürekli barış gerçekleştirilemez	
		7. Yunanistan'ın politikası, aynı zamanda İngiltere'nin çıkarlarına da uygun düşmektedir. Yunanistan, Doğu Akdeniz havzasının ve Boğazların koruyuculuğunu yapmış olacaktır.	
		8. Bu savaşında Yunanistan, İngiltere'den anlayış ve destek göreceğini ummaktadır.	
160	25 haziran	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDAN BAYAN RAWLINSON'A YAZI.	441
		Türkiye'deki bütün İngiliz tutsaklarının iyi oldukları yolunda Mustafa Kemal'den bir mesaj alındığı. Albay Rawlinson'un Erzurum'da tutsak bulunduğu haberi.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
161	25 haziran	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 275 Arabuluculuk konusunda müttefik önerisine Yunanista'ın cevabının ilişikte sunulduğu.	441
Ek.	25 haziran	YUNANİSTAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDAN İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİLİĞİNE NOTA.	442
		1. Yunan Hükümeti, müttefiklerin arabuluculuk önerilerini pek büyük bir ciddiyetle incelemiştir, onların insani duygularını büyük bir takdirle karşılar.	
		2. Ancak Yunanistan, Elenizmin yüzyıllık emellerini ve Sèvres andlaşmasından doğan haklarını savunurken, aynı zamanda uygar dünyanın Doğu Akdeniz ve Boğazlar bölgesindeki çıkarlarını de koruduğu inancındadır.	
		3. Bu görev anlayışı Yunanistan'ı Türklere karşı yeni bir savaş için bütün fedakârlıkları yapmağa itmiştir.	
		4. Bu bakımdan Yunanistan, müttefiklerin tavsiyelerini kabul edememektedir. Askeri harekâtı geciktirmek, Yunanistan'ın zararına olacaktır.	
		5. Müttefik devletlerin dostluk duyguları Yunanistan için bir güvencedir ve Yunanistan, askeri harekâtın herhangi bir safhasında büyük müttefiklerini dinlemeğe yine hazır olacaktır.	
		6. Yunan ordularının misyonunu müttefiklerin gözönünde tutacağından Yunanistan'ın kuşkusu yoktur.	
		7. Türklere gerekli tedbirler empoze edildikten sonra Doğu'da kurulacak yeni *statu quo*'nun muhafızlığını Yunanistan kolayca yapacaktır.	
162	25 haziran	İNGİLTERE'NİN ROMA BÜYÜKELÇİSİ SIR G. BUCHANAN'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A ŞİFRE TEL. NO. 253. .... M. Kemal-Harington görüşmesi konusu. Mustafa Kemal ile görüşmeyi İtalya Dışişleri Bakanının uygun bulduğu ve görüşmede İngiliz temsilcisiyle birlikte İtalyan ve Fransız temsilcilerinin de bulunmalarını önerdiği.	444
163	27 haziran	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 281.	444

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		1. Yunan basının, oybirliği ile müttefiklerin arabuluculuk önerilerinin Yunanistan tarafından kabul edilemeyeceğini yazdığı. Yalnız sosyalist "Rizospastis" gazetesinin bu fırsattan yararlanıp savaşa son vermeyi savunduğu.	
		2. Gazeteler, arabuluculuk önerisinin önce Yunanistan'a yapılmış olmasını ilk günlerde İngiltere'nin Yunan dostluğunun sonucu olduğunu belirtirken şimdi bunu da eleştirdikleri ve Büyük devletlerin Yunanistan'a karşı düşmanca davranışı gibi yorumladıkları.	
		3. Müttefiklerin notasına Yunanistan'ın cevabı yayınlanınca, sosyalist organ dışındaki bütün gazetelerin ağız birliğiyle bunu yerinde buldukları.	
		4. Yunan ordusunun Panislamizm ve Bolşevizm karşısında tek set olduğunun, Mustafa Kemal'i ezmeden barış yapılamayacağının ileri sürüldüğü.	
		5. Afyon–Kütahya–Eskişehir hattına kadar ilerledikten ve Mustafa Kemal'in küstahlığına ve prestijine bir darbe indirdikten sonra Yunanistan'ın arabuluculuk önerisine yanaşabileceğinin sanıldığı.	
		6. Atina'daki İtalyan Elçisinin de Yunanlıların Mustafa Kemal'e karşı kesin bir zafer kazanmaları gerektiğini söylediği.	
164	30 haziran	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDINGE-DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A. ŞİFRE TEL. No. 436. Fransa Başbakanının, Yunanistan'ın tutumu karşısında Mustafa Kemal ile görüşmenin daha da gerekli olduğunu söylediği.	446
165	1 temmuz	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ MR. RATTIGAN'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. No. 475.	447
		1. Kemalist kuvvetlerin tarafsız bölgeye girmemeleri için Osmanlı Hariciye Nazırının uyarıldığı.	
		2. Doğrudan doğruya Anadolu'ya uyarıda bulunmağa gerek olmadığı.	
166	1 temmuz	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDINGE'E. YAZI. No. 1828.	447

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		1. Fransa'nın, Londra Büyükelçisi aracılığıyla, arabuluculuk önerisini reddeden Yunanistan'a sert davranılmasını istediği: (i) Savaşın yeniden başlatılmasından sorumlu olacağının Yunanistan'a hatırlatılmasını, (ii) İstanbul'un ve Marmara'nın Yunan gemilerince üs olarak kullanılması kolaylığının kaldırılmasını önerdiği.	
		2. Kendisinin (Curzon'un) ise her iki öneriyi de reddettiği.	
		3. Anadolu'da askerî başarılar kazandıktan sonra Yunanistan'ın Müttefiklerin arabuluculuk önerisini kabul edebileceği kanısı.	
167	2 temmuz	LORD CURZON'DAN PARİS'TE İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDINGE'E TEL. İVEDİ. NO. 360.	449
		M. Kemal-Harington görüşmesi konusu.	
		1. Görüşmek üzere bir Karadeniz limanına gelmesi yolunda Mustafa Kemal'e çağrıda bulunması için General Harington'a talimat gönderildiği.	
		2. Müzakere söz konusu olmadığı için görüşmede Fransız ve İtalyan delegelerinin de bulunmalarına gerek bulunmadığı.	
		3. General Harington'un M. Kemal'i yalnız dinlemekle yetineceği ve onunla müzakereye girişmeyeceği.	
168	2 temmuz	LORD CURZON'DAN İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ MR. RATTIGAN'A TEL. ÇOK İVEDİ. No. 406.	450
		M. Kemal-Harington görüşmesi konusu.	
		1. Mustafa Kemal ile buluşması için General Harington'a talimat gönderileceği.	
		2. Görüşmede, General Harington'un yanında kendisinin de (Rattigan'ın da) bulunması gerektiği.	
169	2 tammuz	İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINDAN İSTANBUL'DA MÜTTEFİK ORDULARI BAŞKOMUTANI GENERAL HARINGTON'A. ŞİFRE TEL. GİZLİ. NO. 89383.	450
		1. Mustafa Kemal ile buluşup söyleyeceklerini dinleyeceksiniz.	
		2. Mr. Rattigan katılmasa da görüşmek üzere Mustafa Kemal'e çağrıda bulunacaksınız.	
		3. Talimatınız, M. Kemal'in bildireceklerini dinleyip rapor etmektir.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
170	2 temmuz	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ İSTİHBARAT SERVİSİ İSTANBUL ŞUBESİNCE HAZIRLANAN RAPOR (KISMEN). No. 273. .	451
		Milliyetçiler ve Müttefik önerileri.	
	1.	Müttefiklerin arabuluculuk girişimleri üzerine, Kelistlerin İzmir ve Trakya hakkındaki görüşlerinin değişmediği. Bu yerlerin tam boşaltılması ve Kemalist kuvvetlerin başlıca stratejik noktaları işgal etmeleri gerektiği yolunda karar aldıkları.	
	2.	İzmir ve Trakya boşaltıldıktan sonra Kemalistlerin belki İngiltere'ye karşı düşmanlıklarını sürdürmeyebilecekleri, İttihatçıların ise İstanbul'un ve Boğazlar bölgesinin de boşaltılmasını, kapitülasyonların, mali kontrolün kaldırılmasını da isteyebilecekleri.	
	3.	Kemalistlerle Enveristler arasında rekabet belirtileri bulunduğu, Yunan zaferinin de Enver Paşa yanlılarını güçlendireceği.	
171	3 temmuz	İSTANBUL'DA MÜTTEFİK ORDULARI BAŞKOMUTANI GENERAL HARINGTON'DAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL. YILDIRIM. GİZLİ. No. 526.	452
		M. Kemal-Harington görüşmesi konusu.	
	1.	İzzet Paşa aracılığıyla Mustafa Kemal Paşa'ya bir mesaj göndererek görüşmek üzere Ajax gemisiyle İnebolu açıklarında bulunacağımı ve söyleyeceklerini dinleyip Hükümetime rapor edeceğimi bildireceğim. Mustafa Kemal'den sormam gereken konular varsa bildirilmesi.	
	2.	Söylenen her şey tutanağa geçirilip rapor edilecektir. Hiç kimseyi taahhüt altına sokmayacağım. Yüksek Komiserlikten, Bahriyeden de birer temsilcinin gemide bulunmasını önereceğim. Buluşmanın Yunan taarruzu başlamadan önce yapılması gerekir.	
172	3 temmuz	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ MR. RATTIGAN'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. No. 641.	453
		İnebolu'da İngilizlerle Refet Paşa arasında yapılan görüşme konusunda Mr. Stourton'un hazırladığı rapor ile Mr. Ryan'ın bu rapora ilişkin muhtırasının ilişikte sunulduğu.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
Ek. 1	27 haziran	MR. STOURTON TARAFINDAN HAZIRLANAN VE "İNEBOLU KONUŞMALARI SIRASINDA REFET PAŞA'NIN ANKARA HÜKÜMETİ ADINA İNGİLİZLERE YAPTIĞI TEKLİFLER" BAŞLIKLI RAPOR.	
		(Refet Paşa'nın anlattıkları).	
		1. *Ankara Hükümetinin yakın ve ortadoğu politikası:* Türk nufusunun çoğunlukta olduğu bölgeler, Türkiye sınırları içinde özerk olacaktır. Bunu sağlamak için sonuna kadar savaşılacaktır. İzmir'de ve Trakya'da prebisit yapılabilir. Yakın ve Orta Doğu ülkeleri bir federasyon kurabilirler.	
		2. *İç Politika:* Türkiye meşruti bir hükümdarca yönetilecek ve bu hükümdar aynı zamanda halife olacaktır.	
		3. *Rusya* ile yakınlık bir zaruretten doğmuştur.	
		4. *Bulgaristan* bir ittifak yapılması için Ankara'ya öneride bulunmuştur.	
		5. *Fransa ve İtalya ile ilişkileri* Ankara Hükümeti pek önemsememektedir.	
		6. *İngiltere ile ilişkiler:* Ankara, ileride İngiltere ile sağlam bir ittifak kurma amacı gütmektedir. Irak'ı yeniden zaptetmek niyetinde değildir. Boğazlarda yabancı kontrolünü kabul edemez, İngiltere'ye karşı Hindistan'da Panislamizmi kullanmak arzusunda değildir. İngiliz tutsaklarıyla Malta sürgünleri değiştokuş edileceklerdir. Yetkili bir İngiliz temsilcisi gönderilirse, Mustafa Kemal Paşa onunla Kastamonu'da veya İnebolu'da görüşebilir. Ankara kuvvetleri tarafsız bölgeye girmeyeceklerdir.	
		7. Büyük savaş arifesinde Türkiye, Fransa ve İngiltere'den anlayış göremediği için Almanya'ya yanaşmak zorunda kalmıştır.	
		8. Mustafa Kemal Paşa yürük asıllıdır. Olağanüstü yetenekli ve dürüsttür.	
Ek. 2	30 haziran	İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERLİĞİ BAŞTERCÜMANI MR. RYAN'IN HAZIRLADIĞI MUHTIRA.	458
		1. Refet Paşa'nın Binbaşı Stourton'a söylediklerinin birer palavra olduğu, ama bunların içinde sakıncalı telkinler de bulunduğu. Şöyle ki:	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		2. Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın epeyce İngiliz yanlısı ılımlı bir kimse olduğuna İngiltere'yi inandırmak, Ankara Hükümetini Türkiye'nin tek hükümeti olarak tanıtmak ve İngiltere'yi Fransa'dan ayırmak gibi amaçlar güdüldüğü.	
		3. Mustafa Kemal'in Bolşeviklerden ürkmüş ve Müttefiklerin kollarına atılmağa hazır olduğunu gösteren herhangi bir belirti bulunmadığı. Onun hala Millî Misakı gerçekleştirmek, Türkiye'deki bütün yabancı nüfuzunu yoketmek ve Türkiye'ye ileride güçlü bir yer sağlamak istediği.	
		4. İngiltere'nin Padişah Hükümetini tek meşru Hükümet olarak tanıdığı, Fransa ile arasına kama sokulmasına yanaşmayacağı, barış için galibin peşinde koşmadığı belirtilmek koşuluyla Mustafa Kemal'le açıkça konuşma yapılabileceği.	
173	4 temmuz	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ MR. RATTIGAN'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞIŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. YILDIRIM. NO. 482.	460
		M. Kemal-Harington görüşmesi konusu.	
		1. Mustafa Kemal ile görüşme konusu hakkında Fransız ve İtalyan Yüksek Komiserlerine bilgi verildiği.	
		2. Görüşmede Harington'un yanında kendisinin (Mr. Rattigan'ın) da bulunacağı. Özel bir talimat olacaksa bildirilmesi.	
		3. Yunan taarruzu başlamışsa Mustafa Kemal'in kıyıya gelmesinin güç olacağı.	
174	5 temmuz	İNGİLTERE DIŞIŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDAN SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA YAZI NO. E. 7656/L/44.	461
		Ankara Hükümetinin İngiliz tutsaklarının teslimi konusundaki tutumunun hoş görülmez olduğunu Mustafa Kemal'e bildirilmesi için General Harington'a talimat verilmesi isteği.	
175	5 temmuz	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ MR. RATTIGAN'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞIŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 489.	461
		M. Kemal-Harington görüşmesi konusu.	
		1. Mustafa Kemal'le yapılacak görüşme hakkında Yüksek Komiserlikçe İstanbul Hükümetine bilgi verildiği.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		2. General Harington da hazırladığı mesajı Mustafa Kemal'e ulaştırılmak üzere Osmanlı Hariciye Nazırına verdiği ve mesajın bir İngiliz gemisiyle 4 Temmuz günü Zonguldak'a gönderildiği. Mustafa Kemal'den birkaç gün içinde cevap beklendiği.	
		3. İngiltere'nin İstanbul Hükümetini bir kenara itmek niyetinde olmadığının Padişaha da duyurulacağı.	
176	5 temmuz	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ MR. RATTIGAN'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 490.	463
		General Harington'dan Mustafa Kemal Paşa'ya mesaj.	
		"Görüşmek istediğinizi binbaşı Henry aracılığıyla öğrendim. İnebolu'ya veya İzmit'e gidip görüşme yapabileceğim. Sizi dinleyip İngiliz Hükümetine rapor etmeğe yetkiliyim, ama İngiltere adına müzakereye yetkim yok. Görüşme, İngiliz gemisinde yapılacaktır. Kabul ediyorsanız size uygun gün ve saati lütfen telleyiniz".	
177	5 temmuz	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ MR. RATTIGAN'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 491.	463
		Mustafa Kemal-Harington görüşmesi konusu.	
		1. Ankara'nın İstanbul temsilcisi Hamid Beyin, Harington'un M. Kemal ile görüşmek istediğinin doğrulanmasını istediği ve Mustafa Kemal'e telgraf çekeceği.	
		2. Hamid Beye, Bolşeviklere dayanan Kemalistlerin Müttefiklere meydan okumağa kalkışmalarının sakıncalı olduğunun anlatıldığı.	
178	5 temmuz	İNGİLTERE'NİN BERLİN BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD D'ABERNON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. No. 902.	465
		1. Enver Paşa'nın Berlin'den Moskova'ya gittiği.	
		2. Mustafa Kemal'in temsilcisi Nuri Paşa'nın ve öteki seçkin Türklerin de Almanya'dan ayrıldıkları.	
		3. Almanya'nın, ülkesindeki İngiliz aleyhtarı entrikalara son verip İngiltere ile uyuşmak amacı güttüğü.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
179	6 temmuz	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ MR. RATTIGAN'A TEL No. 418. İvedi .... Mustafa Kemal ile müzakereye girişilmeyeceği için verilecek özel bir talimat olmadığı. Yalnız Ankara'nın, İngiliz tutsakları konusundaki tutumundan dolayı İngiltere'nin infialinin belirtilebileceği.	467
180	6 temmuz	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ MR. RATTIGAN'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI No. 651. .... 1. İzzet Paşa'dan alınan bir muhtıranın ilişikte sunulduğu. 2. Bazı yönleri kabul edilemeyecek nitelikte olmakla birlikte, bu muhtırada ileri sürülen isteklerin Ankara'nın isteklerinden daha ılımlı olduğu. Kemalistlerin hep Millî Misak'ı esas aldıkları. En ılımlı Kemalistlerin bile bağımsızlık amacı güttükleri. 3. İzzet Paşa'nın ileri sürdüğü istekleri elde edebilirlerse Kemalistlerin belki İngiltere ile anlaşabilecekleri.	467
Ek.	—	OSMANLI HARİCİYE NAZIRI İZZET PAŞA'DAN İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ RATTIGAN'A MUHTIRA. 1. Avrupa'nın vadettiği bağımsız Türkiye'nin gerçekleşebilmesinin aşağıdaki koşullara bağlı olduğu: i) Bütün Anadolu'nun Türkiye'ye verilmesi. ii) Meriç sınırının kabulü. iii) İstanbul'un güvenliği koşuluyla Boğazlarda geçiş serbestisi. vi) Azınlıklara, Avrupa azınlıkları gibi haklar verilmesi. v) Ekonomik kapitülasyonların kaldırılması. vi) Türk ordusunun mevcudunun yükseltilmesi, daha fazla asker. vii) Mali komisyonun yetkililerinin sınırlandırılması. 2. Buna karşılık Türkiye, Müttefiklerin Arap ülkelerindeki çıkarlarına zarar vermeyecektir.	469

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
181	6 temmuz	TÜRKİYE BÜYÜK MİLLET MECLİSİ BAŞKANI MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞA'DAN İSTANBUL'DA MÜTTEFİK ORDULARI BAŞKOMUTANI GENERAL HARINGTON'A TEL.	470
		1. Mektubunuzu aldım. Bir yanlış anlaşmayı gidermek için şunu belirtmeliyim: Binbaşı Henry, sizin benimle görüşmek arzusunda olduğunuzu bildirdi. Aramızda başlayan yazışmaların çıkış noktası budur. 2. Topraklarımızın kurtuluşu, ulusal sınırlarımız içinde siyasi, malî, ekonomik, askeri, adli ve kültürel tam bağımsızlığımız ilkesi tanınırsa müzakereye hazır olacağız. Görüşmeler İnebolu'da karada yapılacaktır. 3. Cevabınızı bekliyorum. Yalnız görüş teatisi arzu ediyorsanız o zaman bir arkadaşımızı görevlendirebiliriz.	
182	7 temmuz	İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINDAN İSTANBUL'DA GENERAL HARINGTON'A ŞİFRE TEL. NO. 39416. GİZLİ.	471
		Mustafa Kemal ile yapılacak görüşmede İngiliz tutsakları konusunda İngiltere'nin şikayetinden söz açılması.	
183	7 temmuz	İSTANBUL'DA MÜTTEFİK ORDULARI BAŞKOMUTANI GENERAL HARINGTON'DAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL. YILDIRIM. NO. 548. GİZLİ.	472
		1. Mustafa Kemal'den cevap geldi. Anlaşılan Binbaşı Henry talimatımı aşmış, Ankara'da yanlış izlenim yaratmış. 2. Mustafa Kemal, koşullarını bildiriyor: Milliyetçi toprakların tam kurtuluşu, siyasi, malî, iktisadi, askeri ve adli tam bağımsızlık. Ancak bu esaslar üzerinde müzakereye girişebileceğini bildiriyor. 3. Talimat bekliyorum.	
184	7 temmuz	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ MR. RATTİGAN'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL NO. 495.	472
		1. Mustafa Kemal'den (Harington'a) cevap geldi. Görüşme isteğinin Harington'dan geldiğini öne	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		sürüyor. Karada müzakere istiyor. Şartları: Türkiye'nin kurtuluşu ve tam bağımsızlığı. Yalnız görüş teatisinde bulunulacaksa kendisinin görüşmeye gelmeyeceğini, yerine bir arkadaşını göndereceğini bildiriyor.	
	2.	Binbaşı Henry'nin talimatını aşmış olduğu anlaşılıyor.	
	3.	Mustafa Kemal'in tatminkâr olmayan cevabı karşısında Osmanlı Hariciye Nazırıyla görüşeceğim. Kimsenin Mustafa Kemal'le görüşme istemediğini, kendisinin böyle bir istekte bulunduğunu söyleyeceğim.	
	4.	Mustafa Kemal'in ilkeleri kabul edilecek gibi dağildir. Ankara'nın peşinde koşuyormuşuz gibi yanlış bir izlenimi hemen silmemiz gerektiği kanısındayım	
185	8 temmuz	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ MR. RATTIGAN'A ŞİFRE TEL. NO. 426. ÇOK İVEDİ. ... M. Kemal-Harington görüşmesi konusu.	474
	1.	Mustafa Kemal'in cevabıyla ortaya çıkan sorun, bir Hükümet kararı işidir.	
	2.	İstanbul'da İngiltere'yi bağlayacak bir davranıştan kaçınmanız ve talimat almadan Mustafa Kemal'e bir cevap vermemeniz gerekir. (Bkz. No. 194).	
186	8 temmuz	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A ŞİFRE TEL NO. 388.	474
	1.	Atina'da çeşitli hikâyeler anlatılıyor. Bir söylentiye göre, Ankara ile müzakereler yapılıyormuş, bu yüzden Yunan taarruzu geciktiriliyormuş. Bir başka hikâyeye göre de, Yunanlılar Türk komutanlarını satın almışlarmış.	
	2.	Bir Hükümet gazetesi, Mustafa Kemal Trakya'dan vazgeçerse ve İzmir konusunda uyuşmaya yanaşırsa Yunanistan'ın barışa razı olabileceğini yazdı.	
187	8 temmuz	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ MR. RATTIGAN'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO 499.	475
	1.	Mustafa Kemal'e gönderilecek cevabın İstanbul Hükümeti Haricye Nazırına verildiği. Bu arada,	

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		görüşmeyi önce Harington'un değil, Mustafa Kemal'in istemiş olduğunun da söylendiği.	
		2. Ayrıca, Mustafa Kemal'in tam bağımsızlık isteğinin çılgınlık olduğunun, İngiltere'nin müzakereye girişmek niyetinde olmadığının belirtildiği.	
		3. Hariciye Nazırının yanında bulunan Hamid Beyin, M. Kemal-Harington görüşmesinden vazgeçilmiş olmasına üzüntülerini bildirdiği.	
		4. İngiltere bakımından bu işin artık kapanmış olduğunun söylendiği.	
		5. Kemalist Hükümetinin Bolşeviklerin avuçlarına düşmüş olduğu kanısı.	
188	8 temmuz	İSTANBUL'DA MÜTTEFİK ORDULARI BAŞKOMUTANI GENERAL HARINGTON'DAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL. No. 557. GİZLİ.	476
		M. Kemal-Harington görüşmesi konusu.	
		1. Yüksek Komiserliğin yanlış izlenim edinmiş olduğu.	
		2. Mustafa Kemal'in telgrafının tatminkâr olmadığının kesinlikle öne sürülemeyeceği.	
		3. Mustafa Kemal'in halâ görüşmek istediği kanısındayım.	
189	8 temmuz	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ MR. RATTIGAN'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A ŞİFRE TEL. No. 506.	478
		1. Mustafa Kemal'in cevabı karşısında İngiltere'nin Yunanistan'dan yana bir politika izlemesinin İstanbul'un Yunanlılarca (üs olarak) kullanılmasının uygun olacağı. Amiral de Robeck ile General Harington'un da böyle düşündükleri.	
		2. Ankara'da aşırıların hakim olduğu, Kemalistlerle anlaşma olanağı bulunmadığı.	
190	8 temmuz	İNGİLİZ AKDENİZ DONANMASI BAŞKOMUTANINDAN İNGİLTERE BAHRİYE BAKANLIĞINA TEL. No. 374. GİZLİ.	479
		Mustafa Kemal'in Harington'a cevabı ve İngiliz tutsakları sorunu karşısında artık pek tarafsız olunmaması ve Yunan gemilerinin İstanbul'u üs olarak kullanabilmeleri isteği.	

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191	9 temmuz	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ MR. RATTIGAN'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A ŞİFRE TEL NO. 510.	479
		1. Mustafa Kemal'in cevabını ve bunun karşısındaki davranışımı Fransız ve İtalyan Komiserlerine bildirdim.	
		2. Ankara'nın akıl almaz isteklerinin hemen reddedilmiş olmasını onlar da uygun görüyorlar.	
192	9 temmuz	İSTANBUL'DA MÜTTEFİK ORDULARI BAŞKOMUTANI GENERAL HARINGTON'DAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL NO. 569. GİZLİ.	480
		1. İngiliz Yüksek Komiser Vekili ile görüştükten sonra Ankara Hükümetinin İstanbul temsilcisi Hamid Beyin Ankara'ya çektiği telgrafın tellendiği. Hamid Beyin General Pellé ile görüşmesi.	
		2. (Yüksek Komiser Vekilinin ileri sürdüğünün aksine) Ankara'nın Bolşeviklerin avucuna düşmüş olduğunun söylenemeyeceği. Türkiye'nin Fransa'ya dönmekte olduğunun dikkati çektiği.	
		3. Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın Harington'a gönderdiği telgraftan parçalar. Buna henüz cevap verilmediği. Talimat beklendiği.	
		4. Mustafa Kemal'in hemen isteklerinin asgarisini açıklayamayacağı ve herhalde kendisini (Harington'u) boş yere İnebolu'ya çağırmadığı.	
193	9 temmuz	LORD CURZON'DAN İNGİLTERE'NİN PARİS İŞGÜDERİ SIR E. CHELTHAM'A VE ROMA BÜYÜKELÇİSİ SIR G. BUCHANAN'A ŞİFRE TEL NO. 383. (295). .... M. Kemal-Harington görüşmesi konusu.	481
		1. Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın General Harington'a cevap verdiği, görüşme isteğinin Harington'dan geldiğini iddia ettiği ve ancak Türk topraklarının tam kurtuluşu ve tam bağımsızlığı esaslarına göre müzakereye girişebileceğini bildirdiği.	
		2. Arada tam bir anlaşmazlık bulunduğunun Osmanlı Hariciye Nazırına bildirildiği.	
		3. M. Kemal'in aşırı istekleri karşısında kendisine cevap verilip verilmeyeceğinin henüz kararlaştırılmadığı ve önce Fransa ve İtalya'ya danışıldığı.	

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		4. Mustafa Kemal'in zaman kazanmak ve Müttefikler arasında ayrılık yaratmak istemiş olabileceği.	
194	9 temmuz	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ MR. RATTIGAN'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A ŞİFRE NO. TEL 511.	482
		(No. 185'e cevap).	
		1. Mustafa Kemal'in tam bağımsızlık isteğine dayalı görüşme isteğini talimat beklemeden reddetmiş olduğum için özür dilerim.	
		2. Ama M. Kemal tutumunu değiştirirse bu konunun yeniden açılabileceğini de Osmanlı Hariciye Nazırına bildirmiştim.	
195	9 temmuz	İSTANBUL'DA MÜTTEFİK ORDULARI BAŞKOMUTANI GENERAL HARINGTON'DAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL. NO. 571. GİZLİ.	483
		1. *General Harington'dan Yüksek Komiserliğe yazı:* Mustafa Kemal'in cevabı ilişiktedir. Anlaşılan Binbaşı Henry talimatını aşmış ve bizim Mustafa Kemal ile görüşme aradığımız izlenimini yaratmış.	
		2. *General Harington'dan Osmanlı Hariciye Nazırı İzzet Paşa'ya Nota:* General Harington, Binbaşı Henry'ye İngiliz tutsakları hakkında mümkünse M. Kemal'den bilgi alması talimatını vermişti. Dönüşünde Binbaşı Henry, General Harington'un İnebolu'da M. Kemal ile görüşebileceğini bildirdi. Harington Mustafa Kemal ile görüşebileceğini Hükümetine bildirdi ve şartlarını da açıkladı. Mustafa Kemal'in cevabı siyasi konulara ilişkin olduğu için, Yüksek Komiserliğe yollandı. M. Kemal, bir askerin diğer bir askerle görüşmesini arzularsa bu belki ortak davaya yardım eder.	
196	10 temmuz	İSTANBUL'DA MÜTTEFİK ORDULARI BAŞKOMUTANI GENERAL HARINGTON'DAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL NO. 579. GİZLİ.	485
		Mustafa Kemal ile görüşme kapılarının daha tam kapanmış olmadığı. Talimat beklendiği.	
197	11 temmuz	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A ŞİFRE TEL NO. No. 394 (D).	485
		M. Kemal-Harington görüşmesi konusu.	

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		Yunan basınının Mustafa Kemal-Harington görüşmesinden vazgeçilmiş olmasını alkışladığı ve artık İngiltere'nin Yunanistan'ı destekleyeceği umudunu belirttiği.	
198	11 temmuz	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A ŞİFRE TEL NO. 395.	486
		M. Kemal-Harington görüşmesi konusunu basından öğrendiği. Bu gibi olaylardan ve İngiltere'nin politikasından kendisine (Granville'e) de bilgi verilmesi ricası.	
199	11 temmuz	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ MR. RATTİGAN'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 661.	486
	1.	Ankara'da açılan Afgan Elçiliğine bayrak çekme töreni yapıldığı, bayrağı Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın çektiği, törende yapılan konuşmaların çevirilerinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
	2.	Konuşmalarda, bir üçlü İttifakın üyesi olarak Sovyetlerin adının anıldığı. Bu törenin Afgan-İngiliz ve Afgan-Sovyet görüşmelerinin nazik bir dönemine rastladığı, Afgan Emiri'nin Moskova veya Ankara ile ilişkilerini kesmek niyetinde görünmediği.	
Ek.	12 haziran	HAKİMİYET-İ MİLLİYE GAZETESİNDE SERBEST ÇEVİRİ	487
		10 Haziran 1921 günü Ankara'daki Afgan Elçiliğine bayrak çekme töreninde yapılan konuşmalar.	
	1.	*Afgan Elçisinin konuşması:* 10 milyonluk Afgan milleti her zaman önder bildiği Türk milletine resmi bir temsilci göndermiş bulunmaktadır. Böylece dini bağlarımız güçlenmiş ve iki millet arasındaki andlaşma İslâm dünyasının kurtuluşu için bir umut olmaktadır. Batı Emperyalizmi, Doğu veya İslâm dünyasını ezmekte ve yoketmeğe çalışmaktadır. Türk-Afgan ve Rus ittifakı, Doğu'yu ezenlerin elini kıracaktır. Geleceğimizden umutluyuz, bağımsızlığımızı gerçekleştireceğiz. Bu törenin Bayrama ve Cuma gününe rastlamış olmasını mutlu sayıyoruz. T. B. M. M.'den ve onun Baş-	

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		kanından gördüğü kabulden dolayı bu Elçilik gurur duymaktadır.	
		2. *Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın konuşması:* Türkiye ile Afganistan ve bütün İslâm dünyası arasında aslında güçlü bağlar vardır. Resmi ilişkilerimizin kuruluşu Anadolu'nun bağımsızlık savaşı sırasında rastlamıştır. Türk-Afgan işbirliği İslâmın mutluluğuna yardım edecektir. Yüzyıllardır Türkiye, İslamiyet için tek başına savaştı. Bundan böyle yanında Afganistan da bulunacaktır. İslâm dünyasının arzusu bağımsızlıktır. Bütün İslâm ülkelerini Afganistan gibi özgür ve bağımsız görmekten mutlu olacağız. Türk, Afgan ve Sovyet ittifakı bir mutluluktur. Bayrağınızı çekme onurunu bana bahşettiğiniz için teşekkür ederim. Yakında Afganistan'da bir Elçiliğimiz açılacaktır.	
200	11 temmuz	İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANI SIR L. WORTINGTON-EVANS'TAN İNGİLİZ KABİNESİNE MUHTIRA.	489
		Anadolu'daki durumun değerlendirilmesiyle ilgili raporun Kabineye sunulduğu.	
Ek.	7 temmuz	İNGİLİZ GENELKURMAY BAŞKANI MAREŞAL HENRY WILSON'DAN SAVUNMA BAKANINA RAPOR.	489
		1. Kabine'nin arzusu üzerine, Yunan ordusunun başarı şansı hakkında yapılan bir değerlendirme ilişiktetedir. Türk ordusunun durumu incelenemediği için değerlendirme eksiktir, ama bundan fazlası yapılamamaktadır.	
		Yunan ordusunun değeri üzerine bir değerlendirme.	
		1. Değerlendirme, Yunan cephesinde inceleme yapmış General Morden ve Albay Nairne'nin raporları ile General Harington'un yorulmarına dayanır.	
		3. Raporlara göre, Yunan ordusu iyi talim görmüş, iyi techiz edilmiştir ve savaşa isteklidir. Son başarısızlıkların (İnönü yenilgilerinin) nedenleri giderilmeğe çalışılmıştır. Yunan ordusu, hiç değilse ilk safhada başarı kazanacaktır.	
		4. Türk milliyetçi ordusu da son birkaç ay içinde çok büyümüş, etkin ve metotlu talim görmüş ve Rus yardımıyla silâhlanmıştır.	

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		5. Yunan ordusunda 58.000 tüfek, 816 makinali tüfek, 326 top vardır. Türk ordusunda ise 68.500 tüfek, 345 makinalı tüfek, 213 top bulunduğu tahmin edilmektedir. Yunanlılar ise Türk ordusunu daha güçsüz tahmin etmektedirler.	
		6. Yunan üstünlüğü pek fazla değil. Büyük savaşta İngilizler ancak çok büyük sayı üstünlüğüyle Türkleri yenebilmişlerdir. Yunanlılar mahalli başarılar kazanabilirler, ama büyük zafer kazanamazlar. Bu durumda liderlerin üstünlüğü gereklidir. Ama Türk liderlerinin Yunan liderlerinden daha aşağı oldukları söylenemez.	
		7. Moral bakımından da Yunanlıların daha üstün oldukları ileri sürülemez.	
		8. Yunanlıların harekât planlarında da zayıf noktalar vardır. Yunanlılar birçok şeyi şansa bırakıyorlar.	
		9. Yalnız başına Yunanistan'ın Anadolu'ya barış getirebilecek büyük zafer şansı yoktur.	
		10. Müttefiklerin Yunanlılara silâh, cephane, para ve malzeme yardımları durumu düzeltmez. Çünkü Yunanlıların bunlara ihtiyacı yoktur. İhtiyaçları olan insan gücü yardımını da müttefikler yapamazlar.	
Ek. A	15 haziran	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ATAŞEMİLİTERİ ALBAY NAIRNE'İN YUNAN ORDUSU ÜZERİNE RAPORU.	494
		1. Yunan ordusu, "etkin bir savaş makinasıdır". Giyim kuşam, talim, disiplin ve moral fevkalâde iyidir. Kumandan kadrosu genellikle çok iyidir.	
		2. Hastalar dışında Anadolu'daki toplam Yunan gücü, 14 Haziran'da 169.000 kişidir ve harekâtın başında 200.000'e ulaşacaktır.	
		3. Yunan ordusunda silâh ve cephane boldur ve yedek cephane de gelecektir.	
		4. Ulaştırma durumu iyidir.	
		5. Uçaklar pek iyi değildir ama iş görebilmektedirler.	
		6. Mart-Nisan başarısızlığından (İkinci İnönü) Yunanlılar yararlı dersler almışlar ve kof güvenlik duygusundan kurtulup kendilerini toparlamışlar.	
Ek.B.1	18 haziran	GENERAL HARINGTON'DAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL NO. 451.	497

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		Albay Nairne çok iyimserdir. Yunan ordusu pek iyi bir savaş makinası değildir. Sonucu ancak çarpışmalar gösterecektir.	
Ek.B.2	23 haziran	GENERAL HARINGTON'DAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA TEL NO. 472.	499
		1. Yunan ordusu hakkında Albay Nairne'in rakamlarıyla kendisinin (Harington'un) tahminleri azçok birbirini tutuyor.	
		2. Yalnız, Yunan topçu bataryalarının tam olduğu kuşkuludur. Yunan birlikleri arasında haberleşme zayıftır. Zincirde birçok zayıf halkalar vardır. Türk kumandanlarının hedefleri açık - seçiktir. Yunan kumandanlarında kararsızlık vardır.	
Ek.B.3	21 haziran	GENERAL HARINGTON'DAN TEL. NO. 461. (KISMEN). Albay Nairne'le görüşme. Yunanlıların 3-10 Temmuz arasında saldırıya geçebilecekleri, ilk başlarda bazı başarılar kazanabilecekleri, fakat bunun onları hiçbir yere götürmeyeceği.	500
Ek.C.1	21 haziran	İZMİR'DE GENERAL MARDEN'DEN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL NO. T. M. 2 ...... Yunan harekât planının Türk kuvvetlerini yoketmek amacı güttüğü. Yunanlıların Türklere kesin üstünlükleri bulunduğu. Harekâtın büyük başarıyla sonuçlanabileceği. Başarısızlığa uğransa bile Yunanlıların şimdikinden daha kötü duruma düşmeyecekleri kanısı.	500
Ek.C.2	26 haziran	İZMİR'DE GENERAL MARDEN'DEN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL NO. T. M. 3 ... Uşak cephesini ziyaret ve Yunan ordusu hakkında ayrıntılı rapor. Yunan ordusunun, her bakımdan mükemmel göründüğü ve Türkleri yeneceğine güvendiği. Ayrıntılı bilgiler ve tahlil.	501
Ek.C.3	30 haziran	İSTANBUL'DA BULUNAN GENERAL MARDEN'DEN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL NO. T. M. 4 .... Bursa cephesinin de ziyaret edildiği, tüm olarak Yunan ordusunun iyi teşkilâtlı, iyi talim görmüş olduğu, disiplin ve moralinin de çok iyi bulunduğu. Buna karşılık Türk ordusunun iyi teşkilâtlı ve tec-	505

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		hizatlı olmadığı. Durumun Yunanlılar lehine olduğu.	
Ek.D.	28 haziran	GENERAL HARINGTON'DAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL NO. 509. .... General Marden'in iyimser raporuna rağmen kendisinin (Harington'un) şüpheci olduğu, gerçek değerlerin muharebede anlaşılacağı.	506
Ek.E.	7 Ağustos 1920	YUNANİSTAN'IN İNGİLTERE'DEN İSTEDİĞİ ASKERİ MALZEMENİN AYRINTILI LİSTESİ	507
201	12 temmuz	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN PARİS'TE İNGİLİZ MASLAHATGÜZARI SIR M. CHEETHAM'A TEL NO. 391. .... İngiltere'nin Avrupa'da temaslar yapan Bekir Sami Bey'le görüşmekte yarar görmediği, başvurursa bunun kendisine anlatılması talimatı.	509
202	12 temmuz	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ MR. RATTIGAN'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 664. GİZLİ.	510
		1. Ankara Hükûmetinin politikasına ilişkin iki belgenin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
		2. Kemalistlerin halâ Millî Misak programını tümüyle gerçekleştirmek emelinde oldukları, Bolşeviklerle işbirliği yapan İslâm Devletleriyle ittifak yapmak amacı güttükleri.	
		3. Bolşeviklerin Enver Paşa'yı Mustafa Kemal'e yeğ tutabilecekleri, ama Kemalistlerle ilişkileri koparmak istemedikleri. Kemalistlerin, Enver Paşa'nın geri dönmesini istemedikleri ve Bolşeviklerle ittifaka çok önem verdikleri. Mustafa Kemal'in şimdilik güçlü olduğu.	
		4. Milliyetçiler arasında Batılılarla anlaşma eğilimi de bulunduğu, son zamanlarda Ankara'nın İngiltere aleyhindeki yayınlarının azaldığı.	
		5. "Yeni Gün" ve "Hakimiyeti Milliye" gazetelerinde yabancı düşmanlığı yapan iki yazı görüldüğü.	
Ek. 1	6 temmuz	GİZLİ KAYNAKLARÇA HAZIRLANAN "MİLLİYETÇİLERİN POLİTİKASI" BAŞLIKLI RAPOR.	512
		1. T. B. M. M.'de yapılan gizli görüşmede Mustafa Kemal'in bir konuşma yaparak, Ankara Hükûmetinin Millî Misaka bağlılığını açıkladığı.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		2. Fevzi Paşa'nın da Sovyetlerden alınan yardımlar konusunda bilgi verdiği, Doğu politikasından Türkiye'nin caymadığını, askerî bakımdan ise savunma stratejisi izlediğini belirttiği.	
		3. Görüşmeler sonunda Meclisin Hükûmete güven oyu verdiği.	
		4. M. Kemal'in Cemal Paşa ile mektuplaşmakta olduğu.	
Ek. 2	3 temmuz	"JOURNAL D'ORIENT" GAZETESİNİN "ANKARA HÜKÜMETİNİN DIŞ POLİTİKASI" BAŞLIKLI YAZISI.	515
		Yusuf Kemal Beyin 27 Haziran günü T. B. M. M.'de yaptığı politika konuşması.	
		1. Ankara Hükûmetinin yakında Güney Kafkasya Cumhuriyetleriyle ilişkilerini normalleştireceği, İran'la da ilişki kuracağı.	
		2. Bekir Sami Beyin Londra'da yetkisini aştığı.	
		3. Fransa ile Türkiye arasındaki savaş haline son verilmesinin düşünüldüğü.	
		4. İtalyan askerlerinin de Türk topraklarından çekilmelerinin beklendiği.	
		5. Ankara Hükûmetinin, tam bağımsızlık politikasından sapmadığı ve sapmayacağı. Bu konuşma sonunda Hükûmete güven oyu verildiği.	
203	12 temmuz	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ MR. RATTIGAN'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 669.	517
		General Harington'dan alınan iki belgenin sunulduğu.	
Ek. 1	6 temmuz	İSTANBUL'DA MÜTTEFİK ORDULARI BAŞKOMUTANI GENERAL HARINGTON'DAN MR. RATTIGAN'A YAZI.	517
		1. Mustafa Kemal'den cevap geldiği.	
		2. Yanlış anlaşma olduğu yolunda İzzet Paşa'ya ayrıntılı bilgi verildiği.	
Ek. 2	7 temmuz	GENERAL HARINGTON'DAN MR. RATTIGAN'A YAZI.	518
		Hamid Beyle Harington görüşmesi.	
		1. Binbaşı Van Milligan'ın, İngiltere'nin Ankara Hükûmetiyle müzakereye girişmek istediğini Hamid Beye söylemiş olması.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		2. Bundan kendisinin (Harington'un) haberi bulunmadığı ve bazı küçük İngiliz subaylarının yetkisizce konuşmalar yapmakta ve M. Kemal'e yanlış izlenim vermekte olmaları.	
204	13 temmuz	İNGİLTERE'NİN ROMA BÜYÜKELÇİSİ SIR G. BUCHANAN-DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 289.	519
		1. İtalyan Dışişleri Bakanının İtalya'nın İngiltere ile Doğu'da daha sıkı işbirliği yapmak istediğini söylediği.	
		2. Üçlü anlaşmadan İtalyanın vazgeçmek niyetinde olmadığı.	
205	13 temmuz	İSTANBUL'DA MÜTTEFİK ORDULARI BAŞKOMUTANI GENERAL HARINGTON'DAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL NO. 593. GİZLİ. YILDIRIM.	520
		1. Ankara'nın Bolşeviklere teslim olduğunun söylenemeyeceği. Kemalistlerin Ruslardan yalnız yardım aldıkları.	
		2. Bolşeviklerle sıkı işbirliği yapmak isteyenlerin Kemalistlerden ziyade İttihatçılar olduğu.	
		3. Bolşeviklerin Kafkaslara askeri yığınak yaptıkları.	
		4. Mustafa Kemal'in "iki ateş arasında" bulunduğu ve pek güç durumda olduğu.	
206	13 temmuz	YUNANİSTAN'IN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A ŞİFRE TEL NO 404.	522
		1. Bütün Yunan basınının Yunan taarruzunu alkışladığı ve son hedefin İstanbul olacağını belirttiği.	
		2. Yalnız bir Venizelos'çu gazetenin Mustafa Kemal'in çok güçlü olduğunu söylediği.	
		3. Sosyalist organın ise bu iyimserliği saçma bulduğu. zaferin bile işe yaramayacağını öne sürdüğü.	
207	13 temmuz	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ MR. RATTIGAN'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 670.	522
		1. Yeni Rus Elçisi Yoldaş Nachekanof'un Ankara'ya geldiği ve 27 Haziran günü güven mektubunu sunduğu.	
		2. Elçinin ve Mustafa Kemal'in konuşmalarının özeti.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		3. M. Kemal'in, minnettar bir müşteri gibi değil, bilinçli bir eşit olarak konuştuğu. Rus Elçisi gibi "ihtilâl", "kapitalizm" ve hele "dünya ihtilâli" sözcüklerini kullanmadığı.	
208	15 temmuz	İSTANBUL'DA MÜTTEFİK ORDULARI BAŞKOMUTANI GENERAL HARINGTON'DAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL NO. 604. GİZLİ	525
		1. İngiltere'nin Yunanlılar'ı kayıran tarafsızlığının yanlış olduğu, Kemalistleri kızdıracağı.	
		2. Kemalistlerin, Bolşeviklerin avuçlarına düşmüş sayılamayacakları, Yüksek Komiser Vekilinin bu konudaki görüşüne kendisinin (Harington'un) katılamayacağı.	
		3. Mustafa Kemal'le görüşme kapısının şiddetle kapatılmasının yanlış olduğu.	
		4. Ya Yunanistan'ı açıkca desteklemek, ya da tam tarafsız kalmak gerektiği.	
209	15 temmuz	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 312.	526
		1. Müttefiklerin arabuluculuk tekliflerini reddeden Yunan Hükümetinin politikasının Yunan Millet Meclisince onaylandığı.	
		2. Yunan taarruzunun Atina basınında alkışlandığı. Yunan Hükümetinin zaferden emin göründüğü, ama Mustafa Kemal'in savaşı kabul etmeyerek geri çekilmesi olasılığından kaygılı olduğu.	
Ek. 1	15 temmuz	"PROGRÈS D'ATHENE" GAZETESİ KESİTİ. .... Yunan Millet Meclisinde görüşme. Yunan Hükümetinin savaş politikasının onaylanması. Yunanistan'ın savaş amaçlarının açıklanması.	527
Ek. 2	16 temmuz	"PROGRÈS D'ATHENES" GAZETESİ KESİTİ. .... Müttefiklerin arabuluculuk teklifi üzerine M. Gounaris'in Yunan Millet Meclisinde yaptığı konuşma.	530
210	15 temmuz	PARİS'TE İNGİLİZ İŞGÜDERİ SIR M. CHEETHAM'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A ŞİFRE TEL NO. 486.	531
		Mustafa Kemal-Harington görüşmesi konusunda M. Briand'ın görüşü:	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		Mustafa Kemal'in öne sürdüğü koşulların, Müttefiklerce saptanmış barış esaslarından çok farklı olduğu. *Foreign Office'in notu:* Artık Mustafa Kemal'e cevap vermeğe gerek olmadığı, bundan sonraki adımı o'nun atması gerektiği.	
211	15 temmuz	PARİS'TE İNGİLİZ İŞGÜDERİ SIR M. CHEETHAM'DAN LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 2035. .... Mustafa Kemal-Harington görüşmesine ilişkin Fransız cevabının eklice sunulduğu.	532
Ek.	14 temmuz	FRANSA DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI M. BRIAND'DAN PARİS'TE İNGİLİZ İŞGÜDERİ MR. M. CHEETHAM'A NOTA. ... Mustafa Kemal'in öne sürdüğü koşulların, Müttefiklerce saptanmış barış esaslarından çok farklı olduğu. Görüşme olursa bu noktanın Mustafa Kemal'e hatırlatılmasının yerinde olacağı.	533
212	18 temmuz	İSTANBUL'DA AMERİKAN YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ BRISTOL'DEN MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞA'YA TEL. .... Samsun bölgesindeki Rumların Anadolu içlerine gönderilmesinden vazgeçilmesi isteği.	534
212 bis	—	ANKARA HÜKÜMETİ HARİCİYE VEKİLİ YUSUF KEMAL BEYDEN İSTANBUL'DA AMERİKAN YÜKSEK KOMİSERİNE TEL. .... 1. Samsun bölgesinden Rum çocuk, kadın ve yaşlılarının Anadolu içlerine gönderilmediği. Ancak Pontus için çalışan bazı Rumların, askeri bir tedbir olarak içlere yollandığı. 2. Yunan işgali altındaki bölgelerde yerli müslüman halka karşı girişilmiş zulümlerin durdurulması için girişimde bulunulması isteği.	534
213	19 temmuz	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ MR. RATTIGAN'A TEL NO. 442. .... 1. (Türk-Yunan savaşında) İstanbul'un tarafsızlığı konusunda General Harington'un Yüksek Komiserlikten ayrı düşündüğü ve kendisinin Savunma Bakanlığınca desteklendiği. 2. Bu konuda bir görüş birliğine varılması talimatı.	535

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
214	20 temmuz	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ MR. RATTIGAN'A ŞİFRE TEL. NO. 446.	536
		Mustafa Kemal-Harington görüşmesi konusu. Mustafa Kemal'e artık cevap göndermek gerekmediği. Görüşmek istiyorsa bundan sonraki adımın M. Kemal'den gelmesi gerektiği.	
215	20 temmuz	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A ŞİFRE TEL. NO. 414 (R).	537
		Yunan ordusunun Kütahya'yı zaptettiği haberinin Yunan başbakanınca açıklandığı ve Atina'da büyük coşkunluk yarattığı.	
216	20 temmuz	İNGİLTERE'NİN BERLİN BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD D'ABERNON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI No. 949.	538
		Almanya'daki ittihatçılar.	
	1.	Dr. Nazım Bey ile Bahaeddin Şakir'in Moskova'ya, Bedri Beyin Kâbil'e gittikleri, öteki ittihatçıların Münich'te toplandıkları.	
	2.	İsmail Hakkı Paşa'nın Ankara Hükümeti için Almanya'dan malzeme almağa çalıştığı.	
	3.	Mustafa Kemal'in yaveri Cemal (Cevad?) Beyin silâh almak için Sofya'da Bulgarlarla müzakereler yaptığı	
Ek.	14 temmuz	RUS–TÜRK–AFGAN İLİŞKİLERİ KONUSUNDA BİNBAŞI BREEN'DEN LORD D'ABERNON'A RAPOR.	539
	1.	Berlin'deki Milliyetçi Türklerin önderi Emir Şekip Arslan'ın Moskova'ya gidip döndüğü, Rusya'da çok iyi karşılandığı. Troçki ve Çiçerin ile görüştüğü. Ankara Hükümeti için Sovyetlerden yardım istemiş olduğu.	
	2.	Çiçerin'in, Ankara Hükümetiyle İtilâf devletleri arasında anlaşmaya karşı olmadığını, en büyük engelin Trakya noktasında toplandığını söylediği.	
	3.	Afganistan ordusunun düzenlenmeğe ve yetiştirilmeğe çalışıldığı.	
	4.	Ölümünden önce Talat Paşa'nın Enver Paşa ile arasının soğumuş olduğu.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
217	21 temmuz	İngiltere Savunma Bakanliğindan Dişişleri Bakanliğina Yazi. No. 0152/5875 (M. 1. 2.)	542
		1. Harington'dan alınan iki telgraf örneğinin sunulduğu.	
		2. Mustafa Kemal'in telgrafına cevap verip vermemek konusunda Harington'un talimat beklediği. Talimat verebilmek üzere, Curzon'un görüşünün bildirilmesi dileği.	
Ek.	18 temmuz	İstanbul'da İngiliz Genel Karargahindan (General Harington'dan) İngiltere Savunma Bakanliğina Şifre Tel No. 625.	543
		1. Yunan saldırısı başarısızlıkla sonuçlanırsa Kemalistlerin İstanbul üzerine yürümekte gecikmeyecekleri. Bunun için İstanbul ve çevresini Kemalistlere karşı savunmak için tedbirler alındığı.	
		2. Mustafa Kemal'in telgrafına cevap verip vermeyeceği, verecekse ne gibi bir cevap vereceği hakkında (Harington'un) halâ talimat beklediği.	
218	21 temmuz	İstanbul'da İngiliz Yüksek Komiser Vekili Mr. Rattigan'dan Dişişleri Bakani Lord Curzon'a Şifre Tel No. 524.	544
		1. Kemalistlerin İstanbul'u tehdit edebilecek durumda olmadıkları, bu yüzden tarafsızlığı Yunanlılar zararına sıkılaştırmağa gerek bulunmadığı. Bu konuda General Harington'la yeniden görüşüleceği.	
		2. Fransız Yüksek Komiserinin tarafsızlığı Yunanlılar zararına sertleştirmekten yana olduğu, ama İtalyan Yüksek Komiserinin İngilizleri desteklediği.	
219	21 temmuz	İngiltere'nin Atina Elçisi Lord Granville'den Dişişleri Bakani Lord Curzon'a Tel No. 418 (R).	545
		1. Eskişehir'in Yunan ordusunca zaptedildiği haberinin Atina'da büyük coşkunlukla karşılandığı.	
		2. Yunan basının artık Sèvres andlaşmasını Yunanistan için yeterli saymadığı ve "Eskişehir yolunun İstanbul'a gideceğini" yazdığı.	
220	21 temmuz	Yunanistan'in Londra İşgüderi Mr. Rizo-Rangabe'den İngiltere Dişişleri Bakanliğina Yazi.	546

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		Eskişehir'in zaptedildiğine ilişkin resmi bir telgrafla bir Yunan basın bülteninin sunulduğu.	
Ek. 1	21 temmuz	YUNAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI BALTAZZI'DEN YUNANİSTAN'IN LONDRA ELÇİLİĞİNE TEL.	546
		Yunan ordusunun Eskişehir'i zaptettiği, Yunan Kralının Uşak'a gittiği, "düşmanın" kovalanmasına devam olunduğu, Kemalist sürülerden kurtarılan ahalinin sevinç içinde bulunduğu.	
Ek. 2	20 temmuz	YUNAN BASIN BÜLTENİ.	547
		Genel taarruzun başladığından beri Yunan ordusunun 100-120 kilometre ilerlediği, Kütahya'yı zaptettiği, orada bulunan Mustafa Kemal'in önünde bile bir bomba patladığı, şimdi Eskişehir'e yürünmekte olduğu.	
		NOT: KÜTAHYA VE ESKİŞEHİR'İN DÜŞMESİ ÜZERİNE İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞININ YORUMLARI.	548
	1.	Yunan ordusunun, hedefine ulaştığı, Eskişehir'den sonra İstanbul'a yönelebileceği.	
	2.	Yunan Hükümetinin şimdi müttefiklerin arabuluculuğunu kabul edebileceği, ama isteklerini artırarabileceği.	
	3.	İngiliz Savunma Bakanlığına göre ise, Türk ordusunun düzgün bir biçimde geri çekildiği, zamanın Türklerden yana olduğu.	
221	21 temmuz	YUNAN BASIN BÜLTENİ.	549
		Eskişehir'in zaptının hikâyesi: Türk ordusunun artık savaş dışı edilmiş olduğu, silâhını ve ağırlığını bırakarak kaçtığı, Ankara'ya doğru kovalandığı.	
222	22 temmuz	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ GÖREVLİLERİNDEN D. G. OSBORNE'UN MUHTIRASI.	550
		M. Kirtchew adlı Bulgar ile görüşme:	
	1.	M. Kirtchew'in, Mustafa Kemal'in İngiltere ile anlaşmak istediğini, bunun için: a) İzmir'in geri verilmesini, b) Doğu Trakya'nın geri verilmesini veya özerk hale getirilmesini ve c) Üçlü nüfuz bölgelerinin kaldırılmasını şart koştuğunu bildirdiği.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		2. Bunlar kabul edilirse Mustafa Kemal'in Batılılara döneceğini, Anadolu'daki bolşevik yanlısı aşırıların nüfuzunu kırabileceğini ileri sürmesi.	
		3. Kirtchew'e, Mustafa Kemal'in yetkisiz temsilcileriyle görüşmelere girişilemeyeceği yolunda karşılık verildiği.	
223	22 temmuz	ROMA'DA İNGİLİZ İŞGÜDERİ MR. KENNARD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL No. 311 (R)	552
		1. İtalyan Dışişleri Bakanının Fethi Beyle görüşmüş ve Mustafa Kemal'in İtalya'ya karşı düşmanca tutumundan yakınmış olduğu haberi.	
		2. Fethi Beyin bunları Mustafa Kemal'e duyuracağını söylemiş bulunduğu.	
224	23 temmuz	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A ŞİFRE TEL No. 424. GİZLİ.	552
		1. Yunan basınının Mustafa Kemal'e karşı ezici bir zafer kazanıldığını ileri sürdüğü.	
		2. Atina Genelkurmayının ise daha ölçülü bir tutum içinde bulunduğu.	
		3. Yunan gemilerinin, Trakya'da yeni kurulan "İstanbul tümenine" asker taşıdıkları.	
		4. İtalyan Elçisine göre ise, Mustafa Kemal'in başarılı biçimde geri çekildiği. Gerçek durumun bildirilmesi ricası.	
225	23 temmuz	YUNAN BASIN BÜLTENİ.	553
		Eskişehir'in zaptını kutlayan gazete muhabirine Yunan Başkomutanı General Papoulas'ın bir demeç verdiği, Yunan zaferini övdüğü, Anadolu yolunun Yunanlılara yabancı olmadığını belirttiği.	
226	24 temmuz	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ MR. RATTIGAN'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A ŞİFRE TEL. No. 532.	554
		1. İstanbul'daki Yunan Yüksek Komiserinin, Yunan zaferinin kesin olduğunu, bundan sonra Anadolu'da Mustafa Kemal'e karşı ayaklanma olacağını söylediği. Kendisinin (Rattigan'ın) ise bu görüşü biraz iyimser bulduğu.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		2. Ankara Hükümetinin Bolşevik askerleri yardıma çağırdığı söylentisi.	
		3. Ilımlı ve güçlü bir İstanbul Hükümetinin şimdi, savaştan bıkmış Türk halkını etrafına toplayabileceği umudu.	
		4. İstanbul Rumlarının aşırı taşkınlıklar yapıp Türkleri kışkırtmamaları için Patrikhanenin ve Yunan Yüksek Komiserliğinin uyarıldığı.	
227	25 temmuz	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A ŞİFRE TEL NO. 426. DAĞITIMI YAPILAMAZ.	555
		1. Atina'dan elde edilen haberlere güvenilemiyeceği.	
		2. İngiliz ataşemiliterinin cepheye gidip güvenilir bilgi alabileceğinin umulduğu, ancak buna da olanak bulunmadığı.	
228	25 temmuz	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 427	556
		1. Yunan başarısı üzerine, ılımlı bir İstanbul Hükümeti etrafında Türk halkının birleştirilmesi düşüncesinin yerinde olduğu, ancak bunun gerçekleştirilmesinin zaman alacağı.	
		2. Yunanlıların her halde yeni isteklerde bulunacakları.	
229	26 temmuz	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ MR. RATTIGAN'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 535.	557
		1. Osmanlı Hariciye Nazırının İtalyan Yüksek Komiserine başvurarak Müttefik Yüksek Komiserleri ile müzakereye girişmek istediği ve Milliyetçi orduyla T. B. M. M.'nin % 65'inin desteğini garanti edeceğini söylediği.	
		2. Kendisinin (Mr. Rattigan'ın) bunu biraz iyimserlik gibi gördüğü.	
		3. Kâzım Karabekir Paşa'nın da Padişaha bağlılık telgrafı çektiğinin söylendiği.	
230	26 temmuz	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 325.	558
		1. Yunan halkının, Yunanistan'ın İngiltere tarafından desteklendiğine inandığı ve İngiltere lehine sevgi gösterilerinde bulunduğu.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		2. Yunanistan'ın İstanbul'u da ele geçirmesine İngiltere'nin ses çıkarmayacağına inanıldığı.	
231	26 temmuz	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. No. 326.	559
		1. Anadolu'daki gerçek durum hakkında Atina'dan güvenilir haber alınamadığı. Yunan zaferinin biraz kuşkulu sanıldığı.	
		2. Yunan basının ise dünyanın en kesin zaferini kazandıklarını ileri sürdüğü, aşırı yayınlar yaptığı, şimdi hedefin İstanbul olduğunu yazdığı.	
		3. Kralcı basının da zaferin Kral Kostantin sayesinde kazanıldığını yazdığı.	
Ek.	21 temmuz	ATİNA'DA YAYINLANAN "POLİTEİA" GAZETESİNİN YAZISI.	561
		"Yunan İstekleri".	
		1. Yunan zaferi üzerine Avrupa basınının kaygılanmağa başladığı, Yunan isteklerinden ürktüğü.	
		2. Bu savaşın bir Türk-Yunan savaşı sayıldığı: Yunanistan'ın isteklerinde haklı olduğu, bütün Yunanlıların ve bütün Yunan topraklarının (Türkiye'den) kurtarılacağı.	
232	26 temmuz	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDAN SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA YAZI No. E. 8403/1/44.	562
		Mustafa Kemal-Harington görüşmesi konusunda Lord Curzon'un görüşünün Mr. Rattigan'a çekilen telgrafta belirtilmiş olduğu.	
233	26 temmuz	LONDRA'DA ÇIKAN "THE DAILY TELEGRAPH" GAZETESİNİN TÜRK-YUNAN SAVAŞI ÜZERİNE YAZISI. ..	563
		1. Yunan Başbakanı Gounaris'in, barış yapılabilmesi için İstanbul sorununun da çözümlenmesi gerektiğini söylediği.	
		2. Çözümlenmesi gereken bir başka sorunun da Yunan-İtalyan ilişkileri olduğu, bu konuda Yunan Kralının ve M. Stratos'un konuşmaları.	
		3. Türk-Yunan savaşı üzerine haberler.	
234	27 temmuz	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ASKERİ ATAŞESINDEN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL No. S. M. 69. GİZLİ.	565
		23 Temmuz günlü Yunan resmi bülteninde yeni bir bilgi bulunmadığı. Anadolu'daki savaş durumu	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		üzerine kısa bilgiler. Yunan Kralıyla Başbakan ve Savunma Bakanının Kütahya'da, Yunan Genel Karargâhının ise Eskişehir'de bulundukları.	
235	28 temmuz	İstanbul'da Müttefik Orduları Başkomutanı General Harington'dan İngiltere Savunma Bakanlığına Şifre Tel. No. 678.	566
	1.	Türk ordusunun artık daha fazla direnebilecek veya taarruza geçebilecek durumda olmadığı.	
	2.	İstanbul Hükümetinin pek ciddi kaygı içinde olduğu ve İngiltere ile anlaşma yolları araştırdığı.	
	3.	İngiliz yanlısı ve Milliyetçilere karşı olan Salih Paşa'nın Londra'ya gönderilmesinin düşünüldüğü.	
236	28 temmuz	İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığından Savunma Bakanlığına Yazı. Gizli No. E. 8462/143/44.	567
		İstanbul'un tarafsızlığını Yunanlılar zararına sıkılaştırılmasını artık General Harington'un da istemediği. Bu konuda artık birşey yapılmayacağı.	
237	28 temmuz	İngiltere Savunma Bakanlığından Dışişleri Bakanlığına Yazı No. M. 1. 2. (b). Gizli.	567
	1.	Mustafa Sagir'in idamı üzerine Mustafa Kemal'in bir bildirisi ile,	
	2.	Anadolu ajansının bir yalanlamasının eklice sunulduğu.	
Ek. 1	7 nisan	Mustafa Sagir Hakkında Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın Bildirisi. Gizli.	568
	1.	Hind Hilâfet Komitesi üyesiymiş gibi Ankara'ya gelen İngiliz casusu Mustafa Sagir'in Ankara'da Karaoğlan çarşısında asıldığı.	
	2.	İngiltere'nin bu olayı istismar ederek Hindistan müslümanlarını Türkiye aleyhine çevirmeğe çalıştığı. Hindistanlı kardeşlerin bu konuda ihtiyatlı ve uyanık olmaları gerektiği.	
	3.	İngilizlerin beş yaşlarında on fakir Hindli çocuğu alıp casus olarak yetiştirdikleri, bu iğrenç İngiliz metodunun uygar dünyaya açıklanacağı ve İngilizlerin hesap vermek zorunda kalacakları.	
	4.	T. B. M. M., Mustafa Sagir hakkında yayılan söylentileri yalanlar ve gerçeği Hind müslümanlarına açıklar.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
Ek. 2	4 temmuz	ANADOLU AJANSININ YALANLAMASI.	569
		1. Mustafa Sagir konusunda ve Ankara Hükümetinin İngiliz casusluğu hakkında Milletler Cemiyetine başvuracağı yolunda İstanbul basınında Mustafa Kemal imzasıyla yayınlanan iki bildirinin sahte olduğu.	
		2. 16 Haziran tarihli "Temps" gazetesinin bu konudaki yayınının da sahte olduğu. Anadolu ajansının bunları yalanladığı.	
238	29 temmuz	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ MR. RATTIGAN'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 544.	570
		1. Osmanlı Hariciye Nazırının İngiliz Yüksek Komiserliğine gelerek bir görüşme yaptığı, Müttefiklerin barış şartlarını sorduğu ve akıl danıştığı.	
		2. Kendisine, Bolşevik tehlikesine karşı Mustafa Kemal'in gözlerini açmak, M. Kemal'i kazanmak gerektiği yolunda öğüt verildiği. Mustafa Kemal'i kazandıktan sonra ordunun çoğunluğunun da desteğinin sağlanabileceği ve İstanbul Hükümeti etrafında birleşerek barışa gidilebileceğinin söylendiği. Ama milliyetçilerin şimdiki isteklerinde direnmeleleri halinde anlaşma umudunun pek bulunmadıdığının eklendiği.	
		3. Osmanlı Nazırının, Türkiye'nin tek umudunun İngiltere ile anlaşmak olduğunu tekrarladığı.	
239	30 temmuz	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL NO. 433. (R).	572
		Yunan ordusu Kurmay Başkanı Albay Pallis'in, Yunan zaferi üzerine bir demeç verdiği, Yunanistan'ın işgal ettiği topraklarda yerleşeceğini ve Boğazların muhafızlığını yapacağını söylediği.	
240	30 temmuz	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ HABERALMA ÖRGÜTÜ İSTANBUL ŞUBESINCE HAZIRLANAN RAPOR. NO. 303.	572
		Markov adlı bir Bulgar Generalinin Ankara'yı ziyaret etmek üzere Mustafa Kemal'den izin aldığı, Trakya'da Türk-Bulgar işbirliğini görüşmek istediği, ancak geri çağırıldığı için bir sonuç alamadığı.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
241	30 temmuz	LONDRA'DA ÇIKAN "DAILY TELEGRAPH" GAZETESİNİN "YUNANİSTAN VE İSTANBUL" BAŞLIKLI YAZISI.	573
		Yunan Başbakanı Gounaris'in barış yapılabilmesi için İstanbul sorununun çözümlenmesi gerektiği yolundaki demecinin Yunan basınındaki yankıları.	
242	1 ağustos	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ GÖREVLİLERİNDEN MR. OSBORNE'UN YAKIN DOĞU DURUMU ÜZERİNE MUHTIRASI.	573
		1. Kazandıkları askeri başarı üzerine Yunanlıların isteklerini arttırabilecekleri ve İstanbul'u da isteyebilecekleri.	
		2. Buna karşılık Ankara'nın Milli Misaktan vazgeçmemiş olduğu.	
		3. Ilımlı İstanbul Türklerinin ise Müttefiklerin barış koşullarını sordukları ve Mustafa Kemal'e galebe çalmayı umdukları.	
		4. İngiltere'nin bir açıklama yapmak gibi bir tuzağa düşmemesi gerektiği, zira artık Yunanistan'ın İzmir'i geri vermeğe zorlanamayacağı.	
		5. Şimdiki anın bir müttefik müdahalesine pek elverişli olmadığı.	
		6. Savaşan taraflardan biri arabuluculuk için başvurursa, Müttefiklerin Türkiye ile Yunanistan'ı konferans masasına çağırabilecekleri.	
243	2 ağustos	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 549.	575
		1. Hariciye Nazırı İzzet Paşa'nın Hamid Beyle birlikte, İngiliz Yüksek Komiserini ziyaret ederek Anadolu'daki savaşın bir an önce sona erdirilmesi arzusunu açıkladıkları, ama pratik önerilerde bulunmadıkları.	
		2. Kendilerine Müttefiklerce Sèvres andlaşmasının esas sayıldığının hatırlatıldığı. Hamid Beyin ise Ankara Hükümetinin Milli Misak'ta direneceğini söylediği.	
		3. İzzet Paşa'nın pek sarsılmış göründüğü. Ankara ve İstanbul Hükümetleri arasında sıkı temaslar bulunduğu.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
244	2 ağustos	İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINDAN HİNDİSTAN VE KAHİRE KUMANDANLIKLARINA ŞİFRE TEL. No. 89559. GİZLİ.	577
	1.	Türk-Yunan askeri harekâtının 29 temmuza kadarki durumu hakkında özet bilgi.	
	2.	Harekâtın başında cephede Yunanlıların 11, Türklerin 19 Tümenleri bulunduğu.	
	3.	Yunanlıların önce, stratejik önemi olan, Kütahya'ya, Afyonkarahisar'a saldırdıkları.	
	4.	Türklerin Kütahya'yı boşalttıkları ve burada kesin savaştan kaçındıkları. Yunanlıların 13 temmuzda Afyon'a, 17 temmuzda Kütahya'ya girdikleri.	
	5.	Yunan ordusunun 20 Temmuzda Eskişehir'i zaptettiği, burada Türklerin yine çekilmek zorunda kaldıkları.	
	6.	Son haberlerin, Türklerin Sakarya'nın doğusuna çekilmekte olduklarını gösterdiği.	
	7.	Türk kayıpları hakkında güvenilir bilgi bulunmadığı. Yunan zayiatının ise 10.000 kadar olduğu.	
245	5 ağustos	İSTANBUL'DA MÜTTEFİK ORDULARI BAŞKOMUTANI GENERAL HARINGTON'DAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL. No. 719. GİZLİ YILDIRIM.	578
	1.	Türk ordusunun geri çekilmesi üzerine, Ankara'da Mustafa Kemal ve Fevzi Paşa ile Genelkurmay dışında herkesin Enver Paşa'nın geri dönmesini istemeğe başladığı.	
	2.	Ankara'daki Bolşevik temsilcisinin de fırsattan yararlanarak Rus andlaşmasının onaylanması için Mustafa Kemal'i sıkıştırdığı ve andlaşmanın hemen onaylandığı.	
	3.	Kafkasya'daki Kızılordu komutanının da Anadolu'ya yardıma gelmeyi önerdiği, ama kibarca reddedildiği.	
	4.	Mustafa Kemal'in Milli Misak'tan vazgeçmek niyetinde görünmediği. Bolşeviklerin askerlerle yardıma gelmesini de istemediği.	
	5.	Yunanlıların 19-20 temmuzda Trabzon'u, 22 temmuzda Sinop'u bombaladıkları.	
	6.	Ardahan, Kars yöresinde 15.000 süvari toplandığı, ancak bunların Bolşevik kuvvetlerle karıştırılmaması gerektiği.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
246	5 ağustos	İSTANBUL'DA GENERAL HARINGTON'DAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL NO. 729. GİZLİ YILDIRIM.	580
	1.	Ankara'dan dönen Kanadalı Binbaşı Brown'un verdiği bilgilere göre, Mustafa Kemal'in duruma hakim olduğu, geri çekilmeye pek aldırmadığı, asıl orduyu korumak niyetinde olduğu. Bolşevik yardımı da istemediği.	
	2.	Yunanlıların aslında başarı kazanamamış oldukları.	
247	6 ağustos	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 734.	581
		Ankara'dan alınan bir notanın ilişikte sunulduğu. Bu nota hakkında Babıâliye protestoda bulunulduğu.	
Ek.	16 temmuz	ANKARA HÜKÜMETİ HARİCİYE VEKİLİ YUSUF KEMAL BEYDEN İSTANBUL'DAKİ BÜTÜN YABANCI TEMSİLCİLİKLERE NOTA.	582
	1.	Yunan ordusunun işgal ettiği bütün bölgelerde halka karşı katliam yaptığı.	
	2.	Samsun bölgesinde de Pontus cemiyetinin bir ayaklanma çıkarıp Yunan ordusuna yardım ettiği.	
	3.	Yunanlıların, Osmanlı vatandaşı Rumları da askere aldıkları, İstanbul bölgesinde ise İngilizlerin Rum ve Ermeni çetelerini silahlandırıp İstanbul halkına karşı katliam hazırladıkları.	
	4.	Türk halkının canına ve bağımsızlığına kasteden bu Yunan suikastına karşı doğacak tepkilerin bütün sorumluluğunun Yunanlılara ait olacağı.	
248	6 ağustos	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 739.	583
		İzzet Paşa ve Hamit Beyin Rumbold'la görüşmeleri.	
	1.	Bu ilk görüşmede İzzet Paşa'nın Hamid Beyi de yanına almış olmasının yadırgandığı.	
	2.	Ziyaretçilerin, somut öneriler getirmedikleri, bir nabız yoklaması yaptıkları. Hamid Beyin, Ankara Hükümetince Milli Misak'tan vazgeçilmediğini söylediği.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		3. Sadrazamın da Ankara ile temasa geçerek Kemalistlerin barış koşullarını öğrenmeyi vadettiği, Yunanlıların da Kemalist orduyu ezmek hedefine ulaşamadıklarını söylediği.	
		4. İzzet Paşa'ya, Ankara Hükümetinin ılımlı olması, İngiliz tutsaklarını salıvermesi gerektiğinin öğütlendiği. İzzet Paşa, Malta sürgünlerinin tümüne karşılık bütün İngiliz tutsaklarının da salıverileceklerini söylediği.	
		5. Sadrazam ile İzzet Paşa'nın 5 Ağustos günü yeniden İngiliz Yüksek Komiserliğine geldikleri, ama yine somut bir öneri getirmedikleri, bir müdahale çağrısında bulunmayı ciddiyetle istemediklerinin anlaşıldığı.	
249	8 ağustos	İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINDAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA YAZI NO. M. 1. 2. (b) MISC. .... Anadolu'da tutsak kalıp yakında serbest bırakılan Teğmen Bowring'in Dışişleri Bakanlığının sorularına verdiği cevapların ilişikte sunulduğu.	586
Ek.	—	TEĞMEN BOWRING'IN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞININ SORULARINA VERDİĞİ CEVAPLAR.	586
		1. Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın, Malta'da sürgün bulunan Ali İhsan Paşa'nın ve birkaç sürgünün daha kurtarılmasına özellikle önem verdiği.	
		2. Kemalistlerin elindeki İngiliz tutsaklarını kurtarmak için tehdit kullanmak, Mustafa Kemal'e özel olarak yaklaşmak, tutsakları gizli ajanlarla kaçırmak gerektiği, İngiliz tutsaklarına başlangıçta kötü davranıldığı.	
		3. Ankara'da en dürüst ve samimi insanın Mustafa Kemal olduğu, Anadolu'da etkin bir anayasal hükümet kurmak istediği, fakat maiyetindekilerin güçlükleriyle karşılaştığı. Türk milletinin Mustafa Kemal'den yana olduğu, Enver Paşa'nın nüfuzunun bulunmadığı, bir yıl öncekine kıyasla Anadolu'da Bolşeviklik tehlikesinin pek kalmadığı.	
		4. İzmir'i geri alabilirse Mustafa Kemal'in Trakya'dan vazgeçebileceği.	
		5. Kemalistlerin büyük bir ordu kurabilecek güçte oldukları, yalnız silâh ve cephane kıtlığı çektikleri,	

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		şimdi Rusya'dan bunları alabildikleri, bunları taşıma güçlüğü çekildiği. Yüksek vergiler alındığı, suistimalin az olduğu.	
		6. Savaşta Türklerle Yunanlıların birbirini tüketecekleri ve sonunda barışa yanaşacakları kanısı.	
		7. Kemalistlerin İstanbul Hükümetini pek önemsemedikleri, Padişahın yetkilerini son derece azaltmak istedikleri.	
250	8 ağustos	İSTANBUL'DA MÜTTEFİK ORDULARI BAŞ KOMUTANINDAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL No. 741. GİZLİ.	591
		Yunan cephesindeki İngiliz subayların verdikleri bilgiler:	
		1. Türklerin, kaçaklarla birlikte 13.000, Yunanlıların ise 9500 zayiat verdikleri. Yunanlıların 5000 tutsak, 25 top ele geçirdikleri.	
		2. Tutsak Türk erlerinin Padişaha, subayların ise Mustafa Kemal'e bağlı oldukları.	
		3. Yunan Başkomutanlığını Kral'ın üzerine aldığı, Papoulas'a kolordu komutanlığının verildiği. Prens Andrew'un de 3. kolorduya kumanda ettiği.	
		4. Yunanlıların yakında üç koldan Ankara üzerine yürüyecekleri. Ama Ankara ele geçirilemezse Yunan ordusunda büyük düş kırıklığı olacağı.	
		5. Yunan Savunma Bakanı Theotakis'in General Papolas'ı kıskandığı.	
251	8 ağustos	İNGİLİZ MİLLETVEKİLİ MR. A. WILLIAMS'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A MEKTUP. GİZLİ. ...	592
		1. Vatikan Dışişleri Bakanı Kardinal Gasparri'nin Mustafa Kemal'e bir telgraf çekmiş, Mustafa Kemal'in de uzun bir cevapla Hristiyan halk için güvence vermiş olduğu.	
		2. Vatikan'ın ayrıca Kilikya Ermenileri konusunda Fransız Hükümetine de başvurmuş olduğu.	
		3. Vatikan'ın Ermeniler için bütün Hristiyan dünyasına çağrıda bulunabileceği.	
252	9 ağustos	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI No. 742.	593
		Padişahla görüşme.	

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		1. 6 ağustos günü Padişah tarafından kabul edildiği ve İngiliz Kralının mesajının kendisine iletildiği.	
		2. Sultan Vahdettin'in, Türkiye'yi bugünkü kötü duruma düşürenlerin % 10'dan fazla olmadığını söylediği ve İngiltere'nin niçin bu savaşı durdurmadığını sorduğu.	
		3. Padişaha, Müttefiklerin barış istedikleri ve müdahale etmek için zamanın henüz gelmediği yolunda cevap verildiği.	
		4. İstanbul Hükümetinin Ankara ile temasa geçmek girişimlerinin başarısız kaldığı, şimdi Salih Paşa'nın Fransa ve İtalya'ya yollandığı ve oralardaki Kemalist ajanlarla temas kuracağı.	
253	10 ağustos	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL NO. 565.	595
		1. Hristiyan halkın sürülmesi ile ilgili olarak Ankara'ya ortak bir telgraf gönderileceği.	
		2. Sadrazamın, sürgünlerin Karadeniz limanlarının Yunanlılar tarafından bombalanması ve Pontus ayaklanması üzerine başlatıldığını söylediği.	
		3. Amerikan Yüksek Komiserinin bu konuda Mustafa Kemal'e bir telgraf çekmiş olduğu, Mustafa Kemal'in ise yalnız silâhlı kimselerin sürüldüğü yolunda karşılık verdiği.	
254	10 ağustos	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL NO. 447. (R).	596
		Mustafa Kemal'in Müttefiklerin arabuluculuğunu aradığı söylentisi üzerine, Yunan Savunma Bakanının artık eski hataların işlenmeyeceğini, kurtarılmış kimseler için güvence isteneceğini söylediği.	
255	10 ağustos	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 347.	596
		1. İzmir'den dönen Gounaris'in bir demeç vererek, Yunan ordusunun Ankara'ya yürüyeceğini açıkladığı.	
		2. Yunan Başbakanının ilk kez Yunanistan'ın durumundan söz ederken "pek kritik ve nâzik" sözcükle-	

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		lerini kullandığı, bununla daha ziyade diplomatik ve malî durumu kastetmiş olabileceği.	
	3.	İstanbul üzerine yürünmesine engel olunacağının öğrenilmesinin Yunanistan'da düş kırıklığı yarattığı. Yunan gazetelerinin bu konudaki yayınlarından örnekler.	
256	11 ağustos	İNGİLİZ KABİNESİ SEKRETERİNDEN KABİNEYE NOT. NO. C. P. 3210	599
		Yunanistan'a savaş malzemesi sağlanması konusunda Başbakan'dan alınan telgrafın Kabine'ye sunulduğu.	
Ek.	10 ağustos	PARİS'TE BULUNAN İNGİLİZ BAŞBAKANI MR. LLOYD GEORGE'DAN MR. A. CHAMBERLAIN'A ŞİFRE TEL. No. 589.	599
		İngiliz firmalarının Yunanistan'a savaş malzemesi vermeleri için gerekenin yapılması buyruğu.	
257	12 ağustos	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A. ŞİFRE TEL. No. No. 451.	600
		Yunan Savunma Bakanının, savaş alanında vahşilik yapıldığını ve tutsakların öldürüldüklerini itiraf ettiği.	
258	12 ağustos	İSTANBUL'DA GENERAL HARINGTON'DAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL. No. 783. GİZLİ.	600
		Yunan cephesinde Kral'ın yanından dönen General Koutsis'in, Yunan ordusunun yakında Ankara'ya yürüyeceğini bildirdiği, Yunanistan'ın artık İzmir bölgesiyle yetinmeyeceğini söylediği, pek iyimser olduğu.	
259	16 ağustos	İNGİLTERE BAŞBAKANI MR. LLOYD GEORGE'UN PARLAMENTODA KONUŞMASI. (KISMEN).	601
	1.	Yunanistan'ın, İtilâf Devletleri Yüksek Konseyince İzmir ve Trakya'yı işgale çağırıldığı. Arkasından Sèvres andlaşmasının ve Türk milliyetçi ayaklanmasının geldiği.	
	2.	Kemalist ayaklanmayı Anadolu dağlarında bastırmak için İngiliz askeri gönderilmediğine göre, geriye yalnız Yunanlılarla Türkleri çarpıştırma seçeneği kaldığı. İngiltere'nin taraflara yardım etmediği.	

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		3. Başarılı bir savaş yapan Yunanistan'ın, önceki barış koşullariyle tatmin olamayacağı. Ölçülü olması öğüdü.	
260	17 ağustos	YUNAN BASIN BÜLTENİ.	603
		1. Anadolu'da Yunan askerî hükûmeti kurulduğu ve yetkisinin bütün işgal altındaki toprakları kapsadığı.	
		2. Türklerin Ankara'yı boşaltmağa başladıkları.	
		3. Lloyd George'un nutku üzerine Yunan basınında yorumlar... Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun mirasçısının Yunanistan olduğu sözlerinin hatırlatılması.	
261	18 ağustos	YUNAN BASIN BÜLTENİ.	605
		Yunan ordusunun yeniden 100 kilometre ilerlediği. Sivrihisar halkının Kemalist orduyla birlikte kaçıp gitmiş olduğu. Mustafa Kemal'in şaşkına dönmüş bulunduğu, savaşı nerede kabul edeceğinin bilinmediği.	
262	19 ağustos	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN İNGİLTERE'NİN PARİS, ROMA VE BRÜKSEL BÜYÜKELÇİLİKLERİNE YAZI. NO. 2275.	606
		1. İtilâf Devletlerinin tarafsızlığının, özel firmalarca savaşan taraflara askerî malzeme satılmasına engel olmadığı. İngiltere Hükûmetinin firmalara silâh satış lisansı vereceği.	
		2. Bunun, Fransız, İtalyan ve Belçika Hükûmetlerine duyurulması talimatı.	
263	19 ağustos	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN TOKYO BÜYÜKELÇİSİ SIR C. ELLIOT'A. TEL. NO. 172.	607
		İngiltere Hükûmetinin, Anadolu'da savaşan taraflara silâh satılabilmesi için özel firmalara lisans vereceği. Bunun Japon Hükûmetine duyurulması talimatı.	
264	20 ağustos	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDAN İNGİLİZ TİCARET ODASINA YAZI.	607
		Özel firmaların Yunanistan'a ve Kemalistlere silâh satmalarına bir engel bulunmadığı. Bu konuda gereken işlemin yapılması ricası.	
265	22 ağustos	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A. YAZI. NO. 371.	609

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		1. Yunan Başbakanının basına verdiği demeçte, Yunanistan'ın emperyalist emelleri olmadığını, yalnız Yunanlıları Türk boyunduruğundan kurtarmak istediğini söylediği.	
		2. Yunan basınının Mr. Lloyd George'un nutkunu ve Elen dostluğunu övdüğü.	
266	22 ağustos	"İNGİLİZ MUHİBLER CEMİYETİ" REİSİ SAİD MOLLA'DAN İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'A. RAPOR.	610
		1. Türkiye'de panislamizm ve panturanizm hakkında bilgiler.	
		2. Jön Türklerin, İngiltere'ye karşı kullanmak için panislamizmi yetersiz bulup panturanizmi de yarattıkları.	
		3. Türkiye'de İngiliz aleyhtarlarının Panislamist oldukları, Damat Ferit Paşa'nın bile İngiliz aleyhtarı olduğu, Mustafa Kemal'i Anadolu'ya gönderdiği.	
		4. İzzet, Tevfik, Ali Rıza ve Salih Paşaların da İngiliz aleyhtarı oldukları.	
		5. Ankara ile İstanbul arasındaki ilişkilerde de panislamizm ve panturanizm konusunda görüş birliği bulunduğu.	
		6. Anadolu'daki savaşın da panislamizm ve panturanizmin sonucu ve İngiliz çıkarlarına karşı olduğu.	
		7. Kendisinin (Sait Molla'nın) ve arkadaşlarının ise Türkiye'de panislamizmi ve panturanizmi yoketmek, halkın eğitim düzeyine göre bir hükümet kurmak ve İngiliz uygarlığından yararlanmak istedikleri.	
		8. Mütârekeden sonra İstanbul'da durum üzerine bir not.	
		9. Cavit Bey, Hüseyin Cahit Bey, Reşit Bey, Sabahattin Bey gibi kişileri jurnal...	
267	23 ağustos	İNGİLTERE'NİN ŞAM KONSOLOSU MR. PALMER'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A. YAZI. No. 120.	615
		1. Şeyh Sünnisi'nin Mardin'de Mustafa Kemal Paşa'dan yana konuşmalar yaptığı.	
		2. Doğu Anadolu göçmenlerinin yerlerine dönmeleri emredildiği.	
		3. Birçok Türk askerinin firar ettiği.	

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		4. Ankara Hükümetinin, Müslüman olmayanların güvenliği için bir genelge çıkardığı.	
268	24 ağustos	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 785.	616
		1. Hariciye Nazırı İzzet Paşa'nın ziyaret edildiği, üç Osmanlı Nazırının istifalarına, malî sorunlara değinildiği.	
		2. Yalova-Gemlik yöresinde yağmacılık yüzünden tutuklu bulunan Hristiyanların serbest bırakılmalarının istendiği, İzzet Paşa'nın da Mütârekeden beri tutuklu bulunan Müslümanları hatırlattığı.	
		3. Bugünkü durumda Mustafa Kemal'in ne yapacağının sorulduğu, İzzet Paşa'nın da "Size başvurur" diye cevap verdiği.	
269	24 ağustos	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ HABERALMA ÖRGÜTÜ İSTANBUL ŞUBESİNCE HAZIRLANAN RAPORDAN. (KISMEN).	
Ek.	17 ağustos	TÜRKİYE BÜYÜK MİLLET MECLİSİ BAŞKANI MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞA'DAN "HALAÂS-I VATAN CEMİYETİ"NE BİLDİRİ	618
		Ordu geri çekilirken Anadolu'da ayaklanma çıktığı yolundaki söylentilerin asılsız olduğu, bunlara inanmamak gerektiği, ordunun moralinin yerinde olduğu, düşmanın yenileceği.	
270	26 ağustos	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ATAŞEMİLİTERİNDEN SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL. NO. S. M. 81	
		Yunan Genelkurmayının bildirdiğine göre, Mustafa Kemal Paşa Sakarya doğusunda savaşı kabul edecektir.	
271	27 ağustos	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A ŞİFRE TEL. NO. 471 (DAĞITIMI YAPILAMAZ).	620
		1. Yunan Savunma Bakanının İngiliz ataşemiliterine 5 eylül için Ankara'da randevu verdiği haberinin "Daily Telegraph" gazetesinde yayınlanmış olduğu.	
		2. Bu haberin gazeteye İngiliz Elçiliğinden sızdırılmadığı.	
		Not: Mr. Leeper'den Lord Curzon'a yazı: Yunan Savunma Bakanının Ankara'da randevu verdiği	

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		haberinin gizli tutulmağa çalışıldığı halde dikkatsizlikle gazetede yayınlanmış olduğu. Bir daha sır tutulmağa çalışılacağı, böyle dikkatsizlik yapılmayacağı.	
272	29 ağustos	İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINDAN İNGİLİZ KABİNESİNE MUHTIRA.	621
		1. Temmuz-Ağustos 1921'de Anadolu'da Türk-Yunan askerî harekâtı hakkında İngiliz Genelkurmay Başkanlığınca hazırlanmış bir raporun eklice Hükûmete sunulduğu.	
		2. Yunan taarruzunun başında tarafların askerî durumları üzerine bilgiler.	
		3. Yunan Herakât Plânı uyarınca 13 temmuzda Afyon, 17 temmuzda Kütahya ve 20 temmuzda da Eskişehir'in ele geçirildiği.	
		4. Yunan ordusunun ikmal ve nakliye hizmetlerinin ve moral durumunun değerlendirilmesi.	
		5. Tarafların zayiatı: Fransız tahminlerine göre her iki tarafın onar bin zayiat verdiği, İngiliz tahminlerine göre ise Türklerin zayiatının 4 bin tutsak, 6 bin yaralı ve 2 bin ölü olmak üzere 12 bin olduğu.	
		6. Yunan Ordularının Başkumandanlığını Kral Konstantin'in üzerine aldığı.	
		7. Yorum: Türklerin bir yenilgiye uğradıkları, bundan sonra önlerinde üç seçenek bulunduğu: a) Ya Yunanlılarla kesin bir savaşı kabul edeceklerdir, b) Ya geri çekilmeye devam edeceklerdir, c) Ve ya orduyu dağıtıp gerilla savaşını seçeceklerdir. Yunanlıların hedefinin ise Türkleri savaşa zorlayıp kesin sonuç almak olması gerektiği.	
Ek. A	—	YUNAN HAREKÂT PLÂNI (BİRİNCİ SAFHA).	628
Ek. B	—	TÜRK MİLLİYETÇİ ORDUSUNUN İNGİLİZ GENELKURMAYINCA TAHMİNİ.	629
Ek C	—	RUS ORDUSUNUN KEMALİSTLERE YARDIM OLANAĞI ÜZERİNDE YORUM.	631
Ek. D	—	YUNAN HAREKÂT PLÂNI (İKİNCİ SAFHA).	634
273	2 eylül	YUNAN BASIN BÜLTENİ.	635

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		1. Yunan ordusunun ilerlemeye devam ettiği, Gordium yakınında çarpışmalar olduğu.	
		2. Sağlık durumu düzelen Yunan Kralının Eskişehirden Bursa'ya gittiği, harekâtın sonuna kadar orada kalacağı.	
		3. Mustafa Kemal tarafından kendisine özel bir görev verilen Ali Rıza Paşa'nın Arnavutluk'a gittiği.	
274	2 eylül	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. No. 812.	636
		1. 31 Ağustos günü Dolmabahçe sarayında Veliaht Abdülmecid'i ziyaret ettiği.	
		2. Abdülmecid'in Damat Ferit Paşa'yı suçladığı, İngiltere'nin neden Milliyetçilerle doğrudan doğruya ilişki kurmadığını sorduğu. Kendisine uygun cevabın verildiği.	
		3. Veliahtın, İngiltere ile Türkiye'nin beraber olabileceklerini uzun uzun anlattığı, Ermeni kırımına değindiği.	
		4. Görüşme sırasında Dolmabahçe önünde Yunan denizcileri geçtiği, ama arkası pençereye dönük olduğu için Veliahtın bunları göremediği.	
275	3 eylül	İSTANBUL'DA MÜTTEFİK ORDULARI BAŞKUMANDANINDAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL. No. 910. GİZLİ.	638
		1. Sakarya savaşı hakkında bilgiler: Yusuf İzzet Paşa'nın İkinci grupla Haymana hattını tuttuğu, Üçüncü grup cephesinin büyük önem taşıdığı. Çaldağ'a yönelen Yunanlılara hücüm etmesi için dördüncü gruba emir verildiği.	
		2. 3 Eylül gecesi Mustafa Kemal'in bütün grup komutanlarına bir emir yayınladığı, buna bakarak Türklerin durumunun ciddi olduğunun sanıldığı. Ama Türk merkez cephesinin Yunan saldırılarına karşı tutunduğu.	
276	5 eylül	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A. ŞİFRE TEL No. 597.	640
		1. Sakarya savaşının on-onbir gündür devam ettiği.	

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		2. Her iki tarafta büyük zayiat olduğu, savaşın karşılıklı tükenmeyle sonuçlanacağı.	
277	5 eylül	YUNAN BASIN BÜLTENİ.	640
		1. Trakya'da Yunan ordusunun arkasında sabotaj hareketlerine girişmek için Türklerle Bulgarların işbirliği yapmalarının kararlaştırıldığı.	
		2. Bu planın uygulanması görevinin, Mustafa Kemal Paşa tarafından Fuad Bey adındaki bir Türk subayına verildiği.	
278	6 eylül	"THE DAILY TELEGRAPH" GAZETESİ YAZISI.	641
		1. Yunan Kralı Konstantin'in Eskişehir'de "Daily Telegraph" gazetesi muhabiri A. Baumont'a verdiği demeç.	
		2. Kralın, Eskişehir'de oturmakta olduğu bir Türk evinden yakındığı, Türklerin şehir planlamayı, ev yapmayı bilmediklerini söylediği. Yakında Bursa'ya gideceği.	
		3. Yunan Kralının, askeri durumu çok iyi gördüğü, Mustafa Kemal'in ordusunu yokedebileceklerini ve Ankara'ya gireceklerini söylediği.	
		4. Soru üzerine Kralın şimdilik İstanbul'a yürümeyeceklerini söylediği.	
279	7 eylül	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 827.	643
		1. İstanbul'da siyasal bir gelişme olmadığı. Dikkatlerin Anadolu'daki savaşa çevrilmiş bulunduğu, iki tarafça yayımlanan bildirilerde yeterince bilgi bulunmadığı.	
		2. Sakarya savaşının hala devam ettiği, Yunanlıların böyle çetin bir direnişi beklememiş oldukları.	
		3. Bu savaşın, iki tarafın adamakıllı yorgunluğu ve bitkinliği ile bitebileceği ve böyle bir durumun yeni girişimlere elverişli olabileceği.	
		4. Yunan gemilerinin İstanbul'dan geçip Türk gemilerinde arama yaptıkları, savaş malzemesi olmayan halı, mücevher gibi şeyleri aldıkları ve asker olmayan yaşlı sivilleri ve çocukları tutukladıkları.	
		5. Beyoğlu caddesine ve Yunan Askeri misyonu binasına, Yunan kralının büyük boy resimlerinin yapıştırıldığı ve altına "geliyor" yazısının yazıldığı.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
280	12 eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A ŞİFRE TEL. No. 489.	645
	1.	Askeri durumu Yunan Hükümetiyle görüşmek üzere Atina'ya gelen General Stratigos'un, Ankara'ya yürüyüp yürümeme konusunda henüz karar verilmediğini söylediği. Yunanlıların 15.000 zayiat vermiş oldukları.	
	2.	Trakya'daki Yunan tümeninin Eskişehir'e yollandığı.	
	3.	General Stratigos'un, askeri harekâtı durdurup Sakarya'nın Doğu kıyısında tutunmaktan yana göründüğü.	
	4.	Türk kuvvetlerinin 18 tümen tahmin edildiği, bir genel karşı taarruza kalkışabileceklerinin kuşkulu olduğu, ama bu konuda yeterince bilgi bulunmadığı.	
281	13 eylül	İSTANBUL'DA MÜTTEFİK ORDULARI BAŞKOMUTANINDAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL No. 978. GİZLİ.	646
	1.	Sakarya savaşının 10 eylül'e kadarki durumu.	
	2.	Yunanlıların 18.000, Türklerin ise 12.000 zayiat verdikleri. Yunan ordusuna yeni takviye ve cephane gönderildiği.	
	3.	Yunan Genelkurmayının taarruzdan vazgeçtiği ve Ankara'yı ele geçirmeğe kalkışmayacağı. Eskişehir-Kütahya-Afyon hattına çekilmeyi düşündüğü.	
282	14 eylül	İSTANBUL'DA MÜTTEFİK ORDULARI BAŞKOMUTANINDAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL No. 991.	647
		Yunanlıların (Sakarya'dan) toptan çekilmeğe başladıkları ve Türk ordusunca kovalandıkları.	
283	14 eylül	LONDRA'DA ÇIKAN "THE TIMES" GAZETESİNİN "YUNANİSTAN VE TÜRKİYE" BAŞLIKLI BAŞYAZISI.	648
	1.	Sakarya havzasında 18.000 zayiat verdikten sonra Kral Konstantin'in ordusunun geri çekilmek zorunda bırakıldığı. Bütün Doğuda bunun Mustafa Kemal'in zaferi olarak görüleceği. Kemal'in ordusunun boyun eğmemiş olduğu. Yunan başarısızlığı	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		karşısında Türk milliyetçi liderinin Doğu'daki prestijinin arttığı. Bunların, Müttefiklerce gözönünde tutulması gereken soğuk gerçekler oldukları.	
		2. Müttefiklerin şimdi acıklı bir çıkmaz içinde bulundukları. Kaçamaklı tarafsızlığın yetersiz olduğu geçmişin hatalarının ve oyalamalarının şimdi hissedildiği, herhalde müttefiklerin yeni bir politika oluşturmaları zamanının geldiği.	
		3. Yeni politikanın bir unsurunun, taşıyamayacağı kadar yükü taşımağa Yunanistan'ın artık teşvik edilmemesi olması ve Anadolu içlerine bu saldırının bir felâketle bitmemesine şükredilmesi gerektiği.	
284	15 eylül	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 852.	650
		1. İngiliz torpitolarının tarafsız davranmadıklarıyla ilgili olarak Yusuf Kemal Beyin İstanbul'daki yabancı temsilciliklerine gönderdiği nota ile Amiral de Robeck'in buna cevabının eklice sunulduğu.	
		2. Yusuf Kemal Beyin, Yunan gemilerinin İstanbul'u üs olarak kullanmalarını protesto edişini ise cevapsız bırakmak gerektiği.	
Ek. 1	4 eylül	ANKARA HÜKÜMETİ HARİCİYE VEKİLİ YUSUF KEMAL BEYDEN MÜTTEFİK YÜKSEK KOMİSERLERİNE NOTA.	650
		1. 27 Ağustos günü iki İngiliz torpitosunun Samsun limanına girerek arama yaptıkları, bunun, Müttefiklerin ilân ettikleri tarafsızlığa aykırı olduğu.	
		2. İstanbul bölgesinin tarafsızlığı ilân edildikten sonra da Yunan donanmasının Karadeniz'e saldırmak için İstanbul'u üs olarak kullandığı.	
		3. Türk savaş donanmasına müttefiklerce elkonulmuş ve yalnız Yunan donanmasına harekat serbestliği tanınmış iken Müttefiklerin tarafsızlığının sözde kaldığı, samimi olmadığı.	
		4. Bir yandan tarafsız görünerek İslâm dünyasını yatıştırmağa çalışan, öte yandan elden geldiği kadar Yunanistan'a yardım eden Müttefik politikasını en sert biçimde protesto.	
Ek. 2	12 eylül	AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'TEN SIR H. RUMBOLD'A YAZI.	652

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		1. İngiliz destroyerlerinin Samsun açıklarında bir Türk kayığı ile karşılaştıkları, haber almak için kayığa asker indirdikleri, ama arama yapmadıkları.	
		2. Mütareke hükümleri gereğince İngiliz gemilerinin Türk gemilerinde arama yapmağa hakları olduğu.	
		3. Kemalistlerin de tarafsızlığa uymadıkları, Türk limanlarında İngiliz gemilerine kolaylık göstermedikleri, İngiliz mallarını boykot ettikleri.	
		4. Yunan gemilerinin ise İstanbul'da bütün müttefiklerin rızasıyla bulundukları, esasen İstanbul şehrinin müttefiklerin işgali altında bulunduğu, tarafsız ilân edilmediği.	
285	16 eylül	İSTANBUL'DA GENERAL HARINGTON'DAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL NO. 1004. GİZLİ.	654
		1. General Coutsis'in verdiği bilgilere göre, Yunan ordusunun ikmal güçlülüğü yüzünden Sakarya'dan çekilmek zorunda kaldığı. 15.000 zayiat verdiği, daha önceki zayiatının da 8000 olduğu.	
		2. Yunanlıların bu kadar zayiat ve böyle çetin bir direnişi öngörmemiş oldukları, Denikin gibi yenildikleri.	
		3. Milliyetçilerin dengeyi kendi lehlerinde çevirdiklerinin kuşkusuz olduğu.	
286	19 eylül	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDAN HİNDİSTAN İŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA YAZI. İVEDİ VE GİZLİ.	655
		1. Kemalistler için Hindistan'da toplanan paralarla İngiltere'den silâh satın alınacağını gösteren bir işaret bulunmadığı.	
		2. İngiltere'nin Türkiye'deki hukuki durumunun anormal olduğu, bir yandan İstanbul Hükümetiyle halâ savaş halinde sayıldığı halde Türk-Yunan savaşında tarafsızlığın ilân edildiği, nazari olarak özel firmaların Kemalistlere de silâh satabilecekleri. Ama bu silâhlara yolda Yunanlılarca el konabileceği.	
		3. Kemalistler için Hindistan'da para toplanmasının önlenip önlenemeyeceğinin de kestirilemediği.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
287	20 eylül	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 868.	656
		1. Yunan ordusunun Sakarya'dan çekildiğinden beri Müttefik Yüksek Komiserlerince yeni bir arabuluculuk girişimi konusunun görüşüldüğü.	
		2. Ama şu sırada Kemalistlerin İzmir konusunda daha önce teklif edilenden azına kanaat etmeyecekleri.	
		3. Gelişmeleri bir süre daha beklemenin uygun olacağı görüşü. Ekim sonuna doğru zamanın daha elverişli olabileceği.	
288	20 eylül	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 869. GİZLİ.	657
		1. M. Franklin-Bouillon'un Paris'ten İstanbul'a geldiği ve İnebolu'ya gittiği.	
		2. Fransızlarla Kemalistler arasında yapılacak anlaşmada gizli bir askeri madde bulunduğunun haber alındığı.	
		3. Herhalde Franklin-Bouillon'un yürüttüğü görüşmelerin yalnız tutsak değiştokuşu ile ilgili olmadığı.	
289	21 eylül	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDAN KRALLIK HUKUKÇULARINA YAZI. E. 11600/143/194.	658
		1. Sovyet Hükümetince Ankara Hükümetine savaş gemileri verilmesi konusunda hukuki mütalea isteği.	
		2. İngiltere'nin Sovyetlerle imzaladığı 16 Mart 1921 tarihli ticaret anlaşması, Müttefiklerin Türkiye ile ilişkileri, Türk-Yunan savaşında tarafsızlıklarını ilân etmeleri, Kemalist Hükümetin İngiltere'ye karşı hasmane tutumu, Ankara ile Moskova arasında imzalanmış 16 Mart 1921 tarihli andlaşma gözönünde tutularak, devletler hukuku açısından aşağıdaki soruların aydınlatılması isteği:	
		i) Kemalist Hükümetin tutumunun İngiltere'ye karşı "hasmane bir hareket" sayılıp sayılamıyacağı.	
		ii) Sayılacak ise Sovyetlerin Ankara Hükümetine vereceği savaş gemilerini İngiltere'nin batırıp batıramıyacağı, bu gemilere el koyup koyamı-	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		yacağı veya bu konuda Sovyetleri protesto edip edemeyeceği.	
Ek.	18 ekim	İNGİLİZ KRALLIK HUKUKÇULARININ RAPORU.	662
		1. Türk-Yunan savaşında tarafsızlık ilân edildiğine göre, İngiltere Hükümetinin Kemalist Hükümetin davranışlarını "hasmane hareket" sayamayacağı.	
		2. Bu durumda ikinci soruya yer olmayacağı.	
290	21 eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 501 (R).	663
		1. Yunan Başbakanının, ileri yürüme çok pahalıya mal olacağı için Yunan ordusunun çelikmeğe karar verdiğini, herşeyi taşıyarak geçtiği yerleri çöle çevirerek çekildiğini söylediği.	
		3. Başbakanın ayrıca, Yunanistan'ın Mustafa Kemal ile görüşmek için ilk adım atmayacağını söylediği ve arabuluculuktan da söz etmediği.	
291	23 eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 442.	663
		1. Yunan ordusunun Anadolu'dan geri dönüşünün Atina'daki bilgilerle tam değerlendirilemeyeceği, Türklerin bir türlü, Yunanlıların ise başka türlü söyledikleri.	
		2. Ama Atina'da büyük düş kırıklığı ve karamsarlık olduğu.	
		3. Yunan yenilgisinin İngiltere için de bir darbe olacağı, İngiltere'nin Yunanlılara maddi, manevi yardımda bulunması ve Yunan ordusunun ezilmesine fırsat vermemesi gerektiği.	
292	26 eylül	İNGİLİZ SÖMÜRGELER BAKANI MR. W. S. CHURCHILL'DEN BAKANLAR KURULUNA MUHTIRA. C. P. 3328.	665
		"Yunanistan ve Türkiye"	
		1. Yunanlıların Ankara'yı ele geçirme denemelerinin geri teptiği, Mustafa Kemal'in şimdi Yunanlıları cephede uzun zaman çok sayıda asker tutma zorunda bırakacağı, bunun zamanla Yunanistan'da tehlikeli tepkilere yol açabileceği.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		2. Bu bekleyiş zamanı içinde Mustafa Kemal'in Irak'ı ve Musul'u tehdit edebileceği, İngiltere'nin güç durumda kalacağı.	
		3. Bu nedenle bir çözüm yolu bulmak için müdahale etmek gerektiği, herhalde İngiltere'nin artık seyirci kalmaması, taraflara seslenmesi zamanının geldiği.	
		4. Sorunun Kabine'de görüşülmesi önerisi.	
293	28 eylül	LONDRA'DA ÇIKAN "THE MORNING POST" GAZETESİNİN "GAZİ MUSTAFA KEMAL" BAŞLIKLI YAZISI.	667
		1. Ankara Meclisinin Mustafa Kemal'e "müşir" ve "gazi" payelerini verdiği, Paşa'nın, teşekkür ederek Mecliste önemli bir konuşma yaptığı ve milliyetçilerin politikasını bir kez daha açıkladığı.	
		2. Türkiye'nin, ulusal sınırları içinde özgür ve bağımsız yaşamak istediği, aslında savaş isteklisi olmadığı, ulusal istekleri tanınınca barışa razı olacağı. Türkiye'nin haksız yere suçlandığı.	
294	28 eylül	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 897.	670
		1. Ankara Meclisinin Mustafa Kemal'e "gazi"lik ve "müşir"lik payelerini verdiği, bu vesileyle Paşa'nın önemli bir konuşma yaptığı, bütün Yunanlılar Türkiye'den atılmadıkça ordunun silâhı bırakmayacağını açıkladı.	
		2. Osmanlı Hariciye Nazırının, Kemalistlerin şimdi barışa daha istekli olacaklarını söylediği, ama İstanbul Hükümetinin herhangi bir öneride bulunmadığı, yalnız İzmir yöresiyle Trakya'nın geri verilmesi gerektiğinin söylendiği.	
		3. İstanbul'daki yabancı kamuoyu ise, Büyük devletlerin Türkiye ile Yunanistan'a barışı empoze etmelerinden yana göründüğü.	
295	28 eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN IRAK YÜKSEK KOMİSERİNDEN SÖMÜRGELER BAKANLIĞINA TEL NO. 534.	671
		1. Mustafa Kemal'in, parlak stratejisi ve büyük taktikleriyle Yunan taarruzunu ezdiği, Enver Paşa'yı gölgede bıraktığı.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		2. Mustafa Kemal'in Irak'ın bağımsızlığına karşı olmadığı, İngiltere'nin Yunanistan'ı desteklemesine kızdığı için Irak'taki İngiliz çıkarlarına zarar vermek istediği.	
		3. Emir Faysal aracılığıyla Mustafa Kemal'le müzakerelere girişmek ve Irak sınırını güvenlik altına almak gerektiği, böyle bir girişim için zamanın elverişli olduğu.	
296	29 eylül	LONDRA'DAKİ FRANSIZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ İLE İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKAN YARDIMCISI SIR E. CROWE ARASINDA GÖRÜŞME TUTANAĞI (KISMEN).	672
		1. Fransız Büyükelçisi Kont Saint-Aulaire, Yunanlıların şimdi Büyük Devletlerin arabuluculuğuna kabule hazır olup olmadıklarını sorar.	
		2. Sir E. Crowe, kesin bir şey söyleyemeyeceğini bildirir.	
		3. Fransız Büyükelçisi, Yunan Başbakanı Gounaris'in Londra'ya gelip gelmeyeceğini sorar. Sir E. Crowe, gelmek istediğini açıklar.	
		4. Sir E. Crowe, Kemalistlerin niyetini Fransız Büyükelçisinden sorar ve M. Franklin-Bouillon'un Ankara'ya gitmiş olması nedeniyle Fransızların Ankara'nın tutumu hakkında bilgi sahibi olabileceklerini ekler.	
		5. Fransız Büyükelçisi birşey bilmediğini söyler ve Ankara'nın niyeti hakkında bilgi alırsa İngiltere'ye de bildirmeye söz verir.	
297	30 eylül	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDINGE'E YAZI NO. 2567. İVEDİ.	673
		1. M. Franklin-Bouillon'un ne amaçla Ankara'ya gittiğinin Fransa Dışişleri Bakanından sorulması.	
		2. İngiltere ile uyuşmaya varmaksızın Fransa'nın Kemalistlerle anlaşma yapmayacağı yolunda daha önce İngiltere'ye söz verilmiş olduğu.	

B E L G E L E R

No. 1

Lord Hardinge to Earl Curzon.

PARIS, *January 3, 1921.*
(Received January 3.)

No. 4.
Telegraphic.

THIS evening's newspapers announce that President of the Council this morning received General Townshend and General Achmed Riza, former Resident (sic) of Ottoman Chamber.

General Townshend has already given press interview, in which he advocates revision of Treaty of Sèvres, and French will undoubtedly make as mush capital as possible out of his views.

The President of the Council impressed upon me again to-day the necessity of effecting a settlement in the Near East owing to the presence of Bolshevik emissaries in Angora.

In reply to my enquiry as to what he would propose, he urged afresh a modification of the Treaty of Sèvres in regard to Smyrna, and necessity of making peace with Turkey on these lines before Greeks had been forced to evacuate that city. I expressed the opinion that no advantage was to be derived from being precipitate, and that whatever the future developments might be we should await them with confidence.

He did not tell me that he had seen General Townshend.

F.O. 406/45, p. 38, No. 12

No. 2

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *January 4, 1921.*
(Received January 17.)

No. 10
My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a report on the heads of foreign missions at this capital, in so far as they are known to me. Having only recently arrived I fear that the report must be necessarily somewhat incomplete.

2. In view of the fact that I am thrown into especially close contact with my French and Italian colleagues owing to the weekly meetings of the High Commissioners, and to the nature of our work here, good relations with the French and Italian High Commissioners are especially important.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

F.O. 406/45, p, 46, No. 19.

Enclosure in No. 2.

Report on Heads of Foreign Missions in Constantinople, January 1921.

France. — The French High Commissioner, M. Defrance, came here from Egypt in March 1919. He is the senior of the three Allied High Commissioners, and having been here a considerable time is naturally better acquainted with most of the questions dealt with at the High Commissioners' meetings than either my Italian colleague or myself. His experience is thus valuable to us.

I have found M. Defrance an excellent colleague, and I regret his approaching departure for Madrid. He is conciliatory in the handling of questions of a controversial character, and as far as I can judge, has done his utmost to work cordially with us. I have cultivated close relations with him.

Italy — The Marquis Garroni arrived here in the latter half of November, a week or so after my own arrival. He was Italian Ambassador at Constantinople before the war, and therefore knows this part of the world. He is not a regular member of the Italian Diplomatic Service, his appointment being a political appointment made by Signor Giolitti. He is a senator from Genoa. His appearance is that of an easy-going elderly gentleman, but he is very alert. My impression is that he is determined to push Italian interests to the utmost, *vide* his recent proposal to send an agent to Mustapha Kemal with a view to facilitating the development of interests which Italy has acquired under the Tripartite Agreement. This effort was, however, nipped in the bud. I have found the Marquis Garroni a very pleasant colleague, anxious for close co-operation with my French colleague and myself. So far I have no reason to suspect him of want of loyalty, and he was perfectly frank about his proposal to send an emissary to Mustapha Kemal.

United States — Admiral Bristol, the United States High Commissioner, came to Constantinople early in 1919. He has therefore been

here longer than any of the High Commissioners. Before I arrived here he was described to me by the American naval attaché in London as a man of "transparent candour". I have not had much intecourse with him since my arrival, but I have always found him friendly, and certainly in one case, in which an American subject and the British military authorities were concerned, conciliatory. I am under the impression, however, that he is inclined to be jealous of the fact that the Allied High Commissioners are practically directing the administration of Constantinople. I have dealt with two categories of Americans since the armistice. The one category, whilst deeply regretting that America has, through her own action, renounced participation in the post-war settlement, nevertheless do their best to help their former allies. The other category are jealous of the necessarily preponderant rôle played by England in the settlement of European affairs. I conclude that Admiral Bristol belongs to this latter category. His occasional comments on decisions taken at the High Commissioners' meetings and communicated to him seem to indicate a desire to remind us to be careful of what we are doing.

A trained diplomatist in the shape of Mr. Dulles, a nephew of Mr. Lansing, has recently arrived as First Secretary at the American High Commission, and his influence will no doubt be beneficial.

Greece. — M. Canellopoulos is the Greek High Commissioner. I have seen very little of him as, since my arrival, he has been in a particularly difficult position owing to the result of the elections in Greece. He is inclined to be a trimmer. We have to address frequent notes to M. Canellopoulos on the proceedings of the Greek troops in the territories which they occupy in Asia Minor. Of late he has shown a desire to be conciliatory and to meet our requests.

Belgium. — M. Michotte de Welle came here in October of last year. He is somewhat garrulous and plays no part.

Sweden. — M. Wallenberg was appointed here from Tokyo, where I knew him in 1909-13. He was very pro-German whilst in Japan, and I understand that this made his position very difficult when Japan entered the war. He has been absent since I arrived but is now on his way back to his post. He is in charge of German interests at Constantinople.

Denmark. — M. Wandel is the Dutch Minister. I have only met him once.

Spain. — M. Servert y Vest is the Spanish Minister. I am told that he is quite insignificant and rarely appears.

There are also representatives from Jugo-Slavia, Czecho-Slovakia, Poland and Roumania.

F.O. 406/45, p. 46-47, No. 19/1

No. 3

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *January 6, 1921, 1.20 p.m.*
(Received January 7, 11.20 a.m.)

No. 13

Telegraphic.

Colonel Bodrevo an Italian officer who has just arrived from Tiflis called on me yesterday at suggestion of Italian High Commissioner. He state that he had travelled part of the way from Tiflis with Mustafa Kemal's Foreign Minister Bekir Sami Bey, who was on his way back from Moscow[1]. Latter informed him that agreement between Nationalists and Bolsheviks has not yet been signed because former wished to keep a loophole open in the event of Allies being ready to negotiate with Mustafa Kemal. Bekir Sami also expessed opinion that Izzet Pasha would not return to Constantinople. This is probably Nationalist propaganda.

Colonel Bodrevo informed me that he had recently met at Tiflis a Kemalist emissary on his way to Djemal Pasha in Afghanistan[2]. The emissary had spoken in the same sense as Bekir Sami and had said that Nationalists wished for peace with Entente and must have it. But they must stand out for Turkish frontiers of 1914 in Europe and for elimination of foreign territorial rights etc. in Asia Minor although they would agree to special régime for Smyrna.

D.B.F.P., Ist series, vol. XVII, p. 3, No. 4.

[1] Bekir Sami had been in Moscow since the summer of 1920.

[2] Jemal Pasha, a member of the Young Turk Committee of Union and Progress War Government, had fled from Constantinople in October 1918. He was in Kabul from October 1920 to September 1921 as the leader of a special Turkish mission, financed by Bolshevik funds. His aims were to be the reorganization of the Afghan army and the prosecution of anti-British intrigues among the tribes of the Indo-Afghan frontier and in India. He was not fully recognized by the Angora Government, and was suspected by the Bolsheviks of planning independently a Pan-Islamic movement.

Copy

No. 4

Extracts From "The Daily Express" of January 7, 1921.

TURKEY FOR THE TURKS.

NATIONALIST LEADER EXPLAINS HIS AIMS.

"RIGHT TO EXIST."

MESSAGE TO "THE DAILY EXPRESS"

"Daily Express" Correspondent.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *Jan. 4.*
(Received yesterday).

I have to-day received the following telegram addressed to the Editor of the "Daily Express" from Mustapha Kemal Pasha, the Turkish Nationalist leader, from his headquarters at Angora, Asia Minor, in reply to a request for a statement of his terms of peace.

ANGORA.

To the Editor of the "Daily Express," London.

I am not responsible for the terms of peace. Everything is in the hands of the great National Assembly of Turkey at Angora. That Assembly was formed for the purpose of legitimate defence following the attack that was made against the existence of the nation by imperialist Powers.

The objects of the Assembly have been repeatedly declared, both openly and indirectly, on various occasions. The Assembly met in order to secure complete national independence within the national frontiers, and to preserve the seat of the Khalifate and Sultanate for the Turkish people.

The Turkish people demands no more than the recognition of its right to independent existence. The Assembly is confident that it will succeed in rescuing the nation from capitalist and imperialist domination, and that it will restore national power and sovereignty.

In obedience to the dictates of the Assembly, there is an organised army created to fulfil the duty of defending the nation against its capitalist and imperialist enemies, and to punish all who hinder this purpose.

The Assembly considers its principal object the elimination of the causes of misery among the people by the introduction of reforms. It will devote attention to problems concerning the land, education, justice, finance, and economy, and devise a new organisation in conformity with national requirements on the fundamental basis of social fraternity and co-operation.

It will rely on innate national principles in applying these reforms by taking into account national traits and traditions.

MUSTAPHA KEMAL.

This means that the Nationalists have resolved to stick to their original demands regarding Smyrna and Thrace, which they consider integral parts of Turkey, inhabited by Turkish majorities.

The sudden recall of Izzet Pasha's Mission from Angora is due to the inability of the Government in Constantinople to guarantee the possibility of the fulfilment of the Nationalists' demands, which include modification of the financial and military clauses of the Treaty of Sèvres.

CROWN PRINCE'S PLAN.

MUSTAPHA KEMAL DEPENDENT ON HIS WILL.

"Daily Express" Correspondent.

PARIS, *Jan. 5.*

"Le Gaulois" publishes a special interview with Abdul Medjid, Crown Prince of Turkey, in which the Prince states his views on the policy which should be adopted by the Allies in the Near East. This policy would be a modification, but not a stultification, of the Sèvres Treaty.

"The Allies", he said, "must allow Turkey an opportunity to exist. In the first place, why should not the Allies, instead of Greece, occupy Smyrna for the five years contemplated by the treaty, leaving the Turkish officials in power, under a general control?

"I would not ask for Thrace to be restored to us immediately, but I would ask that she be granted autonomy for, say, twenty-five years, during which her administration would be undertaken by the Allies. By the end of that time many conflicts would have been laid to rest, and the province would return naturally to the Turkish Empire by means of some form of plebiscite.

"In regard to the Straits and the Debt, I would agree to any guarantees which the Allies may wish. I would not revise the Treaty of Sèvres, but, rather, modify it.

"The question of the frontiers of Armenia is simpler, because the boundaries have not yet been fixed."

"But what will happen, your Highness, if Mustapha Kemal refuses these terms?".

"He will not refuse."

"He may want more?".

"He will not ask for more. If he did I should intervene personally at Angora. I should only have to give the word to my friends, and the fall of Mustapha Kemal would follow."

"And your friends will obey you.?"

"They will obey me."

F.O. 371/6464/E. 333.

No. 5

Record by Sir E. Crowe of a conversation with the French Chargé d'Affaires

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 7, 1921.*

The French Chargé d'Affaires referred in conversation with me today to the situation in Turkey. He said there were three alternative courses open to the Allied Governments in view of the fact that the Sultan of Turkey, with whom we had concluded the Treaty of Sèvres, was now found to possess practically no authority by which he could bind his subjects:—

1. We could either deal with Mustapha Kemal by force of arms—indeed we had to some extent done so, with more or less of a success, largely relying on Greek troops: this resourse seemed now at an end.

2. The second alternative was to play a waiting game in the expectation that the position of Mustapha Kemal, which had never been one of great strength, would gradually become weaker. This was in fact very much the attitude we were now adopting. It was not, however, certain whether Kemal's position was actually getting weaker or stronger.

3. The third alternative was to come to an arrangement with Kemal under which we secured the essential benefits of the Treaty of Sèvres at the price of certain concessions.

Monsieur de Fleuriau himself thought we should be soon driven to-adopt this third alternative. It was quite certain from the reports received from General Gouraud [1] that France must evacuate Cilicia [2]. It was obviously desirable that this evacuation should not be effected without exacting some price for it from Mustapha Kemal, and it was quite possible

[1] French High Commissioner in Syria and Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Levant.

[2] Cilicia, occupied by British forces at the end of 1918 and the beginning of 1919, in accordance with articles 7 and 10 of the armistice, had been transferred with Syria in November 1919 to French military control. Nationalists fears that Cilicia might be incorporated in Syria led to disorder which forced the French High Commissioner to conclude a short-term local armistice with Nationalists in May 1920.

that the latter would readily consent to a good deal in return for a peaceful evacuation.

Of course we must expect Kemal to raise the question of Smyrna. It was M. de Fleuriau's opinion that the Turks, true to their invariable instinct, cared a great deal more for the outwart form of sovereignty than for the essence of a Turkish Government. He was convinced that it would not be really difficult to find a 'formula' under which the Greeks would retain to all practical purposes the administration of Symrna, whilst the nominal rights of the Sultan would be outwardly respected. Possibly, concessions of a similar formal kind might have to be made to the Sultan even at Constantinople: for instance, as regards the Commission of Control over the Straits.

I asked M. de Fleuriau whether the French Government had in fact received any intimation as to the terms that Mustapha Kemal would be ready to accept. He said no, but added that it ought not to be difficult to get into touch with Kemal and sound him on the subject. There was no doubt that Italian agents were in direct communication with Kemal systematically. The French themselves had at one time negotiated with him when General Gouraud sent M. de Caix[3] to conclude the armistice in Cilicia.

I observed that in dealing with Turks we ought always to hesitate to appear in the guise of people anxious to obtain something. It seemed to me essential for the success of any diplomatic discussions with Kemal that overtures should come from him and not from us, and I thought there were indications that Kemal was beginning to feel uncomfortable under the pressure of the Bolsheviks, so much so that he would probably be only too glad to seek an understanding with the Allies which would enable him to show a firm front to the Bolsheviks. M. de Fleuriau agreed with this diagnosis, and said that all he wished to suggest at the present moment was that we should consider what kind of pact we could enter into with Kemal if and when he came forward with proposals. If we had once cleared our minds on the subject, it ought to be easy for the Allies to find the means of indirectly letting Kemal understand that if he were to come forward with any suggestions, there was no intention of refusing him a hearing[4].

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XVII, p. 5-7, No. 6

[3] Secretary-General to the French High Commission in Syria.

[4] Lord Curzon commented on January 7 as follows:

'We have talked a good deal about modifications of the treaty of Sèvres. It might be a useful thing if, in the interval before Paris, F.O. went to work on the kind of alternative modifications that might form a basis of discussion.

No. 6

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *January 8, 1921.*
(Received January 18.)

No. 31.
My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, summary of intelligence reports issued by S.I.S. (Constantinople Branch) for the fortnight ended the 30th December, 1920.

I have, &c.

F.O. 406/45, p. 47, No. 20.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 6.

Summary of Intelligence Reports Issued by S.I.S. (Constantinople Branch) for the Fortnight ending December 30, 1920.

Secret.

DURING the past fortnight interesting information has been obtained with regard to the arrival of the Government Mission in Angora, and the progress of the subsequent negotiations. As foreshadowed in the foreword to the summary for the 25th November, and also for the 2nd December, the Nationalists appear to have adhered practically to their original uncompromising attitude, although the members of the mission were treated with the utmost personal consideration. According to semi-official announcements on the 30th December, Izzet Pasha and the other members of the Government delegation left Angora for Constantinople on Wednesday, the 29th December, at the request of the Central Govern-

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These would include:

(1) Admission of Turkish sovereignty over Smyrna in some more palpable form than a flag on a fort.

(2) Provision for Greek administration there without providing for Greek annexation— near or remote.

(3) Substitution of Enos-Midia for Chatalja line.

(4) Some arrangement by which we can provide for the safeguarding of the demilitarized zones without requiring the large Allied garrisons—*which will never* be forthcoming.

(5) I suppose any concession about the Holy Places is impossible?

ment, which, it is reported, is under the impression that the Allies are prepared to discuss Mustapha Kemal's proposals. In any case, the negotiations with the Nationalists are terminated. Izzet Pasha is expected back in the course of next week, when it may be possible to obtain full confirmation of the reports hitherto received with regard to the progress of the negotiations.

An interesting item of the general scheme of Nationalists policy is the decision that the Sultan must abdicate in favour of the pro-Nationalist Heir-Apparent, in order that the Nationalists may possess an adequate guarantee against a return of Damad Ferid Pasha, and a return to his policy of ruthless suppression of everything savouring of unionism. In the meanwhile, the Nationalists are taking advantage of the truce between Anatolia and the capital to recruit officers for service with the national forces, and in this respect the inability of the Central Government to pay salaries and pensions is probably a favourable element from the Nationalists point of view.

Ghalib Kemali Bey, whose return to Constantinople from Rome was mentioned in the summary for the 9th December, has now gone back to Rome again, but this time as the special agent of the Sublime Porte.

1. *Turkish Affairs.*

(a) The policy of the Nationalist Government was defined before the Grand National Assembly on the 4th December by Mustapha Kemal, Mukhtar, the Foreign Affairs Commissioner, and Colonel Ismet, Chief of the General Staff.

Mustapha Kemal stated that it was impossible to refuse to negotiate with the Constantinople Government, since the Cabinet was composed of Ministers whose patriotism was beyond doubt, and since one of the principal purposes of the Nationalist movement was to unite the nation; he regretted that the Central Government delegates had not been furnished with sufficient powers, but the negotiations would proceed in accordance with the desire of the Assembly; no information would be given, hovewer, until a defined result in one direction or the other had been achieved; there would be not the slightest divergence from the Assembly's original principles; the European situation had become favourable and, although the negotiations would be protracted, there was no need for pessimism; rumours to the effect that delegation was accompanied by suspected persons were false, and the delegation itself would be unable to communicate with unauthorised persons; in case of necessity, the delegation would be allowed to send a courier to Constantinople under constant surveillance.

Mukhtar Bey's speech concerned foreign relations, which, he said were limited to certain non-European Powers, although France and Italy had realised the necessity of the good-will of the Nationalists; the fall of Veniselos had given rise to hopes of an agreement, and every effort had been made to assist the anti-Veniselists, but once in power, the latter part had evinced the same chauvinist spirit as the Veniselists; it would soon be clear whether this was only a manœuvre, and it would be as well, therefore, to wait before condemning as fruitless the support given to the anti-Veniselist Party; the peace negotiations with Armenia were proceeding, and a treaty in harmony with Turkish interests would shortly be submitted to the Assembly; relations with the Soviet Government were more friendly than ever, and rumours of hostility on the part of the Moscow Government were untrue; the note, which had been received from the Soviet Foreign Commissioner, contained nothing unfriendly; as a matter of fact, the two Governments had long been in agreement with regard to Armenia, and the Angora Government knew that such a communication would be made by the Bolsheviks at a certain moment; Georgia had shown a desire to maintain good relations, and had received an assurance that there was no need to fear an attack; Ismet Bey stated that the army was beginning to move against the principal enemy on the Western front, but, as this movement had not yet developed, little information could be given; he could say that the enemy army was weary and demoralised; the principal action was taking place at Ushaq; Demirji, Simav and Gedis had been recaptured, and the Nationalist forces were advacing against Alashehir; he hoped to give further information shortly, but for military reasons no further details could be given for the moment.

(b.) On the 8th December the Foreign Affairs Commissioner, Mukhtar Bey, made a confidential statement to the Great National Assembly to the effect that before the negotiations with the delegation of the Central Government would proceed, it was essential, in the interests of honour and discretion, to ascertain the views of the Moscow Government with regard to those negotiations, and more especially as the delegation had been unable to provide certain guarantees; the Nationalist Government had sent a communication to the Soviet Government, and only when a reply had been received would the negotiations be proceeded with; the Assembly would be informed of all developments and, if an agreement were concluded, it would be submitted to the Assembly for ratification; rumours concerning the delegation's being prevented from returning to Constantinople were false; whatever the result of the negotiations, the delegation would be free to return.

The above-mentioned communication to the Soviet Government is reported to have been addressed to Chicherin on the 7th December and,

after intorming the latter of the arrival of the Central Govenment's delegation, stated that the Nationalists were more than ever resolved to fulfil their engagements; they would only discuss the Central Government's proposals if convinced of the possibility of concluding an honourable peace; although the Nationalists attached the highest importance to the negotiations in question, they considered it essential to ascertain the views of the Soviet Government with regard to the policy to be pursued for the safeguard of their mutual interests.

(c.) Negotiations with the Nationalists were officially commenced on the 7th December, when the Government Mission, under Izzet Pasha, arrived Angora. In the telegram which Izzet Pasha despatched to Constantinople immediately after his arrival in Angora, it was stated that the mission had a tremendous ovation, and that in all the towns and villages the people had cheered the Sultan; at Eski Shehir, Izzet Pasha, after inspecting the 77th regiment, which was said to have been the first to enter Kars, told the commander that he deeply appreciated the sacrifices that were being made by the Turkish army, but he hoped that before long existing evils would be overcome, so that every man could return to his home; at Angora the mission was received by Mustapha Kemal, who subsequently informed Izzet Pasha that the decisions of the Great National Assembly rested irrevocably upon the modification of the Treaty of Sèvres, although the question would be again considered in the light of the proposals brought forward by the mission; Izzet Pasha expected to commence negotiations the following day, and added that success depended upon the result of the overtures that were then being made by the Sublime Porte to the *Entente* Powers; the telegram ended with a massage from Mustapha Kemal to the effect that the whole of Anatolia was completely loyal to the Sultan.

(d.) On the 11th December Izzet Pasha addressed another telegram to the Sublime Porte, in which he stated that all the members of the Nationalist Administration with whom he had conversed had told him that, before negotiations could be commenced they would have to receive a reply to certain communications which they had made in fulfilment of existing agreements; Mustapha Kemal had also informed him that it was hoped that the military action which had been commenced upon the Western front would have a salutary effect, both upon the negotiations and upon the political situation; hitherto, there had been only an exchange of wievs, and in the meanwhile Jevad Bey and Mukhtar Bey were going to report upon the manner in which the negotiations would be affected by the foreign engagements entered into by the Nationalists. This message was discussed at the Ministerial Council held upon the 18th December, and considered by the Grand Vizier as not being sufficiently explicit to

permit the Government to take any action. Mustapha Arif Bey, interim Minister of the Interior, expressed the opinion that the Nationalists were delaying matters in the hope that successes would be gained upon the Smyrna front, as well as in order to obtain the opinions of the States with whom they had made certain agreements; he suggested that a message should be sent to the mission urging that the Government's final terms should be placed before the Nationalists, and pointing out that the *Entente* representatives were impatiently awaiting the result of the negotiations. It was finally decided by the Cabinet to wait until Monday, the 20th instant, before sending such a communication. At the Council held on the following day, however, two further communications from Izzet Pasha, dated the 13th and 14th December respectively, were submitted to the Council of Ministers. The first communication stated that each member of the mission had been given in writing the terms upon which the Nationalists were prepared to come to an agreement. Those terms were as follows:—

(i.) An Imperial proclamation and a provisional law whereby the Fetvas against the Nationalists and the decisions of the courts-martial would be annulled.

(ii.) A Chamber of Deputies to be convoked as soon as possible for the purpose of reconsidering all measures adopted by both the Constantinople and the Angora Administrations, and to decide whether they should continue to be applied or not.

(iii.) All who have suffered on account of their connection with the Nationalists at the hands of the Constantinople Government to be indemnified.

(iv.) Assurances to be obtained from the *Entente* Governments with regard to the modification of the Treaty of Sèvres in accordance with Nationalists claims. Meanwhile the Nationalists will renounce any hostile movement.

(v.) The modifications of the treaty as desired by the Great National Assembly were:

(*a.*) The *Entente* Powers to accept to the principle of acknowledging complete Turkish independence wherever there was a Turkish majority of population, and to submit differences of opinion to international arbitration.

(*b.*) Claims regarding Smyrna and Thrace to be settled without arbitration.

(*c.*) A certain period to be allotted to the Arbitration Commission for purposes of studying ethnographical and other questions.

(*d.*) Districts in Thrace and Anatolia now occupied by the Hellenes to be evacuated immediately; in return those districts where there were non-Turkish minorities would be granted a form of administration to be drawn up by a mixed commission, which would safeguard the rights of those minorities. Once the Hellenic troops had been withdrawn, peace and security would at one be re-established in both Thrace and Anatolia, and the rights and interests of the *Entente* Powers would also guaranteed.

(*e.*) Those clauses dealing with financial control to be modified in conformity with the honour and independence of the Ottoman Government, and the rights of the Ottoman Chamber to elaborate and ratify the budget to the unrescricted.

(*f.*) The neutrality of the Straits, while accepted in principle by the Nationalists, to be applied in such a manner as not to interfere with the sovereign independence of the Ottoman Government.

(vi.) The Government to be free to enter into political and economic relations with any Government it chooses.

(vii.) The Ottoman Government, so long as its territorial integrity remains intact, will continue to observe a benevolent neutrality towards the Soviet Government and the neighbouring Asiatic Republics, and the Angora Government will be at liberty to revise engagements in agreement with those States.

(viii.) Treaties concluded or about to be concluded by the Angora Government not to be revised.

(ix.) The military clauses of the treaty to be modified in accordance with the necessities of defence.

(x.) The moral position of the Khalifat as the protector of Moslems in all Islamic countries without exception to be recognised, as also the rights of the populations of Syria and the Iraq to maintain relations with the Khalifat.

(xi.) A reply to be given to the above proposals within one month.

Izzet Pasha stated in conclusion that as the mission had not been invested with sufficiently extensive powers to permit the discussion of such proposals, he was merely communicating them to the Government and awaiting further instructions. The communication, dated 14th December, gave a short account of a meeting with Jelladdin (sic) Arif Bey,

who appeared to be the President of the Nationalist delegation, and asked that a further sum should be sent to the mission for travelling expenses.

With regard to these communications, the Grand Vizier expressed the fear that, unless the Nationalists modified their terms, the mission would have to be recalled, and the Government would then have to consider the question of changing its policy or resigning. Other Ministers expressed their regret that the Nationalists should have put forward such exaggerated terms and it was finally decided that a commission of Ministers should draft a reply containing a statement of the Government's views. This reply was read at the Ministerial Council on the 23rd December, and was to the following effect:—

"The conditions imposed by the Nationalists were far from fulfilling the principal object of the negotiations, which was to enable the Government to negotiate with the *Entente* Powers in the name of the entire nation, and the mentality which still persisted at Angora might indeed destroy the very basis of negotiations. There was no doubt that the *Entente* Powers were anxious to put an end to the uncertainty and to safeguard their interests in the Near East and it was a crime to throw away this opportunity. The Nationalist leaders should be given to understand that even those Powers which were animated by benevolent sentiments would not consent to a return to the *status quo ante bellum*, and no negotiations could be possibly successful on the grounds proposed by the Nationalists . The Mission was therefore authorised to inform the Nationalists that the Central Government had not the power to accept their conditions, but if those conditions concerned only Thrace, Smyrna and Adana and the means of defence against attack, it would be possible to negotiate with the *Entente* Powers. The conditions of an interior nature proposed by the Nationalists would be accepted by the Central Government."

The letter was approved by the Cabinet, but a further clause was added at the suggestion of the Sheikh-ul-Islam emphasising the complete responsibility of the Nationalists if the present favourable opportunity were lost.

(*e.*) The dethronement of the Sultan in favour of the Heir-Apparent, in spite of frequent assurances of loyalty on the part of Mustapha Kemal, is being widely discussed amongst the Nationalists, who regard it as a *sine qua non* of any agreement with the Central Government, because in this manner alone would they possess a guarantee that Damad Ferid Pasha would not be recalled to power and a policy of reprisals reinaugurated. The Heir-Apparent himself is said to be not averse to the idea. It will be remembered that this has already been the subject of former reports based

upon reliable information (see summaries for the 19th August, p. 15, and the 26th August, p. 14). In the latter report there was also mention of a proposal on the part of the Soviet Government that a principle of "Evkafs" (pious foundations) should be extended. It is significant that the new Cabinet has been energetically pushing through a scheme whereby the Evkaf Ministry is to become a department of the Sheikh-ul-Islamat. Evkaf properties are of almost incalculable value and the Ottoman Government has made several attempts to convert them to its own use, but has been prevented by the Powers.

(f.) The attitude of the Constantinople press, since the fall of Damad Ferid Pasha, has become rather more interesting. One section, which remains more or less faithful to the ex-Grand Vizier continues to publish bitter diatribes against the Unionists and Nationalists. This section is also strongly anti-Bolshevik and is represented by the "Peyam Sabah" and the "Alemdar". Another section, of which the evening paper "Aksham" is a notable example, is of pro-Nationalist tendencies, but makes a point of condemning the Unionists, though in milder terms than the first-mentioned journals. A characteristic article was published in the "Aksham" recently, in which a plea was made for an understanding between Great Britain and Turkey on the grounds of their common interests. This understanding, it was stated, could be brought about if Turkey were confirmed in her territorial "integrity", for the Turks would then never think of "casting their eyes" beyond their eastern frontiers, and the pan-Islamic menace would cease to exist. Another section of the Constantinople press, as represented by the "Ikdam," may be regarded as furtively supporting Bolshevism. This paper frequently publishes articles of a subtly questionable nature from the pen of a certain Yakub Kadri, who in private life, makes no secret of his Bolshevik sympathies.

(g.) Nationalist intrigues in Mesopotamia are known to have been at least a partial cause of the unrest in that country. An interesting item of the Nationalist campaign in that direction was revealed by the "Hakimet-Millie" of Angora on the 17th November, in which it was stated that a mission from the "provisional government" of the Iraq, said to be located at Nejf, arrived in Diarbekir on the 12th October. The delegation brought a letter from the chief of the "provisional government", El Seyid Muhammad Bedreddin, in which the British were accused of the usual crimes against civilisation, and of setting up a bogus form of popular government with the assistance of their paid agent Talip of Busra, who was described as the Ferid of Iraq. With the help of God, however, the British had been driven from the Euphrates basin, but the assistance of the Nationalists was requested in order that the enemy might be completely destroyed. The epistle terminated with an assurance that "all the chiefs of Iraq"

wished "to remain for ever in friendly relations with the Turkish Government." The "Hakimet-i-Millie" at the same time published certain statements said to have been made by members of the mission, which were merely an elaboration of the contents of the above-mentioned letter, but in the opinion of the editor, "Nejf was to the Iraq as Angora was to Turkey."

(h.) The want of officers amongst the National forces is known to be one of the greatest difficulties with which the Nationalists have had to contend, and it would appear that an attempt is being made to take advantage of the advent to power of a Cabinet in sympathy with their ideals, for the purpose of inducing officers in Constantinople to proceed to Anatolia and join the national forces. In this connection, the Nationalist Commissioner for War, Fevzi Pasha, is said to have sent a private communication to the chief of staff of the Central Government requesting the latter to encourage officers to join the Nationalists by giving them indefinite leave during which their pay would be handed to anyone they liked to designate.

(i.) The relations of the Central Government with Italy entered upon a fresh phase with the advent of the present Government to power. The return of Ghalip Kemali Bey to Constantinople from Rome has already been noted previously (see summary dated the 9th December). He remained in Constantinople only a few days however, and went back to Rome about the 8th December, after having been charged with special fonctions by the Turkish Government. He was given instructions which embraced the following points:—

(a.) He was to proceed to Rome on behalf of the Government, not in an official capacity, but on account of his intimacy with various Italian Government officials.

(b.) The expenses of the mission would be covered by the secret funds of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

(c.) He would remain in Rome until the return of the Government Mission from Angora and his services would then either be terminated or renewed as the Government thought fit.

(d.) While in Rome he would maintain constant contact with Italian political personages, particulary to convey the following:—

(i.) Turkey was grateful for Italian assistance already afforded.

(ii.) Turkey now had more need than ever of Italian support.

(iii.) The Turkish Government was doing its utmost to cary out the advice given by the Italians to

eliminate the duality which had arisen in Turkey, but begged to point out that this object could not possibly be achieved unless a guarantee were given that the unjust Treaty of Sèvres would be modified.

(iv.) Once this guarantee were given, the Turkish Government would faithfulty follow all recommendations emanating from the Italian Government or the other *Entente* Powers, for the safeguarding of Italian or *Entente* political and economic interests in the East.

(v.) Italy's position in Anatolia as defined by the Treaty of Sèvres was accepted in advance by the Turkish Government, which was also prepared to conlude further agreements as soon as a peace securing Turkish rights had been concluded.

(vi.) The Turkish Government would give every material and moral assistance to the Italian Government in return for the latter's friendly support.

(*e.*) He would ascertain and inform the Turkish Foreign Office immediately with regard to what immediate economic and financial assistance the Italians were prepared to afford and upon what conditions.

(*f.*) He would keep the Turkish Government constantly informed with regard to Italian public and offical opinion, and would strive in every way to influence them in a favourable manner.

(*j.*) The financies of the Turkish Government are becoming constantly more involved, and from one of the principal subjects of the deliberations of nearly every Cabinet Council held on the 19th December, the Minister of Finance painted the situation in very gloomy colours and stated that a crisis would become inevitable unless something was done before the end of the month. He was prepared to resign at once if anyone could do better, but the measures that had been taken were insufficient. On the 23rd. both the Minister of Finance and the Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed that the financial situation could not be improved until a definite result had been obtained in the negotiations with the Nationalists, and proposed that the Government Mission in Angora should be informed of the fact. In reply to the Finance Minister's suggestion that the *Entente* Powers should be informed of the grave consequences that would ensue if the present state of affairs were prolonged, the Grand

Vizier stated that every possible measure had been taken without success, and there was nothing further that could be done but to put a brave face on the matter until the negotiations begun at Angora had produced a favourable result *.

F.O. 406/45 p. 47 - 52, No. 20/1.

No. 7

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *January 8, 1921.*
(Received January 18.)

No. 40.
My Lord,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1314 of the 18th December, and other previous correspondence relative to Izzet Pasha's Mission to Angora, I have the honour to transmit herewith translations of two documents which have now come into my possession, namely, a statement issued by the "Anatolian Telegraph Agency", on the 6th December, and a telegram from the headquarters of the Kemalist headquarters in the Easertn front, as published in the newspaper "Yeni Kirasun" of the 16th December, 1920.

2. The "Anatolian Telegraph Agency" is the chief propaganda organ of the *de facto* Angora Government, and anything published by it has the imprimatur of that Government. The two documents enclosed are therefore equally to be regarded as official Kemalist pronouncements, and as such they are of great interest. They not only account for the rumours mentioned in my telegram under reference, but what is more interesting, they show that the leaders at Angora have considered it advisable to conceal as far as possible from the public in Asia Minor the fact that they were in negotiation with the Central Government. They have preferred to represent the Izzet Pasha Mission as not being a mission at all, but as being a party of eminent patriots, whose position had been rendered so precarious by British action in Constantinople, that they decided to take refuge in Angora and to join the Kemalist movement.

3. It is also interesting to note the recent and present attitute of the Government here regarding the mission. There is some reason to suppose, though I cannot affirm it positively, that important reports have been received from the mission. If the information which reaches me to this

* Raporun son bölümü Mısır sorunlarıyla ilgili olduğu için buraya alınmadı. (B.N.Ş.)

effect is correct, the reports of the mission show that the attitute of the Angora Government is most uncompromising, and that the Kemalist leaders stand out for nothing less than the abrogation of the Treaty of Sèvres. According to the same information, the Central Government are said to have instructed Izzet Pasha to urge the Kemalists to take up a less extreme attitute.

4. To all enquiries addressed to them by myself and my colleagues, however, Ministers invariably reply that no news has been received except a statement that the mission reached Angora on the 8th December. They have, contrary to a general rule prohibiting any reference in the press to the proceedings of the mission, recently alloved a statement to appear to the effect that the mission was leaving Angora on the 29th December viâ Ineboli but even after this the Government continued to declare themselves to be without any official information whatsoever.

5. It is a matter of the utmost difficulty at her present moment to decide what is the balance of probability as regards the missions having really left Angora. On the one hand, I am assured that the statement published here is borne out by statements published in the Angora press as long ago as the 23rd December, to the effect that the mission was leaving Angora, and was bringing with it an "agreement" —which could of course only mean a statement in the Nationalists minimum demands, for it is quite certain that the mission has not induced the Angora Government to accept the Treaty of Sèvres. On the other hand, much scepticism prevails here as to whether the mission has left, or has any present intention of leaving Angora at all. In support of this theory, it may be said that the Government here certainly want it to be believed that they wish and expect the mission to return, and that they also want to gain all the time they possibly can, in order to see how the cat jumps in Greece, and how the views of the Allied Great Powers develop.

6. At the moment, I am inclined to think that there is some foundation for the report that the mission is coming back, though if it is, it is probably rather as the bearer of Kemalist terms to be proposed to the Allies, than as persons standing for the authority of the Central Government over Angora rebels. At the same time, I should be very sorry to commit myself to any confident statement, and I would observe that, if the tale of the mission's imminent return is merely a time-saving invention, its authors have shown ingenuity in suggesting that it is coming viâ Ineboli. The selection of that route for the purpose of such a fiction affords the maximum possibility of staving off any definite announcement, as communications between Angora and Ineboli in winter time, and between Ineboli and Constantinople at any time, are very defective.

7. I have impressed upon the Grand Vizier and the Minister for Foreign Affairs the importance which I attach to having the earliest news of the mission, and the results that are achieved by it, in view of the approaching meeting of the Allied Premiers.

I have, &c.

F.O. 406/45, p. 54, No. 21

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 7.

Extract from the "Agency of Anatolia" of December 6, 1920.

UNION WITH ANOTOLIA.

(Translation.)

IT is a well-known fact that one of the means which our enemies have adopted for some time past, in order to do away with Turkey and everything Turkish, consists in oppressing the intellectual classes and those who have proved their loyalty to the country, and their interest in its welfare, and to exterminate those who do not obey their orders.

Izzet Pasha, Sahih Pasha and Hussein Kiazim Bey, members of the Cabinet in Constantinople, Hodja Feteen Effendi, Münir Bey, and Djevad Bey, intellectuals of Constantinople, have long been victims of persecution, and have been kept under observation by the English and by those who act as instruments of the English, and they understood that owing to their official position they would be exposed to more active persecution still. They therefore left Constantinople on the plea of entering relations with the Grand Council of the National Government, and they have gone to Anatolia in order to work more usefully and more efficaciously for the safety and welfare of the country.

The above reached our town this afternon at 2 o'clock.

F.O. 406/45, p. 55, No. 21/1

Encolusre 2 in No. 7

Extract from the "Yeni Kirasun" of December 16, 1920.

COPY OF A TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM HEADQUARTERS ON THE EASTERN FRONT.

(Translation.)

HIS Highness Izzet Pasha and his Highness Salih Pasha, ex-Grand Viziers, Hussein Kiazim Bey, formerly second Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies, the venerable Ulema Hodja Fetini Bey, Munir Bey, and Djevad Bey, deputies of Constantinople have come to Angora, and have joined the Nationalist forces.

The whole world has been astonished at the heroism shown by our eastern army in the face of hostile attacks.

The English wished to deceive our nation once again by their latest trick. They secured the nomination of honest patriots, such as Izzet Pasha and Salih Pasha, as members of the Cabinet. Now these two venerable personages have joined the selfsacrificing children of Anatolia. The ancestors of our heroic Anatolia declare that this Holy War will save the honour of the whole Mahommedan world and pray for divine assistance.

In the name of the army I have welcomed our beloved Ministers, and I have saluted them in the name of all my comrades.

F.O. 406/45, p. 54-56. No. 21/2

No. 8

Weekly Report No. 102, Issued by the British Secret Intelligence Service (Constantinople Branch), for Week ending January 8th, 1921.

Secret.

1. TURKEY

Military Situation

Area controlled by the Central Government.

1. The financial situation seems to be approaching a crisis. Many officers in CONSTANTINOPLE have sold all their possessions for food, and are showing signs of starvation. Many have entered ANATOLIA in order to gain a livelihood, and the reinforcements to the Nationalist army which have been gained from this source have made good propaganda for the Nationalist Government.

2. The Russian refugees have been considerably perturbed by reports which have reached them to the effect that the French have refused any further grants of money, as from January 1st, and that they will receive no material assistance after February 1st.

3. The demobilisation of the 1894 class by the Central Government is now practicaly completed. The personnel have been disposed of as follows:—

469 Repatriated to Black Sea ports.
289 Repatriated via. ADALIA.
1774 Demobilised locally in CONSTANTINOPLE.
248 awaiting repatriation to MARMORA ports.

The Greek military authorities have greatly obstructed the repatriation of ex-prisoners of war and demobilised personnel to their areas. One parry of ex-prisoners of war destined for THRACE has been detained for over one month owing to delay on the part of the Greeks in providing the necessary visa for their passports. Ex-prisoners repatriated to BROUSSA and MOUDANIA have been detained by the Greek Military authorities there and forced to work on roads without payment.

4. The Greek Military Mission in CONSTANTINOPLE anticipates agressive action by the Ottoman Greek faction of CONSTANTINOPLE. One of the members of the Mission has been assualted, and the common opinion of the Mission is that the local Committee of National Defence aims at the assassination of the whole Mission and the organisation of a revolutionary movement. The local Greek population is wholeheartedly pro-Venizelist, and has certainly adopted a somewhat aggressive attitude, but as yet there is no sign that a revolutionary movement is on foot. The Greek Mission, which has no power of arrest in Constantinople, is undoubtedly presenting the situation to the Allies in an exaggerated form in hopes of persuading the Allies to arrest or expel from the town the most prominent Venizelists.

Area of the Greek Army of Asia Minor.

5. The suspicion that an offensive by the Greek forces on the BRUSA front was impending was found to be correct when on January 5th, a reconnaissance in force was undertaken by the units of SMYRNA and ARCHIPELAGO Divisions. On January 7th, the towns of YENISHER and AINEGUEL were occupied after slight resistance, and the enemy was pursued beyond NAZIF PASHA (12 miles East of AINEGUEL). About fifty prisoners of the 12th Regiment (11th Divisions) were taken at the latter place.

6. No news of any subsequent withdrawal of the Greek forces has as yet been received. In this connection it is of importance to note that an officer of H. Q. SMYRNA Division informed the British Liaison Officer at BRUSA, prior to the opening of operations, that he thought that ESKISHEHR would be occupied and that the Greek forces on the USHAK front would advance northward in co-operation with the troops from the BRUSA front.

7. On January 7th enemy concentrations on the USHAK front were dispersed and the Greek line was advanced to BANAZ-SIVASLI and CHIVRIL, but as yet these operations do not appear to be developing into a general advance on the USHAK front.

Area of the Nationalist Army.

Dispositions of Units.

8. Postal telegrams show that at the end of December the 33rd and 34th Caucasus Regiments (11th Caucasus Division) were still in ARMENIA. This disproves previous reports that this Division had been withdrawn.

Another telegram, dated January 7th, confirms the presence of the 61st Division, at ESKISEHR.

9. Information from French sources states that a 9th Division has been identified in fighting near AINTAB. The identity of this Division is not clear. The 9th Caucasus Division (last reported in ARMENIA on November 19th) is rumoured to have been withdrawn from ARMENIA, while a new 9th Division (reported to have been fomed at BOLI and to have been despatched to KONIA) is considered by the Greeks to be on the Western front, BRUSA sector.

10. The 126th Regiment (11th Division) retired before the Greek forces towards BAZARJIK. No other have as yet been reported by name as identified during the present Greek operations.

General Military Activities of the Nationalists.

11. There is no indication of any great movement of units of the Nationalist army at the time but it is clear that the Nationalist Headquarters at ANGORA are doing their best to transform their forces into a more highly organised Army. Almost all the irregular and independent bands have been abolished, as generel mobilisation as possible has been proclaimed and the formation of units and training of personnel are in progress. Five training schools have been established (three of which are known to be at ERZERUM, ANGORA and KONIA), and great activity is being shown in attempting to supply the new personnel with equipment and uniform. In this connection it is reported that a factory, employing

800 tailors and many shoe-makers, has been established at ANGORA, while information from an entirely trustworthy source shows that at the end of November the Nationalist Minister of war despatched to CONSTANTINOPLE an envoy for purpose of purchasing 25.000 pairs of boots.

12 Provision of arms and ammunition is also proving dificult, as is shown by the fact that ANGORA has ordered the Eastern Front to despatch to ANGORA all the arms and ammunition captured in the Eastern operations.

13. Rumours to the effect that operation of great importance are immediately impending are continually in circulation amongst the Nationalist troops. This, however, is probably an attempt to raise the moral of the Natoinalist Forces, since it is reported from many sources that the Nationalists are not contemplating any great military enterprise until the coming Spring, by which time they anticipates being in possession of an Army of 200,000 men.

Political Situation.

14. Two fresh factors have appeared in the political situation which has consequently undergone a great change:—

a. The apparent refusal of the ANGORA Government to treat with the Central Turkish Government.

b. The possibility that negotiations are in progress between the ANGORA Government and the Greek Government.

15. Whereas up till recently no trustworthy information had been received with regard to the reception of Izzet Pahsa's Missions at Angora, it has now been reported that no negotiations have taken place at all. The Central Government at CONSTANTINOPLE has received no official information whatever, and has no authority for its optimistic statements that negotiations have been proceeding favourably and will shortly be concluded. On the other hand a recent Bolshevik report from BAKU to MOSCOW stated that the Nationalists were more definetily in favour of rejecting the idea of negotiations with Ottoman Government than they had been previously, whilst in another intimation to MOSCOW, from the Nationalist Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated December 15th, it was stated that Nationalists had asked for Bolshevik opinion on the question of these negotiations, and, owing to the silence of MOSCOW on this subject, the Nationalists had refrained from entering into any agreement with the Central Government.

16. This change of Nationalist attitude raises the suspicion that some new opportunity for bettering the Nationalist situation must have

been afforded to ANGORA, and it is possible that this new opportunity is the opening of secret negotiations with the Greeks.

17. In favour of this possibility there are two items of information.

a. At the end of November, 1920 the Nationalist Minister of War sent warning to the G. O. C. Western Front to the effect that secret negotiations had been opened with the Greeks. This fact was tò be concealed from the troops, but operations against the Greeks were to be prevented as far as possible.

b. On January 7th, the British Liaison Officer at SMYRNA was informed by a certain STEPHANOPOULOS that EDHEM Bey had arranged with the Greeks to fight against MUSTAPHA KEMAL on certain conditions. Envoys from EDHAM Bey had visited Greek H. Q. and operations between EDHEM Bey and the Nationalists were supposed already to be in progress. STEPHANOPOULOS himself was supposed to be closely connected in the matter.

In considering the possibilities underlying the above affair it is important to note that the two individuals whom EDHEM Bey demanded should be allowed to join him are both Greek Secret Service agents, formerly in touch with ATHENS and the Royalist movement in the Greek Army in Asia Minor.

Secondly it is known that EDHEM Bey was in close confidence of MUSTAPHA KEMAL and might well be chosen by him as his representative in secret negotiations. It is unlikely that he would revolt against MUSTAPHA KEMAL, and it would therefore appear to be possible that the story of anti-Nationalist action is in reality a shield to cover the exchange of envoys between Greek H. Q. and the Nationalists.

On the other hand it is known that the Nationalists have issued an order for the abolition of all irregular formations and that subsequently EDHEM Bey applied for command of the Western front in place of ALI FUAD Pasha. This command having been refused him and given to ISMET Bey, it is possible that EDHEM Bey has genuinely revolted.

18. Should the first of the above conjectures be correct, the present Greek offensive on the BURSA front is hard to explain. The following possibilities, however, can be enumerated:—

1. That Greece considered that an offensive, even when there seemed a possibility of coming to an agreement with the Nationalists, would have satisfactory results, since it would demonstrate to the Allies that Greece was capable and willing to fulfil the responsibilities accepted by her under the Treaty of Sèvres, whilst

at the same time demonstrating to the Nationalists that their military strength was not sufficient to be counted as a Nationalist asset in diplomatic negotiations.

2. That King CONSTANTINE considered that further military successes were imperatively necessary in order to consolidate his position.

3. That the mercurial temparement of the Greek soldier, which prevents the maintenance of passive operations by him for any considerable period, demanded a return to active operations in the interests of discipline.

F.O. 371/6497.

No. 9

Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome).

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 10, 1921.*

No. 27.

Sir,

ON the 5th instant the Italian Chargé d'Affaires enquired of Sir Eyre Crowe whether His Majesty's Government had heard a report that Mustapha Kemal was sending Izzet Pasha back to Constantinople with the advice that the Sultan should now ratify the Treaty of Sèvres. This appeared, if true, advice rather dangerous to the Allies, as it would enable the Sultan at Constantinople to claim all the benefits of the treaty whilst throwing on Kemal the responsibility for preventing the execution of the treaty in respect of all the clauses which the Turks thought objectionable.

2. Sir Eyre Crowe replied that His Majesty's Government had received a somewhat similar report, but not in a form which invested it with a high degree of reliability. He did not, however, share the view that the advice alleged to have been given by Mustapha Kemal was dangerous to the interest of the Allies; it seemed, on the contrary, that the Allies could only gain from the advice being followed. What we all desired was peace and the return to legality in our relations with the Turkish Government. Peace would settle the question of Constantinople, where the Sultan's authority remained established. It would regularise the situation in the mandated territories, as also in the zones established under the tripartite agreement. If, after ratification, Mustapha Kemal continued to oppose the execution of the treaty in those regions to which his material power extended, that would create no worse situation than existed now,

without the treaty. Peace would lastly bring into operation the financial clauses to which the Allies were unanimous in attaching great importance, and which would, in the first instance, contribute powerfully to the maintenance of order at Constantinople, where at this moment arrears in the payment of salaries, joined to high prices, threatened to create widespread unrest.

3. Signor Preziosi did not dissent from the wiews expressed by Sir E. Crowe, with which I myself entirely agree.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

F.O. 406/45, p. 44, No. 15,

No. 10

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *January 12, 1921.*
(Received January 15)

No. 25.

Telegraphic.

PRESENT situation may be summarised as follows:—

Government still profess to be without news of return of their mission from Angora. Nothing authoritative has transpired as to what has passed between that mission and Nationalists.

Turkish Government have not yet given way on the question of control of their finances, and LT. 252,000 gold have therefore not yet been released. Turkish Government are spreading report that in spite of their having control over budget receipts and expenditure, financial controllers are maintaining embargo of LT. 252,000 gold. Thus Turkish Goverment wish to make financial controllers responsible in the eyes of the public for acute distress prevailing among Turkish officials. Steps are being taken to counter this mischievous propaganda.

In my view Turkish Government are awaiting results of forthcoming meeting of Supreme Council, and will live on, from hand to mouth, until they hear of the decisions taken at that meeting. It may well be that mission to Kemalists will remain at Angora either voluntarily or because they are obliged to remain until the result of meeting of Supreme Council is known, in order to be in a position to exchange views with Nationalists

by light of decisions come to by Supreme Council. New Greek offensive attempts also have a bearing on the movement of mission.

F.O. 406/45, p. 45, No. 18
D.B.F.P., Ist. series, Vol. XVII, p. 9, No. 8

No. 11

British G. H. Q., Constantinople, to War Office, London.

1930, 12/1/21.
Received 0830, 13/1/21.

Paraphrase.
Secret.
Clear the line.

I. 9754 cipher January 12th *Part 2.*

The main idea in minds of Anatolians appears to be the unity of Eastern peoples. During past few months diskile of British, French and Greeks has grown into deeper anti-European feeling. Generally considered that no understanding with Britain possible since apparent modification in allied attitude possibly resulting from Italian and French good-will would not lead to anything ?owing to British opposition. At the same time Nationalists ?do not desire to undertake military enterprize which would make Nationalists depend on Russian assistance. They desire to play waiting game hoping that British public opinion will serve to weaken British Expeditionary Force in near East thereby making possible the formation of independent middle and near east confederation.

Comments. See statement contained in General Baghdad's telegram dated 9th No. X. 1159 showing that Russians considered that a definite turn has been made for refusal of the conciliation policy of the Entente and Constantinople. Above aspect of Mustapha Kemal's attitude would appear to be confirmed thereby, and views strengthened that Mustapha Kemal desires to convey impression that he is more sure of his position than Constantinople Governments appreciate, and is playing more games than one.

F.O. 371/6466.

No. 12

British G. H. Q., Constantinople, to War Office, London.

Despatched 1930, 14/1/21.
Received 0900, 15/1/21.

Clear the line.

I. 9769 cipher January 14th.

Referance 87495 * M. I. 2. It is considered there is a possibility that Edhem's (?) action was merely an excuse direct liaison between Turkey and Greece. Some such subterfuge would naturally be prelude to an understanding which, as yet, Turks did not wish to assume concrete form.

2. This view is supported by personality of the Confederate, given in paragraph 4, without as yet encouraging more than a suspicion which is not completely allayed by positive information that on January 9th before Eskisher, Edhem was reported by the (?) Turks to be fighting on side of Greece with 300 followers and to have dropped, into the Turkish lines from aircraft, proclamation signed by himself.

3. See also your 87490 of January 11th regarding duplicity of Mustapha Kemal, and my *I.* 9766 of to-day.

4. Mustapha Kemal during period December 12th to December 16th, stated to a person whom he believed to be connected with British Intelligence service that provided it were kept entirely secret from advanced Nationalists he was prepared to enter into negotiations with British and proposed to send a secret letter to G. H. Q. So far, no such communication has been received.

F.O. 371/6506/E. 882

* 87495 reads as follows:— "Your I. *9747 January 11th.* The suspicion, referred to in para 2, that there is collusion between Mustapha Kemal and the Greeks, seems to be contradicted by para 3. As soon as you have sufficient information to form an opinion, should be glad to receive an appreciation of real situation between Mustapha Kemal and the Greeks, and an explanation of the apparent contradiction in your telegram above quoted".

No. 13.

British G. H. Q, Constantinople, to War Office, London.

Despatched:- 14. 05, 18. 1. 21.
Received:- 18. 40, 19. 1. 21.

I.9785 cipher 18.1.21.

There are indications here that design of Mustapha Kemal is to use the Russian threats to secure from Entente and Constantinople recognition of his position while making surreptitious attempt to approach Great Britain. He appears at the same time to be attempting to bluff the Soviet by hostile treatment of Izzet and by exaggerating his own military strength.

2. On January 14th Constantinople Committee of the Nationalist movement sounded Monsieur Addisiovitch, President of the National Ukrainian League anti Bolshevik and of British sympathy as to whether in the interest of "Turkey, Russia and the whole world" he would consent to become channel for communications between Mustapha Kemal and the British authorities. An early visit to Angora was suggested. See also para 4. of my 1.9769 January 14th. Further details will be wired when known.

F.O. 371/6466.

No. 14

Memorandum by Mr. Nicolson on the Treaty of Sèvres.

[*C 1339/20/19*]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 18, 1921*

The Bulgarian Minister told me recently that he had a long conversation with Monsieur Briand when passing through Paris at the beginning of this month. M. Briand had told him that the Leygues Cabinet was not likely to last and that if and when it fell he himself would probably succeed to power. He had added that if he did so, he would certainly insist upon a revision of the Treaty of Sèvres and an arrangement with Mustapha Kemal. Monsieur Stancioff gathered the impression that M. Briand would merely insist upon some modification of the Symrna chapter and would not touch territory of Turkey in Europe or revise the régime established by the Treaty for the control of the Straits.

The above was, of course, merely a casual conversation and may not in the least represent M. Briand's present intentions. It is of interest however, as indicating that the pro-Constantinist feelings attributed to M. Briand owing to his intimacy with Princess George are not likely to outweigh his desire to curtail French commitments in Anatolia or to establish French financial predominance at Constantinople.

Assuming, however, that the French policy of modification will be concentrated on the Smyrna chapter alone, I have thought it convenient to consider a revision of that chapter in greater detail than was possible in the joint memorandum prepared by Mr. Osborne and myself, and I annex a scheme of revision which I have disscused in detail with Mr. Malkin. The scheme speaks for itself and I would merely add that the essential difficulty to my mind resides, not in the finding of a formula to maintain the appearance of Turkish sovereignty, but in coping with the article (Art. 76) which provides for customs union with Greece. This article is the corner stone of the Greek economic position in Smyrna and in spite of the assertion of the French that Mustapha Kemal cares more for formalities than for facts, I doubt whether he would ever accept an arrangement under which this customs union was provided for.

While fully realising that circumstances may compel us to meet the French Government in this matter and to show some readiness to revise the Smyrna chapter of the Treaty, I venture to recapitulate the following obvious objections to such a course:

1. The arguments in favour of revision proceed from several hypotheses the correctness of which is at least open to question. The first of these assumptions is that Greece will bow to the pressure of the Powers and accept a curtailment of her rights in the Smyrna zone. Although it is perfectly true that there is a large section of opinion in Greece which considers that the Smyrna zone represents commitments and responsibilities beyond the present resources of Greece, and although a still wider section would welcome the exchange of Greek rights in Smyrna for similar rights in Constantinople, yet I doubt whether any section of Greek opinion would consent to be turned out of Smyrna as the result of orders from Paris. There is also a further point, namely that if the Smyrna chapter is merely modified and not actually abolished, the Greek would still be exposed to indefinite commitments in the Smyrna zone while seeing themselves stripped of all the imperialistic glamour by which these commitments were rendered palatable.

These objections will, of course, be realised by the Conference and the form in which the revisions will be communicated to Greece will presumably be on the line that the Allies can no longer furnish support for the

maintenance of the full programme and that the Greek Government would be well advised, in order to regain their goodwill, to come to some direct arrangement with Kemal or with the Constantinople Government on the lines indicated in the revised chapter. The Allies would presumably at the same time inform the Constantinople Government and through them, Mustapha Kemal, that this advice had been given to Greece and the Kemal would be well advised to profit by the opportunity. This procedure, which seems indeed to be the only procedure, opens out gloomy vistas of delay, misrepresentation and failure. It also leaves unanswered the question whether Greece will accept such advice and whether King Constantine may not be roused thereby into definite hostility to the Allies and embark upon some extravagant Nationalist crusade.

2. In whatever form the revision of the Treaty is communicated to Turkey it will be clear to the Nationalists that they have been justified in their policy and that the Allied Powers are now seeking for terms. It is commonplace of eastern diplomacy that in dealing with orientals the first offer should always come from them. It is quite possible that this commonplace may be faulty and may not apply to the present situation; but the converse is to my mind certainly true, namely that there is no logic and no conviction in the phrase 'a contented Turkey'. It is possible that Mustapha Kemal, as the French say, will be prepared to come to some arrangement with the Allies in return for specious concessions at Smyrna; I foresee, however, that if Kemal is satisfied by such concessions, the Kemalists will not be satisfied and that we shall see a progression of Turkish Nationalism which will begin by claiming the Straits, which will proceed to claim Adrianople and which will be exploited by the C. U. P., by Enver, by Talaat and possibly even by Raouf for the purpose of regaining their hold upon the country.

3. There is a third, and to my mind a far more vital objection to any revision of the Treaty. The reasons for which we have supported Greece and secured for her the very large territorial gains, have already been stated and are in my opinion extremely vital. Greece constitutes a very positive asset in British imperial policy and so long as we have an Empire, our policy is bound to be imperial. We now propose to surrender this asset in deference to the French. I cannot see that the necessity of executing the alliance with France need extend to every quarter of the globe. I do not see why, because of the attacks in the French press and Chamber and because of the very vivid jealousy of France we should throw away a factor which is of definite defensive value to the Empire. It might be possible to achieve some compromise over the Greek question under which the semblance of Allied solidarity would be maintained had we any confidence that the French Government and their agents would support such a com-

promise. We have no such confidence. We know full well that whatever compromise is arrived at will represent a certain sacrifice to us whereas to the French it will serve only as a slight obstacle to be either circumvented or undermined.

The revision of the Treaty of Sèvres will face us with a discontented and possibly an actively recalcitrant Greece. I feel that it is imprudent to hope that we shall be compensated for this by having a contented and pacific Turkey. A compromise on the question will not either please Greece, placate Turkey or be loyally subscribed to by the French. I trust that it will be possible to take a strong line with M. Briand and to indicate to him that, while fully and loyally prepared to carry out the alliance in regard to our former enemies against whom that alliance cemented, we are not prepared to follow the French in a policy which is the negation of our war policy and which entails the sacrifice of a former ally for the benefit of a former enemy.

HAROLD NICOLSON

D.B.F.P., Ist. series, Vol. XVII, p. 13-16, No. 12

ANNEX TO MR. NICOLSON'S MEMORANDUM

(Revised articles of Smyrna Chapter)

ART. 65

'The provisions of this section will apply to the city of Smyrna and the adjacent territory defined in Art. 66.'

ART. 66

No change.

ART. 67

No change.

ART. 68

'In view of the régime of local autonomy provided in this section for the city of Smyrna and the territory defined in Art. 66, the said city and territory will, subjet to the provisions of this section, be assimilited in the application of the present treaty to territory detached from Turkey.'

ART. 69

'The city of Smyrna and the territory defined in Art. 66 shall be constituted a separate province within the Turkish Empire and under Ottoman sovereignty. The province so constituted shall be called the "Province of Ionia". In witness of such sovereignty the Turkish flag shall remain permanently hoisted over an outher fort in the town of Smyrna. No Greek flag shall be flown on any official buildings'.

ART. 70

'In view of the large Christian and Greek speaking population of the Province of Ionia as above constituted, the Ottoman Government hereby undertake to invite the Greek Government to assume responsibility for the administration of the Province. The Greek Government in accepting this charge will execute the administration of the Province through a High Commissioner appointed by them subject to the approval of the Turkish Government. Such approval if not formally withheld within one month of the notification of the appointment shall be considered to have been accorded. The High Commissioner shall hold his appointment for a period of five years and shall himself select the officials af the provincial administration.'

ART. 71

'In witness of the Turkish sovereignty over the Province of Ionia, the said Province shall pay to the Financial Commission provided for in Article 231 of the present Treaty an annual sum which shall be calculated by the Financial Commission in acccordance with the principle laid down in Article 243. The provisions of Article 241 will not apply to the Province of Ionia.'

ART. 72

'Internal order shall be maintained in the province by a native gendarmerie assisted by a local militia which may both be recruited on a basis of compulsory service. The organisation of these forces shall be entrusted to the High Commissioner acting on the advice of the elective Council provided for in Article 73. In the event of the internal or external security of the province being threatened, the High Commissioner may call upon any of the signatories of the present Treaty either to despatch or to designate regular troops to occupy the province. In no case, however, can the forces of H.I.M. the Sultan of Turkey enter the territory of the province except

on the written authority of the High Commissioner and with the approval of the Principal Allied Powers.

Except in so far as is provided under this article compulsory military service shall not be enforced in the Province.'

ART. 73

'The High Commissioner shall be assisted and advised by a Representative Council set up on an elective system calculated to ensure proportional representation of all sections of the population, including racial, linguistic and religious minorities. Within six months of the coming into force of the present treaty the High Commissioner shall submit to the Council of the League of Nations... (as in Art. 72 of original Treaty.)

The High Commissioner shall be entitled to postpone etc... (as in para. Art. 72 of original Treaty.)'

ART. 74

'Within a period of one month after the coming into force of the present treaty a Commission shall be formed to arrange, in concert with the Ottoman Government, for the organisation of the Province of Ionia. This commission shall have to determine within three months the powers and functions of the High Commissioner, his relations with the Representative Council, as well as the judicial, financial and administrative organisation of the province. The Commission shall consist of representatives of France, Great Britain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey. The representative of Greece shall be the High Commissioner who shall act as President of the Commission. In the event of disagreement, the vote of the majority shall prevail.'

ART. 75

As in original Treaty.

ART. 76

'In order that the province of Ionia may become economically and financially self supporting, the High Commissioner may establish a customs boundary along the line defined in Art. 66. Should the High Commissioner consider it essential to the prosperity of the province the city of Smyrna and the territory defined in Art. 66 may, with the consent of the Principal Allied Powers, be incorporated in the Greek Customs system'.

ART. 77

'The High Commissioner will undertake no measures... (as in original Treaty.)'

ART. 78

As in original Treaty.

ART. 79

'The nationality of such inhabitants of the Province of Ionia as are of Turkish nationality and cannot claim any other nationality under the terms of the present Treaty will not be affected by the present stipulations. Greece shall provide for their diplomatic and consular protection abroad.'

ART. 80

'The provisions of Article 292 Part IX (Economic clauses) will not be applicable in the case of the province of Ionia.'

ART. 81

'The rights to exploit the salt marshes of Phocea belonging to the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt, including all plant and machinery and material for transport by land or sea, shall not be altered or interfered with. No tax or charge shall be imposed on the manufacture exportation or transport of salt produces from these marshes. The High Commissioner shall have the right to regulate and tax the consumption of salt within the province.'

ART. 82

As in original Treaty.

ART. 83

Cancel completely *

H. G. N.

* Sir E. Crowe minuted on January 18:

'Our difficulties arise from *(a)* the necessity of some concession to the Kemalists in order to get the treaty of Sèvres ratified by Turkey and by France; *(b)* the false position in which we find ourselves towards Greece owing to the presence on the throne of Constantine.

'The solution which suggests itself at first view is to make the acceptance of the necessary concessions to Mustapha Kemal our condition of accepting and assisting Constantine.

'I agree with Mr. Nicolson on two important points: It is a British interest to maintain a strong and friendly Greece; and it is very problematical whether you can win Kemal's definite support by minor concessions.

'M. de Fleuriau made some remarks to me in casual conversation this morning, from which I gather that the French government themselves realize the difficulty of a comprehensive settlement with Kemal, and that they may perhaps rest content for the moment with an arrangement restricted to Cilicia, and otherwise continue to wait upon events, leaving the situation to develop, in the hope that the natural divergence between Turkish nationalism and Russian bolshevism may sufficiently paralyze the Kemalists, and so prepare the way for a more general understanding.

'If we were dealing with the question of Turkish nationalism alone, I should not see great objection to a policy of wait and see. But we must recognize that delay works for the Kemalists in so far as it works against the Greeks, so long as the allies continue to refuse assistance or even countenances to the latter.

'There seems to be no immediate prospect of Constantine's fall. If he remains, we must face the question whether in our own interest we should not now revert to the policy originally advocated by Lord Curzon, but not approved by the Supreme Council during its recent meeting at No. 10 Downing Street. [On December 2, 1920] That policy was one bargaining with Constantine (or rather with Greece,—for Constantine had not then returned to Athens). It might well be our course now to accept Constantine on certain conditions. Such conditions might have to include certain concessions to Kemal respecting the status of Symrna. It would be matter for negotiation how far such concessions should go. I agree with Mr. Nicolson that they should not go too far. (His particular difficulty of the customs might be solved by making Smyrna a completely free port—in distinction from the free zone within the port, as laid down by the treaty [article 335]).

'The thing to do would be to come to such an arrangement with the Greeks first, as would enable us to withdraw our ban on financial assistance and moral & diplomatic support, and then discuss with the Kemalists. If thereupon the latter do not come to terms, continue the wait-and-see policy, which, in those circumstances, would no longer have the disadvantage of involving the progressive weakening of Greece. There would however be a reasonable chance of the Kemalists coming to terms on these lines, on which case we could get Turkey to rafity the treaty even if she connot be counted upon to ensure its loyal execution. If France and Italy still held out, and if Italy refused to part with the Dodecanese, we should on our part refuse to proceed with the tripartite agreement [of August 10, 1920, printed in *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 133, pp. 797-803], and, as regards Italy with the African agreement (territotial cessions to Italy) [as laid down in the Secret Treaty of London of April 26, 1915, Articles 10 and 13. This was published as Cmd. 671 of 1920].

'I feel that if we make concession over Smyrna and facilitate France's proposed arrangement respecting Cilicia we are entitled to have our own way as regards our general policy towards Greece, and could, if necessary renew financial and diplomatic support to a Constantinist government even if France did not join. Italy probably would. E. A. C.'

D.B.F.P. Ist series, Vol. XVII, p. 17-19, No: 12/1

No. 15

India Office to War Office.

LONDON, *18th January 1921.*

P. 8769/20.
Confidential.

My dear Oliphant,

I am desired to enclose, for the information of the Foreign Office, three copies of a Memorandum prepared by Major Bray, political Intelligence Officer attached to this Department on the Indian Khilafat Delegation.

Copies are also being sent to the Director of Military Intelligence.

Yours sincerely

F.O. 371/6549/E. 1013 *(Signature)*

ENCLOSURE TO No. 15

THE INDIAN KHILAFAT DELEGATION.

(MEMORANDUM BY POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER ATTACHED TO INDIA OFFICE.)

I. — **Introductory.**

1. Owing to recent indications of the possibility of an attempt being made to separate the Khilafat from the Sultanate and the extreme importance of such a step, it has become necessary to study the activities of the Indian Khilafat Delegation in order to judge whether the political situation in India is in any sense connected with the various revolutionary organisation in Europe and elsewhere. It should be emphasised that we are not concerned with particular individuals except in so far as they are agents for carrying out any special policy. We need not concern ourselves, therefore, with the merits or demerits of Mohd. Ali or his associates, or their influence in Europe or India, but to try to piece together from their activities and associates the result their visit is likely to produce, and above all to trace any outside influences assisting them in their schemes and the possibility of such connections being maintained after their return to India. The Delegation's ostensible object in visiting Europe may best be explained by the following brief extract from the official account of their interview with the Prime Minister on 19th March 1920. During this interview Mohd. Ali advanced the following claims:—

(1) The Khilafat must be preserved with adequate temporal power. After the various wars in which Turkey has recently been engaged, Moslems consider that the irreducible minimum of temporal power adequate for the defence of the Faith to be the restoration of the *status quo ante bellum* subject to guarantees for security of life, property, and opportunities of autonomous development of all communities.

(2) Mohd. Ali, therefore, was unable to agree to the independence of Arabia, the granting of which would be inconsistent with the above, but claimed that he could reconcile the Arabs with their co-religionist Turks.

(3) No control by mandate or other means should be exercised over Arabia.

(4) The Khalifa to be warden of the Sacred Hareems of Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem.

(5) The retention of Constantinople as a point of overwhelming sentiment. To drive the Turks thence would constitute a challenge of the Modern Crusaders to Islam and European domination of the entire East, which could not be taken up by the Moslem world or the East without great peril to our own Empire.

(6) A thorough enquiry into the causes of the Armenian massacres.

The whole of the above, with the exception of section 6, may be reduced to a short sentence:— "Restore Turkey to her pre-war status with certain guarantees, otherwise you will evoke the hostility of the whole Moslem world and the East generally".

2. There are, in addition, two points of interest in the report of the interview worthy of our attention. The first, that the Delegation was congratulated by the Prime Minister for the moderation with which their claims had been advanced; and, secondly, that the Delegation claimed to represent India—Mohammedans and Hindus. As regards the first point, whilst it is true that Mohd. Ali appeared "moderate" on this occasion, his doings in England both before and after this interview by no means convey a sense of moderation. On 29th February he gained the co-operation of Pickthall, whose attitude is well known. On 5th March he spoke at 3, Campden Hill Road; in the course of his speech he said: "If our "opponent uses force to crush the Muslims by superior arms, these must "draw the sword and fight to the last." On the 8th March he lunched with Captain Bennet, who is very friendly with Amir Ali, and was responsible for pro-Turkish advertisements in the Press. In the evening he spoke at the Minerva Café, and concluded his speech with a threat of force

against force, and took part in a discussion on Bolshevism and Nationalism. On the 17th March he was present at the formation of the Persian Association, a society which is anti-British. It is significant, therefore, that before his interview with the Prime Minister he had already associated himself with matters outside the business he was supposed to have come to England for; associations which were by no means limited to procuring the *status quo ante bellum* for Turkey.

3. From a study of the doings of the Delegation it soon becomes abundantly clear that Turkish interests were by no means the sole or even principal reasons for their visit to Europe, but that this important question was used as a handle to open the door of unrest in India. Mohd. Ali's speech to the Prime Minister was so obviously inspired by a Nationalist spirit, so obviously concocted as a means of propaganda, that we are not surprised at the silence with which the Prime Minister's reply was received. It was obvious from Mohd. Ali's activities before his interview that the nature of the reply he would receive was anticipated, and that he was preparing the ground for the reception of that reply in the most unfavourable light from the British point of view. The primary object had in view was the indepedence of India, more especially Mohammedan India, with the object of uniting her to a revived Islam. In support of the foregoing, the following information just received bears out the above independent conclusions:— "By pro-Bolshevik Indians in America it is openly "stated that the Khilafat movement is only the visible cause by which "Indian leaders are bringing the masses into a movement to overthrow "British rule." At the same time it is fully realised that under present circumstances no force that the Indian Nationalists could oppose to the Indian Administration could hope for success. The policy, therefore, is to hoodwink the British public, especially the anti-militarist party, with the idea of obtaining their freedom through pacific measures so as to hamper the authorities in their employment of the military in the suppression of disturbances, at the same time to make every endeavour to seduce the Indian Army from their allegiance to the Crown and prevent recruiting.

Note :—

W/H.D. (268), 16.7.20.— "They [the Indian Khilafat Delegation] wish to start a new agitation against *all* war. To hold big meetings, and link up with all pacifists and Socialists to try and influence public opinion against any military campaign whatsoever".

W./H.D. (276), 3.8.20.— "They will devote their propaganda openly to the Khilafat question, but will subsidise any anti-militarist body".

W./Y.C. (14), 6.9.20.— "Mohammed Ali will work for stopping the sending of Indian troops outside India".

II. — Extracts from Reports.

(a) Mohammedan Solidarity.

W./L. H. (1), 24.4.20.— Reported from Switzerland that the Turks, acting on advice given by Talaat Pasha from Berlin, are endeavouring to send a representative of the C. U. P. to Rome to meet and discuss matters with the Indian Khilafat Delegation.

D./O., 27. 4. 20.—From a raliable agent in Switzerland: "As far my "knowledge and information goes, I see that the Germans, Turks, and "Russians have made up their minds to assist by every possible means "the Indian Revolutionaries in the execution of their plans to create trouble "in India, which they consider to be the backbone of the British Empire. "I am certain that if the British Government do not take precautions be-"forehand, their enemies will succeed in their aims in two or three years. "Efforts have already been made by Germany to unite all revolutionary "movements within the British Empire."

W./L. H. (3), 30. 4. 20.— "Moreover, the Turks are in direct communication with Mohammed Ali through Khalid Bey, former Turkish Consul in Bombay."

W./L. H. (9), 10. 6. 20.—Reported to be about to receive a visit from Edip Bey (deputed by Talaat to form an organisation in co-operation with the Italians to forward arms and munitions and take every possible action against England) to settle certain important points which the C. U. P. wanted him to handle.

Edip Bey left Rome on 29th May in order to consult Talaat as to what further steps should be taken in Mohd. Ali's case.

W./M. C. (8), 17. 6. 30.—Extract from a letter from H. Alitcha: "A personage staying for the moment in Berlin belonging to a Moslem group, desires to speak with you to discuss the basis of a general Moslem association. He is disposed to come to Switzerland to meet you".

W./D. R. (4), 20. 7. 20.—A dinner and meeting convened by Djavid Bey is to be held shortly in Montreux to consider the Khilafat question. Many of the representatives of Mohammedan countries who are said to be in Paris, as also others from elsewhere, will attend, and amongst others Khalil, Mohd. Fahmy, and some Persians will attend.

W./D. R. (7), 31. 7. 20, 20. 8. 20.—Mohd. Ali arrived at the Hotel des Alpes Territed on or about the 31st July. Immediately on his arrival he telegraphed to Mohd. Fahmy, asking him to meet him for the discussion of important matters relating to the Khilafat question.

C. X./V. (1738), 6. 8. 20, 7. 8. 20.—Mohd. Ali had long interview with Talaat on the afternoon of the 6th.

W./D. H. (7), 20. 8. 20.—During the meeting with Mohd. Fahmy, Mohd. Ali expressed a wish that before he left for India another meeting would be held in Switzerland about the end of August, to which Mohammedans from all over the world would come to form an international alliance ostensibly for the advancement of improved culture of the Mohammedan race. No political matters were to be introduced.

W./H. S. (26), 30. 8. 20.—In a recent conversation with Indian students, Maulvi Abdul Kasem stated that the Delegation had information that Indian Moslems had been sent to Persia, Arabia, and Turkestan, to consult with Moslems in those countries as to future action.

W./Y. C. (14), 6. 9. 20.—In the course of conversation at the Woking mosque on the occasion of the Eid festival, Mohd. Ali expressed himself as being very optimistic over the idea of the regeneration of all Mohammedan Powers in the East aided by the Bolsheviks, and thinks that Persia and Afghanistan in conjunction with the others will work their best for the independence of India.

R./Misc. (131), 9. 9. 20.—Report from an independent and reliable source gives an account of the Delegation's visit to Switzerland.

A dinner was given at Territet in honour of the Delegation, presided over by Fuad Selim Bey, formerly Turkish Minister at Berne. Twenty people were present, among whom were Dr. Behdjet Bey, Haroun, the Nationalist leader, Chirin Bey, and other delegates of the Egyptian Nationalist party.

Fuad Selim eulogised the existing Mussalman solidarity. Mohd. Ali affirmed that the Indians were prepared for every sacrifice on behalf of the Mussalmans of Egypt and Turkey.

(b) Afghanistan.

9. 11. 20.—We learn that the relations between the Bolshevik envoy in Afghanistan and Djemal Pasha are strained owing to the latter promising Afghanistan considerable material help, over which he is to have complete control. Djemal Pasha is also to have complete control over all Indian work. In order to carry out this work he propose the formation of Indian units, improvement of existing defences, establishment of a young officers school, and to examine the conditions on the frontier. The Amir of Afghanistan is reported to have approved these steps being taken.

10. 11. 20.—In wiev of the above, the Bolshevik envoy asked for instructions regarding his relations with Djemal, and also asked if the Moscow Government approved his (Djemal) scheme for establishing a national revolutionary centre at Kabul, and whether Moscow and the

Indian centres were aware that Djemal intended relying mainly on the National Congress and Mussulman League for carrying out his programme.

Note.—The Bolshevik Agent therefore implies the existence of revolutionary centres in India.

12. 11 20..—The Bolshevik envoy met the Afghan Foreign Minister and Minister for War, who informed him that a decision had been reached to adopt an aggressive attitude towards England. Their proposal was to assist the tribes and the revolutionaries in India.

15. 11. 20.—The Afghan Government agreed to give Djemal charge of the reorganisation of the Afghan army, and to organise, with Bolshevik help, the Central Committee at Kabul containing representatives of the "Khilafat Mussalman League" and Congress. Djemal expressed the opinion that the Afghan-Bolshevik treaty would enable a vigorous propaganda campaign to be carried out on the Indian frontier.

22. 11. 20.—Obeidulla receives a telegram from Acharya, who is accompanying Roy to Kabul, to prevent the arrival of Shaukat Ali and Abdul Bari and other members of the Khilafat Delegation at Kabul till the middle of January, in order to ensure their meeting with Roy and Acharya, who expected them to be in Kabul. Acharya stated that it was extremely important for this meeting to take place and expressed satisfaction at the situation in Tashkent.

(c) Anatolia.

W./Misc. (114), 11. 5. 20. 17. 5. 20.—On 11th May a certain Tewfik, a member of the Turkish delegation, tells Mohd. Ali to address himself to a prominend member of the Red Crescent Society (Hamid Bey), this society being in touch with the Anatolian Nationalists.

W./M. C. (7), 15. 6. 20.—In direct communication with Galib Kemali Bey—Mustafa Kemal's agent in Rome.

W./M. C. (10), 10. 7. 20, 19. 8. 10.—A letter written by H. A. Rashid to Dr. Nehad Rechad states that he (Rashid) is leaving for Angora in a few days, and that Mohd. Ali and the others should be notified (evidently in order that they might take advantage of the opportunity to communicate with the Nationalists); he continues that it is absolutely necessary to take some active steps in India, "passivité is not good enough".

H.C./1273, 25. 7. 20, 19. 8. 20.—Mohd. Ali wrote to Mustafa Kemal from Rome (the letter reaching Angora on 4the August) in the name of 70,000,000 Mussalmans of India; announces that his committee, "after a meeting of the 27th (? June) had come to the conclusion that in view of the certainty that a disastrous peace would be signed by the Turkish

Government under coercion, that the time had come for a congress of the representatives of all parts of the Moslem world to take final measures for consolidating Islam".

This letter was discussed in the Great National Assembly and a select committee, with Mustafa Kemal at its head, was appointed to examine the proposals made.

R./Misc. (131), 6. 8. 20, 9. 9. 20.—At the meeting in Switzerland on 6th August with Talaat and other mambers of the C. U. P., Mohd. Ali stated that he approved the tactics of Mustafa Kemal; his plan of campaign could not fail to complicate things still further for England in the East.

H. C./1436, 12. 9. 20, 13. 10. 20.—On 12th September, Mustafa Kemal informs his Army Corps Commanders that England can take no effectual action against the Nationalists, as the Indian troops could not be relied on, and that all Indian troops, both Moslems and Buddist (*sic*), had been ordered to refuse to obey if ordered to fight against the Anatolian forces.

H. C./1438, 20. 9. 20,—A certain Nergis (a member on the Turco-Indian friendship society) writes to Mustafa Kemal: "I hope by the time this letter reaches you, the trusted representative[1] of the Indian Khilafat Society will be in your presence".

M. C. 1434, 13. 10. 20.—States that Mirza Azimeddin has left Anotalia for Paris. This man is closely associated with Indian agitators in Europe, and professes Bolshevik convictions.

W./R. W. (56),—Just previous to his departure for India on 17th September, received a communication from Mustafa Kemal asking him what money he would require for propaganda in India. Mohd. Ali replied that he would let him know after his return to India.

(d) Intrigues With Soviet Russia.

W./R. C. (334), 3. 5. 20.—Abdur Rahman and Schiab Karachi are still at 8, Albert Hall Mansions (the residence in London of the Delegation). The latter was a class mate of Hasan Shahid Suhrawardy, who is believed to be on the staff of the Oriental Bureau of the Bolshevists. Sayed Hussain of the delegation also knows Suhrawardy well.

W./D. H. (7), 31.7.20, 20.8.20.—On the 6th August he had a long interview with Talaat. The latter flattered Mohd. Ali in fulsome phrases, telling him he hoped he would be regarded as the leader, not by the

[1] Supposed to have been Dr. Mustapha Bey.

70,000,000 of Indian Mohammedans, but by the whole Moslem world. He added as a spur to greater efforts that Russia intended to conclude peace with Poland, smash Wrangel, and then pour troops into Anatolia.

W./H. D. (279), 5. 8. 20.—"Since Turkey is so weak the game to be played is to "protest loudly in the West against all wars, whilst at the same time holding out promisses to Russia if she will help Turkey and invade Mesopotamia, Persia, and even India". French and Italian Socialists will also play this game.

C. X./4738 V., 7. 8. 20.—According to his own statement, finding little support from the Labour Party at home, and finding it impossible to gain the support of the French Government, "he could find little support there *(i. e.*, Europe), so in consequence he was forced to seek help from Russia." Russia had promised freedom to Indian Mohammedans, and was prepared to give it into them in spite England's bluff.

C. X./4738/V., 7. 8. 20.—Mohd. Ali stated to be very discouraged at the state of Europe, saying he could find little support there, so in consequence he was forced to seek help from Russia.

W./Z. (6), 31. 8. 20.—We will now turn our attention to a certain Chattopadhyaya. On the 31st August we received a report to say that this individual hopes to get money from the Bolsheviks and to edit a weekly paper called the *Indian Communists*, which is to be distributed all over the world. He is in communication with Germany and Russia by means of Bolshevik messengers, mostly Germans. The Bolsheviks are said to be preparing a revolution in India at the end of March 1921.

W./Y. C. (14), 6. 9. 20.—Mohd. Ali expresses himself as very optimistic over the idea of the regeneration of all Mohammedan Powers *in the East aided by the Bolsheviks.*

W./H. D. (289), 9. 9. 20.—The Khilafat Central Committee are trying to induce conversions. They are out for the conversion of India into a Muslim State in order to link up with other Muslim countries. Their dream is a block of Muslim States leaning on Russia.

Special Bureau of Information, India, week ending 18. 9. 20.—In Rome it was reported that Mohd. Ali was in close touch with the Turkish Ambassador, to whom he said to have given 2,000*l*. The intention was that he and his fellow delegates were to meet Talaat Pasha, who was to bring with him important papers from Germany relating to the agreement between the Nationalists and the Soviet and German Governments. The meeting actually took place on 6th August, when Talaat declared that an understanding had been arrived at between Germany, the Soviet and the Turkish Nationalists. The Soviet was to make peace with the Poles, after which Russia would mass her armies for an offensive in Asia.

W./Misc. (133), 30. 9. 20.—On the 30th September information is received that Helleberg is providing him with funds received from Bolshevik sources.

W./L. H. (37), 11. 10. 20.—On the 11th October further information is received to the effect that Dr. Mansur (the notorious revolutionist) sent a letter through Chattopadhyaya to Mohd. Ali. This shows the latter to be in direct touch with England. (*See also* under "Afghanistan", page 3.)

(*e*) Italy.

W./L. H. (20), 5. 7. 20.—See Section III. (*b*). (iii).

W./M. X. (131), 31. 7. 20.—Information has been received that Mohd. Ali corresponds with the Turkish Government through the Italian diplomatic bag at Rome. This information, which is given from a different source, corroborates that given in the note headed "Italian intrigues in the East and Near East, dated 5th" July 1920.

F. O. E. 9999/139/44, 3. 8. 20, 24. 8. 20.—A report from Rome states that Mohd. Ali, the head of the Indian Delegation, is on a visit to Rome and has been received by the President of the Council, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Pope. He is said to have represented to the Members of the Government and to His Holiness the grievances and aspirations of the Mohammedans of India. No definite indication is given of the nature of his interviews with Signor Giolitti and Count Sforza, but the Pope is reported to have listened to Mohd. Ali's exposition with sympathy.

W./H. D. (279), 5, 8. 20.—With regard to the visit of Mohd. Ali to Rome, it is reported that not only he is trying to play upon the Italian Government and their dissatisfaction with the Asia Minor settlement, but is actually receiving and visiting the revolutionary elements.

Note.—The Italian Government threatened to cease to have anything to do with him unless he broke his connections with the Socialists.

Mohd. Ali finally expressed the hope that Italy would not range herself on the side of injustice. On being reminded by the interviewer that the last two Italian Governments had done their best to mitigate the terms of peace with Turkey, he replied: "Of course we know it. What more could we want here at Rome? The Government, the Socialists and the Vatican have all expressed their sympathy with us".

R./Misc. (131), 9. 9. 20.—In speaking of his visit to Rome, Mohd. Ali mentioned that the Pope had told him how he had received frequent reports from the Nuncios in Constantinople testifying to the tolerance shown by the Turks towards the Christians; members of the Italian Government had spoken too of their sympathy for the Turks and for Islam.

In addition to the above the Delegation was whilst in Italy in constant touch with dangerous Mohammedan elements, and though not actually present at the Fiume Conference Mohd. Ali was in touch with it and made a party to any decisions arrived at there.

His treachery to the Italian Government is quite comprehensible since it was his design to cause dissensions between the Entente Powers in order to paralyse any concerted efforts. This is further borne out by a report, where it is shown how he indulged in the same double dealing in regard to the French, whilst it has been shown at the beginning of this note now he was already in touch with hostile elements in England whilst pretending to plead his cause with the British Government. It must be realised that the promotion of the pan-Islamic movement was his principal object in Europe.

It is also significant to note his close association with Djavid Pasha, who, it will be remembered, was deputed to "cause dissensions with the Entente," *vide* causes of unrest in Mesopotamia, Report No. 2.

W./L. H. (35), 6. 10. 20.—Mohd. Ali arrived in Rome on the 23rd of July last accompanied by Mohd. Hayat, and carried on his work in accordance with the programme laid down for him by the Ligue des Nations Opprimées de tout l'Orient. The Italian Premier, Signor Giolitti, was notified of his arrival. An interview was asked for and immediately granted.

The Italian Premier expressed his entire sympathy with the aims of the Khilafat mission, and said that it had never been the policy of Italy to allow a disintegration of the Turkish Empire and that the Italian Government had given and would continue to give Turkey all the help which it was in its power to give.

In the reply to Mohd. Ali's representations, Signor Giolitti admitted that until such time as the Oriental countries were freed from foreign yokes, there would never be permanent peace in the world. He pointed out, however, that this canker would not be got rid of merely by appealing to other Powers for assistance, but that what was wanted was a combined rising on the part of Orientals themselves ..... Mohd. Ali explained that they were powerless owing to their poverty, ignorance and caste prejudices, and owing in particular to want of arms. All they now required was some material help from a civilised Power in Europe.

Signor Giolitti replied that Italy was ready to render help, more especially to the Mohammedans if they would all unite.

As evidence of his good faith he pointed out that he was responsible for the formation of the Ligue des Nations Opprimées de tout l'Orient which was formed in the interests of the Orient and of Italy.

He warned Mohd. Ali not to publish anything of what he had said which would give rise to any misunderstanding between himself and Great Britain.

Mohd. Ali thanked the Premier on behalf of the people of India and promised that united India would render the League all its support.

(f) France

W./H. 5. D. (260), 3. 7. 20.—Mohd. Ali left for Paris on 24th June. The objects of the visit are—

(1) Meeting in the Salle Wagram on the 25th.
(2) To further the agitation among the French deputies.
(3) To sound the Turkish delegates.

W./H. D. (273), 24. 7. 20.—Shuaib Koreshi has now returned to 8, Albert Hall Mansions from Paris. He states that the present feeling of the Delegation is that they have so far failed to cause any difference of opinion between France and England, and the Syrian developments have further complicated things for them. Mohd. Ali hopes to be more successful in Rome.

W./H. D. (279), 5. 8. 20.—When in France he supported the Tunisian demands for independence whilst plating for French support against the Turkish treaty.

C. X. / 4738/V., 7. 8. 20.—Mohd. Ali very discouraged at the state of Europe, saying he could find little support there so in consequence he was forced to seek help from Russia.

E. 10082/139/44, 18. 8. 20.—Delegation had an audience with M. Millerand on 11th August 1920. Apparently the French Premier gave the Delegation no encouragement. They returned to England the following day.

R./Misc. 131, 9. 9.a 20.—In the opinion of the Delegation, French interests in the Orient were largely in accord with their own; both of them were opposed to any extension of the influence and domination of England. They had, however, been greatly deceived. They found that France, or rather the French Government (note the distinction), attached so high a value to the support of England *vis-à-vis* Germany that they had perforce to become the slaves of English aspirations in the East.

The following diary of the Delegation's doings in France will throw further light on their sinister connections:—

April 24th. — Meets Senators, Deputies and ex-Ministers.
25th. — Visited Taalby Abdul Aziz (Tunisian) and Mon. Chauvin, editor of *Débats*.

27th. — Visited by Lonquet le Coconnier, Secretary of *La France et l'Islam.*

May 9th. — Visited the Turkish Delegation at Versailles.

10th. — Telegraphed to the Sultan.

11th. — Called at the offices of *Le Populaire.*

12th. — Called at the offices of *Le Temps* and *Le Journal.*

14th. — Visited by Baron L. P. Lormain and Mon. Stoiloff.

15th. — Called on M. Leon Barthod, Deputy, and well-known Anglophobe. Visit reported as of utmost importance.

16th. — Received a letter from Mohd. Riza in which Franchet d'Esperey's name occours. Telephoned to Comité Bulgare.

17th. — Present at a Conference attended by many politicians and journalists, amongst whom were Rene le Comte, Du Menil, Thoret, General Cherfils D'Estailleur, Hardemarde, Terff, Jules Roche, Baron de Lormain, Le Coconnier.

21st. — Received Lieut. -Col. Azan.

25th and 26th. — Visited offices of *Le Populaire.*

III. — Extracts From Reports — Continued.

(a) Future Plans.

W./M.C. (19), 10. 7. 20, 19. 8. 20.—The name of Mohd. Ali figures in a letter dated 10th July 1920 from Adalia signed by H. A. Rashid and addressed to Dr. Nahad Reshid. (sic) After announcing his departure for Angora and asking that Mohd. Ali be notified, he continues that it is absolutelty necessary to take some active steps in India.... To save the situation something real must be done and this must be communicated to Mohd. Ali.

H. C./1273, 25. 7. 20, 19. 8. 20.—Extract from a translation of a document from Mohd. Ali to Mustafa Kemal, dated 25th July 1920.

The measures necessary for the deliverance of the Islamic countries at present under foreign domination would from the general subject of a debate (at proposed pan-Islamic conference to be held in Switzerland in October); a programme of general strikes is hinted at, which recalls the non-co-operation movement of Mr. Gandhi.

W./H. D. (268), 16. 7. 20.—Abdul Kasim has returned to London and brought with him a new move. They wish to start a new agitation against *all* war, to hold big meetings, and link up with all pacifists and Socialists to try and influence public opinion against any military campaign whatsoever.

W./H. D. (276), 3. 8. 20.—The Delegation organised a meeting which was to be held on Thursday, 29th July, at the Essex Hall. This is part of

the game they intend to play. They will devote their propaganda openly to the Khilafat question, but will subsidise any meeting or anti-militarist body.

W./H. D. (279), 5. 8. 20.—Since Turkey is so weak the game to be played is to protest loudly in the West against all wars, whilst at the same time holding out promises to Russia that if she will help Turkey and invade Mesopotamia, Persia and even India, French and Italian Socialists will also play this game.

No. 195, 19. 8. 20.—Report that Mohd. Ali is expected to pass through Paris about the end of August before he embarks for India, where it is said as soon as he arrives he will try to start a revolution.

W./M. C. (20), 23. 8. 20.—Formation of Indian club in Paris.

F.O.E. 9999/139/44, 24. 8. 20.—Non-co-operation. In an interview to the Press in Italy, Mohd. Ali stated that India deserved her fate as she has been too weak, but from now onwards she intends to follow a line of her own, and to show her fixed determination of severing her connection with the British Government. Her programme will be carried out in various stages. First, Indians will return all decorations conferred on them, and will renounce all British honours. If that has no effect, those who occupy Government posts will hand in their resignations. The third step will be for all troops and police to resign and leave the army and police force *en masse*. Then it will be seen whether Great Britain still finds it possible to occupy Mesopotamia and Palestine, to support the Greeks in Thrace and Asia Minor, and to continue to dominate India itself. The fourth step will be the refusal to pay taxes. If none of these things succeed, the Mohammedans, or rather the Indians, reserve to themselves the right to declare a Holy War.

W./H.S. (25), 24. 8. 20.—Kasem was going back to start a movement among the peasants.

S.B. 18824/4, 2. 9. 20.—One direct result of the delegates' stay in London is that the cause is to be promoted by the inauguration very shortly at 25, Ebury Street, of an institute on the lines of an Islamic Bureau for the distribution of pamphlets and other propaganda. An Indian named Mulk, who has been an assistant secretary to Mohd. Ali in London, will be in charge.

W./Y.C. (14), 6. 9. 20.—Mohd. Ali is for opinion that liberty can never be secured by begging, but must be taken by force or any other possible means.

W./H.D. (289), 9. 9. 20.—The Khilafat Central Committee are trying to induce conversions. They are out for the conversion of India into a Muslim State in order to link up with other Muslim countries. Their dream is a block of Muslim States leaning on Russia.

W./Y.C. (14), 6. 9. 20.—Mohammed Ali will work for stopping the sending of Indian troops outside India, chiefly on the ground of the risk of creating enmity against India from her neighbours. He is confident there will be disturbance and revolution in India in the near future.

C.X./5233/V, 12. 10. 20. The main subjects of discussion at the Baku conference were—

(*a*) The Eastern policy of the Entente.

(*b*) Manner in which Soviet Russia can help to free the colonies of the Entente Powers.

(*c*) Propaganda in these colonies with a view to preventing the use of Colonial troops, especially in any war against Soviet Russia.

(*b*) Communications With External Revolutionaries.

(*i*) *United Kingdom.*

There are indications that connections were formed with Sinn Fein, though the evidence is slight.

The Delegation got into touch with various labour leaders, but it appears that they received little support.

The *Daily Herald* is under contract to publish Indian news in a favourable manner, but this paper has been prohibited entry into India.

S.B. 18824/4, 2. 9. 20.—A bureau is shortly to be inaugurated at 25, Ebury Street, on the lines of the Islamic Bureau. This may provide a means of communication and is being watched.

W./L.H. (37), 11. 10. 20.—Informs us that Mohd. Ali was reported as being in touch with the Bolsheviks through Chattopadhyaya, who was reported as being in direct touch with England *via* Sweden, and also in touch with Berlin.

(*ii*) *France.*

W./H.D. (300), 13. 10. 20.—He will receive from Paris news of the progress made in France, and will have agents in French India.

Talaat and the various Indian organisations in Berlin are in touch with Paris, as is also the Society of Oppressed Nations. If they are able, therefore, to establish the channel of communication mentioned above, India will be kept in touch with the central organisations in Berlin. In addition to the Bureau Islamique in Paris, an Indian club has been formed that, according to precedent, may do well for a centre for receiving and distributing news and propaganda.

(iii) Italy.

W./M.C. (13), 31. 7. 20.—Information has been received that Mohd. Ali corresponds with the Turkish Government through the Italian diplomatic bag at Rome. This information, which is from a different source, corroborates that given in the note headed "Italian intrigues in the East and Near East," dated 5th July 1920, in which it was stated that Indian, Egyptian and Turkish terrorists shall be permitted to hand in their secret papers for transmission to their various destinations through the various Italian Consular bags. They are to be kept supplied with the names of persons who are permitted to exercise this privilege in India, Egypt, and Turkey.

W./L.H. (20), 5. 7. 20.—Colonial Institute in Rome. President, A. Chesaro. Secretary Dr. Escarpa is playing in the Italian anti-British movement. This bureau is a private body somewhat similar to the German Oriental Bureau, but it is intended it shall co-operate secretly with the Ministry of Colonies and Foreign Affairs. Signor Lago has arranged to place the institute at the disposal of all Oriental extremists. By this means it is intended that the Central Committee of Oppressed Nations of the Orient which has just been formed in Rome shall keep in close touch with their respective fellow-workers in India, Egypt, and Turkey. So far no Communication has been established in India, but the authorities are sure their Consul in Calcutta will co-operate with the scheme, but they are not quite certain of their Consul in Bombay.

(iv) Anatolia.

Our information shows fairly clearly that the Delegation was in constant and direct touch with Mustafa Kemal, who has good Communications with Europe, especially Italy, and we see above under "Italy" how it is proposed to communicate with India.

(v) Afghanistan.

Reports from Kabul show clearly that the Indian Khilafat Delegation is in actual communication with Djemal, *see* Section II. *(b)*.

Note.—W./H.D. (300), 13. 10. 20.—Mohd. Ali has arrived in India. There is reason to think that there may be something in his boast that Indian soldiers will refuse to fight for Great Britain. He will work his hardest to assure the success of the non-co-operation movement among the officials, army and police force.

He will receive from Paris news of the progress made in France and will have agents in French India.

IV. — Brief Diary of Delegation's Proceedings

Feb. 1st. — Mohd. Ali, Maulana Syed Suleiman Nadvi, Syed Hussein, sailed for Marseilles.

22nd. — Landed at Venice.

29th. — Dined with Pickthall, whose help he enlisted.

March 2nd. — Received by Mr. Fisher on behalf of the Secretary of State of India

5th. — Spoke at 3, Campten Hill Road. "If opponent uses force to crush the Muslems by superior arms these Muslems must draw the sword and fight to the last."

8th. — Lunched with Captain Bennet, who is very friendly with Amir Ali, and responsible for pro-Turkish advertisements in the Press. Spoke at meeting of Minerva Café, concluded his speech with threat of force against force. Discussion: Bolshevism and Nationalism.

15th. — Left for Curzon Hotel.

17th. — Present at formation of the "Persian Association."

19th. — Interview with the Prime Minister.

21th. — At the Woking Mosque.

30th. — Visited Labour Executive, but interview not very encouraging.

31st. — Two hours with George Lansbury.

April 13th. — Left London for Paris.

15th. — Interview with Longuet at office of *Le Populaire.*

22nd. — Meeting in the Kingsway Hall, information published interview with Sayed Hussein.

23rd. — Meeting with Pickthall.

24th. — M. A. meets Senators, Deputies, and ex-Ministers.

25th. — Visited Taalby Abdul Aziz, a Tunisian, and Mon. Cauvain, editor of *Débats.*

27th. — Visited by Longuet, Le Coconnier, Secretary of *La France et l'Islam.* Visited by Dr. Richard and Burde.

28th. — Left for Edinburgh.

29th. — Spoke at Edinburgh.

30th. — Spoke at Manchester. No longer wished to be under foreign subjugation. A king who is antagonistic to their religious convictions could not receive their homage and respect.

May 2nd. — Letter to *Daily Telegraph,* "The Khilafat claim."

8th. — Arrived Paris.

9th. — Saw members of Turkish Delegation at Versailles.

10th. — Telegram to Sultan, visited a Deputy at 10, Av. Dugnesne in company of Mlle. Pureau.
11th. — Called at *Le Populaire* and *Le Temps*. Telegram from Tewfik, member of Turkish Delegation, telling him to address himself to Hamid Bey of the Red Crescent, Constantinople.
12th. — Called at *Le Journal*.
14th. — Visited by Baron L. P. Lormain and M. Stoiloff.
15th. — Called on M. Leon Barthou, Deputy, well-known Anglophobe. Visit of utmost importance and M. Riza. Telegram from Bombay, "3000. cabled International strong non-co-operation Surat Movement started."
16th. — Received a letter from M. Riza in which D'Esperey's name occurs. Telephoned to Comité Bulgare.
17th. — Present at conference attended by many politicians and Journalists. Among them René Le Comte, Du Menil, Thoret, Gen. Cherfils D'Estailleur, Hardemarde, Terff, Jules Roche, Baron de Lormain, Le Coconnier, Jean Meila.
18th. — 8, Rue al Pouttach.
19th. — L'Ordre Public, called at 8, Rue de Ponthien, received Mr. Haidar, Shouman, Perin.
20th. — Rained all day.
May 21st. — Received Lieut.-Col. Azan.
22nd. — Assisted at conference at the College de France.
23rd. — Assisted at a fête at the Trocadero.
24th. — Bank holiday. Walked near hotel.
25th. — 26th. — Visited office of *Populaire*.
27th. — Meeting at Salle Des Sociétés Savantes; speeches by Longuet, Marcel Cachin, Le Coconnier. Secretary went alone to Turkish Delegation at Versailles.
29th. — Left Paris for London.
30th. — Arrived Oxford.
June 6th. — Conference at the Salle des Ingénieurs Civils organised by *La France et l'Islam*. Speeches by Le Coconnier, De Kerguezec and Claude Farrère, de Mouzie, Senator.
7th. — Went to Bureau Islamique at 2.15; at 4.10 went to Palais de Justice.
8th. — Dined with M. Fealbi, took Arabic newspapers of political interest.

9th. — Went to Versailles, and at 8.50 to Salle des Indigéniens. Revision of Peace Treaty with Turkey.

11th. — Letter from Alitsha Zade Harun, confederate, of Djavid Bey and Djemal Pasha, asking M. A. to meet an important personage known in Berlin.? Talaat. Went to Cooks 2.30; went to 9, Quai du Quatre Septembre; 9,0 went to Salle Gaveau.

12th. — Left Paris for London on receipt of a telegram from London from Horniman, "Very urgent. You should be here Saturday without fail."

24th. — Left for Paris.

25th. — Meeting at Salle Wagram under auspices of the Comité France et Islam. The Peace Treaty with Turkey, and interests of France in the East. Present: M. Bourdarie, Director of *Revue Indigène*, M. de Monzie, Senator, Xavier de Magollon, Députés Le Coconnier, Pollin, Secretary of the Comité France et Islam, S. R. Bomanji.

July 4th. — In Paris.

7th. — Met Pertinax.

10th. — Kidwai arrives in Paris from India.

11th. — Abul Kasem and Sayed Hussain left Paris for London.

23rd. — Arrived in Rome. Interviewed Italian Premier and Dr. Nikoli, President of the Italian Chamber.

25th. — Met Turati, Italian Socialist.

25th. — Attended meeting of league of Oppressed Nations.

30th. — Received by the Pope.

31th. — Arrived Montreux (Territet).

August 1st. — Meeting in his rooms.

2nd. — Returned to Paris from Geneva.

3rd. — (Talaat holds meeting at Lucerne. Union of C. U. P. and Nationalists complete, he says.) Versailles to see Turkish Delegation.

5th. — Returned to Geneva.

6th. — Had long interview with Talaat.

7th. — Returned to London from Paris.

11th. — Interview with M. Mollerand

12th. — Returned to England.

13th. — In England; wrote to Mr. Montagu.

22nd. — Members of Delegation present at Labour meeting in Trafalgar Square.

30th. — Left for Paris.

Sept. 1st. — Arrived Paris.
3rd. — Left for Rome.
17th. — Left Brindisi for India.
Oct. 13th. — Arrived in India.

INDIA OFFICE,
10th January 1921
F.O. 371/6549/E. 1013.

No. 15

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *January 20, 1921.*
(Received January 21).

No. 43.
Telegraphic.

GENERAL HARINGTON has shown me his recent telegrams to War Office on various aspects of situation in Turkey, including his telegram No. I. 9766 of 14th January.

It may be useful for your Lordship to have connected statement of my own views on other than purely military aspects of situation before meeting of Allied Prime Ministers.

I would beg that this telegram be read in conjuction with my telegram No. 1253 of 27th November, 1920. I still regard objects indicated in third paragraph of that telegrams as those which should be kept steadily in view now, though difficuly of securing them seems greater than ever.

It is useless to regard Mustapha Kemal any longer as a brigand chief. Angora Government has tight grip on the whole of Asia Minor not in effective foreign occupation, with probable exception of certain more or less Kurdish areas in the south-east. It exercises all functions of Government with average efficiency as efficiency goes in Turkey. Bulk of population, sheep-like as always, recognised its anthority without demur and majority of Moslem element support it strongly, as standing for best interests of Turkey and individual Turks. It has been strong enough to repress quickly and thoroughly any attempts at local risings by anti-Kemalist Turks. It has strangle hold on native Christians, though they do not fare badly at present except in marginal areas, which are more or less the theatres of war.

Economic situation in Anatolia is, of course, bad. Accounts differ as to financial situation of Angora Government. It must evidently be preca-

rious, but country will stand almost unlimited amount of extortion, and it would be most unwise to count upon collapse of Kemal in the near future from lack of money. Officials are better off than those of Central Government. Prospects held out to military are sufficient to draw many away from Constantinople. Troops appear to be well found.

Foreign orientation of Angora Government still turns mainly on question of relations with Bolsheviks. These are undoubtedly subject to frequent strain, owing, firstly, to frequent differences over Caucasus question and, secondly, to mistrust of Bolsheviks amongst large numbers of Turks, who fear penetration of Bolshevik principles into Asia Minor or who simply see old Russian menace behind present Bolshevik friendship. Nevertheless, all recent indications point to conclusion that guiding spirits on both sides attach utmost value to continued co-operation, and desire to avoid anything in the nature of rupture.

In this connection it is well to bear in mind considerable rôle played by certain members of old Union and Progress gang in Bolshevik councils, as exemplified in use made of Enver and Djemal's Mission to Afghanistan. It is very doubtful how far, even if leaders at Angora now wished to disentangle themselves from Bolsheviks, they would find themselves able to do so. It is not impossible that at given moment Bolsheviks might be in a position to put any squeamish element on one side and impose new leaders who would take Bolshevik's orders.

I am familiar with theory that Nationalist movement contains sufficiency of moderate element to be capable of being drawn into our orbit by relatively small concessions. There was a time when, if we had been prepared to drive Turkey less hard in the matter of territorial sacrifices, we might have divided moderate Nationalists and irreconcilable extremists. But as things have worked out movement has maintained its cohesion, and extremists entitled to claim that its present strength justifies their attitude. I do not say it would be impossible even now to make bid for cohesion of more moderate elements to Allied point of view. For this, however, it would be necessary not merely to offer substantial concessions, but to show that Allies disposed of and intended to use force necessary to impose any new settlement.

Whatever their difficulties, leaders of Nationalist movement are now elated and self-confident, and their acts and pronouncements show them to be intensely hostile to Allies with the exception of Italy, whose complaisance is, however, her only recommendation in their eyes. They are especially hostile to Great Britain. That is their chief common ground with Bolsheviks. Many of them still cherish hope of not merely saving Thrace and whole of Asia Minor, but of establishing Turkish hegemony in the

East at the expense of Great Britain. Others do not go so far as this, and some of them would even like to revert to traditional friendship with Great Britain if only Great Britain would transfer her affections from Greece to Turkey, but even these would now regard retention of whole "Turkey proper" with complete sovereign rights, subjects, perhaps, to mitigation by financial control, as object to be attained.

I do not altogether exclude possibility of attempts at direct rapprochement between Angora and new Greek Government. I should, however, require more evidence than at present exists to believe that any exchange of views is on foot, and in any case, I cannot conceive any basis on which definite understanding could be reached.

It would be a mistake to regard at present Constantinople Government as submissive to Allied point of view. They regard substantial revision of treaty as now being foregone conclusion. Their rôle is to keep home fires burning until Nationalists win back as much as possible for Turkey. They are compelled to render much lip service to Allies, but their attitude over every important question and some minor ones since they came into power shows strong determination to give nothing away.

Their strongest motives are probably sympathy with moderate Nationalists and fear of extremists.

I cannot believe that Nationalist leaders are indifferent to fate of Constantinople as is sometimes alleged. It is quite likely, hovewer, that, even if Allies' position here collapsed in next few months, they would continue to govern at Angora until settlement was complete. It is essential that we should keep our hold here and maintain semblance of legitimate Government. This involves maintenance of order. I entirely share General Harington's views as to extent to which it is menaced by starving condition of officials and by the presence of Russians. It is difficult to see how things can be kept going here unless means are found to finance Turkish Administration and unless someone continues to feed Russians.

All this amounts to saying that Turkish situation as a whole has become almost inextricable, it is true—inextricable if Treaty of Sèvres is still to be regarded as basis of future unless Allies are united and are preparad to fight new war on large scale. Assuming that treaty is to be modified, way out may possibly be found by making our displeasure with Greece excuse for new territorial settlement, by giving controls more palatable appearance while sacrificing as little possible of their efficacy, by gradually building up from Constantinople a new position, with Sultan as corner-stone, and by giving him definite and whole-hearted assistance with a view to reconstruction of Administration on sound financial basis, creation of gendarmerie and progressive extension of authority outward from here. Obstacles

to realisation of revolutionary programme are enormous, and may be insuperable. They include usual difficulty of adjustment between Allies, difficulty of liquidating Greek complications imported by ourselves into Asia Minor and difficulty of finding elements to form Turkish Government suitable for purpose in view. I nevertheless recommend that [group undecypherable] of some such programme be employed if only to avoid alternative of being compelled presently to recognise Kemal Government, to which it is certainly not desirable that victorious Allies should go as suitors for peace.

F.O. 406/45, p. 56-58, No. 23
D.B.F.P., Ist. series, Vol. XVII, p. 21-24, No. 14

No. 17

Major Batten to Earl Curzon.

JEDDAH, *January 20, 1921.*
(Received February 4.)

No. 9.
Secret.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jeddah report for the period ending the 20th January, 1921.

Copies of this report and despatch have been sent to his Excellency the High Commissioner for Egypt, his Excellency the High Commissioner for Mesopotamia and the Political Resident, Aden.

I have, &c.

W. BATTEN, *Major*, I. A.,
Acting British Agent.

F.O. 406/45, p. 261, No. 141.

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 17

Mecca Report to January 19, 1921.

Extract.

AS usual, the news of the week with regard to the trouble between the Hedjaz and Ibn Saud's followers has been very conflicting, and would cover several pages if given *in extenso*, from day to day. The King has not shown any outward signs of agitation but there are grounds for believing

that he is not quite easy at heart, and the situation is fairly serious, according to my agent, who overheart a conversation between Emir Ali and Qazi-ul-Quzza of Mecca. Constant summonses to his adherent Ashraf and sheikhs are evidence of this latter belief. The Wadi Seil was already closed to trafic, but as a result of a very recent fracas, the Jebel Kura route has also been closed to the public, who are prohibited from going to or coming from Taif. It has been stated that Shereefian forces reoccupied Liyah and have advanced eastwards to a new line of defence. Although the Shereefians lost heavily, they succeeded in routing the Mudayana in a battle in the Wadi Seil and capturing 100 prisoners. Eighty prisoners were also stated to have been taken near Jubbal Ashaish. Three Nejdis (Mudayana) were caught at Taif, and have been sent here in irons. Izzet Effendi, one of the Shereefian officers, is said to have been killed.

2. The fidelity of the Ashraf of Taif and its neighbourhood is doubted and with regard to the Shereef Hamza of Liyah, the King has given orders that if his troops ever have to fall back on Taif, they must first raze the houses of that gentleman before leaving Liyah. The transport of foodstuffs and material is by means of camels commandeered from the Bedouin.

3. His growing unpopularity is no secret to the King and, instead of threatening the British Government with his resignation, he has now since some time taken to calling leaders to the Mecca society, and lecturing them on his own disinterestedness, telling them that his revolt was in their interests, and offering to resign in favour of their nominee, whom he would assist in State affairs, if the public desired, or leave the country with his children. The last lecture on the subject was given on Friday last, and at the back of it was apparently his desire to justify some of his actions.

4. Usually the Mecca police parade before the King on a Friday on the line of the Turkish Salamlik, but owing to the despacth of some of them to Taif during the period under report this ceremony was not observed last week. Two machine guns and a number of soldiers also left for Taif during last week.

5. A message is said to have come from Emir Abdullah saying that he is now in direct touch with the Turkish Nationalists, and that Mustapha Kemal wishes the King to declare open hostilities against the Allied Powers, if he wants to prove his friendliness. The King is not yet certain whether his doing so would bring him the coveted honour of becoming the Khalifa of Islam, which is the bait offered by the Turkish leader. While he is still hesitating, I am convinced, that by throwing in his lot with Mustapha Kemal the King will certainly improve his own position with the Moslem world, who, though they may favour the idea of his becoming a Khalifa all at once, will be prepared to reconsider the question,

in their present restive and discontented mood, and will overlook his past conduct in order to see Turkey strong again. The new outlook is well worth watching carefully.

The articles in "Al Qibla" are indirect indications of the feelings existing.

6. The exchange question here is causing great inconvenience to everybody. Money-changers are imprisoned, flogged or expelled from the country simply because they change a gold sovereign for more than seven medjidiehs, which is the Government rate. The amazing thing about it is that the Government itself changes gold at favourable rates in Turkish copper and nickel, and resells them to the money-changers at a dearer rate.*

F.O. 406/45, p. 261-262, No. 141/1

No. 18

Lord Granville to Earl Curzon.

ATHENS, *January 21, 1921, 1.30 p.m.*
(Received January 21, 10. p.m.)

No. 27 Telegraphic

Colonel Repington[1] has arrived on a roving commission from 'Daily Telegraph' and under special patronage of Princess Chistopher[2]. He is being treated with greatest civility and Greek officer who has reputation of being strong pro-German has been told off to show him (?round) and help him generally.

Colonel Repington had long conversation with Prince Nicholas[3] yesterday and with King to-day[4]. Both told him that though Greek operations in Asia Minor the other day were entirely satistactory they were uneasy about their lines of communication. Prince Nicholas said that if they received a hint that Great Britain would approve they would be glad

* W. Batten, 21 Şubat 1921 tarihli, 19 sayılı raporunda Curzon'a şunları yazmıştır: "Reports of communication between Mustapha Kemal and the King (Hussein) become increasingly frequent, but no confirmation could be obtained of their truth". *FO. 406/45, p.* 296, No. 152/1

[1] Colonel C. A'C. Repington, formerly Military Correspondent of *The Times* (January 1905-January 1918) and author of *The First World War* (London 1920,).

[2] Princess Christopher (formelry Mrs. Leeds, a very wealthy American) was the wife of King Constantine's brother Prince Christopher.

[3] Prince Nicholas was a brother of King Constantine.

[4] For an account of these conversation of January 19 and January 20, see Colonel Repington's Diary, published under the title *After the War* (London. 1922), pp. 23-7.

to enter into negotiatoins with Kemal at once—he did not suggest on what terms; when Colonel Repington mentioned this idea to King, His Majesty would not say much but did not seem to (? favour) it. King of Greece stated that they could only maintain their front in Asia Minor for another month or six weeks without financial assistance; he seemed fully aware of French and Italian desire to see Greeks turned out of Smyrna but did not show smallest sign of being willing to acquiesce, and he used all the usual arguments that Greece was acting on mandate of the Powers especially Great Britain.

His Majesty stated that as a constitutional monarch he would interfere in no way in choice of Prime Minister by Chamber, but that Monsieur Gounaris[5] had a great majority and was certain. He referred to Monsieur Rhallys as 'Ramolli[6]'. Monsieur Gounaris was waiting when Coloned Repington came out and Colonel gathered (I do not know how) that he is in high favour.

King talked of absolute impossibility of General amnesty to party of Monsieur Venizelos and showed no sign whatever of disapproving, or even regretting, their universal removal from posts, etc.

Colonel Repington told me he had impression that King is stupid but honest.

D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol. XVII, p. 24-25, No. 15

[5] M. Demetrios Gounaris (Prime Minister from March to November 1915) was Minister of War in the Rhallis Cabinet.

In his telegram No. 25 of January 20 Lord Granville had reported: 'I was told on apperently good authority that Monsieur Gounaris had now secured very large majority of anti-Venizelists and that Monsieur Stratos had recognized this fact and agreed to vote for Gounarist candidate for the Presidency of the Chamber. Now I hear on the contrary that Monsieur Stratos is still full of hope and that it is very uncertain how many (? deputies) Monsieur Gounaris has secured'. Lord Granville added: 'The King and Prince Nicholas both told English journalist that Monsieur Gounaris was impossible because of the Allies, and Monsieur Rhallis because of his (? age) and frequent "gaffes", and that Monsieur Stratos would therefore be Prime Minister...' To this telegram Lord Curzon replied in telegram No. 14 of January 21: 'Without desiring to interfere in any way in internal politics of Greece, I need not conceal from you that appointment of M. Gounaris as Prime Minister would be very unwelcome to ourselves, and that view of King Constantine that Stratos would be the best man in the interests both of Greece and the Entente is one in which we entirely concur'. M. Nicholas Stratos was at one time Minister of Marine in the Venezelist Cabinet. He ignored instructions concerning a contract and was asked to resign. He thereupon became an ardent Royalist.

[6] i.e. a dotard. Following the resignation of M. Venizelos on Nonember 17, 1920, M. M. D. Rhallis had become President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Justice *ad interim*. He was suceeded by M. Kalogeropoulos on February 6, 1921.

No. 19

Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 24, 1921.*

No. 243.

My Lord,

I HAVE to inform your Excellency that, on the 15th instant, the French Chargé d'Affairs called on the Under Secretary of State in order to give the following information:—

2. There are at Rome a number of Nationalist Turks who are anxious to put themselves forward as intermediaries between the Allies and Mustapha Kemal. Their spokesman, M. de Fleuriau explained, is Ahmed Riza Bey, and Djavid Bey is associated with them. They recently approached M. Barrère, the French Ambassador, on the subject of Cilicia, and offered to facilitate an arrangement with Mustapha Kemal for the withdrawal from Cilicia of both Kemalist and French forces, the former beginning the evacuation. A gendarmerie to be established under French officers would keep order in the province.

3. This arrangement, M. de Fleuriau said, would entirely suit the plans of the French Government, and would in fact be in harmony with the provisions of the tripartite agreement. In these circumstances, M. Barrère had been authorised to reply that if Mustapha Kemal were to put forward proposals to the above effect the French Government would be quite prepared to consider them.

4. Sir E. Crowe asked M. de Fleuriau whom these Turks at Rome purported to represent. He replied that he did not know in the least.

5. Sir E. Crowe then enquired whether the French Government contemplated dealing with the problem of Cilicia all by itself, or whether they desired to use an understanding on this subject as a lever for obtaining a general settlement with the Kemalists. It seemed to Sir E. Crowe of advantage to avoid attacking the problem that was confronting the Allies piecemeal.

6. On this point also, M. de Fleuriau had no information, but said he could at once give an assurance that in no case would the French Government make any decision, or any bargain, except in complete understanding with their Allies.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

D.B.F.P. 1./XVII. p. 26-27, No. 17

F.O. 406/45, p. 58, No. 24

No. 20

British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held in the Salle de l'Horloge, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, January 25, 1921, at 4 p.m.

PRESENT: *France* : M. Briand *(in the Chair)*, Berthelot, M. Kammerer; SECRETARIES, M. Massigli *(Secretary General)* M. Chastenet.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, O.M., M.P., Prime Misinter; The Rt. Hon. The Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K.D., &c., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Sir Eyre Crowe, Mr. Philip Kerr, Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Harold Nocolson; SECRETARIES, Sir Maurice Hankey, Mr. R. B. Howorth.

Italy : Count Sforza, Count Borin [Bonin] Longare, Marquis della Torretta, Signor Galli; SECRECTARIES, Count Vannutelli-Rey, Signor Garbosso.

Japan : Viscount Ishii, Mr. Koshide; SECRETARIES, Mr. Sawadu [Sawada], Mr. Kato.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

Situation in Greece and Turkey

M. BRIAND said that he thought the conference should now turn to certain general questions of foreign policy, and he suggested that a start should be made with the situation in Greece. The return of Constantine to the throne and his re-establishment there, had resulted in a situation wich might, unless handled carefully, develop into a problem of great difficully and complexity[1]. After recalling that the Greek elections had, as was anticipated, resulted in the return of the opponents of Veniselos[2], he reminded the conference of the protests made by the Allies and of the measures which the Allies had intended to adopt in the event of Constantine's resumption of the throne. The Greek people had taken no notice of the Allied warnings and the Allies had refused to recognise Constantine. This was the present situation. He would be glad to know whether the British Government had any very definite ideas to place before the conference.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he himself would like to hear first what the representatives of the other interested Powers had to say.

[1] King Constantine of Greece, after a period of exile in Switzerland, had returned to his country in Dec. 1920.

[2] The reference is to the elections, held in Nov. 1920, which led to the resignation of M. Venizelos, Prime Minister of Greece since June 1917.

M. BRIAND, resuming, indicated that in his view the number of possible solutions of the problem was small and conceivably it might be desirable to adopt a 'wait and see' attitude. As regards the measures which might be taken by the Allies to enforce their will upon Greece, the position did not seem to him be materially different from that which had presented itself to the London Conference[3]. It was, of course, always open to the Allies to refuse Greece any financial help, but it was not at all clear that the Allies were in a position to turn Constantine off the throne without the use of force. Public opinion in France was disposed to the view that a lapse of the might bring new factors and elements into the situation and that these, combined with financial stringency, might bring the Greek people into a more reasonable frame of mind.

The Greek question could not be dissociated from the Turkish situation if for no other reason than that the two problems were brought into contact in a very striking fashion at Symrna. Generally speaking, the position of the Greek army in Asia Minor was that in recent military operations it had met with some successes and had encountered some checks. There was reason to belive that the new leaders of the army who had succeeded the Veniselist generals did not possess the confidence of the troops to the same extent as the latter, and that a spirit of demobilisation [*sic*], which had accounted to some extent for the failure of the Veniselists, was threatening the Greek army with dissolution. If that army disappeared the Allies would have to face a new and very troublesome situation and they might have to consider the advisability of some drastic rearrangement of the policy which they had hitherto attempted to carry out. He would be glad to receive any suggestions from the other members of the conference, and possibly the British or Italian delegations might be in a position to submit more recent information than France possessed. He added that public opinion in France was unanimous in rejecting and distrusting the Government of Greece under King Constantine and was also disposed to press for some modification of the Treaty of Sèvres[4]. After carefully considering the position, he himself was disposed to think that, at the present, the Allies had no very solid ground on which to base extreme measures.

COUNT SFORZA said that public opinion in Italy was strongly in favour of some speedy settlement being effected in the Near East. Unhappily, the position was one which was full of difficulty and circumstances were such as to make any forecast of the immediate developments very

[3] i.e. the Second Conference of London, Nov. 26-Dec. 4, 1920.

[4] i.e. the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, signed at Sèvres on Aug. 10, 1920; for the text see *B.F.S.P.*, vol 113., pp. 652-776.

difficult. In his view the activities of the Bolsheviks, combined with the present political, financial and economic situation in Constantinople, rendered the whole position at the place most dangerous. Public opinion in Italy would be disposed to favour some compromise, provided that the rights and claims of the Allies were not thereby prejudiced.

Count Sforza proceeded to inform the conference that recently a number of Turkish politicians from various parts of Europe had met together and had drawn up a statement of the terms on which the Nationalist Turks under Mustapha Kemal would be prepared to make peace with the Allies[5]. In his opinion, a permanent settlement of the Turkish question could only be attained by bringing the Nationalist Turks into the arrangement. He fully recognised the difficulties of the situation, which, however, would tend to grow worse instead of better. If the Russians at Constantinople became Bolshevik[6], it was not improbable that the Turks at Constantinople would follow suit. In this event a new and pressing Turkish problem would arise, and he warned the conference of the Turkish proverb which said that a drowning man grap at anything, even a snake. In this case the snake might be the Bolsheviks.

The terms of the document handed in by Count Sforza (Appendix A) were then read to the conference, which was informed that the authors of the document were in touch with Mustapha Kemal and could speak for the Turkish Nationalists.

Count Sforza, resuming, said that his personal impression of this document was that it would be difficult to base any satisfactory policy upon it. At the same time the Russo-Turkish situation was so very dangerous that it might not be possible for the Allies to adopt a dilatory policy and consequently they should not give up all idea of some reconsideration of the whole position. In this connection the Turks were by temperament strongly opposed to Bolshevism. They were certainly growing frightened of Moscow's activities, and it might not be long before some opportunity presented itself of negotiating with them and obtaining a reasonable settlement.

Lord Curzon felt that the conference would agree with him as to the importance of having a correct statement of the facts of the present situation and a general appreciation of the position in Greece and Turkey which could be drawn from the facts themselves. He reminded the conference that at the time of the previous meeting in London, Constantine was still in exile. The decisions of that conference had in point of fact been taken

[5] See Appendix A; the meeting appears to have been held at Rome.

[6] Constantinople at this time was full of White Russian refugees and of remnants of the forces of the White Russian leader, Gen. Wrangel, evacuated from the Crimea.

too late to influence the decision of the Greek people. The plebiscite had been held before the views of the Allies could be communicated to the voters, and in these circumstances the threat of the Allies to withhold further resources had been futile. At the London Conference an alternative proposal had been submitted by Great Britain, but it had not been adopted. This proposal contemplated the recognition of Constantine as King subject to certain definite and stringent conditions.

Constantine had now returned, and had consolidated his position in such a way that he was tolerably secure, at all events for some months. There was no prospect of his being turned out by either the Greek Parliament or the Greek people. M. Rhallys[7] was being kept in power by King Constantine merely to satifsy the Allied Powers. The King was reserving M. Gournaris (Gounaris)[8] in the background with a view to using him if and when the circumstances rendered such a course desirable. Constantine was clearly endeavouring to conciliate the Allies by continuing in Asia Minor the policy initiated and maintained by M. Veniselos. News had just come to hand that the Greek army in Asia Minor was contemplating a military operation on a large scale, and in his (Lord Curzon's) view there was no justifiable ground on which the Allies could quarrel with Constantine in respect of his activities in Asia Minor. With regard to his activities in Europe, it must be remembered that the credits obtained by the Government of M. Veniselos from the Allied Governments were very nearly exhausted, and that under the decision of the London Conference, Constantine was unable to obtain any fresh financial help from the Allies. The issue of paper money was also coming to an end. The drachma had fallen seriously, and, in consequence, trade had been prejudicially affected, and sooner or later a financial crash was inevitable. Constantine represented that he was in a position to pay the army for a month. The Greek Finance Minister was more optimistic, and thought that sufficient funs were available for three months. In any case, Constantine must, in all human probability, come to the ground in about four months' time. If this happens it might be assumed with certainty that the Greek people would not part with him, but would sympathise with, and support him. The Allies would undoubtedly incur the undying hostility of the Greeks, who would maintain that they had been ruined merely because of the Allies' detestation of their chosen ruler.

As had been truly said, the Greek and Turkish problems were very intimately connected. The Turkish Government at Constantinople was feeble in the extreme. It was discredited throughout Turkey, and was

[7] Prime Minister of Greece since the resignation of M. Venizelos.

[8] Minister of War in the government of M. Rhallys.

bankrupt in purse and reputation. Mustapha Kemal was the real ruler of the country outside Constantinople, and possessed much greater resources and authority than the Sultan. The object of the Allies was to clear up the whole Middle Eastern situation, and this could best be done by getting the Treaty of Sèvres ratified, and by exploring possible modifications of the provisions of the treaty with a view to seeing whether any concessions to the Turks could be made.

Lord Curzon agreed with Count Sforza that the proposals of the Turkish Nationalists were quite unacceptable, inasmuch as they involved the tearing up of the treaty and the reopening of almost every large question which the treaty purported to settle. The Allies must make up their minds to stand by the treaty in its main outlines, and to agree only to modifications in matters of detail. Clearly it was most important to get the treaty ratified, if possible, by Turks of all shades of political opinion as well as by the Greeks. It appeared to him that the opportunity now presented itself by which the Allies could lay down the conditions and exact the guarantees on which the recognition of Constantine could be allowed. At the same time, steps might be taken to bring the Turkish Nationalists into line. At a round-table conference, at which all parties were represented, it seemed not at all impossible that some compromise might be effected. For example, the Allies might agree to recognise and to support Constantine in return for his undertaking that in the case of Smyrna the symbols of sovereignty would revert to the Turks. It was quite certain that any engagements Constantine entered into would be observed by him. The Greek Government was so much in the hands of the Allies that they could not afford to play false. On the other hand, the Turks should be definitely and firmly told that the Allies could not for a moment entertain the idea of tearing up the Treaty of Sèrves, and that at the most it would be open to consider whether some modifications of detail were possible. He envisaged a conference attended by Turks from Constantinople and from Angora, by Greeks, and by representatives of the Allied Powers. His personal experience and knowledge of the East told him that it is vitally necessary to reach a settlement as speedily as possible. The situation in Asia was going from bad to worse. Obscure negotiatoins were proceeding between Mustapha Kemal and the Bolsheviks, which might conceivably result in an unnatural and dangerous alliance[9]. Let the Allies, therefore, take action at once, and come to some definite decision before the end of the present conference. In conclusion, Lord Curzon suggested that the conference which he had envisaged might either be held at Constantinople or elsewhere.

[9] A treaty of alliance between Soviet Russia and Nationalists Turkey was eventually signed in Moscow on March 16, 1921; for the text see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 118, pp. 990-6.

M. Briand said that he understood the British point of view to be that while it was almost impossible to lay down a clear line of policy it seemed eminently desirable to hold as soon as possible a conference at which all interested parties could be present and explore the ground with a view to arriving at some permanent settlement of the Middle Eastern problems. This proposal was one which appealed to him personally, but at the same time he was bound to mention the very real difficulties which were involved. In the first place, it was probable that no real understanding of a permanent character was possible between the Turks and the Bolsheviks. Secondly, there was the critical situation at Constantinople itself; the town was full of the remnants of the army of General Wrangel to an extent which almost made it a Russian town, and at any moment very grave and unpleasant events might occur. Thirdly, it seemed not impossible that the fighting powers of the Greeks had been exaggerated. Recent military events seemed to justify this contention [10]. Was it really safe to base any policy which depended to a substantial extent on the Greek army as a fighting force? Even if preliminary difficulties of the kind mentioned could be surmounted he felt doubtful whether it would be possible to arrange for a meeting of a conference as contemplated by Lord Curzon. At the moment the Allies had no relations with the Greek Government. He himself was not disposed in a matter of this kind to stand on ceremony, but clearly the invitation to the Greeks to attend the conference in itself involved recognition. Even more difficult was the case of the Turks. How would it be possible to get Mustapha Kemal to attend the conference? At the moment he was probably suffering from a swollen head, and he might be most difficult to approach. In any case, the Allies should be very careful indeed lest they should give Mustapha Kemal the impression that they were suing for peace. The position of France was one of peculiar difficullty. At the moment France was maintaining 60,000 men in Cilicia, and quite recently the French troops had sustained a check and had lost a substantial number of officers and men. After the experiences of the war France was not disposed to favour military operations, especially those which involved the shedding of French blood on ground which France would have in any case to return to the Turks. The operations in the East added very heavy financial burdens and made the budget position one of great difficulty. The suggested conference might lead to good results, but on the other hand, it might be wrecked by the ambitions and intrigues of the enemies of the Allies.

[10] On Jan. 10, 1921, the Turkish Nationalist army had driven the Greek forces back to Brussa after a fierce engagement at Inönü.

Mr. Lloyd George stated that in his view no unsurmountable difficulty presented itself provided Mustapha Kemal himself was anxious for peace. If, however, Mustapha Kemal did not want peace than things must go on as at present. He (Mr. Lloyd George) could not imagine that Mustapha Kemal was hostile to a peaceable solution unless indeed he was filled with the vain ambition of resurrecting the old Turkish Empire and constituting himself the first of a new line of Sultans. He most cordially agreed with M. Briand that it was imperative that the Allies should not give Mustapha Kemal any justification for thinking that they were suing for peace. He could imagine no more disastrous policy than for the Allies to open negotiations on some such basis as that which had been suggested by the Turks at Rome. This involved the tearing up of the treaty, and the clearing of the Greeks out of the Ægean; any such policy would have the most unfortunate consequences. Moreover, he felt that Constantinople would be a very bad place at which to hold the proposed conference. The whole atmosphere of Constantinople was bad, and this problem was one which could only be settled by the heads of Governments who could defend the policy in their respective Parliaments, and it was not right or fair to entrust the settlement to the Ambssadors or High Commissioners at Constantinople, or to ask them to assume the great responsibilities which any settlement would involve. Mustapha Kemal would quite justifiably urge that while his predecessors had been forced to crawl to Paris and humbly accept such terms as the Allies would give them at Sèvres, he, with his army at his back, had forced the Allies to come to Constantinople to negotiate with him on equal terms. The situation would be very much as if the Germans had systemetically violated the Treaty of Versailles and the Allies had then agreed to go to Berlin to discuss a new treaty with them. The natural inference in both cases would be that the whole situation had changed very much to the detriment of the Allies.

Turning to the Greek situation, Mr. Lloyd George wished the Allies to emphasise the fact that they were not throwing over the Greek people. He reminded the conference that Constantine was merely an episode, who might possibly last weeks or months, or even years, but who could not in any case last for centuries, as the Greeks had done in the past and seemed likely to be in the future. The Allies did not build up their policy on Veniselos, and if they did so they blundered. The Allied policy was rather erected on the Greek people, and he implored the conference to think well before they abandoned a policy merely because Mustapha Kemal was troublesome or because in a moment of not, perhaps, unnatural enthusiasm the Greek people had chosen a ruler whom the Allies did not like. He himself was very doubtful about using any weapons against the Greeks excepts those of argument, and, in particular, he deprecated

the imposition of financial pressure. If the Allies used the financial weapon, Constantine would undoubtedly take the opportunity of representing to the Greek people that while, he himself did not wish to give up Smyrna, France, Italy and Great Britain had starved Greece and her army and so compelled him, against his better judgment, to submit. This assuredly would mean that the Allies would incur the hatred of a great and democratic people, and in return the Allies might conceivably obtain an asset of somewhat dubious value, namely, the friendship of Mustapha Kemal. Of what use to the Allies was the friendship of the Turks? In the past Great Britain and France had on many occasions stepped in and prevented the dissolution of the Turkish Empire. When the time came the Turks seized what they thought was their opportunity and betrayed the Allies almost to the verge of ruin. It was true that the responsibility lay with the Turkish Government, but the Turkish people could escape responsibility altogether. They were not a democratic people, and they must bear to some extent the responsibility for the sins of their Government. To exchange the friendship of Greece for the friendship of Turkey would be a mistaken policy for the Allies. In his view it was quite unnecessary to use any pressure on the Greeks other than the force of argument. The Greeks were well able to their own in Smyrna provided that money was ultimately forthcoming, and they were sensible enough to recognise that an arrangement which saved the face of Turkey and gave them substantial control of Smyrna would be a favourable solution to the present difficulty. While he was in favour of the conference, he felt that the Allies must decide on whether their policy at the meeting would be to give up nothing themselves and make Greece surrender the liberties of her recently-redeemed population and make other territorial sacrificies. A transaction of this caharacter was one which he (Mr. Lloyd George) was not in the least anxious to enter into, and he urged that the Allies should try and escape from their difficulties with as clean hands as possible. It was absurd to suppose that Mustapha Kemal would be satisfied with Smyrna. What he really wanted was European Thrace, including Adrianople, the removal of financial control and power to block up the Straits. In short, Mustapha Kemal was scheming to revert to the pre-war condition of things, and for the Allies to agree to any such proposition would mean that, as regards Turkey, the war had not been an overwhelming victory, but a disgraceful defeat.

The overthrow of Turkey was a matter which particularly concerned the British Empire. From first to last Britain had expended something like £ 1,000,000,000, scores of thousands of lives, hundres of thousands of casualties, and was the result to be a return to the pre-war state of things in Turkey? The Straits liable to be closed, subject races suffering the most dreadful opression from their cruel and unreasoning taskmasters? What

a wretched conclusion to great story! If the Allies were to go into the conference they must go having made up their minds not only as to what they were going to do, but also as to what were they not going to do. Nothing approaching the terms which had been mentioned could be considered, nor, he suggested, was it possible for the Allies to contemplate selling the Greeks to the Turks. The Allied line of policy should be settled now and at the present conference, and he entirely agreed with Lord Curzon that there was no time to lose.

M. Briand expressed the opinion that the Allied points of view were getting nearer together and were enabling the conference to contemplate the possibility of the meeting with Mustapha Kemal and the Greeks. He was entirely in agreement with Mr. Lloyd George about the question of putting pressure on the latter, and thought that every effort should be made to distinguish between the Greek rulers and the Greek people. It was not improbable that the position at Smyrna would tend to make the Greeks more reasonable. The fact that the Allies were willing to hold a conference might very well divide the extremist and moderate Nationalist Turks, and Mustapha Kemal might find himself deprived of the help of the moderates if he declined to go to the conference. In matters of this kind it was certain that the parties would come to the conference asking for much more than they would ultimately be willing to make. The position was, in this respect, similar to that of an advocate asking a court to award damages to his client on a much higher scale than the client would be satisfied to accept. M. Briand added that possibly it might advisable to try and find out in advance whether the conference would be likely to have much success, and also what the attitute of the people towards such a conference would be.

(At this point the conference adjourned for tea.)

On the resumption the following draft conclusions were read to the conference:—

1. That a conference be convened, to be attended by representatives of the Allied Powers, and also of the Greek and Turkish Governments, to discuss the settlement of the East.
2. That the basis of such a conference shall be the Treaty of Sèvres already signed by the Powers and by Turkey, subject to such modifications as may have been necessitated by the passage of events.
3. That the invitation to the Turkish Government shall propose as an essential condition that Mustapha Kemal or his representatives shall be included in the delegation.
4. That the Greek Government be invited similarly to attend.

5. That the question of giving recognition to King Constantine be subject to reconsideration in accordance with the guarantees that may be given by the Greek Government to the Allied Powers.

Mr. Lloyd George expressed some doubt as to saying in conclusion 5 in so many words that the Allies recognised Constantine on certain conditions when, in point of fact, they were recognising him by inviting the Greek Government to the conference. It was always open to he Allies among themselves to agree the conditions on which they would be ready to recognise Constantine.

M. Briand agreed with this view, and thought that it would be a mistake for the Allies in the circumstances not to make as much capital as possible out of Constantine's difficult position. In any case, it was very important that the Allies should not give up any good cards when playing with an expert like Constantine.

The conference accordingly agreed to omit conclusion 5.

Some discusion then took place as to the advisability of making the invitation to the Turkish Nationalists conditional on the cessation of hostilities, but it was generally agreed that, while the suggestion that hostilities should cease might well be made, both in the case of the Turkish Nationalists and the Greeks, this stipulation should not be inserted as a condition precedent to the invitation.

Place and Time of Meeting of Conference

On the suggestion of Count Sforza, it was agreed—

'That the proposed conference between the Allies and representative of the Greek and Turkish (Constantinople and Angora) Governments should take place in London and should, if possible, begin on Monday, the 21st February'.

Invitation to Turkish Natiolalists: Necessity for Secrecy

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out it was most desirable that the Allied invitation to Mustapha Kemal should reach the Government at Constantinople before it appeared in the press, and after some discussion the conference agreed:—

'That a telegram in the terms of Appendix B should be sent off to Constantinople forthwith and that the press communiqué should contain no reference to the decision to invite the Turkish Nationalists to attend the conference'.

Agenda for Meeting on Wednesday, January 26, 11 a.m.

M. BERTHELOT[11] suggested that various questions connected with Poland and Russia might profitably be discussed at the following meeting *inter alia*. He indicated various outstanding questions, such as the situation in Georgia and the Caucasus, the *de jure* recognition of the Baltic States, the possibility of a Soviet attack on Poland in the spring and the question of the future of Russian refugees at Constantinople.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that all these questions were of considerable importance but, he wished to remind the conference that the one question which public opinion in France, Great Britain, and, indeed, throughout the world, was anxiously awaiting was the question of reparation, and he ventured to suggest that a preliminary discussion on reparation might be highly desirable.

Mr. Lloyd George also mentioned that a suggestion had been made to him that possibly the conference might divide and deal with the question of reparation and Russia simultaneously at two separate meetings.

The conference agreed—

1. That the meeting at 11 a.m. on Wednesday, the 26th January, should be devoted to a preliminary discussion on the question of reparation; and
2. That the question of the conference dividing and holding two meetings on reparation and Russia should be further considered at to-morrow's meeting.

(The proceedings then terminated.)

Hôtel Crillon, Paris, January 26, 1921.

APPENDIX A TO NO. 20

1. Maintien de l'indépendance et de la souveraineté de l'Empire ottoman dans ses limites sous-indiquées aussi que dans la ville Constantinople et le bassin de la Marmara, de façon à écarter toutes restrictions susceptibles d'entraver son développement national.

2. Maintien sous la souveraineté ottomane de l'intégralité des vilayets de l'Anatolie, y compris la ville et la zone de Smyrna ainsi que les districts d'Aïntab, d'Ourfa et de Mardine.

3. Retour à la Turquie de la Thrace ottomane, y compris Andrinople.

[11] Secretary-General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

4. Sauvegarde des droits des minorités en conformité des principes énoncés dans les Traités de Saint-Germain, de Trianon et de Neuilly.

5. Institution d'un régime de liberté de navigation internationale des Détroits compatible avec l'indépendance et les droits souverains de l'Empire ottoman.

6. Perception par l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane de revenus nécessaires à l'amortissement des dettes contractées avant la guerre et de celles qui seraient reconnues par le Traité de Paix, et appel aux spécialistes étrangers de ce déparment pour la réorganisation des finances de l'Empire, à condition de ne pas porter atteinte à la souveraineté nationale.

Appendix B to No. 20

1. His Majesty's High Commissioner, Constantinople.
2. His Majesty's Minister, Athens.

Very urgent *January 25*, 1921

As president of the conference in Paris, I request that you will inform your British and Italian colleagues[12] the following decisions which have to day been adopted by the Supreme Council, and that you will concert with them in bringing these decis[i]ons to the notice of the Ottoman (Greek) Government, inviting the latter to furnish an immediate reply in order that the conference may be in possession of their answer before breaking up at the end of this week.

Text of decisions adopted by the conference at Paris, the 25th Janury, 1921—

1. That a conference of Allied representatives, as well as those of the Turkish and Greek Governments, be summoned to meet in London on the 21st February to discuss a settlement of the Western [Eastern] question.
2. The basis of such a conference shall be the Treaty of Sèvres, already signed by the Powers and by Turkey, subject to such modifications as may have been necessitated by the passage of events.
3. The invitation to the Turkish Government shall propose as a condition that Mustapha Kemal or qualified representatives of

[12] The text here printed was presumably that sent to the French representatives, although it is addressed to H. M. G. representatives.

the Government at Angora should be included in the Turkish delegation.

4. That the Greek Government be similarly invited to attend.

(End of conference decisions.)

D.B.F.P., Ist series, vol. XV, p. 28-39, No. 4

No. 21

Lord Hardinge to Sir W. Tyrrell.

PARIS, *January 25, 1921.*
(Received January 26.)

No. 59.
Telegraphic.

FOLLOWING from Earl Curzon:—

"Following for King and Cabinet:—

"Conference this afternoon discussed Turkish and Greek questions. Italian representative produced, but did not definitely support, proposal which had been made by representative of Turks in Rome, purposing to represent Kemalist views, effect of which would have been complete reversal of Treaty of Sèvres. Prime Minister and Lord Curzon pointed out uncertainty of any arrangement with Kemal proving permanent, and strong moral objections which existed to our purchasing peace with Turkish Nationalists at exclusive expense of Greeks. French Government did not press for any drastic revision of treaty, and welcomed proposal which was then advanced by Lord Curzon that matter should be dicsussed by an Allied Conference at which both Greeks and Turks should be represented. After further discussion, the resolutions contained in my immediately following telegram were adopted, and necessary instructions have to-night been sent to High Commissioners at Constantinople and Ministers at Athens".

(Repeated to Athens and Constantinople.)

F.O. 406/45, p. 58-59, No. 25

D.B.F.P., Ist series, vol. XVII, p. 28, No. 19

No. 22

Mr. Craigie (Washington) to Earl Curzon.

WASHINGTON, *January, 25, 1921.*
(Received February 8.)

No. 93.

My Lord,

In the course of conversation yesterday with the Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Davis observed that the President's attention had been drawn by an influential Armenian Association in this country to an alleged report by two British Officers, Captain Salter and Lieutenant Isaacs, who are stated to have visited Mustapha Kemal at Sivas in November 1919, as representatives of the British Government. This report was stated to certain evidence that Mustapha Kemal's movements were being supported indirectly by France and Italy and in particular that large quantities of arms were being supplied by Italian firms. The Association enquired of the President whether he could not obtain a copy of this report from the British Government.

While the President realised that he could not properly ask His Majesty's Government for a copy of this document, it had occurred to him that the publication of the report would be extremely useful at the present moment and, Mr. Norman Davis wondered whether there was any question of such publication being undertaken. I replied that if the contents of this alleged report were stated, it seemed improbable that publication would be considered by His Majesty's Government to be desirable at the present moment.

I should be grateful if I might be furnished with any information on this subject which Your Lordship may think it desirable to communicate to the American Government. In view of the shortness of the period during which the present administration remain in office, I would much appreciate a reply by telegraph *.

I have, &c.

R. CRAIGIE

F.O. 371/6481/E. 1749.

* Bu yazı üzerine İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığında şu yorumlar yapılmıştır:

"Captain Salter was a military Control officer at Samsoun and it is very likely that he did visit Mustafa Kemal and learn from him that he was supported by the French and Italians. We have, however, never had Capt. Salter's report and the D. M. I.'s dept. inform us by telephone that they cannot trace it.

No. 23

Lord Hardinge to Sir H. Rumbold and Earl Granville

PARIS, *January 26, 1921.*
(Received January 26.)

No. 60.
Telegraphic. R.

FOLLOWING telegram is being addressed to your French colleague by M. Briand, as president of Conference in Paris. You should at once concert with your French and Italian colleagues in executing instructions therein contained:—

"As presindent of Conference in Paris, I request you will inform your British and Italian colleagues of the following decisions which have to-day adopted by Supreme Council and, that you will concert with them in bringing these decisions to the notice of Government to which you are accredited, inviting latter to furnish an immediate reply in order that Conference may be in possession of their answers before breaking up at the end of the week.

"Text of decisions adopted by Conference of 25th January, 1921:—

" 1. Conference of Allied representatives, as well as those of Turkish and Greek Governments, have been summoned to meet in London on 21st February to discuss a settlement of Eastern questions.

"2. Basis of such a conference shall be Treaty of Sèvres already signed by Powers and by Turkey, subject to such modifications as may have been necessitated by passage of events.

"Inform Mr. Craigie by telegraph that this report does not exist and authorise him to tel the Acting S. of. S. confidentially that while we have no reason to think that Frechn are now supporting Mustafa Kemal we have good ground for believing that the Italians let him have military supplies.

W. S. EDMONDS, 9/2/21"

"I think it would be sufficient to say the report does not exist nor any evidence of the alleged visit.

D. G. OSBORNE, 9/2"

"There is some evidence of the visit. Mr. Weakley saw an Armenian of Sivas (Dr. Karakin) at the end of 1919 and understood from him that he had been got away from Sivas by a capt. Salter who had been with Mustafa Kemal. This Armenian was on his way to the U. S. and in touch with missionary circles there.

In draft attached I have therefore omitted any reference to evidence.

W. S. EDMONDS 10/2/21" D. G. O.

"3. The invitation to Turkish Government shall propose as a condition that Mustapha Kemal or qualified repserentative of Government at Angora should be included in Turkish delegation.

"4. That Greek Government be similarly invited to attend".
"(To Constantinople only)

"You should leave to Turkish Government task of notifying Angora of Allied decisions and of eliciting an immediate reply.—BRIAND."

Above is from Prime Minister.

(Repeated to the Foreign Office)

D.B.F.P. Ist. series, Vol. XVII, p. 29, No. 20

F.O. 406/45, p. 59-60, No. 27.

No. 24

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *January 26, 1921.*
(Received January 26)

No. 57.

Telegraphic. D.

MY French colleague has communicated to my Italian colleague and myself decisions taken by Supreme Council yesterday with reference to summoning of a conference in London on 21st February to discuss settlement of Eastern question.

We have communicated text of this decision to Grand Vizier to-day in a joint note, and have requested him to let us have before the end of the week answer of Turkish Government to invitation to send representatives to said conference. We have also asked Grand Vizier to get into touch with Angora at once on the same subject.

In view of decision of Supreme Council, which we welcome, it will probably be necessary to help Turkish Government to tide over their financial difficulties at least until end of February if not longer. (Please see my telegram No. 56 of 25th January). (Repeated to Paris, No. 3).

F.O. 406/45, p. 59, No. 26

Mr. W. G. Middleton Edwards to Mr. Randall, Foreign Office.

ORIENT EXSPRESS, *Jougo-Slavia.*
26. 1. 21.
(Received 2nd February).

Dear Randall:—

I am travelling eastward from Switzerland where my wife and I have spent all too short a holiday. While there I met a war time acquaintance named Davidoff to whom I have given a letter of introduction addressed to you. D. was useful to us during 1918, as was also K. Kyrtcheff, who will probably be in London at the same time as D. Early in the war D. was in Con'ople where he was useful to Talaat and the C.U.P. Since the Armistice he has been to Berlin from Switzerland several times - the last time about three weeks or so ago. Altho' I do not know I suspect that D. has again been making himself useful to T. by facilitating operations for T. which probably the Germans as well as the Swiss would look upon with doubtful approval. That, however, is no business of ours. T. wishes to make use of D. to put his (T's) ideas with respect to the Turkish question before the proper people in London. T. wishes to make special agreements with England, but I told D. that he would rapidly fail in his mission if he did otherwise than talk of the Allies as a whole. The Turks are after the old policy of playing one power against another and if we blunder into this foolishness we shall do it with our eyes open and be the bigger fools. He carries with him a letter of authotiry from which is, I believe, good enough as a beginning. D. says T. has promised fuller authority if the first conversations justify further powers being granted. Boiled down to one sentence the Turks want Smyrna and accept everyhing else. T. says if England agrees he will cause a delegate from Mustapha Kemal to come to Switzerland or anywhere else to discuss and agree to terms. Also if England agrees, the policy of the Moslems in Turkestan and the Caucasus will immediately become anti-Bolshi and they will set up a barrier against Bolshevism with respect to India and other Moslem parts of the world. All this is D's story to me. He comes to tell it himself as Talaat's unofficial messenger and to receive the equally unofficial reply, which I suppose would become official if sufficiently hopeful of a settlement. In my conversations with D. I told him not to expect the Allies to agree to the return of Smyrna to the Turks. He left for Paris on the 19th and may be in London

already altho' I doubt it as he was to see Kyrtcteff who was to come to London with him. K. will want passports etc. and these take time. D. knows Bulgarian, very very bad Turkish and that is all. ....*.

(Signed) W. G. MIDDLETON EDWARDS

F.O. 371/6498/E. 1474.

No. 26

British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held in the Salle de l'Horloge, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, January 27, 1921, at 4 p.m

Extract

PRESENT: *France:* M. Briand *(in the Chair)*, M. Doumer, M. Loucheur, M. Berthelot, M. Seydoux, M. Cheysson, M. Tanneny [Tannery], M. de Margerie; SECRETARIES, M. Massigli *(Secretary-General)*, M. Chastenet.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister; The Rt. Hon. The Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., &c., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; The Rt. Hon. Sir Laming Worthington-Evans, Barth., M.P., The Hon. Lord D'Abernon, Sir John Bradbury, Sir Eyre Crowe, Sir H. Llewellyn Smith, Mr. Philip Kerr, Mr. Wigram, Mr. E. Allden, Mr. H. E. Fass; SECRETARIES, Sir Maurice Hankey, Mr. R. B. Howorth, Mr. A. J. Sylvester.

* Bu mektup üzerine İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığında aşağıdaki açıklamalar ve yorumlar yapılmıştır:

"Mr. Edwards is a member of the British commercial community at Cons. ple (Constantinople).

Talaat seems to have made overture which have reached the W. O. (War Office), since in a telegram submitted in the special file they ask Genl (General) Harington what the influence of Talaat, Enver etc., is. The Young Turks who met recently at Rome are reported to have thrown over Talaat and the other extremists. This may or may not be true. But in any case we do not want to complicate the present situation by opening negotiation with Talaat.

If M. Davidoff calls we can only hear what he has to say.

W. S. EDMONDS 2/2/21"

"But as soon as he says he comes from Talaat, he should be told we want to hear no more.

D. G. OSBORNE. 2/2"

R. C. L.
Feb. 3."

Belgium: M. Jaspar, Colonel Theunis, M. Delacroix; SECRETARIES, Vicsount Davignon, Viscount Terlinden.

Italy: Count Sforza, Count Borin [Bonin] Longare, Marquis Selvaggo [Salvago]-Raggi, Marquis della Torretta, Dr. Giannini, Signor Ameglio [d'Amelio]; SECRETARIES, Signor Galli, Count Vannutelli-Rey, Signor Garbasso.

Japan: Viscount Ishii, Mori, Mr. Sebika; SECRETARIES, Mr. Kato, Mr. Arai.

1. *Situation in Greece and Turkey*

M. BRIAND informed the conference that he had received information to the effect that the telegrams which it had been decided to send to Greece and Constantinople had been received and acted upon accordingly[1].

LORD CURZON interpolated that he had been informed that the above telegrams had been received with great relief at Constantinople.

M. BRIAND, continuing, said that the Turkish Government had undertaken to appoint its representatives without delay. Further, they were going to wire to Angora requesting Mustapha Kemal also to appoint delegates to be members of the Turkish delegation and a prompt reply had been requested.

D.B.F.P. Ist. series, vol. XV, p. 58-59, No. 8

[1] For these telegrams, see No. 20 and Appendix B.

No. 27

Record by Mr. Nicolson[1] of a conversation with M. Venizelos.

PARIS, *January 27, 1921*

1. I had a long conversation this afternoon with M. Venizelos[2] who arrived last night from Nice.

2. He was somewhat puzzled as to the meaning of the allied resolution[3] of Tuesday last, and his uneasiness had been increased by a conversation he had had with Mr. Winston Churchill[4] at Monte Carlo in which

[1] Mr. Nicolson had accompanied Lord Curzon to the Paris Conference of January 24-9.

[2] M. Venizelos had left Athens on November 17; he had arrived in Nice on November 25, and in Paris on January 26.

[3] See No. 20.

[4] Minister for War from January 1919, Mr. Churchill became Secretary of State for the Colonies on February 13, 1921.

the latter had told him that some drastic revision of the treaty of Sèvres was inevitable.

3. I assured M. Venizelos that he need not be uneasy as to a desertion of Greece by England in regard to any vital Greek interest. The idea of the Conference had been mooted by Lord Curzon himself and, in spite of the jubilation of the French press, constituted in fact a success from the British point of view.

4. M. Venizelos was relieved to hear this. He was amused at the awkward predicament in which Mustapha Kemal would be placed by our proposal. He felt certain that Kemal would do something foolish; he would either refuse to come to the conference or else, if he came, put forward such extreme proposals as would ruin his whole case. It would then be possible for us to convince the French and Italians that no hope of a peaceful settlement resided in any drastic revision of the treaty of Sèvres.

5. As regards the attitude to be adopted by the Powers towards Greece, M. Venizelos stated that in present circumstances the only course open to us was to support King Constantine. He realised that that monarch might remain in power for two or three years, but he feared that any drastic action tending to secure his overthrow would do irretrievable harm to Greece and little good to the Allies. I explained to him that even if we desired to do so, it would be very difficult to reconcile public opinion in England to granting any financial support to King Constantine. There was a great cry at home for economy and any suggestions of a Greek loan would be severely criticised in the House of Commons. M. Venizelos said that he did not think any very extensive assistance would be necessary; the Greeks could easily hold Smyrna with their ordinary standing army and without the axcessive mobilisation which had been necessitated by their desire to assist the Allies at Ismid and Broussa. If he were himself the present head of the Greek Government, he would say to the Allies that the Greeks proposed on a certain date to reduce their army to the limits necessary to hold Smyrna; that he would be prepared, however, if the Allies so desired to maintain the army on its fully mobilised basis, but that in that case the Allies should pay for the extra charge.

6. As regards King Constantine, M. Venizelos stated that he would regard it as 'political immorality' for ever to accept service under that monarch. He felt however that King Constantine would not last for more than a few years, and was himself quite prepared to enjoy a long rest before resuming office.

7. Finally, M. Venizelos asked me whether I thought it would be indiscreed on his part to come quietly to London when the Conference takes place in February. I pointed out to him that it would be impossible

to keep his visit secret and that the blame of whatever was decided by the Conference would be exploited in Athens as having been due to his influence. He remarked with justice that Constantine's press would formulate this attack in any case, and that the important thing was whether his presence would or would not be of any walue. I merely said that I really was not in a position to give him any indication one way or another on this point. I presume that as the Prime Minister asked him to come to Paris he will also ask him to come to London, but I gave no hint of this to M. Venizelos.

8. M. Venizelos who seemed on excellent health gave me the impression of regarding the present crisis as little more than an irritating interruption in his work for Greece. He was not in the least resentful or dispirited and his only uneasiness was that during this interruption he might be deserted by his friends. The little I was able to tell him seemed however to reassure him considerably.

HAROLD NICOLSON

D.B.F.P., Ist. series, Vol. XVII, p. 32-33, No. 24.

No. 28

Lord Granville to Earl Curzon.

ATHENS, *January 27, 1921.*
(Received January 28.)

No. 37.
Telegraphic. R.

PARIS telegram No. 60 of 26th January and my telegram No. 36 of 27th January.

I have called on President of the Council to inform him officially that French Minister's note of yesterday was on behalf of three Powers, and Italian Minister proposes to do the same. President of the Council asked me to communicate decision of the Conference to him officially in English as usual, so I am doing so.

President asked me to telegraph that Greek Government accept invitation to London Conference and will be represented by himself; he asked me to add that he had expressed unofficially, and not as a [group undecypherable], his surprisse at invitation being extended to Kemal. British Prime Minister had stated publicly that it was not possible to negotiate with Kemal, who was a rebel, and Greek Government were con-

vinced, especially after news just received of defection of Etem Bey and desertion of some 2,000 Turks into Greek lines, that Kemal was a mere bogey.

President told me confidentially that he will ask M. Politis to assist him at Conference, hoping that he will accept, as he accepted to represent Greece at Geneva.

(Repeated to Paris and Constantinople.)

F.O. 406/45, p. 60, No. 30.

D.B.F.P., Ist. series. Vol. XVII, p. 31, No. 23.

No. 29

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *January 27, 1921.*
(Received January 27.)

No. 59
Telegraphic. D.

MY telegram No. 57 of 26th January.

Minister for Foreign Affairs called on my French colleague yesterday evening and communicated to him tenor of note which Turkish Government will address to us to-day in reply to our joint note to Grand Vizier of yesterday's date.

Turkish note will end as follows:— (End of D.)

"La Sublime Porte s'empresse de remercier votre Excellence pour communication et de l'informer qu'elle avisera sans retard au nécessaire pour se rendre à l'invitation qui lui sera adressée par la Conférence."

(D.) Minister for Foreign Affairs added that Turkish Government were telegraphing to Angora immeditially.

(Repeated to Paris).

F.O. 406/45, p. 60, No. 28.

No. 30

Lord Granville to Earl Curzon

ATHENS, *January 28, 1921, 9 p.m.*
(Received January 29, 5.15 p.m.)

No. 41
Telegraphic

My telegram No. 39 [1].

Press of all shades express bitter disappointment at decision on Greek affairs being postponed and at Kemal being invited to attend London conference; Greek Government are severely blamed for the unjustifiable optimism which has led all (? Government) papers to assure people that all would be well, that allied Ministers would enter into relations with King Constantine within a few days, and that friendship and ... [2] of allies for Greece would be resumed at once. It is argued that inclusion of Kemal in invitation is direct contradiction of statement of Prime Minister on December 22nd.

One or two rare exceptions maintain optimistic line and argue that decision taken is best possible as time (? would) bring France and Italy round to accept British policy.

Veniselist papers while taking pessim[i]stic view express patriotism and call on all Greeks to (? forget) dissensions and work together to save Greece. 'Patris' carries this argument so far in leading article signed by Editor as to suggest that, if it should appear necessary for welfare of country, King should be called on to make supreme sacrifice and abdicate in favour of Crown Prince.

D.B.F.P., Ist. Vol. series, XVIII, p. 37, No. 27.

[1] Not printed.
[2] The text is here uncertain.

No. 31

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *January 28, 1921.*
(Received January 28.)

No. 62.
Telegraphic. R.

MY telegram No. 59 of 27th January.

Following is a translation of reply to our joint note received to-day from Porte:—

"I have had the honour to acquaint myself with contents of note which your Excellency addressed yesterday, conjointly with their Excellencies the French and Italian High Commissioners, to His Highness the Grand Vizier transmitting to him text of decision reached by Supreme Council, sitting at Paris, regarding convocation of Imperial Government to conference which will meet in London on 21st February.

"Sublime Porte hastens to thank your Excellency for this communication, and to inform you that it will without delay take necessary steps to comply with invitation which will be addressed to it by conference."

F.O. 406/45, p. 61, No. 32

No. 32

British G. H. Q., Constantinople to War Office, London.

Despatched 0500, 28/1/21.
Received 1000, 29/1/21.

PARAPHRASE.
Secret.
Clear the line.

I. 9817 cipher January 28th.

VERY SECRET. The following is a reliable report of a telephone communication made on January 27th to Tewfik Pasha the Grand Vizier from Mustapha Kemal in reply to an appeal that Mustapha Kemal would have delegates ready to proceed to London in time to join the representatives of the Constantinople Government. (Begins). To his Excellency Tewfik Pasha Constantinople. The Grand National Assembly of Angora is the only legitimate and independent sovereign force that

has taken in hand the destiny of the nation. The Government of that Assembly is the only one who can speak on behalf of the nation on foreign relation. Nobody whatsoever in Constantinople has a legitimate and legal position, consequently such a body giving itself the name of a Government is clearly opposed to the right of sovereignty of the Nation. To present itself to foreigners as a responsible speaker in questions concerning the life of the nation is not admissable and the (best course) is to accept and declare that the legitimate representatives of Government having the right to speak in the name of the country is an Angora Government.

While there is no doubt that the fact that the Government possessing the legitimate right to speak in statu quo of our country and nation is at Angora, is appreciated by the Allied powers, the reason why the Allies delay in making this point of view publicly known is because they think the existance in Constantinople of a mediating body is beneficial to themselves.

F.O. 371/6465/E. 1791.

No. 33

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *January 29, 1921.*
(Received January 31.)

No. 64.

Telegraphic.

MY telegram No. 57 of 26th January.

Decision of Conference, which was published here on 27th January, has naturally caused sensation.

Principal Greek papers regard decision as blow to Hellenism, and points moral that it is first disastrous consequence of betrayal of M. Veniselos by Old Greece.

Turkish papers all welcome decision as marking return of Allies to juster attitude towards Turkey. Those with strongest Nationalist leanings are careful not to prejudge attitude of Angora Government. One of them had leading atticle on 28th January, emphasised [? group undecypherable] decision, however gratifying, was only first step, and published no leading article on 29th January. Another takes for its text "hopefulness and doubt," and while professing preference for hopeful view of new development, lays stress on doubts which it must suggest to Turkish minds.

Some papers represent your Lordship's initiative in the matter as showing that His Majesty's Government have definitely accepted principle of modification of treaty, thereby coming into line with French and Italians. Great prominence is given to activities of Turkish agents in Europe, arrival of Naby Bey at Paris and numerous policitians now gathered in Rome.

(Repeted to Athens, No. 37.)

F.O. 406/45, p. 61, No. 33

No. 34

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *January 29, 1921.*
(Received February 4.)

No. 108.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report that the Minister for Foreign Affairs called on me yesterday evening and we had a long conversation about the conference which it is proposed to hold in London on the 21st proximo.

2. I asked Sefa Bey whether he thought that Mustapha Kemal would be willing to be represented at that conference. I should mention incidentally that I am aware that an active exchange of telegrams is proceeding between Constantinople and Angora on the subject. The Minister for Foreign Affairs would not commit himself to an expression of opinion, and said that he had not seen the Grand Vizier in the course of the day, and therefore was not acquainted with the latest developments.

3. Sefa Bey then proceeded to give me his views as to the way in which the treaty might be modified, and I report them because they are an indication of the spirit in which the Turkish Government will go to the conference.

4. As regards territorial questions, the Minister for Foreing Affairs thought that the southern frontier of Turkey in Asia, as drawn in Map 2 annexed to the Treaty of Sèvres, should be modified in favour of Turkey by the inclusion of districts and towns such as Aintab, Urfa and Mardin, which, according to his Excellency, are inhabited exclusively by an Ottoman population. Sefa Bey said that the wishes of the inhabitants of Smyrna and the surrounding district with regard to the régime under which they wished to come might be ascertained by means of an enquiry. I said I supposed that Sefa Bey meant a plebiscite, but he replied in the negative, and said

that he had in mind a commission of enquiry. As far as I could gather this commission would be apparently similar to that at one time contemplated by he Polish Minister for Forcing Affairs in connection with Vilna and the territories in dispute between Poland and Lithuania. With regard to the Turco-Armenian frontier, the Minister for Foreign Affairs was prepared to admit that any districts containing 55 per cent or more of Armenians should be awarded to Armenia. In order to meet the criticism that the Turks had, by their own actions, purposely diminished the Armenian population in various districts, he was prepared to take as a basis the pre-war statistics of the population in these districts. He thought that it would be manifestly unjust to assign to the Armenian State districts in which there was a majority of Turks. He expressed the opinion that there would be little difficulty about a port for Armenia, and suggested that the railway line leading from Armenia to a Black Sea port should be neutralised, and full facilities given at the port selected as an outlet for Armenian trade. Finally, as rergads Thrace, he thought that Turkey should be given the pre-war frontiers, but if this not possible then, at least, the Enos-Midia line.

5. Sefa Bey then went on to claim that Turkey should not be treated more unfavourably in other matters than the other defeated Powers. By this he meant that the financial and military clauses, &c., of the treaty should be modified. Thus, as regards the Straits Commission, he pointed out that the object of the Allies presumably was to ensure at all times the free passage of the Straits. This could be attained without the Straits Commission necessarily having jurisdiction over the extent of territory indicated in Map I of the annex to the Treaty of Sèvres. It would be quite sufficient if the Allies were to hold the Gallipoli Peninsula and a strip of territory on the Asiatic coast opposite that peninsula. Moreover, other stipulations of the treaty connected with the Commission, such as the right of requsition in the Straits zone, were unnecessary. As regards the military clauses, he pointed out that the authorised strenght of the Turkish army was far too small. Bulgaria, for instance, was, he believed, entitled to any army of 20,000 men, but Turkey, a much larger country with far more extended frontiers, was only entitled to an army of 15,000 men, excluding the legions, which were to amount to 35,000 men.

6. Sefa Bey then went on to speak of what he called a modification of the Capitulations in an economic sense. By this he meant that the subjects of foreign States domiciled in Turkey should pay exactly similar taxes to those payable by Turkish subjects. I remarked that they already paid taxes on real property, I then told him that as far as I knew the great difficulty of applying either full municipal or Imperial taxation in the case of subjects of foreign States had always been the feeling that the money

raised in this way from those subjects would be mis-applied and wasted. The question of municipal taxation was an instance in point. This was a question which had formed the subjects of discussion for many years past. It has been impossible to obtain from the Municipality of Constantinople a correct statement of the municipal taxes which the municipality levied. The foreign point of view was that there should be no municipal taxation without representation. What guarantee was there that Imperial taxes levied on foreign subjects would be properly applied and the proceeds not wasted? Possibly, however, the Financial Commission provided for by the treaty would, to a certain extend, remedy previous abuses. This led Sefa Bey to remark that the financial clauses were too severe on Turkey and should be modified. Thus the Turkish Government would be prevented from contracting any internal or external loan. Should the Turkish Government require a loan the relevant stipulation would debar them from accepting the lowest tenders. I replied that, in the first place, article 234 of the treaty expressly laid down that the Turkish Government undertakes not to contract any internal or external loan *without the consent of the Financial Commission.* The financial clauses clearly showed that the Allied Powers wished to relieve and assist Turkey, and the Financial Commission could be trusted to see that if necessary Turkey obtained a loan on the cheapest terms.

7. Sefa Bey then alluded to the appointment of M. Desclosières as French representative on the Financial Commission. He said that this gentleman was mixed up with many banks and would approach his task, as Frenchmen were liable to do, mainly from the point of view of the interest of the banks with which he was concerned, the interests of Turkey coming second. He regretted to make this observation, but it was the truth. No one could cast a stone at the British representatives in this respect; in fact, England inspired confidence. I felt, though I did not say so, that there is much force in what Sefa Bey said in this connection.

8. Finally, Sefa Bey said that he would like to do away with the principle of spheres of influence. This system really meant that what was left of the Ottoman Empire would be, in practice, subject to foreign Powers. The Italians and the French, for instance, would probably, in their respected spheres, control appointments and anagolous matters. Some friend of his had even said that it was to be foreseen that the remaining territory outside the spheres of influence would in time become the prey of a reconstituted Russia, and then Turkey would have disappeared for good. He objected also to the system under which there would be Italian gendarmerie in the Italian sphere and French gendarmerie in the French sphere. The officers to be supplied by the Allied or neutral Powers for the organisation and training of the gendarmerie should be employed

all over Anatolia without regard to nationality or spheres of influence. In other words, though he did not say so, it was obvious that Sefa Bey would like to do away with the Tripartite Agreement.

9. After listening to the foregoing I told Sefa Bey that it would be a great mistake for Turkey to go into the conference with exaggerated pretensions. I reminded him that the conference was to be held on the basis of the Treaty of Sèvres with such modifications as may have been necessitated by passage of events. It would be bad tactics from the Turkish point of view to antagonise the Allied Powers by putting forward extravagant demands. Sefa Bey replied that he did not think that the modifications he had just outlined were exrtavagant. He repeated that he did not see why Turkey should be treated with greater harshness than the other defeated Powers. She had been sufficiently punished by losing what he described as nine-tenths of her territory. He thought that there was a disposition on the part of British statesmen to consider that Turkey was a potential danger in the future. This was a great mistake. If properly handled Turkey could be of considerable use to England in the future. He thought that English statesmen took much too rigid a view of Turkey, and that the misfortunes of the latter left them cold.

10. I replied that he could not in justice say this of your Lordship, who, as he knew, had made a special study of Eastern questions and had spent many years in the East. We had never had a Foreign Minister so conversant with Oriental problems.

11. I pointed out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that there were two things which the British nation could not forget. One was that Turkey had entered the war on the side of our enemies unmindful of the longstanding friendship which had existed between our two countries. The other was the Armenian massacres. Sefa Bey admitted the folly which had brought Turkey into the war on the side of the Central Empires, but said that this was due to the action of two or three men, and that the country as a whole was not to blame. He sincerely regretted the Armenian massacres, but pointed out that the Armenians had since been perpetrating atrocities at the expense of the Turks. He thought, in fact, that the Armenians had killed even more Turks than the Turks had killed Armenians. I expressed incredulity at this statement, and said that in making it Sefa Bey evidently did not realise the full extent of the atrocities perpetrated on the Armenian nation.

12. Sefa Bey then went into a long disquisition on the orinig of massacres of Christians under Turkish rule. He maintained that the Turks had been very liberal in the past towards Christians of every denomination. He traced the misfortunes of Turkey to the action of Russia extending

over centuries. Russia had gradually encroached on the Turkish dominions until finally she had to fight the Crimean war. As a result she had realised that if she attacked Turkey in the future she would find the Western Powers ranged on the side of Turkey. She had then decided that she must exploit to the fullest extent any grievances which Chiristians who were subject to Turkish rule might have against the Turkish Government. By means of *agents provocatuers* she had stirred up the Chiristans and had promoted massacres with a view to alienating the sympathy of the Western Powers for the Turks. Sefa Bey elaborated this theme, but I need not trouble your Lordsihp with his arguments.

13. The Turkish press has unanimously welcomed the proposed conference, and builds high hopes on it. The local European press, however, sounds a warning note to Turkey not to put forward extravagant demands.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

F.O. 406/45, p, 67-69, No. 38
D.B.F.P., Ist. series, Vol. XVII, p. 38-42, No. 29

No. 35

British G. Q. H., Constantinople, to War Office, London.

Paraphase.
Secret.

Despatched: 17.00, 29. 1. 21.
Received: 22. 30, 29. 1. 21.

I.9821 cipher January 29th. Continuation of my I.9817.

Summary of character sketch of Mustapha Kemal, compiled from information given by (A) his formor Officer Commanding (B) School and College comrades (C) Nationalist agent in Constantinople, well acquainted with him (D) Former finance Minister (E) Member of Armistice Commission is as follows.

1. Born in humble circumstances in Salonika, 1881.

2. Educated at primary school and military college at Salonika, thence passed into Cadet school at Monastir at age of 13, finally completed his military studies at the Harbie military college, Constantinople.

3. Studious and industrious both as boy and young man.

4. A military student brought up in atmosphere hostile to absolutist Régime of Abdul Hamid. Developing, as a consequence, passionate Nationalist sentiment. By reason of his rebellious ideas and ambitious competitive and ascertive nature, leading to unpopularity, he was remarkable among his comrades.

5. Entered General Staff College direct having passed brilliant examinations. Jealous of more successful comrades and regarded brilliant young man with whom intimacy impossible.

6. In 1905 posted to Syria as Staff Captain in Haifa division. In 1907, General Staff Salonika, where he became member of C. U. P. and initiated into Free Masonry in the Italian Lodge.

7. Although addicted to the spectacular, regarded, up to outbreak of Great War, as efficient patriot and meritorious staff officer.

8. In 1913 appointed Turkish Military Attaché at Sofia where he indulged in dissipation and contracted venereal.

This apparently has imbued him with contempt and disgust for life, prohibited marriage and driven him to homosexual vice, and he has become somewhat immoderately addicted to liquor of late.

9. Careless of his life in action, he deliberately disobeyed Liman von Sanders at Gallipoli. This led to violent quarrel with Enver Pasha, and as result Mustapha Kemal threw up his command. In this fighting he lost an eye.

10. His quarrels with Enver Pasha and German Commander induced present Sultan (then Prince, Vahieddin), on ocacsion of coronation of Karl of Austria-Hungary to select Mustapha Kemal to accompany him to Vienna with intention of using him as counterpoise to Evner and CUP interests. It was Sultan who sent Enver (sic) to Anatolia in May 1919 especially for purpose of thwarting Greek aspirations for Pontus republic, for which purpose he was given 40.000 pounds Turkish although nominally he was sent as Inspector of Northern area.

11. In spite of the fact that he is probably a comparatively wealthy man to-day, there is no reason to suppose he has resorted to dishonest methods and, almost alone amongst unionist leaders, has never been accused of peculation, on minor scale.

Finally he is fluent speaker and clever politician but probably too egotistical to envisage wide issue and ultimate consequences.

He is well qualified to lead the forlorn hope which on the one hand is playing with probable annexation by Reds and on the other is defying Europe.

F.O. 371/6465/E. 1473.

No. 36

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *January 31, 1921.*
(Received February 1.)

No. 70.
Telegraphic.

MY telegram No. 62 of 28th January.

Present indications show that Mustapha Kemal, elated by invitation to attend forthcoming conference in London, which he no doubt considers a triumph for Nationalist movement, is proving intractable. From information which has reached my colleagues and myself, Mustapha Kemal takes line that his is the only Government in Turkey, and as such should furnish Turkish delegation to conference. He also considers that he should have received an invitation to attend conference direct from Allied Powers instead of through intermediary of Government of Constantinople. The latter are doing their utmost to persuade him to come into line.

Mustapha Kemal is now at parting of the ways, and must decide whether to grasp the hand held out to him by Allies or throw in his lot with Bolsheviks.

I think it likely that if a proposal were made at present juncture to Turkish Government for immediate constitution of financial commission provided for by treaty that Government would be unwilling to agree, first, because they probably hope for a modification of financial clauses as an outcome of London Conference, and secondly, because acceptance would hopelessly compromise them.

F.O. 406/45, p. 62, No. 43
D.B.F.P., Ist. series, Vol. XVII, p. 42-43, No. 30

No. 37

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 1, 1921.*
(Received February 1.)

No. 71.
Telegraphic. R.

MY Italian colleague has communicated to me a translation of telegram from Angora, handed to Italian authorities at Adalia for transmission to British, French and Italian Governments.

Telegram, which is addressed by Achmed Muktar Bey, styling himself Minister for National Defence, to British, French and Italian Foreign Ministers, is as follows:—

"Achmed Bey hastens to communicate to said Ministers text of telegram sent by President of National Assembly to Tewfik Pasha in reply to invitation to take part in conference in London on 21st February which was transmitted by Grand Vizier to Angora Government.

"National Assembly at Angora which is based on will of people, is sole independent and legal authority having right to discuss [group undecypherable]s of Turkey. That Assembly alone can engage in discussions with foreign Powers in name of nation. Political group established at Constantinople has no legal political situation, and has no right to call itself a Government, for such a claim entirely contrary to rights of sovereignty of people. It follows all the more that this group cannot discuss interests of country with foreign Powers.

"You have patriotic duty regulating your personal conduct by recognising and proclaiming that only legitimate authority having right to speak in name of nation is Government of Grand National Assembly. Powers are convinced that Angora is seat of only legitimate Government; they are slow to recognise this, in fact, because they consider existence of interior group at Constantinople more useful for their interests.

"Angora Government has declared on several occasions that its most lively desire is re-establishment of peace and of tranquility, but on condition that rights of people are recognised. With these objects in view it declares its readiness to enter into peace pourparlers. If Powers really intend to settle Eastern question according to principles of justice and of right they should address themselves direct to Grand National Assembly. An invitation in this sense will have best reception from us".

F.O. 406/45, p. 62, No. 35

No. 38

Earl Granville to Earl Curzon.

ATHENS, *February 1, 1921,*
(Received February 2.)

No. 48.
Telegraphic.

COLONEL PALLIS, Army of Asia Minor, who is in Athens till 3rd February, has told military attaché that from military point of view natural and proper course is to put off further offensive until April on account

of climatic conditions; he does not know, however, whether Government may order immediate offensive for political reasons; if so, he declares that army is ready both as regards men and munitions of war and can attack Afiun Karahisar or Eskishehr, or both; capture of either would cut Kemal's force in two, as Kemal has very little transport and depends on railway; in that case he thinks Turkish troops in Iconium district would collapse and leave [group undecypherable], and Greeks would either leave Kemalists to stew in their own juice at Angora, or they could attack Angora with every chance of success. With loss of Angora, Colonel Pallis thinks that Kemalists movement must collapse altogether for want of supplies, especialy munitions of war, and he does not foresee any danger of Kemalists drawing Greeks on and on.

Colonel Pallis states that present actual strength in Asia Minor is 105.000, and there is comparatively little sickness; declares that *moral* is high, and leave is only stopped because uncertainty of political situation may force offensive at any moment. He says that Turkish inhabitants' one desire is peace, and that many come behind Greek line to live in discomfort in tents, &c., and that when Greeks returned to Brussa from neighbourhood of Eskishehr the other day, some 10,000 inhabitants, partly Turk and partly Greek, went with them. He confirmed Etem surrender with about 1,000 men.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 17.)

F.O. 406/45, p. 63, No. 36

No. 39

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 4, 1921.*
(Received Februaey 4.)

No. 76.

Telegraphic. R.

MY Italian collegue has shown me a telegram addressed by Angora Government to most of European Powers, as well as to some of their legislators, in which that Government, whilst expressing a sincere desire for peace, reaffirms point of view that it is the only Government entitled to represent Turkish nation and to speak on its behalf. Understand Angora Government is sending delegation to London Conference. Delegatin is

starting immediately furnished with full instructions, and notice will be given of exact date of its departure.

We can only suppose that delegation in question will travel viâ Adalia and proceed by way of Italy.

F.O. 406/45, p. 69, No. 39

No. 40

Lord Granville to Earl Curzon.

4th February 1921., 1.30. p.m.
(Received 6th February 1921., 11.55. a.m.)

No. 54.
Telegraphic

Statement attributed to Count Sforza to the effect that Greek Government were ready to make separate peace with Kemal has coused considerable excitement and indignation. President of the Council issued formal démenti and one or two papers have suggested that Monsieur Gounaris, though probably no such a traitor as to have really promised this, may during (? the time, omitted) he was being pette (*sic*) in Italy have allowed Italians to infer that that would be his policy.

Please see in this connection my telegram No. 27 quoting Prince Nicolas's remark to Colonel Repington *.

F.O. 371/6507/E. 1653.

No. 41

Record by Sir E. Crowe of a conversation with Signor de Martino[1]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 5, 1921*

The Italian Ambassador called upon me this morning with an urgent message for Lord Curzon, which I promised to refer to him at once. It was to the effect that Count Sforza proposed to send an Italian officer to Mustapha Kemal at Angora, there to act as an unofficial agent and mouthpiece of the Italian Government. Count Sforza considered that this direct contact with Kemal would enable the Italian Government to influence the Turkish

* Bkz. No. 18

[1] Signor de Martino had arrived in London on January 6, 1921. He presented the Letters of Recall of Marquis Imperiali (Italian Ambassador in London since 1910) and his own Letters of Credence on February 8, 1921.

Nationalists in the direction of a conciliatory attitude to the Allies as regards the necessary modifications of the Treaty of Sèvres. The Italian agent would at the same time be able to use his influence for the establishment of such relations between the Nationalists and the Turkish Government at Constantinople as would best serve the Allied interests. Count Sforza added that the instructions to the Italian agent would be to act not merely on behalf of Italian interests, but to take due account of the interests and wishes of the Allies, and notably those of Great Britain. Count Sforza hoped that his proposed action would meet with the cordial approval of His Majesty's Government, and asked for an assurance from Lord Curzon to this effect.

I said I would of course refer the matter to Lord Curzon at once. But when the Italian Ambassador asked me to express my own opinion, I said I must hesitate, as it seemed to me that an important question of general policy was involved on which only the Secretary of State could speak with authority. I asked myself what particular object there could be of going out of our way to reverse the decision hitherto acted upon of not having Allied agents at Angora at the very moment when we were going to have the opportunity of contact with the Nationalists through their envoys to the London Conference. I asked Monsieur de Martino whether the Italian suggestion was for the carrying on of negotiations and discussions simultaneously between an Italian agent and the Nationalists at Angora and between the Supreme Council and a Turkish delegation comprising Nationalist representatives, in London. It seemed to me at first sight that such an arrangement might lead to confusion. There was the further point to consider, whether the despatch of an Italian agent to Angora, however much stress was laid on its unofficial character, would not be regarded by Kemal as an act of recognition of his Government by Italy.

Monsieur de Martino assured me that such an impression would certainly be avoided by accentuating the purely unofficial character of the Mission and in fact its influence might be used, as Count Sforza had indicated to persuade Kemal to drop his claim for independ[e]nce from the Constantinople Government. As regards the discussions to be carried on in Angora, Monsieur de Martino thought they would to smooth the way for, and accelerate, the negotions in London.

The Ambassador then proceeded to say the present proposal was part and parcel of the general orientation of Italian policy in the Mediterranean. He read to me a long telegram from Count Sforza recording an interview which the latter had with Mr. Lloyd George in Paris on this subject and which Count Sforza had instructed the Ambassador to make the subject of a confidential conversation with Lord Curzon, to whom,

to his great regret, Count Sforza had been unable, owing to the hurry of Lord Curzon's departure, to speak on the matter at Paris. As the telegram was long, and Monsieur de Martino's extempore translation of it not clear, I asked him to be good enough to let me have a summary of its contents, which I might communicate to Lord Curzon, unless he preferred to postpone the matter altogether until he met Lord Curzon personally on his return to London. Monsieur de Martino promised to let me have such a summary[2], if possible to-morrow, and I therefore refrain for the moment from attempting to reproduce Count Sforza's message.

E. A. C.

D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol. XVII, p. 43-44, No. 31

No. 42

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 6, 1021.*
(Received February 7.)

No. 81.
Telegraphic.

MY telegram No. 57 of 26th January.

High Commissioner sent dragomans yesterday, 5th February, to Grand Vizier to enquire as to present position between Constantinople Government and Angora, and intentions of former regarding London Conference.

Grand Vizier stated that Angora had made proposal of Supreme Council occasion for raising issues which were wholly internal question. He had replied that present was not moment for such discussions, and had asked for plain answer as to whether Angora Government would associate their delegates with those of Central Government as contemplated in decision of Supreme Council. Definite answer had been promised and [group undecypherable]. Latest intimation was that it would be sent on afternoon of 5th February.

Grand Vizier said that, whether Angora came into line or not, Central Government proposed to send delegation to London in compliance with invitation addressed to them.

[2] M. de Martino communicated to Sir E. Crowe a brief summary in his letter of February 6 (C 2754/2754/22), not printed. M. de Martino subsequently saw Lord Curzon on February 12.

Grand Vizier addmitted that Izzet Pasha, with whom he was now for first time in communication, appeared to support views of Kemalists, but he cast doubt on authenticity of telegrams purporting to be signed by Izzet.

Communications were interrupted at hour fixed for answer by unauthorised action of Greek officer at a point beyond Ismid. General Harington took immediate action and communications were restored, but nothing reached Constantinople last evening except copy of telegram addressed by Angora Minister for Foreign Affairs to Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, France and Italy. Translation of text is given in my immediately following telegram.

Dragomans again saw Minister for Foreign Affairs after receipt of this communication. He said he was still not hopeless of understanding which would enable delegations from Constantinople and Angora to fuse in London and present joint statement of Turkish desiderata. He laid great stress on interests of Bolsheviks in preventing an understanding between Turkey and Allies.

There is evidently much division of opinion at Angora, but position there is obscure. Significant feature is that telegrams are now signed by Bekir Samy Bey, who seems to have replaced firebrand Mukhtar as Minister for Foreign Affairs. Bekir returned only recently from Moscow, and according to one account, is disillusioned with Bolsheviks. Surface indications are certainly that relatively moderate counsels are gaining ground at Angora. It is [group undecypherable] unlikely that Kemalist delegation to London will present other than inadmissible demands, at any rate in first instance.

Possibilities of surprise must also not be lost sight of. Leaders at Angora may even now be working in accord with Bolsheviks and may be merely playing for time.

They are immovable up to date in their pretension to be regarded as sole Government of Turkey, and they have been remodelling Constitution on their own lines. It is not impossible that they may attempt some bold *coup*, like declaring Ahmed-es-Senussi Caliph. Please understand, however, that this paragraph is conjectural and is based on indications for confident interpretation of which much fuller knowledge of situation in interior would be required.

Central Government have made real effort to effect rapprochement with Angora and have shown much tact and skill in telegrams sent to Mustapha Kemal. Sultan has followed developments closely and is much concerned for his own position on the event of Angora creating impossible situation as between Turkey and Allies.

If Central Government are reduced to necessity of acting independently of Angora, their delegation will obviously not comply with condition laid down in third paragraph of decision of Supreme Council. I presume they should nevertheless be allowed to despatch delegation.

It is urgent that I should know your Lordship's views on this point.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 19.)

F.O. 406/45, p. 70, No. 40.
D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol. XVII, p. 44-46, No. 32.

No. 43

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 6, 1921.*
(Received February 7.)

No. 82.

Telegraphic. R.

FOLLOWING is translation of text of telegram addressed by Angora Government to French, Italian and British Governments signed by Bekir Sami, People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs in Government of Great National Assembly, Turkey:—

"Delegation which will represent Government of Great National Assembly of Turkey at conference to be held in London on 21st February will leave Angora at latest on 7th February and will proceed to Europe viâ Adalia and Brindisi.

'Owing to length and difficulty of journey, we fear lest arrival of our delegation at its destination may be somewhat delayed. In that case we would be grateful if the Great Powers would be willing to postpone for a few days proposed conference in order to enable our delegation to participate therein"

(Repeated to Athens, No. 20.)

F.O. 406/45, p. 71, No. 41.

No. 44

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 7, 1921.*
(Received February 7.)

No. 84.
Telegrapgic. R.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs called last night to say Government delegation to London Conference would start on 12th February. Delegation would probably be headed by Grand Vizier, and would include Osman Nizami and Reshid Pashas, respectively Turkish representatives at Rome and London. It was, however, possible that Sultan might not be willing to let Grand Vizier go away at this juncture. Delegation would also include at least one secretary with a perfect knowledge of English.

Minister for Foreign Affairs added if Mustapha Kemal persisted in sending delegation independently of Government delegation, as to which point Turkish Government are still awaiting categorical pronouncement from Angora, he supposed that the two delegations would have to come to some understanding in London.

I reminded Minister for Foreign Affairs of exact terms of paragraph 3, decision of Supreme Council and said that I had thought it well to refer point to your Lordship in view of attitude of Angora Government.

D.B.F.P., Ist. Series, Vol. XVII, p. 46, No. 33.
F.O. 406/45, p. 71, No. 42.

No. 45

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 7, 1921.*
(Received February 15.)

No. 139.

My Lord,

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Rome has been so good as to send me a copy of his despatch No. 67 of the 27th ultimo, on the subject of the conferences which have been taking place in Rome between representatives of Moderate Turkish Nationalists and Mustapha Kemal. That despatch also enclosed copy of a *pro-memoriâ* which certain Turkish politicians who

have assembled under Achmed Riza's presidency at Rome had decided to send to the *Entente* Governments, with a view to drawing their attention to the situation in which the unfortunate population of Constantinople finds itself.

2. I have read this *pro-memoriâ* with interest, and although some of the statements made in it are exaggerated, it presents, on the whole, a fairly accurate picture of the state of things prevailing in Constantinople at the present day.

3. Amongst the inacurracies I would draw your Lordship's attention to the fact that over 18.000 Turkish prisoners have been already repatriated to their homes leaving only a few thousands in this town. Further it is doubtful whether the British and French troops of occupation number more than 20.000 at the outside.

4. It is an unfortunate fact, for the reasons given in the *pro-memoriâ*, that large portions of the population of Constantinople are reduced to a state of the utmost distress and misery. I understand from an Englishman who has been here for many years that many Turks are literally dying of starvation. An ordinary visitor would not realise that matters are so bad. The lower classes of the native population whom he sees in the street mostly appear to be well fed, and have not that pinched look which struck me so much at Warsaw during the winter of 1919-1920. But the Turks do not complain and those who reduced to the last extremity remain in their hovels and die. Their distress is not patent to the outside world.

5. A local paper, published in French, describes Constantinolpe as follows:

"The town is a sink of vermin, of misery and of perdition. If only a hundredth or even a thousandth part of the happenings here took place elsewhere, the latter would arouse the attention of the whole world, which would hasten to attempt to purify the place morally. But the East is discreet, and covers itself with a veil." These words pretty accuratelly describe the situation.

6. Constantinople is crammed with refugees of every description, who have added some hundreds of thousands to the normal population, and this at a moment when the town is practically cut off from Anatolia and Thrace, and impediments have been placed in the way of exports from the territories in the occupation of the Greek troops. Thus supplies of certain necessaries of life such as cheese, are very short, and a fall purchasing power of the £ T. makes it still more difficult for the poorer elements of the population to purchase these necessaries. The Turkish officials, numbering many thousands, who only receive their pay greaty in arrear and at irregular intervals, are hard put to it to keep themselves and their families alive.

7. Apart from the great inconvenience caused by the presence of many thousands of Russian refugees, it is now evident that a large number of these refugees should never have left Russia, and are not entitled to any sympathy or relief at all. Many of them are bad characters and gaol-birds who managed to get on board the ships at the last minute, and who, since their arrival here, have contributed still further to lower the already low standard of morality prevailing in this town.

8. It is not easy to see how this state of things can be improved until Anatolia is again opened up and there can be a steady flow of supplies to Constantinople from that district.

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

F.O. 406/45, p. 73, No. 48.

No. 46

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 7, 1921.*
(Received February 15.)

No. 146.
My Lord,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 81 of the 6th February, I have the honour to transmit herewith certain documents, which contribute to an understanding, however imperfect, of the present political situation at Angora. They are (*a*) a condensed translation of an interview given by Mustapha Kemal Pasha to a representative of the "United Telegram" press agency; (*b*) a similar translation of a speech delivered by Mukhtar Bey, Nationalist "Commissioner" for Foreign Affairs, before the Grand National Assembly, and (*c*) a translation of one of the *en clair* telegrams addressed by the Angora Government to the Grand Vizier in the course of the correspondence arising out of the request of the Supreme Council for a Turkish delegation to take part in the proposed London Conference.

2. The first two documents are unfortunately not dated. I have every reason to suppose that they are comparatively recent, though, of course, prior to the decision taken by the Supreme Council on the 25th January.

The statement of Mukhtar Bey is evidently intended mainly for internal consumption, as is shown by the entirely false statement that advances have been made to the Angora Government by agents of the British Government. I cannot understand such a statement, except on the assumption that it was deliberately invented to enhance the prestige of the Kemalist leaders in the eyes of hesitant adherents.

3. Mustapha Kamal's statement is addressed to a wider audience. His references to the United States of America, though doubtless inspired by the fact that his interlocutor appears to have been an American press agent, are interesting as indications of a revival of the hope that America may help to the balance between the Turkish Nationalists and the Allies. Mustapha Kemal's allegation that massacres on a large scale have been committed by the Armenians is also worthy of attention. Allegations of this kind against Armenians and Greeks, having perhaps a limited foundation in fact, play a considerable part in Turkish propaganda. There is an increasing tendency to combine condemnation of the anti-Christian policy of the Turks during the war with explanations tending almost to justify it, and to make the most of any atrocities which can be laid to the door of Armenians or Greeks as a counterpoise. I had occasion in reporting a recent conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs here place on record language of the same general tendency used by Sefa Bey.

4. The enclosed telegram from Mustapha Kemal to the Grand Vizier has an interest independent of the general correspondence of which it forms part. Turkish political circles here are more than a little exercised by the alleged recent adoption by the Grand National Assembly of a new Constitutional law. According to the accounts current in Constantinople this law was voted by the Assembly on the 20th January. I have not yet been able to procure the text and cannot threfore say for certain whether a law has been voted or merely submitted to the Assembly. It seems almost certain that either a law or a draft is in existence and that it affirms in explicit terms the sovereignty of the people, and the supremacy of the Grand National Assembly as beign the sole emanation of the will of the people. What is still uncertain is whether it attempts any definition of the position of the Sultan in the new order of things. Meanwhile the enclosed telegram puts forward as from the leader of the National movement suggestions which responsible statesmen here, hovewer great their sympathy with the main object of the Nationalists, find disquieting, and which the Sultan justly regards as not only disquieting but insulting.

5. It is noteworthy that the Angora leaders in their recent telegrams have not explicitly rejected the proposal that the Treaty of Sèvres should be made the basis of discussion in London, but have concentrated all

their attention on an effort to make good their claims to be recognised as the *sole* Government of Turkey. They have been at pains to address their telegrams to Tewfik Pasha, not as Grand Vizier, but as "His Highness Tewfik Pasha, Constantinople".

6. The respective positions of leading personages at Angora is also somewhat obscure. The replacement of Mukhtar Bey by Bekir Samy Bey is *primâ facie* significant, but once explanation offered is that Bekir Samy, who was certainly Commissioner for Foreign Affairs some months ago, never vacated the post, that Mukhtar was merely acting for him, and that on Bekir Samy's return from Moscow, he resumed the post in the ordinary course. Another matter of uncertainty is the exact position of Mustapha Kemal himself, in view of the fact that certain telegrams have been signed by Fevzi Pasha, formerly Minister of National Defence, as head of the executive authority, or, as it were, Grand Vizier. There is no reason to suppose that Mustapha Kemal has been superseded, but the fact of his having ceased to be technically head of the executive, while remaining President of the sovereign Grand National Assembly, may be, like the alleged adoption of the new Constitution, a step in the direction of a quasi-republican form of Government.

7. The question of how the Caliphate would be adjusted to any new organisation of the Turkish State is obviously a matter of great interest and importance. I can add little to what I said on this subject in my telegram under reference, except that there appears to be a good deal of discussion as to whether the Caliphate might not be vested in a purely spiritual personage surrounded by representatives from Islamic countries and maintaining touch with them through representatives of an ostensibly ecclesiastic character in those countries. I find it difficult to believe that the Angora leaders would think the present moment opportune to challenge Moslem feeling in Turkey itself on so great an issue, but it would not be safe to dismiss the possibility altogether.

8. These are some of the numerous elements of perturbation and uncertainty which made it necessary for me in my telegram under reference to sound a note of warning as to the possibility of surprises in the near future. The readiness of Angora to send any delegation at all to the London Conference is at first sight an ancouraging sign, but it would be an obvious device for gaining time, if there should really be some plan for joint action with Bolsheviks in the coming spring. It is still true that the relations between the Turkish Nationalists and the Bolsheviks are the crux of the situation, and there are at present no serious sign of a break between them, though causes of tension are not wanting.

9. Some observers go further and suggest that the difference of opinion between Constantinople and Angora is unreal and is merely an elaborate

blind intended to conceal complete unity of purpose and plan. I do not share this view. It is possible that some members of the Constantinople Government may be hand in glove with Angora, but I have little doubt that Tewfik Pasha is sincerely anxious to do his best for the Sultan, whose personal and dynastic position is threatened by the extravagances of Angora, and that both Tewfik Pasha and the Sultan see in the proposad London Conference a chance of regaining something for Turkey instead of exposing her to worse wreck than ever.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD.
High Commissioner.

F.O. 406/45, p. 75, No. 49
D.B.F.P. Ist series, Vol. XVII. p. 47-49, No. 34

ENCLOSURE 1 IN NO. 46.

Declarations of Mustapha Kemal to the Representative of the "United Telegram."

Symrna Question. — Smyrna is an indivisible part of Anatolia and an exclusively Turkish area. This country, which has belonged to the Turks for a thousand years, has been occupied by Greek forces under the pretence of the existence of Greeks who arrived from the islands solely for commercial purposes and who are in the minority even in the city of Smyrna itself. The Greeks have committed massacres and oppressions and pursued a policy of extemination towards the Turkish population, as is confirmed by the report drawn up by the International Commission. The Turkish nation will turn them out sooner or later from their country. Meanwhile she is ready to negotiate for peace provided the country will be immediately evacuated. We do not desire to have direct negotiations with the Greek Government, but accept with pleasure the kind mediation of the United States of America.

Thrace Question. — Like Smyrna, Thrace also is an inseparable part of Ottoman territory, in which the Turkish population is also in the majority. The essential point about these questions is the immediate evacuation of both Smyrna and Thrace. Naturally the rights of the Greek minority will be protected in the manner specified in the Treaty of Saint-Germain concerning the protection of minorities.

With regard to Western Thrace, we agree that its destiny should be determined by means of a plebiscite

Treaty of Sèvres. — We cannot admit the existence of the Treaty of Sèvres which denies our political, juridical, economical and financial in-

dependence. Our desire is to conclude a treaty which will assure our independence and sovereignty.

Armenian Question. — Basing ourselves on the principle of the right accorded to the nations to determine their own destinies, we have concluded peace with Armenia. The rumours, according to which massacres have been committed upon the Armenians, are without foundation. We readily agree that neutral commissions should make insquiries freely in our country in order to discover the truth. We recommend also the reading of the reports recently prepared by the American Relief Commission for the Near East.

Massacres and atrocities on a large scale have been committed by the Armenians on the Turkish population. Documents to prove these massacres will be produced.

Canstantinople Question. — Conditions for free passage of the Straits and the Bosphorus can be fixed, under which Constantinople will without restriction under Turkish sovereignty as before.

Opinions of the United States of America. — The United States of America is known by the Turkish population as benevolent, humanitarian and the protector of liberty. We hope to profit as much as possible from American sources in our efforts to restore our country.

Future Policy. — Our country is destroyed, our populatin is poor, education is lacking and our economic situation is weak. Our sole desire is to restore peace and tranquillity and to raise the intellectual standard of our country.

Our nation knows its rights and its humanitarian duties and clings to its liberty and independence.

Our nation, which is fighting for its independence and its liberty, leaves its legitimate claims to the appreciation of humanity.

Ahmed Mouhtar, in a speech which he delivered before the National Assembly concerning the relations with the Western Powers, declared that it was naturally not intended to go against the civilised world with their imperfect means. No one with intelligence or wisdom would have such an intention. "For what," he asked," are we fighting? Why have we decided to resist by force of arms? Naturally there is a limit to all such acts. Our demands are not boundless. We demand only our economic and political independence within our national limits, and we are ready, from henceforth, to offer our hand to any Power which would accept our demands definitely and without rancour. Such a state of affairs does not yet exist. Perhaps it will soon exist, for, slight as it is, a disposition to accept does exist. Our Government which follows very closely the course of events

in Europe, is convinced that there does not exist in Europe any force which would compel us to accept and ratify the Treaty of Sèvres.

"This nation will wait until acceptance of our demands seems probable and will only conclude peace without injury to her Russian ally, when she is convinced that her national ambitions will be satisfied."

Ahmed Mouhtar added that the nation could not regard favourable the unofficial propositions, which have been and are being made from time to time on behalf of the French, British and United States Governments.

After having informed the Assembly of the French proposals for the exchange of prisoners of war—proposals which the Angora Government were ready to accept and to fulfil in accordance with the Convention of Geneva—Ahmed Mouhtar discussed the peace negotiations and declared that as long as the Treaty of Sèvres remains they cannot conclude peace with an *Entente* Power. Such is the position at present.

The English also are endeavouring by repeatedly sending their men to Kerasund, Trebizond, &c., to establish contact with us.

Their object is to inform the population that they grant means of existence to Turkey and have proposed to her favourable conditions, which, however, a few despots refuse to accept.

Concerning the Georgian question, Ahmed Mouhtar declared that after the defeat of the Armenian army, the Georgian Government hastened to propose peace, but refused to reply before being informed of the point of view of Russia.

As regards Armenia, Ahmed Mouhtar declared that the Russian Soviet Government had proposed a modification of the conditions of peace with Armenia, especially in regard to the delivery of arms, as Armenia had become Bolshevik, but that they are obliged to take their arms in order to prevent possible Armenian attacks in the near future.

In reply to the question put forward by Ahmed Mouhtar regarding the relations of the Russian Soviet Republic with the British Government, Chicherin had replied that the Soviet Government did not even find it necessary to examine the proposals of the British Government, and that he did not known the reply given by the British Government to their refusal.

The only agreement was that reached in July last, whereby the British and Soviet Governments agreed not to carry on propaganda or commit any hostile acts in the country of the other.

With regard to the Commercial Convention, Chicherin declared that a copy of that convention had been sent by post.

As regards Batoum, Ahmed Mouhtar declared that it is essentially Turkish and must belong to Turkey. Howover, in view of the fact that it is the sole outlet for a population of 13.000.000, he was ready to agree to the internationalisation of the port provided the town itself remained Turkish. The Georgian claims that Batoum and Ardahan should be given to Georgia he characterised as sheer imperialism.

FO. 406/45, p. 75-77. No. 49/1

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 46

Translation of Telegram from Mustapha Kemal Pasha to Grand Vizier.

WE reproduce the following summary of proposals set forth in our private and official telegrams, and we beg you to take the necessary action, and communicate the result to us-:—

1. His Majesty the Sultan will proclaim by a brief Iradé that he recognises the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. This Iradé (Hatti Humayun) will declare that the Grand National Assembly (which recognises as a principle the maintenance intact of the Caliphate and Sultanate) is constituted, and he will recognise it with all its present powers and faculties. We have no need to add the other details which would only give rise to confusion of interpretation.

2. Should the proposals made in the preceding pragraph be accepted, we will arrange our internal situation (which is a family question) as follows:—

His Majesty the Sultan will reside as in the past at Constantinople. The Grand Assembly of Turkey which has the responsibility and the power, and which possesses all conditions of independence, will sit, for the present, with the Government at Angora. There will naturally remain no longer at Constantinople a directory body under the name of a Ministry but a Mission invested with the necessary powers by the Grand Assembly will be present with His Majesty on account of the peculiar situation of the town of Constantinople.

3. The details of administrative ornagisation of the town of Constantinople and its neighbourhood will be drawn up latter.

4. Immediately after the acceptance and application of the above proposals the necessary sums for the Civil List of His Majesty the Sultan and the Imperial House, as well as for the salaries of officials and pensioners in general, sums for which provision is made, in principle, in the

budget approved by the Grand National Assembly, will be assured and paid by the Government. Our financial resources guarantee this expenditure.

FO. 406/45, p. 77, No. 49/2

No. 47

Sir M. Cheetham[1] to Earl Curzon

PARIS, *February 8, 1921*
(Received February 10)

No. 464 (P. 191).
Immediate

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit to Your Lordship here with a copy of a note received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in reply to the note from this Embassy of the 27th ultimo (copy of which was enclosed in Lord Hardinge's despatch No. 347), on the subject of the Inter-Allied command at Constantinople and the Commissions instituted by the Treaty of peace with Turkey.

As originally received at this Embassy, the second sentence in the second paragraph of this note ran as follows:—

'C'est ainsi que la Trésorerie britannique, consultée par le Foreign Office, n'a pas cru pouvoir accepter que le Secrétaire Général de la Commission financière'... etc.

This passage appeared to me so extraordinary (there being no record in the archives of this Embassy of any such refusal on the part of His Majesty's Treasury to accede to the French resquest that the Secretary-General of the Financial Commission should be a Frenchman), that I feared that some misunderstanding must have arisen, and caused enquiries to be made of Monsieur Kammerer[2], the expert in charge of these questions at the Quai d'Orsay, regarding its exact meaning. Monsieur Kammerer explained that the passage referred to a conversation which he himself had had early in December at the Foreign Office, an Italian expert and a representative of the Treasury being present as well as members of Your Lordship's Department. He argued that point (6) in Your Lordship's

[1] Sir Milne Cheetham had been transferred to Paris as a Minister Plenipotentiary on January 1, 1921. He acted as Chargé d'Affaires from February 7 to 15.

[2] Head of the Asia and Oceanic Sections in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

despatch No. 4193 of December 315, and the subsequent explanation in Your Lordship's despatch No. 2816 (namely, that point 6 was specially drafted with a view to cover the reservation of the French Government) did not constitute either a refusal or an acceptance of the French demand, but left over for future settlement a matter on which the French Government felt bound to insist on a definite decision—i.e. that if the Inspector-General of Turkish Customs is to be British, the Secretary-General of the Financial Commission must be French. On it being suggested to him that such reference in the French note to a conversation, of which no record apparently exists in the official correspondence between the two Governments, required somewhat fuller elucidation, he consented to alter the passage in question to the form in which it now appears.

In explanation of the final paragraph of the note, Monsieur Kammerer made it clear that the French Government desire to take no furthet steps whatever as regards setting any of the Commissions to work until after the approaching Conference in London. It was pointed out to him that the French Government themselves had just admitted (in the note dated February 7, copy of which was enclosed in my despatch No. 429 of the same date) the danger of trouble in the neighbourhood of Constantinople owing to the continued presence there of over 60,000 soldiers from General Wrangel's army; that what His Majesty's Government had in mind in pressing for unity of command was not so much the possibility of an attack by Mustapha Kemal, as the inflammable material (unpaid Turkish officers and officials, refugee Russian troops, discontented Greeks, etc.) now accumulated in and near Constantinople itself; that the danger of outbreaks in Constantinople cannot be removed unless and until the Turkish officers and officials are paid, for which purpose the immediate setting to work of the Financial Commission was indispensable; and that formation of a gendarmerie capable of suppressing disorders remained in suspense pending the settlement of the question regarding the Presidency of the Sub-Commission on Organisation of the Turkish forces. Monsieur Kammerer, however, insisted that there was no urgency in pressing forward any of the arrangements, as proposed by His Majesty's Government, until after the London Conference. The French Government knew, he said, for a fact that among the modifications of the Treaty of Sèvres with which that Conference would have to deal, there would figure Turkish requests for changes in the constitution and scope of the Commissions; it was therefore futile at the present moment to set up organisms at Constantinople which will inevitably be thrown back into the melting pot in a few weeks. As regards the danger of trouble in and near Constantinople, it was of no consequence whether unity of command was established or not; Generals Harington and Charpy who were on the best of terms together could be relied upon to settle without

the least difficulty any question arising as regards the employment of the tiny force at their disposal (12.000 men all told).

Your Lordship has doubtless observed that for several months past the French Government have raised fresh difficulties on each occasion when His Majesty's Government have urged them to set up provisionally, and in advance of the exchange of ratifications, any of the machinery contemplated by the Treaty of Sèvres. It appears to me clear that this obstructive attitude is dictated not so much by the merits of each proposal, as by a desire to put off the evil day when French Government will have to surrender to one or other of their Allies some portion of that political prestige which they regard as the historic patrimony of France in the Levant. The country never accepted the concessions made by Monsieur Millerand in the negotiation of the Treaty with a good grace and recent avents in Greece have rendered it impossible for any French Government to obtain the acceptance by Parliament of the Treaty as it stands. The prospects of securing such revision of the Treaty as would be acceptable to France would, the French Government fear, be compromised if certain of its clauses were provisionally put into effect.

The argument advanced in the third paragraph of the note herein enclosed would of course fall to the ground if His Majesty's Government felt able to give the assurance desired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as regards the nationality of the Inspector-General of Customs and Secretary-General of the Financial Commission. It is curious to note that while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs lay stress on the uncompromising attitude of the French Ministry of War as regards the Presidency of the Sub-Commission on Organisation, the Chief of the French General Staff some ten days ago told the Director of Military intelligence that the French Military Authorities saw no objection to that post being assigned to General Franks.

I have, &c.,

D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol. XVII, P. 50-52, No. 35

MILNE CHEETHAM

ENCLOSURE IN No. 47

Note from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Lord Hardinge (Paris)

PARIS, *February 7, 1921*

Très Urgent

En se référant à la dernière communication de l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Britannique, du 27 Janvier, visant les Commissions interalliées à

constituer en Turquie en exécution du traité de Sèvres, le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères se permet de rappeler à Son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Britannique qu'il est difficile de régler séparément les questions restées en suspens, dont les unes appellent des observations des experts militaries et les autres des observations des experts financiers, sans que ces deux catégories de techniciens entrent en communication entre eux et puissent apporter à leur examen les vues d'ensemble qui s'imposent aux Gouvernements.

A cet égard la note britannique du 27 Janvier ne fait que répéter les objections primitivement faites à quelques unes des demandes françaises et elle doit amener naturellement le Government français à maintenir également ses objections sur les points que le Gouvernement britannisque desirait voir régler autrement. C'est ainsi que d'après des conversations qui ont eu lieu au Foreign Office en décembre, la Trésorérie britannique n'acceptait pas alors que le Secrétaire Général de la Commission financière soit un Français, pour la raison que, dans le cas où le Président de cette Commission serait un Français, la Commission tout entière paraîtrait dans la main de représentants français. La note britanniquie du 27 Janvier qui a traité le même sujet, sans comporter de refus exprès à cet égard, laissait à l'avenir le soin de régler un problème auquel le Gouvernement français attache de l'importance.

D'autre part, le Ministère de la Guerre français estime que du moment que le Président de la Commission militaire doit être un officer Général britannique réunissant en outre les pouvoirs de commandant en chef, la Grande Bretagne jouira, en matière militaire, à Constantinople d'une situation assez forte pour ne pas avoir à demander de présider en outre la Sous-Commission d'organisation militaire. On ne pourrait que renvoyer à cet régard au War Office l'argumentation développée en matière financière par le Treasury.

Des difficultés du même ordre se posent en ce qui concerne l'installation de la Commission financière. Le Departement des Affaires Entrangères a déjà exposé les raisons pour lesquelles il n'est pas possible d'admettre que le Président de cette Commission devra attendre pour s'installer que la Commission financière elle-même ait pu en décider, ce qui implique qu'elle fonctionnera déjà sans que son Président soit lui-même installé, tandis que pour des raisons de fait les membres britannique et italien disposent d'installations suffisantes.

En terminant, le Gouvernement français pense qu'il y a lieu de considérer que la situation militaire à Constantinople est moins critique depuis que les Alliés ont décidé de convoquer Mustapha Kemal à la Conférence de Londres. Les nationalistes ne voudront sans doute pas précipiter un

conflit armé dans le région des Détroits au moment où des espoirs leur sont nés d'obtenir des modifications dans les traités internationaux. Enfin, la faiblesse relative des contingents britannique et français à Constantinople, non moins que les tempéraments respectifs des généraux Harington et Charpy, sont un sûr garant qu'aucune difficulté pratique ne rend indispensable une solution immédiate. Des raisons analogues permettent de penser que l'entrée en fonction de la Commissions financière n'est plus urgente; et il est clair que la Commission des Détroits n'aurait pour l'instant que peu d'occupation. Enfin on peut penser que ces divers organismes sont susceptibles de faire l'objet de certaines modifications dans leur constitution au cours des délibérations de Londres.

D.B.F.P., 1st. series, Vol. XVII, p. 52-54, No. 35/1

No. 48

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 9, 1921.*
(Received February 24.)

No. 151.
My Lord,

IMMEDIATELY after my despatch No. 146 of the 7th February was drafted, it was brought to my notice that publicity had been given by the Kemalists to a considerable portion of the telegraphic correspondence between Constantinople and Angora arising out of the invitation to the Turkish Government to attend the London Conference.

2. A polygraphed broad sheet containing the telegrams so published was distributed in Constantinople through the Turkish post on the morning of the 7th February. The broad sheet is dated from Zumbuldak[*sic*] on the 30th January, and it looks as if it had been sent in bulk to Constantinople with other Kemalists communiqués for distribution here.

3. The same telegrams were printed on the afternoon of the 7th February in the Constantinople paper "Terdjuman-i-Hakikat." The Turkish censor made a special point of their being allowed to appear, and the Allied censors, whose general instructions at present are to allow considerable latitude to the Turkish press, acquiesced.

4. The published telegrams consist of the Grand Vizier's original massage to Mustapha Kemal Pasha communicating the Supreme Council's

decision of the 25th January and three telegrams sent by Mustapha Kemal to the Grand Vizier on the 27th January. I enclose French translations of the first three. The fourth is the telegram enclosed in my despacth No. 146 of the 7th February, referred to above.

5. On the attention of the Minister for Foreign Affairs being informally called to this publication and to the possible danger of circulating in Constantinople documents of such a nature, especially the telegram requesting the Central Government to efface itself, and presenting terms to the Sultan, Sefa Bey explained that the telegrams were already widely known, and that the Acting Minister of the Interior had thought it well to enlighten public opinion regarding the extravagance of the Kemalist pretensions. He said that his colleague was even thinking of publishing the replies of the Government to Angora by way of further englihtenment.

6. I doubt whether the Acting Minister of the Interior will publish anything really calculated to discredit the Nationalists. Unfortunately, Mustapha Arif Bey, a lawyer by profession, and by origin one of the group of Islamised Jews from Salonica, who played so large a rôle in the Committee of Union and Progress is perhaps the least trustworthy member of the Cabinet. Whatever his motives for instructing the Turkish censor to press for the publication of the telegrams, the publication assumed a form very little calculated to belittle the Kemalists, for it was illustrated by a photograph of Mustapha Kemal Pasha equal in size to and printed opposite a portrait of the Grand Vizier, together with a picture of the opening of the Grand National Assembly at Angora.

7. The telegrams were submitted to the censors at a later hour than usual, and at a moment when only junior Allied representatives were present. The whole incident presents the appearance of a Nationalist *coup* in the press, such as might be expected to precede an attempt to force the Nationalist point of view on the Sultan and the Central Government. It may seem incredible that the Kemalists should contemplate such an attempt while Constantinople is in Allied occupation, but Constantinople is so full of Kemalist sympathisers, the Allied forces are so reduced, and the occupation has interfered so little with the Turkish administration, that the Angora leaders might hope succeed in achieving their object, not by a *coup d'Etat*, which would bring their supporters here into direct conflict with the Allied authorities, but by bringing extreme pressure to bear on the Sultan to recognise the Grand National Assembly, and on the Constantinople Government to relinquish its task.

8. I need hardly say that this forecast of one of many possible eventualities is in the nature of a pure speculation, and that, if the Kemalists

should have conceived such a plan, they would have to reckon with many difficulties. The situation is, however, such that no possible outcome of it should be disregarded.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

F.O. 371/6466/E. 2484
F.O. 406/45, p. 82-83, No. 57.

ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 48.

Tewfik Pasha to Mustapha Kemal Pasha.

Traduction.
Télégraphique.

LA conférence qui s'est réunie à Paris, le 25 janvier 1921, a décidé qu'une nouvelle conférence, compsée des délégués des Puissances alliées et des délégués des Gouvernements ottman et hellénique, sera convoquée à Londres, le 21 février, en vue de disputer la solution de la question d'Orient. Les modifications qui seront jugées inévitables par suite des circonstances, seront apportées au traité existant. L'invitation adressée au Gouvernement impérial stipule que Moustafa Kémal Pacha, ou bien des délégués munis des pouvoirs nécessaires conférés par Angora, doivent faire partie de la délégation ottomane. Ces décisions nous ont été communiquées par les représentants des Puissances alliées à Constantinople. J'attends votre décision et votre réponse, afin que les délegués nommés par vous puissent se joindre aux personnages que nous nommerons nous-mêmes, et partir ensemble.

F.O. 371/6466/E. 2484.
F.O. 406/45, p. 83, No. 57/1.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 48

Mustapha Kemal Pasha to Tewfik Pasha.

Traduction.
Télégraphique.

LA seule force légitime at indépendante qui, de par la volonté nationale, tient entre les mains les destinées de la Turquie est la Grand Assemblée nationale turque siégeant à Angora. C'est le Gouvernement issu de cette Assemblée qui, seul, est chargé de résoudre toutes questions interessant la Turquie et qui peut, seul, entretenir toutes sortes de relations ex-

térieures. A Constantinople, aucun corps constitué n'a une situation juridique légitime. En conséquence, le fait qu'un pareil corps constitué se soit donné le nom de Gouvernement va explicitement à l'encontre des droits de souveraineté de la nation; il est en outre inadmissible que, sous le couvert de ce nom, ledit corps constitué se soit présenté comme interlocuteur, vis-à-vis de l'étranger, dans des questions touchant l'existence même du pays et de la nation. Le devoir que nous imposent notre conscience et l'intérêt de la patrie, c'est—en nous pénétrant de la réalité des faits—de reconnaître et de proclamer immédiatement que le Gouvernement légitime qui peut parler au nom de la nation et du pays se trouve à Angora. Il est hors de doute que les Puissances alliées apprécient que Gouvernement qui possède des pouvoirs légitimes au nom de la nation et du pays est actuellement à Angora. Si lesdites Puissances tardent à exprimer leur façon de penser, c'est parce qu'elles croient que l'existence à Constantinople d'un Gouvernement intermédiaire peut leur être avantageuse

Le Gouvernement issu de la Grande Assemblée nationale turque a maintes fois publié que, mû par le patriotisme, il désire sérieusement la paix; que sa seule condition est de voir reconnaître les droits de sa nation et qu'il est prêt, en cas de reconnaissance de ces droits, d'accepter l'offre d'entrer en négociations.

Si les Puissances alliées ont décidé de résoudre, suivant la justice et l'équité, la question d'Orient à la Conférence de Londres, elles doivent adresser leur invitation directement au Gouvernement issu de la Grande Assemblée nationale turque. Je déclare une nouvelle fois que l'invitation qui serait adressée dans les conditions ci-dessus sera bien accueillie par le Gouvernement issu de la Grande Assemblée nationale turque.

F.O. 371/6466/E. 2484.
F.O. 406/45, p. 83-84, No 57/2

ENCLOSURE 3 IN NO. 48.

Mustapha Kemal Pasha to Tewfik Pasha.

Traduction.
Télégraphique.
Privé.
Excellence,

VOUS qui avez, dans toute votre carrière sans interruption, rendu des services signalés à ce pays, vous avez maintenant une occasion exceptionnelle et historique pour couronner et parachever tous vos services antérieurs. Nous voulons agir en parfaite union. Nous sommes persuadés

que vous voyez, vous-même, tous les inconvénients qu'il y aurait à ce deux délégations distinctes représentent le pays à la conférence à laquelle nous sommes indirectement convoqués. Les efforts qu'a déployés la nation dans l'unique but de sauvergarder ses droits de souveraineté, le sang qu'elle a versé sans calculer, la fermeté qu'elle a montrée à l'occasion de tant de difficultés tant intérieures qu'extérieures, ont créé la nouvelle situation favorable en présence de laquelle nous nous trouvons aujourd'hui. D'autre part, les événements qui se déroulent dans le monde continuent à se développer de façon à confirmer notre indépendance complète, vers laquelle tendent tous les efforts de la nation.

Alors que nous défendons nos droits nationaux contre les Gouvernements qui ont voulu nous condammer à l'esclavage et à la ruine, il est de toute nécessité que toutes les forces matérielles et morales du pays—à commencer par le Sultanat et le Califat, toujours vénérés par la Grande Assemblée nationale—agissent en parfaite union. A cet eftet, il est enfin temps que Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan proclame officiellement qu'il reconnaît la Grande Assemblée nationale turque, seule représentation de la volonté nationale dans le pays. C'est de cette façon qu'on pourra mettre un terme à la situation anormale de Constantinople, qui cause des préjudices continuels au pays et qui n'est maintenue qu'au seul profit de l'étranger.

Les Communications déjà faites par les représentants des Puissances de l'Entente démontrent que la délégation qui partira de Constantinople ne sera admise à la Conférence de Londres que si elle a parmi ses members des personnes déléguées avec pleins pouvoirs de la part du Gouvernement d'Angora. Ainsi, les Puissances de l'Entente avouent, avec suffisamment de clarté, que les délégués qui iront assister, en Europe, à la Conférence de la Paix ne pourront être envoyés que par le Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée nationale.

Nous vous proposons, en conséquence, en nous appuyant sur le devoir et le pouvoir que nous avons assumé devant la nation et l'histoire, de reconnaître les principes posés et proclamés par le Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée nationale, qui est, effectivement et juridiquement, le seul Gouvernement légitime en Turquie, et de rectifier et consolider votre position en vous joignant à nous, afin de faciliter le reconnaissance de ces même principes par nos ennemis. Ainsi vous aurez hâté la solution heureuse de notre conflit.

Dans le cas où vous accepteriez ces propositions sincères, que nous vous faisons dans l'unique intention d'agir en commun et de défendre, avec le maximum de nos forces, la volonté de la nation, la situation de Sa Majesté le Sultan et le Calife cessera d'être chancelante. Et nous, en notre

qualité de Gouvernement investi de tous les pouvoirs effectits et juridiques conférés par la volonté nationale, nous notons dès maintenant que toute la responsabilité découlant d'un refus éventuel, de votre part, de ces propositions retombera, avec ces innombrables conséquences, directement sur Sa Majesté le Sultan.

Nous attendons qu'en présence de cette situation Votre Altesse s'acquitte de tout son devoir historique et qu'elle nous informe en termes formels et explicites de ce qui aura été fait.

F.O. 371/6466/E. 2484.
F.O. 406/45, p. 84-85, No. 57/3.

No. 49

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 11, 1921.*
(Received February 11.)

No. 91.
Telegraphic.

GENERAL HARINGTON has notified War Office of imminent offensive by Greek army on Nationalist forces, alleged object of which is to forestall a Turkish attack. It is a fact, I understand that Turkish reinforcements have been brought up, perharps with a view to resisting Greek offensive, which is doubtless known to be comming off.

Military operations undertaken by whichever side on the eve of London Conference must obviously be intended to influence proceedings at that conference, and are calculated still further to complicate already difficult situation.

F.O. 406/45, p. 72, No. 45

No. 50

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Rumbold.

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 11, 1921.*

No. 91.
Telegraphic.

YOUR telegram No. 82 of 6th February.

His Majesty's Government are unable to postpone date of meeting of Turkish Conference in order to meet convenience of Angora delegation. Latter can only be received in London as part of the Constantinople dele-

gation, having no independent status or title of their own. If they choose to travel by Adalia and Brindisi that is their concern. Their natural course would appear to be proceed viâ Constantinople.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 70, and Rome, No. 43.)

F.O. 406/46, p. 72, No. 46

No. 51

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 11, 1921.*
(Received February 13.)

No. 93.
Telegraphic.

MY telegram No. 88 of 8th February.

Delegation of Central Government leaves for London to-morrow night, 12th February, by Simplon express.

Angora maintains its attitude as regards separate delegation. Central Government are sending Grand Vizier and Osman Nizami Pasha now in Rome, as their delegates. Reshid Pasha, being in London, will probably act as third delegate. Large staff of experts include Shevki Bey, now Minister in Stockholm, who accompanied last delegation and may be expected to play an active rôle. He has great influence with Grand Vizier. Colonel Grogan knows him vell. Grand Vizier's son Ismail Hakki Bey, also goes as expert. He is Sultan's son-in-law. He also has great influnce with his father, and has strong Kemalist sympathies. Delegation as a whole may be expected to lean that way.

Ali Riza Pasha, former Grand Vizier, has entered Cabinet as Minister of Public Works in order to become Acting Grand Vizier. He is an old-fashioned soldier, and represents middle policy between Kemalists and the Palace.

I have no certain news of composition of Angora delegation. It appears certain that president will be Bekir Sami Bey, Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, and that it will include Jami Bey, who was recently in Rome. Bekir Sami's position since recent return from Moscow is obscure. As against report that he came back disillusioned, others affirm that he has a perfect understanding with them and is going to play their game.

F.O. 406/45, p. 72, No. 47.

No. 52

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *11th February, 1921.*
(Received February 24)

No. 161.

My Lord,

With reference to paragraph 4 of my despatch No. 146 of the 7th instant, I am still without the text of the new Constitutional Law to have been voted by the Grand National Assembly at Angora. As, however, I learn from a secret source, which I believe to be reliable, that in one of the telegrams to the Grand Vizier which has not, so far, been published, Mustapha Kemal notified His Highness of the adoption of the law in question, I think it worth while to forward, in translation, a summary of it which appeared in the Constantinople paper *Peyam-Sabah* of the 5th instant.

2. This summary is probably accurate, so far as it goes, though it contains passage which have the appearance of having been corrupted in telegraphic transmission. It is hardly credible, for instance, that the Grand National Assembly should have declared in black and white that it had power to modify the religious law of Islam. It is also very possible that the summary may have omitted many things dealt with in the full text, including not impossibly articles relative to the Sultan's position.

3. While the law bears traces of Bolshevist influence, and is most subversive of established Turkish institutions, it would be an exaggeration to regard it as an attempt definitely to Bolshevise the administration. It is rather an attempt to combine the "sovereignty of the people" as a whole with the ideals of decentralisation by Vilayets and communal organisation, which were much in vogue in this country between 1908 and 1914.

4. The selection of the name *Vekil*, which is commonly translated Commissaire or Commissioner, for the Ministers has contributed to the impression in European circles that the Angora leaders have gone Bolshevik in their ideas of administration. As a matter of fact the word in itself means attorney or mandatory, and though "Commissioner" is a convenient translation it is not necessarily used in a Bolshevist sense. It appears to have been chosen mainly to emphasise the fact that the Ministers have merely delegated powers, and the word is consecrated in the established official language of Turkey by the fact that the Turkish Cabinet is always

called collectively *Heyet-i-Vukela* or "Board of *Vekils*", though Ministers individually do not bear that title. In the old usage they were presumably regarded as deputies of the Sultan.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner.

F.O. 371,/6466/E. 2488.

No. 53

Earl Granville to Earl Curzon.

ATHENS, *February 11th, 1921.*
(Received February 21)

No. 62.

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit, herewith, a very interesting report which I have received from Colonel E.S. Hoare Nairne recording conversations with General Gramat, Head of the French Military Mission, with the Greek Army, and with Colonel Palles, Chief of the General Staff of the Greek Army in Asia Minor.

Your Lordship will observe that whereas General Gramat is pessimistic as to the chance of the Greeks being able to defeat Mustapha Kemal so as to bring him to terms, Colonel Palles thinks that they could defeat him so decisively as to reduce him to impotence on the Anatolian front.

The Military Attaché is forwarding a copy of his Despatch to the Commander-in-Chief, Army of the Black Sea.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GRANVILLE

F.O. 371/6507/E. 2247.

No. 54

Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome)

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 12, 1921.*

No. 154.

Sir,

The Italian Ambassador asked to see me this afternoon, in order to communicate to me the tenor of the conversation which Count Sforza had held at Paris with the Prime Minister, and to supplement it with some further observations. He had had instructions in this sense at Paris, but had been unable to act upon them owing to departure immediatelty after the breakup of the Conference.

What Count Sforza had proposed and held in view was a revival of the understanding between Italy and Great Britain which had, in his opinion, been the decisive factor in the Mediterranean situation before the war. Negotiations had, he said, taken place between the two Governments in 1912-13 with a view to putting this understanding on a definite basis, and the Ambassador thought therefore that there ought to be no difficulty in returning to the point at which they had been suspended. I pointed out to Signor de Martino that, while I knew nothing of the *pourparlers* to which he referred, the European situation had entirely changed in the last seven years, that there was a different orientation of the Mediterranean States and peoples, and that the solutions or understanding of 1913 might not be equally applicable to 1921, and I asked him axactly what the new policy or resuscitated old policy was to be. As to this he was becomingly vague, but when I hinted to him that what Count Sforza had in view was probably a pro-Turk and anti-Greek policy to be jointly pursued by the two Powers, he did not dissent, but rather indicated that Italian support in other matters might be easily purchased by an accommodating attitude in this. While reciprocating the friendly intentions of Count Sforza, I told the Ambassador that it was quite impossible for either of us to ignore the position which Greece had won in the Mediterranean as the result of the war, and I said that I thought we had better await the results of the impending London Conference before we made any fresh dispositions. Much the best policy for the moment seemed to me to be to get the Treaty of Sèvres ratified, subject to such modifications as might be agreed upon, and then to determine the Mediterranean relations of the future.

Knowing from long experience that an interview with an Italian representative cannot take place without eventuating in some petition, appeal or request, I felt no surprise when the Ambassador, after repeating

the familiar, but eminently disputable, complaint that Italy alone of the Allies had got nothing out of the war, proceeded to formulate a definite demand. This was that the Tripartite Agreement should be definitely incorporated in the revised treaty.

His Excellency arrived at this end by an ingenious line of approach. He reminded me that the Italian Government had made certain reserves at San Remo about the British mandates for Mesopotamia and Palestine. In their present mood of complaisance they were willing not to persist in these reservations, but thought it very desirable that the question of mandates should not be decided until after the London Conference had completed its labours.

Never having regarded the Italian reservations as possessing any but a tactical *raison d'être* (and that of the slightest), I displayed no emotion on hearing of the proffered withdrawal, but pointed out that the matter was no longer in our hands, but in that of the Council of the League of Nations. They had fixed the date of meeting, not we. We had no intention of asking for its further postponement. On the contrary, if we could we should hurry it on, in order to regularise our mandatory position. But even if there was to be further delay it could make no difference to us, since we were already exercising mandatory powers in anticipation of sanction, and must continue to do so. What the Ambassador really wanted, of course, was to be sure of the Tripartite Agreement for Italy before agreeing to the mandates for Great Britain.

As regards the Tripartite Agreement, of the exact form of which I had been the author in London a year ago, I pointed out to his Excellency what he did not appear to know, namely, that it had been deliberately decided not to include it in the treaty because (1) of the criticism that it would be sure to excite and (2) of the difficulty in obtaining the signature of Turkey to any treaty that contained it. I had therefore proposed, and the Supreme Council had accepted, the idea of a self-denying ordinance between the three Powers, to be communicated to the Turkish Government simultaneously with the signature of the treaty. This had been done, and we could not recede from or reserve this procedure now. If we did there would be a good-bye to the Treaty of Sèvres and to the Tripartite Agreement at the same time.

I then alluded to the despatch of the Angora delegation to the London Conference, and explained quite cleary to his Excellency that, while we did not wish to object to the Italians bringing them over from Adalia to Brindisi if his Government wished to do so, we had no intention either of postponing the date of meeting, which had been settled to meet the general convenience, in order to humour the pretensions of Mustapha Kemal, or of admitting the delegation to the conference as an independent Government, or as the *de*

facto Government of Turkey. They must either be incorporated with the Turkish delegation or not be admitted at all. I hoped that the Italian Government would use their influence to bring about the desired result.

The Ambassador undertook to communicate my views to his Government.

I am, &c.,

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol. XVII, p. 54-56, No. 37.

No. 55

Colonel Stokes to Earl Curzon.

TIFLIS (VIA CONSTANTINOPLE), *February 12, 1921.*
(Received February 19.)

No. 43.
Telegraphic.

IN *en clair* telegram, dated 8th February, from Angora, Bekir Sami Bey, who signs as Commissary for Foreign Affairs, informs Chicherin of impending departure of delegation from Angora Government for London. He states that failure to obtain satisfaction at conference will expose the west (*sic*) of the Allies, while success will make beginning of era of peace by which Russia also will profit. Nationalists will not forget at the conference that Russia is their ally, and latter will be kept informed of the course of negotiations. In return, he requests information regarding Krassin negotiations and decisions taken regarding the East. Telegram concludes with complaint that telegraphic communication between Kars and Baku is hindered by Soviet Armenia and commander of the 11th Army in Karaklis area, also that couriers are arrested and their bags seized.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 43, and Commander-in-chief Afloat, No. 15; repeated to India, Bagdad and Tehran.)

F.O. 406/45, p. 79, No. 55

No. 56

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 12, 1921.*
(Received February 24.)

No. 165.
My Lord,

THE delegation from the Constantinople Government to the London Conference leaves to-night, with the Grand Vizier at its head. I understand that the Sultan was very insistent that Tewfik Pasha should go at the head of the delegation. Tewfik Pasha is a man of eighty, and it is not easy to determine what measure of authority he exercises over his colleagues at Constantinople. He is an agreeable personality and makes a pleasant impression.

2. The Constantinople Government have done their best since they received the invitation to attend the conference in London to bring Mustapha Kemal into line. But they have completely failed, while the attitude taken up by Mustapha Kemal regarding the Sultan and the Caliphate has aroused indignation even amongst Turks who may be supposed to be in sympathy with the Nationalists on other grounds. I am told that the above-mentioned attitude of Mustapha Kemal is likely eventuarlly to react to his detriment in Anatolia.

3. My Italian colleague informs me that the delegation from Angora should have reached Adalia yesterday, the 11th instant, but although he has told his representative at that port to telegraph the arrival and composition of the delegation, he was without news up to last night. There is a persistent rumour that the delegation is headed by Bekir Sami Bey, who only recently returned from Moscow. Reports say that Bekir Sami Bey was thoroughly disgusted with waht he saw at the Bolshevik capital.

4. It is to be assumed that the delegation from the Central Government will do its utmost to get into touch and come to some agreement with the Nationalists delegation, should the latter reach London in time for the opening of the conference. I am without indication, however, of the view His Majesty's Government will take of the arrival of an independent delegation from Angora.

5. It has been suggested to me that the Nationalists are speculating on a Bolshevik offensive against Poland and Roumania in the spring. They think that such an offensive will absorb all the attention of the Western Powers, and thus render the latter incapable of dealing with the Turkish situation. It is difficult to appreciate, with any accuracy, the present re-

lations between the Nationalists and the Soviet Government, though indications show that the former are much disturbed by the attitude taken up by the Soviet Government as regards the retention by the Nationalists of Kars and Alexandropol.

6. The necessary funds for the expenses connected with the despatch of the Constantinople delegation to London have been forthcoming with great difficulty, and Sir Adam Block informs me that there will, in consequence, be delay in paying the police, gendermerie, &c. In fact the Turkish Government are now at the end of their resources, and it will be necessary for the High Commissioners to meet early next week to consider the means of enabling the Administration to continue to function.

I have, etc.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

F.O. 371/6466/E. 2490.
F.O. 406/45, p. 85, No. 58.

No. 57

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 14, 1921*
(Received February 15.)

No. 101.
Telegraphic.

MY telegram No. 100 of 14th February gives list of Angora delegation based on statement in local press, which purport to reproduce Kemalist communiqué, and on news just received by my Italian colleague from Adalia. Both versions agree pretty closely.

I have already said what little I can about Bekir Sami. Jami is an intelligent ex-officer who played a rôle in organisation of Smyrna defence movement before occupation of Symrna. He was for a time member of Angora Government, after which he went to Italy. Yunus Nadi is a particularly poisonous and unscrupulous journalist, whom both we and French wanted arrested. He edits "Yeni Ghazi" newspaper at Angora, and was some months ago too extreme for Government there. He was Socialistic, and stood strongly for Bolshevik alliance, though not for introduction of Bolshevism as such.

Other persons are little known here. Nedjati is suspected in connection with deportation. Same applies to Sirri if he is the man formerly Gevornor of Amassia, but identification is not certain. Munir may be legal adviser of Sublime Porte who went with Izzet Pasha to Angora, but this is not certain. If so, he has name of being industrious lawyer and not much else.

Selection of Yunus may be due to desire to give representation to Extreme Left in Grand National Assembly. Notable feature of delegation as a whole is inclusion of deputies (presumably in Grand National Assembly) from all occupied areas still held by Turks at time of the armistice.

Delegation left Adalia on 13th February, and is expected to reach Brindisi about 17th February.

Constantinople Government still express hope that two delegations will combine.

Neither Acting Grand Vizier nor Minister for Foreign Affairs sounded really confident of this, however, in conversation to-day, 14th February, I communicated to them substance of your telegram No. 91 of 11th February. They of course profess strongest disapproval of attitude of Angora. Minister for Foreign Affairs, while sympathising with aims of Kemalists, seems genuinely disgusted with their refusal to have anything to do with Central Government, and probably fears they will overreach themselves. Acting Grand Vizier has hardly had time from views, having been little in touch with affairs nearly for twelve months.

F.O. 406/45, p. 78, No. 51.

No. 58

Sir Horace Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *14th February, 1921.*
(Received February 21)

No. 173.
My Lord,

In a despatch, dated 15th November last, the Acting British Consul-General at Beirout transmitted to me a copy of a Report which he had forwarded to Your Lordship containing information which he had received from missionary sources regarding the capture of Hadjine by the Nationalists. I now have the honour to enclose copy of a Memorandum which I have received from similar sources relative to the massacre of the Christian inhabitants after the capture of the town.

2. According to the information in this Memorandum, the veracity of which I have no reason to doubt, the Turks appear to have displayed at Hadjine a ferocity even surpassing that shown in the massacres of 1915 when the young children, at any rate, were spared with a view to subsequent conversion to Islam. At the same time I am of opinion that Mustapha Kemal Pasha does not himself encourge or countenance the massacre of Christians, but rather that he is powerless, even if desirous of doing so, to protect from massacre the Christian population of the areas in which military operations are in progress and that, accordingly, the unfortunate Christians in the interior of Asia Minor are practically hostages in the hands of the extremists over whom the central authority has little or no control.

3. It, therefore, appears certain that, in the event of the resumption of hostilities, the Christian population must inevitably suffer, whatever course these operations may take. If the Hellenic forces are compelled to withdraw the Christian peoples of the evacuated territory will probably, as was the case in the recent reconnaissance towards Eski-shehir, accompany the troops in their withdrawal, while, if they are successful and it is the Turks who are driven back, the latter are likely to show no mercy to the population not only of the area through which they retire but probably also of regions much further in their rear.

I have, etc.

(Signed) Horace Rumbold
High Commissioner.

F.O. 371/6556/E. 2297.

Enclosure in No. 58

Momerandum.

Communicated by Dr. W. Peet, American Board of Foreign Missions.

10th February, 1921

A report has lately been received from the region of Hadjin through Turkish sources to the effect that, after the capture of Hadjin, there seemed to be a division of counsel in regard to the course to be followed in dealing with the town and its inhabitants. For a time, milder and more humanitarian counsels prevailed, and it was hoped that some intervention from outside might take place on behalf of the Hadjin people. Apparently, if this took place, the Turks were disposed to deliver the people over to their friends. As no friends appeared, the more fanatical counsels headed by the Turkish commander, Arslan agha, pravailed, and under his direction the destruction of the town and the people took place.

Miss Cold, the American lady who, for a long time, held her ground in Hadjin, and who is now in the region of Adana, has seen the nephew of the above-mentioned Arslan, who stated to her that he was responsible for the milder counsels and that he favored the sparing of the people of Hadjin, and after the opposite party prevailed, he was able to save from destruction only a portion of the children. He states that thirty children are now in Turkish hands from the Hadjin population. These children are stated to be in a town three hours from Hadjin. The name of the town, as nearly as I can get it, is Guelisan.

F.O. 371/6556/E. 2297.

No 59

Sir G. Buchanan to Earl Curzon.

ROME, *February 17, 1921*
(Received February 17)

No. 45.
Telegraphic. D.

FOLLOWING for Prime Minister and Lord Curzon from Hankey:—

"Last night I saw Count Sforza. From sources in touch with Talaat he learns that while latter thinks moment has arrived for settlement, Angora Government is still rather truculent. Sforza's personal impression is that they will begin on Oriental principles by asking far more than they expect to get. He thinks, however, they would ultimately accept some arrangement whereby Greeks would withdraw their troops from Symrna, but retain administration under some nominal form of Turkish sovereignty. Angora delegates are due here this morning. Italian Government conveyed them in Italian destroyer in order that they might arrive in time for conference.

"Count Sforza has promised to send us advance information as to general attitude [group undecypherable] Angora delegates."

F.O. 406/45, p. 78, No. 52.

No. 60

Sir G. Buchanan to Earl Curzon.

ROME, *February 17, 1921.*
(Received February 17.)

No. 47.
Telegraphic,

MY telegram No. 45.

Osman Nizami, Turkish Ambassador designate, called yesterday evening and told me he was leawing for London to day to attend conference. After criticising at length harshness of terms of Treaty of Sèvres, which would, he declared, reduce Turkey to a state of slavery, he said that Angora Government never consent to their delegates being merged in Turkish delegation. For them to do so would be tantamount to renouncing all the advantages of their present position. Contrary to views expressed by Count Sforza to Sir M. Hankey, he maintained that were two to be treated with as a single delegation Angora delegates would return home. Withdrawal of Greece from Thrace and Symrna would be demanded by latter, and on my asking whether there was any hope of a compromise between Greeks and Nationalists, he replied this was objected to as Greeks were systematically exterminating Musulmans in districts occupied by their troops.

Sir M. Hankey saw President of the Council this morning. Latter takes view that, in spite of above language, there is a close "subterranean" understanbding between Angora and Turkish delegates.

F.O. 406/45, p. 79, No. 54.

No. 61

Interview between the British Prime Minister and M. Kalogeropoulos[1] *on Fabruary 18, 1921*

M. KALOGEROPOULOS said that he wished to thank Great Britain for the support which it had throughout given to Greece in recent years.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that Great Britain was a true fiend of Greece, and that, though it had been distressed at certain recent incidents, it intended to remain a friend.

[1] M. Kalogeropoulos, Greek President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs since Feb. 7, 1921, had arrived in England on Feb. 17 as head of the Greek delegation to the Third Conference of London.

M. Kalogeropoulos said that the whole people of Greece would be grateful for that declaration, and that he would communicate it to them at once.

In reply to enquiry, M. Kalogeropoulos said that it was his mission to find out if the British Government had any desires or advice to give the Greek Government. It was the wish of Greece that all the arrangements provided for in the treaty[2], which would give peace to the East, should be maintained, but the Greek Government was anxious to hear whether the British Government had any advice to give it.

The Prime Minister asked whether Greece was able to defend its new possessions against any attacks which might be made upon it.

M. Kalogeropoulos said that Mustapha Kemal[3] could do nothing in Thrace, and that he was convinced that the Greek army could scatter Mustapha Kemal as soon as it was given the right to do so by the Allied Powers, who had the right to give or withhold permission. Once the Kemalists had been scattered the Greeks could maintain in Smyrna three divisions permanently, and in addition, if necessary, could send two further divisions. So far as the maintenance of the Greek possesssions in Symrna and Thrace were concerned, Greece was absolutely one and united.

The Prime Minister said that if M. Kalogeropoulos did not wish to do so, he would not press him for an answer at the moment, as he might like to consult his Government before giving one, but the suggestion had been made that the road to peace might be eased by making Smyrna an autonomous province with a Christian Governor appointed by the Allies, and separate from Athens. The suggestion, in fact, was to apply to Smyrna the system which had previously been adopted in the case of Eastern Roumelia[4], and which in this case, as in that would, probably end in complete incorporation with Greece. The defence of the province would then rest on local levies, and Greek troops could only be introduced at the call of the Allies and in the event of a Turkish invasion.

M. Kalogeropoulos said that he would have to consult his Government before giving any answer, but he would like to say immediately that the situation in Smyrna had already been transformed through the introduction of a Greek Administration. Law and order had been established, and the population, which had previously been driven away by the Turks,

[2] i.e. The treaty of Sèvres.

[3] Leader of the Turkish Nationalists.

[4] By the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, E. Roumelia had been established as an autonomous province within the Turkish empire; a Chiristan governor-general was to be nominated by the Sultan with the assent of the Great Powers.

was now returning. Everybody in Smyrna now admitted that the situation was greatly improved. If however, the Greek army were compelled to withdraw, disorders would probably ensue. Further, once the Greek army was withdrawn, it would be a very difficult thing to reintroduce it again. He could not disguise the fact that there were other Powers, by which he clearly meant the Italians, who were engaged in an active propaganda there in favour of the Turks against the Greeks. The majority of the population was Greek, but there was a large Turkish minority which outside propaganda could work upon. The withdrawal of the Greek army, therefore, would make the autonomy of Smyrna very dubious.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that, as far as he could ascertain, the Kemalist demands were that both Smyrna and Thrace should be returned to Turkey.

M. KALOGEROPOULOS replied that such a thing would be absolutely impossible. The Greeks would never agree to that so long as they could resist it.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was glad to hear this, and that he relied upon the spirit of the Greek people not to surrender legitimate rights. At the same time, it would help the British Government if the Greek Government could find some way of making a concession about Smyrna. From the point of view of Greece, it would be a great pity if the conference broke down because the Greeks were unreasonably unyielding. If the conference is to break down, it would be far better it should do so by unreasonableness of the Turks, for in that case, if Greece had been willing to agree to a reasonable compromise, they would have the Allies on their side.

The Prime Minister then explained to M. Kalogeropoulos the proposed procedure, and said that the conference would probably hear the Turks first, but would then communicate to M. Kalogeropoulos what the Turkish proposals for the modification of the treaty were, and the confeference would then hear M. Kalogeropoulos himself.

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W.,*
February 18, 1921.
D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol. XV., p. 125-126, No. 13.

No. 62

Lord Granville to Lord Curzon.

ATHENS, *March 18, 1921, 2 p.m.*
(Received March 19, 12. 15 p.m.)

No. 127 Telegraphic.

Your telegram No. 151 to Constantinople.

Proposals have not received altogether favourable comment in the Press. It is pointed out that Turkey will always be a friend of Germany and an enemy of the Entente and of Greece. Hence everyting which strengthens Turkey will strengthen Germany in the future. Attitute of France in wishing to destory part of Treaty and coming to terms with Kemal is severely criticized. Disappointment is expressed that Great Britain whose interests are identical with those of Greece should have consented to modify Treaty to please France.

According to the Press, Greece cannot accept the proposals which would mean the loss of Smyrna, and the withdrawal of the menace to Turkey in Article 36[1] will result in further massacres of un-redeemed Greeks and Armenians. Many papers urge that Greece should promptly settle the matter with Kemal by force.

Monsieur Gounaris's organ[2] on the contary professes relief at the prospect of the end of Asia Minor campaing and seeks to blame Monsieur Veniselos for having entangled Greece in Asia Minor.

Repeated to Constantinople.

D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol. XVII, p. 74-75, No. 53.

No. 63

Emir Feisal to Mr. Lloyd George. (Received at Foreign Office, February 23.)

12a, BERKELEY SQUARE, LONDON, *February 21, 1921.*

Confidential.

Dear Mr. Lloyd George,

I HAVE written to the Foreign Office stating that my august father desires me to attend the forthcoming Conference as his representatives, for reasons that I have given. I now write to you personally, as the President

[1] This article provided for the expulsion of the Turkish authorities from Constantinople in certain contigencies.

[2] 'Protevousa'. M. Gounaris, Minister of War, had left Greece on March 5 to join the Greek delegation to the London Conference.

of the Conference, to inform you of my father's wishes, which are based on the following considerations-:—

1. The Conference is to consider measures to secure peace in the Near and Middle East. His Majesty, as one of the Allies in the war against Turkey, is of opinion that he has an equal right with the other Allies to be represented, and that to exclude the Arabs would be unfair.

2. The Hedjaz is still at war with Turkey. That is a state of affairs which should not continue.

3. His Majesty King Hussein has certain points to bring up for discussion which have been neglected in the Treaty of Sèvres, especially those dealing with the responsibilities connected with religious questions that have devolved upon him.

4. His Majesty King Hussein refrained from signing the Treaty of Sèvres because he foresaw that, on the one hand, it would not meet aspirations of the Arabs, and on the other would not secure peace in the Middle East. The object of the Conference being what it is, my father is insistent on the necessity of his Government being represented. The Allied Powers are aware of the present state of dissatisfaction among the Arabs; if they are represented and know that their case is being heard, their doubts will be set at rest pending the final settlement. This will facilitate the reaching of a good understanding between the nations interested in the Middle East, to whom the establishment of peace is indubitably a principal consideration.

5. In order to give you an idea of the prevailing feeling in the Arab provinces, I enclose a copy of a telegram received on the 17th instant.

6. I am aware, as the Foreign Office has said, that this matter does not solely concern Great Britain but I hope that the other Allies will regard the Hedjaz with the same benevolence as His Britannic Majesty's Government and allow me to attend the Conference, as I attended the Peace Conference at Paris, so that independent action on the part of the Hedjaz may be avoided.

F.O. 406/45, p. 276, No. 148.

I remain, &c.

IBN-UL-HUSSEIN.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 63

Telegram received on February 17 by General Haddad Pasha.

STILL expecting your answer. Invitation of Mustapha Kemal to Eastern Conference to meet 21st February in London and neglect of Arabs has shown patriots that no confidence is placed in them. People's convic-

tion of this has given impetus to Maan movement and number of those joining this movement is steadily increasing.

Adhesion to movement of woman's mission has aroused feelings of young men, and certain young men who had taken refuge in Egypt and elsewhere have begun to join the movement.

In my opinion, if things go on like this and Arabs are prevented from defending their just rights at Eastern Conference and from attaining their just demands, important incidents may well occur in Syria which will give rise to the ruin of the country.

People are everywhere asking whether Arabs will have a delegate at this Conference or not. Decisions of this Conference will be barometer for Maan movement.

F.O. 406/45, p. 276, No. 148/1

No. 64

Notes of a Conversation between Mr. Lloyd George and M. Briand at the Hyde Park Hotel, London, S.W., on Monday, February 21, 1921, at 9.15 a.m.

PRESENT: *British Empire:* The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister; Sir M. Hankey, G. C. B.

France: M. Briand, President of the Council; M. Berthelot, Secretary-General to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

After some preliminary conversation,

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had seen M. Kalogeropoulos[1]. He had made it quite clear that the Greeks did not intended to clear out of Smyrna. He himself had not thought it worth while to mention any proposal that they should clear out of Thrace. He mentioned this fact in order to show that the difficulties of the conference would not be confined to the Turks.

M. BRIAND said that the Greeks would have to bear in mind that they find themselves confronted with all their neighbours— the Bulgarians and Serbs, as well as the Turks.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Serbs would be afraid of the Bulgarians.

[1] See No. 61.

M. BERTHELOT said that as a matter of fact, the Serbs and Bulgarians were drawing close together.

M. BRIAND confirmed this, and stated that the Bulgarians were the most sturdy race in the Balkans.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that these were really matters for the future, and for the moment the Allies had to take a decision about Smyrna, and it was evident that M. Kalogeropoulos did not mean to clear out. He said that the Italians were intriguing with the Turks in the Smyrna district.

M. BRIAND thought that the Turks were making use of the Italians, but would drop them as soon as they had got all they could out of them.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had informed M. Kalogeropoulos that, if the conference failed because the Turks were unreasonable then they would be against the Turks, but if it broke down because the Greeks were unreasonable, then the Powers would be against the Greeks.

M. BRIAND said that if the Greeks were reasonable—and they had every reason to be so, because a considerable element of Greek public opinion was against any active operations by the Greek army and wanted to reduce their military burdens—they ought to be willing to contemplate some such arrangement as had been made in regard to Crete [2] and elsewhere for a gradual transition of sovereignty. If the Greeks were wise they would envisage some arrangement which would give them the advantage of complete safety for their citizens, as well as safeguard their economic position. The only question was whether Greeks were capable of such reasoning and wisdom.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had tried M. Kalogeropolous [*sic*] with that. He had suggested that some arrangement should be made similar to that made in regard to Crete. He had replied that he apprehended that the Italians would stir up the Turkish population in the Smyrna district, which, though numerically inferior to the Greek population, formed a strong minority. Moreover, any arrangement of this kind would involve ordering the Greek troops to march out from Smyrna and the hauling down of the flag. No Greek Government could face that. M. Kalogeropoulos had shown himself very reasonable, but very firm. After this interview he himself had recognised that Greece was absolutely united. M. Kalogeropoulos had been just as firm as M. Veniselos [3].

[2] In a note of Oct. 4, 1898, the Four Powers, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Russia, had invited the Turkish Government to withdraw their garrisons from Crete in order to facilitate the establishment there of an autonomous regime under Turkish suzerainty. In November they had agreed to offer the post of High Commissioner of Crete to Prince George, second son of the King of Greece.

[3] Prime Minister of Greece from June 1917 until his resignation in Nov. 1920.

M. BRIAND said he thought that Greek fears of the effects of a withdrawal were very much exaggerated. Withdrawing was a national characteristic of the Greek. Had not Achilles himself adopted this method?[4] There was also the famous retreat of the 10.000[5]. It might be said that Greece made rather a speciality of retirements. For the rest, he thought that the Greek preoccupations were legimate. They would have to ensure the safety of their compatriots, and with a good police force and the gendarmerie it ought to be possible to prevent the Italians from making mischief.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE interpolated at this point that it was important to know whether the gendarmerie was to be raised in Greece, or merely from the population of the Smyrna district.

M. BRIAND said it might resemble the Macedonian gendarmerie with a Greek preponderance in the towns in order to secure their minorities.

M. BERTHELOT suggested that there might be some kind of a tripartite agreement in regard to Smyrna.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had only put this matter as one of the difficulties in the case. It must not be assumed that all the difficulties would be with Mustapha Kemal. It would be impossible for the British Government to sent battleships to Smyrna to clear the Greeks out by force of arms. Whatever was done with the Greeks must be done by persuasion only.

M. BRIAND said that he had the same preoccupation.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had put this to M. Kalogeropoulos, suggesting that Smyrna should receive a status similar to that of Eastern Roumelia.

M. BRIAND said that he had also suggested the precedent of Eastern Roumelia.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, continuing, said that he had suggested to M. Kalogeropoulos that he should not give an immediate answer, but should first communicate with Athens. M. Kalogeropoulos had shown that he did not at all like the proposal personally. He was due at Downing Street at 11 a.m., and he would suggested that M. Briand or M. Berthelot, or both, should come to Downing Street to meet M. Kalogeropoulos.

[4] Achilles, an early king hero in Ancient Greece and a central figure in Homer's *Iliad*, had withdrawn in wrath to his tent after his quarrel with Agamemnon, leader of the Greek forces opposing the Trojans.

[5] A reference to the return from Persia of the Greek mercenaries in the army led by Cyrus, viceroy of Asia Minor, after the latter's defeat and death at the battle of Cunaxa, outside Babylon, in 401 B.C.

Perhaps it would be necessary to invite Count Sforza[6] as well, but the objection to this was that then M. Kalogeropoulos might not be willing to speak freely.

M. Briand agreed that it might be better not to invite Count Sforza in the circumstances. He agreed to come to Downing Street at 11 a.m. He said that in a short interview with M. Kalogeropoulos he had the impression that the Greek Prime Minister was preoccupied with the need for assistance, and more especially financial assistance, from the Allies. Without such assistance he would be helpless.

Mr. Lloyd George said that in his interview with him he had never asked for a penny.

M. Berthelot said he had a conversation with M. Kalogeropoulos, when he had given him to understand that, if the Allies delegated Greece the taks of advancing on Angora, they must receive financial assistance. Without it, the advance was impossible. Probably, in his interview with Mr. Lloyd George, M. Kalogeropoulos had assumed as a matter of course that financial assistance would be forthcoming.

Mr. Lloyd George said that M. Kalogeropoulos had made it clear that the Greeks could easily scatter the troops under Mustapha Kemal, whose power was greatly exaggerated. He thought the Allies were making a great mistake in allowing themselves to be bluffed by Mustapha Kemal. All he had asked was that the Allies would withdraw their veto on the issue of paper money by Greece. Poland was issuing paper money extensively, but the moment Greece wanted to do so the Allies placed a ban on it. Of course, M. Kalogeropoulos would like financial assistance. Everyone wanted money; even the Americans, who had, he understood, acquired all the money that had been in Europe. Perhaps it would be better now to adjourn the discussion of the Greek question.

M. Briand said he would like to add one word. He agreed with what Mr. Lloyd George said about exaggerating Mustapha Kemal's power. France, however, had had to deal with a force of 60,000 men belonging to Mustapha Kemal's army in Cilicia. These had proved to be very good troops, and the French forces had lost more than 2,000 killed and, had been in great difficulties. He wondered what would have happened if they had been Greek instead of French troops.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he had heard a rumour that the French army was not composed of the best French troops. They had included a good many Senegalese, and even Armenians. They were by no means equal to the average French troops.

[6] Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

M. BRIAND said that no Armenians had been included, although there had been Senegalese. Armenians had been tried at first, but given up.

M. BERTHELOT said that some good troops were included, but there were worse elements as well.

M. BRIAND said that General Gouraud's view was that if the Greeks were allowed to advance there would be no end to the operations[7]. First the Greeks would have a success, then the Turks would drive them back, and there would be no peace. What worried him was that the Bolsheviks, who at the moment were at the extreme limit of their power, which might in course of time gradually disappear, would receive a new lease of life if there were an attack on the Turkish troops.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Bolshevik bugbear had more or less disappeared in this country, and he had thought it was beginning to disappear in France. It seemed, however, that it still lived there. He was not in the least afraid of the Bolsheviks. The idea of their marching on Angora was a chimera. They could not finance the purchase of goods abroad, even from Germany. They had given no real support to Mustapha Kemal; in fact, they had sent nothing but despatches. The Bolshevik bugbear was very good for use in Parliament or on the platform, but was not a serious menace.

M. BRIAND said this was so much the better.

D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol. XV, p. 127-130, No. 14

No. 65

British Secretary's Notes of a Meeting held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W., on Monday, February 21, 1921, at 11 a.m.

PRESENT: *British Empire:* The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister; The Rt. Hon. A. Bonar Law, M.P., Lord Privy Seal; The Rt. Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, G.C.B., Mr. Kerr.

France: M. Briand, President of the Council; M. Berthelot, Secretary-General to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Greece: M. Kalogeropoulos, Prime Minister; M. Rizo-Rangabé.

[7] Gen. Gouraud was French High Commissioner in Syria and Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Levant.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

Position at Smyrna

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had invited M. Kalogeropoulos to see him and M. Briand in order to inform them if he had anything to add to what he had said at the previous interview.

M. KALOGEROPOULOS said that he had now received a reply from Athens, which he handed to Mr. Lloyd George (Appendix 1).

M. CAMERLYNCK read this telegram in French and English.

M. KALOGEROPOULOS then handed Mr. Lloyd George a memorandum (Appendix 2) which explained and developed the arguments in the telegram. He then handed him a further document on the subject of refugees (Appendix 3). He stated that two further annexes were being prepared which would be ready, he hoped, in an hour's time.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that if M. Kalogeropoulos had nothing more to add he would not detain him beyond thanking him for the information he had given. He said that the Angora delegation were not expected to arrive before that evening, and he thought it was unlikely, therefore, that M. Kalogeropoulos would be required before Wednesday.

(The conference then adjourned.)

(*Note.*—Later in the morning it was decided to invite M. Kalogeropoulos to attend a meeting to be held at St. James' Palace at 4 o'clock that afternoon.)

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W.,*
February 21, 1921.

APPENDIX 1 TO NO. 65

Athens Note communicated to M. Kalogeropoulos

(A. J. 254. Confidential.)
Excellence Kalogeropoulos, London.

We believe that Mr. Lloyd George anxious to obtain exact information in regard to the sentiments of the Greek people and the views of the Greek Government with reference to the effective means which Greece may be capable of putting forward in the event of her taking over heavy responsibilities for the continuation of hostilities, as well as the moral and material forces which she could put forward in order to obtain the pacification of the Middle East. He will also wish to have evidence as to whether

all that we say represents an unshakable determination to clear Asia Minor of the Nationalist organisations by means of our own forces sufficient for this enterprise. The British Prime Minister's need to obtain as complete as possible information on this subject appears to us fully justified, in view of the tendencious [*sic*] statements which have recently been put into circulation in regard of the weariness of the Greek people and army. We also share the views contained in the words used by your Excellency in regard, on the one hand, to the impossibility of the Greek Government going beyond certain limits in spite of its desire to bow to the advice of the British Government, and, on the other hand, in regard to the power of Greece to shatter the efforts of Mustapha Kemal. These two arguments prove conclusively the will and the undoubted capacity of the Greek people to cary out the engagements undertaken. The much-desired pacification could not be obtained by concessions to Turkey, especially if the latter tended to cause the principle to disappear, that populations who had been given their liberty should never again be placed under the Turkish yoke. This principle, which brings honour to the statesment of England, has alone been able to assure peace in the past, and to put an end to the difficulties which Turkey has never ceased to cause to the Powers; intermediate and incomplete solutions have only perpetuated disturbances and bloody conflicts. If, after the shedding of so much blood, the replacing under the Turkish yoke of provinces which have definitely been detached from Turkey by a treaty were tolerated, the only means which existed for settling the threatening situation would for ever be sacrificed. Should the conference be anxious to see its efforts crowned with success, it must more especially insist that Turkey should pay for the actions of Mustapha Kemal which have been the cause of the perpetuation of disorder and massacres in the Near East, and which have, for Greece, added a new sacrifice to those made by her during the world war, and for which she received compensation under the Treaty of Sèvres. It is in this way that it will become possible to impose on Turkey the decisions of the Allies, by making her fully understand that she would have to pay further sums as reparation to atone for her non-submission.—BALTAZZIS[1].

[1] Minister of Agriculture in M. Kalogeropoulos's administration and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

APPENDIX 2 TO No. 65

The Greek Army in Asia Minor: Memorandum by the Greek Delegation

(A. J. 252. Confidential.)

In pursuance of a mandate from the Allied and Associated Powers the Greek army, close on two years ago, landed on Asia Minor[2]. The mandate conferred on it was a tangible proof of the will of the Allied democracies to affirm in the Near East the ascendancy of the principles which had been their bond of union throughout a long and bloody war. Fifteen months later the vindication of those principles in the Near East was registered in an international Act bearing the signatures of the Allied Powers[3]. Fully conscious of the nature of its mission, the Greek army had, in the meantime, firmly established peace and order in Western Asia Minor. The Greek Administration which followed it had secured to the afflicted populations the benefits long unknown to them of a just and paternal rule, which admitted no privileges of race or religion. After centuries of misrule and oppression a happier future seemed in store for the classic lands which had been the cradle of the Hellenic race, and of our common European civilisation.

The evidence of all foreign observers (including the commissioners of the Powers and Generals Sir T. Bridges and Hanbury[4], who followed the Greek army) will show that there is no element of exaggeration in these claims. The best proof, however, is furnished by an almost incredible decrease of criminality, as compared with the conditions formerly obtaining in Smyrna, and with the present condition of Asia Minor outside the Greek zone.

In this connection may also be mentioned the successful repatriation of no less than 126,000 Greek refugees without any untoward incidents whatever attending their return, in spite of the very natural animosity of the refugees against their whilom persecutors.

The actual administration of the Smyrna zone passed into Greek hands only in August 1920. In this short period, in spite of insufficient means and of lack of preliminary study of the various aspects of the administration, considerable results have been attained, especially if a comparison is made with the Turkish régime.

[2] On May 15, 1919. For the decisions by the Allied Powers on May 6 and 12, see *D.B.F.P.*, Ist series, Vol. I, No. 10, n. 8; cf. *F.R.U.S.*, *The Paris Peace Conference*, 1919, vol. v, pp. 484 and 578.

[3] i.e. the Treaty if Sèvres, signed on Aug. 10. 1920.

[4] Gen. Sir T. Bridges had been Head of the British Mission with the Allied Armies of the Orient, 1918-20. Gen. P.L. Hanbury was attached to the British Army of the Black Sea.

Two appended notes[5] give a detailed account of the steps taken in regard to the repatriation of refugees and the encouragement of agriculture. The latter has included loans to agriculturists of 20,000,000 drachmas at 6 per cent. Steps have also been taken to combat malaria and endemic diseases generally, including the establishment of an institute for the preparation of serum and the despatch of doctors into the villages.

All branches of the administration exclusively concerned with the Turkish element (vakoufs[6], orphanages, muftis[7], cadis[8]) have been maintained and subsidised by the Greek authorities. The latter are also meeting the expenses of the upkeep of the Turkish schools, while leaving the upkeep of the Greek schools to the Greek communes.

A university at Smyrna is being organised with faculties for (1) engineering, (2) mining, (3) commerce, (4) agriculture, (5) Eastern languages, and (6) Moslem jurisprudence. Pre-war postal and telegraphic communications have been reestablished and extended, and are working satisfactorily; 100 kilom. of road have been repaired, and a wireless station for commercial use has been established.

The foregoing brief account will give some idea of the work achieved and of the efforts and sacrifices which it has involved. It should, in fairness, be added that these achievements are only a beginning, and have been realised amid difficulties, internal and external, of every kind. In the nature of things, the Greek administration of the Smyrna zone had hitherto aimed, in the first instance, at pacification and reconstruction. Having thus succeeded in creating the conditions indispensable for the development of production Greece's task for the future will be to organise the exploitation of the rich resources of the country, securing to the commercial and industrial enterprise of all nations free scope to avail themselves of the advantages of Smyrna's geographical position as a natural door for economic intercourse between East and West.

Greece has the conviction that she constitutes the prime factor of European civilisation in the Near East, and she is confident that she will not be found wanting if only the Allied Powers will continue to extend their confidence to her. However, it is clear that her works, as an agent of peace and civilisation, is only made possible for her by the presence of her army constituting, as it does, a solid rampart against all those reactionary influences and elements which aim at, and will surely seek to compass, if only they are given scope, the restoration of a régime whose crimes

[5] Not attached to filed copy.

[6] i.e. land held in trust for religious or charitable uses.

[7] Muslim priests or expounders of the law.

[8] Civil judges.

called forth the indignation of the civilised world so recently that they cannot already have been forgetten. Further, while it is true that the Greek army in Asia Minor has pursued a mandate conferred on it by the Allied Powers in the common interest, this mandate was in full harmony with the capital national duty recognised by every Greek of liberating these Greek populations from an alien and barbarous domination. The duty of the Greek State in regard to the Greek provinces freed by its armies and the ties of blood binding the Asiatic Greeks to those of the mother country create obligations which no Greek Government can ever repudiate. The Greek army in Asia Minor is not only the champion of interests which Greece has in common with her allies in the Near East, but above all an effective guarantee of peace and freedom which Greece cannot withdraw without again exposing Chiristian populations, liberated by the blood of her soldiers, to the outrages of the Moslem fanaticism. Were such an eventuality to be realised it would mean that a war fought to secure the right of the nations to independence had issued in a moral catastrophe of the first magnitude.

It may be added here that the extreme left wing of the Greek army is at present mounting guard over Constantinople and the Straits. Any withdrawal of this force would immediately expose the internationalised zone of the Straits to a surprise attack analogous to that attempted in the spring of last year, which, in the absence of Allied troops, the Turks of the interior could easily organise without being detected in time.

The Treaty of Sèvres is an historical fact. It bears the signatures of the victorious Allied Powers. In respect to Greece this instrument simply endorses her legitimate national claims in full conformity with the principles for whose vindication so much blood has been shed.

The Greek Government and the Greek people firmly believe that the Allied Powers, in full knowledge of the results obtained and of the services rendered by Greece in Asia Minor, will not to-day repudiate the declarations made to the Porte with reference to this treaty in July last—declarations whose force nothing has since come to invalidate. On behalf of the Allied Powers M. Millerand declared to the Ottoman Government[9]: 'The Allies see clearly that the moment has come to put an end for all time to Turkish domination over other nations. The history of the relations between the Porte and the Greek [? Great] Powers is nothing but a series of repeated but unsuccessful efforts to put an end to atrocities which have shaken and revolted the conscience of humanity in the course of the last twenty years. The Ottoman Government has massacred 800,000 Armenians,

[9] M. Millerand was at that time French President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

men, women and children, and deported or expelled from their homes more than 200,000 Greeks and 200,000 Armenians. The Turkish Government has not only failed in its duty of protecting its subjects of mon-Turkish race against pillage, violence and murder; numerous proofs indicate that it has itsellf assumed the responsibility of directing and organising the most savage act of aggression against populations which it was its duty to protect. For these reasons the Allied Powers have resolved to emancipate from the Turkish yoke all territories inhabited by a non-Turkish majority. It would be neither just nor conducive to an equitable peace in the East to compel numerous non-Turkish populations to remain under Ottoman sway. The Allied Powers cannot consent to any modification of the provisions of the treaty detaching Thrace and Smyrna from Turkish domination, for in both these territories the Turks are in a minority'.

The Greek army in Asia Minor, 121,000 strong, is in a position to scatter the Kemalist forces and to impose the will of the Powers as embodied in the Treaty of Sèvres. In every respect the Greek army is overwhelmingly superior to the Kemalist levies, which along the Greek front attain a total of 30,000 to 34,000 men, including irregulars.

The objective of the Greek army in the above case would be, in the first instance, to occupy the railway line Adapazar-Eskishehir-Afioun-Karahissar, and establish itself firmly to the east of this line. The details and consequences of this operation are considered in an appended note[10].

After the break-up of the Kemalist army three divisions on a peace footing would be sufficient for the zone allotted to Greece by the Treaty of Sèvres. In case of need these three divisions could promptly be raised to war strength. This would supply a force amply sufficient for any contingency.

However, the necessity of guarding the freedom of the Straits imposes on the Allied Powers, including Greece, an obligation to maintain adequate forces for this purpose. These forces should, it is clear, be maintained until such time as the clauses of the treaty relative to the disarmement of Turkey shall have been executed, and more generally so long as the Allied Powers shall consider it expedient in view of the existence of a determination to defy the decisions taken by those Powers. Thus it will depend on Turkey to put an end to this military occupation and the financial burdens accruing from it by loyally conforming to the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres.

February 21, 1921.

[10] Not attached to filed copy.

Appendix 3 to No. 65

*Repatriation of Refugees: Memorandum by the Greek **Delegation***

(A. J. 250. Confidential.)

A serious problem which had to be taken in hand by the Greek administration of the Smyrna zone was that of the repatriation of Greek refugees. As a result of its exertions 126,000 of these refugees have already returned to their homes.

The following considerations will serve to indicate the difficulties which had to be faced in this connection:—

1. The difficulty of housing the refugees is clear from the fact that out of 45,000 houses available before the war 23,000 were now wholly and 18,000 partially destroyed, only about 3,000 remaining in tolerably good condition. Further building material was almost unobtainable except in Smyrna, and even there was very costly. In spite of this the Greek administration by the end of 1920 had succeeded in repairing 29,000 houses—an achievement which compares favourably with similar work in other devastated regions.

2. A second difficulty was the presence in these districts of some 35,000 Turkish refugees from Serbia, Macedonia, Crete, &c., who had been installed in deserted Greek villages by the Turkish Government. This made it likely that the repatriation of the Greek refugees would be attended by friction and reprisals. The Greek administration accordingly took steps to dispose of these floating populations before allowing the repatriation of Greek refugees to begin. Some of these Turks were sent back to their homes in new Greece (Macedonia, Epirus, the islands) at the expense of the Greek administration. Further, a special commission for the relief of destitute Turks was instituted, under the auspices of which many of the remainder were settled at certain points within the Smyrna zone. A difficulty consequent on the foregoing was that the repatriation of Greek refugees only began in the winter of 1919 and the already existing difficulties were intensified by the action of the local Turkish authorities, who did all in their power to prevent the restoration of Greek property to its legitimate owners by the Turkish refugees who had seized it.

3. Yet another problem was the preservation of order during the repatriation, having regard to the very natural animosity of the repatriated Greek refugees against their whilom persecutors. The police measures taken by the Greek administration, which included the immediate expulsion of every repatriated Greek who showed the slightest inclination to molest his Turkish neighbours, were nevertheless sufficient to preserve

perfect order. No untoward incident whatever occurred and no complaints were formulated by the Turkish element. On the contrary, documents signed by Turks are available in which their appreciation of the equity of Greek administration is expressed.

It should be noted that in other provinces of the Ottoman Empire at present under Allied occupation, it has not proved in the same way possible to avoid collisions between Turks and Christian refugees returning to their homes (cp. Gautherot, '*La France en Syrie et Cilicie*', p. 182)[11].

4. A complicating factor was the parallel arrival of refugees from the territory under Kemal's sway. The total number of such refugees was 64,500, and among them were not only Greeks, but Armenians, Jews and even Turks. All these refugees are in receipt of relief from the Greek administration. In particular, relief for the refugees of Aidin, Nazli and Ak-hissar has cost 842,534 drachmas.

The results achieved by the Greek administration in spite of the difficulties explained above are indicated by the appended figures and maps[12].

February 21, 1921.

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No. 66

British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W., on Monday, February 21, 1921, at 11.30 a.m.

PRESENT: *British Empire:* The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister (*in the Chair*); The Rt. Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; EXPERTS, Sir E. Corwe, G.C.M.G., K.C.B, Mr. Kerr, Mr. Vansittart; SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, G.C.B., Mr. Howorth.

France: M. Briand, M. Berthelot, Count de Saint-Aulaire; EXPERT, M. Kammerer; SECTETARIES, M. Massigli, M. Chastenet.

Belgium[1]*:* Baron Moncheur.

[11] This book by M. Gustave Gautherot was published at Courbevoie in 1920.

[12] Not attached to filed copy.

[1] The invitation to Belgium to attend the sessions of the London Conference beginning on Feb. 21 and concerned with questions arising out of the Treaty of Sèvres had been sent inadvertently. When the error was discovered Lord Curzon had instructed H. M. Ambassador at Brussels to substitute March 1 for Feb. 21, but is was then too late, since the Belgian

Italy: Count Sforza, Signor de Martino; EXPERT, Signor Galli; SECRETARY, Signor Guariglia.

Japan: Baron Hayashi, Mr. Nagai; SECRETARIES, Mr. Saito, Mr. Tsubokami.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

[*1*] *Procedure.*

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, in opening the proceedings, expressed the view that it would be idle to hold meetings of the full conference until the delegates from the Angora Government had arrived. Cound Sforza would, no doubt, be able to inform the conference as to the present position respecting the delegates in question.

COUNT SFORZA said that, before leaving Rome, he had seen the head of the Angora delegation, who had informed him that the delegation under strict orders not to proceed to London without first receiving a separate and official invitation to the conference. He (Count Sforza) had immediately pointed out that this was a very wrong attitude for the Angora delegates to take up, and after some discussion it had been agreed that the delegates should proceed to London without a definite separate invitation. The head of the delegation had handed to Count Sforza a copy of this instructions, and he (Count Sforza) had then wired to London and Paris and had received the answer just as he was crossing the Italian frontier. He had forwarded the answer on to Rome, and in the result the Angora delegates had decided to resume their journey. In the course of the interview the head delegate had informed him that Mustapha Kemal could not for a moment agree to the Turkish delegation from Constantinople being regarded as the principal Turkish representatives. If the Allies so regarded the Constantinople delegation, the Angora delegates would enter an emphatic protest, which they would ask should be recorded in the minutes. Speaking for himself, he (Count Sforza) had received the impression that the Angora delegates were in a most unconciliatory mood, which was, no doubt, attributable, to the chauvinistic atmosphere of Angora. It was very probable that after they had been some little time in Europe, and appreciated the difficulties of the situation, they would become more reasonable.

Minister for Foreign Affairs had already informed the Commission for Foreign Affairs of the invitation for Feb. 21. As a compromise it was agreed that the invitation should not be cancelled, but that it should be arranged for the Belgian Ambassador in London, Baron Moncheur, to be present 'on accasion either of first meeting or of some meeting or meetings at which general discussion might take place, it being understood that participation in Turkish discussions cannot be conceded'.

Mr. Lloyd George enquired whether they could, in fact, be expected to take up a more conciliatory attitude when they would be acting under definite instructions from the Angora Government.

Count Sforza replied that the Angora Government was divided between a party which favoured peace and conciliation, and a party of extremists who wished to precipitate a crisis.

Mr. Lloyd George then stated that he desired to inform the conference of a discussion which he had had with the Greek Prime Minister, M. Kalogeropoulos, on Friday last[2]. M. Kalogeropoulos appeared to be a man of moderate and conciliatory views, and he (Mr. Lloyd George) had thought it right to inform him that if the conference came to the conclusion that the Turks were adopting an unreasonable attitude it would decide against the Turks; but if, on the other hand, it came to the conclusion that the Greeks were unreasonable, it would decide against the Greeks. He had pressed M. Kalogeropoulos to state his view as to the probability of the Greeks making concessions not in the matter of Thrace, but as regards Smyrna, and he had made various suggestions on the lines of Smyrna being treated as autonomous under a neutral Governor appointed by the Allies. He was surprised to find M. Kalogeropoulos very obstinate and unbending on this subject, and he had come to the conclusion that the Constantinists would be very much more difficult to deal with than the Veniselists. The present Greek Government had apparently the greatest confidence in their army and in their power to defeat the Kemalists, and represented that they had the whole of the Greek people behind them. As soon as he realised that the conference was likely to encounter serious difficulties from the Greeks as well as the Turks, he had asked M. Kalogeropoulos to inform the Greek Government that Great Britain remained, as in the past, a true friend of Greece, and that it would be well if Greece would accept the advice of the Allies. M. Kalogeropoulos had just brought him a reply of an unfavourable character[3], which indicated that the Greek Government meant to fight and to reject any compromise.

Count Sforza said that he agreed generally with the line which Mr. Lloyd George had taken with M. Kalogeropoulos, except in one respect. He believed that the people in Greece, at Constantinople and at Angora were all unwilling to appear conciliatory, but that they would all be glad if the Allies would assume full responsibility and impose some compromise upon them. He took this opportunity of handing in a copy of the note which had been given him at Rome by the Kemalist delegate, in order that its terms

[2] See No. 61.

[3] See No. 65, Appendix 1.

might be recorded (see Appendix 1). The Kemalist Turks were anxious to know whether the Allies would treat with them separately, but he (Count Sforza) had made it quite clear that the conference would only recognise a single Turkish delegation.

Mr. Lloyd George and M. Briand agreed entirely with Count Sforza's reply on the last point.

Lord Curzon said that Count Sforza had reported that he thought some secret arrangement existed between the two Turkish groups, and enquired whether he thought the two groups would still remain hostile to one another, or would endeavour to compose their differences.

Count Sforza said that he thought the two groups would agree to continue to pretend to be hostile one another.

M. Briand said that the conference would have a difficult part to play between at least two unreconcilable and hostile factions, and that in this matter it would be well to remember that we were dealing with Turks and Greeks, both of whom would have to take, at all events at first, a very extreme and uncompromising attitude, in order to satisfy public opinion in their own countries. It would be the business of the Allies to act as umpire, and to try to effect some reasonable arrangement, and he thought that after the conference was some days old it would be found that both the Turks and the Greeks were more disposed to accept a compromise.

Mr. Lloyd George then enquired whether it was possible for the conference to have any discussion on question of principle or substance before the arrival of the Angora delegates.

M. Briand suggested that the Allies might discuss in advance the nature of the ultimate solution which might have to be imposed, with a view to reaching some sort of agreement which might help when the time came for the Allies to guide the Turks and Greeks into a compromise.

Mr. Lloyd George thought it would be very difficult to explore the possible solutions until the conference had heard both the Greeks and the Turks.

Count Sforza then suggested that the experts might meet together, with a view to seeing what was the total amount of agreement between the Allies. The experts might prepare some kind of a statement and the arguments to be employed, so that later on the conference would be ready to submit definite proposals for the consideration of the Greeks and Turks. He added that anyone who had bought carpets in the East knew exactly what was goingto happen at the conference.

Mr. Lloyd George said that in his opinion this was not a question for the experts, but for the heads of Governments, who must take the

responsibility for deciding the great question of policy at issue. He was certain that the best course would be get the Allies to meet, after hearing both sides, as they would then be in a much better position to judge the case on its merits.

M. Briand agreed that, if the Allies hoped to reach some good and lasting conclusion, the heads of Governments must assume the responsibilities for the decisions ultimately reached. As he had already pointed out, the two parties most closely concerned in the question would not take the responsibility upon themselves of settling the difficulties, but would, in the end, he felt sure, be quite ready to hand over to the Great Powers the task of imposing a solution which commended itself to those Powers.

Lord Curzon pointed out that the Turks from Angora would only arrive in London that night, and that if the conference decided to hear their views on the following morning, this would occupy most of the day, and then it would be necessary to hear the views of the Greeks. There was no reason why the views of the latter should not be heard first, and he suggested that the conference should meet the Greeks that afternoon. The result of the meeting between Mr. Lloyd George and M. Kalogeropoulos, in the course of which suggestions had been made to the latter indicating possible solutions, had been an unfavourable reply. The Greek Government was apparently determined to re-embark upon hostilities. Let the conference summon the Greeks and find out exactly what their plans are; what forces they have at the present time in Asia Minor, and to what extent those forces can be augmented; what is their present financial position, and how long they can maintain hostilities with their existing financial resources; and when those resources come to an end, what steps do they propose to take to raise more money. If the attitude of the Greek Government was that the Treaty of Sèvres must be maintained to the latter, the Allies were entitled to know how the Greek Government proposed to secure such maintenance.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he agreed with this suggestion. He reminded the conference that there was a great deal of business to be done both with the Greeks and the Turks, and that no time should be wasted. It was possible, however, that the Turks might not be ready with their case tomorrow morning.

M. Briand agrreed with Lord Curzon's proposal, and thought it would be desirable to have the military experts present at the discussion.

The conference decided—

That the Greek delegation should be invited to attend a meeting of the conference at St. James's Palace at 4 p.m. that afternoon, and that

this meeting should be attended by the military advisers of the various delegations.

D.B.F.P., Ist. series, Vol. XV. p. 137-140, No. 16.

Appendix to No. 66

Note handed to Count Sforza, in Rome, by the Angora Delegation

The Grand National Assembly of the Turkey has learned indirectly of the decisions taken by the Allied Powers on the subject of the participation of its own delegates at the conference which is about to meet in London to consider the question of the Turkish peace.

The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, being the only legitimate representatives of the Turkish nation, must insist on being directly invited to this conference. However, to show its goodwill, and as a demonstration of its sincere desire to subscribe to a peace which will assure to the Turkish people its independence and free development, it has decided to despatch its delegates to a town in Europe from which they will easily be able to reach the place of conference. The delegates of the Grand National Assembly, who arrived on the 17th February in Rome, think that they ought to wait for an invitation. They can only express the hope that if the Allied Powers have a genuine intention of carrying out justice and peace in the East, they will take steps to address the necessary invitation to the delegation of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, the only mandotary of the Turkish nation.

In sending the above for the consideration of your Excellency, the Turkish delegation has the honour to convey to you the assurance of its highest consideration.

D.B.F.P., Ist. series. Vol. XV. p. 147, No. 16/1.

No. 67

British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at St. James's Palace, London, S.W., on Monday, February 21, 1921, at 4 p.m.[1]

Present: *British Empire:* The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister *(in the Chair)*; The Rt. Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Military Experts, Major-General Sir W. Thwaites, K.C. M.G., C.B., Director of Military Intelligence; Colonel Kerr;

[1] A French translation of Sir M. Hankey's notes of this conference is printed in Frangulis, vol. ii. pp, 183-94.

POLITICAL EXPERTS, Mr. Kerr, Mr. Vansittart; SECRETARIES. Sir M. Hankey, G.B.C., Mr. Howorth, Major Caccia, Mr. Sylvester.

France: M. Briand, M. Berthelot, Count de Saint-Aulaire; MILITARY EXPERTS, General Gouraud, Colonel Georges, Colonel Mougin; POLITICAL EXPERTS, M. Kammerer, M. Brugère; SECRETARY, M. Massigli.

Italy: Count Sforza, Signor de Martino; POLITICAL EXPERT, Signor Galli; SECRETERY, Signor Guariglia.

Japan: Baron Hayashi, Mr. Nahai; MILITARY EXPERTS, General Watanabe, General Itamy, Major Kawaise, Captain Sakai; SECRETARIES, Mr. Saito, Mr. Yoshizawu [Yoshizawa]

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

GREEK DELEGATES: M. Kalogeropoulos, Prime Minister of Greece; M. Rizo-Rangabé, Greek Chargé d'Affairs in London; Colonel Exadactylos, Colonel Sariyannis, Colonel Lacon.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said it was his privilege to open this first sitting of the conference, which would deal with problems arising out of the Treaty of Sèvres. It would be within the memory of those present, that the Greek Government of the day—that is, two years ago—occupied Smyrna at the request of the Allied Powers with a view to restoring order as the mandatory of the Powers. And that occupation had continued uninterruptedly to the present day.

A treaty had been signed at Sèvres last year by the Allied countries and by the representatives of the Turkish Government, whereby Thrace and the vilayet of Smyrna had been allocated to Gerece. The treaty contained other provisions which, however, did not concern the conference at the present moment, but which might eventually be raised by the Turkish delegation when it came to present its case.

Since the signature of the Treaty of Sèvres, much disturbance had occurred in Asia Minor, and considerable forces under Mustapha Kemal Pasha had been fighting against the provisions of the treaty. As a result, a general desire had been expressed that efforts should be made to restore peace, by common consent, in that very disturbed area of the world. Therefore, with the object of ascertaining whether it would be possible to arrive at an agreement acceptable to all parties concerned, this present conference had been summoned. The Greek and Turkish Governments had been invited to send representatives, and he was glad to welcome the Greek Prime Minister who had come in person to represent the Greek Government.

The Greek Government had collected together considerable quantities of armaments in the area in question; they had been engaged in military operations, and the conference would now wish to hear what the Greek Prime Minister had to say in regard to the suggestions which had been put forward to modify the Treaty of Sèvres in such a way as to make it more acceptable to all parties concerned. Furthermore, the conference were anxious to obtain from M. Kalogeropoulos information which would assist it to come to a conclusion upon the various proposals which had been brought forward. The information required might be put in the form of questions as follows:—

1. What was the military situation in Asia Minor on the Turkish front in so far as the Greek forces are concerned?
2. What was the strength of the Greek forces?
3. What was the information of the Greek Government as to the *moral* of the Greek soldiers, and the effect produced upon the army by the very considerable recent change of officers?
4. What was the forecast of the Greek Government as to the results of the military advance which they are prepared to make?
5. For how long would the Greek Government be prepared to maintain their present forces out of their own resources, and even to augment them in the manner proposed by the Greek Government?
6. From what sources would any further expenditure be defrayed?

Additional question—

What permanent forces were the Greek Government advised would be necessary to maintain in the Smyrna and Thrace areas, and whether they considered themselves in a position to maintain adequate forces for the permanent defence of the provinces of Smyrna and Thrace against a hostile Turkish neighbour?

Before asking the Greek Prime Minister to reply to these various questions, he would enquire from the French, Italian and Japanese representatives whether they desired to add anything thereto.

M. Briand agreed that the issue had been stated quite clearly by Mr. Lloyd George.

Count Sforza agreed that the whole ground had, he thought, been covered, especially in regard to the last question upon which he laid great stress.

Baron Hayashi[2] said that he had nothing to add.

M. Kalogeropoulos said that he fully realised the importance which the conference attached to the pacification of the countries in question at the earliest possible date. Mr. Lloyd George first question related to the military situation in Asia Minor and, he would deal in turn with each of the existing three fronts.

On the northern front (Armenia) operations were practically suspended for the time being. The Ottoman troops on that front did not exceed 4,000 or 5,000 in number. On the southern front (Cilicia) some 10,000 Turks were present, in addition to some 5,000 to 7,000 irregular free lances. On the western front, the Kemalist troops numbered under 35,000, including irregulars who had been recruited by force, and only fought as men forcibly enrolled usually did. He thought it unnecessary to enter into further details in regard to these figures, but, if necessary, the Greek Chief of the General Staff, who was present[3], could give exact information as he had come direct to London from the Smyrna front. Facing Mustapha Kemal in the whole of Asia Minor, Greece possessed, at the present moment, 121,000 soldiers under arms, including combatants and non-combatants. He could affirm with absolute confidence that this figure was absolutely accurate, and he considered that this force would be more than sufficient to restore order, should the Greek Government receive a mandate to do so. He had been asked how long it would take to restore order, by which he meant, to sweep the country clean of Turks. His military advisers had stated that it would not take more than three months. Within that period he felt confident that the Greek troops would be able to annihilate the forces of Kemal and those who were putting to naught the provisions of the Sèvres Treaty.

Mr. Lloyd George enquired whether he had correctly understood M. Kalogeropoulos to say that the total number of Turkish troops on the various fronts totalled 55,000 including combatants and non-combatants.

M. Kalogeropoulos replied that the rationed strength should not exceed 65,000 men including combatants, non-combatants and irregulars.

Mr. Lloyd George enqiured as to what interpretation should be placed on M. Kalogeropoulos's statement that the country would be swept clean of Turks. What part of the country did he allude to?

M. Kalogeropoulos replied that he had referred to the whole of the country occupied by the Kemalists. As a result of the operations con-

[2] Japanese Ambassador in London.

[3] Col. Sariyannis.

templated by the Greek Government Mustapha Kemal's forces would be so scattered as not to be able to offer any resistance in the future.

LORD CURZON enquired up to what point the Greek troops contemplated advancing.

COLONEL SARIYANNIS replied taht the Greek troops contemplated advancing as far as Angora as a first stage, and this advance would, it was thought, lead to the complete dissolution of the main forces of Mustapha Kemal. The Greek General Staff believed that the crumbling of Kemal's forces on the western front would necessarily lead to the complete disappearance of the whole of his forces. The Greek Government were ready to start this operation at any given moment.

LORD CURZON anquired whether it had been intended to include the division under General Harington, known as the Manissa Division, among the forces to be used against Kemal.

COLONEL SARIYANNIS replied in the affirmative.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked M. Kalogeropoulos next to give some information in regard to the *moral* of the Greek army in Asia Minor.

M. KALOGEROPOULUS replied that the *moral* of the Greek army was excellent from every point of view. The Greek soldiers at present in Asia Minor were only too anxious to continue to fight, particularly at the present moment on account of their being irritated by the recent agressions of the Kemalists. In a recent engagement 2.000 Turkish prisoners had been taken, including 1,100 men who were found to be in a state of utter destitution—in rags, starving, and in a sad plight. He had no hesitation in affirming that the Kemalists were in fact not regular soldiers; they merely constituted a rabble worthy little or no consideration. The recent political events in Greece had in no way affected the *moral* of the Greek army. The Greek army fully realised that it belonged to the nation as a whole, and not to any particular faction, and if called upon by the nation it would never fail to respond and do its duty. At the present moment the army was ready to make any sacrifice without the least hesitation. He could assure the conference that in reality little or no change had occurred in the personnel of the officers. A few (some twenty or thirty) had left and gone towards Constantinople, but by far the great number had remained faithful to their duty. His confidence in the Greek troops was absolute, and their courage was undoubted. And, should it be found necessary to take further action, all that might be required would undoubtedly be achieved.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE desired to invite M. Kalogeropoulos's attention to another question in regard to which the conference, and especially Count Sforza, attached considerable importance. Supposed the Kemalist

troops were scattered, and the Greek troops retired within their own frontiers where they might have to meet a constant menace of attacks from small forces of Turks, it would be necessary for the Greeks to maintain an army which would be sufficient to defend the Smyrna Vilayet. The following questions then arose:—

1. What forces did the Greek military advisers consider it necessary to maintain constantly in the vilayet?
2. Did the Greek Government feel that it could sustain that burden, both from a military and from a financial point of view?

M. Kalogeropoulos thought that the situation contemplated by Mr. Lloyd George would never arise. As a result of the operations contemplated by the Greek army two solution might be possible. In the first place a very large number of Kemal's forces might be made prisoners, in which case the danger of subsequent attack would no longer exist. In the second place Mustapha Kemal's forces might retreat and disappear, but the danger of subsequent attack would, in that case, not be much greater, since the operations contemplated by the Greek army would drive Kemal's forces so far from all communications as to make it impossible for them to refurnish. In other words, should Mustapha Kemal retire far from the present theatre of operations, he would thereby be deprived of all means of subsequent attack through lack of communications.

Count Sforza said that the conference had learned that in the opinion of the Greek Prime Minister and his advisers the Greek army could in three months reach Angora, shattering and finally dispersing Mustapha Kemal's forces; and should these operations succeed as contemplated, he agreed that the Turkish forces would thereby lose all power of subsequently harassing the Greek forces. But should the Greek army, on the other hand, reach Angora, without coming into contact with Mustapha Kemal's army, owing to the latter having retired, he thouht that a very serious situation would thereby undoubtedly be created—a situation which might be likened to that which had led 105 [*sic*] [4] years ago to the downfall of a great army led by one of the world's greatest generals.

M. Kalogeropoulos replied that if the Greek army reached Angora, and Kemal's forces retreated further, it would naturally follow that the whole of his troops would be bound to disperse and scatter, because it would be impossible for them to find the wherewithal to live in those parts. The Turkish troops in Asia Minor could no longer be compared to the fanatical Ottoman soldiers of the past. They were merely kept together

[4] The reference is presumably to Napoleon's Moscow campaign of 1812.

by force. Consequently, famine and want, and lack of communications would throughly complete anything that might be left undone by the Greek army. But, if necessary, the Greek armies were quite prepared to advance beyond Angora, so as thoroughly to achieve the object in view, and, in his opinion, they ran no danger of meeting the same fate which had overtaken Napoleon's armies.

In reply to further questions put by Mr. Lloyd George, M. Kalogeropoulos stated that Angora formed a railhead and that a Decauville line[5] proceeded beyond to a point 60 miles east of Angora. Consequently the Turks would not be able to proceed by rail further than 60 miles east of Angora, and since they possessed no means of transport, their retreat beyond that point would necessarily result in the dissolution of the regular army. Only a very small body of soldiers would be able to live on the country, which was, moreover, mountainous.

Mr. Lloyd George enquired whether it would be found difficult for the Greek army to maintain its line of communication should the Turks start a guerilla warfare with a view to cutting the same.

Colonel Sariyannis replied in the negative, for the reason that the lines of communication had so far never been attacked by the Kemalists. The Greeks had learnt from experience that they had nothing to fear in that direction. Three regiments had been found sufficient to protect the lines of communication.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out, on the other hand, that as the Greek army advanced in hostile country more troops would be required to protect the lines of communication.

Colonel Sariyannis agreed; but he could affirm that the Greek General Staff knew exactly how many troops would be required for that purpose.

Lord Curzon pointed out that beyond Angora no railways existed.

M. Lloyd George enquired whether the Greek population of Smyrna were taking any part on the fighting. In other words, did the Greek inhabitants of Smyrna show any inclination to fight for their liberty.

M. Kalogeropoulos replied that in additation to the Greek subjects who were liable to conscription, a few volunteers had enlisted, but they had not been encouraged to do so, as thereby one of the stipulations of the Sèvres Treaty would be broken.

Mr. Lloyd George enquired how many men the Greek Government would be able to put in the field in addition to the 120,000 men above referred to.

[5] i.e. a narrow-gauge railway, named after its inventor, M. Decauville.

M. KALOGEROPOULOS replied that the Greek Government would be able to put in the field as many men as might be needed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired what would be the limit of their possibilities in that respect.

M. KALOGEROPOULOS replied that Greece would be able to put 200.000 men in the field in addition to the 120.000.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether amongst those 200,000 men would be included Greeks recruited in Thrace.

COLONEL SARIYANNIS replied that the army in question would be recruited merely from the Greek provinces.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE requested M. Kalogeropoulos to give a reply in regard to the next question, namely, whether the Greeks felt able to face the financial burden of putting through the contemplated operations.

M. KALOGEROPOULOS said he was able to answer that question in the affirmative without the slightest hasitation even though he realised that these operation[s] would necessarily entail certain financial sacrifices. On the other hand it would be realised that Greeks had not incurred such heavy financial liabilities as other countries during the world war. At the present moment Greek citizens contributed to the taxes of the country per had of population only 840 fr.: whereas the citizens of other countries were required to make far greater sacrifices. It must therefore be admitted that the resources of Greece had not yet been exhausted, but to enable Greece to wage war by means of her own resources she must not be prevented from freely using her credit. In other words, if the Powers would permit Greece to raise the necessary resources she would be able to carry through the contemplated war and rapidly reach a decision.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether any enthusiasm existed amongst the population of Greece in regard to the liberation of the Greek population in Asia Minor. How would the Greek people as a whole without reference to any particular political party view the removal of the Greek flag from Asia Minor.

M. KALOGEROPOULOS had no hesitation in stating that no difference of opinion whatever existed in Greece on the national question. All Greeks would be ready to make every sacrifice to deliever their brethren in Smyrna. It would be wicked to suspect Greek patriotism in regard to this question.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether any difference existed between Constantinians and Veniselists in regard to Smyrna.

M. KALOGEROPOULOS affirmed that in regard to internal questions considerable differences of opinion existed, but in regard to Smyrna the

whole of the people were unanimously agreed. All Greeks loved their country and were ready to sacrifice themselves for their country.

Mr. Lloyd George enquired whether the Constantinians would be prepared to make the same sacrifice for the retention of Smyrna as Veniselists.

M. Kalogeropoulos said that there was no doubt of any kind in regard to that question. He himself had come to the conference to proclaim that the Greece was absolutely united on that point.

M. Briand said he had listened with the greatest interest to the statements made by the Greek Prime Minister. He personally did not for a moment doubtet of patriotism of all Greeks and their desire and will to give expression to it in a striking manner at Smyrna. But he could not himself be as optimistic as M. Kalogeropoulos in regard to the worthlessness of the Turkish troops. France had maintained in Cilicia a force of 60,000 men, courageous, well-trained, patriotic and well-armed soldiers who had been perfectly equipped with evertyhing that might be required. They had been facing the Turks in that theatre of war for over a year and as a result he personally had come to have a decided respect for this so-called rabble band which the Greek Prime Minister despised. The experience gained by the French forces went to prove that the Turkish army did not disperse as easily as the conference had to-day been to believe. These forces had inflicted cruel losses on the French soldiers. For a month the French army had invested Aintab which had been fiercely defended[6]. In a word the French had found the Turkish troops to be full of pluck; to fight savagely and to dispute every inch of ground. It might be possible that the French had had the misfortune to be faced by the pick of Mustapha Kemal's troops, but before accepting the opinion expressed by M. Kalogeropoulos in this respect he felt bound to ask his military representative, General Gouraud, to give the conference his appreciation of the military situation, especially in regard to the resistance which the Turkish forces might be expected to put forth. He personally felt extremely anxious that the full facts should be ascertained before a decision was reached, since every conflagration started in those Eastern countries should be quickly extinquished, as otherwise one fire would undoubtedly give rise to others.

Mr. Lloyd George desired, on behalf of the British mission to extend a hearty welcome to General Gouraud, who had come to London for the first time to attend a conference. The British army felt the greatest admiration and regard for General Gouraud, not only on account of his brilliant achievements and victories in France in the hour of greatest need, but more especially in regard to his work in Gallipoli, in connection with which the

[6] In May 1920.

British soldiers invariably spoke of him in the most affectionate terms. Therefore, on behalf of the British delegation, he wished to give him a specially warm welcome to the conference, and anything that he might say would be listened to with the greatest respect and would undoubtedly carry great weight.

General Gouraud expressed his warm thanks to the British Prime Minister for the words which he had uttered and which had greatly touched him. Ever since 1914 he had witnessed with the greatest admiration the wonderful courage invariably displayed by the British troops, but he would unhesitatingly affirm that he had never seen braver troops than those who landed on the Gallipoli Peninsula in April 1915.

In replying to the question which had been put to him, he wished to weigh his words very carefully, both in regard to the value of the Turkish troops and in regard to the operations contemplated. The Greek Prime Minister had expressed what he, General Gouraud, must consider to be very optimistic views in regard to the value of the Turkish troops. He fully admitted that the Turkish troops which they had had to deal with in the Dardanelles belonged to the old traditional Ottoman type, and undoubtedly the troops of to-day were not as good as those of 1915; but they were still dangerous adversaries, and not be lightly despised. It was possible, also, that the troops in the Smyrna area differed considerably from those in the Cilicia theatre of operations. Turkey in Asia was not a properly administered country, and evidence undoubtedly existed that the people of the western part of Asia Minor had contributed far more troops to the war than the people of the east. This fact might explain the reason why the Turkish troops at Smyrna were said to be bad, whereas further east the advesary was found to be better equipped.

The Greek Prime Minister had likewise referred very scathingly to the Turkish irregular troops. The Turkish forces might be divided into three groups, namely:—

1. The regulars, the remainder of the old Turkish army, numbering some 15,000 to 20,000 men.
2. The Nationalists, or regular national forces, which might be likened to the 'Franc-tireurs' of 1870[7]—patriots who were fighting with ardour, obeying the wall the feudal magnates of the country.
3. The irregulars, or 'brigands,' who had been raised during the past year of war, and who preferred war to agriculture. These forces were undoubtedly inferior to the above two groups, but made up numbers, and could not be altogether neglected.

[7] Guerrilla fighters in France at the time of the Franco-Prussian war.

Opposing these forces there existed under his command 50,000 French troops of excellent quality, French, Algerians and Senegalese, men who had displayed the same valour and the same military qualities as similar troops had done during the Great War. The siege of Aintab had been a very difficult and arduous task, which had been likened by the Turks to the siege of Verdun. Taking these facts into consideration, he thought that if the Greeks advanced they find themselves confronted by an enemy far more dangerous than the one which they had had to deal with in the Smyrna Plains.

In the next place, in regard to the operations contemplated, the Greeks would have a force of 60,000 men, since it would only be found possible to make use of half the total number of troops actually available in the country. These 60,000 men would be expected to proceed a distance of 600 kilom. from the base to Angora, a distance which would have to be increased by 300 kilom. should the Kemalist forces retire to Sivas. Angora and Sivas were situated at elevations of 800 and 1,500 metres respectively, thus giving very cold climates. In addition, he could positively state that the Decauville Railway from Angora had been dismantled. He need not, therefore, lay stress on the difficulties which would exist in taking an army to a distance of 600 kilom. from its base in such a country. Furthermore, he would ask the conference to realise what exactly would happen should the Turks retire. They would still be in their own country, and would be able, without difficulty, to disperse, with the result that the Greek army would find itself in a very critical position.

To sum up, had he been in command of the forces at Smyrna, and had the French Government asked him to do the work now contemplated by the Greek Government, he would not have forgetten that Marshal Foch had estimated that a force of twenty-seven divisions would be required to pacify this country [8].

Mr. Lloyd George, intervening, remarked that the twenty-seven divisions were required to pacify the whole of Asia Minor.

General Gouraud, continuing, said that the Greek Prime Minister had also very correctly spoken of the *moral* and patriotism of the Greek troops. This was undoubtedly an essential condition of succes, but he personally was convinced that the Turks, though perhaps not keen in the offensive, would be found to be dangerous enemies in a defensive war. He would repeat the words spoken to him in May last at Beirout by a representative Turk, who had told him that no Power would ever succeed in driving the Turks from the central plateau of Anatolia, which constituted a natural impregnable fortress, and he (General Gouraud) believed that

[8] See Vol. II, p. 51, No. 18.

to be the truth. He did not believe that any one nation possessed either the necessary means or resources to achieve the objects contempleted.

Mr. Lloyd George said he would like to ask General Gouraud how many white troops the French had on the Cilician front.

General Gouraud replied that the number was abour 15,000 in all, of whom very few were non-combatants. In answer to a further question whether he had made a special study of the military aspects of a campaign against Angora, General Gouraud said that he had not done so, but that Colonel Georges[9] had experience of this particular district and had worked out a scheme of operations.

Mr. Lloyd George then enquired what information the French possessed on the subject of the number of rifles, guns and ammunition in the possession of the Kemalist forces.

General Gouraud replied that the Turks appeared to have plenty of rifles and rifle ammunition. They had not, of course, as many guns as the French, but quite a fair number, as was indicated by the fact that in a recent engagement lasting the whole morning the Kemalists had thrown over 2,000 shell, some of them from heavy guns.

Mr. Lloyd George remarked that every battalion on the French front had got that number of shells before breakfast.

General Gouraud remarked that in a case of this kind it was not quite fair to compare what happened in France with what was happening in Cilicia. It must not be forgotten that on the French front the soldiers were protected by trenches and dug-outs. In Cilicia the fighting was in the open, and often at very considerable distances from the base of supplies. His remarks were intended to indicate that the Kemalist coulds not properly be said to be short of war material.

(The conference then adjourned for tea.)

On resuming, Mr. Lloyd George said that he thought the best course would be for the conference to hear the remarks of Colonel Sariyannis, the Greek Chief of the Staff, and, after that, he proposed the conference should adjourn. He had just received an intimation that the Kemalist delegates had passed through Paris, and might, therefore, arrive in London to-morrow. He proposed that the Allied delegations should meet at No. 10, Downing Street, at 11 a.m. to-morrow, and possibly see the Turkish delegation in the afternoon.

[9] A French representative on the Allied Military Committee of Versailles.

M. Briand and Count Sforza agreed with this procedure.

Colonel Sariyannis said that he felt great diffidence in discussing this question with, and in particular in seeming to differ from so great and distinguished a General as General Gouraud. He paid an eloquent tribute to the bravery of the French troops and the skill and foresight shown by the French Higher Command. He (Colonel Sariyannis) had served on the staff of a Greek division which had been under the general command of the French at Ghevgeli, and he had also had a very close and intimate knowlegde of war conditions in Asia Minor over a long period of time. With all respect to the views which had been expressed by General Gouraud he felt, that the conference should be placed in possession of the views of the High Command. First, with regard to the fighting value of the Kemalist troops on the Greek front, which it had been represented would tend to increase the further the Greeks penetrated towards the east; he thought that in this connection it might be useful to inform the conference of a recent incident which threw some light on the value of the Kemalist forces. A Greek reconnoitring party had advanced towards Eskisher and had fought there with three Kemalist divisions, plus artillery, for the greater part of the morning, turning them out of a strong position which had been carried at the first rush. While it was true that had it been impossible to reap the fruits of the victory, because the Greek Headquarters had recalled the party, for political reasons, the incident showed the small fighting value of these particular Kemalist troops. The conference should remember that the Greek troops were fighting to relieve their opressed brethren, the recollection of whose wrongs filled them with ardour and anthusiasm. Secondly, the difficulty had been emphasised of operating from Smyrna as a base, and the danger to the Greek lines of communication. On this he would say that the real Greek base against Angora would not be Smyrna, but Brussa, which was only 300 kilom. from Angora. Even if the railway line was rendered useless, it would be possible to organise a service of motor lorries and to requisition supplies from the country while the line was being restored. After the fighting had once taken place he had no serious apprehension on the score of danger to the lines of communication. Thirdly, he wished to point out that according to recent experience not more than three regiments would be required for duty on the lines of communication. In the Greek army the proportion of non-combatants to combatants was low, but he would be prepared to give further details on this subject to-morrow. The number of men actually required for a successful campaign against the Kemalists was not, in his view, anything like so great as the European military authorities estimated. The Greeks, being an Eastern people, possibly undertood the Turks better, and could

deal with them with considerably smaller forces than would be the case if a Western Power was campaigning in Asia Minor. Lastly, even if the Greek army had to go as far as Sivas, it was certain that the retirement of the Kemalist army would result in its entire loss of fighting value. In this event the Greeks could considerably shorten their lines of communication by landing on the shore of the Black Sea and establishing a base there.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he would like ask Colonel Sariyannis two questions. In the first place, the Colonel would no doubt recollect the operation conducted by the Greeks last summer towards Panderma. Before those operations were begun, was it not a fact that the military advisers of the Western Powers had taken a far more serious view of the military difficulties than the Greek staff had done, and was it not also true that the anticipations of the Greek staff had turned out to be perfectly correct?

Colonel Sariyannis agreed that this was so. The operation in question was finished in a month; the Turks had been easily defeated, notwithstanding that certain military officiers of the Western Powers had warned the Greeks of the formidable dangers in front of them.

Mr. Lloyd George then asked whether Colonel Sariyannis could explain why it was that the Turks were apparently fighting so much better on the Cilician front than on the Greek front. Had Colonel Sariyannis seen anything on the Greek front comparable with the Turkish resistance as described by General Gouraud?

Colonel Sariyannis said that he was not in a position to reply. It might be that the Kemalist troops on the Cilician front were of a tougher or more ferocious type. It was also possible that they included a number of Arabs.

M. Briand then enquired whether Colonel Georges migth be allowed to say a few words.

Colonel Georges said that he had had an opportunity of witnessing operations on the Greek front, and desired to pay a high tribute to the zeal of the troops and the capacity of the High Command. So far the Greek army had only met with a feeble resistance, but it was quite possible that when they began to approach Angora they would find their task much more difficult. Mustapha Kemal was reported to have 40,000 men in training camps; numerous officers were constantly joining him from Constantinople, and he was also recruiting Russian officers. It was not inconceivable that the Turks might concentrate at Angora. As regards the question of a base, it must be remembered that for the Greeks to base a campaign

on Brussa would mean that they must hold down successfully the whole of Anatolia, and make quite sure of their communications between Smyrna and Anatolia. It had been estimated that the total Greek forces in Asia Minor amounted to eight divisions. Three or four of these divisions would be needed for the defence of Smyrna, and at least two for the lines of communication, which would leave only two or three divisions for the offensive against the Kemalists. In his view it would be runnig a very great risk to undertake an attack with such small resources, and he could not but feel doubtful whether the Greek resources in men and money were really as great as had been estimated. He could not say that a successful operation against Angora was impossible, but he did say that such an operation undertaken with the existing Greek resources was one of a hazardous character. This was the opinion of the Allied Higher Command which had also represented that it would not only be necessary to beat the Kemalists in the field, but subsequently to hold down the country, and, in particular, to suppress guerilla warfare.

Mr. Lloyd George enquired whether any Greek representatives had been present at the Allied Military Council when this conclusion had been reached.

Colonel Georges replied that the council had been held in Paris, and the opinion was given on the 27th [? 29th] March, 1920.

Mr. Lloyd George then pointed out that this opinion was prior in date to the carrying out by the Greeks successful Panderma operation, when the Allied Higher Command had taken exactly the same view of the streght of Mustapha Kemal and the inadequacy of the Greek forces that they were taking now. He repeated that on that accasion the Allied Military Command had turned out to be wrong and the Greek staff to be right.

Colonel Sariyannis intimated that he would like to make some remarks in reply to Colonel Georges.

Mr. Lloyd George suggested that he should submit any observations he had offer in writing, and, if necessary, the conference would hear him again.

The conference agreed—

To hold the next meeting at No. 10, Downing Street, S.W., at 11 a.m. on Tuesday, the 22nd February, 1921.

(The proceedings then terminated.)

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.,
February 21, 1921.

D.B.F.P., Ist. series. Vol. XV., p. 147-159, No. 17.

No. 68

British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference, held at 10, Downing Street, S.W., on Tuesday, February 22, 1921, at 11 a.m.

PRESENT: *British:* The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister (*in the Chair*); The Rt. Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs; POLITICAL EXPERTS, Mr. Kerr, Mr. Vansittart; SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, G.B.C., Mr. Howorth.

France: M. Briand, M. Berthelot; POLITICAL EXPERT, M. Kammerer; SECRETARIES, M. Massigli, M. Chastenet.

Italy: Count Sforza, Signor de Martino; POLITICAL EXPERT, Signor Galli; SECRETARY, Signor Guariglia.

Japan: Baron Hayashi, Mr. Nagai; SECRETARIES, Mr. Saito, Mr. Tsubokami.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

1. The Turkish Delegations

MR. LLOYD GEORGE informed the conference that he had learned that the Turkish delegates from Angora had arrived in London, and that a representative of the British Government was at that moment endeavouring to ascertain when the Turkish delegation would be ready to state their case to the conference. The representative would inform the Turks that the Allies would be quite ready to receive them that afternoon at 4.30, if this convenient to the Turks themselves. Possibly however, Count Sforza and M. Briand might have some later information on the subject.

COUNT SFORZA said that he had received a visit at 10 o'clock that morning from Osman Nizami Pasha, the second Constantinople delegate and the prospective Ambassador at Rome. The Pasha had informed him that Tewfik Pasha, the Grand Vizier, was indisposed and could not venture out to-day. He (Count Sforza) had replied that while the Grand Vizier was a person of great distinction and prestige, it was possible that the statement which he might have to make could be equally well delivered by some deputy. Osman Nizami Pasha had then stated that the Constantinople delegation had yesterday discused the situation with the Angora delegation, and the latter had made it clear that they regarded themselves as the only persons who could speak for Turkey in this matter, and that they could not regard the delegation from Constantinople as in any respect representative of Turkish opinion. Ultimately, however, some *modus vivendi* had been reached, and it was certain that the Turkish factions would not

display their differences in the conference itself. If pressed, the Turks would be prepared to come to the conference that afternoon, but they would much rather be given a little more time and would consequently prefer to meet the Allies on the following day.

MR. LOYD GEORGE thought that it was very little use for the Allies to meet the Turks until the latter were quite ready. He was expecting a report from the British official, who had been deputed to visit the Turks that morning, and he suggested that the conference should await that officer's report.

Later in the meeting, Mr. Lloyd George informed the conference that he had just received a note from the official in question to the effect that it was out of the question for the Grand Vizier to meet the Allies to-day and that the other Turkish delegates would much prefer to come to a meeting to-morrow.

The conference agreed—

That a meeting with the Turkish delegates should take place at St. James's Palace at 11.15 a.m. on Wednesday, the 23nd February, 1921, and that the Allied delegations should meet at the Palace for a preliminary discussion at 11 a.m. on that date.

2. The Emir Feisal and the Conference

MR. LLOYD GEORGE informed the conference that he had received a letter, dated the 21st February, 1921, from the Emir Feisal[1], which he would ask M. Camerlynck to read.

After the letter had been read, Mr. Lloyd George said that his feeling in this matter was that, as the Arabs had a very direct interest in the settlement under the Sèvres Treaty, not only in Arabia, but in Syria, Palestine, Transjordania and Cilicia, he favoured the conference hearing the Arab view. The conference had heard the Greek delegation and was proposing to hear the Turkish delegation, which included the rebel Turks, and to refuse hearing to the Arabs would be a fatal step, which would resound throughout the whole Arab world and might have the most serious consequences. In these circumstances, he would like to reply to the Emir Feisal, inviting him to appear before the conference and to state the Arab case. It must be remembered that he was the representative of the King of the Hedjaz, who was an independent sovereign recognised by the Treaty of Sèvres, and in these circumtances it would be politic to give him an opportunity

[1] The Emir Feisal, son and representative of King Hussein of the Hedjaz, had arrived in England at the end of Nov. 1920.

of coming to St. James's Palace and informing the conference of the views of his people.

M. BRIAND said that the Allied delegates were present in London as representing the Greet Powers, who were endeavouring to find some settlement of the dispute between the Greeks and the Turks.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, intervening, said that this was not at all his view of the duty of the conference. The conference would have to consider many questions outside the Græco-Turkish difficulty. If the Treaty of Sèvres is to be torn up, it must be torn up altogether, and he certainly could not contemplate any settlement being effected at the sole expense of the Greeks. Great Britain could not be a party to an amiable policy of this kind. If there was to be a real settlement it must be one to which all parties contributed by making sacrificies.

M. BRIAND, resuming, said that the representatives of the Great Powers had met together to try and effect a settlement of the whole difficult questions of the Treaty of Sèvres, including the Græco-Turkish disputes; but, if all the fifferent nationalities interested in the Treaty of Sèvres were to be heard, the conference would be unduly protracted. For example, Armenia and Bulgaria would certainly claim a hearing if one were accorded to the Arabs. As a Frenchman, he could only say that the suggestion that the conference should hear the Emir Feisal was an impossible one. Feisal had been instrumental in betraying the French cause in Syria, and was directly responsible for the shedding of French soldiers' blood[2]. It would be most difficult for the French representatives to sit in the same room with him, and he (M. Briand) took the strongest possible objection to the suggestion that Feisal should be invited to state the Arab case to the conference in person. If Feisal desired to put his views before the conference, let him submit them in writing, when they could receive careful consideration.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquierd whether this meant that the conference was to refuse to hear the Arabs. If so, an announcement of this momentous decision would have to be made.

M. BRIAND said that he did not think there need be a definite refusal to hear the Arabs. Psychological considerations weighed on Governments and peoples alike, and French public opinion would not for a moment tolerate his meeting Feisal face to face in the conference after all that had happened and particularly after the bloodshed in Syria.

[2] For the Emir Faisal's nominations as King of Syria by the Syrian Congress at Damascus on March 8, 1920, and the subsequent events which led to his flight from Syria at the end of July 1920, see *D.B.F.P.*, *Ist. series*, Vol XIII, Chap. II, Nos. 219-92 *passim.*

Mr. Lloyd George remarked that Feisal had not shed as much French blood as Mustapha Kemal.

M. Briand said that there was all difference in the world between the two cases. Mustapha Kemal was an open enemy, who carried on warfare against the French in the duly recognised manner. Feisal had at first pretended to be the friend of France, and had then taken the first opportunity of stabbing her in the back. He himself was quite ready to meet and discuss matters with honourable enemies, but he could not contemplate meeting a traitor like Feisal, who in French eyes was much more than an ordinary enemy. He felt sure that General Gouraud would refuse to sit at the same table with Feisal. Why should not Feisal state his case in writing, in the same way that the Armenians and Bulgarians had been told to do? He could not over-emphasise the hatefulness of Feisal's personality felt by the French.

Mr. Lloyd George thought that there had been an unfortunate misunderstanding in Syria, which possibly had led to something like a breach of faith on the Allies' part, but he certainly did not want to go into this aspect of the matter now. He reminded the conference that throughout the war Feisal had been the firm and steadfast ally of the British, and that but for him the great victory gained by General Allenby[3] might have been won, or, at all events, might not have been so complete in its immediate consequences, one of which had been the French occupation of Syria. The position of Great Britain was a very difficult one. Great Britain had a very direct interest in the Treaty of Sèvres, and he very sincerely hoped that the conference was not going to rule out the hearing of the Arabs. There was a great deal of feeling in this country on the way the Arab question had been handled. If France declined to receive an Arab deputation, it was clear that the Arabs could not be received by the conference; but the reason must be given and he, would feel under an obligation to send Feisal a reply stating that his (Feisal's) personality was objectionable to France, and that he could only be heard by the conference through the medium of a written communication. This answer would then be published to the world, the Arabs would know the position, and the consequences might be of a most serious character; but clearly some answer to Feisal must be given.

M. Briand said that the attitude of France did not amount to a refusal to settle the Arab question, but was a definite rejection of the reception by the conference of Feisal himself. If Great Briatin had been in the position of France, he felt quite confident that she would have refused

[3] Gen. Allenby, Commander-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, had defeated the Turkish army in Plastine in Sept. 1918 and entered Damascus on Oct. 1.

to see Feisal even more vigorously than he had done. He again urged that Feisal should put his representations into writing, and added that, if it was necessary to send a reply to Feisal, the French objection to him personally should not be emphasised, as this would only increase the difficulties of the Allies. If the Arabs still insisted on sending a delegation, it might be possible for the conference at a later date to consider its personnel.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that in this matter he was most anxious to meet the views of M. Briand, whose difficulties he fully realised. British and French interests in this matter were identical, and both aimed at the re-establishment of peace and the settlement of the whole Arab question, including the Syrian and Mesopotamian problems. He had been told that Feisal was accompanied by Haddad Pasha [4], a very able man, and he would like to know whether M. Briand would feel the same difficulty about receiving Haddad Pasha as he had expressed in the case of Feisal. He (Mr. Lloyd George) thought it most important to hear the Arabs in person and to restore good relations with them before the conference terminated.

M. BRIAND said that he would have no objection to Haddad Pasha as the Arab delegate.

The conference agreed—

That an oral communication should be made to the Emir Feisal to the effect that the conference would have great difficulty in listening to him as the Arab representative, but that, if he would send Haddad Pasha to state the Arab case as the delegate of the King of the Hedjaz, the conference would accord Haddad Pasha a hearing in person.

3. Scope of the Conference

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he hoped that the conference was not going to limit itself to a discussion of the Græco-Turkish question. There were other important matters for consideration, such as the Armenian situation, the various controls imposed by the Treaty of Sèvres, and the question of the Straits, all of which the Turkish delegation might wish to raise. He did not want to have to rule out any subject from discussion, and he thought the wisest course would be to let the Turks present their whole case, as otherwise a very bad impression would be created.

The conference agreed with the views expressed by Mr. Lloyd George on this question.

[4] Gen. Haddad Pasha had been Syrian diplomatic agent in London during the Emir Feisal's rule in Syria.

4. Lithuania

MR. LLOYD GEORGE read to the conference a letter received from the acting Chargé d'Affaires of Lithuania, asking that a Lithuanian delegation might be received by the conference on the subject of the *de jure* recognition of that country. He (Mr Lloyd George) thought it was quite out of the question to receive the delegation this week, but if there was time the conference might give the Lithuanians an hour to state their case later in the session.

M. BRIAND said that there was no particular case for *de jure* recognition of Lithuania, the frontiers of which had not yet been determined. At the same time, it was most important not to take any action in the matter which might be regarded as discourteous towards the League of Nations, which was interesting itself in the Vilna question.

The conference agreed—

That a reply should be sent to the Lithuanian Acting Chargé d'Affaires in the form set out in Appendix 3.

5. British and French Prisoners in the Hands of the Kemalists

LORD CURZON informed the conference that there were a number of British officers and men in the hands of the Angora Government, and he understood that the Kemalists also held some French prisoners. The occasion of meeting the Kemalist delegates might be taken for attempting to obtain the release of these prisoners, and it might be possible to effect a kind of exchange. At Malta the British Government had over 100 Turkish prisoners, about seventy of whom were charged with offences against the armistice, cruelty to prisoners of war and brutality to Christians. The balance, about thirty-six, might be used for exchange purposes. There were about twenty-six British prisoners in all, including Colonel Rawlinson, a brother of the Commander-in-chief in India. It would be easier to secure the release of the prisoners if we could offer an exchange.

M. BERTHELOT mentioned that there were about 600 Frenchmen held prisoners by the Kemalists, and that the French had taken several thousand Turkish prisoners in the recent operations.

The conference agreed—

That the question of exchange of prisoners should be raised with the Turkish delegation, on the lines suggested by Lord Curzon.

6. Publication of Mandates and Conclusions of Conferences

Mr. Lloyd George informed the conference that the British Government was being pressed in Parliament on certain question which possibly were also giving parliamentary trouble to his colleagues at the conference. These questions were:—

(i) The demand for the publication of mandates,

which, he reminded the conference, had still to go before the League of Nations for final approval. The mandates had already been published in an American newspaper, and the British Government would have no objection to publishing them in the form a White Paper, but felt unable to do so until they had obtained the consent of their Allies to this course.

(ii) The demand for the publication of a summary of the conclusions of the various inter-Allied conferences held since the Treaty of Versailles.

He (Mr. Lloyd George) had undertaken to bring this question up at the conference, and, if publication was decided upon, it would be necessary for the delegates to agree exactly on what they were going to publish and how much. So far as he was concerned, he thought there would be little harm in publication. All the interesting material had already appeared in the newspapers.

Count Sforza said that he would like the publication of the mandates delayed for a few days, otherwise he might be open to parliamentary attacks.

M. Briand and Baron Hayashi said that they had no objection to publication in either case.

Lord Curzon enquired whether he was to understand that at the same time [?as] the British Government published the Palestinian, the Mesopotamian and colonial mandates the French would publish the Syrian mandate; if not, the British Government would certainly be asked why the decision of the conference had applied only to its own mandates.

M. Berthelot said that the French Government would arrange for publication in the press. They did not propose to issue a White Paper on the subject.

Mr. Bonar Law said that it would be difficult to withhold publication much longer in Great Britain. He was quite ready to meet Count Sforza, however, by promising publication but delaying actual publication until next week.

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No. 69

Report No. 37, Issued by The British Secret Intelligence Service, Constantinople Branch.

Secret.

February 22, 1921

The Government, The Nationalists, and The London Conference.

The invitation to the National Representatives to attend the London Conference was made known on January 26th. Since then the discussions between Angora and the Turkish Government have been of great interest and importance. The trend of Nationalist policy was unmistakably betrayed by a telegram from Mustapha Kemal Pasha dated the 28th January in which the following demands were made in imperative terms:—

(1) The Sultan will issue an Imperial decree recognising the Great National Assembly as the sole and legal Turkish Government.

(2) The Sultan shall continue to reside in Constantinople and the Great National Assembly in Angora. As there will be no Cabinet or administrative body in Constantinople a liaison mission authorised by the Great National Assembly will be attached to the Sultan.

(3) The local administration for Constantinople will be settled later on.

(4) The above conditions being accepted, the Great National Assembly will guarantee the payment of the Imperial appanage, also the salaries of Government officials.

The Nationalists thus betrayed that the matter of first importance to them was not settling the dispute with the Allies, but their desire for official recognition in order, it may be presumed, to retain power and safeguard the fulfilling of the engagement with the Bolsheviks or other foreign power, whatever the result of the Conference might be.

Izzet Pasha, in a telegram dated the 30th January to the (Grand) Vizier, urges acceptance of the Nationalists conditions with a view to the representation of Turkey at the Conference by a single and united mission. The terms, as well as the purport of Izzet Pasha's telegram, indicated clearly that he has either gone over to the Nationalist camp or is playing the Nationalist game under coercion.

The Grand Vizier, in replying on the 31st January, pointed out that a radical change in the Constitution could not be made thus arbitrarily and on the 3rd February officially refused Mustapha Kemal Pasha's demand, urging at the same time a Nationalist representative should in any

case attend the London Conference for the sake of the redemption of the country.

On the 5th February Mustapha Kemal Pasha wired to the effect that a Nationalist representative, name not given, would be sent independently of the Central Government Mission, but that co-operation would be possible should the Government delegate take an identical line with the Nationalist representative. Meanwhile on January 31st an appeal signed by Bekir Sami had been made to the Allies and principal neutral powers begging that the Great National Assembly be formally recognised as the legal Government of Turkey.

One view of the above telegraphic dispute between the Nationalists and the Turkish Government is to the effect that it merely represents a bluff intended to show that the Central Government and the Nationalists are opposed to each other, and to impress the Great Powers with the fact that identical recommendations are made at the Conference by opposing Turkish factions, whereas they are in reality in agreement and have arranged in secret the line to be taken by both at the Conference. I do not agree with this view. The demands formulated by Mustapha Kemal Pasha betray the intention of Vaticanizing the Khalifat and, by abolishing the Imperial administrative prerogative of transforming the Sultanate into a passive instrument for echoing the Nationalist policy. It is important to realise that the presence of the Khalif with full power previously possessed by him in Constantinople within reach of the Allies' influence is a serious obstacle to the Pan-Islamic and Bolshevik scheme to which both Angora and Moscow attach such importance. It will be remembered that the alteration of status of the Khalif so as remove this obstacle was one of the terms of the Soviet agreement with Angora.

The fact therefore that Angora has shown no satisfaction at the invitation to the London Conference, and no indication of seizing opportunity thus afforded of jettisoning its Bolshevik Allies but, on the contrary, has made it an ill-advised occasion to attempt to cement its own power and carry through a Bolshevik demand, seems imply that Mustapha Kemal Pasha has too long enjoyed power to relinquish it voluntarily, and that the Great National Assembly is too bound up with Bolshevik and the C. U. P. either to wish to extricate Anatolia from their clutch or to be capable of doing so. We should not therefore lose sight of the possibility that Angora in sending delegates is doing so merely to obtain an implied recognition of the Great National Assembly, and firm in their present policy of separation, will by professing excessive demands at the Conference render abortive the possibly more moderate attitude of the Government representatives.

A significant point is the absence so far of any indication of the Bolsheviks feeling perturbed at the new line taken by the Allies. This fact coupled with the circumstances given above, may be taken as evidence that the Bolsheviks feel assured of their unshaken position regarding Anatolia.

As regards the Greeks, there is some evidence that an offensive is contemplated in the immediate future with the object of occupying Angora and presenting the Allied Conference with the traditional "fait accompli".

F.O. 371/6549

No. 70

British Secretary's Notes of a Conference held at St. James's Palace, London, on Thursday, February 24, 1921, at 6 p.m.

PRESENT: *British Empire:* The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister; The Rt. Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; SECRETARY, Sir M. Hankey, G.C.B.

France: M. Briand, M. Berthelot.

Italy: Count Sforza, Signor de Martino.

Japan: Baron Hayashi.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

The Treaty of Sèvres

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, as the conference had now heard what the Greeks had to say, and had also a very fair idea of the Turkish claims, he had thought it advisable to invite an informal preliminary discussion in order that he and his colleagues might clear their minds and ascertain exactly where they stood.

M. BRIAND said that if we could obtain from the Turkish delegation a formal and clear undertaking that they would accept the result of an enquiry whatever that result might be, which would check definitely the conflicting accounts of the population of Smyrna and Thrace, the situation in these regions would be settled in the best possible manner. M. Kalogerepoulos had just said to him he had absolute certainty in being able to prove his figures. In that case Greece would have an interest in a settlement of this kind by an international arbitration which, if the Greek Prime Minister's statement was correct, might reach a decision in their favour.

Otherwise there would certainly be a prolongation of the present state of war, and the Greeks would soon find themselves in a very difficult situation. He agreed that the Greeks might secure some partial and local successes, but they would take a long time to reach a strategical decision of such a degree as would bring about a definite peace. If things dragged on as at present, he feared the fire which would sooner or later break out throughout the whole of the Near East. At the moment he thought that Bolshevism was coming to an end in its present form. The only way in which it might prolong its existence was to keep in contact with the Turks and to draw closer to the fire which was burning in Asia Minor. Consequently the conference should aim, if possible, at engaging the Ottoman delegation (and he did not think it would be impossible to do this) to accept in advance and to submit to the results, whatever those results might be, of an international enquiry. By this means the present conflict would be brought to and end, as well as the heavy expenditure in men and money. Perhaps it might be easy to secure the assent of the Greeks also. At the present time he recognised that the Greek Government was compelled by public opinion adopt an uncompromising attitude, but in view of the present internal difficulties of the country they might accept this proposal. If they were so sure of their figures they would have no reason to complain of an arbitration and they might hope for success. Of course his proposal was conditional on securing the consent of the Ottoman delegation. It would be out of the question to envisage a prolonged investigation, but if we could induce the Ottoman delegation to say that they would place themselves in the hands of the conference and accept the results of a rapid investigation, whatever those results might be, a practical procedure would be found. Naturally, he would demand at the same time a cessation of hostilities, the exchange of prisoners and guarantees for the minority populations, pending the results of the enquiry.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if M. Briand was not assuming too much as regards the Turkish attitude. He had noted all through that it seemed to have been assumed that the dispute was only about Smyrna. He could not see anything to justify the assumption that if the question of Smyrna were settled the Turks would accept the Treaty of Sèvres. This morning the Turkish delegation had put their case as regards Thrace, the sovereignty of the Straits, the freedom of control in Anatolia, &c., just as strongly as they had put it for Smyrna. Why should it be assumed that the Ottoman delegation would be satisfied with an investigation only into the case of Smyrna? Supposing the decision went in favour of the Turks and that Smyrna was restored to them. Would Mustapha Kemal then make peace without having the rest of the treaty amended; for example, Thrace, Constantinople, the garrisoning of the Straits, the neutral zone, &c.? Supposing,

on the other hand, the results of the enquiry went in favour of the Greeks, and he must remark at this if the proposal was made on the assumption that the enquiry would go against the Greeks he would not participate in it (M. Briand interjected that this was *not* the assumption). Suppose then, Mr. Lloyd George continued, the investigators came to the same conclusion as had been reached four times before, at Paris, London, San Remo and Spa, namely, that the Greek case was made out; in this event would Mustapha Kemal bind himself to accept the decision and to make no further claims as regards Thrace, the Straits, the financial and other controls, &c.? Otherwise the arrangement would be a one-sided one, and could only be regarded as a mere device to get the Greeks out of Smyrna. Unless Mustapha Kemal would accept the Smyrna decision as settling the whole treaty the arrangement would be one-sided, because the Greeks would be bound to accept it. If Mustapha Kemal would accept these conditions, the proposal was worthy of consideration.

M. Briand said that perhaps he had explained himself insufficiently. The proposal was only made on the assumption that the Ottoman delegation would say: 'We have produced figures for Thrace and Smyrna, and our opponents have produced similar figures, which do not correspond. We will therefore accept an arbitration on these figures. We will agree in advance to bow to the award. Only then would his scheme be applicable. He would say at once that he thought there was little doubts as to what the decision would be in regard to Thrace; but Smyrna was less certain. This afforded an opportunity to disarm the Turkish Nationalists on a question which specially interested them. Otherwise he would not propose to try it.

Mr. Lloyd George said that perhaps it was he who had not explained himself sufficiently clearly. M. Briand assumed that the only point on which the Kemalists challenged the treaty was as regards Greece. That was not the case of the Kemalists. They challenged the whole treaty, the financial and military terms, the demilitarisation of the Straits, and many other points. Supposing, however, the question were put to Mustapha Kemal: 'We are prepared to set up an arbitration in regard to Thrace and Smyrna. If it decides against you, will you nevertheless accept the whole of the Treaty of Sèvres?' That would be of some value. It was no use putting the case of Smyrna and Thrace by itself. The question must be put to the Kemalists as to whether, if this arbitration were granted, they would withdraw their objection to the rest of the treaty. Then there was a good deal to be said for it.

Count Sforza said that it seemed to him that the important question put by Mr. Lloyd George showed that, in spite of appearances, the conference found itself in a very favourable situation; fundamentally

there were far more important question involved than that of Smyrna, which was a flag and a slogan. Other questions, such as the financial and economic questions, were really of much greater interest and more important to the safety of civilisation. Assuming for the moment that fair and honest expert were to declare that the Smyrna district should belong to Turkey and not to Greece, then he was convinced that Mr. Lloyd George was right when he thought that the fanaticism of the Angora people would not be satisfied, and that it would maintain its objections to the Treaty of Sèvres. Nevertheless, this would not be very serious, because the adherents of the Angora fanatics would be greatly reduced. The only thing that maintained this fanaticism was the presence of foreigners on Turkish soil, and especially the presence of those who at present occupied the Smyrna district. The moment that flag was withdrawn, all the other question, financial, economic, &c., would be abandoned by the mass of the people, and there would be peace. He thought also that the peace which ought to be secured by the formula which M. Briand had proposed had an importance for secondary reasons. At the present moment he believed there was at Moscow a delegation of the Angora Turks who were ready to sign peace with the Bolsheviks. They had not yet signed, but were awaiting the issue of the present negotiations. In his view this was a terrible danger.

Mr. Lloyd George said he thought that that bogey had been laid. Was he to understand that it was now proposed to say to the Turks to-morrow: 'Will you be prepared to submit your statistical differences with the Greeks to the arbitration of the Powers? Will you abide by their decision, not merely in regard to Smyrna and Thrace, but to the extent of accepting whole treaty whatever their decision?' Othervise the proposal was of no value, and he could not accept it.

Count Sforza said that the question might be put in another way: 'Will you accept our decision? If you are right in regard to your figures, then everything will be right. If you are wrong, then the whole Treaty of Sèvres will be imposed'.

Mr. Lloyd George said that nothing could be gained by entering on an enquiry on the assumption that the Greeks would be overruled, and that the Turks would be induced to accept the Treaty of Sèvres, because this would be a direct bribe to the Powers to give a decision in favour of the Greeks [? Turks]; whereas, if they agreed in advance to accept the whole Treaty of Sèvres, and then to engage in the enquiry on a footing of equality between the two parties, there was something to be said for it. The former method involved purchasing peace for ourselves at the expense of the Greeks.

COUNT SFORZA said it was really for the benefit of Greece herself.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Greece, like other nations, was entitled to be accounted the best judge of her own affairs.

M. BRIAND said that, if he understood Mr. Lloyd George correctly, he wished the Turkish delegation to accept the Treaty of Sèvres with the possibility of an eventual modification in regard to Thrace and Smyrna as a result of this arbitration, but that they must accept the treaty even if the result was adverse; that is to say: the Turks must accept the treaty, subject to a possible modification as the result of this enquiry.

LORD CURZON who was engaged in drafting a formula, said that he assumed that in referring to 'Smyrna' M. Briand meant the Smyrna district as defined in the Treaty of Sèvres. He asked, however, what he meant by 'Thrace'. The arguments employed by the Turks at the morning meeting had applied entirely to Eastern Thrace. Did M. Briand propose that the investigation should be confined to Eastern Thrace, or extended to the whole of Thrace?

M. BRIAND said: 'To Eastern Thrace only.'

LORD CURZON then read a draft proposal setting forth M. Briand's suggestions.

M. BRIAND said that generally speaking, he would accept the draft, though it might require modification in detail.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the Turks and Greeks should be invited to meet the conference on the following day, and that the formula should be read first to the Turks and then to the Greeks.

LORD CURZON said that, of course, his formula did not mean that every detail of every clause of the treaty must necessarily be accepted.

M. BRIAND said that conditions also be added in regard to prisoners, and guarantees to be obtained for the populations during the enquiry.

LORD CURZON agreed to add these to his draft.

M. BRIAND said he should also add something about the cessation of hostilities.

LORD CURZON agreed.

COUNT SFORZA reminded Lord Curzon that, if prisoners were to be referred to, the Turks would say that the prisoners detained at Malta must also be returned.

LORD CURZON said he would be prepared to discuss that.

M. BERTHELOT suggested that some definition was required of the international commission. He presumed that it would consist of represen-

tatives of each of the Great Powers, including the United States of America, and of Greece and Turkey.

Lord Curzon pointed out that the United States of America had cut themselves off from the Associated Powers, and had taken no part in recent inter-Allied activities.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he would summon the Turks for 11.30, and Greeks for 12 noon, on the following day.

It was agreed—

That the conference itself should assemble at 11.20 a.m. on the following day, Friday, the 25th February, 1921, at St. James's Palace, in order to give a few minutes for discussion before the arrival of the Turkish delegation.

A copy of Lord Curzon's draft is attached (see appendix).

2, Whitehall Gardens,

February 24, 1921.

D.B.F.P., 1 st. series. Vol. XV. p. 189-193, No. 22

Appendix to No. 70

Viewing the difference of opinion that has arisen concerning the populations of Eastern Thrace and Smyrna in the areas assigned to the Greeks by the Treaty of Sèvres the Powers are willing to refer the questions of the population of those two areas to an international commission to be appointed by themselves, with instructions to examine into the figures both before and since the war, and to proceed with its investigations on the spot without delay, on the clear understanding, which shall be accepted by both parties, namely, by Turkey and by Greece—

(a) That they will accept the results of such an arbitration.

(b) That the remaining clauses of the Treaty of Sèvres shall remain unaltered, and shall be loyally accepted both by Turkey and Greece.

The following supplementary conditions are attached to this proposal:—

1. That there shall be an immediate cessation of hostilities between the parties concerned.
2. That there shall be an exchange of prisoners between them on conditions to be examined and laid down.
3. That guarantees shall be given for the security of the minority populations in Greek and Turkish territories in the interval before the final conclusion of peace.

February 24, 1921.

No. 71

British G. H. Q., Constantinople, to War Office, London.

Desp. 2115 25. 2. 21.
Recd. 0830. 26. 2. 21.

Paraphrase
Clear the Line.

1.9885 cipher 25th February.

According to local information a confidential circular was issued by Mustapha Kemal to leaders of Nationalist Committee in Constantinople and provinces on February 2nd; Mustapha Kemal's attitude vis-a-vis Moscow according to this circular was one of expediency designed to secure Turkish parties in Caucasus after which Nationalist policy is to re-establish position of Sultan. Meanwhile, Nationalists have to appear to Soviet to maintain very cool relations with imperialistic Turks. See my 1.9785 January 18th and Part 2 of my 1.9754 January 12th. With reference to my cable of February 9th 1.9851 paragraph C., additional incentive would be provided by above for keeping their fronts separate until last possible moment; one or other delegation being discredited according to process of negotiations.

F.O. 371/6466/E. 2766.

No 72

British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held in Lord Curzon's Room at the Foreign Office, London S.W., on Saturday, February 26, 1921, at 11 a.m.

PRESENT: *British Empire:* The Rt. Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs *(in the Chair)*; POLITICAL EXPERTS, Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Osborne; SECRETARIES, Mr. Nicolson, Mr. Howorth, Lieut.-Colonel C. W. G. Walker, D.S.O.

France: M. Berthelot; POLITICAL EXPERT, M. Kammerer; SECRETARY, M. Massigli.

Italy: Count Sforza; POLITICAL EXPERT, Signor Galli.

Japan: Baron Hayashi; POLITICAL EXPERT, Mr. Nagai; SECRETARY, Mr. Saito.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

Armenia: His Exvellency Boghos Nubar Pasha, His Excellency M. Ahoranian, M. Malcolm, General Bagratouni.

TURKISH DELEGATES:

Constantinople: His Excellency Osman Nizami Pasha, Ottoman Government delegate at Rome.

Angora: His Excellency Bekir Sami Bey, Deputy for Amassia, Minister for Foreign Affairs (President of Delegation); Dr. Nihad Reshad Bey, Munir Bey.

LORD CURZON stated that the Supreme Council had been informed that the Armenian delegation desired to state their case in connection with the negotiations now proceeding regarding the Treaty of Sèvres. Everyone knew the unfortunate events which had modified the situation since the Conference of San Remo[1]. The present meeting had been convened in order to enable the Armenian delegation to give their views on the present situation. The conference would listen to what the delegation had to say on which the conference must in the first place be enlightened, namely, who was the spokesman on behalf of the Armenians, and what was the body on behalf of which this spokesman would address the conference.

BOGHOS NUBAR PASHA replied that since the beginning of the war he himself represented the Armenians of Turkey. After the fall of the old régime in Russia the Republic of Erivan had been constituted and had formed a special delegation, presided over by M. Ahoranian. These two delegations had worked together in the hope of securing the union of Turkish and Russian Armenia. Recent events have doubtless complicated the situation, but this had not prevented the two delegations from combining or from continuing their joint efforts.

Boghos Nubar and M. Aharonian would each speak in the name of their respective delegation, but the former would act as chairman of the two.

LORD CURZON indicated his assent to this arrangement.

BOGHOS NUBAR PASHA opened his statement by begging the conference to excuse the emotion which overcame him at so critical a moment in the history of his suffering people, of a people who shed their blood on the side of the Allies and who, in spite of the victory of these Allies, now found themselves in the most critical and uncertain position.

The basis of the Armenian programme was the Treaty of Sèvres. The Armenian delegation demanded the maintenance of this treaty in so far as Armenia was concerned. They felt that in making this request they had the approval of the conference, since it was the conference which had drawn up

[1] See *D.B.F.P.*, *Ist series*, Vol. XII, Chap. IV, pp. 597-678, for events in Transcaucasia since the San Remo Conference in April 1920.

the treaty, and since the Powers when drafting the articles on Armenia desired, not only to put an end to the excesses of which Armenians had been the victims, but also to suppress the germs of future conflict. One question which was sometimes raised was whether the constitution of a Bolshevik régime at Erivan [2] should be allowed to affect the creation of an Armenian State as foreshadowed in the Treaty of Sèvres. It must not be forgotten that the independent Armenia provided for in the treaty was to be formed by the union of the Armenian Caucasian Republic with portions of the four Armenian vilayets of Turkey, the frontiers of which territory had been submitted to the arbitration of President Wilson [3]. The fact that a Soviet had been imposed upon Armenia should not prevent the Powers from freeing the other portions of the country, that is to say, the four Turkish vilayets. It should be remembered, indeed, that it was in Turkey that the Armenian question had had its origin; it was the massacres of the Armenians in Turkey which had induced the Powers to work for their liberation. It was with a conquered Turkey and not with Russia, their former ally, that the Powers had signed the Treaty of Sèvres. It was merely because Russian Armenia had happened to proclaim its independence that it had been incorporated in the Armenian State. It was true, of course, that the four vilayets were occupied by the Kemalist troops, but the Allies have various means of pressure which they could use to secure evacuation. Among the sanctions they could enforce the most easily applicable would be the continuance of the occupation of territories which are now under Allied military control, but which, if Turkey carried out her engagements, would eventually have been evacuated.

Boghos Nubar then proceeded to discuss the question of Cilicia, where the situation was, he admitted, entirely different. In view of the fact that the Armenians had asked for the application of the Treaty of Sèvres as regards their own country they could scarcely contest the clauses of this treaty which concerned Cilicia. They therefore accepted these dispositions and admitted that the greater part of Cilician territory must remain under Turkish sovereignty. They begged none the less that the population of Cilicia, which before the war was in majority Armenian and which even now comprised more than 150,000 Armenians, who thanks to France, had been repatriated since the armistice, should not be abandoned to Turkish administration. The conferences of Paris and Spa had recognised in the

[2] For the setting-up of a Soviet régime in Armenia on Nov. 30, 1920, see *D.B.F.P.*, *1 st series*, Vol XII, No. 634.

[3] See Article 89 of the Treaty of Sèvres. For the referring of the definition of the Armenian frontiers to President Wilson, see *D.B.F.P.*, *1 st series* Vol. VIII, No. 14, minute 3, No. 15, minute 1, 16, minute 2, No. 20, minute 2, and *D.B.F.P.*, *1 st series* Vol. XII, Nos. 589 and 600.

notes which they addressed to the Turkish delegation the incapacity of Turkey to govern alien races[4]. Cilicia was one of those regions where this incapacity had been peculiarly glaring. The clauses bearing on the protection of minorities scarcely applied to this district, since the Armenians of Cilicia constituted, in fact, not a minority, but a majority. The Armenians appealed therefore to France, who was their official protectress and in whose zone of influence Cilicia was included, not to desert the Armenian populations but to obtain for Cilicia a régime of administrative autonomy with a mixed gendarmerie. Such a régime would leave intact the Turkish sovereignty over the country and would at the same time secure order and tranquillity. It was impossible to conceive that after a war which had restored so many oppressed peoples to their homes, the Armenians who had suffered so terribly and who had fought on the side of the Allies should be the only people for whom not even a corner of their country could be redeemed.

LORD CURZON asked Boghos Nubar to explain what he meant by a mixed gendarmerie.

BOGHOS NUBAR replied that his idea was the constitution of a mixed gendarmerie composed of the Christian inhabitants of the country, who are mostly Armenians, as well as of Moslem inhabitants.

M. AHARONIAN began by stating that he spoke in the name of the Armenian State recognised by the Treaty of Sèvres, and the legal Government of which had just been restored after the fall of a transitory Soviet régime[5]. The Turkish successes and the capture of Kars and Alexandropol[6] had led to the temporary installation of a Soviet régime. Although he did not know the details of what had passed yet, he would like to explain the general nature of the occurrences to the conference in order to combat the impression which existed in some quarters that these recent events had created a new situation.

Bolshevism was only rendered possible in Armenia by the successful advance of the Turkish forces. The best proof of this lay in the fact that Georgia had been able to resist the infection and that in Armenia itself Soviet had already been overthrown. The Kemalist invasion of Armenia was really directed against the Treaty of Sèvres and against the Allies. This was proved by the first conditions imposed upon Armenia after the defeat, stipulating the rejection of the Treaty of Sèvres by the Armenian

[4] See *D.B.F.P.*, *1 st. series*, Vol. IV, No. 426, Appendix IX and *D.B.F.P.*, *1 st. series* Vol. VIII, No. 62, Appendix 1.

[5] The Dashnak (Nationalist) party had carried out a successful *coup d'état* on Feb. 19 and established a Provisional Government.

[6] See *D.B.F.P.*, *1 st series*, Vol. XII, No. 615 enclosure.

Government. There were some who said that as Russian Armenia had become Bolshevised there was no longer any need to create an Armenian State. These people forgot, however, that all the Armenians of Turkey had not been exterminated. Nearly 300,000 of them had taken refuge in the Caucasus and were waiting the moment when they could return to their homes. It should be remembered, however, that in the three Vilayets of Van, Bitlis and Erzeroum, according to the latest information, there remain only 96,000 Moslems.

He admitted that the Government of Erivan had entered into negotiations with the Kemalists[7], but he had himself received a letter after the fall of Kars and before the signature of the treaty[8], in which his Government informed him that they were surrounded and would be forced to accept the conditions of their enemies, but they instructed their representative in Europe not to recognise this impending treaty and to deny the validity on any engagements undertaken by them under Soviet and Kemalist pressure. The Turks are now devastating the regions which they have invaded and endeavouring systematically to replace the Armenian element by Moslems; the Armenian delegation would welcome the despatch of an Allied commission to this part to verify this account of present conditions. The Turkish Nationalists, by invading Armenia, sought to render impossible the execution of the Treaty of Sèvres and the creation of an Armenian State, their ambition being to join hands over Armenian territory with the Turanian elements.

M. Aharonian stated in conclusion that the Treaty of Sèvres had given Armenia to the Armenians as a recompense for what they had suffered after five centuries of persecution, thirty years of struggle and six years of war and massacre. Article 218 of the Treaty of Sèvres assures the protection of the cemeteries where Allied soldiers are buried in Ottoman territory; for the Armenians, Turkish Armenia itself was one vast cemetery, a sacred plot of land which they would never cease to claim. Let not the Allies forget, moreover, that if 1,500,000 Armenians had been massacred there still remained another 2,000,000 in Russian Armenia and 1,000,000 further dispersed abroad. These remaining Armenians would never be at rest until this sacred land of Turkish Armenia was restored to them.

The decision which would eventually be taken by the Supreme Council would have an important effect upon the spread of Bolshevism in Transcaucasia; he was convinced that an announcement that the Treaty of Sèvres would be maintained would be a terrible blow for Bolshevik propoganda.

[7] *Ibid.* Vol. XII, No. 622.
[8] i.e. the Treaty of Alexandropol.

Lord Curzon stated that there were certain questions which he would like to ask. Both the Armenian delegations had demanded that the Supreme Council should stand by the whole of the Treaty of Sèvres. At the same time Boghos Nubar had himself admitted that there were serious difficulties to be faced. In Lord Curzon's opinion these difficulties could be grouped under three headings, namely, Bolshevism in Russian Armenia, the occupation by Mustapha Kemal of the greater portion of Armenian territory, and the inability of the Powers to send large forces to assist Armenia. It would thus be useful to learn what the Armenian delegation considered were the essential territorial limits of Armenia. They would remember that the Conference of San Remo had referred the definition of the Armenian frontiers to President Wilson. President Wilson had drawn a frontier which included several Turkish portions as well as the port of Trebizond[9]. It was clear that there would be very great practical difficulty in establishing such a frontier. Lord Curzon desired, therefore, to put two definite questions to the delegations, namely:—

1. What were the essential limits of Armenia for which the two delegations pleaded?
2. What were the resources in men and money which Armenia could herself furnish to achieve her independence?

Boghos Nubar Pasha replied that the decision of President Wilson had never been communicated to the Armenian delegation. Lord Curzon had just said that President Wilson's frontier included Trebizond within Armenian territory; it would be remembered, however, that since last year's London Conference when the Frontiers Commission had been of opinion not to include Trebizond in Armenia[10]—which the two Armenian delegations had accepted—the Armenians themselves had never claimed Trebizond, and even in the recent memoranda which they had sent to New York and Washington stating their claims, they had been careful to exclude the Port of Trebizond (where the Armenians are not in the majority) from their programme. All that they had demanded was access through Trebizond to the sea. As regards the rest of President Wilson's frontier it was difficult to express an opinion as the Armenians did not know what it included. They were prepared, however, to be accommodating.

Lord Curzon, after thanking Boghos Nubar for his declaration, asked M. Aharonian to furnish information as to the treaty come to be-

[9] The text of President Wilson's decision of Nov. 22, 1920, is printed in *F.R.U.S.*, 1920, vol. 3, pp. 790-804. It was made public in Washington on Jan. 2, 1921.

[10] See *D.B.F.P. Ist series.* Vol. VII, No. 34 minute 2 *(a)*.

tween Mustapha Kemal and Armenia, before that country became Sovietised. What did this treaty included? What frontiers, as between Armenia and Turkey, did it provide for? Was it recognised by the Armenian delegation? Was it included [? concluded] before or after Armenia was invaded by the Turks?

M. Aharonian in reply again referred to the instructions he had received from his Government after the fall of Kars. The treaty had been imposed by force, and was categorically repudiated by the Armenians. As regards the frontiers, he did not know the exact line; approximately the frontier followed the River Arpachai till its meeting with the Araxes; Kars and Kagizman were surrendered to Turkey. Beyond the Araxes the frontier turned to the west and followed the longitude of Erivan.

Lord Curzon referred to Boghos Nubar's suggestion that some arrangement might be made for the protection of Armenians in Cilicia, and asked whether the French delegation had any observations to make on the subject.

M. Berthelot reminded the conference that France had always expressed a determination to do all that was possible to secure the protection of Christian minorities. This undertaking figured not only in the Treaty of Sèvres but also in the tripartite agreement[11]. The French Government did not think that it would be possible to demand a special régime for Cilicia. No such régime had ever been contemplated in the Treaty of Sèvres. On the other hand, France was determined to do all that she could to secure a completed guarantee for Armenian minorities whether by the creation of a mixed gendarmerie under French officers or whether by some other arrangement. In any case France would keep her engagements whatever might be her relations with Turkey.

In thanking M. Berthelot for these assurances, Boghos Nubar expressed disagreement with the word 'minority' as applied to the Armenians in Cilicia. In fact the Armenians constituted a majority of the Cilician population. In order to support his contention he quoted the figures given in a recent book by a French officer, M. Pierre Redan, entitled 'La Cilicie et le Problème ottoman[12]'. In this book certain figures were quoted from the 'Oriental Year Book' published at Constantinople, and which show the population of the Vilayet of Adana to be 185,000 Moslems as against 215,000 Christians. These figures had even been quoted in the French Chamber of Deputies.

[11] Of Aug. 10, 1920, between Great Britain, France and Italy respecting Anatolia; printed in *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 113, pp. 797-803.

[12] Published in Paris 1921. The figures quoted are printed on p. 43.

M. Berthelot contested these figures, and asked permission for M. Kammerer[13] to make a detailed statement.

M. Kammerer indicated that according to the official figures the Vilayet of Adana comprised, in 1914, 314,000 Moslems, 55,000 Christian Armenians and a certain number of Greeks. Moreover, the French authorities had reported that before the war, and even up to the war, the population was three-quarters Moslem and one-quarter Armenian. It is true that many Armenians had recently taken refuge in Adana, while a large number of Turks had left the town. It was thus possible that at the present moment there existed a Christian majority in the actual town of Adana, but it was not a large majority and applied only to the town itself.

Boghos Nubar Pasha indicated his desire of replying to M. Kammerer's figures, but Lord Curzon intervened and said that the meeting must continue its main programme. He thanked the Armenian delegates for their statements which would be reported to the Supreme Council with whom the final decision rested.

The Armenian delegations then withdrew.

(The sitting was suspended for a few minutes at 12.15 while the Turkish delegates were introduced).

Lord Curzon began by reminding the Turkish delegation of the decisions which had been taken at the recent sittings of the Supreme Council. It had been agreed that a special commission should be sent to Smyrna and Thrace to investigate the ethnical statistics on the spot; the condition of the despatch of this commission had been that the Treaty of Sèvres should stand. There were, however, certain portions of the treaty in regard to which the passage of events had necessitated reconsideration, especially was this the case in regard to Kurdistan and Armenia.

[a.] *Kurdistan*

Lord Curzon then proceeded to summarise the provisions of articles 62 and 64 of the Treaty of Sèvres relative to Kurdistan. He would like to hear Bekir Sami Bey's views on these clauses, and all the more so as Sami Bey had alluded the day before in the Supreme Council to the presence of Kurdish Deputies in the National Assembly at Angora, and to the close co-operation with their Turkish colleagues.

Bekir Sami Bey replied that as he had already had the honour to tell the Supreme Council, the populations of Kurdistan possessed complete representation in the Grand National Assembly, since each sanjak, which

[13] Head of the Asia and Oceanic Section in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

had been taken as the electoral unit, elected five Deputies. The Kurds were thus fully represented at Angora, and since Bekir Sami himself held a mandate from the Angora Assembly, he could himself claim legitimately to represent the Kurds as well as the Turks. Moreover, the Kurds had always proclaimed that they constituted an indivisible whole with Turkey: the two races were united by a common feeling, a common culture and a common religion.

It was true that after the armistice a few Kurds had asked for the separation of their country from Turkey, and that a small committee had been formed in Constantinople at the head of which were two Ottoman Senators, one of whom was Cherif Pasha. This committee had asked for the independence of Kurdistan, but its members in no way represented the population for whom they claimed to speak, and [he] suggested that they were actuated by personal rather than national motives. In any case they were now completely disavowed even by the Constantinople Kurds. If the Supreme Council so desired, however, the Government of Angora would be quite prepared to accept the despatch to Kurdistan of a commission of enquiry or the holding of a plebiscite.

In addition, Bekir Sami stated that the new organic statute for the vilayets, which had recently been drafted by the Angora Assembly, recognised in certain cases the local autonomy of the vilayets.

None the less, if the population so desired the Ottoman Government were prepared to accept the principle of local autonomy in favour of those regions where there was a predominantly Kurdish element, but the frontiers indicated in article 62 of the Treaty of Peace did not correspond to the real ethnographical situation. In effect the western and southern portion of the Vilayets of Mamouret-ul-Aziz and of Diarbekir, particularly Sanjak of Dersim (to the north-west) vas Kurdish. The Kurdish population was particularly dense in the Vilayets of Bitlis, Van and in a portion of Mosul. The Kurds were superior in numbers above all in the district bordering upon Persia and in the north. On the other hand, the district of Erbil, Altoun-Koupru and of Tas Hourmatto were inhabited by a Turkish majority.

Lord Curzon stated that he would like to ask Bekir Sami a question. The head of the Angora delegation had stated that the elections were held by sanjaks, and that each sanjak sent a delegate. He had also stated that with the exception of the Vilayets of Van and Bitlis, where the Kurds predominated, the two races were intermingled. Lord Curzon asked, therefore, if Bekir Sami Bey could say how many sanjaks had a Kurdish majority, and what was the number of the Kurdish Deputies who sat in the Angora Assembly. Finally, what was the proportion of these Kurdish Deputies to the total number of the Assembly.

Bekir Sami Bey replied that it was difficult to give exact figures. According to the electoral law the sanjaks could elect whom they liked, and any candidate could stand for any sanjak which he chose. He himself, for instance, although a Circassian, had been elected for a constituency which contained no Circassian population, and thus it came about that there were Turkish sanjaks which had elected Kurds and *vice versa.* As regards the proportion which the Kurdish Deputies bore to the whole Assembly, he could not give any exact figures, but he was convinced that the ratio was higher than that which existed between the Kurds as race, and the Turks as a race.

Lord Curzon then referred to Bekir Sami statement that the Ottoman Government would grant autonomy in the vilayets where the Kurdish population was predominant, and enquired what exactly he meant by this autonomy.

Bekir Sami Bey replied that this autonomy did not only apply to the Kurdish vilayets, but was applicable to all the vilayets. It meant that the vilayets were allowed to decide their own budget and generally manage their own internal affairs. The system contemplated was, in fact, one of administrative decentralisation.

In reply to a further question from Lord Curzon, who indicated that this autonomy really amounted to little more than what was known in England as local self-government, and that no real concession was being made to the Kurds as Kurds, Bekir Sami Bey protested that the Kurds did not desire any such concession; all they want was to live together with the Turks like brothers, as they had lived for centuries; there was no greater difference between the Kurds and the Turks than between an Englisman and a Scotchman.

Lord Curzon thanked Bekir Sami Bey for the information he had given, which would be communicated to the Supreme Council.

[*b.*] *Armenia.*

Lord Curzon suggested that the conference should now pass to a discussion of the Armenian question, and quoted articles 88 to 93 of the Treaty of Sèvres bearing on this matter. He added that, as regards Armenia, there had also been considerable changes owing to the march of events, and the actual position in that country was still somewhat obscure.

Irrespective of the fact whether any changes might be made in the dispositions of the treaty in so far as they affected Armenia, Lord Curzon desired to take it quite clear from the outset that there were certain principles which must be absolutely maintained. When the Treaty of Sèvres had been drawn up it had been decided that the western frontiers of Armenia

should be left to the arbitration of President Wilson. The frontiers which the President had laid down included districts which were now to a great extent in the hands of the Turkish Nationalists. Moreover, as a result of the Nationalist invasion and the occupation of Kars and Alexandropol, the Government of Russian Armenia had, just before the Bolshevisation of the country, signed an agreement with the Kemalist Government. This treaty had, however, never been ratified, and had therefore no legal existence. It remained to make a new one.

Lord Curzon added that he desired to be quite explicit. He wished the Turkish delegation to understand clearly that Europe—that is, the Powers who had been victorious in the war—were solemnly pledged to create an independent State of Armenia. It was therefore quite impossible to conceive of any peace which did not provide for this independence and which did not give Armenia definite frontiers. Although he did bot desire to discuss the details of such frontiers, yet it must be laid down at once that the Powers would not contemplate the creation of any Armenia which did not include the towns of Kars, Ardahan and Alaxandropol. It was in the interests of Turkey herself to have on her borders a contented and independent Armenia. It might be found, indeed, that the frontiers defined by President Wilson were not feasible, but it was, in any case, certain that some independent Armenia must be created.

Bekir Sami Bey stated that his Government had every desire to see the creation of independent Armenia in those regions where there existed an Armenian majority and where the independent State could logically be set up. They were anxious, moreover, to live in harmony with such an Armenia. As regards the treaty concluded with the Tashnak [Dashnak] Armenian Government, it was true that the treaty had not been ratified, but now that the Tashnakists had returned to power the Government of Angora were daily awaiting ratification. At the same time, Bekir Sami stated that he was glad to take note Lord Curzon's declarations to the effect that a treaty which had not been ratified is not legally in existence. He trusted that this principle would be applied equally to the Treaty of Sèvres. He would further observe that when speaking of Kurdistan mention had been made of the Vilayets of Van and Bitlis, but if one was to consider these vilayets as Kurdish, where would Armenia come in? Armenia must be constituted on an ethnical basis, but even on the pre-war statistics it could not be seen how the Armenians could lay claim to territory in Turkey. Moreover, the town of Kars had a crushing Turkish majority; at Ardahan there were only 20 per cent. of Armenians and, the place was now Georgian; on the other hand Alexandropol was an entirely Armenian town, and the Turks made no claim to it. In conclusion, Bekir Sami Bey expressed his readiness to accept a plebiscite as regards these three towns.

LORD CURZON intervened by saying that he must remind Bekir Sami Bey that he was, in fact, asking for territory which had not belonged to Turkey for fifty years or more, and that it was not thinkable that Turkey, who had not been victorious in the present war, should come out of it with an increase of territory.

BEKIR SAMI BEY replied that he based his claim to these districts on the doctrine of nationality, but that he was prepared to leave the decision in the hands of the Supreme Council.

LORD CURZON agreed that it was for the Supreme Council to decide on this matter, and that a scheme would be prepared which the Turkish delegation would be asked to agree to. At some later stage, perhaps, it might be possible to send out some mixed commission of enquiry, but for the present it was not desired to carry the matter beyond the preliminary stage. For the moment he desired only to make it quite clear to the Ottoman delegation that the Powers were absolutely determined that there must be an independent Armenia and an Armenia with enough dimensions and sufficient independence to secure its existence. Kars, Ardahan, and Alexandropol must certainly be included in such an Armenia.

BEKIR SAMI BEY repeated that the Government of Angora were quite ready to recognise an independent Armenia capable of existing. Turkey and Armenia would have to be neighbours, and it was not the desire of the Turkish delegation to create the germs of discord from the outset. Bekir Sami Bey did not feel any difficulties on this subject would arise between Turkey and the Allied Powers.

(The conference adjourned at 1.15)

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.,
February 26, 1921.
D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol. XV., p. 207-216, No. 26.

No. 73

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 2, 1921.*

No. 206.

Sir,

HIS Excellency Tewfik Pasha, the Grand Vizier and senior Turkish delegate at the Allied Conference now sitting in London, called on me this week. It was intended, as I understood, to be merely a courtesy visit, the more so that his Excellency, who is over 80 years of age, has been in

poor health ever since his arrival in England (having suffered, as he told me, very much from his five day's journey), and has presented a very feeble appearance at the few sittings which he has attended.

This did not prevent him, however, from developing a political argument which occupied about twenty minutes, and commenced with the deliver of a message from the Sultan to the effect that His Imperial Majesty was deeply convinced that the only hope for his country and his throne lay in a revival of the old relations between Turkey and Great Britain, to which he was ready to agree in any manner that might be thought best.

I remarked that, pending the conclusion of peace, we could only proceed in close concert with our Allies, and were precluded from taking any independent action. Moreover it was a pity that these considerations had not been present to the mind of the Turkish Government in 1914, when their action in making war upon us had been of a particularly shameless as well as a suicidal nature.

The Grand Vizier deplored the lamentable errors committed by his countrymen at that time, which he had done his best to avert, and for they were now paying the penalty.

When I asked him whether he was speaking exclusively for the Constantinople Government and reminded him that in the present conference the attitude of his delegation had been one of almost complete subservience to the Angora delegates, to whom they had invariably ceded the word, the Pasha replied that this had been done for reasons of expediency, but that really there was quite a good understanding between them and, that, in respect of friendship with Great Britain, the sentiments of Bekir Sami Bey were exactly identical with his own. This indeed, was the feeling of the entire Turkish people.

When I replied that it was a little difficult to reconcile these inclinations with the known facts—(1) that a representative of the Angora Government was at this moment sitting at Moscow on close consultation with the Soviet leaders; and (2) that the same Government was trying to come to separate arrangements with the French and Italian Governments behind our backs in London—the Grand Vizier did not appear to be in the least disturbed by these symptoms, which he evidently regarded as conventional moves in the diplomatic game.

His second request related to the financial position in Constantinople, which he described (I believe with absolute truth) as desperate. None of the officials or functionaries had been paid their salaries for many weeks; the Treasury was empty; poverty and destitution were widespread; and unless financial aid were forthcoming the entire State would collapse.

His proposal was that the Powers should agree to an increase in the customs duties levied at Constantinople. He seemed to be a little uncertain about his figures, and did not appear to be thoroughly acquainted with the controversy that has recently been going on at Constantinople concerning the revival of the old *ad valorem* system, to which I understand that the High Commissioners have already agreed.

Upon this subject I was non-committal, though sympathetic, and the Grand Vizier, having discharged his task with the courtesy of an old and experienced diplomat and received from me the parting advice to persuade his Angora friends to ratify the treaty as quickly as possible, enveloped himself in a heavy overcoat and withrew.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

F.O. 406/45, p. 86-87, No. 61.

No. 74

British G. H. Q., Constantinople, to D. M. I., London

Despatched 1320 2/3/21.
Received 1550 2/3/21.

Not paraphrased.
Secret. Very Urgent.

Clear The Line.

I. E. 357 cipher 2/3/21.

Black Jumbo. Mustapha Kemal to Bekir Sami, March Ist.

Begins. Your telegram February 26th was received on 28th, I believe points which you desire delegation enlightened on were explained clearly in addition to the provisions of our national oath, which forme the basis of our programme, during discussions and exchange of opinion which took place while you were here. Nevertheless I beg to state here-under my views one by one on the important points raised in your telegram.

1. Particulars of principles re economic and financial questions are unalterable.

2. There is no such thing as the question of Kurdistan unity.

3. Matters effecting Armenian and Georgian frontiers have been settled with the respective Governments. There is no need of referring to those questions at the London Conference.

4. Exchange of prisioners of war can be effected after the concluding of peace in accordance with our national oath.

5. The offer to us to accept Sèvres treaty should in the first instance be categorically rejected without examination.

6. Your approval in principle of the proposal to examine question of majority of population of Thrace and Smyrna is irreconcilable with our conviction and insistance that such action is unnecessary. However as I have stated in my previous cipher message it should be laid down as a sine qua non condition that this investigation can only be carried out after Greek troops and their civil administration and everything Greek is set aside (? withdrawal) from these regions which should be handed over to Turkey.

7. During discussion with Greeks (Conference should not only be told that) they have no rights whatever over Thrace and Smyrna but you should also persuade it (the Conference) that in the event of their insisting on stopping in our country we could expel them with an Army sooner or later.

8. Our (southern) frontier should be demarated in accordance with outlined principle. We cannot agree to retention of a single French gendarme in our territory whether north of this boundary or in Cilicia. I cannot see any difference between the statement made to you by Cabinet and these made by Picot at Sivas and by De Caix at Angora. Desire of the French to pave ground for an agreement by such cunning proposal would only serve to our closing the doors to military victory which we could in the meantime win over the French in Cilicia.

9. We recognise our public debt only as discussed when you were here; but while there is no necessity for recognising the foreign public debt establishments we cannot agree to accord privileges and power to these establishments ?which would set ?up commission of finance control.

10. You are not at all right in your views concerning installation of a provisional international administration or the exercise of international military control in Smyrna and Thrace till termination of enquiry. Point of view explained in my paragraph 6 should be taken as a principle by you. The condition proving for the participation of our officials too in the committee of investigation which either exists or its appointment is contemplated is in no way sufficient for securing our objective.

11. Unless the conditions of peace which should be concluded afresh between the Entente Powers and Turkey are defined, its title cannot form subject of discussion.

12. Of the peace conditions financial and economic clauses are of paramount importance compared with those dealing with territories.

You should consider matter of benefiting from opportunities presented to us by events at London Conference but you should at the same time take care absolutely not to be deceived by giving extensive credit to England's amour propre, for we do not approve your desire to grant some nominal privileges to English for securing peace. You may also at first fail to take into consideration privilege, be it nominal, given to English would be sufficient to destroy our independence which is spirit of our national cause. Powers granted to Your Excellency's delegation are confined within limits of national oath. Maximum (2 groups undec.) applies to the defined and limited points, which, as it was pointed out when you were here, subject to your previously consulting us about them.

F.O. 371/6466.

No. 75

British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at No. 10, Downing Street, London, S.W., on Wednesday, March 9, 1921, at 1.30 p.m.

PRESENT: *British Empire:* The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister (*in the chair*); The Rt. Hon the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; POLITICAL EXPERT, Mr. Vansittart; SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, G.C.B., Mr. St Quintin Hill.

France: M. Briand, M. Loucheur. M. Berthelot; MILITARY EXPERTS, Marshal Foch, O.M., G.C.B., General Weygand; SECRETARIES, M. Massigli, M. Chastenet.

Italy: Count Sforza; SECRETARY, Signor Galli.

Japan: Baron Hayashi, Mr. Nagai; SECRETARY, Mr. Saito.

Belgium: M. Jaspar; SECRETARY, Viscount Davignon.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

Turkey and Greece

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether anyone had seen M. Kalogerepoulos or Bekir Sami Bey. He himself had seen neither and did not know what the position was. He had heard that the Greeks intended to advance, and he did not think the Allies could stop them.

COUNT SFORZA said he had not seen M. Kalogerepoulos. He had, however, seen Bekir Sami Bey, who was very hostile to any compromise. He personally thought that Mr. Lloyd George was right, and that the Greeks would advance at once. Any advance would be made on their own

responsibility, and they should be told so again. He did not see any possibility of the Allies preventing the advance.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked what Marshal Foch thought of the Greek's projected military operations.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he knew the rumour which had been circulating, but he had no definite information as regards the nature of those operations.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that in these circumstances it would not be fair to ask for Marshal Foch's opinion.

MARSHAL FOCH said that his opinion was, it had as always been, that the Greeks were not capable of a great effort or of producing great results. If, however, the Greeks wished to make a small demonstration, then he thought they might be allowed to do so.

LORD CURZON remarked that the Greeks claimed that they could do very much more than make a small demonstration. They stated that they could cut the railway between the towns of Eskishehr and Afium Karahissar. He did not see how the Allies could prevent them from doing so.

MARSHAL FOCH remarked that the Greeks might very well get to these two towns, but he did not know if they could get back.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE stated that the other point was this: the Greeks were not asking for any money as far as the Allies were concerned, but he thought that the Allies had forbidden the issue of any further notes in Greece. Since every country was using the printing press, and Poland had, for instance, carried on a war for two years simply by the use of the printing press, and since Mustapha Kemal had issued notes and was continuing to do so, he thought it rather hard that the Allies should say to the Greeks that they would not allow them to issue drachmas.

M. BRIAND said that the measure had been taken by way of a 'sanction' on the occasion of the return of Constantine. If the Allied Governments considered it inopportune [? opportune] to modify their decision, this must not be construed as an act of weakness and action must be taken with the utmost prudence.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this measure was taken to prevent Constantine going back. It was a suggestion of M. Leygues[1]. He had never thought it would be effective. In fact, it had not proved to be effective, and Constantine was in Athens. It was unfair and childish to allow Mustapha Kemal to issue notes, and stop the Greeks from doing so. Greece

[1] French President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sept. 1920-Jan. 1921.

was the only country in the world which was not doing so, and it was not fair.

M. BRIAND asked if Mr. Lloyd George did not think that the arrival of M. Gounaris would not alter the situation. M. Gounaris would bring new proposals. He was a stronger man than M. Kalogerepoulos, and was the leader of his party. No doubt he would come forward with concessions of which we were in ignorance at present, and he thought the matter might be considered when we knew what line M. Gounaris would take.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE answered in the negative. The only proposal by Gounaris would be that the Allies should withdraw their veto on the advance of the Greek army. The Greeks were perfectly confident, perhaps foolishly so. Their claim was that Mustapha Kemal could not resist them now, but he would bring up new forces, and they should therefore be allowed to strike at once while the game was in their hands. Personally, he thought that this was fair.

M. BRIAND expressed the view that it would be quite impossible for the present conference to stop the Greeks undertaking a plan in which they thought they could succeed. The only thing which the conference could do would be to approach both parties and offer to act as mediators. If this offer were refused the Allies could only say: 'Settle the question among yourselves.' This might be a foolish business, both for the Greeks and the Turks, but no other procedure was open to the Allies. At any rate, by acting in this way the Allies would avoid being involved in the business. The Greeks might succed. If they did not succeed as much as they expected they would perhaps be wiser, and the Allies would say that their offer was still open. If, however, the Greeks soldiers gave rein to their well-known impetuosity and rushed forward, then M. Kalogerepoulos would have to swallow Bekir Sami Bey as best he could. If he could not do so, the Greeks would come back and accept the mediation of the Allies.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the chances were ten to one that the first military operation would be a brilliant success. There was really nothing at present in front of the Greeks, and in that kind of country Mustapha Kemal would have to move very slowly. It would take a long time to collect a force sufficiently large to hit the Greeks back. If, therefore, the Allies proposed to leave the matter to the chances of war, that country would be in a disturbed condition for at least two years.

M. BRIAND remarked that he wished for nothing better than to be able to stop the Greeks now.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he did not think the Allies could do so.

COUNT SFORZA stated that refraining from advance was conditional on the commission of investigation being started. If that did not start the Greek army could be expected to refrain from advancing

MR LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the Greeks should be informed now of the Allies' views, as every day counted. If the Greeks were not told at once, and their advance failed, they would attribute failure to the Allies.

M. BRIAND agreed[2]

MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed that the Greeks should be told if they liked to wait until to-morrow they could, but it was not the Allies who were holding them back.

M. BRIAND suggested that the Greeks should be summoned at 11 tomorrow, and the others at 11.30.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE replied that there was very little use in seeing them in public. Possibly, if Bekir Sami Bey, Kalogerepoulos and Gounaris could be interviewed separetely and privately, something could be done, but publicity was of no use.

M. BRIAND suggested he should see Bekir Sami Bey, and Mr. Lloyd George should see M. Gounaris.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE remarked that he did not like seeing M. Gounaris.

M. BRIAND said that M. Gounaris would have to be seen, and he might be an interesting sight.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE replied that he had been a bitter enemy of the Allies, and M. Kalogerepoulos was not.

M. BRIAND said that in favour of M. Kalogerepoulos, it must be remembered that he had produced a plan for siding with the Allies in certain eventualities, and had in consequence been upset[3].

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this was true.

He proposed that the conference should meet again at 6 p.m. the same day.

(The proceedings then terminated.)

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W. 1,
March 9, 1921.

D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol. XV., p. 345-347, No. 48.

[2] *Notes in original:* 'N. B.—This is not included in the French secretary's notes.'

[3] M. Kalogerepoulos had been Greek Prime Minister, Sept.—Oct. 1916.

No. 76

British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Wednesday, March 9, 1921, at 7 p.m.

PRESENT: *British Empire:* The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister *(in the Chair)*; The Rt. Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; The Rt. Hon. A. Chamberlain, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer; POLITICAL EXPERT, Mr. Vansittart; SECRETAIRES, Sir M. Hankey, G.C.B., Mr. St. Quintin Hill; INTERPRETER, Major Ottley.

France: M. Briand, M. Loucheur, M. Berthelot; SECRETARIES, M. Massigli, M. Brugère.

Italy: Count Sforza; SECRETARY, Signor Galli.

Japan: Baron Hayashi, Mr. Nagai; SECRETARY, Mr. Saito.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

Turkey and Greece

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether anyone had seen the two 'belligerents'. M. Gounaris had not arrived, and he did not think there was any use in seeing M. Kalogerepoulos. Lord Curzon had seen Bekir Sami Bey that day, and would make a statement.

LORD CURZON said that he had seen Bekir Sami Bey, not because of anything that had happened at the morning's conference, but because of an engagement with Bekir Sami Bey, which had been standing for some days. The interview to-day had lasted for three-quarters of an hour and *inter alia* the question of the exchange of prisoners had been discussed. Bekir Sami Bey had expressed himself with ability, clearness and with a courtesy which had increased since his first appearance. At the beginning of the interview he had expressed the desire of the Turks to resume friendly relations with the principal Powers of the West. Lord Curzon had discussed with him the chief points outstanding in the Treaty of Sèvres. Bekir Sami Bey had said little about Thrace but he had laid great stress on the claim of the Turks to the shores of the Sea of Marmora and the Straits. He was most anxious that, whilst giving all guarantees required as to the demilitarisation of the Straits, Turkey should be allowed to resume responsibility for them. Lord Curzon had told him that the Allies had suffered terribly from Turkish administration in the past, and that it was very unlikely that Turkey would be allowed to resume ownership of the Sea of Marmora.

The next point was Smyrna, and Bekir Sami Bey had indicated that if they could obtain satisfaction on this point the Turks would not be difficult

in regard to the others. Lord Curzon had asked him how he proposed to act in regard to Smyrna, and had pointed out that the Powers had asked the Greeks to Smyrna during the course of the Paris Conference. The Greeks were there now, and in the course of fighting with the Turks had at times been very succesful. Bekir Sami Bey had denied this, and had claimed that in the recent fighting the Turks had won a conspicuous victory, and the Greeks had suffered a military disaster. Lord Curzon had said that, nevertheless, the Greeks were in Smyrna, and that, unless the Turks were willing to agree to some accommodation, there would be nothing but fighting.

Lord Curzon had discussed with him some arrangement by which Turkish sovereignty might be retained, such as, for instance, a special arrangement for the town and another arrangement for the country outside the town, in which the population was very largely Turkish. Bekir Sami Bey would not look at anything of this nature, and had declined any accommodation. Lord Curzon had then remarked that the Turks always claimed that all they desired was peace, and yet there was no result when it came to business. The Allied conference had been extremely obliging to the Turkish delegation (this Bekir Sami Bey admitted), but there was a gap between the views of the conference and those of the Turkish delegation. Did Bekir Sami Bey realise what this meant? The Greeks were anxious to fight. If hostilities ensued all prospects of peace in Asia Minor were at an end, and all prospects of peace between the Turks and the Allies. Therefore, in the interests of peace both for the Turks and for Europe, he asked Bekir Sami Bey to consider whether something could be done at the last moment. Bekir Sami Bey had replied that, as regards Smyrna, nothing could be done. The Turks had defeated the Greeks before and they would do so again. Lord Curzon had enquired how the Turks proposed to defeat the Greeks, when they expected this would take place, and in what particular area. He had replied that they would defeat the Greeks anywhere in Asia Minor, and expected to do so in a few months. They would advance and the Greeks would be defeated. They would turn them out of Smyrna. By the time the Turks reached Smyrna, the Greeks would have had enough and would go of their own accord. The Turks would then resume complete occupation of Smyrna. Lord Curzon had not tried to move Bekir Sami Bey from this position, and he only mentioned this fact because it showed the spirit in which the Turks would come to the conference to-morrow.

It seemed to him that a failure as great or even greater than that which the Allies had experienced in connection with the Treaty of Versailles confronted them now. He had put it to Bekir Sami Bey whether he was prepared to fail at the London Conference as Dr. Simons had done. Dr. Simons had not as a matter of fact, possessed full powers in that he did not have the

confidence of his country. Did Bekir Sami Bey possess full powers? To this Bekir Sami Bey replied that he had full powers to act, but any powers he possessed were based on Smyrna. There could be no concessions on this point. At this remark Lord Curzon shook hands with Bekir Szami Bey, and bade him a polite adieu.

M. Briand said that he had interviewed Bekir Sami Bey that day, very probably after his talk with Curzon, and had asked him whether he did not wish to come before the conference with reasonable proposals as regards Smyrna, and to come to an understanding on this point and on Thrace, Bekir Sami Bey had replied that the Turks were not making any conditions and were ready to accept anything in regard to the Vilayet of Smyrna. The Turks thought that the people in the vilayet were Turks—the Greeks denied it. The Turks were ready to accept the result of the enquiry which had been proposed, and if the Greeks were ready to accept it everything would be settled. M. Briand had put other points in the Sèvres Treaty to Bekir Sami Bey. He had said that he did not possess full powers to discuss those, but it would no doubt be possible to come to an agreement with the Greeks, and he hoped the conference would settle these points. M. Briand had asked him to put aside all other considerations and to find a common ground in regard to Smyrna. He had replied that such a common ground could never be found because the Greeks would never accept Turkish sovereignty. M. Briand had never asked him if the Supreme Council could work out an arrangement with the Greeks, but he was disposed to think that this suggestion was worth while considering.

M. Gounaris had more power than M. Kalogerepoulos, and it would be worth while attemping to come to some agreement with him on the lines suggested by Lord Curzon. It might be possible to retain the sovereignty of the Turks, and perhaps the Greeks would accept it. If such a proposal were put forward by the Allies, both sides would be shaken. The trouble was that the Turks were convinced that the Greeks wanted to fight.

Count Sforza stated that he had heard [? had] a conversation that afternoon with Bekir Sami Bey. It had followed practically the same lines as Lord Curzon's conversation with him, and he did not propose to trouble the conference with a detailed report. As regards M. Briand's last remark, he thought that it might be possible to arrange such a compromise, although it would be a difficult one from the Turkish point of view.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he did not think that any compromise could be reached which involved the evacuation of Smyrna by the Greeks. The Greeks would rather fight; evacuation meant the fall of the dynasty, and Heaven knew what would happen then. If, however, the Allies indicated concessions, say, in regard to controls or boundaries in the East,

things might be different. He was not at all sure that the Allies could not give up a good part of the international zone. This was not a definite proposal, but was only a suggestion for discussion. For instance, the Allies might retain a Gibraltar at Chanak, with Gallipoli in possession of the Greeks as it already was. They might then clear out of Constantinople and leave it to the Turks. For himself, he did not think that any of the Allied countriés would be willing to keep large garrisons at Constantinople. Great Britain was not willing to keep forces there indefinitely for the purpose of maintaining order. Would it not be better to keep only the Dardanelles, and with the possession of this, Constantinople would be at the mercy of the Allies? Should not some such proposals as these be made to Bekir Sami Bey, and should we not say that we could give the Turks relaxations of control? In every protest he had seen from the Turks they had dwelt on that point. They said that they were not independent, and that they possessed merely sham sovereignty. He thought that we could meet the Turks, and that the Allied controls were ultra-stiff. The sooner the Allies relaxed their controls the better. They could then leave Mustapha Kemal to govern that part of the world. Then there might be something on the lines of Lord Curzon's proposals for Smyrna—giving the Turks the hinterland to Smyrna. They would not occupy it without that.

Then in Cilicia the Turks might be given a relaxation of frontiers. He understood that the French were contemplating giving up Cilicia.

All these offers might be made to Mustapha Kemal, who wished to go back to Turkey and say: 'I've got this scalp; I've got this, and this'

M. Briand remarked that the French taxpayers would not allow the French to stop in Cilicia.

Mr. Lloyd George said that the Allies could hold the Dardanelles, and it would be cheap.

M. Briand agreed that it would be with a few good guns. He then referred to the question of exchanging prisoners.

Count Sforza remarked that the proposal of Mr. Lloyd George was very interesting. So far as Italian public opinion was concerned, there had been difficulties in sending troops to Constantinople. The idea had been very unpopular. And in regard to the proposed abandonment of Constantinople he thought that the concession might not appear so valuable to the Turks as we believed. They would think that if they returned they would be enslaved there and not free. At heart they had a desire to remain at Angora, because in that capital the Allies could not apply the screw to them. Parhaps the concession in regard to the Financial Commission would be the more important to them.

Mr. Lloyd George said that the Allies were supposed to hold the Gallipoli Peninsula. All the towns in the Ismid Peninsula were under Allied

control. He suggested that these should be given up. Scutari might be garrisoned by the Greeks; in fact they were doing that now. They were at present garrisoning Ismid, and they might very well garrison Constantinople in the near future. No one could tell what a country would do in military matters. Because the Greeks had fought badly twenty years ago there was no saying that they would fight badly now. They might run, but then they might fight well. If they fought well he did not think that the Allies could keep them out of Constantinople. He therefore suggested that all the international zone at present controlled by the Allies should be given up, and that the Allies should retain only control of the Dardanelles by means of Chanak.

M. Briand said that Mr. Lloyd George's suggestion was interesting. It was certainly calculated to attract the attention of the Turks, who would see that big territories would be returned to them by it.

Lord Curzon remarked that the territoires controlled by the Allies had not been taken from the Turks.

Mr. Lloyd George said that nevertheless these territories were largely occupied by the Greeks. The Allies would tell the Greeks to leave Ismid. They would then leave Constantinople themselves and occupy merely their fortress in the Dardanelles.

At this point in the proceedings the following statement was read as a suggested basis for further discussions on this subject:—

1. The withdrawal of the Allied garrison from Constantinople and the Ismid Peninsula, which will remain entirely in the hands o the Turks.
2. The demilitarised zone to be reduced to a sufficient area on the south side of the Dardanelles to secure the free passage of the Straits.
3. The Allies to have the right to place troops and fortifications in the demilitarised zone.
4. Smyrna: Some arrangement which provides for the Turkish flag and Turkish sovereignty; Greek administration and garrisons.
5. A relaxation of the financial and military controls in Anatolia.

Mr. Lloyd George, continuing, said that evertyhing that had read had shown that the Turks desired more freedom in Asia Minor. The Allies could not exercise control even on the coast; how could they do so in the mountains? The French could not do it in Cilicia. How could the Allies control Angora, Sivas and Erzeroum? To provide for such controls was simply putting something into the treaty which was mere paper, and which made the Turks say that their independence was abolished. He thought that the controls over Turkey should be reduced to the mere minimum.

Because of these controls the Turks were not allowed to raise their own taxes, and everything had to be done with the consent of the Powers. The Turks had not the control of a parish council in this country. They could not even strike a rate. That was the kind of thing that they objected to. If the Allies made substantial concessions, Bekir Sami Bey would have something to go back with to Angora.

M. Briand said: 'And we will be rid of them'.

Mr. Lloyd George observed that the Allies were not going to make any money out of the Turks. What was the use of these controls if they did not produce any money?

M. Briand said: 'None'.

Mr. Lloyd George suggested that the British, French and Italian delegations should evolve some definite proposals which could be put before the Turkish delegation. The Allies could then say to Mustapha Kemal: 'Here you are, here is something for you; if you cannot take it, then you must fight'.

M. Briand observed that the Allies would retain Chanak and Gallipoli.

M. Berthelot asked why Greek troops should be left at Gallipoli.

Mr. Lloyd George replied that the Allies could not garrison Gallipoli; they must therefore leave it in the possession of a Power which was at their mercy. The Greeks were at the mercy of the Allies because they had Athens. If they closed the door of the Straits the Allies could always leave a card at Athens. Moreover, the population of Gallipoli was about 90 per cent Greek.

He then enquired whether Bekir Sami Bey should not be approached informally. He felt that there was no use in summoning the Turks and Greeks to St. James's Palace only in order to receive a refusal from both sides. He would himself see M. Gounaris, but he had no influence over Bekir Sami Bey.

Count Sforza said that the Italians and the French would see Bekir Sami Bey.

M. Briand again referred to the question of the exchange of prisoners.

Lord Curzon said thar he had had a conversation with Bekir Sami Bey on that subject, but without very much success. While the British Government were willing to undertake an equal exchange, or even to return a larger number of Turks than the number of British held prisoners by the Turks, Bekir Sami Bey had wanted a complete exchange of prisoners. In Turkish hands there were only 20 British prisoners, whereas the British

held 130 Turks, of whom 70 were detained at Malta under serious charges of having been concerned in atrocities. As Bekir Sami Bey had insisted on a complete exchange, the matter had come to an end.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that if the Allies had come to an agreement with the Turks on everything else, and this had been the only outstanding question, he did not think it would be worth while remaining firm on the point; but the Allies had not yet come to an agreement.

M. BRIAND proposed that Mr. Vansittart*, Signor Galli and a representative of the French delegation should meet on the following day at 10 a.m., to discuss the proposals to be put forward to the Turks, on the lines suggested in the preceding minutes.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE remarked that M. Briand would see Bekir Sami Bey, and that he and Lord Curzon would see M. Gounaris.

M. BRIAND replied that he would see Bekir Sami Bey at 10 a.m. the next day. Count Sforza and a British representative (Mr. Vansittart) would be present.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he would see M. Gounaris and M. Kalogerepoulos at 10.30 on the next day.

(The proceedings then terminated.)

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W. 1,*
March 9, 1921.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XV., p. 360-366, No. 51.

No. 77

Notes of a Conversation held at 10, Downing Srteet, London, S.W. 1, on Thursday, March 10, 1921, at 10.30 a.m.

PRESENT: *British Empire:* The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister; The Rt. Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of state for Foreign Affairs; Sir M. Hankey, G. C.B., Secretary, Cabinet.

Greece: M. Kalogerepoulos, M. Gounaris, M. Rizo-Rangabé.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Turks had brought to London a large delegation which would represent the various interests in Turkey. He had felt that the decision now to be taken was so vital to Greece that M. Kalogerepoulos should have the advantage of the presence of one

* Lord Curzon's Political Secretary.

of his more important colleagues with whom he could confer as to the reply. That was why he had ventured to suggest to M. Kalogerepoulos that he should invite M. Gounaris to join him in England. To-day the Greek delegation would have to give an answer full of fate for the future destiny of the Greek nation. He did not know whether M. Gounaris and M. Kalogerepoulos had had an opportunity of conferring or whether they had anything to say in regard to the proposals which the conference had placed before them. The Angora delegation had notified the conference that it would refuse anything which implied the retention by Greek troops of Smyrna. In fact, they would consent to nothing short of evacuation of the Smyrna region by Greece. They were not prepared to accept any proposal such as he had outlined to M. Kalogerepoulos, providing for a nominal Turkish suzerainty, even though it were accompanied by some form of tribute. They said that the Greeks must clear out of Smyrna altogether. In short, Turkish rule over Smyrna must be as effective as it was over Angora.

Lord Corzon interpolated that it was only fair to add that the Turks had accepted the proposed enquiry by a commission.

Mr. Lloyd George said that it was only true in the sense that the Turks had been willing to accept the Treaty of Sèvres. They knew perfectly well that the question of the population of Symrna had already been twice examined and had been decided against them. Now that a third examination was proposed, which would reopen the question, naturally they were willing to accept it.

M. Gounaris said that he was glad of an opportunity to attend here in order to defend the rights and interests of Greece in collaboration with the Allies, whose interests and sentiments towards Greece had so often been manifested by their deeds. The Greek Government realised the difficulties of the situation, and would be glad if it were possible to discover a solution which would put an end to the difficulties without any further struggles or sacrifice. Unhappily, as he had gathered from the communication which Mr. Lloyd George had just made, the Turks would not hear of any other solution than one which would entail the withdrawal by Greece from Asia Minor. This rendered any conciliatory settlement quite impossible. Given that attitude on the part of Turkey, it was evident that the duty would fall to Greece to complete the mission which she had undertaken in accord with her allies, namely, the enforcement of the Treaty of Sèvres by means of her military forces. He had just come from Greece with the deep impression that the Greek people, without any difference of opinion, was whole-heartedly decided to make sacrifice in order to enforce the Treaty of Sèvres. The military operation would surely bring

about the dissolution of the Kemalist forces in a short time, which he estimated at about three months. He was confident that in this way the Treaty of Sèvres could be enforced in all its clauses upon the Turks, who would realise the impossibility of upsetting the results of the war. If this was not so, sooner or later the Turks would, by their deeds, put in question the whole situation which the Treaty of Sèvres had established, especially if the natural sentry, namely, the Greek army, was withdrawn from Asia Minor. The Greek Government were convinced that the main objection of Turkey to the treaty was not so much the concession to Greece in Asia Minor as the régime established in the zone of the Straits, and more especially the provisions for securing a free passage. This régime would be threatened by the withdrawal of its principal guardian, namely, the Greek army. If the Allies abandoned the Treaty of Sèvres and followed another path, it was evident how strongly Turkey would be reinforced. If they achieved such a success it would simply lead to a great augmenation in the prestige of those who lead the Nationalist movement and whose tendencies and ambitions are immeasurable.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he had just received a communication to the effect that M. Briand had seen Bekir Sami Bey and the Turkish delegation. He did not know what their answer was, but he would know at noon. He suggested that the Greek delegation should take the proposal in regard to the Smyrna region, which had been framed in the British Foreign Office for the consideration of the Greeks and the Turks*, and, after studying it, should let the British Government know their opinion. The underlying idea of these proposals was more or less the same as he had suggested to M. Kalogerepoulos. It provided for Turkish suzerainty with Greek possession of the town of Smyrna, the rest of the Smyrna zone being placed under a Christian Governor, with a gendarmerie drawn from the population in proportion to its nationality in the different districts. The régime would exist for five years, after which either the Powers or the League of Nations would reconsider the whole question.

Lord Curzon added that the Greek troops would remain as a garrison to Smyrna. The administration in the interior of the Smyrna region would be conducted on the same lines as the gendarmerie, according to the nationality of the population of the various districts. He understood, for example, that there were some towns in the interior, and perhaps a few on the coast, where the population was mainly Turkish and not Greek. In those the gendarmerie and the administration would be primarily Turkish. Where, however, the Greeks were in the majority, the administration and the gendarmerie would be primarily Greek. That was the underlying

* See Appendix below.

principle. The boundaries of the Smyrna district, as defined in the Treaty of Sèvres, might have to be rearranged. These boundaries had been drawn in order to satisfy M. Veniselos, and had been based at certain points in accordance with strategical considerations. Under the régime now proposed these strategical considerations would disappear. Consequently, purely Turkish districts might revert to Turkey. It would be to the interest of Greece that villages whose inhabitants were entirely Turkish should not be within a Greek zone. A commission would have to be appoined to examine the whole question, but it would not be the same commission as had been contemplated by the conference during the recent sittings. In reply to a question by M. Gounaris, he said that a Christian Governor would be appointed either by the Powers or by the League of Nations, who would, of course, consult both parties and secure agreement. The document which he was about to hand to the Greek delegation, had been drawn up in the Foreign Office merely as a basis for consideration, which it was hoped, might be accepted by both sides, and as a possible compromise. (See Appendix).

Mr. Lloyd George said that Bekir Sami Bey had refused to look at anything of the kind, and he thought that M. Kalogerepoulos and M. Gounaris should know this. Of course, it might be put to Bekir Sami Bey again.

M. Gounaris said that, according to the opinion of Greek military experts, the boundaries of the Smyrna region had not been drawn in accordance with strategical considerations.

Lord Curzon agreed that this wa snot the case as regards the boundaries as a whole, but as regards certain parts strategical considerations had predominated. For the moment, however, the point was not one of importance.

M. Gounaris remarked that, according to this proposal, there would be two administrations, one for the town of Smyrna, and one for the district. What, he asked, would be their relations?

Lord Curzon said that there would not really be two administrations. There would be a single administration for the whole of the Smyrna Sanjak, with a Christian Governor. The case of each town or district would be examined, and the administration would be conducted according to the ethnological majority. He had always understood that in Smyrna town the Greeks predominated, although Bekir Sami Bey said this was not the case. There would be a series of local administrations in which the nationality would be different, according to the nationality of the population.

M. Gounaris asked whether there would be a central authority in the town of Smyrna over all these districts.

Lord Curzon said it would be necessary to appoint a commission to draw up the local administration. It was not possible to settle the details here; they would have to be settled on the spot. The commission, of course, would not be the same as had been proposed at the earlier discussions in regard to Smyrna.

M. Gounaris asked whether the Governor would be appointed over the whole zone or only over that of the city.

Lord Curzon said: 'The former'. Presumably, the Christian Governor would live in Smyrna.

M. Gounaris asked what was the difference between this proposal and the one previously made to M. Kalogerepoulos?

Mr. Lloyd George said there was all the difference in the world. The commission proposed by the conference might have reported in favour of clearing the Greeks out of Smyrna and handing over the whole region to Turkey, if they had found that the Turks had a majority of the population. Lord Curzon's proposal, however, secured the town of Smyrna to Greece and provided a neutral Government for the whole sanjak, with a Greek administration in all kazas where the Greeks were in a majority. Further, in five year's time the whole situation would be reviewed. He thought the best plan would be for M. Kalogerepoulos and M. Gounaris to take away a copy of the scheme to study it, and in the afternoon to let him and Lord Curzon know their views. Meanwhile, he would have heard what Bekir Sami Bey had to say.

Lord Corzon said that M. Gounaris must understand that this scheme had been drawn up not by the Allies as a whole, but by the British Foreign Office, who had not yet show it to their French and Italian colleagues, although he was quite prepared to show it to them at any time.

Mr. Lloyd George added that he had made a somewhat similar proposal, though not identical with this draft, to the French and Italian delegations. He had also put that analogous proposal before Bekir Sami Bey, who had rejected it.

M. Gounaris asked if the present proposal had been shown to Bekir Sami Bey.

Mr. Lloyd George said: 'No.'

(The Greek delegation undertook to return later in the day and give their reply).

Note.—After Lord Curzon's withdrawal, M. Kalogerepoulos referred to a verbal message he had received from Mr. Lloyd George, by Sir Maurice Hankey, on the previous evening, to the effect that if the Greek Government should consider it vital and of paramount importance to the

security of their army to attack Mustapha Kemal's forces, the conference could no longer take the resposibility for restraining them.

Mr. Lloyd George confirmed Sir Maurice Hankey's message.

M. Kalogerepoulos said that he had received a telegram from the Smyrna district, to the effect that Mustapha Kemal's forces had been increased, but that a fall of snow had prevented the Greeks from striking a blow at them for another fortnight.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S. W. 1.

March 10, 1921.

APPENDIX TO No. 77

1 The Greeks to be allowed to keep a garrison in Smyrna *town*.

2 Order to be maintained in the rest of the sanjak by a gendarmerie with Allied officers to be recruited in proportion to the numbers and distribution of the population (as reported by *a* commission (inter-Allied), *not* the one we have proposed).

3 The same proportional arrangement—equally, according to the report of the commission—to be made for the administration.

If there is a Greek majority this will ensure their real control of the country, more especially if there is,

4. A Christian Governor to be appointed by the League of Nations and assisted by an Elective Assembly and an Elective Council.

5. As an off-set to this the country so administered would be called the *Vilayet* of Smyrna, and,

6. As proposed by the Prime Minister this morning, it would remain nominally under Turkish sovereignty, even if, under the 'proportional' arrangement of the administration, the real control was Greek.

7. The Christian Governor would be responsible for the payment to the Turkish Government of a fixed annual sum which might be augmented with the prosperity of the province. It had better not be called 'tribute', as that term might, for opposite reasons, give both Greeks and Turks something to cavil at.

8. Our great object is to get a provisional arrangement *now*, and peace, i.e., to tide over the period when this particular point is overheated. The heats will diminish. We should therefore add that this arrangement would be reviewed in, say, five years, on the demand of either party, by the League of Nations.

D.B.F.P., Ist. series, Vol. XV, p. 366-371, No. 52.

No. 78

British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London S.W., on Thursday, March 10, 1921, at 12 noon.

PRESENT: *British Empire:* The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister (*in the Chair*); The Rt. Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; EXPERTS, Mr. Blackett, Treasury, Mr. Vansittart; SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, G.C.B., Mr. Howorth, Mr. St. Quintin Hill.

France: M. Briand, M. Berthelot; EXPERT, M. Kammerer; SECRETARY, M. Massigli.

Italy: Count Sforza, Marquis della Toretta; EXPERT, Signor Galli; SECRETARY, Signor Guariglia.

Japan: Baron Hayashi, Mr. Nagai; SECRETARIES, Mr. Saito, Mr. Yoshizawa.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

Interviews with Turkish and Greek Delegations.

M. BRIAND informed the conference that this morning Count Sforza and himself had interviewed the Ottoman delegates[1] and laid before them the proposals which had been discussed yesterday by the Allies. He had particularly emphasised the political, financial and economic aspects of the proposals. The Ottoman delegates had asked for time consideration, and Count Sforza and himself proposed to meet them again at 4 o'clock this afternoon. As the result of the interview, the general impression left upon his (M. Briand's) mind was that the Turks were impressed with the proposals taken as a whole. In particular, Bekir Sami Bey and Reshid Bey, both during the discussion and subsequently in private conversation, had indicated their view that the proposals merited their careful consideration. At the same time they had taken pains to remind him that their powers were strictly limited, and that they had no authority to decide these particular issues. It would be necessary for them to communicate with the authorities in Turkey and to obtain fresh powers. In any case, they would come with a considered reply at 4 o'clock to-day.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the Turkish delegates had clearly understood that these proposals were conditional on the acceptance by them of Allies' decision respecting Smyrna.

[1] As arranged on March 9, see No. 75.

M. BRIAND replied that he had taken care to impress on the Turkish delegates that the proposals must be taken or rejected as a whole, and that at the moment they could only be regarded as made unofficially. If the Turkish delegates stated that they were empowered to accept the proposals as a whole then the proposals would be submitted to them officially.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE informed the conference that he had that morning had a conversation with M. Gounaris and M. Kalogerepoulos[2]. He had obtained the impression that M. Gounaris was the man that mattered. He was the Greek Bekir Sami Bey, while M. Kalogerepoulos was the Greek Grand Vizier. The Greeks had made it perfectly clear that they were not in a position to compromise as regards Smyrna. On this point they could not have put their view more definitely or emphatically. They appeared to be convinced that the Greek army could defaat Mustapha Kemal with the greatest ease. In fact, they were as much convinced that they could beat Mustapha Kemal as Bekir Sami Bey was convinced that Mustapha Kemal could beat the Greeks. He (Mr. Lloyd George) had never seen two combatants who were so confident of being able to beat each other.

In the course of the discussion Lord Curzon had handed to the Greeks the proposals contained in a paper which Mr. Lloyd George submitted to the meeting. (Copy attached see, Appendix 1.)[3].

The Greeks, while expressing no opinion on the proposals in this paper had asked many searching questions, and in particular M. Gounaris had shown himself to be conversant with the situation and competent. He had taken away the proposal[s] and promised to reply later in the day. One of the questions which he had put indicated perhaps that he had taken an unfavourable view of the proposals, and this questions was a request for an explanation of the differences between the present proposals and the original propositions made to the Greeks by the conference.

LORD CURZON explained that under the present scheme it was suggested that there should be a commission set up whose duties should be to define the Greek and Turkish zones. When M. Gounaris had asked what the difference was between this and the original proposals, Mr. Lloyd George had replied that the functions of this commission were strictly limited in character, whereas the commission contemplated in the original proposals would have [?had] a completely free hand, and could for example, have advised the withdrawal of the Greek soldiers and the substitution of a Turkish for a Greek administration. This explanation had seemed to satisfy M. Gounaris.

[2] See No. 77.

[3] This document not here reprinted, was identical with the Appendix to No. 77.

(M. Camerlynck translated the proposals into French).

Lord Curzon added that with regard to item 1 it would be understood that the Greeks would have to withdraw their troops from the rest of the Smyrna zone.

In answer to M. Briand, MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had alluded to these proposals in conversation with the Turks a few days ago, and that Lord Curzon had also mentioned them to the Turks in very general terms [4].

M. BRIAND remarked that the references in the proposals to the League of Nations were very important, and it would be interesting to know what view the Turks took about them.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that if the Turks accepted the proposals it would show that Bekir Sami Bey had very great confidence in the League of Nations.

M. BRIAND agreed, and remarked that of course very great hopes and expectations regarding the League of Nations which had been raised throughout the world had also permeated Asia Minor.

M. BERTHELOT remarked that there was a Chinese proverb which said that hope is the dream of a waking man.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that nothing fresh could be done until the conference were informed of the views of the Greek and Turkish delegates.

Treaty of Sèvres. Proposed Military and Financial Concessions.

M. BERTHELOT enquired whether the meeting could not now consider certain proposals contained in a paper which had been drawn up by the political experts (copy attached, see Appendix 2), dealing with certain military and financial questions arising out of the Treaty of Sèvres. If possible it would be very desirable if the French and British Governments could agree on these proposals.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had been looking at the document in question and thought that it would be very convenient if M. Berthelot would explain precisely what the proposals involved.

M. BERTHELOT said that the proposals were of two kinds. The first referred to the military clauses of the treaty and the second were concerned with certain financial and economic concessions. M. Kammerer would be prepared to explain the points in detail.

M. KAMMERER explained that from a military point of view it was proposed to reduce the demilitarised zone to the two sides of the Dardanelles

[4] Cf. No. 75.

and Bosphorus. There would only be military occupations at Chanak and at one point on the Dardanelles. Under the treaty all military works in these zones had to be destroyed and must not be rebuilt, and if this was insisted upon to the letter the continued occupation of Constantinople by the Allies would cease and the Turks, who would have full liberty outside the narrow zone thus demilitarised, would enjoy a free passage between Asia and what remained of their territory in Europe.

Secondly, it was proposed to modify the provisions under which Turkey was forbidden to have a conscript army and was only allowed to raise forces by voluntary means. The financial position of the country rendered it impossible for the Turks to maintain a properly paid army on a volunteer basis. The question arose whether it was possible or desirable to treat Turkey differently in this respect from Germany and other ex-enemy countries. He (M. Kammerer) thought that it was possible to do this, inasmuch as the other treaties were all actually in force, whereas the Treaty of Sèvres was not in force. The Allies, in any case, were not obliged to treat all their late enemies in precisely the same manner. The conditions in Turkey were quite different to those elsewhere and warranted exceptional treatment. It was proposed to increase the Turkish army to 75,000 men in all, including 30,000 special troops instead of 15,000, as discussed hitherto. A slight decrease of foreign officers was also contemplated, as it was desirable to increase the number of Turkish officers so as to find emplacement for a number of ex-officers who were at present out employment and easily become a danger to the country.

With regard to finance, it was proposed that the new Financial Commission should have as its honorary president the Turkish Minister of Finance for the time being. It was also desired to add to the commission a Turkish delegate, who should have a single vote and not two votes like the other delegates, and who should only be entitled to vote on questions with which Turkish finance was directly concerned. When the Financial Commission was discussing the questions in which Turkey was only indirectly concerned, such as the distribution of the Turkish debt, the annuites and reparations, the Turkish delegate would be present merely in a consultative capacity and would have no right to vote. Secondly, it was proposed to make certain concessions in the matter of the Turkish budget. The budget was to be approved in draft by the Financial Commission and then submitted to the Ottoman Parliament. That Parliament might have power to alter the headings and to vary details of expenditure provided that these modifications did not involve any change in the aggregate receipts, expenses or surplus respectively. Before these latter could be changed the budget would have to be returned and approved by the Financial Commission.

Thirdly, the Ottoman Government might be given power to formulate proposals for financial and economic concessions on the distinct understanding that the interest of the Turkish Treasury were safeguarded by the grant to the Financial Commission of an effective veto on such proposals.

MR. VANSITTART added that it was also proposed to give the Turks the permanent and effective chairmanship of the Straits Commission.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE remarked that he did not in the least like the proposed concessions respecting conscription. In his opinion, it would be most difficult, if not impossible, to allow Turkey to conscript troops and at the same time maintain a refusal in the case of Germany, Austria and other ex-enemy Powers. He quite realised that Turkey could not pay for a volunteer army, but at the same time he felt satisfied that the Turkish Government would get the men somehow or other. In any case, it would be most unwise for the Allies to admit, in so many words, the principle of conscription in Turkey.

COUNT SFORZA remarked that the Turks would no doubt raise a compulsory volunteer army.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed. The position would be very much the same as it was in Great Britain at the time of the Napoleonic wars when, while nominally the men were regarded as volunteers, the press-gang and other similar means made the system really one of compulsion. He was convinced that if the Allies agreed to give Turkey a conscript army they could not, in the long run, refuse to make the same concession to Germany.

As regard finance, he confessed that he had held heretical views. It seemed to him that the Allies were creating very elaborate machinery for raising money out of the barren rocks of Asia Minor. In point of fact, there was little or no money to be got of that country. The Turkish Empire had been torn to pieces, and practically nothing of value would, in the end, be left in Turkish hands. It was, he thought, absurd to constract this huge machine for the purpose of collecting reparations and other pre-war and post-war Turkish debts. It had been difficult enough before the war to enforce the right of Turkish creditors. How much more difficult would it be in the altered circumtances of the present day! He himself was disposed to think that the Turkish delegates should be told that their Empire, having been torn to pieces and there being no intention of restoring it, the Allies had decided that the Turks must be called upon to pay as much as they could in reason be expected to pay, but that it was not proposed to set up an elaborate administration for the purpose. To erect all this complicated machinery would make for peace in Asia Minor but was being done very largely in the interest of British and French financiers, who, no doubt, found it highly profitable to fish in these troubled waters, and who looked anx -

iously for the time when they could dictate, through their numerous agents, to the future Turkish Government. For these reasons he would go much further than the proposals before the meeting, and he would do everything possible to give the Turks a free as regards finance. These particular concessions might have some value, but if he were a Turk he would not have looked at them.

M. KAMMERER said that he would answer Mr. Lloyd George solely from the financial point of view. The experience of the French Government had been that the Ottoman Debt Commission had worked satisfactorily and efficiently before the war, and had contributed much to the interests of Turkey while protecting Turkish creditors. This commission had, however, fallen into disfavour with certain of the Allied Governments, and the British Government had invented, and had pressed very strongly, the new Financial Commission, the creation of which had been resisted by the French Government for a very long time. Ultimately, however, the French Government had acquiesced in the views of the British Government[5]. The result would be that the Ottoman Debt Commission would disappear in 1923, and unless there was some body to take its place the consequences would be most serious. It was not for him to defend the proposed Financial Commission, which, as he had already pointed out, was an invention of Great Britain. No doubt the Turks would readily fall in with Mr. Lloyd George's proposals, but great care must be taken before the Allies committed themselves to giving Turkey a compulsory free hand in financial matters.

With regard to the future possibilities of Asia Minor, he would remind the meeting that the country had always been agriculturally prosperous, and in former times had been the granary of the Middle East. The position of the Government of Mustapha Kemal was very enviable from the financial point of view. He had no external debt, and no acknowledged internal debt. On the other hand, he was collecting taxes without difficulty at three or four times the rate in force before the war. Admittedly this condition of affairs could not continue for a long time, but it must not be forgotten that Asia Minor was a rich and fertile country with great future possibilities. This, of course, did not mean it could possibly bear the heavy charges incidental to the continued occupation of parts of the country by British, French, Italian and Greek troops.

It was in any case necessary, if anything was to be got out of Turkey, to have an effective machine. For this, one might well consider a reorganisation of the Ottoman Debt Commission.

[5] For correspondence concerning the establishment of this Financial Commission, see *D.B.F.P.*, *1st series*. Vol. XIII, Nos. 151, 154, 158, 190, 192, 194, and 204-5.

Count Sforza remarked that the Turks would, no doubt, prefer to retain the new Financial Commission, because they thought it would be easier to get rid of than the Ottoman Debt Commission.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he had been told that we were not collecting reparations, but that he thought there were some reparations, and 'some' meant a good deal for that part of Turkey. He thought that the Allies ought to take these charges for occupation and get rid of them. Had not the Allies better close down at once as there was no money to be got out of Turkey. Peace meant a good deal to the Allies, who had spent more on quarelling with the Turks than all the money which they could possibly get from reparations.

The Allies should say to the Turks, that they give up their claims. They could then go to the Greeks and say that they had made all these sacrifices and diminutions of their claims under the Treaty of Sèvres, and the Greeks would have to make sacrifices also. The same could be said to Mustapha Kemal. At present the only persons who were asked to make sacrifices were the Greeks. This was an impossible situation. It would be easy to make peace if everyone put his penny into the hat instead of it all being drachmas.

M. Briand replied that when he saw the Turks he had observed that they had something chiefly in mind. It was this. They had only recently established a Parliament, which had risen all hot from the embraces of the electorate. This Parliament expected to play a part in the moulding of Turkish policy, especially in regard to the budget. He thought that the existence of a commission which could exercise a veto, especially in financial matters, would result in an impossible situation, but it was important to conceal from the Turks, at the moment, the extreme concessions which the Allies were prepared to make. It was well known what the Turks were. If concessions were made to them they would immediately ask for further concessions. Between the Allies it should be understood that they would go as far as Lord Curzon had pointed out. They would give very great concessions in regard to the payment of sums due in respect of occupation. Moreover, it would be understood that the costs of occupation would be given up on both sides, including the Greeks.

M. Berthelot added that all the same, a certain control of the budget must be maintained. In any case, if the Allies forwent their claim for occupation expenses, the Greeks must renounce their claims also.

Mr. Lloyd George assented and said that the Greeks would be included in this arrangement.

Count Sforza remarked that it was important not to lose sight of hard facts. If only the obligations of the treaty were in question peace

could be brought about immediately, but there was a lion in the path, and that was Smyrna. The Allies could make all the concessions they liked, but there would still be the Smyrna question, which was the sore point.

Mr. Lloyd George replied that the concessions proposed were only by way of giving something to the Turks in return for Smyrna. If they would not have this then—

M. Briand said that what might happen would be as follows: If the Allies insisted on the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres it meant the total destruction of an Empire. Naturally, there was a very violent reaction against the treaty. It was quite natural for the Turks to resist the treaty, but not all the Turks were of the same opinion. This difference of opinion was noticeable even in the delegation which had come to London. The delegation consisted of some reasonable people and of some extremists. At Angora, if they heard of the concessions which it was proposal to make in regard to the treaty, and which would allow Turkey to reconstruct herself and to live a normal life, he thought that there would be very little left of the Extremist Party, and these could be dealt with easily by the Allies. There would be a rush for peace when the Allies' proposals were heard, a rush which would be irresistible. If Bekir Sami Bey inform his people of the Allies' proposals there would be a new revolution, but he must have time to tell them. Meantime, the Greeks wanted war. They were anxious to fight, and the Allies must not deny this supreme satisfaction, if they really desired it. In the event of war, there were the two following possibilities:—

Firstly, either the Greeks would annihilate the Turks, and in doing so would settle the whole question; or

Secondly, there would be a check at some time or other to Greek progress, and no definite strategic result would be obtained. Then there would be a revulsion of feeling in Greece, and a tendency towards peace. Peace was in fact already desired by some people in Greece. That would be the opportunity for the Allies to bring the two conflicting peoples together. To-day, it would be a little premature to attempt to force a definite conclusion.

Count Sforza said that he was all the more in agreement with M. Briand's opinion, because he was under the impression that Bekir Sami Bey distrusted another member of his delegation even more than he distrusted M. Gounaris.

Mr. Lloyd George asked whether this person was one of the Constantinople people, or one of Bekir Sami Bey's own people.

Count Sforza replied that the person in question was one of Bekir Sami Bey's own people.

M. BRIAND said that if the reasonable elements of Turkey represented by Bekir Sami Bey could join forces with the somewhat fragile Tewfik Pasha he thought that they would together form an imposing figure.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE remarked that Tewfik Pasha was not an important person.

M BRIAND said that he represented merely tradition.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that M. Briand would see the Turks this afternoon. He thought it undesirable to submit a written document to Bekir Sami Bey until the Allies saw what the Greeks would say about the matter. He was referring to the document which Lord Curzon had produced this morning in regard to Smyrna [6].

M. BRIAND said that in the conversations he had in regard to Cilicia with Bekir Sami Bay the latter had stated that the Turks were ready to give all guarantees possible as regards the Christian and Armenian population. There would be a mixed force in Cilicia with French officers and a mixed municipality. The Turks would give all the necessary guarantees.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that first of all M. Briand and Count Sforza would see Bekir Sami Bey at 4 p.m. in the afternoon, and discuss with him the subject which had been before the conference this morning.

MR. VANSITTART remarked that Bekir Sami Bey had asked for a written document.

M. BRIAND said that a document had been promised to him.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE observed that there was one very important point. If Bekir Sami Bey was under the impression that he was going to get all the concessions which had been referred to from the Allies and yet would not abandon his position that the Greeks should leave Smyrna, then peace would be no nearer.

COUNT SFORZA said that this had been made quite clear to Bekir Sami Bey.

LORD CURZON asked whether Bekir Sami Bey had a clear idea of the scheme.

COUNT SFORZA replied that he had.

LORD CURZON remarked that they had only dealt with generalities so far.

COUNT SFORZA said that Bekir Sami Bey had understood that Smyrna would remain under the Turkish flag and Turkish sovereignty.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Bekir Sami Bey should be asked to accept the principle of the Allies' proposals, and should be told that a de-

[6] i.e. No. 77, Appendix.

tailed plan would be put before him later. The plan should not, however, be shown to him before the Greeks accepted it.

M. Briand agreed that the detailed plan should not be shown to Bekir Sami Bey before the Greeks saw it.

Mr. Lloyd George said it would be worth while to find out if Bekir Sami Bey accepts the principle and then tell him that a detailed plan would be put before him.

M. Briand said that when he had seen Bekir Sami Bey and Reshid Pasha (who was the most impressive figure in the delegation) they had had in their minds the question of the Russian population in Constantinople, which was a serious one, since the population in question had recently been growing very greatly. He personally had no doubt that the suggestions which had been made yesterday and which had been produced to-day were something that would interest the Turks very much. In spite of everything Angora was not Constantinople, and for the wild cats the eaves Constantinople might prove more comfortable. Perhaps the Allies might let their proposals be known.

Mr. Lloyd George said that the Allies should not press the matter on too much.

Count Sforza remarked that it was of no use to hope that the Allies would settle things at once.

M. Kammerer asked whether any document should be given to Bekir Sami Bey.

Mr. Lloyd George said he thought not. He had been very much impressed by what M. Briand had said that the Allies should not press the matter forward too hard. No document should be given at the present juncture to Bekir Sami Bey.

M. Briand remarked that Bekir Sami Bey had been promised a document this morning and something would have to be said to him about it.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he should be given a general idea, and no document should yet be handed to him.

M. Briand asked whether Mr. Lloyd George would have a conversation with M. Gournaris [Gounaris].

Mr. Lloyd George replied that M. Gournaris [*sic*] would come to see him as soon as he had made up his mind.

M. Briand asked whether the conference of the Allies delegations could not meet again at 5 or 6 in the evening.

Mr. Lloyd George said that owing to a debate in the House of Commons this would be difficult unless the meeting took place in his room at the House of Commons.

M. Briand agreed to his proposals, and said that it would be very interesting to meet Mr. Lloyd George in the House of Commons and see him in the full exercise of his powers.

Mr. Lloyd George said that the conference would reassemble in his room at the House of Commons at 6 p.m. the same day.

(The proceedings then terminated).

2, Whitehall Gardens,
March 10, 1921.

Appendix to No. 78

Draft proposals for modification of the Treaty of Sèvres.

The Allies would be prepared to facilitate the admission of Turkey to the League of Nations on conditions that they have proof of Turkey's readiness to execute the treaty as now modified.

They would be prepared to withdraw from the treaty the menace at present suspended over Turkey of expulsion from Constantinople in certain contingencies.

They would be prepared to concede to Turkey the chairmanship of the Straits Commission, on which Turkey should moreover have two votes instead of one as hitherto proposed.

The Allies would admit Turkish membership of the commission to prepare the scheme of judicial reform to replace the Capitulation[s].

The Allies are prepared to admit the increase of the Turkish forces to 30,000 special elements, and 45,000 gendarmerie. The latter would be distributed in agreement between the Government and the Inter-Allied Commission. The proportion of officers and non-commissioned officers admitted in the gendarmerie will be modified in a sense more favourable to Turkish desires, and the number of foreign officers will likewise be reduced and distributed in agreement between the Turkish Government and the Inter-Allied Commissions, which might likewise be able to consent to some extension of the number and nature of military schools. An extension of the periods specified for demobilisation, reduction of armaments, &c., would also be accepted.

Further, in regard to the Straits, the Allies have in mind considerably to reduce the demilitarised zone which would be limited—

1. To the Peninsula of Gallipoli and the Marmora coast up to Rodosto.
2. On the Asiatic coast of the Dardanelles from Tenedos to Karabiga.
3. On the two shores of the Bosphorus to a depth of 20 or 25 kilom.

4. To the islands commanding the Dardanelles in the Ægean and the Marmora.

The Allies might also consent to the rapid evacuation of Constantinople, of the Ismid Peninsula, and to limit the Allied occupation to Gallipoli and Chanak.

They would also in these circumtances assent to the maintenance by Turkey of troops in Constantinople and to a Turkish right of free passage between Asia and Europe in the demilitarised zone of the Bosphorus.

The Allies might also be prepared to consider the possibility of giving to Turkey more satisfaction in the matter of the strength of her naval forces.

They would further be prepared to withdraw certain stipulations of the armistice still in force, and the provisions restricting Turkey's freedom to send officers abroad.

In the financial chapter the Allies are prepared to make substantial concessions in the sense desired by Turkey.

The Financial Commission would be placed under the honorary presidency of the Turkish Finance Minister, and Turkey would participate in the Financial Commission by a delegate with a vote on all questions affecting the internal finances of Turkey and a consultative voice in those effecting more specially the financial interests of the Allies.

The Turkish Parliament would have the right to modify the budget prepared in agreement between the Minister of Finance and the Financial Commission, but if these modifications were such as to disturb financial equilibrium, the budget would return for approval to the commission.

The Ottoman Government would regain its liberty in regard to the grant of concessions. The Minister of Finance shall, however, examine and decide in agreement with the Financial Commission whether the contracts are in conformity with the interests of the Ottoman Treasury.

The suppression of foreign post offices might also be considered on certain conditions.

Certain modifications in the definition of 'nationals of the Allied Powers' might also be contemplated.

In regard to Kurdistan, the Allies would be prepared to consider a modification of the treaty in a sense in conformity with the existing facts of the situation, on condition of facilities for local autonomies and the adequate protection of Kurdish and Assyro-Chaldean interests.

In regard to Armenia the present stipulations might be adapted on condition of Turkey recognising the rights of Turkish Armenians to a national home on the eastern frontiers of Turkey in Asia, and agreeing to accept the decision of a commission appointed, by the Council of the

League of Nations, to examine on the spot the question of the territory equitably to be transferred for this purpose to Armenia.

In regard to Smyrna the Allies would be ready to propose an equitable compromise with a view to ending the present unhappy state of hostilities and ensuring the return of peace.

The region called the Vilayet of Smyrna would remain under Turkish sovereignty.

A Greek force would be maintained in Smyrna town, but in the rest of the sanjak order would be maintained by a gendarmerie with Allied officers and recruited in proportion to the numbers and distribution of the population as reported by an Inter-Allied Commission. The same proportional arrangement, equally according to the report of the commission would apply to the administration.

A Christian Governor would be appointed by the League of Nations and assisted by an Elective Assembly and an Elective Council. The Governor would be responsible for payments to the Turkish Government of annual sums expanding with the prosperity of the province.

This arrangement would in five years be open to review on the demand of either party by the League of Nations.

D.B.F.P., 1st. series, Vol. XV., p. 371-381. No. 53.

No. 79

Report No. 79, Issued by The British Secret Intelligence Service, Constantinople Branch.

12. 3. 1921

Extracts *Anatolia.*

Secret Sitting of the Great National Assembly.

According to information from a Nationalist source as yet untried but believed to be reliable, the Great National Assemly held a secret sitting on February 12th., of which the following is a summarised account:—

Mustapha Kemal:— "With regard to external affairs we must be more than ever on our guard. It is common knowledge that Anglo-Russian rivalry is entering on a new phase in the East. For the purpose of hastening conclusion of an alliance with the Russians, the English have invited us to the Conference of London and we have sent our delegates there".

Tewfik effendi (Dersim):— "Are the rumours true according to which we shall not be received at the Conference until we have come to an agreement with the Constantinople delegates?"

Mustapha Kemal:— "Sir, the Government has done all it should. We have come into official contact with France and Italy and been informed with regard to the intentions of Enlgand. Italy's reply was as follows:— "The Entente Powers wish to enter upon negotiations with the Angora delegates themselves. The invitation given through the intermediary of the Constantinople Government is a pure matter of form. Attach no importance to it but select your delegates at once".

"We have received no reply from the French. As they must correspond with us through Constantinople it is probable that the English are objecting. Otherwise I except a reply from the premier Briand".

Ahmed Hamdi Bey (Ertoghrul):— "Do you think that the London Conference will have any result?".

Mustapha Kemal:— "I am not placing great hopes in it. I am not sure of the good faith of England. The fact especially of a spy such as the Agha Khan taking part in the Conference as delegate for India is in my mind a proof that this country is wanting to play us a trick".

"As to our policy with regard to Russia: Russia wishes to found a Soviet Government in Anatolia and I have learned that of late the Russians have financed various committees in the interior of Anatolia. I have managed to procure a list of the men composing these committees, and we are now engaged secretly in tracking them down. There can be no doubt that Russia, under whatever regime she may be, has never modified her secular policy or renounced the desire to attack us on the first opportunity. Our National Government, however, has seriously considered all these points and adopted the necessary measures. Our Eastern army is perfectly armed and equipped and awaits my orders. The Republics of Daghestan and Azerbaijan are ready to obey our instructions. According to reports received from Nuri and Khalil Pashas, armed forces have been prepared in readiness to resist any invading schemes of the Russians in the Caucasus. I beg you to have faith and confidence. I think that the Russians will shortly attack Georgia and present us with an accomplished fact. Our Government has also taken measures in the matter, however, and has recalled the fact that Georgia is placed under the protection of the Great National Assembly of Turkey. I am sure that you will not ask me at the moment for exact details with regard to the measures that have been taken.

"Our divisions on the Greek front have been brought up to strenght. We are now awaiting the result of the London Conference. Yesterday I learned from Constantinople that the Greeks are going to make an unexpected offensive on February 28th on the Afion Karahissar front. You can be absolutely certain that all the necessary measures have been taken. For the moment I shall not speak of the Adana or Aintab fronts".

FO. 371/6467

Enclosure in No. 79

An Address by Mushapta Kemal to the Army at the Greek Front.

According to the same informant, on February 16th Mustapha Kemal accompanied by Ismet Pasha, O.C., Wεstern front and C. G. S., Fevzi Pasha representing the National Defence, and Salih Bey his Ist A. D. C., left Angora to visit the Greek front. After inspecting Eski Shehir and the neigbourhood, Mustapha Kemal made the following speech at headquarters:—

"The blood flowing from the bayonets of our heroic soldiers gives life to the sacred land of Turkey and is a pledge of the independence of my dear nation. History has made no mention of Turkish slavery and it never will do so. The efforts put forth by Constantinople from the Sultan down to the pettiest official - with some exceptions - who have been intriguing with the British to stifle Anatolian hopes of independence, have come to naught when confronted with the force and vigor and determination of our army. Long live the heroic soldiers".

F.O. 371/6467.

No. 80

The British Senior Naval Officer, Constantinople, to the Commander in Chief, Mediterranean.

12th March, 1921.

No. 199/A. 10.

SITUATION REPORT NO. 1.

I assumed the duties of Senior Naval Officer, Constantinople, from Rear Admiral Webb on 3rd March, 1921, and "BENBOW" sailed for Malta.

2. — SITUATION IN CAUCASUS. After a temporary check outside Tiflis, the Bolsheviks redoubled their propagandist activities in the town and eventually there were serious rising. The effect of this propaganda had a dispiriting effect on the troops, and when the Bolsheviks attacks were renewed there was little resistance. The Georgian Army retired to the Westward and were followed as far as Gori by the Red Army, where the Reds checked for 2 or 3 days. The Georgians withdraw to Suram. At the same time strong Bolshevik forces had attacked at Gagri and the Georgians gradually fell back to Sukhum.

On the 2nd March Bolshevik risings occurred in Oni district and though not at first regarded very seriously eventually spread and caused the withdrawal of the Georgian forces on this front.

Sukhum fell on the 4th March, since when the Georgians in this sector have made no real stand.

On the 6th March Bolsheviks again attacked on Suram front and the Georgians were driven back some miles.

3. — The Turks had taken advantage of the Georgians' difficulties to occupy Artvin and Ardahan, and on the 7th March the Georgian Government (at Kutais) asked the Kemalist Government to occupy Batoum, leaving the civil administarion in Georgian hands. On the 8th March all British subjects and those non-British to be evacuated were embarked in H. M. S. "CARADOC" who sailed for Constantinople; the British Mission remained at Batoum.

On the 10th March the Kemalist representative informed the Georgian Government that the Kemalists would occupy the province of Batoum and the districts of Akhaltsikh and Akhalalski; a small party of Turkish troops passed through Batoum that day. The Georgian flag was still flying on the 10th March and the civil administration had not been interfered with.

There are still Georgian forces on the line of the Tsngur river, but there is little chance of them offering any further resistance.

4. — The following refugees were brought to Constantinople in H. M. Ships:—

"CARADOC" arrived 10th March, *British* 6 men, 8 women & 9 children.
Non-British 19 men, 48 women & children.

"SOME" arrived 11th March, *British* 2 men (Mission)
Russian 11 men.

5. NOVOROSSISK. S. S. "RECHID PASHA", who had been sent to Novorosisk with repatriated Russians of General Wrangel's Army, returned to Constantinople on the 10th March. It has been impossible to obtain any information from her as the French are very reticent and no boats are allowed near the ship. I am informed, however, by Admiral de Bon that, when in Novorossisk Harbour, two Bolsheviks submarines were seen practising diving and those left Novorossisk for an unknown destination, but the date on which they sailed was not reported. I at once informed H. M. S. "MONTROSE" and all British ships proceeding into the Black sea are being warned. (List of Ships in the Black Sea on the 7th March is attached as Enclosure No. 1.).

6. — The French have received a W/T massage from Nikolaev from the Bolsheviks authorities informing them that in future repatriated Russians must be sent to Odessa and that they will not be received at Novorossisk.

7. — CONSTANTINOPLE. The decisions of the Allied Admirals in respect to the handing over of the "GOEBEN" to Great Britain is the subject of my submission No. A. 255 of 4th March, 1921, but I have since been verbally approached by the High Commissioner who does not concur in that proposal and urges that the "GOEBEN" should be brought to Golden Horn and reduced to a Care & Maintenance Party. Admiral de Bon has also been approached by His High Commissioner on this subject and informs me that he intends to reply as follows:—

(i) The removal of the "GOEBEN" to her present anchorage out of sight of the capital is a matter of principle, and the situation has not materially changed in such degree as to render any change in that principle desirable.

(ii) At the present time especially it is most undesirable to bring the "GOEBEN" back to Constantinople where it may be hoped she has been partially forgotten.

(iii) That the removal of the agitation to put the "GOEBEN" in the Golden Horn is another attempt on the part of the Italians to gain favour with the Turkish Government, and there is no reason for the British and French to assist them in this.

I propose to inform the High Commissioner verbally in a similar sense.

8. — The following are the revised dispositions of Russian refugees:—

Constantinople Area	33,000
Lemnos	21,000
Gallipoli	29,000
Tchatalja	15,000

I undertand from General Wrangel who has just returned from inspecting refugee camps, that the camp at Gallipoli is in very good order, and compares favourably with that at Lemnos. He is, however, fairly satisfied with the general condition of the troops, and his principal anxiety is that the French will shortly present him with a sort of ultimatum insisting that he will shortly bring pressure to bear on his troops to volunteer to return to Russia or to accept some scheme of which I have been unable to obtain details, but which involves the evacuation of several thousand Russians to Brazil in connection with some big labour undertaking. He is still anxious to maintain his forces as a fighting unit and naturally hopes that a Bolshevik offensive in the Spring against Poland or Roumania will turn the Allies once and for all against Bolshevism and thus enable him again to take the field against the Red Army.

9. — On the night of the 7th March, two Greek Officers from Beikos informed General Harrington at Therapia that they had reliable information

that a small steamer with arms and ammunition on board would call at Beikos during that night to pick up additional crew and agents and then proceed to a Black Sea port. H. M. S. "SPLENDID" was send to Beikos but nothing eventuated.

The General is of the opinion that the information was reliable but that the people concerned had in some way got warning and postponed or abandoned their attempt The military have recently been successful in raiding one or two arms depots on the coast and this also may have deterred the smugglers.

It is the intention if the General Officier, Commanding in Chief, to blockade all roads out of Constantinople for 24 hours if possible by what route arms are being sent to the coastal depots. He has asked me to co-operate by searching all caiques moving in the Bosphorus during the same period, and arrangements are being made to assist as effectively as possible with the limited patrol craft available.

10. — H. M. S. "SPEEDY" proceeded to Constanza on the 4th March with orders to keep in touch with the Roumanian Royal Yacht "REGELE CAROL" during the voyage of her Majesty through the Bosphorus. Her Majesty did not sail until P. M. on the 7th March and passed through the Bosphorus about noon on the 8th. Following the motions of the French Vice-Admiral ships were dressed over all and a Royal Salute was fired. Arrangements were made that the Royal Yacht should not be controlled either in the Bosphorus or the Dardanelles, and I have received a letter of thanks from the Roumanian Legation at Constantinople.

11. — The Italian Rear Admiral Galleani arrived at Constantinople on the 8th March, in "GALLILEO" and re-hoisted his flag in "SARDEGNA" on 9th March.

12. — ISMID PENINSULA. A band of brigands has been operating in the vicinity of Polish Farm, Adempol, and operations are in progress for dispersing them. There have been patrol encounters between Greek troops and brigands in the vicinity of Beikos.

13. — S. N. O., Ismid reports that the village of Kondgi was attacked by brigands and evacuated by the Greek population who were brought across to Ismid by the Greeks.

14. — Greek Military Authorities have issued a proclamation threatening to try by Court Martial any one found attempting to land contraband in this area. The Allied High Commissioners have informed the Greek authorities that they cannot admit the right of Greek authorities to court martial Allied subjects.

15. — A further protest has been made to Athens regarding the restrictions imposed by the Greek military authorities on the exportation of

live sctock from the Greek occupied areas to Constantinople. The Allied High Commissioners insist that these restrictions should be withdrawn.

16. — ANATOLIA. There is no change in the Greek Military situation. Rumours of encounters between Greeks and Nationalists are believed to be without foundation.

17. — MUSTAPHA KEMAL has been touring the western front and has now returned to Angora.

18. — The Nationalists Western front has been divided into two areas, the North-Western front being commanded by Ismet Bey (Late C. G. S. Angora), whose headquarters are at ESKISHEHR, and the South-Western front by Rafet Bey (Late Minister of Interior, Angora), with headquarters at Afion Karahissar.

19. — It is reported that a new gold coinage is being minted at Angora. Russian gold is being used and the coins bear the image of Mustapha Kemal.

20. — DARDANALLES. S. N. O., Chanak has been informed by the British military authorities at Chanak that the Greeks are continually encroaching in the British Area, and that the O. C. Chanak has asked that strong action may be taken at Constantinople to prevent Greek interference in the British Area.

21. — Greek S. S. "MEGALI HELLAS" who grounded near Kum Kale has been re-floated. I understand that the Master's explanation are not altogether satisfactory, and I am making further enquiries.

22. — On 8th March, H. M. S., "TUMULT" arrived at Constantinople to oil and returned to Chanak on the 9th March.

23. — The following enclosures are appended:—

(1) Biritish Ships in Black Sea.

(2) Disposition of H. M. Ships in Constantinople Area, 12th March.

(3) Extracts from Bolsheviks W/T Press, Ist March.

(Note:— French W/T Station whence these reports were received has been closed down. I hope to arrange to obtain them from other sources).

24. — A copy of this reports is being sent to the Rear Admiral, 4th Battle Squadron.

(Sgd) R. Y. TYRWHITT.
Rear Admiral,
and Senior Officer.

F.O. 371/6498.

No. 81

Admiralty to Foreign Office.

ADMIRALTY, *March 17.*
(Received March 17.)

Confidential.

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioner of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a report, dated the 17th February, 1921, which has been received through the Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, relative to the general situation in the Southern Caucasus up to the 10th February, 1921.

2. A copy of the above-mentioned report, excepting the portion relating to Russian ships in Georgian ports, has been sent to the War Office.

I am, &c.

V. W. BEDDELEY.

F.O. 406/45, p. 18, No. 6

ENCLOSURE IN No. 81

Report on General Situation in the Southern Caucasus up to February 10, 1921.

Extracts

Confidential.

2. *Relations between Georgia and Nationalist Turkey.*

Declaration made by the Social Democrats, who are the leading party in Georgia:—

"Being Social Democrats, we first of all wrote openly and announced that we sympathise with the Kemalist movement, as with any struggle for the freedom of a nation, in so far as is really a movement towards freedom. Apart from this we wrote several times that we are definitely opposed to the principles of this movement, so far as it contains elements of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism, connecting itself with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and imperialistic designs of Enver Pasha.

"We are opposed in principle to Bolshevism, but we sincerely strive to establish friendly connections with Bolshevik Russia, nor can we sympathise with the aggressive designs of the Allies in any way. But we are making all efforts to establish normal relations with France, Britain and Italy.

"We are not Bolsheviks, but Social Democrats. We therefore do not recognise the right of one nation interfere with the rights and internal affairs of other nations, or the right of one State to dictate its will to some other State.

"We are Social Democrats, and as such recognise that the only method of action as to the internal affairs of independent nations is through organs of international union, recognised by themselves, and by moral pressure of the Proletarian International Assembly, at which we are represented.

"We approach the mutual relations of Georgia and Angora from this Social Democrat point of view.

"Be the feeling towards Kemal's Government what it may, it must be admitted that it is the only Government recognised and supported by the Turkish nation. Angora is now Turkey, and there is no other Turkey.

"This Turkey has approached our frontiers and we want to be with her, as with all other nations, bearers of principles of peace and solidarity of States.

"We want to be in friendship with the Turkish nation, and do not want to interfere with their interior affairs, but we also demand that their Government shall recognise the sovereignty of our State and respect our frontiers and interest.

"If the Government of Angora will keep to this track honestly and to the end, that is the way of recognition of Georgian sovereignty, then the Georgian authorities will not see any obstacles for the establishment of peace with Turkey, just as well as they did not see any obstacles to the establishment of peace with any other States, willing to recognise the independence of the republic".

6. *Relations between Armenia and Turkish Nationalist Government.*

The following is a communication of the Commissar for Foreign Affairs Bekzadian, of Armenia, to the Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Ahmed Mukhtar, Angora. Copies of this communication have been sent to Chicherin and Ter Gabrielian, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, Husseinof and plenipotentiary representative of Soviet Armenia in Georgia, Shaverdof. Owing to the importance of this communication I am quoting it in full:—

"My Government is observing with a feeling of complete satisfaction the animated interest displayed by the Government of Angora in the future of Soviet Armenia. We watch the progress of development of the revolution in Anatolia with no less interest. From the present time Soviet Armenia may prove to be a reliable background for revolutionary Turkey in her struggle against the Western Imperialism and a firm support in the national

liberating movement in Turkey. Soviet Armenia is a creation of Soviet Russia and expresses the principles of the latter, being the bearer of the dictatorship of the Armenian working-classes.

"Being firmly aware of its historical mission, the Communist Government of Armenia is safeguarding the attainments of the revolution in the interior of the country, and will be a watchful sentry of the revolution in the Near East. In carrying out this task as historically unavoidable, our eyes will be turned to the Third Communist International Assembly and to Soviet Russia, whose approval or disapproval will indicate the measure of her success.

"We shall gladly receive criticism on the part of the Orient inasmuch as this criticism will indicate a real sincere interest of the ciritics of our revolutionary tasks in and outside of the country.

"The communication of your Government, with reference to the plebiscite carried out in the districts occupied by the Turkish army, resulting in the expression by the population of the desire to unite with Turkey, is not correct, inasmuch as the plebiscite might have been carried out under the conditions of military occupation with a one-sided effect. The result of the plebiscite announced by your Government appears to be extremely odd, if one considers the statistics of the population in this country. The Government of Armenia consider it their duty to point out that the plebiscite, being one of the means of solving territorial discussions, cannot be considered in all cases as correct especially in this case, for the following reasons: The great war and the terrible prosecutions during the last years by the Government of Sultans with regard to Armenians, emigration, &c., make this plebiscite lose its moral and political importance.

"The Government of Armenia cannot understand the object of the Turkish Grand National Assembly in maintaining the Treaty of Alexandropol, regarding the Soviet Armenian restrictions of armament. This tendency could only be understood by Soviet Armenia, if the social and political tasks of the Turkish National Government did not correspond with their assurances.

"The Government of Soviet Armenia do not see the justification for Turkish troops remaining in Alexandropol and the adjoining districts, which are inhabited by Armenians and are under altered conditions owing to the establishment of Soviet rule. The population has to suffer all privations of the military occupation and are deprived of the possibility to start peaceful work in the country liberated from the Dashnak Nationalists.

"Being convinced that all questions under discussion will receive a satisfactory solution at the forthcoming conference at Moscow, the Armenian Government express their hope that the Turkish Government will

prove their friendly intentions towards the Soviet rule in Armenia and Soviet Russia, and will not fail to recall their troops from the district of Alexandropel.

"The Government feel sure that the Government of Angora will not refuse to release and repatriate the prisoners of war, partly deported to unknown destination, and partly concentrated in the district of Erzeroum, where are compelled to work under most trying conditions.

"The Armenian Government consider that the further detention of these prisoners would be against the friendly assurances given by the Turkish Government".

Wireless Messages from Erivan to Angora Government.

The wireless station at Batoum has intercepted a wireless message from Erivan addressed to Angora Government, copy to Commissar for Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan.

This wireless clearly shows that the relations established between the unfortunate Armenia after her transformation into "socialistic" and the Angora Government. The Russian Communists who established Soviet rule in Armenia by force, now say "an end has come to all strife", that the proletarian Armenia, in close contact with Soviet Azerbeijan and under the high proctection of the workmen and peasants of Soviet Russia, has at last attained peace and that all questions will settled amicably.

The Communists assure that the Kemalists, their true allies and followers, will act in unision and, "paradise on earth" will reign in Armenia. Of course, nobody believes these promises, knowing by experience what Communism is. The Communists brought no peace to Armenia and the Kemalists continue their atrocities, in spite of the presence of the Russian Red army, towards the Armenian nation, contrary to the promises of Soviets. The pillaging, violence and murders continue, all cattle is driven away and the last food supplies of the population are requisitioned. Practically everything is taken away, agricultural implements, engines, telegraphs and telephones. People are forced to work. Where, then, are the Russian Communists who profess to have benefited Armenia?

Wireless message from Armenian Government to Angora Government: (Translation).

"Erivan. Urgent. Angora, copy to Baku to the Commissar for Foreign Affairs Gusseinof. [Jammed] continuous violence, pillaging and murders of the peaceful population, in places occupied by Turks [Jammed]. The private property and households, the cattle of the peasants driven away and the last food supplies of the population requisitioned. Everyhing is being taken away during the last month from Alexandropol, agricultural

machines, engines, telegraphs and telephones, as well as private property. The district has been laid waste and the cattle driven away. Great quantities of grain confiscated from the villages and stored at station Nalbad, therefore condemning the population to starvation. All ablemen from 18 to 50 years of age have been deported by force from their native country and compelled to work in the districts of Sarikamysh and Erzeroum.

"The Turkish supreme occupation authorities are trying to send trains with refugees arriving from Paraklis to Erzeroum, viâ Kars, for compulsory work under terrible conditions. After your toops occupied Kars, wholesale pillaging and murders prevailed during the first three days, and is still continued on a smaller scale. All fuel has been requisitioned from the population [atmospherics] of Askers are raiding villages [jammed] after the village of Kantary was occupied by a Turkish detachment of the 36th Turkish volunteer regiment [jammed] group of Askers attacked on the 23rd January without any reason, opened fire on village Ogapiat [jammed] in neutral zone murders amongst peaceful population [jammed] food supplies taken away from population under the pretence of repeated tax collections. Raids by armed detachments [jammed] difficulty of communication with Alexandropol owing to establishment of your control over telegraphs and refusal to our comrades of passports to leave Alexandropol, it is obvious that the authority on the revolutionary committee in the town occupied by your troops is only nominal, the actual control being in the hands of the military command.

"Revolutionary committee repeatedly receives demands from your commanding officers [jammed] these demands have nothing to do with the functions of the revolutionary committee, for instance, mobilisation of men, delivery of 10.000 rifles, delivery of some Turkish soldier killed unknown, where and by whom, &c. [jammed] has brought down the functions of the Alexandropol revolutionary committee to a level of a tool in the hands of the occupationary force stationed in this town. This only makes revolutionary committee recognise that is further existence is completely useless and merely discredits the principles of Soviet rule in the opinion of the working classes. In areas where military occupation prevails using the above methods of serfdom and devastation, no rule of workmen and peasants can exist.

"The impartial analysis of the above-mentioned facts makes it obvious that the Soviet Government of Armenia cannot tolerate Turkish attitude leading to economical ruin of the country which is considered as belonging to Armenia by right [jammed] severe discipline of your troops and their obvious sympathy with the Soviet rule precludes the possibility of presuming the presence of violence [jammed]. I draw the attention to

the above facts on behalf of the Armenian nation, who only wish to establish peaceful life conditions and friendship with revolutionary Turkey.

"Being sure that there can be no difference of opinion with regard to have above facts, my Government does not doubt that the Turkish National Government will take urgent steps to stop these atrocities and recall the Turkish occupationary force from the district of Alexandropol. (Signed by People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of Soviet Armenia. BEKZADIAN)".

General Information.

When the Turks were occupying Kars, all the Armenian population left the town and took shelter in a gorge. A Turkish officer went there and commenced to persuade the refugees that there was no danger, and eventually ordered them to return to their homes. The returning people were registered when passing the bridge. After this the men were separated from the women and sent to work. On the same day the Moslems arrived from the vicinity of Kars, including Kurds, and after dark commenced looting and massacring the Armenians. Towards the morning the Tartars joined them.

Great assistance was rendered to the Armenians by the American consular agent, Mr. Fox. He showed the Turks that American orphanages contained not only Christian but also Mahommedans as the result of this not a single American institution was touched, and many Armenians found refuge in these buildings. Robberies and murders lasted for two weeks. The American Relief Committee was running short of supplies, and the refugees were compelled to free all the buildings as the Turks demanded them for their troops.

The first commandant of Kars was appointed, Rushtim Bey. He took up his residence in the house of the Governor, but after his promotion to Rushtim Pasha he was transferred to Alexandropol and relieved by Kiazim Pasha. Having occupied Kars, the Turks immediately commenced to take away all objects of value—guns, ammunition, machinery, furniture—and transported this to Erzeroum and Sarakamysh.

Alexandropol.

Alexandropol is in the hands of the local Bolsheviks, and is governed by the Revolutionary Committee. The station and the fortress are in the hands of the Turks. The Turks are trying to take away all that is possible from this town just as well as from Kars, even taking away parts of old railway engines. A caravan of 200 camels, loaded with requisitioned property, leaves daily for Sarakamysh. The milita in Alexandropol consists of Turks and Bolsheviks.

All shops are closed, and only small grocers' stores are opened, chiefly dealing in food and tobacco, prices being very high. Great shortage of fuel is experienced every-where, and in many towns the population are pulling down the wooden buildings deserted by inhabitants. The first train from Erivan arrived at Alexandropol on the 7th January and left for Karaklis.

In Karaklis.

About 1,000 Bolshevik Russian troops are stationed here according to information received from the peasants.

A permission must be obtained from the Bolsheviks and the Georgian consul to leave Karaklis for Sanian.

Armenian troops are stationed half-way between Karaklis and station Shagali, after this comes the Georgian sphere of influence.

7. *The Russo-Turkish Azerbaijan Conference at Moscow.*

The Turkish delegation have already left Tiflis viâ Baku for Moscow. According to latest information, Ali Kemal Bey is at the head of the Turkish delegation. The delegation of Soviet Armenia consists of three persons—Commissar for Foreign Affairs Bekzadian, Korinian and Ter-Gabrielian. The two latter are already in Moscow; Bekzadian left for Moscow on the 20th January viâ Baku. The members of the Azerbaijan delegation are not yet known. The permanent representative of the Angora Government in Moscow is Faud (Fuad) Pasha.

8. *Ex-Russian Moslem Officers joining Kemalist Army.*

According to information received, many Mahommedan officers, formerly belonging to the late Russian Volunteer Army, have arrived at Anatolia. Most of these officers are mountaineers of the Northern Caucasus—Ingushes, Circassians, Tchechrya, Daghestan and Kabarda people. When the Soviet rule was established in the Northern Caucasus, these officers took refuge in the mountain villages. Their properly organised detachments raided these villages and destroyed railway lines in the Kuban district. Their guerilla warfare was no longer of any use after the fall of Crimea, and one by one and in small groups they set out to join Kemal and are willingly received by his troops.

It is through these officers that the Angora military command get their information regarding the situation in the Northern Caucasus and Daghestan, establish their communication with these regions and send their recruiting agents.

F.O. 406/45, p. 22-25, No. 6/1.

No. 82

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 15, 1921.*

No. 240.

Sir,

THE Grand Vizier, in much better health, and in greater spirits than on the occasion of his former visit, called upon me at the Foreign Office this afternoon in order to bid good-bye.

His manner on this occasion was assured and his utterance voluble, and there was no concealment on his part of the fact that he was leaving England in a very good humour at the concessions which had been made.

Following up the advance which he had made to me on the previous occasion at the instance of the Sultan, he told me that the latter was exceedingly anxious to fortify the closer co-operation, which he hoped would exist in the future between Turkey and Great Britain, by a separate alliance or agreement with ourselves. He realised, however, that at a time when we were acting in close concert with the other Great Powers, such a solution was impracticable and could not receive favourable consideration at our hands. He therefore refrained from putting it forward, but he wished me to know what had been in the mind of his royal master and what was the future situation to which the latter looked forward.

I made no comment upon this suggestion, except to say that the Grand Vizier was quite right in thinking that it was impossible for us to take any step at the present juncture in separation from our allies.

His Excellency, while protesting that he did not want to raise any question of a revision of the Treaty of Sèvres beyond that which had been officially proposed, then proceeded, in contravention of his own assurance, to plead for lighter treatment in respect of Thrace. His argument was really a plea for the Enos-Midia against the Chatalja line.

I allowed him to develop his case without interruption, but informed him at the end that an essential condition of the modifications that had been proposed was the maintanence of the rest of the Treaty of Sèvres intact, and that it was therefore out of the question that an exception should be made in the case of Thrace. The Turkish Government should bow to the facts of the situation and be grateful for the very substantial concessions that had been made.

The Grand Vizier then went on to give me a rather interesting account of the private relations which had existed between the Angora delegation and himself. He admitted that they had come to the Conference

with some suspicion of each other, and that the relations for the first day or two had been strained. At the end of that time, Bekir Sami Bey having shown a very conciliatory spirit, they had acted in close co-operation and he hoped to have established relations with the Angora delegation which would render co-operation between the two much easier than had at one time been imagined. The "wild cats of Angora" had indeed, according to him, become quite tame under his fatherly care.

Tewfik Pasha then proceeded to develop a long argument about the increase in customs duty to which the High Commissioners had agreed at Constantinople. Apparently this particular concession was not in the least what the Turkish Government desired and would not result to them in the pecuniary advantage which was the only thing to which they really attached importance. They did not want an *ad valorem* duty at all, and the 11 per cent., in practice, would mean a realised duty of not more than one-half.

I did not either interrupt or follow the Grand Vizier in this argument, which he continued until he had exhausted the fertility of the vein.

We then parted with hopes—the realisation of which, considering his advanced age, I cannot but doubt—that we might meet again.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

F.O. 406/45, p. 90-91, No. 65.

No. 83

Interview between the British Prime Minister and Bekir Sami Bey at the House of Commons, on Wednesday, March 16, 1921

BEKIR SAMI BEY said that he wished to thank the British Government for the way in which it had treated the Turkish delegation. He was going to Angora next day and would arrive there in about a fortnight, and he undertook this journey in good spirits hoping, with the support of Great Britain, to arrive eventually at a satisfactory settlement.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that Great Britain was also anxious to restore its ancient friendship and that no further misunderstandings should arise. There were two points, however, which he wished to mention. The first was that the British Government had heard that the Turks were making trouble for the British in the Mosul area*. He said that the British Govern-

* See *The Times*, March 12, p. 9, where a semi-official statement issued on March 11 is printed. It stated that two bands from Turkish territory had raided in the Mosul area and one of them had collected booty to the amount of 70 camels and 1300 sheep. In retaliation, British aeroplanes had bombed the raider's camps on March 3 with good effect but two British machines had been hit by fire from the ground.

ment did not want to have any disagreements with the Turkish Government, and he hoped that the Angora Government would prevent any such thing being done, because if there was trouble of that nature, the British Government would feel bound to give assistance to the Greeks in any hostilities which they might undertake against Mustapha Kemal.

BEKIR SAMI BEY replied that, so far as Mosul was concerned, he could assure the Prime Minister that it was not the intention of the Turkish Government to make trouble. They had no interest in doing so, and they did not wish to interfere with the Arabs, and, in his opinion, Mesopotamia was certainly not worth the price of British friendship. He would certainly impress upon the Angora Assembly what the Prime Minister had said.

THE PRIME MINISTER then said that the second point which he wanted to make clear was that he hoped that the Angora Government would be in a position to send a reply to the Allied proposals as soon as possible. At present there was no truce between the Greeks and the Turks and war might restart at any time as the Allies had no power controlling the Greek army. It was therefore very important that a settlement should be arrived at if possible without any unnecessary delay, as othersive the war might break out afresh.

BEKIR SAMI BEY said that he entirely agreed, and that he would do his best to get a reply sent from the Angora Government as soon as possible.

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that it was in the intreest of Turkey to make peace with the goodwill of all the Powers. In that way the past would be wiped out and Turkey would make a fresh start. Great Britain did not wish to interfere in any way with the freedom of Turkey. He would like, therefore, a peace which would mean a fresh start all round.

BEKIR SAMI BEY agreed, and asked whether he could inform the Turkish Assembly at Angora that Turkey would have the support of Great Britain in her request for a modification of the treaty in various ways, especially financial and economic. From that point of view alone, Thrace and Smyrna were indispensable to the future of Turkey.

THE PRIME MINISTER here interrupted, and said that it was impossible for Great Britain to go beyond its present concessions. Great Britain had made very great concessions to Turkey, and the Turkish delegation ought to be proud of the succes it had achieved. It had recovered liberty in Constantinople and liberty in the Straits. It had recovered a great deal of financial and economic independence, and had gained concessions in Kurdistan and in regard to Armenia. It had secured a modification of the régime in Smyrna, and it would be a great mistake for Turkey to throw away these concessions for the sake of impossible in Thrace and elsewhere. The fundamental question was whether it was worth while for Turkey to

renew the war with Greece for the sake of trying to get better terms in Smyrna. If the Turks were unreasonable, it undoubtedly meant a renewal of the conflict in which the Smyrna question would have to be fought out between the Greeks and the Turks.

BEKIR SAMI BEY said that, despite Mr. Lloyd George's statements in regard to Thrace and Smyrna, he returned to Angora in a optimistic frame of minds, as he was confident that Great Britain would support Turkey's just claims. He then urged the British Government to recognise the States to the north of the Caucasus, as he was convinced that the constitution of a powerfull Caucasian federation was to the interests of both Turkey and Great Britain.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.,
March 19, 1921.
D.B.F.P., Ist. series, Vol. XV, p. 440-442, No. 65.

No. 84

Interwiev between the British Prime Minister and Tewfik Pasha, Grand Vizier of Turkey, at 10, Downing Street, on Wednesday, March 16, 1921

After the usual exchange of courtesies, during which TEWFIK PASHA said he wished to thank the Prime Minister for the kindness and hospitality of the British Government, and the expression of a mutual desire for an early peace, THE PIRIME MINISTER said that he hoped it would be possible for the Turkish delegates to give an early reply to the proposals. He wished to make it clear that until the peace was signed there was no truce. The Allies had no means of preventing the Greeks from attacking the Turks, and, if the reply was delayed, there was grave risk that the Greeks would attack Mustapha Kemal in order to bring matters to head. He urgently pressed, therefore, that the Turks should give a reply with the minimum of delay in order to prevent a fresh outbreak of war.

THE GRAND VIZIER said he perfectly understood this, but that the difficulty was that, though Constantinople would ready to give a reply immediately, Bekir Sami Bey had to go back to Angora, which would take some time to reach, even though the French had placed a destroyer at his disposal.

THE PRIME MINISTER again pressed for an early reply in order to prevent a renewal of the war, and the interview terminated.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.,
March 19, 1921.
D.B.F.P., Ist. series, Vol, XV., p. 442, No. 66

No. 85

Earl Granville to Earl Curzon.

ATHENS, *March 17, 1921.*
(Received March 29).

No. 126.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despacth No. 95 of the 1 st. instant, I have the honour to report that the news of the proposals which the London Conference has now submitted to the Greek and Turkish delegates for a compromise scheme covering certain modifications in the Treaty of Sèvres has not been favourably commented upon in the press although it has not created anything like the alarm which was caused a fortnight ago by the suggested Inter-Allied Commission to study ethnical questions in Thrace and Smyrna.

It is pointed out that Turkey was, is, and will always remain the friend of Germany and the enemy of Greece and the *Entente* Powers, and in any future trouble with a resuscitated Germany, she will always be able to count upon Turkish support. Hence everything which may now be done tending to strenghten Turkey will cause trouble in the future, as soon as Germany is sufficiently recovered to revenge herself upon her enemies. Greece and the *Entente* must pull together in the future as in the past.

The hostility of Italy anything tending to strengthen Greece is fully appreciated in this country. The recent attitude of France, who calls upon Great Britain to support her in forcing upon Germany the fulfillment of all the terms of the Versailles Treaty and at the same time, whilst retaining her own rights in Syria, wants British support to enable her to destroy part of the Treaty of Sèvres, has evoked very severe criticism in the press and elsewhere. France, it is pointed out, was glad enough to get all the help she possibly could from Greece during the war. Now she turns round and makes peace with Greece's enemy—Kemal. This will not only release extra forces for Kemal to use elsewhere, but it is suggested that France may even hand over to Kemal arms and supplies which he will certainly employ against the Greeks—France's late allies!

All look to Great Britain for support and profess great friendship for her, but how far the majority of Royalists are sincere in their professions is open to doubt. All are convinced that it is in England's interests to see a powerful Greece, but disappointment is expressed that England should have allowed herself to act against her better judgment in order to please France, and that she should have joined Italy and France in repudiating a treaty which she had signed. Some Government papers seek to throw

the blame on M. Veniselos for having sided against the common enemy with the *Entente*, which now leaves Greece in the lurch.

Greece, it is stated, cannot accept the proposals as they stand. MM. Kalogerepoulos and Gounaris would never be able to return with such a treaty to present to the National Assembly. The Assembly, says the "Athenai" (Independent); would return a unanimous vote against any modifications in the Treaty of Sèvres, and in so doing it would be voicing the sentiments of the entire nation, which demands that the mandate given to Greece in Asia Minor shall remain intact. "Eleftheros Typos" (Veniselist) writes in much the same sense. According to the "Embros" (Veniselist), the whole edifice erected at Sèvres is about to crumble to pieces. The Sultan Sovereign at Smyrna and its hinterland; a Christian Governor whom the Greeks will not appoint; Greek troops confined to the town, means the loss of Smyrna to Greece. The withdrawal of the menace to Turkey contained in article 36 will leave the Turk free to massacre unredeemed Greeks and Armenians to their hearts' content, the one restraining factor having been removed. Greece, according to the "Athenai", will see the dream of Constantinople vanish before her eyes. Greece, who has already suffered so much in the common cause, will be compelled, so the "Embros" says, to make war in the future on two fronts against both Turks and Bulgars. She does not seek war, but will not hesitate to fight if necessity should arise.

The idea of promptly being able to settle matters with Kemal does not seem to worry anyone. All are convinced of the supperiority of the Greek forces both in number, arms, discipline, &c., and a rumour is now current, of which I have been unable to obtain confirmation, that Greece is about to advance for this very purpose.

According to some, however, all the Royalist talk of a "last ditch" is mere bluff, and they would be willing to come to an arrangement about Smyrna if they could find some means of putting all the blame on the backs of the Veniselists. M. Gounaris's organ, the "Protevousa," contained an article the other day quite a different strain to those which usually fill the press. In the course of this article, the following passage occurs:—

"The Conference of London will free the Greek people from the nightmare of the Asia Minor campaign, which has neither beginning nor end and no objective purpose, and which does not promise to lead to the military settlement of our difficulties with Turkey..... Those who long after the national achievements of the expelled statesman must not forget that the entanglement of our army in Asia Minor, which threatens to paralyse our natural life, is his work".

In view of criticism of this paragraph in the part of the Veniselists press, the "Protevousa" endeavoured to explain it away the next day.

I am forwarding a copy of this despacth to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople.

I have, &c.

(For the Minister),
C. H. BENTINCK.

F.O. 406/45, p. 93-94, No. 68

No. 86

Notes of a Meeting held at 10, Downing Street, London S.W., on Friday, March 18, 1921, at 11 a.m.[1].

PRESENT: *British Empire:* The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, O.M., M.P., Prime Minister; Sir M. Hankey, G. C. B., Mr. Kerr.
Greece: M. Kalogerepoulos, M. Gounaris, M. Rizo-Rangabé.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Turkish delegation had already left London. Before they went, he had seen Tewfik Pasha and Bekir Sami Bey[2].

The former had said that the Imperial Ottoman Government would give its answer to the Allied proposals quite soon. Bekir Sami Bey had said that it would take fourteen days for him to reach Angora and another ten days before the answer would be forthcoming. He (Mr. Lloyd George) had felt obliged to remind both of the principal Turkish delegates named above that no truce had been arranged between the forces, and that the conference could not be responsible to either side that its enemy would not attack. It could not restrain the Greeks from attacking the Turks nor the Turks from attacking the Greeks. The Turkish delegation, therefore, must not assume that there was any guarantee that there would be no further fighting. He asked if the Greek delegates had anything to say before they left.

M. GOUNARIS said, in reply to Mr. Lloyd George, that having regard to the proposals of the conference, the Greek delegation desired to submit certain considerations in regard to the situation in the Near East, in the hope that the British Prime Minister would examine them and give them the benefit of his own views on the subject. The British Government was already acquainted with the attitude of the Greek delegation on those parts of the conference's proposals which affected the status of the Smyrna area. In a confidential conversation the Greek delegation had made known

[1] A French translation of these Notes is printed in Frangulis, vol. ii, pp. 224-8.
[2] See Nos. 83 and 84.

the modifications which were calculated to render its acceptance of the proposals possible. Such acceptance was, of course, conditional on the proposal being also accepted by Turkey.

Mr. Lloyd George interpolated that everyting depended on that.

M. Gounaris, continuing, said it was also contingent on no fresh sacrifices being demanded of Greece. The Greek delegation, he continued, would naturally be disposed to lay before the British Government certain observations on the remainder of the proposals of the conference, especially in regard to the military and naval increase proposed to the Turkish forces, and the possible use of the Straits for transferring Turkish troops from Asia to the European side. However, as he understood from Mr. Lloyd George that the Turkish delegation did not propose to answer for twenty-four days and was returning to Angora to consult the National Assembly, the Greek delegation felt that there was no necessity to give its answer at the moment.

In the meantime the military situation on the Asia Minor front, where the Greek army was still fighting in order to fulfil the obligations involved by the mandate of the Powers, had changed somewhat to the detriment of Greece. An important factor was the conclusion of a separate truce between Turkey and France, which appeared to have become an accomplished fact, though no official communication on the subject had been made by France to Greece, who was her ally[3].

Mr. Lloyd George interposed that no official communication had been made to the British Government either. He knew as little on the subject as M. Gounaris. Apparently it had been arranged between the French and the Turks.

M. Rizo-Rangabe said there had been an announcement in the 'Temps' on the subject[4].

M. Gounaris said that this facilitated the transfer of Kemalist forces from the French front to the Greek.

Mr. Lloyd George said that the British Government had entered into no corresponding arrangement.

M. Gounaris said that the prisoners exchange would also be available to reinforce the Turkish front.

[3] On March 10, M. Briand had concluded an armistice with the Turkish Nationalist delegation which provided for an immediate exchange of prisoners, a new Syrian-Cilician frontier, and French military evacuation of Cilicia in return for the grant of economic advantages to France in Cilicia.

[4] See *Le Temps*, March 12, p. 1.

Mr. Lloyd George said that the British Government had also arranged an exchange of prisoners, but the numbers were negligible[5].

M. Gounaris said that his remarks about prisoners had referred only to the French. As a matter of fact, hostile concentrations on the Greek front had already been observed. As a consequence, Greece found herself under the necessity of undertaking immediate operations in Asia Minor. Such operations, moreover, he hoped would tend to accelerate the submission of the Turks, which, as Mr. Lloyd George himself had pointed out on the previous Thursday, was otherwise extremely unlikely.

Mr. Lloyd George asked if the operations were to be undertaken immediately.

M. Kalogerepoulos said that they would start next week.

M. Gounaris said that the Greek Commander-in-Chief and his staff had already started for the front.

Mr. Lloyd George said he had been afraid that the Turks might charge the conference with a breach of faith if Greece attacked. Consequently, he had left bound to make it clear both to Tewfik Pasha and Bekir Sami Bey that the Greeks were free to attack the Turks, and, *vice versa*, the Turks, were free to attack the Greeks, and that the conference had made no arrangement to prevent such an attack.

M. Gounaris said that, with a view to greater security in these operations, the Greek Government had decided to balance the accession of strength to the Turkish army by mobilising three new military classes. This mobilisation would take effect immediately after the commencement of hostilities, and the Greek Government confidently expected that 45,000 additional troops would become available. They proposed to support this mobilisation by a personal appeal by His Majesty the King of Greece, and they contemplated also that it might be desirable to utilise the presence of the King at the front in order to improve the *moral* of the army.

For these operations Greece required financial sacrificies. The general economic condition of the country was such as to justify the acceptance of the financial burden involved in the coming operations. It was only natural, however, that Greece should not have the necessary cash immediately ready. They had immediately ready cash for a period only, and after that they would have to have recourse to paper currency. Should the consent of the International Financial Commission not be forthcoming, the Greek

[5] In an answer to a parliamentary question on Feb. 24, Mr. Harmsworth, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had said: 'There are 22 British prisoners in the hands of the Turkish Nationalists, and there are a number of Nationalists in British custody.... It is hoped that the matter may be settled at the present conference'; see 138 *H. C. Deb.*, *5 s.*, col. 1144.

Government proposed, as it did not wish to issue paper money without such consent, to establish a new bank of issue and to issue through it paper currency which would be legal tender in those provinces where the International Financial Commission had no jurisdiction owing to the fact that the said provinces had been united with Greece subsequent to the establishment of the International Financial Commission[6]. In reply to Mr. Lloyd George, he said that these provinces were Macodonia, Thrace, Epirus and the Islands. Smyrna had a special financial status under the Treaty of Sèvres, and employed Turkish currency. The Greek army in Turkey would be paid with Greek money converted into Turkish exchange. The Greek Government was not unmindful of the effect that these transactions would have on the Greek exchange, and consequently on the interests represented by the International Financial Commission. The Greek Government, therefore, would regard it as a favour if the British Government could find some other solution of their financial difficulties than by the measures proposed above. Such a solution might be achieved if the British Government could facilitate a loan being floated with its support on the British money market, or, alternatively, by opening a credit to the Greek Government without any immediate deposit of cash.

Mr. Lloyd George said he did not understand the latter porposal.

M. Gounaris explained that the proposal was for the Greek Government to utilise those credits which would be corvered by the issue of banknotes by the National Bank of Greece, a system which had already been applied by Greece.

Mr. Lloyd George said he still did not understand how this could be done without some sort of guarantee by Great Britain.

M. Gounaris said that the National Bank of Greece would issue paper currency or cash, the cover for which was actually abroad and amounted to several hundred millions of drachmas. If Greece secured fresh credits abroad, the National Bank of Greece would not use the credits open now before the other credits outstanding.

Mr. Lloyd George suggested that the proposal should be put in writing for examination in the Treasury.

M. Gounaris said that the system he contemplated had already been applied in Greece by the opening of credits in England, and M. Maximos, the Governor of the National Bank of Greece, had already exchanged views with the Treasury on the subject and had given full explanations as to the financial and economic situation of Greece.

[6] In 1898.

Mr. Lloyd George approved the discussions with the Treasury.

M. Gounaris said that this was the system which the Powers had examined a year ago with the idea of applying it to their own financial pcsition.

Mr. Lloyd George said that Great Briatin had made considerable advances—he believed about £ 16,000,000—to Greece. He wanted to know if they were connected with this scheme.

M. Gounaris replied in the affirmative. The outstanding balance was from these credits.

Mr. Lloyd George said that when the British Government came to consider these proposals a good deal would depend upon the attitude of Angora. If the Turks refused the proposals of the Powers and made war, they would have a new situation to examine. It was imperative to Greece to make it quite clear to the Western Powers, and particularly to the people of England, that responsibility for bloodshed and strife rested with the Turks and not with the Greeks. Hence, a reasonable attitude on the part of the Greeks to the proposals of the Powers would make a great difference to the British people and Parliament.

M. Gounaris said that the military situation was changing so rapidly against Greece that it imposed upon her the necessity of taking measures to re-establish it without undue provocation.

Mr. Lloyd George said he had not objected to such measures as Greece might think it essential for her to take, but his remarks had applied to the general attitude of Greece towards the proposals of the Powers. If Greece were to accept while the Turks refused, the situation would be easier for her.

M. Gounaris asked if he might be allowed to go with M. Maximos to the Treasury to discuss the financial question.

Mr. Lloyd George said he quite agreed to this.

M. Gounaris said he would stay a few days longer in London for the purpose.

Mr. Kerr said that M. Maximos had seen Mr. Blackett and Mr. Hawtrey[7].

Mr. Lloyd George said it would be advisable for M. Gounaris to see Mr. Blackett. He wished to make it quite clear to the Greek delegation that if the Greek army thought it necessary to take steps to provide for its safety in view of the increase of Mustapha Kemal's forces, the conference could not take the responsibility for forbidding them. He had put that quite clearly to his colleagues at the conference, namely, that it was not

[7] An assistant Secretary in H.M. Treasury.

fair that Mustapha Kemal should be able increase his forces to the disadvantage of the Greeks, without the latter being free to safeguard their position. His colleagues had quite accepted this. He would add, on his own account, however, that presumably the Greek had taken into consideration the fact that if the Greek army sustained a reverse it would make the Angora Government impossible to deal with.

M. Kalogerepoulos and M. Gounaris replied that this had been taken into account.

M. Gounaris said the Greek delegation wished to express their thanks for the measures that Mr. Lloyd George had taken, not only with the Turks, but also with the Allies, to secure their freedom of action.

Mr. Lloyd George said he hoped that this matter would be settled in such a way as to bring peace to the East, and, in addition, to strengthen Greece, because Great Britain always had a warm corner in her heart for the Greek people and wished them well and looked forward to a career[8] of usefulness and revived glory in Greece.

M. Gounaris thanked Mr. Lloyd George for expressing these sentiments and for the great support he had given to Greece and to the members of the Greek Government present to-day in order to secure a settlement of peace to the East and to bring security and a flourishing condition to the Greek country. Finally, he thanked Mr. Lloyd George for the hospitality of the British Government.

2. Whitehall Gardens, S.W.,
March 18, 1921.
D.B.F.P., Ist. series, Vol. XV, p. 452-447, No. 69.

No. 87

Consul Morgan to Earl Curzon.

Aleppo, *March 22, 1921.*
(Received April 27).

No. 7.
My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report as follows on my journey to Aleppo and the situation here:—

I left Smyrna on the 21st February. The situation in the Greek zone was calm. The Greeks were keeping order in all parts of it, and, judging

[8] The French text (see n. 1 above) here read: 'un avenir'.

by the fact that no attempt had been made by Moslems living under Greek administration on Greek communications, the Moslems appear to have accepted their present lot.

The Greek army is confident of being able to deal with the Kemalist forces, and the latter have made no serious attempt to attack the Greeks.

Veniselist are not being well treated by the partisans of the Constantinist régime; but both Veniselists and Royalists are united in desiring to continue operations against the Turks.

We called at *Rhodes* and *Adalia*. In both places Italians and Moslems are working hand in hand. At Adalia the control of shipping and passengers is carried out by Moslems and Italians. The latter have a garrison of about 200 men in the town and seemed somewhat afraid of the Turks and subservient to them. An Italian sentry was put on our ship (British steamship "Palitana") during all our stay both at Adalia and Rhodes.

A Turkish notable and landowner of Alaya, named Tewfik, came on board at Adalia bound for Beirout and Egypt. He owns forests, and was travelling in connection with the sale of timber. He seemed an influential person, and was met by acquaintances at Mersina and Tripoli.

I had several conversation with him, during which he told me that Mustapha Kemal had reorganised his forces and had forbidden independent irregular chiefs like Edhem Bey, of Salihli, and Demirji Mehmed Efé, of Nazli and district, to operate unless incorporated in the regular army under his orders.

Tewfik further said that Kemalists propaganda was being carried on in Adalia and district. After a speech by one Shukri, from Angora, over 1,000 men had volunteered in Alaya district, and 300 Mausers had been handed in. Even the women were ready to go and fight. Recently the Italians had supplied 2.000 uniforms to Adalia district at 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ Turkish Liras a suit. Anatolia would not be settled until Smyrna and Armenia were recognised as being Turkish. The Turks were indifferent about the fate ot Constantinople, where effeminate Byzatine Turks spent their time in amusements and fought for empty ministerial honours. Smyrna had been Turkish for 600 years, and Turks would never allow a people like the Greeks, who had been under their rule, to possess it. The Italians were good people, and so were the Austrians and Germans. The latter would succeed in not paying an indemnity to the *Entente*, and would soon become powerful again. If the British had kept one corporal in each large town in Anatolia there would have been order and prosperity in the country. A petition to that effect was once got up in Alaya, but the Italians stopped it. If the Smyrna and Armenian questions were settled to the satisfaction of the Anatolian Moslems, they would have no desire to follow the Angora

Government in any other questions. As regards the French, the Turks thought they were, as a race, decreasing in number and decadent. Their treatment of women had not been good, and this had raised the local people against them.

At *Mersina* it was noticed that the trains to Adana were running. Apart from railway communication with Adana, Mersina had lost all trade with the interior. After sunset we heard rifle-firing near the town. It appears that villages living close to Mersina while peaceful by day, become brigands at night and snipe French forces.

Alexandretta is a base, and was a sense of great activity. Great quantities of military stores were being imported. The railway to Adana was nearing completion. Road communication with Aleppo was for the time being safe, but people going into the country, even fairly close to the town, were armed.

Beirout to Aleppo.—The only matter of note on the railway journey was at the railway station of Aboudouhoun, where an Arab cavalry petrol was seen. I was informed that they had been operating in the district of Idlib.

Aleppo.— I called on General de Lamothe, who command of the 2nd division and is representative of the French High Commissioner, and on M. Reclus, Chief Secretary and Adviser to the Government of Aleppo. Aleppo, Alexandretta and Edder form an independent State under French conrol. The flag is white with the French colours in the corner and three golden stars on the fly. The Government is carried on by native officials under French control. The Moslem supremacy over native Christian elements is maintained.

I gathered from the French that the fall of Aintab had quietened things down and released a number of troops. Since the fall of that town trouble, which appears to be chronic occurred and is still going on in the district of Idlib, souht-west of Aleppo, where local Moslems, led, according to the French, by Turkish officiers, have rebelled against French authority. A strong French column was despatched about the 9th March against these rebels. On 13th March a fight took place near the village of Kennirji, where four French officers, including a major were killed or mortally wounded. The public funeral of three of the officers took place at Aleppo on the 18th March. The body of the fourth officer remained in the hand of the rebels.

The officers who were killed belonged to the 19th and 22nd Algerian Trailleurs.

Operations are still going on in Idlib region.

Apart from the Idlib district there is nothing of much importance to report. Peace has been made between the French and Hachem and Muchlhem Beys, two Arab chiefs who control the Rakka-Edde region, east of Aleppo, and there is hope that communications with Bagdad will benefit as a result. During the week a camel caravan reached Aleppo from Bagdad after three months' journey, but this has been the only caravan which has succeeded in getting through.

General.—The French opinion is for peace with the Kemalists at all cost. According to General de Lamothe, peace with Turkey was necessary to avoid local trouble and its repercussion on the Moslem world; Turkish resistance in 1921 was much better organised and more formidable than that of the spring of 1920, and operations round Aintab recalled trench warfare in France. The general holds also the view that Kemal's forces would easily dispose of the Greek army.

Both French and Italians seem to have been persuaded (perhaps because they wished to be persuaded) that the Greeks were seriously defeated in their operations near Eskishehr at the beginning of this year.

The French have very little good to say of the Armenians. They profess to think they are not worth fighting for.

The general spoke of a Turkish concentration near Urfa, but thought it might be destined for operations near Bagdad or Mosul.

Conclusion.—Comparison of the French zone here and the Greek zone in Smyrna is immensely in favour of the latter. The Greeks have shown much more competence in dealing with their troubles than the French. They keep order in their zone and their troops have inspired respect into the Turkish troops and are capable of, and willing to, continue operations against them. Moreover, they are of opinion, that Mustapha Kemal is putting up a bluff.

The French troops seen bewildered with the resistance they encounter, and exaggerate the Turkish power of resistance and offence. This has led them to make an agreement which looks almost like a capitulation. The conclusion of the agreement is announced as follows in the local press.

> "La France, continuant sa politique traditionelle de sympathie et de bonté à l'égard de la Turquie, a réussi, grâce à ses efforts et malgré les difficultés qu'elle a éprouvées à faire adopter ses conceptions par ses Alliés à faire bénéficier la Turquie d'un traitement aussi logique que possible: c'est ainsi qu'elle a pu obtenir que les pays de langue turque reviendraient au Gouvernment de Constantinople.

"La France, toujours soucieuse de remplir immédiatement ses obligations a signé avec les représentants de Turquie à Londres un armistice en vertu duquel les pays de langue turque occupés actuellement par elle seront remis à la Turquie.

"Dans ces circonstances, la France, bien qu'ayant été tourjours victorieuse et alors que la récente victoire d'Aïntab venait une fois de plus de lui donner le droit de dicter sa volonté, a été uniquement guidée par le respect des droits des nationalités et par la répugnance qu'elle éprouve à infliger plus longtemps aux populations les horreurs de la guerre avec le malaise économique qui en est la consequénce.

"D'ailleurs, de sérieux avantages économiques lui ont été accordés en compensation de son geste de générosité".

This agreement only postpones trouble. It would certainly be better for Syria and Mesopotamia and for the Christian living in Turkey and are abandoned to the Turks if French and Italians withdrew their opposition to Greek action and co-operate with them; but French and Italians feeling themselves unable to cope with the Turks, have to proclaim that Greeks cannot do so, and to oppose the continuance of their operations.

(Copies to Constantinople, Cairo and Beirout).

I have, &c.

JAMES MORGAN.

P. S.—A piece of information, curious if true, by Tewfik, of Alaya, was that Enver Pasha was in Tashkent, and that when flying there, dressed as a German officer, he came down in Roumania and was taken prisoner. He was handed over to the British authorities, who were unaware of his identity and released him a month or two later.

J. M.

F.O. 406/45, p. 201-203, No. 141

No. 88

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *March 23, 1921.*

No. 292.

My Lord,

I PAID a long visit to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 19th instant, and discussed with him the suggestions which have been submitted

to the two Turkish delegations in London for certain modifications in the Treaty of Sèvres.

2. I reminded the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the conversation in which he had outlined the modifications of the treaty which the Turkish Government hoped to secure at the London Conference. This conversation was recorded in my despatch No. 108 of the 21st January last. I said that the Turkish Government seemed to have secured the greater part of their desiderata.

3. I then impressed on Sefa Bey the fact that the concessions in question were entirely due to initiative of His Majesty's Government. Their representatives had suggested the concessions in question, and had indeed, for the most part drafted them. I emphasised the fact that the solution now offered to the Turkish Government was mainly inspired by the sincere desire of His Majesty's Government to satisfy the legitimate claims and susceptibilities of Turkey, in order to facilitate her recovery from the fatal effects of her recent policy.

4. I pointed out that His Majesty's Government had no particular axe to grind in Turkey. They were sincerely anxious to see peace restored in this part of the world, and wanted a unified and prosperous Turkey. I said that Sefa Bey must be under no misapprehension on this point as well as regards the rôle played by the British representatives at the recent conference in London.

5. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he was convinced of the truth of the foregoing statements, and declared that the moral and economic support of Great Britain were indispensable to the prosperity of Turkey. The Turkish Government wished to resume their former relations of friendship with England. But we ought not, he said, as in the past, to allow intrigues to prejudice the relations between our two countries. We had not been sufficiently alive in the past to such intrigues which had commenced many years back, long before the Russo-Turkish war. The Russians had then been the principal intriguers against England, and they had been followed by the Germans.

6. As I did not wish Sefa Bey to develop this in the sense that we ought to beware of either French or Italian intrigue in the future, I observed that we had been working cordially with our allies, and that I did not see who was going to intrigue against us in the future. I added that intrigue, certainly in the past, seemed to be inherent in the atmosphere of Constantinople.

7. Sefa Bey then alluded to two points in the proposed modifications. These were the nationaliy of the proposed Governor of Smyrna, and the inclusion of Constantinople in the Straits zone of the Bosphorus.

8. As regards the former of these questions, he said that he hoped that the League of Nations would choose a Greek Governor of Smyrna town. I replied that it was impossible to forecast the nationality of the person whom the League of Nations would select for this post. In the case of Danzig, the League of Nations had appointed an Englishman.

9. As regards the Bosphorus, Sefa Bey said that in his opinion, it would be sufficient if the demilitarised zone began at, or in the neighbourhood of, Buyuk-Dere and at a point on the Asiatic shore immediately opposite, leaving Constantinople out of the Straits zone. Sefa Bey made no allusion to Thrace.

10. He then alluded to the arrangement which the Angora delegation is reported to have concluded with the Italians about the Adalia region, and stated that he was afraid the Italians would have been found to have secured a position of such economic preponderance as would seriously hamper the Turks in the development of the region in question. I replied that, whilst I knew nothing whatever about this arrangement, I thought that the Turkish Nationalists would not have given away as much as Sefa Bey feared. He replied that the Nationalists delegation did not include men who were gifted with foresight, but I am inclined to think that Sefa Bey's remarks on this subject are inspired with a certain degree of modification at the preponderant rôle played by the Angora delegation.

11. Speaking generally, I derive the impression that Sefa Bey is really gratified at the results obtained by the Turkish delegations in London and he gave no indication that the Constantinople Government would endeavour to raise the question of Thrace and make difficulties generally about the modifications now submitted to them.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD.
High Commissioner.

F.O. 406/45, p. 95-96, No. 70

No. 89

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *March 23, 1921.*
(Received March 30).

No. 300.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 199 of the 22nd instant, I have the honour to state that my French and Italian colleagues and myself

were received by the Sultan in successive audiences on the 21st March. It had come to my knowledge that the Sultan desired to confer more particularly with myself. I therefore availed myself of the opportunity presented by the close of the London Conference to propose to my colleagues that we should wait on His Majesty with a view to enlist his support in securing the acceptance by Turkey of the settlement now proposed. I desired for my own part also to emphasise the rôle played by His Majesty's Government in the recent negotiations, and the spirit of conciliation which they in particular had shown without seeking special advantages for themselves.

2. The Sultan kept me for two hours an a quarter. I was accompanied by Mr. Ryan. His Majesty again preferred that no other person should be present. He dismissed his own attendant at the outset of the audience, and asked Mr. Ryan to interpret. The Sultan was even more than usually clear and emphatic in explaining his main ideas, but he repeated himself and interrupted frequently. The present record will therefore give a full account of what without attempting to follow the exact order of the conversation.

3. I had prepared a memorandum of what I particularly wished to say to His Majesty. I enclose a copy of this paper, a Turkish version of which was read by Mr. Ryan, after I had stated by way of peace that I considered the moment particularly opportune for an exchange of views with His Majesty, in view of the new turn which events had taken as a result of the London Conference.

4. The Sultan listened attentively to the memorandum, the importance of which he recognised. He asked to be allowed to keep a copy of it for his personal use. He said his memory was defective, and there were points which would require consultation with his Ministers. He assured me that if left the paper with him I could rely entirely on his secrecy. I said I had no instructions to make any written communication, but I consented to leave the memorandum with His Maiesty in full reliance on his discretion, and on the distinct understanding that the communication I had made was still to be regarded as a purely verbal one.

5. Though the Sultan thus showed his sence of the importance of the communication, I found him completely preoccupied with the internal situation and his own position. He said he had expressed a desire to meet me because he realised that matters were entering on a new phase which would react enormously on the situation in Turkey. He had desired the meeting to take place earlier because he thought that events would move very quickly. Definite developments had not come as soon as he expected, and he would still like to give me his personal views of what had happened. He produced three telegrams addressed by Mustapha Kemal to Tewfik

Pasha on the 28th and 29th January, in the course of the correspondence arising out of the invitation to the London Conference. I found that the telegrams were those which had been published, and which I had the honour to forward to your Lordship in translation some little time ago. The Sultan said that they represented, photographically as it were, the mentality of the Angora leaders. They constituted an attempt to compromise the throne and to reduce its authority. The suggestion regarding his civil list in the last telegram was definitely insulting. These telegrams were the answer of Angora to temperate communications from Constantinople. The last was such that no answer could be or had been returned by his Government.

6. I observed that the communication which I had made showed clearly the attitude of His Majesty's Government regarding the Sultan's person and throne. I assured him that the desire of his Majesty's Government was to see Turkey united under him as its sovereign.

7. The Sultan expressed gratitude for the regard shown for himself and his position. He said, however, that the situation in Asia Minor was this. A handful of brigands had established complete ascendancy. They were few in number, but they had got a stranglehold on the people as a whole, profiting by their submissiveness, their timidity or their penury. Their strength lay in the backing of 16,000 military officers who were concerned for their own future personal interests. He admitted that a man like Bekir Sami Bey was reasonable, but those who had sent him to London were entirely Chauvinistic.

8. I expressed the hope that on the new basis created by the London conversations it would be possible to rally all well-disposed elements in the country into a signle whole under the guidance of His Majesty.

9. The Sultan said that he agreed as to the main principle, but that he could not agree as regards details. The Angora leaders were men without any real stake in this country with they had no connection of blood or anything else. Mustapha Kemal was a Macedonian revolutionary of unknown origin. His blood might be anything—Bulgarian, Greek or Serbian, for instance. He looked rather like a Serbian! Bekir Sami was a Circassian. They were all the same, Albanians, Circassians, anything but Turkish. There was not a real Turk among them. He and his Government were, nevertheless, powerless before them. The hold was such that there was no means of access to the real Turks, even by way of propoganda. The real Turks were loyal to the core, but they were intimidated or they were hoodwinked by fantastic misrepresentations like the story of his own captivity. These brigands were the men who sought his submission. They looked for external support and found it in the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks

were now close up against the Turkish frontier. The Angora leaders were still playing with them. They might discover and regret too late that they had brought on Turkey the fate of Azarbaijan. Moslem Turks could have nothing to do with Bolshevism, for it was incompatible with their religion, but if it were imposed on them by force, what then?

10. I repeated that His Majesty's Government desired unity in Turkey on the lines I had indicated. Their desire to see representatives from Angora in the Turkish delegation was based on a wish to bring Angora into touch with realities. A man living on the top of a mountain quickly lost touch with the world of fact. His Majesty's Government wished that Angora should see through the eyes of its delegates in a Western *milieu* what the true situation was.

11. The Sultan said he knew his Mustapha Kemal well. You might set him down in London for twenty or thirty years, replace him on the top of his mountain for twenty-four hours, and he would at once revert to type. His Majesty said there was no hope whatsoever that Angora would accept the London settlement. The leaders there would prefer to carry on their movement. He quoted the Turkish proverb which says that "The wolf loves the air of a fog". Izzet Pasha and his colleagues had returned from the interior. He had seen the three chief members of Izzet Pasha's Mission collectively. They had been a little shy perhaps of talking quite openly before each other. Nevertheless, the general information they gave was most discouraging. He doubted whether if a mission had been sent to Moscow it would have been treated with so much contumely as Izzet Pasha's Mission had been treated in Angora.

12. The Sultan consulted a short memorandum of five number points to which he said he wished to draw my particular attention. They were as follows:—

(1.) The Caliphate was in principle conferred by the procedure called Bei'at of rendering of homage. It was possible that the Angora leaders would set up a Caliph of their own and compel a semblance of the formal rendering of homage, which was the mark of acceptance by the people.

(2). The rule of succession in his dynasty invested all the male descendants of the Imperial House with a right to the reversion of the throne. The Angora leaders were capable of taking advantage of that fact to set up some junior member of his House as Sultan.

(3). The connection between the Sultanate and the Caliphate was that of two complementary parts of a single whole. The Caliphate was not like the Papacy. Temporal power was an adjunct essential to its completeness. The pretension of the Angora leaders

to transfer all temporal power in Turkey to their own Government was likely to be followed by a transference of the Caliphate. It might be vested in some prince set up as Sultan, or, failing that, some sherif or such like, with a semblance of the qualification of power.

(4). The removal of the Caliphate from Constantinople would be fraught with disastrous consequences. He was not speaking now of his own position, but of the general interest of Europe. If the Caliphate were taken eastward from a place in which it was under control it would become an instrument in the hands of uncontrollable elements, "the wolves who loved the air of a fog".

(5). The financial situation of the Constantinople Government rendered it completely powerless. Even here the bulk of the people were under the influence of fear or poverty. Officials were flying to the interior from the destitution to which they had been reduced here. Tewfik Pasha reported that your Lordship had shown a benevolent spirit in regard to the financial situation, but had said that a definite result must depend on his (the Grand Vizier's) further conversations in Paris.

13. I noted the Sultan's first four points without discussion. As regards the fifth, I said that my French colleage and I were exerting ourselves equally to bring about a settlement of certain outstanding questions of money claimed by the Turkish Government notably those with the Tobacco Régie, with the Eastern Telegraph Company, and with the French Government in respect of moneys obtained from the Turkish Treasury early in the armistice. I agreed with an interpolation of the Sultan that relief from such sources would be transitory, but observed that a settlement of the customs question would give relief of a more lasting kind. I explained briefly the controversy which was delaying this settlement, and intimated that the abandonment of the Allied objection to the maintenance of the consumption duties should facilitate the settlement on a basis which the Allies had throughout proposed, namely, a return to the *ad valorem* system.

14. The Sultan said he was not an expert in finance. There was evidently some misundertanding about the customs question, which could be cleared up by the return of Tewfik Pasha. The fact which impressed him was the penury which reigned. The situation was such that his Government had lost its head. The last Government had lost its head completely. The present Government was no better off, and was, moreover, subject to occult influences.

15. The Sultan went on to speak more particularly about matters touching his personal position. He said that a change of Government might

have to be faced on Tewfik Pasha's return. He had full confidence in Tewfik Pasha, and had no desire to part with him. Tewfik Pasha was, however, an old man. He might find his position untenable or he might wish to resign for personal reasons. His Majesty referred to his own position as being one on complete helplessness and isolation, and referred to conversations with my predecessor in which he had foreshadowed such a situation. He was asked to make his submission to a handful of rebels. He was prepared to make any personal sacrifice, but he could not sacrifice his honour, imperil his heritage, or compromise the interests of his throne by a submission so shameful. He indeed desired unity, but it could only be on the basis of submission of the rebels to the lawful authority, and yet he found himself completely impotent to assert that authority.

16. In this part of the conversation the Sultan spoke to me with great frankness and intimacy of the situation as it affected his own person. I fear I was able to give him very little comfort. I could only thank him before withdrawing for the great confidence he had reposed in me.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

F.O. 371/6468. E. 3765.
F.O. 406/45, p. 98, No. 71
D.B.F.P., 1 st. series, Vol. XVII, p. 87-91, No. 68.

No. 90

Lord Granville (Athens) to Earl Curzon

ATHENS, *March 23, 1921, 10 p.m.*
(Received March 25, 10 p.m.)

No. 134 Telegraphic

I saw Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs[1] and Minister of War and Marine[2] yesterday. Both were in very good spirits and former was most accommodating upon all the various questions of minor importance about which I spoke to him. Latter told me in strict confidence that advance in Asia Minor will take place immediately and read me a long telegram from London reporting interview of Monsieur Kalogerepoulos and

[1] M. Baltazzis, Minister of Agriculture.

[2] M. N. Theotokis, Minister of Marine and Acting Minister of War.

Gounaris with Pirime Minister on March 18th and March 19th[3]. According to telegram Prime Minister had stated that he had warned Turks that if they tried to utilise the delay of 25 or 30 days asked for by strengthening their position as against Greeks they would be responsible for any resulting bloodshed and he had entirely approved of Greek proposal to issue to (? General Staff) message to mobilise three classes and make an advance counteract Turkish concentration. He had also encouraged them to hope to raise money in England and had arranged meeting for Gounaris with Chancellor of the Exchequer but this to be kept quite secret.

Minister of War and Marine expressed considerable discomfort regarding position of French military mission, several officers of which are actually at the front in view of French (? agreement with) Kemal.

Both Ministers talked of enthusiams in the country for mobilization; I cannot say I have seen any and I suspect enthusiasm as may exist is limited to those who are not liable to military service. Veniselists express in conversation and in the press to a certain extent, much anxiety and bewilderment and ask what these operations are to (? lead to), will Greeks be stopped by Allies before they have done any good, are they going to fight for the old treaty of Sèvres or for the new arrangement proposed (your telegram No. 151 to Constantinople) and more specially where is the money coming from; is more paper money to be issued with resultant heavy fall in drachma?

Outlook inspires me with much anxiety: if Greeks succeed as they say they are confident of doing in smashing Kemal very quickly well and good, but head of French mission[4] consider (his opinion may, of course, be biassed) that it is folly for them to attempt anything till at least they have received reinforcements as though they may have initial success he thinks they cannot go any distance. It is also certain that if they have real success their appetite will be proportionately whetted. If a succes is not crushing and rapid it means long and ruinous warfare for both parties which His Majesty's Government (? may be) accused of having encouraged or at least of having acquisced in. Also unsuccessful war might lead to revolution, civil war and anarchy in Greece inviting attack by Bulgaria and even Serbia with endless consequence of Balkan complications. On the other hand it seems obvious Greeks stand better change now than a month or two hence when Turks will be better prepared; Turks are presumably being encouraged if not armed by Italians and French (? and it) would be therefore very unfair to stop Greeks unless it were possible really to prevent Turks concentrating and preparing. Could Turkey perhaps be

[3] In his despatch No. 137 of March 23, not printed, Lord Granville uses the words 'on the 18th or 19th instant'. For the conversation of March 18, see No. 86.

[4] General Gramat.

restrained by renewed threat of loss of Constantinople? Is there no means of ensuring real French and Italian neutrality perhaps through League of Nations?

Repeated to Constantinople.

D.B.F.P., 1 st series, Vol. XVII, p. 86-87, No. 67

No. 91

Report No. 137, Issued by the British Secret Intelligence Service, Constantinople Branch.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *23. 3. 1921.*

(Extracts)

TURKEY.

The Return of the Government Mission to Angora.

The sudden and unexpected return of Izzet Pasha's Mission has been the subject of considerable speculation in Turkish circles. The explanations vouchsafed to the local press were obviously insufficient. Conversations between Fatin Effendi, a member of the delegation, and a friend, throws some light on what took place. The purport of the conversations may be summarised as follows:—

(1) Fatin Effendi, who was formerly a man of moderate views, has fallen under the influence of perfervid Pan-Islamists.

(2) Fatin Effendi admitted that the true reason for the return of the Mission was to wring the consent of the Sultan to the following demands formulated by Mustapha Kemal in his remarkable telegram to Tewfik Pasha on January 31st:—

(i) Promulgation of an Imperial decree by which the Great National Assembly would be recognised by the Sultan as the sole and supreme Government of Turkey.

(ii) The Sultan to continue to reside in Constantinople but the Government to be maintained in Angora. Liaison between the Sultan and Angora to be carried out by a mission specially appointed by the Nationalists. The Nationalists maintain that the agreements made between the delegation in London and the French and Italian Governments amount to a de facto recognition of the Nationalist administration as the Government of Turkey, and that the British Government has proceeded some distances in the same direction. The next step is to obtain the Sultan's recognition and it is hoped that Izzet Pasha by one means or another will succeed in extorting it.

(3) The Nationalists propose, in the event of the Sultan's acceptance of their demands, to dissolve the existing assembly and hold a general election. The new assembly will have the character of a "Constituent Assembly" and will at once proceed to abolish the Imperial prerogatives.

(4) The second act of the new assembly will be to repudiate any agreement made, either now or later, by the Nationalist representatives in Europe.

These plans, it is said, have been settled by the Nationalist chiefs in close concert with the Bolsheviks, although Fatin Effendi strongly denies that there is the slightest intention on the part of the Nationalist leaders to espouse the principles of Bolshevism. It would appear certain, judging from unexceptionable information from another source, that the Soviet Government of Moscow has at last realised the futility of attempting to introduce Communism into Turkey at the present moment. On the other hand, it would seem equally clear that the Turks are still assigned an important part in Bolshevik plans for the future, and it is therefore not improbable that the Nationalist leaders consulted Moscow when making their plans for the immediate future.

Mustapha Kemal and The Russian Monarchists.

The Russian Monarchist Delegation acting on Russian instructions from Paris, approached Talaat some time before death, but Talaat refused to deal with them. The Emir Chekkib Arslan showed me on the 16th March Mustafa Kemal's last despatch to Talaat. In it Mustapha Kemal deprecated negotiations with the Monarchist Deputation on the ground that the time was not ripe for any effort to overthrow the Soviet Government. Mustapha Kemal also expressed approval of Enver's activities in Moscow.

F.O. 371/6509

No. 92

General Harington, Constantinople, to War Office and Malta.

Despatched:— 13. 00 26. 3. 21.
Received:— 11. 20. 27. 3. 21.

Secret.

99 cipher March 26th.

Reference War Office 56695 A. G. 3. (P. W.).

I sincerely hope that until all the British prisoners are safe on a British warship none of Turkish prisoners at *Malta* will be released. *Mustapha*

Kemal will not abide by any promise made by Bekir Sami Bey if 25 important ones are released now and he will not mind other 39. Daily events prove he never honours the latter's cheque. The British prisoners belong to this army. I am in honour bound to secure their safe release and I wish to take no risks on their behalf. In my opinion Mustapha Kemal should produce them at Samsun or some Black Sea port and that a British warship should sail there simultaneously with ship from Malta.

F.O. 371/6502

No. 93

Lord Granville (Athens) to Earl Curzon

ATHENS, *March 31, 1921*

No. 148

My Lord,

I have the honour to report that Monsieur Calogeropoulos returned from his mission to London on the 28th instant and that Monsieur Gounaris is expected on the 4th or 5th proximo. Monsieur Baltazzi, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a speech of welcome, declared that 'no Prime Minister of Greece had ever returned from a diplomatic mission abroad bringing back with him so many victories and laurels'! Monsieur Calogeropoulos was received the next morning by the King to report on his mission and then took a week's leave of absence from his fatigue—and also perhaps to avoid resuming the Presidency of the Council before Monsieur Gounaris's return. It is obvious that a reconstruction and completion of the Ministry must then take place, as almost all the Ministers are now in charge of two departments with fatal results to efficiency. It is generally assumed that Monsieur Gounaris, now that he has been received in London and Paris and may therefore be considered to be more or less whitewashed[1], will take the Presidency of the Council himself; on the other hand some people believed that his dislike of responsibility is such that he may prefer to keep Monsieur Calogeropoulos as a figurehead. In any case he will certainly keep the Ministry of war. Monsieur Baltazzi told me this morning that he rather expected to remain Minister for Foreign Affairs as Monsieur Calogeropoulos did not care for that Ministry and preferred that of Finance which he would probably have. Rumour says that Monsieur Protopapadakis will certainly leave the Ministry of Finance and that

[1] After the fall of the Venizelist Government in March, 1915, M. Gounaris had become Prime Minister and later as Minister of the Interior, he had been the real head of the Skouloudis Cabinet of November 1915-June 1916. When King Constantine was expelled in 1917, M. Gounaris was exiled to Corsica.

he is very unpopular and may leave the Government altogether. Monsieur Jean Rhallys is expected to return to the Cabinet, but I do not know to what Ministry, as I think Monsieur Theotokis will almost certainly keep the Ministry of Marine[2].

The news of the capture of Afium Karahisar, which announced unofficially in Athens 24 hours before the offical news was published, caused great joy and was followed almost immediately by a report which gained general credence that Eskishehr had also been taken. When this turned out not to be true and it became known that a desperate battle was raging which must, I fear, mean very heavy losses, the disappointment which must have been felt was very successfully hidden. Monsieur Baltazzi and Monsieur Theotokis, the only two Ministers I have seen, both concealed any anxiety which they may feel and expressed complete confidence that Eskishehr would fall in a day or two; and all the papers, of all parties except the Socialist, take the same line, talk of Eskishehr as being on the point of capture and avoid any reference to the question of casualties. I gather from my French colleague's[3] conversation that General Gramat[4] feels very considerable anxiety as to whether the Greek troops in that sector are strong enough in numbers to be able to stand the very heavy toll that must be being taken and whether they may not be obliged to retire to Broussa, which would be a terrible blow.

I have not yet been able to get any definite or reliable information as to the relative succes of the mobilization of the three class; men connected with the Government assure one that it is completely successful, one Venizelist journalist told a member of my staff that not more than 25 % of the contingents had presented themselves, and the general impressoin would appear to be that it has only been moderately successful, I fancy the truth is that men have presented themselves well in towns where it was difficult to escape but not in remote districts. In Crete the men appear to have declared that they would not serve except under Venizelist Officers.

There is still much talk of the King going to the front and it stated in the press that he is only waiting Monsieur Gounaris's return before doing so; I imagine His Majesty is waiting more especially for a certainty of victory.

As was certain from the first, the initial success at Afiun Karahissar and the expected capture of Eskishehr have already had the effect of whetting

[2] M. Kalogeropoulos resinged on April 8. M. Gounaris became President of the Council and Minister of Justice. Those filling other ministers were: M. N. Theotokis, war; M. Protopapadakis, Finance; M. I. Rhallis, National Economy; M. Baltazzis, Foreign Affairs.

[3] M. de Billy.

[4] Head of the French Military Mission to Greece.

the Greek appetite. The papers are full of articles pointing out that if Greece has been left to fight out her quarrel with the Turks by herself and with her own resources, she is not longer the mandatory of the Powers and liable to be checked at any moment by their orders: she is now fighting to settle the question once and for all and the Treaty of Sèrves will indeed require modification, but in her favour. Constantinople is freely and openly talked of, and it is no doubt a sign of the trend of public opinion that there have been rumours in Athens that the Greeks in Constantinople had started a revolution and also that Greek troops from Ismid were marching on the town.

On the other hand a good deal of nervousness and anxiety is apparent regarding a possible danger of attacks on Thrace and Macedonia by the Bulgarians or Serbians or both. The temptation to both Bulgarians and Serbs to take the opportunity when Greece is so fully occupied in Asia Minor to seize Thrace and Salonika respectively is obvious; I have not seen any definite reports of activities on the part of Bulgar bands or troops, but there was a report that there were 50,000 Serbian troops concentrated at Monastir. The Serbian Minister has indignantly denied this to the Press and has, I believe, said that the report was absurd as they had only 15,000 troops at Monastir; as a matter of fact, as I understand that there is at this moment only one Greek regiment scattered throughout Macedonia, 15,000 men would presumably be ample to seize Salonika. One can only hope that the S. H. S. Government[5] is too busy at present setting their house in order to embark on adventures of this nature. Another danger about which the Greeks are very anxious is presented by General Wrangel's troops in the Gallipoli peninsula. Monsieur Baltazzi mentioned this to me the other day and expressed the greatest anxiety; he understood that the French were going to cease feeding these Russians from today, he seemed to think that they were still armed, and he feared that when they found no more food in the Peninsula they might invade Thrace in search of it. My French Colleague assured me that all the Russians are disarmed except a very small number who act as police and Sir Horace Rumbold explained to Your Lordship in his telegram No. 218, referring to my telegram No. 145, that the French will only cease feeding these Russians on the 24th of April. That certainly gives a respite of three weeks but the danger of this large body of hungry and desperate men is certainly a very serious one, whether it is greater for Constantinople or for Thrace.

I have only noticed one reference in the Press to the action of the British Military Authorities in forbidding the use by the Greeks of the rolling stock of the Haidar Pasha Railway (See Sir H. Rumbold's Telegram No. 214 of

[5] The Serbo-Croat-Slovene Government.

26th March); the newspaper in question remarked that though this decision was a disagreeable one for the Greeks, the extreme correctness of British neutrality which was thus displayed should have a useful effect as an example to the French and Italians. I have not seen any direct accusations against the French of helping Mustapha Kemal except with regard to the Cilicia agreement, but all the papers state categorically that the Italians have supplied and are still supplying arms and ammunition and equipment to the Turks, and, when the Italian Legation issued an official démenti, they said that that only showed that the supply was made by private enterprize and not by the Government. A reliable Englishman was in an Italian steamer which touched at Adalia some five weeks ago and he saw large numbers of cases being landed which were marked 'Angora' and which looked to his civilian eyes like military stores.

I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople.

I have, &c.,

GRANVILLE

D.B.F.P., Ist. series, Vol. XVII, p. 99-102, No. 78

No. 94

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *April 5, 1921.*
(Received April 13.)

No. 339.

My Lord,

AFTER very severe fighting in front of Eskishehr for several days, during which the Greek troops incurred heavy losses, the Greeks have been obliged to fall back. Both the northern and southern columns are retiring to their original lines. The effective rifle strength of the Broussa forces seems to have reduced from 13,000 to 8,000. Their casualties are estimated at 2,700 in one division and 2,000 in another and the *moral* of the troops is reported to be falling steadily.

2. The Greeks assert that reinforcements to the extent of 20,000 are *en route* from Thrace, and reinforcements are being hurriedly collected at Smyrna. The Greek authorities at Constantinople state that, after the arrival of these reinforcements, the Greeks will advance again.

3. I had occasion to see the Greek High Commissioner yesterday, who admitted spontaneously that the Greek losses had been enormous.

He stated that at In Eunu all the officers of one regiment, from the colonel downwards, had been killed. He attributed the Greek failure partly to the fact that the Kemalist artillery had been able to register the ground over which the attack was to take place, whereas the Greeks had been unable to bring up their artillery for counter-battery work. M. Votsis likewise stated that if it had not been for the help which the Kemalists had received from both the French and Italians the operations would have been over by now. He said that the Italians in particular had supplied the Nationalist forces with arms and ammunition; three Italian ships had recently saled from Taranto to Adalia with material of war for the Kemalists. He also asserted that there were two French and three Italian officers serving with the Kemalist staff at Eskishehr, and that a French officer in uniform had been found amongst the Turkish dead. The French High Commissioner is issuing a *démenti* of this story.

4. I understand that one of the main reasons for the losses and set-back which the Greeks have sustained is that the Kemalists brought up 6-inch Howitzers, the existence of which was quite unsuspected by the Greeks. Another reason which has undoubtedly contributed to the Greek failure has been the replacement of capable officers by incompetent adherents of the Constantinist régime.

5. So far the Kemalist troops do not seem to have been able to take advantage of their successful resistance in order to pursue the retreating Greeks. No doubt they have been severe losses themselves.

6. Thus it would seem that both sides have been somewhat exhausted by the first round of this conflict, and since the Greeks have elected renew hostilities in order to settle the question of the Treaty of Sèvres by the sword, the best solution would seem to be that Turks and Greeks should fight one another to a standstill. Then presumably, they would be more amenable to pressure or advice from the Allies. It is impossible to contemplate a complete Greek or Kemalist victory wothout dismay.

7. Military opinion inclines to the belief that the Greek commanders will not be able to get their troops to advance again and General Papoulos may, indeed find himself filling the rôle of a modern Xenophon.

8. An interesting indication of the state of mind of the Angora Government is furnished by a telegram sent by that Government to the secretary of the Régie Company at Constantinople, pointing out that the Angora Governemen will not necessarily recognise the arrangement recently concluded between the company and, what they contemptuously call the Constantinople administration. The telegram remnids the Régie Company that the Anora Government is the sole Government in Turkey.

9. The situation is curious and possibly without precedent. The Greek Government apparently consider itself at war with Turkey, but not, pre-

sumably, with the Constantinople Government, which remains an impotent but deeply interested spectator of events in Anatolia. The unredeemed Greeks, through the mouth of the Patriarchate, have sent their best wishes to the Greek army for its success in the present struggle. On the other hand, prayers have been offered up in the mosque of Eyoub for the succeess of the Kemalist arms. All the mosques were illuminated last night in honour of the Turkish victory.

10. The present situation has given rise to a variety of questions in the domain of international law, in view of the attitude of neutrality which the Powers have decided to observe in the present conflict. The situation is extraordinarily interesting, but, having regard to the rapid and often unexpected sequence of events, it would be rash to predict what is likely to take even within the period of a week.

11. Hardly a day passes without the Allied High Commissions receiving notes of protest, either from the Turkish Government or from the Greek High Commissioner, about deeds of violence committed by one or other of the contending parties. In present circumstances it is perfectly futile passing these notes on.

I have, &c.,

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

F.O. 406/46, p. 19-20, No. 10.

No. 95

Report No. 151 Issued By The British Secret Intelligence Service.

BERLIN, *5. 4. 21*

(Extract)

Relations Between the Kemalists and the Bolsheviks.

I had conversation with the Emir Arslan and Madame Talaat to-day. They showed me, and translated into French, a letter from Enver in Moscow. It contained a resumé of notes between Mustapha Kemal and Chicherin. The latter wrote deprecating the negotiations at the London Conference, which might lead to the cessation of Russian supplies of arms and material to Angora.

Mustapha Kemal answered that it was precisely the lack of arms and material which had compelled the Turks in the first instance to send their delegates to the London Conference.

The outbreak of fresh hostilities with the Greeks made their requirements more urgent than ever.

F.O. 371/6509

No. 96

Earl Granville to Earl Curzon.

ATHENS, *April 7, 1921.*
(Received April 19.)

No. 160.

My Lord,

TO-DAY being the hundredth anniversay of the outbreak of the struggle for Greek independence in 1821, the town is profusely beflagged, it is a public holiday and large crowds are wandering about, salutes are fired, and there was a Te *Deum* in the cathedral and a ceremonial lecture in the university, both attended by the King and the Royal Family.

In the upper classes at least, there is a deep feeling of depression which makes it difficult for them to celebrate this centenary as joyously as they would have wished. After some days of concealment, the news has now been published that the troops which were attacking Eskishehr have been withdrawn to their original positions just east of Broussa, and though ridiculous official explanations have been issued that the attack on Eskishehr was never intended as a serious operation, but only as a feint to render easier the capture of Afium Karahissar, every body realised that the Greeks had met with a serious rebuff which has cost a terrible lot of casualties, I think a good many people also realise the danger that Afium Karahissar may now be very seriously attacked by Turks coming up from the south and by others from the north released by the Greek retirement. There was a report yesterday that Afium Karahissar had already been retaken, but I gather that this is at any rate premature.

Sor far, public opinion appears to be talking this bad news better than I should have expected; possibly the man in the street swallows the optimistic declarations of the Government and the press does not quite realise the situation. On the othar hand, I suppose there is a possibility that the optimism is justified and that when the reinforcements arrive, which I am told they should do in a week or ten days, the Greeks may be able to execute an enveloping operation and still take Eskishehr and inflict a real defeat on the Turks. M. Theotokis, who has been Acting Minister of War during Mr. Gounaris's absence told me two or three days ago that

the mobilisation of three classes had already yielded 40,000 men, and that he felt confident of getting 45,000, which was the figure the Government had counted on. I have no means of verifying this statement which does not tally with General Gramat's impressions or with the stories I still hear constantly of great difficulties throughout the country in getting the men to present themselves. An Englishman travelled in a train full of newly mobilised men a day or two ago and heard the most violent abuse of the mobilisation, of the Government, and even of the King himself; on the other hand, the men I have seen marching through the streets of Athens have been most cheery.

A press telegram reached Athens from Smyrna the other day that the body of a French officer had been found in the Turkish trenches. The Government stopped this telegram but it was followed by many more telling the same story with numerous embellishments, and they were allowed to be published. This produced a crop of articles in almost every Government paper attacking the French in unrestrained language, while the Veniselist papers showed common sense in refusing to believe the story, and anyhow deprecating these attacks on a Power whom it is in Greece's interest to endeavour to conciliate. The abuse was such that my French colleague protested to the Minister for Forcing Affairs, insisted on his issuing a *démenti*, and begged him to keep the press in order; the *démenti* was issued—rather a half-hearted one—and was greeted with contempt and disbelief and fresh abuse of France by the Government press. The Italian Minister also issued periodical *démentis* of the accusations against Italy and protests to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but with no apparent result.

I have, &c.,

GRANVILLE.

F.O. 406/46, p. 20-21, No. 11.

No. 97

Report No. 169 Issued By The British Secret Intelligence Service, Constantinople Branch

CONSTANTINOPLE, *11. 4. 21*

(Extract)

THE SHEIKH-EL-SENUSSI.

Since the Sivas Conference held during January under the Presidency of the Sheikh-el-Senussi his movements have been the subject of

somewhat conflicting reports. Rumours were current that, at the instance of *Mustapha Kemal*, he was to proceed on a propaganda mission to Arabia and Mesopotamia in connection with the decisions of the Sivas Congress. According to announcements in the Anatolian press confirmed by confidential information, he has been moving from place to place in Anatolia. Thus he has been reported at Angora, Konia, Kaisarie, Afion Kara Hissar and even at Adalia, whilst at the commencement of March he was said to be on the point of entering Syria for the purpose of making his way to the Hejaz.

A letter from the Sheikh dated Angora March 10th, has now been seen by an agent adressed to the Tripolitan, Yussuf Shetwan, in Constantinople. In this letter the Sheikh states that he is remaining in Angora, "awaiting the Divine commands". There was some uncertainty with regard to his earlier plans concerning the Hejaz "because the Assembly had decided on the Iraq in conformity with the wishes of our friends". The missive concluded with the request "do not forget our commission, and to send news of our brother the Idrissi".

Commenting on the letter, Yussuf Shetwan stated that it was true the Sheikh intended to proceed to the Hejaz for the purpose of visiting the Ben I Harb tribe between Medina and Mecca. His plans were then to visit his kinsman, El Idrissi of Assir, but Mustapha Kemal had prevented his departure in order to send him to the Iraq.

It is worthy of note in this connection that Reshid Pasha, the former legal representative in Constantinople of the late Ibn U'Rashid, expressed the opinion recently that the Sheikh el Senussi would be unable to enter the Hejaz on account of the very strict precautions taken by King Hussein against anyone who might imperil his sovereignty of the Hejaz, for which reason even his own brother, Sherif Nassir, was not trusted. Reshid Pasha also thought that for similar reasons the Sheikh would not be allowed to enter Assir, for the Idrissi was just as jealous of his own rights as King Hussein. A further obstacle to the Sheikh's travelling to the Hejaz was the occupation of Abha in the south of Assir by the central Arabian chieftain Ibn Sa'ud, as a preliminary to measure against the Hejaz. Thus the Sheikh could only fulfil his purpose if he received an invitation from the Ben I Harb tribe and if he were assisted by some European Power prepared to connive at ultimate operations against King Hussein.

No. 98

Adam Block to Sir Horace Rumbold

CONSTANTINOPLE, 12th *April 1921.*

No. 4/50.

Sir,

Referring to my memorandum of the 18th of January regarding the Financial Situation of the Kemalist Government I have the honour to enclose to you herewith a short report which I have drawn up upon later information which has reached me.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) ADAM BLOCK

F.O. 371/6541.

SITUATION IN KEMALIST ANATOLIA.

Reference my Memorandum of January 18th, 1921.

ESTIMATES FOR FINANCIAL YEAR 1336 (1920 - 1921).

As will be observed by a study of the estimates, which have now come to hand, for the Financial year 1920-1921 as shown on the attached table there is a deficit of Lt. 13. 811. 834, the total expenditure amounting to Lt. 60. 642. 705 against receipts amounting to Lt. 46. 830. 871. These estimates were, however, drawn up towards the close of the financial year, and it would appear that the Angora Financial Commission was of opinion that an economy of Lt. 9.000.000 could be realised, reducing the deficit to Lt. 4.811.834. It was hoped to meet a part of this latter by the following taxation:—

1. Creation of military exemption tax on the non-musulmans.
2. Increase on Hedjaz Stamp dues.
3. Increase on judicial fees.
4. Increase on scale of dues on transfer of title deeds.
5. Increase on imported alcohol dues, customs dues, fishing dues, navigation dues, postal and telegraphic dues.
6. Creation of a tax of 1 % on all commercial transactions by a slight modification in the "temettu", (tax on professions).

It was estimated that this additional taxation would bring in about Lt. 2.500.000 thus further reducing the deficit to about Lt. 2.500.000, but it is not known whether all these proposed changes have been carried out. In certain quarters the idea was entertained to make good the final deficit by a levy to be known as the "Patriotic Defence Levy", but the

National Financial Commission vetoed this proposal, preferring to wait until the time was ripe for the issue of a loan, or should this prove impossible, to carry forward this deficit to the following year, when some reductions in expenditure might be made.

Expenditure.

It should be noticed that with the exception of the customary credits for the Civil List no prevision has been made for any expenditure outside the territory of the Angora Government, such as for instance, the expenses of the Central Administration at Constantinople, and the upkeep of schools and hospitals in Occupied Territory. Nor is there any prevision for the service of the Exterior Debt of the country.

The following details regarding expenditure are worthy of mention:—

Secret Funds of Ministry of War	Lt.	200.000.—
" " " " " Interior	"	150.000.—
" " " " " Foreign Affairs	"	50.000.—
Installation of Ministry of Marine	Lt.	162.000.—
Enlargement of the National Assembly Buildings	"	10.000.—
Construction of National Roads	"	200.000.—

Taxes.

The increases on existing taxation are as follows:—

1. Salt tax increased from Pts. 1 the kilo to Pts. 3 the kilo.
2. Increase of 400 % on Customs dues.
3. "Aghnam" (Sheep and goat tax) increased by 700 %.
4. Property tax increased by 400 %.
5. Professional tax increased by 400 % or 900 %, according to the class of the profession.
6. Creation of a 1 % tax on commercial transactions.
7. The coal tax increased from Pts. 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ the ton to 5 % "ad Valorem" and an export tax imposed of Lt. 2 or 3 the ton according to quality.
8. Increase of the navigation dues.
9. Postal dues fixed at Pts. 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ for postcards and Pts 3 for all local letters; for abroad Pts. 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ and Pts. 5 respectively.

It is proposed to increase by 400 % the "Droits de Timbres fixes", the Hedjaz stamp, and judicial fees, while the proportional stamp dues and land registry dues are to be doubled. Fishing dues and shooting licenses to be increased by 200 %, the tax on raw hides by 400 %, finally a tax of 10 % is projected on rents.

Further enactments.

According to Article 17 of the Finance Law of 1920-1921 the amortization and payment on the following loans are deferred until recognition has been made of complete national and financial independence and until the amount of the contributive parts of the territories detached from Turkey after the Balkan War have been established:—

1. Loans guaranteed by the Egyptian Tribute and by the surplus of the revenues of the Island of Cyprus.

2. Loans forming part of the Decree of Mouharrem.

3. Loans contracted since the promulgation of the Decree of Mouharrem, and of which the service is entrusted to the Public Debt Administration or to Financial Establishments.

4. Loans contracted directly by the Turkish Government.

5. All advances obtained from foreign sources as well as all the kilometric Railway guarantees.

Prevision is made for a credit of Ltq. 735.250 for the maintenance of the Public Debt Agencies, which are to continue as formerly, but to be attached to the Finance Department. Their organisation and attributions will not be interfered with, and they will pay in all sums encashed against receipt to the Treasury. The salaries and expenses will be paid according to the credit opened in the estimates. Owing to a reduction made in the salaries of certain of the higher Debt officials the credit of Lt. 1.735.250 is reduced to Lt. 1.732.240.

According to Article 19 the Tobacco Regie is to continue as hitherto, a sum of Lt. 708.095 being shown in the estimates as receipts. The Angora Government states that in its opinion the Tobacco Regie should be abolished and the tax collected in some other form.

The budget estimates for the 1921 - 1922 show an expenditure of Lt. 86.042.255, receipts Lt. 79.042.255 and a deficit of Lt. 7.000.000 (see Annex 2).

It should be noted that all these estimates were made before the outbreak of the actual hostilities between Anatolia and Greece.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *9th April 1921.*

(Signed) ADAM BLOCK.

THE KEMALIST GOVERNMENT BUDGET FOR THE YEAR 1920 — 1921

Receipts

	Lt.
Property Tax	2.540.689.
"Temettu" (tax on profession)	1.083.756.
War Profits Tax	1.000.000.
War tax	200.000.
"Aghnam" (Sheep & goat tax)	5.783.586.
Tithe 11 %	13.641.079.
Tithe I 1/2 % Surcharge	1.860.146.
Tax on private owned forests	30.000.
Mines	375.000.
Tax forms	75.000.
Stamps	272.137.
Hedjaz Stamps	175.000.
Judicial fees	233.055.
Land Registration fees	241.265.
Fines	43.437.
Licenses to sell 'Tumbeki' (Persian Tobacco)	48.
Customs	10.361.224.
Navigation dues	4.000.
Sanitary dues	5.000.
Shooting and fishing taxes	68.626.
Salt tax	3.500.000.
Tabacco Tax	708.095.
Tobacco surcharge for orphans	100.000.
Posts and Telegraphs	475.149.
Fees for Government Schools	45.000.
Receipts of Sanitary Board	100.
Government Quinine	50.000.
State Mines	15.386.
State Lands	666.000.
State forests	908.200.
Receipts from sale of Government property	400.000.
Receipts from irrigation of Plain of Konia	12.000.
Receipts of Angora-Sivas Rly	29.450.
Treasury Operations	506.443.
Various	400.000.
Pension Fund Contributions	702.000.
Receipts allocated to Local Authorities	150.000.

Refunds on advances made	30.000.
Tax on cigarette paper	100.000.
Tax on matches & Tinder	30.000.
Tax on billiards	5.000.
Tax on playing cards	5.000.
DEFICIT	13.811.834.
Total:	60.642.705.

Expenditure

	Lt.
Civil List	551.012.
Chamber of Deputies	982.995.
Public Debt (salaries & expenses & pensions of Government)	7.679.696.
Finance Ministry	5.838.629.
Customs	356.160.
Land registry	403.316.
Posts and Telegraphs	1.358.820.
Presidency of Council	17.775.
Ministry of Interior	2.731.023.
Public Security	1.349.804.
Refugees	1.257.813.
Board of Health	541.157.
Foreign Affairs	207.823.
Cheikh-ul-Islamat	522.062.
Justice	2.759.274.
Public Instruction	527.282.
Public Works	562.919.
Agriculture	1.049.921.
Press	160.145.
Gendarmery	4.842.474.
Munitions	727.969.
National Defence (War)	25.745.172.
Navy	469.464.
Total:	60.642.705.

THE KEMALIST GOVERNMENT BUDGET FOR THE YEAR 1921 — 1922

Receipts

	Lt.
Property tax	4.000.000.
"Temettu" (tax on profession)	6.500.000.
War Tax	200.000.
Military Exemption Tax	5.000.000.
"Aghnam"	7.002.560.
Tithe	17.030.000.
Share of Government in subscriptions	2.322.272.
Tax on private owned forests	30.000.
Mines	400.000.
Tax forms	10.000.
Stamps	300.000.
Hedjaz Stamps	600.000.
Judicial fees	655.000.
Land Registration fees	570.000.
Fines	45.000.
Tax on alcohol	50.000.
License to sell 'Tumbeki'	2.500.
Customs	15.000.000.
Navigation dues	26.000.
Sanitary dues	30.000.
Shooting & Fishing Taxes	100.090.
Salt	6.000.000.
Tobacco Tax	1.652.833.
Posts & Telegraphs	1.300.000.
Fees for Government Schools	45.000.
Receipts for Sanitary Board	25.000.
State quinine	50.000.
State Property	1.620.000.
State Forests	975.000.
Sales of Government property	400.000.
Revenue of the irrigation of the Konia Plain	40.000.
Revenue of Angora-Sivas Rly	125.000.
Treasury Operations	510.000.
Sundry receipts	400.000.
Pension fund contributions	720.000.
Refunds on advances made	200.000.
Cigarette paper monopoly	2.000.000.

Tax on playing cards	1.000.
Tax on billiards	5.000.
Tax on matches and tinder	100.000.
Consommation tax on sugar, coffee, tea, petroleum, etc	3.000.000.
DEFICIT	7.000.000.
Total:	86.042.255.

Expenditure

Civil List	551.012.
National Assembly	982.995.
Ottoman Public Debt & Government Pensions	8.056.578.
Finance Ministry & Land Registry	7.527.638.
Government Auditing Debt	100.000.
Customs	624.539.
Presidency	120.368.
Ministry of Interior	446.842.
Police & Gendarmery	6.929.868.
Posts and Telegraphs	1.825.071.
Health Board	1.120.836.
Foreign Affairs	449.296.
Sheikh-ul-Islamat	508.801.
Justice	2.832.301.
Public Instruction	1.587.618.
Public Works	2.103.375.
Agriculture	1.879.325.
Press and Informations	151.187.
National Defence (War)	45.000.000.
Difference	3.244.605.
Total ..	86.042.000.

Owing to some error, a sum of Lt. 3.244.605 appears to have been omitted from the expenditure.

F.O. 371/6541.

No. 99

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *April 13, 1921.*
(Received April 19.)

No. 368

My Lord,

A SIGNIFICANT feature of the situation here since the London Conference is the extent to which the Turkish newspapers here already known to be Nationalists in their sympathies have come into the open. Of the nine daily Turkish papers appearing in Constantinople six are Nationalist, two anti-Nationalist and one technically non-political, but run in the Nationalist interest. Out of the first six, four, namely, the "Wakt", "İleri", "Ikdam" and "Aksham" work in close co-operation. They now no longer make any secret of their devotion to the Angora Government, and, though the Allied censorship exercises a restraining influence, it is impossible in present circumstances to attempt to do more than prevent violent explosions and the grosser forms of propaganda, such as the exploitation of real or alleged Greek misdeeds. Even this is increasingly difficult owing to the attitude of the French and Italian representatives on the censorship, who take their cue from the higher authorities.

2. The recent outbreak of active warfare between the Greeks and the Kemalists has given a stimulus to the chauvinism of Turkish and Greek papers alike, and makes the task of the Allied censors still more difficult. All the Turkish papers alike naturally regard the present war as one between Turkey, as such and Greece, but those mentioned above make a special feature of illustrations and letterpress which imply that Turkey is represented exclusively by the Angora Government and its military leaders. As a sample of the kind of matter which is published I enclose in translation an extract from the "Ileri" of the 7th instant*. The reference to the prayers offered in the Constantinople mosque is of interest. There is no doubt that such prayers are offered, and that the mosques are a centre of propaganda representing the Kemalists as shouldering the burden of Turkey as a whole.

3. The insistence on financial and judicial independence is also significant. In this matter also the hope now held out of territorial concessions only serves to stimulate the desire for complete independence of foreign control, the abolition of the Capitulations and a free hand in regard to minorities, subject to safeguards similar to those provided in treaties with

* Not printed.

European Powers. This desire has always occupied a foremost place in the Nationalist conception of legitimate Turkish aims, and here again Constantinople is now in line with Angora. The Minister for Foreign Affairs loses no opportunity of deprecating the creation of zones of influence, and while he carefully avoids any suggestion that financial control can be wholly done away with, it is easy to see in what direction his thoughts are tending. Indeed, Sefa Bey frequently expresses misgiving as to whether in recent conventions, especially that with the Italians, the Nationalists themselves may not have given away too much.

4. The "Ileri", the same paper which published the enclosed extract, printed on the 6th April the telegram mentioned in my telegram No. 259 of the 9th April as having been a source of embarrassment to Izzet Pasha. The telegram was simply a message of congratulations. The sting lay in the fact of its being represented as having been addressed to the Pasha as Minister of the Interior by the members of the Angora Government, thereby seeking to involve him in complete complicity with his recent gaolers. The Pasha, who must for the time being be regarded as a moderate Nationalist, and who, as I have explained in my telegrams, possibly regards himself as being destined to dominate the next phase of the Nationalist movement, was much upset. He explained that the signatures to the telegram he had actually received were entirely different from those published in the "Ileri". "May God put us all right!", he piously observed in his interview on the subject.

5. The local Greek press is equally strong on the Greek side, and has also to be restrained by the Allied censors. Constantinople thus presents the spectacle of a Turkish capital in which both parties to what is, in effect, on both sides, a national war are vociferously acclaimed by their respective partisans, with the Allied authorities not very successfully endeavouring to maintain a balance between the rival propagandas.

I have, &c.,

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

F.O. 406/46, p. 22-23, No. 13.

No. 100

Extract from the "Morning Post" April 15, 1921.

TURKEY'S RED ALLY

Chicherin's Appeal to Germany.

Kemal as a Catspaw.

(From A Correspondent.)

Reval, *April 14.*

Bolshevist headquarters at the Petrograd Hotel here are busy making preparations for the reception of a special Kemalist Military Mission, which is travelling from Angora to Berlin *via* Soviet Russia and Esthonia. I learn that the object of this Mission is to negotiate with the German Government for the supply of arms and ammunition to the Angora Government, which, it seems, is short of war-material. Simultaneously I learn that quite recently a special Soviet messenger passed through Reval to Berlin, bearing a massage from Chicherin to the German Government to the same effect—that the Angora Government is in so great a need of arms and ammunition that if it does not receive supplies immediately the whole Kemalist movement will crumble up within the next two or three months.

Chicherin adds that the Soviet Government has up to the present supplied the Kemalists with whatever surplus war material was at the disposal of Moscow, but at present, owing to transport and fuel difficulties, the Soviet munition works have been forced to curtail their output, and therefore it is impossible for Soviet Russia to continue assisting Mustapha Kemal Pasha.

As a special inducement to Germany to comply with Mustapha Kemal Pasha's request Chicherin assures the Wilhelmstrasse that if the Angora Government receives necessary support immediately it will shortly finally cease operations on its present front against the Greeks, and will concentrate all its forces and activities on the Mesopotamian front. Chicherin, as I am told, also informs the German Foreign Office that although Soviet Russia, under the trade agreement with Great Britain, has pledged herself to abstain totally from anti-British propaganda in the East, such propaganda will be continued in the future by the Angora Government in accordance with a secret treaty concluded between the latter and the Soviet Government.

F.O. 371/6509.

No. 101

Earl Curzon to Lord Granville (Athens)

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 16, 1921, 6 p.m.*

No. 71 Telegraphic[1]

Your tel. No. 171 (April 12th. Export of munitions)[2].

We have agreed with our allies to remain strictly neutral and cannot therefore allow export of war material to either Greece or Turkey.

You may point out that there is no analogy between our attitude towards the present Greco-Turkish hostilities and the attitude of a neutral country towards belligerents generally and particularly in the recent war. The relation of the Principal Allies towards the Greeks and the Kemalists in the present hostilities is peculiar. We were recently seated at conference with both parties to each of whom submitted proposals. While the terms are still under discussion one party has attacked the other. If Mustafa Kemal were in a position to negotiate for the supply of war material by British firms we certainly should not allow such export to him. We cannot, therefore, adopt a different attitude towards Greece.

Confidential. You should also bear in mind our representations to the Italian Gov[ernmen]t regarding the alleged supply by Italian firms of war material to the Kemalists.

D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol. XVII, p. 130, No. 112

No. 102

British Minister at Stockholm to Earl Curzon.

STOCKHOLM, *April 19, 1921.*

No. 230

My Lord,

Laik Moukbil Bey, who was secretary of the Turkish Legation here during the war, has returned to Stockholm and is now acting as Chargé d'Affaires, pending Chevki Bey's return. The "Svenska Dagblad" yesterday

[1] The draft only of this telegram is preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

[2] Not printed. In this telegram, Lord Granville stated: 'Athens agent of Associated British Manufacturers signed contract with Greek War Office on April 2nd. for 200.000 hand grenades. Agent has heard report that export from England is prohibited. Is this correct? If so, I presume it is for reasons of neutrality and no exception can be made. But I am assured that French group is ready to take the contract and deliver at once in which case British trade will suffer by our stricter adherence to neutrality'.

published the account of an interview with him. After complimentary remarks on Sweden Moukbil Bey said that the dual Government in Turkey was in the long run intolerable. The feeling at Constantinople was strongly in favour of Kemal Pasha owing to his military successes.

The vital question for Turkey, was the abolition of the capitulations, "which have been the poison in the body of the sick man. It was not with a light heart that the Turkish people entered the war. The fact was that Germany and Austria uncoditionally abandoned the capitulations, whilst the Entente countries though perhaps also willing to do so, wanted to negotiate first".

In regard to the Sèvres Treaty, Moukbil Bey said that Turkey is prepared to give up all territories not populated by Turks, but not Smyrna nor Eastern Thrace.

After some remarks on Turkish customs and the position of Turkish women, he stated that he was endeavouring to make arrangements for a visit of Turkish students, male and female to Swedish Universities.

I have, &c.,

(Signed)

FO. 371/6574/E. 5141.

No. 103

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *April 20, 1921.*
(Received April 26.)

No. 401.

My Lord,

FOR some time past reports have been reaching me of political intercourse between Angora and Afghanistan. Up to a short time ago the information was very meagre, and amounted to little more than occasional news, not always well authenticated, of the movements of emissaries of a political or religious kind.

2. It has now become known that a definite agreement was concluded between the Angora Government and Afghanistan early in March. Somewhat different versions of this agreement have come to my notice, but the summary published on the 24th March in the "Hakimiet-i-Millie", the organ of the Angora Government, may presumably be regarded as authentic, if not very complete. I enclose a translation of the article containing this summary.

3. According to other accounts, for which, however, I cannot vouch, the agreement is for a period of twenty years, and it contemplates: *(a)* an exchange of military missions and the despatch of a Turkish military mission of instruction to Afghanistan, and *(b)* the creation of a Pan-Islamic federation embracing Persia and Azerbaijan as well as the two principals, under the auspices of the Caliphate. The report that Turkey is to help Afghanistan with military instruction seems intrinsically probable, and may well be covered by articles 8 and 9, the summary of which in the "Hakimiet-i-Millie" article is extremely brief.

4. The report that the treaty expressly contemplates the inclusion of Persia and Azerbaijan in federation seems more open to doubt, and may be founded on the fact, which appears from the enclosed version, that the agreement does refer to two States not parties to it, which are, however, not Persia and Azerbaijan, but Bokhara and Khiva.

5. The "Hakimiet-i-Millie" summary suggests several interesting subjects of speculation. It is, for instance, noteworthy, having regard to the practically certain fact of direct intercourse having existed between Angora and Afghanistan that the present treaty should have been concluded at Moscow. One wonders what role the Soviet Government have played in the matter, and what is the position of Jemal Pasha, whose mission to Cabul was undertaken under Bolshevik auspices, but who, according to secret reports, has aroused the worst suspicions of the Bolsheviks themselves, owing to his supposed intention of running Pan-Islamism not as an instrument of the Soviet, but as an independent and self-sufficing movement.

6. It is also significant that the "Hakimiet-i-Millie" summary represents the Afghans as recognising a Turkish hegemony, but makes no mention of the Caliphate. Altogether, the treaty shows traces of Bolshevik inspiration, as would be expected from the fact of its having been negotiated at Moscow.

7. Incidentally, it will be observed that the "Hakimiet-i-Millie", in an article published as recently as the 24th March, describes the Angora delegation to the London Conference as being on its way back without having found any basis of agreement with the Allies.

8. My information as to the steps taken to establish mutual diplomatic representation in the capitals of Nationalist Turkey and Afghanistan is very incomplete, but I may, perhaps, be able to report something on this subject later on. In the meanwhile I would draw your Lordship's attention to the issue of the "Islamic News" of the 17th February last, which contains a leading article on "Afghanistan and England", and what purports to be the gist of a letter addressed by the Ameer to Mustapha Kemal Pasha.

9. I should be grateful if any fuller information on the subject of relations between Nationalist Turkey and Afghanistan which may have reached your Lordship from India or other sources might be communicated to me. I should also be glad to learn whether Turkish activities in Cabul have had any effect on the position and progress of the British Special Mission, which is still, I understand, in that place.

I have, &c.,

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

F.O. 406/46, p. 32-33, No. 24.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 103

Extract from the "Hakimiet-i-Millie" (Angora) of March 24, 1921.

(Translation).

THE TURKISH - AFGHAN TREATY.

(The Turkish-Afghan Treaty was concluded and signed at Moscow on March 1, 1921).

WHAT remarkable new developments these days are producing! Just as the Turkish delegation sent to London are returning without having found it possible to arrive at an agreement with the Imperialist Powers of Europe, comes the good news that on the other side treaties of friendship have been concluded with two Great Powers in Asia. Our issue of yesterday gave the essential clauses of the treaty concluded at Moscow between Turkey and the Russian Soviet Government. To-day we publish the essential clauses of the treaty concluded between Turkey and that powerful Asiatic Moslem State, Afghanistan. This treaty means that Turkey begins to have a share in Asiatic policy, with which she had not hitherto been able to concern herself. There is no doubt that Turkey, like other Eastern States, must draw her force from the East, and that only by this force can she stand up against the colonising mentality of Europe.

A treaty of alliance in ten articles was concluded and signed at Moscow on the Ist March between the delegates of the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey in Moscow and Mehmed Veli Khan, Ambassador Extraordinary and delegate, with full powers, of Afghanistan. The preamble of the treaty speaks of the bonds which unite the two Moslem and brotherly States, of the historical duties which devolve on them in these days of incipient awakening of the East, and of their decision to transfer to the political plans the long existing spiritual and natural alliance between them and to convert it into an official and material alliance.

Article 1 deals with the position of Turkey and Afghanistan in regard to each other.

Article 2 lays down that the Eastern peoples are endowed with full liberty and rights of independence, and that each is free to adopt and apply the form of administration which it individually desires, and confirms the independence of the States of Bokhara and Khiva.

Article 3 states that Afghanistan recognises the hegemony of Turkey as a State which has for centuries rendered signal services to Islam.

Article 4 lays down that each of the contracting parties will regard any aggression against the other on the part of any Imperialist Power whatsoever pursuing a policy of exploitation [?] as directed against itself, and undertakes to resist it by all available means in its power.

Article 5 lays down that neither Power will conclude any treaty or international instrument in compliance with the wishes of any third Power which is at variance with the other or injurious to the interests of the two contracting parties, and that each will inform the other on the occasion of the conclusion of a treaty with any Power whatsoever.

Article 6 provides for the conclusion of commercial and consular conventions.

Article 7 provides for the organisation of communications and the establishment of cordial relations between the two countries.

Articles 8 and 9 deal with Turkish assistance to Afghanistan, and provide for the ratification of the treaty as soon as possible.

Article 10 states that the treaty has been drawn up at Moscow in two copies.

F.O. 406/46, p. 33-34, No. 24/1.

No. 104

Memorandum on the Supply of War Material to Greece.

IT was decided in December last, as one of the sanctions against King Constantine, to suspend the supply of war material to Greece, and it would not appear that during the recent conference in London any very specific agreement was reached as to an actual prohibition of export. It seems to have been generally agreed among the principal Allies, however, that if fighting was to be renewed between the Turks and the Greeks they must remain neutral.

2. The legal aspect of this attitude of neutrality towards the present Græco-Turkish hostilities has since been carefully considered at the Foreign

Office, and the view was taken that the relation of the principal Allies to the Greeks and the Turks should not be regarded as analogous to that of neutral States towards the belligerents generally, and in particular during the recent war, since the present belligerents were two parties with whom the principal Allies had recently been seated at conference here in London, and to both of whom identical proposals of peace had been submitted. It had also been made clear to both the Greeks and the Turks that, while the principal Allied Powers could undertake no responsibility for restraining either of the two parties from such movements as they might consider necessary to secure the safety of their armies, the responsibility for such movements must rest on those who took them. While the proposals of peace were still under discussion, one party had attacked the other.

3. Since, therefore, His Majesty's Government and the Allied authorities at Constantinople were preventing the despatch of munitions of war to the Kemalists, and since His Majesty's Government had protested strongly to the Italian Government in the matter of the alleged supply of war material to the Kemalists, whether by the Italian Government or by private Italian firms, it was felt at the Foreign Office that we must adopt a consistent attitude and intervene, so far as the powers of His Majesty's Government went, to prevent the export of munitions of war to the Greeks. The Greek Chargé d'Affaires was therefore informed on the 14th April that "His Majesty's Government have agreed with their Allies to adopt an attitude of strict neutrality in regard to the present hostilities in Asia Minor, and they have therefore decided that no facilities can be accorded for the export of war material from this country to either Greece or Turkey". A copy of this note and of other relevant correspondence was sent to the Board of Trade, who, together with the Department of Overseas Trade, had previously been informed verbally of the attitude which the Foreign Office had decided to adopt.

It is understood that the French Government are adopting precisely the same attitude as His Majesty's Government, and it is believed that the Italian Government are acting similarly. They have certainly concurred in this line of policy being adopted by the principal Allies.

4. The power of His Majesty's Government to withhold such facilities is in fact, confined to various Orders in Council, consolidated in the Order in Council of the 24th March last, published in the "Board of Trade Journal", which gives a list of various munitions of war which can only be exported under licence from this country. This list really comprises only arms and ammunition, &c., and would not extend to such supplies as military boots, blankets, &c. The object of the above Order in Council

was to enable His Majesty's Government to carry out the Arms Traffic Convention, which generally prohibits the supply of arms and ammunition to certain specified areas. The Arms Traffic Convention, as such, has not yet been ratified by the signatories or entered into force, but the principal Allies have agreed to apply it so far as the prohibited areas mentioned in the convention are concerned, and one of these is pre-war Asiatic Turkey.

5. It is not unprecedented for a State to prohibit the export of munitions to another State for special reasons which appear to justify that course. At present, all the States represented in China, with the exception of Holland, are restraining their nationals from exporting to, or importing into China arms and munitions until the establishment of a Government whose authority is recognised throughout the whole country. The reason given to the Chinese Government for this action was that the Powers concerned "in considering the present state of disunion between north and south in China have been impressed by the fact that the continued possibility of importing military arms and ammunition into the country from abroad could not but exercise a disturbing influence", and that they were "firmly determined to discountenance any condition or action which might favour the reversion to hostilities."

6. Again, a joint resolution of Congress on the 14th March, 1912, gave the President power to prohibit the export of arms to any American country in which it was found that "conditions of domestic violence exist which are promoted by the use of arms or munitions of war procured from the United States". Acting under this power, President Wilson on the 12th July, 1919, prohibited the export of arms and munitions of war to Mexico.

7. Although the action now taken in regard to Greece and Turkey has not been promoted by considerations of neutrality as generally understood, it may be pointed out that, while "a neutral Power is not bound to prevent the export or transit on behalf of one or other of the belligerents of arms or munitions of war" (5th Hague Convention, article 7), there is nothing to prevent a neutral Power from doing so if it thinks fit, and this has sometimes been done, as, for instance, by Switzerland and Belgium during the Franco-German War.

E. G. F. Adam
H. W. Malkin

Foreign Office, April 22, 1921.
F.O. 406/46, p. 26-27, No. 18.

No. 105

Consul Morgan to Earl Curzon.

ALEPPO, *April 23, 1921.*
(Received May 19.)

No. 20.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report as follows on the situation in this district since my previous despatch No. 15 of the 12th April, 1921:—

Franco-Turkish Peace.—Despite the conclusion of peace, the French are still on the *qui vive.* Reconnaissances by aeroplanes and motor cars are daily made in the direction of Membij and the Euphrates. The French say that at Diarbekir the local Moslems have set up an authority independent of Mustapha Kemal under one Nimet Bey, formerly a Turkish officer in Aleppo, and that he has a force under his orders to be used for attacking the French. In the Killis and Aintab regions French troops are being maintained and even reinforced.

Military Operations.—Matters are brighter for the French in the Djebel Zawiyeh, south of Idlib, and latest newspaper reports announce that operations in that region are being crowned with success.

Marash. — An American who arrived on the 20th April from Marash after five days journey, informs me that there are pro- and anti-Kemalist parties among the Moslems there. There are about 10,000 armed Moslems in the town, and they are drilling and having firing practice. They are under Turkish officers, who are in touch with Mustapha Kemal, but they have struck out an independent line, ignore the Franco-Turkish peace, and are prepared for attack or defence against the French forces. They are deficient in artillery. These independent Marash Turks took a leading part in the fighting at Aintab. Rumours that the French might advance on Marash have two or three times been the cause of threats to massacre the Armenian population, of whom 10,000 remain out of 50,000, the remainder having been massacred.

The American Relief Mission in Marash is not molested. A special permit from Mustapha Kemal was necessary before my informant could leave.

There are ten French prisoners in the town, nearly all disabled men. These are looked after by the Americans.

While anti-French feeling among the Moslems near the French zone is responsible for their ignoring orders from Angora, there are not wanting signs that Turkish officers and villagers are getting tired of protracted

military operations and want things to end. My informant passed through a Moslem village just outside the French lines, where the villagers complained that they have been heavily taxed by the Kemalists, and wanted a French occupation, having favourable recollections of good treatment at the hands of a French detachment which had passed through the village.

In the French zone the Arab gendarmes, now under French control, were content with their lot, being well paid and well treated.

Local Situation. — Locally the French find it necessary to have frequent military parades in the town and firing practice with heavy guns and machine-guns very close to the town to impress the population, and a close watch is kept on the Moslem quarters of Aleppo.

Suspicion of Great Britain is still the dominant thought in the minds of the local French officials. Most local troubles are attributed to British intrigue and annoyance at seeing the French in Syria. A strong leading article attacking England for her alleged attitude towards Syria appeared in the Arab paper "Al Ummah" of the 11th April, 1921. I brought the matter to the notice of the French High Commission Major in charge of the censorship, and he replied that England allowed criticism of France in Egyptian papers. I did not push the matter any further.

Commerce.—Commerce is stagnant. Aleppo which before the war traded with the greater part of Asia Minor lying to the north and north-east is now limited to the district lying within a radius of some 20 miles from the town.

(Copies sent to His Majesty's High Commissioner in Constantinople, Egypt and consul-general in Beirout).

I have, &c.,

JAMES MORGAN.

F.O. 406/46, p. 165-166, No. 116

No. 106

Sir Horace Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, 25th *April 1921.*
(Received May 4)

No. 416.

My Lord,

Reports, which may now be regarded as authentic, have recently reached Constantinople to the effect that the well-known Circassian leader *Ahmed Anzavour* was ambushed by bands and killed a couple of weeks ago in the district of Karabigha.

2. The part played by Ahmed Anzavour in combatting the Nationalist movement will be known to Your Lordship from numerous previous reports. His movement collapsed many months ago, and he had ceased to be of much immediate importance, but his death is worth noting, as it deprives the anti-Kemalist Circassians of a leader of considerable natural ability.

3. The Circassians are an important element in the country south of the Sea of Marmara and eastward from Ismidt. Since the collapse of Anzavour's organised movement and the change of government here after Ferid Pasha's fall last October, they have collaborated to some extent with the Greeks, but they are an unstable, turbulent, and disunited element.

4. Following on the death of Anzavour, a crime of a semi-political nature was committed on the 21st instant in a café near the Railway Station in Stamboul when a former lieutenant of Anzavour's, named Shah Ismail, murdered two notables of Panderma, also Circassians.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) HORACE RUMBOLD.
High Commissioner.

F.O. 371/6574/E. 5226

No. 107

Exract From "Morning Post" of April 25, 1921.

BOLSHEVIST HELP FOR KEMAL

FINE WORDS, ARMS, AND GOLD.

(From Our Correspondent).

CONSTANTINOPLE, *April* 23.

The Bolsheviks, who have long been clandestinely supplying the Kemalists with arms, have now given the Angora Government thirty thousand gold roubles. This gift is nominally to assist the war-burthened population, but is really a contribution towards the Kemalist war budget. The Soviet Ambassador's covering letter to Kemal says:

I am delighted that the Turkish nation and army have again defeated the Western Imperialists in their aggression against Turkey. Nevertheless I regretfully learn that the Greeks in their retirement are systematically ravaging your country and bringing misery on the population. It is one more proof that Imperialism can only establish its policy by violence. Proletarian Russia is following the phases of Turkey's struggle with sympathy, and desires to alleviate your sufferings. With this object the Soviet Republic, wishing to help your war-burthened people, hands you through my inter-

mediary thirty thousand gold roubles in aid of your population. We wish your army full and final success.

Kemal's answer says:

We greatly appreciate Soviet Russia's sublime act of generosity and humanity toward the victims of Greek atrocities. On this occasion we desire to lay stress on the enemy's savageries in his retreat, and ask you to communicate these facts to your Governments. Your wishes for our success are welcome and will bring us good fortune.

F.O. 371/6469

No. 108

Lord Granville (Athens) to Earl Curzon.

Athens, *April 27, 1921, 9.15 p.m.*
(Received April 28, 3 p.m.)

No. 200 Telegraphic

My telegram No. 190.

In conversation with French Minister yesterday on question of right of search etc., Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Greek Government had not yet decided what line to take; he indicated that they were considering possibility of suggesting to Allies not to depart from their principle of neutrality but to act on it in reverse sense i.e. to give free export of war material for both Greeks and Kemalists. Greek Government if they do make this suggestion, obviously hope to be able to get far more than Kemalists. I do not suppose such a suggestion could be accepted but I do think that British trade is now suffering or likely to suffer by others and possibly even our Allies taking contracts for war material which British firms could take but have to refuse owing to prohibition of export (see my telegram No. 171).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs inform me that large quantities of war material are going to Kemal (? from) Novorossisk and points out that Allied precautions at Constantinople do not prevent material reaching Black Sea ports.

D.B.F.P., Ist. series, Vol. XVII, p. 155, No. 136.

No. 109

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *April 27, 1921.*
(Received May 4).

No. 426. Confidential.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 401 of the 20th instant, I have now obtained a certain amount of additional information regarding the relations between Nationalist Turkey and Afghanistan. As it is mainly based on reports from secret sources, I would beg that it be treated for the time being as confidential, though if the reports are correct, the facts will shortly be a matter of general knowledge.

2. In his speech in the Grand National Assembly on the Ist March Mustapha Kemal Pasha mentioned Afghanistan as one of the Asiatic countries with which the Angora Government had cordial relations, but there was nothing in his speech to suggest that formal diplomatic intercourse had been established. The balance of the evidence is that up to the conclusion of the Turco-Afghan Agreement at Moscow any Afghan emissaries who may have visited Angora were at most unofficial agents, and in some cases, perhaps, irresponsible individuals. Towards the end of March, however, a regular Afghan diplomatic mission was stated to be on its way to Angora. This mission appears to have arrived there the second week of the current month. It is headed by a certain Sultan Ahmed Khan, with a staff of two Afghan secretaries and one Indian secretary named Hadji Mansour, who is known as an Indian seditionist.

3. There is nothing to show that a corresponding diplomatic mission has yet proceeded from Angora to Kabul. Such emissaries from the Turkish side as have been reported have been persons in the nature of propagandists. Among them is another well-known Indian seditionist, Abdurrahman Pashwari. The most important Turks who have visited Afghanistan recently have been Jemal Pasha and Bedri Bey, but they went rather as Bolshevik than as Turkish representatives. Jemal Pasha is known to have executed his mission in such a way as to excite grave suspicion among the Bolsheviks for the reason indicated in paragraph 5 of my despatch under reference. There is, however, no evidence that he can as yet be regarded as being an instrument of Angora policy. He stands for the pan-Islamism of the Union and Progress gang, and a distinction must still be drawn between these and the Angora leaders, although in so far as the extreme and at present dominant party in Angora is concerned, there is no real difference in the ultimate programme.

4. The "Hakimiet-i-Millie", the organ of the Angora Government, announced on the 9th March that it learned on good authority that an important and select military mission was ready to start for Kabul in response to an invitation from the Ameer. The secret reports state that this military mission will be headed by Nureddin Pasha, and will be composed of some fifty officers and experts.

5. I have received from the same secret source the translation of a speech said to have been made by Ahmed Mouhtar Bey, Acting Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, on the occasion of the conclusion of the Turco-Afghan Treaty. I enclose a copy of this document which, if genuine, is not without significance. I have not yet been able to verify it by reference to the Angora press, in which it would presumably have been reported. It is not intrinsically improbable that Mouhtar Bey would have held the language ascribed to him, but pending verification the report concerning his speech must be accepted with reserve.

I have, &c.,

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

F.O. 406/46, p. 40-41, No. 29.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 109.

The Turco-Afghan Treaty.

(Secret).

THE following is a translation of a speech said to have been made by Ahmed Mouhtar Bey at the Great National Assembly in connection with the Turco-Afghan Treaty recently signed in Moscow:—

"A treaty of alliance has just been concluded between our Government and that of Afghanistan, which is a Moslem State inhabited by a people of sturdy character, who have preserved their independence for centuries. The union of the Eastern world against the same danger is a very important event. The Imperialist Powers of the West are on the point of losing their authority and their prestige over the oppressed and innocent nations of the East. Islam and Turkism are struggling for national and religious liberty and independence, and will succeed in their endeavours. They have realised the criminal and cowardly objects of the Western Powers, especially Great Britain, at the London Conference. I hope that the Conference, which was nothing more than a stratagem for the purpose of allowing the Hellenic army to prepare, has dissipated all doubts in the matter. In spite of the exceedingly conciliatory attitude of our delegates, the Western world still wishes to sap the strength of the East, and particu-

larly of Islam. The *Entente* Powers, especially Great Britain, will never acknowledge our rights and those of the Moslem. They will foment intrigues until we have attained victory by our arms wielded in the name of right and justice. The agreement concluded at the Moscow Conference was an important step towards our triumph in the East. The Western world is in the throes of upheaval, becoming more acute every day, of the opressed who groan in slavery. The alliance concluded with Afghanistan is thus a guarantee for the welfare of the Moslem world. The Government of Afghanistan is a strong Islamic Government, and Afghanistan is the Turkey of Central Asia. It possesses a regular army and perfect military resources. At all times it has rebelled against British domination, and only two years ago had recourse to war against Great Britain. The Afghans are strongly attached to their religion and their liberty. I am of opinion that we have in a manner taken a practical step for the achievement of the pan-Islamic project. I can conceive of nothing more likely to raise anxiety in Great Britain than this co-operation between Turkey and Afghanistan. Our Government is exercising every effort to reforming the army and finances of Afghanistan. I hope and believe that this summer the Moslem world will recover its ancient grandeur and power. I may inform you in confidence that Bolshevik Russia has agreed that the Afghan army shall be reinforced not only from the independent Turkish khanats of Bokhara and Khiva, but also from the territories with a Turkish population directly under Bolshevik rule. We are hoping to-day that very shortly a Moslem federation of half a million people will exist ready at any moment to rise against the Imperialists of the West. In this manner we shall put an end to the Indian Empire, and we shall ensure the development of a strong Islam. The plans elaborated to this end by the Government are of course known to the National Defence, and the military authorities are occupied with the matter. I can therefore give no further details".

CONSTANTINOPLE, *April 16, 1921.*
F.O. 406/46, p. 41, No. 29/1.

No. 110

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *April 27, 1921.*
(Received May 4).

No. 428.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a report on Turkey since the armistice. It seemed to me essential for a proper ap-

preciation of the situation at Constantinople, and for other reasons, that the report should review the events which have taken place since the commencement of the armistice.

2. As your Lordship is aware, I only reached this post in the latter half of November, and I therefore felt it necessary in the interests of this report as an accurate historical record of the events which have occurred since the armistice that the narrative of those events and the appreciation of the situation should be contributed by Mr. Ryan, who has been at this post since the armistice, and who was admirably qualified for the task. I venture to think that Mr. Ryan has given a valuable and very interesting account of the course of events since the 30th October, 1918, while his appreciation of the Turkish situation at the end of 1920 should also prove of considerable use to your Lordship's office. For the same reasons Mr. Ryan has contributed the section dealing both the foreign relations of the Constantinople and Angora Governments, those on the press, the position of non-Moslem communities, the Kurdish question and the leading personalities in Turkey. Beyond editing and arranging the report generally I have only contributed the section describing the role of the three Allied High Commissioners.

3. I am indebted to Captain Phillimore for the section which deals with the Ottoman navy, and to Colonel Beckwith for those describing the control of the Ottoman War Office and the armed forces at the disposal of the Central Government since February 1920. Colonel Ballard, president of the Inter-Allied Police Commission, has furnished the section on the Turkish police for the year 1920, as well as the memorandum on the Inter-Allied Police Commission. Dr. Clemow has contributed the section dealing with the sanitary administration of this town; Mr. Graves has contributed the chapter on finance; whilst Captain Munroe has reviewed trade with Turkey during the year 1920.

F.O. 371/6469/E. 5233.

I have, &c.,

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 110.

Annual Report on Turkey for 1920. (Extract)

PERSONALITIES.

173. There has probably been no period of Turkish history in which so large a number of persons of every degree have played active parts as during the last two years. More than a dozen Turkish Governments have succeeded each other in Constantinople, apart from partial reconstructions.

Anatolia and Thrace have each produced their crop of notabilities. The old heads of the Committee of Union and Progress have performed a shadow play in the background. An infinite number of politicians, soldiers, journalists and nondescripts have played more or less active roles in the country and outside it. The atmosphere has been one of perpetual and often incoherent intrigue. The circumstances have been so new and changing that hardly anyone has remained stable in his convictions or ideas of policy. Outside very small groups Turks themselves are almost as much at sea as to each other's real attitude as foreigners must necessarily be regarding all of them. The following is a selection of a few men who in virtue of their position have played, and may be destined still to play, con picuous parts. As for the rest, it is quite impossible to assess their relative importance or to say who is likely in a more stable order of things to be of permanent consequence:—

The Sultan.

147. *(sic)* Prince Vahiduddin came to the throne as Sultan Mehmed VI on the 4th June, 1918. Born in January 1861, he is the last surviving son of Sultan Abdul-Mejid. As a prince, he lived a very retired life in his house on the shores of the Bosphorus, and was practically unknown in European circles before the war. In Turkish circles he was known as an opponent of the Committee of Union and Progress, but he played no open part in political life. He is a man of considerable intelligence, amiable disposition, and unaffected manners; sincerely desirous, it would appear, of serving his country, preserving his dynasty, and seeing justice done to all the diverse elements in the country. His personal influence and his authority as Sultan and Caliph have certainly been factors in internal affairs since his accession, and he has fairly definite ideas as to how they should be used, but his weakness, timidity, and caution have prevented him from making the throne the one dominant factor, as a bigger man might have done. To say this is merely to deny him greatness. Had it been the policy of the Allies to use him as an instrument and themselves to build up his position, he would have served the purpose admirably. Without Allied support, he would have required supreme qualities of statesmanship to dominate the chaotic situation which followed the armistice. He denounces in unmeasured terms the adventurers who involved Turkey in the war, and appears to be sincerely imbued with the conviction that the only way of salvation for Turkey is to regain the good graces of Great Britain. Refined in appearance and neurasthenic to the last degree, he presents a somewhat pathetic figure, but he sustains a difficult position with dignity. His nervousness shows greatly in conversation, but he gradually works up into volubility, and expresses his ideas forcibly and clearly as regards his main lines of thought, though in a somewhat involved fashion. He has a certain knowledge of French, but does

not speak it. His private life is entirely free from scandal, though he is reputed to seek mild consolation for his troubles in female companionship. He has two daughters and a son. The elder daughter is married to Tewfik Pasha's son, the younger to the son of the Crown Prince. These connections throw both ladies into the Nationalist camp. They are both young, and the elder is an ardent politician. The Sultans' son, Prince Ertogrul, is a boy of seven, and is extremely remote from the throne, according to the rule of succession by which the eldest prince in the line of Osman inherits the Sultanate.

The Heir Apparent.

175. Prince Abdul-Mejid, the Heir Apparent, is first cousin to the present Sultan, being the only surviving son of the Sultan Abdul-Aziz. He was born in 1868. When more remote from the succession than he now is, he was already known as an intelligent prince of modernising tendencies. At one time, for instance, he had an English tutor for his only son. Since the armistice he has been a good deal in evidence. He has been greatly influenced by the Nationalist movement, and is undoubtedly in strong sympathy with its ideals. It is not possible to say with certainty what truth there is in the accusations frequently made against him of having gone much further and committed himself definitely to the Angora leaders in their open revolt against the Sultan and the Government of Constantinople. Anyhow his relations with the Sultan have more than once in the last two years been strained almost to breaking point. A violent personal enmity of several years standing divides him from Damad Ferid Pasha, and this has been intensified by his disapproval of the latter's policy. He is highly strung and exceedingly impulsive, and has rather a tendency to the spectacular, which occasionally manifests itself in public indiscretions. Although identified in feeling and probably to some extent in action with the Angora leaders, he professes, like many Nationalists, a warm regard and admiration for Great Britain, and a desire to see co-operation with His Majesty's Government made the corner-stone of Turkish policy. The portrait of Lord Palmerston hangs in one of his sitting-rooms. Well educated, keenly interested in politics, and an amateur in painting and other arts, he combines considerable intelligence with many of the defects of the artistic temperament. He has excellent manners and speaks French well. He is credited with maintaining close relations with the ex-Khedive of Egypt.

Tewfik Pasha.

176. Tewfik Pasha is the Grand Old Man of Turkey, the last conspicuous survivor of the older school of Turkish statesmen. He is about 80 years of age. A diplomatist by profession, he was formerly Ambassador in Berlin, and then for many years Minister for Foreign Affairs in the latter

part of Abdul-Hamid's reign. He acquitted himself respectably in the latter post, but he held it at a time when foreign policy was directed from the Palace and not the Porte. He was called to the Grand Vizierate in the troubled days following the so-called counter-revolution of April 1909, but remained in power for a couple of weeks only. Early in the summer of the same year he proceeded to London as Ambassador, and held that post with credit until the outbreak of war. Twelve days after the signature of the armistice he was fetched out of the retirement in which he lived during the war, to form a Cabinet, and he remained in power for some months. Since that time he has always been more or less in evidence as Minister without portfolio, member of Peace Delegations, or candidate for the Grand Vizierate, to which office he again succeeded on the 21st October, 1920. He owes his position not to any great superiority of intelligence or energy, in which he is lacking, but to age, experience, and unblemished reputation for personal integrity, a tradition of fidelity to the throne, and a capacity for serving as a flux in times of difficulty for more strongly marked personalities. He has unfortunately reached such an age that it is impossible to say whether his not infrequent inconsequences are due to failure to grasp an idea, to inability to retain it, or to weakness of character. At his best he gives proof of much intelligence and soundness of judgment, but he is well past his prime, and is much influenced by his personal entourage, which is imbued with strong Nationalist sympathies. He has all the old-world courtliness and serenity of the generation of Turkish public men who preceded the Young Turks. His wife was a German. His eldest son is married to a daughter of the Sultan. Both these young people are strongly Nationalist.

Damad Ferid Pasha.

177. Ferid Pasha is a man of about 70 years of age. In his early days he was employed in the Turkish Foreign Office and diplomatic service. In or about 1886 he married as her second husband Princess Mediha, sister to the then and present Sultans. From that time on he lived a life of cultured leisure, mainly in his palace on the Bosphorus. He was known as a student and a dilettante, and was during the later Hamidian period one of the few distinguished Turks of Constantinople who were able to maintain social relations with Europeans. He took no open part in politics, though he was known to be of Liberal tendencies. After the revolution of 1908 he was made a Senator, and played a certain role in the new political life, notably in 1910, when he made somewhat of a sensation by taking a strongly Conservative line on a question of the revision of the Constitution, and criticised the excessive tendency to adopt French models in the endeavours made during the 19th century to modernise Turkish

institutions. This gave umbrage at the time to the French, and his general attitude compromised him as a reactionary in the eyes of the Young Turks. He played no leading part in public life again until March 1919, when he became Grand Vizier. His subsequent vicissitudes have been fully described earlier in this report. He is in a sense the most remarkable product of the armistice period. He came out of a world of books and music into the most dismal realities of recent Turkish history. No statesman has served the Sultan, to whose person he is devoted, and what he conceived to be the best interests of an all but ruined Turkey, with more singleness of purpose. None has earned more hatred from his countrymen. He is a man of great intelligence and broadness of outlook, but in current affairs he is frequently most unpractical. He has no gift of choosing subordinates and suffers from a passion for occupying himself personally with matters of detail. He is accused by Turks with some reason of knowing little of his country and countrymen. In his relations with the latter he is a curious mixture of mistrust and gullibility. A man of distinguished bearing and manners, he has about him not a little of the *grand seigneur*. This gives him a singular charm in his relations with Europeans, but Turks too often credit him with arrogance and lack of consideration, the appearance of which is due to his constant efforts to do more than any one man can cope with. Whatever his faults and his mistakes, he has given proof of a high courage, of which few would have thought him capable. An incurable optimism as to the effect of his personal endeavours is one of his besetting sins. Give him an inch of hope and he will take an ell of encouragement. In or out of office, he enjoys in a large measure the personal confidence of his brother-in-law the Sultan. He is a convinced admirer of English ideals and institutions, and believes perhaps more sincerely than any other statesman of the first rank that Turkey's sole hope of salvation lies in a good understanding with Great Britain. His unpopularity with the Nationalists is such that it is hardly possible to expect or permissible to hope that he will return to power in any near future. Unfortunately he is too old and too broken in health to make it likely that his turn will come later, but he is still the principal rallying point of the incoherent forces of anti-Kemalism.

Marshal Izzet Pasha.

178. Izzet Pasha is an Albanian from the Janina district. He is about 60 years of age. He had a good career as a staff officer in Abdul-Hamid's reign, but in 1897 he was relegated to a post in the Yemen where he remained twelve years. After the revolution he returned to Constantinople, but was sent back in 1911 to pacify the Yemen. This he effected by a composition between the Imam and the Turkish Government. The Imam secured autonomy in the highlands, and Izeet Pasha the reputation of a successful

military diplomatist. In 1913 he became Ministir of War under Said Halim Pasha, but he gave place later to Enver. He was actively employed during part of the great war, and is said to have come into close personal contact with the German Emperor during a visit to the German General Headquarters early in 1918. In October of that year he was selected to form a Cabinet on the collapse of Talaat Pasha's Government, but his Government was composed of minor lights of the Committee of Union and Progress, and did not last for very many days after the conclusion of the armistice. He kept a good deal in the background during the following two years, though for a time he was a Minister without portfolio. Throughout this period he was generally reputed to be in sympathy with the national movement, but he disclaimed any connection with it. On the fall of Ferid Pasha in October 1920, he entered Tewfik Pasha's Government as Minister of the Interior, for the express purpose of conducting the negotiations by which it was hoped to bring Angora into line with Constantinople. He left for Angora on the 3rd December at the head of the mission sent to treat with the Nationalist leaders. It was hoped, wrongly as the event proved, that the respect in which he is held in the army and in Nationalist circles would ensure the success of the mission. As a matter of fact he was treated at Angora with very scant respect, and there is reason to suppose that the younger soldiers who are the mainstay of the national movement were little disposed to tolerate any attempt to "come the marshal over them". Nevertheless Izzet Pasha enjoys great consideration in many Nationalist circles, and is probably destined still to play a rôle. He is personally honest and straightforward, and, if not a man of commanding intelligence or really strong character, he has a good deal of common-sense and is capable, under guidance, of becoming a centre of relatively moderate nationalism. He is a man of Falstaffian proportions, and, in a frock-coat, is the very type of the bluff and hearty soldier turned statesman for an occassion. The Sultan is prejudiced against him, but he stands well with the Heir Apparent. Among his most intimate political friends are Reouf Bey, ex-Minister of Marine and one of the earliest organisers of the national movement, now a prisoner in Malta, and Nabi Bey, at present Turkish representative in Paris.

Mustapha Kemal Pasha.

179. Born at Salonica of humble parents in 1881, Mustapha Kemal received his early education at military schools at Salonica and Monastir. He distiguished himself by his industry, and passed out of the Constantinople Military School at the head of the list. He seems to have been arrogant and unpopular with his comrades. Having become a staff officer, he was appointed to Salonica in 1907, when he entered the Committee of

Union and Progress and became a freemason, and an ardent exponent of Unionist ideas. As an officer, he was reputed efficient and a good organiser. He became military attaché at Sofia in 1913, and a tendency to intemperance and debauchery which he still manifests is said to date from this time. He showed reckless courage during the war, and is said to have lost an eye. His relations with Enver and the Germans were of the worst. He appears to have attended the present Sultan to Vienna for the Emperor Charles's coronation, and it is said that the Prince entertained the idea of running him as a counterpoise to Enver. He was active in the organisation of a military society in Constantinople, which was one of the germs of the Nationalist movement, early in 1919. His open association with that movement began immediately after his appointment by Ferid Pasha to a specially created inspectorate-general in Northern Asia Minor in May, 1919. Since that time he has been the recognised head of the movement, and his individual personality appears to count for a great deal in it. He has at any rate retained his position in a manner which argues no little administrative capacity, political ability and determination. His speeches, if composed by himself, as seems probable, show considerable skill in handling people and situations. He is spectacular and domineering, but there is no reason to accuse him of lack of patriotism of a chauvinistic type or of personal dishonesty.

General Kiazim Karabekir Pasha.

180. Comparatively little is known of Kiazim Karabekir Pasha's general attitude and views, but he is deserving of particular mention as he is reported to stand for something distinct from Angora in the inner organisation of the national movement, and may be destined to play an important role in the future, as he commands a large and compact portion of the Nationalist regular forces. He is rather over 40 years of age, and had a successful career as a junior officer previous to 1914. During the war he served under Enver Pasha in the War Office, and under Jemal Pasha in Syria, after which he held various commands. He has commanded at Erzeroum since early in 1919, and has had a leading part in military operations in the neighbourhood of the old Russian frontier, and in political dealings with the neighbouring Caucasian States and the Bolsheviks. His attitude towards the latter is somewhat uncertain. According to some accounts he is even more whole-heartedly for the Bolshevik alliance than Mustapha Kemal. According to others, he is fundamentally attached to the Sultan and mistrustful of the Angora policy. Anyhow, he is a separate factor of potential importance.

F.O. 371/6469/E. 5233.

No. 111

Lord Granville (Athens) to Earl Curzon.

Athens, *May 1, 1921, 10.30 a.m.*
(Received May 2, 11.30 a.m.)

No. 209 Telegraphic

Your telegram No. 75 and my telegram No. 190.

Italian Chargé d'Affaires has addressed to Greek Government note similar to mine of April 22nd. French Counsellor made verbal statement to Minister of Justice in the same sense.

I have now received long note in reply, from Minister for Foreign Affairs asking His Majesty's Government to reconsider their attitude in spirit of goodwill and equity.

Note points out that declaration by Powers places Greek Government in embarrassing situation, for there is a war in which there are neutrals but no belligerents able to exercise belligerent rights. Note explains that owing to non-ratification of treaty of Sèvres a state of war exists between Allies including Greece on the one hand and Ottoman Government on the other.

Relations amongst Allies themselves are governed by Alliance and terms of treaty drawn up in common whereas terms of armistice govern state of war existing with Turkey.

Kemalists certainly possess status of belligerents and Kemal's powers received international recognition when Allied Powers invited him to London Conference and negotiated with him. Fusion took place there between the two Ottoman delegations and the two Allies concluded agreements with Kemal.

Since that time Turkey of Constantinople and Turkey of Angora have become one single international and juridical... personally responsible for its acts. It is responsible for prolongation of war and it has eluded its international engagements. It profited by long delay necessary for negotiating treaty to improve its military position and thus opposed application of treaty and it instigated Kemalists in defiance of international engagements. Note argues that Allied action in preventing war material from reaching Kemal viâ Constantinople is not sufficient to render unnecessary exercise of Greek control as Turkey can receive supplies from other quarters and a very active contraband is taking place both in the Aegean Sea and Black Sea. Exercise of control by Greece is a means whereby she can diminish power of resistance of common enemy. If occupation of Constantinople by Allies is going to limit Greek action it might cause considerable military inconveniences for Greece in future whereas if relations of Allies with two

parties in dispute are to assume any particular character this should be in nature of reinforcing belligerent rights of Greece.

Note explains that Greece was obliged to anticipate Kemal's attack before he had obtained reinforcements. It reminds Allies of mandate originally given to Greece in Asia Minor and states that as Greek people undertook this mission in common interests of allies they had right to expect their support in completing task.

Copies by post.

Repeated to Constantinople.

D.B.F.P., Ist. series, vol. XVII, p. 158 - 159, *No.* 141.

No. 112

Lord Granville (Athens) to Earl Curzon.

ATHENS, *May 2nd, 1921.*
(Received May 12).

No. 186.

My Lord,

With reference to my telegram No. 209 of the 1st instant, I have the honour to transmit, herewith, copy of a Note which, in accordance with Your Lordship's instructions, I addressed on the 22nd ultimo to the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, together with a copy of the reply from the latter requesting His Majesty's Government to reconsider their attitude of neutrality in a spirit of goodwill and equity in the light of observations contained in the Greek Note.

A few days ago the Italian Chargé d'Affaires addressed a Note to the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs similar to mine and the Conusellor of the French Legation made a verbal statement to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the same sense.

I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople.

I have, &c.,

(FOR H. M. MINISTER).
(Signed) C. T. BENTINCK

F.O. 371/6512/E. 5548.

ENLOSURE 1 TO No. 112

Earl Granville to Monsieur Balltazzi.

BRITISH LEGATION, ATHENS,
April 22nd, 1921.

Copy.
No. 60.
Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour to inform your Excellency, that I have received instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to explain to the Royal Hellenic Government that the relation of the Principal Allied Powers towards the Greeks and the followers of Mustapha Kemal Pasha in the present hostilities is peculiar, and that His Majesty's Government do not consider either party entitled to the ordinary rights of a belligerant. Both parties were recently seated at a Conference with the Principal Allied Powers and certain proposals were submitted to them, and one of the two has now attacked the other while these poroposals were still under discussion. His Majesty's Government are not therefore prepared at present to recognize the right of the Greek Government to declare a blockade or to visit and search vessels, and they would feel justified in preferring a claim against the Greek Government if any British vessel were to be seized or stopped.

I am to add that the exercise by the Greek Government of belligerent rights over shipping in the Aegean Sea is in any case rendered unnecessary by the action of the Allied Forces which are not allowing any war material to reach the Kemalist forces through Constantinople; where the Allies are in a position to stop it effectively.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

F.O. 371/6512/E. 5548.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 112

M. G. P. Baltazzi to Lord Granville.

ATHÈNES, *Le 17/30 Avril 1921.*

No. 4229.

Monsieur le Ministre,

Le Gouvernement Royal a examiné avec la plus grande attention la lettre en date du 22 de ce mois que Votre Excellence a bien voulu m'ad-

resser pour m'exposer, à l'occasion de l'exercice par la Grèce du droit de visite dans le conflit actuel, les vues du Principal Secrétaire des Affaires Etrangères de S. M. Britannique.

Le Principal Secrétaire de S. M. Britannique estime que les rapports des Principales Puissances Alliées envers la Grèce et les partisans de M. Kémal dans les hostilités actuelles ont un caractère particulier et qu'aucune des deux parties ne peut prétendre aux droits usuels des belligérants.

Malgré le désir sincère du Gouvernement Hellénique d'adhérer aux vues des Puissances Alliées en ce qui concerne l'action entreprise en Asie-Mineure, il se voit obligé de présenter certaines observations, espérant, que le Gouvernement Britannique voudra bien se rendre compte du bien fondé de ces observations et témoigner en cette circonstance l'intérêt qu'il n'a cessé d'avoir pour la Grèce, en admettant les principes juridiques qui militent en faveur de son point de vue.

La déclaration des Puissances, venant après celle qui a été faite par Son Excellence Monsieur Lloyd George à la Chambre des Communes at d'après laquelle les Puissances Alliées se considèrent comme neutres dans le conflit actuel, place le Gouvernement Hellénique dans une situation bien embarrassante; car, dans ces conditions il s'agirait d'une guerre où il y aurait des neutres, sans qu'il y ait des belligérants qui, à leur tour, puissent prétendre aux droits afférants à cette qualité.

Le Gouvernement Hellénique croit devoir rappeler les conditions qui ont engendré la situation actuelle.

Du fait de la non ratification du Traité de Sèvres l'état de guerre existe entre les Alliés, y compris la Grèce, d'une part et le Gouvernement Ottoman de l'autre. Il en résulte que les rapports des Alliés entre eux sont régis du fait de l'alliance et des clauses du Traité arrêtées en commun. Tandis que par rapport à la Turquie c'est l'état de guerre qui subsiste, régi par les stipulations de l'armistice.

Quant au caractère des hostilités existantes entre la Grèce et les organisations nationalistes de l'Asie-Mineure, il ne saurait être sérieusement contesté que les forces Kemalistes possèdent la qualité de la belligérance. Notamment depuis que le pouvoir insurrectionnel de Kémal Pacha a reçu une reconnaissance internationale par les Puissances Alliées elles-mêmes, qui l'ont invité à participer officiellement à la Conférence de Londres et qui ont négocié avec lui.

Du reste à l'heure actuelle Kémal Pacha exerce la puissance effective sur tout le territoire ottoman qui n'est pas occupé par les Alliés; c'est-à-dire qui ne fait pas l'object de l'occupation ennemie. A la Conférence de Londres s'est effectué la fusion des deux délégations ottomanes et deux des Alliés ont négocié et ont conclu séparément, des accords spéciaux avec lui. Dès

lors la dualité de la personnalité juridique de la Turquie est une fiction en contradiction flagrante avec la réalité. La Turquie de Constantinople et celle d'Angora constituent incontestablement une personne internationale unique, capable s'assumer des obligations et pleinement responsable de ses actes. C'est à elle qu'incombe la responsabilité de la prolongation de la guerre et de l'effusion du sang. C'est elle, qui, après avoir apposé solonnellement sa signature au bas de la convention d'Armistice et du Traité de Sèvres, s'efforça d'éluder ses engagements internationaux. Profitant de la cessation des hostilités et du laps de temps nécessaire pour la négociation, la signature et la ratification du Traité, afin d'obtenir une situation militaire meilleure qui lui permît de s'opposer à son application, elle provoqua le mouvement kémaliste qui constitue un défi à la probité internationale et à la bonne foi qui doit régir les rapports entre nations. Admettre une pareille situation serait introduire l'insécurité dans tous les traités et créer un précédent qui consisterait à permettre à un Etat d'ériger un pouvoir de violence au dessus du pouvoir légalement établi dans un pays pour annuler à son profit des engagements internationaux solonnellement contractés.

Le Gouvernement Hellénique a pris note de la Déclaration que le Principal Secrétaire de S. M. Britannique a bien voulu lui faire pour l'assurer que les forces alliées ne permettront pas que du matériel de guerre parvienne aux forces kémalistes par Constantinople, où les Alliés sont à même d'enrayer effectivement de pareils envois.

Par cette action les Puissances Alliées reconnaissent le bien fondé des raisons qui ont déterminé la Grèce à envisager un contrôle sur mer. Mais il est évident que cette mesure ne suffit pas à rendre superflu le contrôle exercé par la Grèce, étant donné que la Turquie peut être approvisionée par ailleurs et que notoirement une contrebande très active s'effectue aussi bien que par la mer Egée que par la mer Noire. Aussi, ne saurait-on priver la Grèce d'un moyen par lequel elle tend à diminuer la force de résistance de l'ennemi commun.

L'occupation interalliée de Constantinople malgré les avantages mentionnés par Votre Excellence au sujet de la surveillance des Puissances dans les Détroits, si elle devait limiter notre action, tendrait à perdre son caractère de pression sur la Turquie pour l'exécution de ses engagements et pourrait engendrer éventuellement des inconvénients militaires considérables pour la Grèce.

Toujours est-il que si dans les relations des Principales Puissances Alliées avec la Grèce et les partisans de Kémal Pacha il y a des éléments présentant un caractère particulier, ce caractère doit être de nature à renforcer les droits de la Grèce comme belligérante.

Les propositions que les Principales Puissances ont bien voulu présenter au cours de la récente Conférence de Londres, ne peuvent evidemment influer d'aucune manière sur la nature juridique des hostilités en cours. D'ailleurs le *(sic)* reprise des hostilités a été envisagée comme possible, par les Puissances elles-mêmes, à la Conférence. Les Puissances Alliées n'ignorent pas les circonstances qui ont imposé à la Grèce d'aller au devant de l'attaque de Kémal Pacha avant que les forces de ce dernier ne fussent renforcées, de manière à exiger un effort ultérieur de beaucoup plus considérable. Toutefois le caractère juridique des hostilités nous paraît indépendant de toutes ces considérations d'ordre politique et militaire.

L'action de la Grèce en Asie-Mineure a son origine dans le mandat qui lui a été confié, comme alliée, par les Puissances, dans le but de la pacification de la Turquie et pour l'application des principes qui ont trouvé leur consécration dans le Traité de Sèvres.

Le peuple Hellène ayant assumé cette mission dans l'intérêt commun de tous les Alliées, avait le droit de penser qu'en accomplissant cette tâche et en entreprenant une paraille guerre il pouvait compter sur l'appui des Puissances afin d'arriver au parachèvement complet de son oeuvre.

Les sacrifices qu'il a subi et qu'il continue à subir, du fait qu'il s'est engagé dans cette guerre, sont considérables. II peut du moins s'attendre à ce que son effort entrepris dans un intérêt commun ne rencontre pas chez ses Alliés une attitude d'indifférence qui ne peut qu'affecter les conditions mêmes de la lutte, et des mesures le privant du droit primordial de légitime défense.

C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement Hellénique espère que le Gouvernement Britannique voudra bien reprendre la question dans son ensemble et l'examiner dans un esprit de bienveillance et d'équité.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Ministre, les assurances de ma haute considération.

(Signé) G. P. BALTAZZI.

F.O. 371/6512/E. 5548.

No. 113

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *May 4, 1921.*
(Received May 10.)

No. 446.

My Lord,

SINCE the date of my despatch No. 432 of the 27th April, I have had brought to my notice a further batch of Angora newspapers for the first half of April, including a complete set of the "Hakimiet-i-Millie", except for one missing copy, from the 3rd to 14th April inclusive.

2. In my previous despatch I drew attention to the comparative reserve displayed by the semi-official "Hakimiet-i-Millie" as compared with the extremist "Yeni Gyun" in the last days of March. In the numbers now under review, however, the "Hakimiet-i-Millie" reproduces every feature which I had already noted in the "Yeni Gyun", with the single exception that there is no specific reference to the London proposals. This is the more significant, as the period covered is that during which the Kemalist successes against the Greeks became public property in Angora.

3. The "Hakimiet-i-Millie" of the 3rd April gives an account of the rejoicings in Angora over the Nationalist victory on the Eski-Shehir front. The leading article, signed by a lady, acclaims the triumph of a handful of Turkish heroes over a Europe in arms, and expressly declares that the victory has been won not merely against Greece, but against "the English, fearing to advance from the sea-coast, but lending help therefrom with all their might; Lloyd George, thinking to have to do with a beaten Turk in a month's time, still further back all Europe, perceptible or imperceptible; then a whole world — the whole new-old Christian world — trembling to strangle Islam", all of whose hopes have been shattered by the Turkish victory and the defeat of Greece. Prominence is given in the same paper to various festive orations, in one of which the speaker claimed that Turkey alone of all the beaten nations had torn up the bond of slavery proffered in the guise of a peace treaty.

4. Subsequent numbers of the same paper single out Great Britain for the bitterest hostility and hold the Sultan up to opprobrium. I enclose translations of two leading articles,* which require no comment, except to state that it is entirely untrue that I had to use any pressure to secure the publication in the Constantinople press of my communiqué regarding the neutrality of His Majesty's Government in the new war between Greece

* Not printed.

and the Kemalists. On the 14th April the "Hakimiet-i-Millie" accuses your Lordship of a change of front, on the strength of a report that you had stated that the Eastern question must be settled not by arms but by diplomacy, a statement which the journal attributes to disappointment over the Greek defeat.

5. There is little mention of France and Italy, except for a statement that French officers are making ready to leave Constantinople in view of the prospect of a declaration of war by Germany against France and a short article on the sorry plight of the Italians in Tripoli. Incidentally, the Constantinople Minister for Foreign Affairs is attacked for having dared to tell the Constantinople press that it was untrue that Tewfik Pasha in London had left it to the Anatolian delegates to speak for Turkey. Sefa Bey is accused of flying in the face certified by Tewfik Pasha, Bekir Sami Bey, and the press of Europe, and it is suggested that his motive may have been "to please the Sultan".

6. The "Hakimiet-i-Millie" records "with regret" the confirmation of the news of Talaat Pasha's death. The "Yeni Gyun" is much more expressive on this subject. It is unnecessary to dwell on this paper's utterances in its numbers for the first half of April, as they are naturally not less flamboyant than those already reported. It is, however, worth noting that in its issue of the 12th April it contains an article on "Talaat Pasha and the Committee of Union and Progress". The writer compares the work of Talaat with that of Reshid Pasha in the nineteenth century, and emphasises the far greater difficulties which the former had to contend with owing to foreign enmities. He says little either way of the Committee, but if he hints at a criticism it is that the Committee shrank from an immediate assumption of full power on the morrow of the 1908 revolution. The article concludes as follows:—

> "The termination in this manner of the general war has for us consigned those periods entirely into the region of history. As for the question of how Talaat Pasha would have taken his part in the epoch now opening, it may not be difficult to form an estimate, but it is out of place; only having regard to the large part of the past which they created, history, when sizing up Talaat Pasha and the Committee of Union and Progress, will not forget in what conditions of foreign pressure they began their task and by what foreign pressure they were again compelled to leave the task they had begun".

7. If I venture to trouble your Lordship with these lucubrations of Angora journalists, it is because, however extravagant in expression, they reflect only too faithfully the deep-seated convictions and permanent ori-

entation of those who have hitherto counted for most in the Nationalist movement. Idealists and adventurers alike, the leaders are at present flushed with the wine of recent successes, and unless something occurs to weaken their position, they may be expected to be peculiarly intractable in their dealings with the Allies in the immediate future.

I have, &c.,

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

F.O. 406/46, p. 46-47, No. 33.

No. 114

Lord Granville (Athens) to Earl Curzon.

ATHENS, *May 6, 1921.*
(Received May 17).

No. 193.

My Lord,

In conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday I alluded to the activity of the Reservists' Leagues referred to in my Despatch No. 188 of the 27th ultimo[1] and pointed out the extreme danger of allowing this sort of thing to go on. Monsieur Baltazzi was bold enough to declare that I was quite wrong in supposing that there was any connection between these Political Clubs and the old Reservists' Leagues which had been dissolved, that the 'Hesperini', which I had quoted as the chief organ for the publication of their resolutions, was a rag which could only be despised and disregarded, (it is constantly read by officers and soldiers) and that he had never even heard of these activities which proved how very unimportant they were! I need hardly say that he agreed volubly with my view that these suggestions of Lynch Law were most reprehensible, but he did not give any indication of a desire to suppress them.

Although Members of the Government themselves have not yet, so far as I know, given any indication whatever of a desire to cut their losses and come to terms with Mustapha Kemal, certain of their papers have certainly published articles which might be interpreted as a preparation of public opinion for such a decision, and it is certain that if that did happen

[1] Not printed. Lord Granville had reported that the Reservists' Leagues (Political Clubs) were publishing almost daily notices in the papers threatening to take the law into their own hands if the Government failed to keep 'these miserable Venizelists in order and prevent them expressing in writing or in speech their treasonable ideas about the Sacred Majesty of King Constantine.

every effort would be made to lay the blame on Monsieur Venizelos and the Allies — more especially the French. That is the moment when the danger of these Political Clubs will become acute, a general attack on Venizelists is not improbable, and I fear that the French are likely to be insulted at least if not actually assaulted. I do not at present foresee the slightest danger for British subjects.

There is a very general idea that the Government's plan is to obtain, if in any way possible, a military success however unimportant, and then to declare that the united opposition of the Great Powers is too much for Greece and that she has no choice but to come to the best terms possible with the Turks. They would probably be glad at that moment of some sort of Allied intervention, and, in view of Monsieur Montagna's remark quoted in my Despatch No. 170 of the 16th ultimo[2], it appears very possible that Italy may offer her mediation. The press campaign against France, to which I have referred in my telegrams Nos. 221[2] and 225[2] of yesterday and today, is carried on so unanimously by the Government papers that it is hardly possible to believe that it is not encouraged by the Government, and the explanation given by the 'Patris' appears to me extremely probable that it is engineered with a view to preparing public opinion to accept the theory, if and when a withdrawal from Asia Minor takes place, that all Greece's troubles are due to the Allies and Monsieur Venizelos's 'fantastic foreign policy'. The' Kathemerine' is the worst offender in the campaign: it has published a series of articles declaring that French hostility to Greece is all due to the ghosts of the French sailors who were killed at Athens in 1916— not in a trap as the French and Venizelists say, but by the heroic defenders of their country's honour — that it was in expiation of these deaths (whose numbers were probably exaggerated) that the savage blockade was applied to which so many old men, women and children succumbed, that Greece was handed over by force to the maleficent rebel who shot, imprisoned, exiled and persecuted the people, *that Greece was led as a slave into war*, and that many of her sons were killed in the advance in Macedonia by bullets in the back fired by the avengers of these sailors (this presumably refers to an incident when the Greek infantry were too impetuous and ran into the French barrage). It goes on to argue that the French are not only doing all they can encourage and assist Mustapha Kemal, but that their influence is at work in Bulgaria and in Albania, and in fact, as one of the independent papers says, the 'Kathemerine' and its fellows follow the principle in all Greek misfortunes of 'Cherchez la France'.

I hear constant stories of the ever growing revulsion of feeling throughout the country which I am assured is now no longer confided to hostility

[2] Not printed.

to the Government but extends to the King himself. I must admit that most of these stories come from Venizelist and therefore prejudiced sources, but I think the King's position is anyhow not nearly so strong as it was.

One hears it frequently stated that German influence is once more getting a strong hold in this country and it is suggested that the newspaper attacks on the French may have German money behind them. The Germans who are here — there are a good many besides the Legation staff— no doubt work hard at propaganda, but I am inclined to think that the bitter anti-French feeling which is undoubtedly very general is due less to pro - German sentiments than to anti - Venizelism and to the fact that France is considered far more responsible than Great Britain for all the unpleasant events of the past such as the blockade and the expulsion of the King. The German Archaeological School is however already reopened and I am told that preparations are being made for the reopening of the ordinary German School in the autumn. I learn from a secret source that it is freely said in the German colony that if the Greeks are beaten in Asia Minor it will not be possible for French and Italians to live in Greece.

I have, &c.,

GRANVILLE

D.B.F.P., Ist. series, Vol. XVII, p. 168-170, No. 153.

No. 115

General Harington, Constantinople, to War Office.

Desp. 0445 10. 5. 21.
Recd. 1015 10. 5. 21.
Clear the line

Paraphrase.
Secret.
284 cipher 9th May. *First of 3 parts.*

It is, I think necessary, that situation here be reviewed again. Please refer to my telegram I. 9766 January 14th. Matters have been altered by subsequent events. Chief factors are: (a) To a large extent, Greek troops have lost confidence in higher command; but I believe they are generally keen to advance again, although in the case of two Divisions I hear the reverse. (b) *Nationalists are much stronger than before,* having 12 Infantry Divisions on interior lines to oppose 7 Greek, and have to their credit two previous successes. They have certainly grown in strength and confidence since last January. High Commissioner's recent despatches show spirit of Angora as reflected by inspired press. Reliable information shows that so far Angora

has consistently refused to endorse the moderate policy adopted by Bekir Sami in London, though news of developments since his return to Angora is still awaited. Of return of our prisoners we have no signs except that Colonel Rawlinson has been re-arrested. Mustapha Kemal, in my opinion, is thoroughly truculent. He is fully aware of our difficulties at home and elsewhere. He does not believe in our efforts of neutrality. He is probably confident of beating the Greeks again and of then tackling us.

Part II.

Neutrality was to-day discussed by Allied High Commissioners, Admirals and Generals who are putting forward proposals regarding Constantinople, with which I agree. The question is a difficult one because, if extreme pressure were put on Greeks by closing Dardanelles and Gulf of Ismid as being within effective Allied occupation, withdrawal of Greek troops from Brusa and Ismid might result which would leave me face to face with Nationalists. Difficult situation would thereby be created unless you can give me sufficient force and mobility to secure our position; probably two Divisions in Asia and additional force to cope with trouble which would occur here. Probability of the Bolsheviks preparing a summer attack on Roumania is strongly indicated, by which diversion Mustapha Kemal would be given an opportunity of becoming aggressive.

Last Part.

It appears from my information as though offensive will be renewed by Greeks in three or four weeks time, probably from Ushak front. Reports of atrocities are much on increase. On 12th Commissions under General Franks and Colonel Farmer leave for Gemlek-Yalova area and Shile, respectively, to investigate. Understand they will be accompanied by Allied officers. My proposal to form gendarmerie battalion(s) without prejudice to future in Sandjak of Scutari, that is from Bosphorus to Ismid (exclusive), under supervision of British officers has been approved by High Commissioners. This has been very well received and is what ought to be done south of Marmora. The real bone of contention is still Smyrna. I note that I shall not now get flight of snipes or 7th Dragoon Guards but may retain 20th Hussars.

F.O. 371/6513/E. 5730.

No. 116

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *May 11, 1921.*
(Received May 18).

No. 476. Secret.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's secret despatch No. 358 of the 21st April *, I have the honour to state that it appears to me quite possible that the Greeks may have been exploring the possibilities of encouraging the Kurds to give the Kemalists trouble on their Eastern borders. As your Lordship is aware, every scheme for reducing the Kemalists by force of arms has included more or less vague plans for raising Kurdistan against them, and there have always been a certain number of Kurds imbued with Kurdish national ideas who have been anxious to see some such plan put into execution, as the Kemalists have been consistently opposed to giving the Kurds any real autonomy, much less independence.

2. I doubt, however, whether, even if united Kurdish action were possible, responsible Kurdish leaders would be very ready to enter into formal relations with the Greeks, as religious and racial sentiment would make it difficult to unite Kurds on such a platform. The two persons named in your Lordship's despatch under reference are of some interest, but can hardly be regarded as leaders in any true sense.

3. Mustapha Pasha is a well known Turkish officer belonging by origin to Suleimanieh. He came into great prominence some time after the armistice as a staunch supporter of Ferid Pasha's anti-Kemalist policy. His last part was that of president of the special court-martial for dealing with massacrers and other war criminals. In this capacity he showed a praiseworthy zeal, and incurred much odium in Turkish nationalist circles. Soon after Ferid Pasha's fall last October, Mustapha Pasha was arrested on a trumped-up charge arising out of his activities on the court-martial, and it was only owing to the intervention of this High Commission that he

* Lord Curzon'dan Sir H. Rumbold'a gönderilen bu gizli yazı şöyledir:

"I have to state for Your Excellency's confidential information, that, according to information of an entirely reliable nature which I have received, the Greek High Commissoner at Constantinople at the end of last month was contemplating measures to bring about an understanding between Kurdish natonalists and his own country, with a view to bringing pressure to bear on the Kemalist forces. Your Greek Colleague is reported to have had interviews with two Kurdish leaders named Mustafa Pasha and Hakkı Bey, and it would appear that the Greek Metropolitan of Sivas acted as intermediary."

(F.O. 371/6574/E. 4676)

escaped with a sentence of seven months' imprisonment, and was pardoned before he even completed that term. I have recently obtained from Mesopotamia permission for his return to that country, and I hope he may shortly go there, as his presence here is undesirable in his own interest.

4. Mustapha Pasha is honest, well-meaning and energetic, but he is too indiscreet to be of great value except as an instrument in careful hands. Properly handled he might be useful, *e.g.*, to the British authorities in Mesopotamia, but he is certainly not the man to induce Kurds generally to commit themselves to definite co-operation with the Greeks. The report that he and they may have some such plan in their minds derives nevertheless support from the fact that, when told he might go to Mesopotamia, he broached the question of his being allowed to take some other Kurdish officers of Suleimanieh origin with him. I have not encouraged him in this, as my grounds for wishing to facilitate his departure from here are personal to himself.

5. I know less about Kurd Hakki Bey, but it is significant that he recently applied to me for facilities to proceed to Bagdad *en route* for his own country in the neighbourhood of Diarbekr, with a select company of other Kurdish notables. His account of himself is that he was in Paris, a fugitive from the Young Turks, when the general war broke out; that he then went to Athens, and that he was in Egypt when Turkey entered the war. He was imprisoned in Egypt as an enemy and sent to Malta, where he remained throughout the war and the first months of the armistice. He was eventually repatriated to Constantinople as a Turkish prisoner of war and has since been here. He seems to have been involved in some brawl in Malta in which certain Turks were killed, but he states that he was acquitted by the British Military Court which dealt with the matter. He claims to be head of the Melikan tribe. He is a well set-up man, but appears to be of the adventurer or komitaji type.

6. I had Kurd Hakki Bey's application under consideration when I received your Lordship's despatch under reference. In view of the information which has reached you, it seems preferable that I should leave it to your Lordship to decide what, if any, action should be taken. I should be glad to be informed of your Lordship's decision regarding this.

7. In conclusion, I would refer your Lordship to my telegram to Bagdad of the 3rd May, which was repeated to the Foreign Office in my telegram No. 320 of the same date. I am still without any definite information regarding the anti-Kemalist movement, which broke out some time ago among the Kurds in the country east of Sivas. It appears to have been of sufficient importance to cause apprehension in Angora and to necessitate strong military action. I have, however, no reason to suppose

that it has had any extension beyond the Kizilbash or Alevi Kurds, who are numerous in the Dersim and the country adjoining it, or that it amounts to more than a local insurrection, which the Kemalist authorities, with their superior military organisation and equipment, are capable of repressing.

I have, &c.,

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

F.O. 406/46, p. 54-55, No. 40

No. 117

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *May 18, 1921.*
(Received May 24).

No. 493.
My Lord,

THE situation here may be summed up as follows:—

2. There is a temporary lull pending the resumption of active hostilities in Anatolia. According to a communiqué issued at Athens the Greek Government repudiate the idea of intervention, and it is generally understood that they mean to see their enterprise in Asia Minor through to the end. I do not find any suggestion that the Kemalists intend to anticipate the Greek offensive, though I have noticed a statement in one Turkish paper that the Kemalist forces will start an offensive after Bairam. It would seem more likely, however, that, having worked hard to strengthen their positions, they will await the Greek attack.

3. In the meanwhile, the sufferers from the present state of things are the inhabitants of the regions in the zone of hostilities. Although the two commissions of enquiry have only been at work for three or four days, their reports point to the fact that irregular bands, organised by the Greeks for operations with the Greek regular troops, have committed and are committing serious excesses. No doubt some of the members of these bands are persons who have suffered at the hands of the Kemalists a year ago, and are actuated by feelings of revenge. A regrettable feature of these excesses is that in some cases Greek regular troops have been a party to them. The outcome is that the hatred as between Mussulmans and Christians in this part of the world is greater than ever.

4. Chauvinistic feelings seem to be getting the upper hand at Angora, and Bekir Sami Bey has resigned. The Constantinople press regret his resignation. I am informed that General Fewsi Pasha, who temporarily succeeds Bekir Sami Bey, is a man of moderate views and not a firebrand. But the moderation with which Bekir Sami Bey has been credited has not prevented the Nationalist Government from giving the impression that they are hostile, in varying degrees, to the Allies.

5. It may be said that the further political course of events depends almost entirely on the issue of the hostilities in Anatolia. On a review of the situation I venture to think that a complete Greek victory would be less disastrous than a complete Nationalist victory. The best result to hope for is a stalemate, which will leave both sides exhausted.

I have, &c.,

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

F.O. 406/46, p. 61, No. 45.

No. 118

Mr. Lago, Ministry For Foreign Affairs, Rome,
to The Italian Consul, Adalia.

ROME, *15th May, 1921.*
DATE OF CIRCULATION, *21st May, 1921.*

No. 4853.

Please transmit to the ANGORA Government the following telegram from JAMI BEY to MUSTAPHA KEMAL PASHA:

"URGENT: To His Excellency, MUSTAPHA KEMAL PASHA, President of the Grand National Assembly.

A telegram despatched on May 2nd by the Italian Command at SOKIA states that the inhabitants of the zone occupied by the Italians have taken up arms and adopted an attitude hostile to the Italians: it is anticipated that a regrettable incident may at any moment happen.

I am informed officially and by the "political representative" that on this account and because of the aeroplane *(sic)* and ADALIA incidents, the Italian Government has again stopped the departure of the ship which was to leave on the 16th instant laden with arms and munitions to the value of 30,000,000 francs. This being so, all the energy we have shown will be wasted, the money paid for the ship lost, and the despatch of arms and munitions of which we stand in so great need negatived.

To assure that permission be at once given for the departure of the ship, I beg you, earnestly, to give orders to those concerned that suitable explanations be given from the locality.

MUMTAZ, MILITARY ATTACHÉ.

F.O. 371/6513

No. 119

Mr. Rizo Rangabé, Chargé d'Affaires of Greece in London, to Earl Curzon.

May 19th, 1921.

No. 1693

My Lord,

On the occasion of my last visit to the Foreign Office I mentioned a telegram which I had received from Athens informing me that Russian officers, of General Wrangel's Army, had been joining the troops of Mustapha Kemal.

As I gathered that a copy of this communication would be of interest to Your Lordship I have the honour to enclose a translation herewith.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) RIZO RANGABE.

F.O. 371/6513/E. 5860

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 119

NOTE

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Athens has communicated to the Greek Legation in London the following telegram which was sent to the Greek High Commissioner in Constantinople—

"According to a telegraphic report sent by the Military Governor of Thrace to the War Office on April 9th, o.s., it appears that 500 Russian officers of General Wrangel's Army passed through the Dardanelles in small vessels, unknown to the Russian Authorities, with the intention of joining the troops of Mustapha Kemal.

"The Military Governor of Thrace adds that a few days ago two French torpedo-boats were seen cruising from Gallipoli to the Straits.

"Kindly see the French High Commissioner in Constantinople and draw his attention to the fact that such a proceeding is greatly detrimental

to Greek interests and that it will be very harmful to our cause if Mustapha Kemal's troops are reinforced by Russian officers. We are all the more pained at this occurence seeing that these same officers received our hospitality for so long. Please request him to take steps to prevent the repetition of such an incident and communicate this telegram to the British High Commissioner".

F.O. 371/6513.

LONDON, *May 19th, 1921.*

No. 120

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, 21 *May* 1921.
(Received, 22nd May 1921).

Telegraphic
No. 363.

My telegram No. 352.

Angora telegraph agency announces in its issue of May 17th resignation of Angora Cabinet. Ostensible reason is difference of opinion between Council of Ministers and Financial Committee of Grand National Assembly.

Everything points to existence of considerable tension in political circles at Angora. I have not sufficient information on which to base considered opinion of trend of events there, but I have no reason so far to doubt that victory still lies with extremists. According to one report Feuzi Pasha, late President of Council (as distinct from Mustapha Kemal who has of late been President of Grand National Assembly only), has reformed Cabinet with participation of new elements.

F.O. 371/6470/E. 5868.

No. 121

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *May 24, 1921, 12 noon,*
(Received May 24, 6.45 p.m.)

No. 370 Telegraphic

My telegram No. 363.

All sorts of rumours have been current here and elsewhere regarding developments in Cabinet situation at Angora. Authentic news has now been

received that Grand National Assembly has re-elected whole of previous Cabinet with the exception of Commissioner[s] for Foreign Affairs, Interior and Finance.

The new Commissioner for Foreign Affairs is *Yussuf Kemal Bey* recently head of special mission to Moscow which signed agreements with Soviet and Afghan Governments. He is one of four members of last Constantinople Parliament who proceeded to Asia Minor just after occupation of Constantinople ostensibly to reassure and englighten public opinion there, but who immediately adhered to national movement.

The late Commissioner for Finance is Ferid Bey formely well known as deputy for Kutahia. He was at one time violently opposed to C.U.P. but is turbulent and unstable. This may suffice to account for his dismissal. Neither his successor [1] nor new Commissioner for Interior [2] are [*sic*] at all well known.

Full list of new Cabinet is given in my immediately following telegram. Present system appears to be that they elect their own (? President). It seems probable that Fevzi Pasha has been so elected.

So far as these changes mark any new development in Foreign Policy, it would appear to be in direct hardening of uncompromising attitude, which has prevailed since London Conference and resumption of hostilities in Asia Minor. Cabinet is, probably, of minor importance as compared to the dictatorship of Mustapha Kemal and military leaders among whom there is no real sign of disintegration up to date.

D.B.F.P., Ist. series, Vol. XVII, p. 189-190, No. 182.

No. 122

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *May 25, 1921.*
(Received May 31).

No. 518.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to state that I was received in private audience by the Sultan on the 23rd May, in order to take leave of His Majesty before my departure from Constantinople. No very settled practice exists as regards visits to His Majesty in armistice conditions, but I desired to seize the opportunity which presented itself of being received by His Majesty independently of my colleagues, and to mark the fact that His Majesty's

[1] Hassan Bey.
[2] Ata Bey.

Government regard the Sultan as a personage to be treated with consideration, and as still being the ultimate fount of authority in this country.

2. The Sultan, as on previous occasions, was unattended, and Mr. Ryan, who accompanied me, acted as interpreter. His Majesty opened the conversation by referring to the occasion of my visit. He observed that my presence in Constantinople in the present serious situation was a source of comfort, but that it was also possible to derive some comfort from my departure on leave, as being perhaps an indication that the situation did not appear to me quite so black as it did to the people of the country. I replied that the situation might in the future enter on new and complicated phases, to which I would hope to return with renewed strength and energy.

3. The Sultan said that I would doubtless take the opportunity afforded by my visit to England to report verbally on the state of affairs in this country. He reminded me of what I had said at our first interview regarding the importance of moral and spiritual factors. He said that I was now in a position to appreciate the operation of such factors, and to present to His Majesty's Government the views which as a conscientious observer, I had formed on the spot. He spoke of the atrocious conduct of the Greeks in places quite close to Constantinople. He accused the Greeks of pursuing a definite plan of extermination, and dwelt at some length on the horrors to which the Moslem population were exposed. Our own commissions of enquiry had, he said, seen what was happening. The suffering of the Moslems were such as could not be conceived possible by people living in Western conditions.

4. I said that His Majesty's Government had taken the lead in arranging for the despatch of commissions to enquire into the occurrences of which His Majesty spoke. I had on the previous day seen General Franks, the president of one of the commissions. What he told me confirmed the reports of atrocities. General Franks had indeed discovered cases in which the reports were exaggerated or unfounded, and I gave His Majesty one salient instance. I admitted that, notwithstanding this, the state of affairs in the Ismid and Yalova districts was very bad. I said, however, that the despatch of the missions had already impressed the Greeks, and was having a deterent effect.

5. The Sultan said he realised how much His Majesty's Government had done, and thanked them for their efforts. He said, however, that peace was the only cure for the situation he had described. On the one hand, the Greeks were pursuing a policy of extermination. On the other hand, the Angora leaders, bent on personal aims, were sustaining disturbance. The innocent and suffering people were the victims of both. His own country abounded in people with mad ideas. They relied on Bolshevik

assistance. His Majesty adverted to the recent change of Government at Angora, where Bekir Sami Bey, a comparatively moderate man, had been replaced by a "fellow" fresh from Moscow. The only cure, he repeated, was the re-establishment of peace by the Great Powers. It must be a peace founded on justice. The population of the hinterland of Smyrna was overwhelmingly Turkish. Even in the town the Turks constituted 60-70 per cent. of the inhabitants. The Greeks might assert the contrary, but Greek, like Persian, exaggeration had passed into a proverb in this country. As for Thrace, 90 per cent. of the population, both in Eastern and Western Thrace, were Turkish. The solution there was to form a kind of buffer State.

6. I said I was sure His Majesty's Government were alive to the considerations put forward by His Majesty and to the danger of Bolshevik penetration in Asia Minor. I said that Mr. Lloyd George was reported to have stated that His Majesty's Government were disposed to intervene in the conflict in Asia Minor when a favourable opportunity presented itself. His Majesty's Government were following the course of events very closely, and might be relied on to do everything possible to promote the re-establishment of peace. The British Empire was so widespread that its interests were touched by disturbance in any part of the world, and we were hardly less interested than Turkey herself in the restoration of peace in Anatolia. For myself, I said, I could not believe that the present conflict between Kemalists and Greeks would last, as neither side had the means of sustaining a prolonged struggle. I doubted whether the war would continue for more than a month or two longer.

7. The Sultan thanked me for what was reassuring in my remarks, but proceeded to develop his own views at some length, explaining more than once that they were personal expressions of opinion, which he offered with a view to assist me in forming my appreciation of the situation. The following is a summary of what he said, drawn up without any attempt to reproduce the precise order of his remarks.

8. Starting from my observation regarding the weakness of both sides in the Turco-Greek struggle, the Sultan said that the Kemalists drew strength from Bolshevism, and he insisted once more on the gravity of the Bolshevik menace. In his view the policy should be to throw the Bolsheviks back on to the Caucasus, in order to avert a danger which would otherwise threaten first Turkey and then the peace of the world. To do this it was necessary to arrive at a basis of settlement which would satisfy people sufficiently to enable peaceable men to settle down to the task of reconstructing their lives by individual endeavour. He compared the continued presence of the Greeks in predominantly Turkish areas to the artificial methods sometimes used in surgery of keeping a wound open. While the Greeks

remained in Smyrna and Thrace it was impossible that Turkey's wounds should be healed. Eastern and Western Thrace, he said, belonged properly to Turkey, but Turkey was incapable of holding them by her own resources against two rapacious neighbours. When restored to Turkey they should at the same time be neutralised, under guarantee of the Powers, and formed into a buffer between Europe and Asia. I understood His Majesty to say that controls need not be objected to, as they would be good for Turkey, but this was merely a passing remark, and I do not know how far it can be taken as a considered statement. As regards the prolongation of hostilities, he said that the leaders on both sides had an interest in the continuance of a disturbed state of affairs. Neither side would take the offensive, and it cost them nothing to remain facing each other as at present. What was wanted was not mediation, but the exercise by the Powers of a strong and just pressure from above. This alone could put an end to the present state of affairs, which, if allowed to drift on through the summer and autumn, might produce disastrous consequences. The Sultan, while admitting that the interests of minorities must be safeguarded, spoke with noticeable bitterness of the minorities in this country as belonging to some of the worst races of the East.

9. After asking that, in reporting personally to His Majesty's Government, I should combine what he had said with what I had myself witnessed, His Majesty said it only remained to wish me a pleasant journey. I thanked him for the great courtesy he had shown me on the three occasions on which he had been pleased to receive me, and said I should not fail to report it personally to the King and his Ministers. The Sultan reminded me of what he had told me more than once of his hereditary admiration for Great Britain, and his conviction that Turkey's best hope lay in the assimilation of British ideals. It was therefore natural, he said, that he should show particular consideration for one who came to him as British representative. He was good enough to give, as a further reason, the personal regard which he had conceived for me in the course of our conversations. After a few further courtesies of the same kind, I withdrew.

I have, &c.,

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

F.O. 406/46, p. 68-69, No. *51*

No. 123

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *May 25, 1921.*
(Received May 31).

No. 521. Confidential.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 479, Secret, of the 11th May, I have the honour to state that on the 25th instant Emin Ali Bey, the head of the Bedrhan family, called on Mr. Ryan, accompanied by his son Jeladet Bey, who is one of the more active promoters of the Kurdish national movement. Emin Ali Bey said that, in view of the present situation, he and his friends had come into touch with the Greek representative here, who had listened favourably to the suggestion of a Kurdish movement against the Kemalists, which, without any formal co-operation, would promote the interests of both Greece and the Kurdish nationalists, but had said that he could not proceed in the matter unless the movement were sanctioned by His Majesty's Government. Emin Ali Bey asked whether, if he or other movers applied for permission to go to Mosul for instance, it would be granted, and whether, if an organisation were set on foot at some place in British occupied territory, it would be favourably regarded.

2. Mr. Ryan, following the line which has always been laid down in Foreign Office instructions since the armistice, at once replied that no encouragement could be given in present circumstances to attempts to create a rising in Kurdistan. He pointed out that the Greeks had embarked on the present hostilities in defiance of the wishes of His Majesty's Government, who had declared their neutrality and deprecated the submission of such po posals as that made by Emin Ali Bey. As regards the journey to Mosul, he said that if members of the Bedrhan family applied as travellers for permission to go to Mosul this High Commission would not oppose their going, but that the application would have to be made through the ordinary channels.

3. Your Lordship will doubtless agree that no other attitude could be taken up at present towards proposals of this kind from Kurdish notables in Constantinople. They have, however, been put forward by so many different persons at different times that they are worth bearing in mind. A Kurdish movement would be a very difficult instrument to handle, but if the extremist tendencies of Angora should end in forcing Great Britain and France into a definite conflict with the Kemalists, the anti-Kemalist sections of the Kurdish race might possibly be turned to account.

4. Emin Ali Bey enquired whether His Majesty's Government had any information regarding his brother Kiamil Bey Bedrhan, who used to reside at Tiflis, and who, according to a report in the Paris "Humanité," had recently appeared somewhere in Kurdistan. I have no knowledge of the movements of this person since the date of a long memorial which he submitted for the consideration of His Majesty's Government some considerable time ago. I have been unable to put my hand on this document, but it was drawn up at Tiflis, and put forward the claim of Prince Kiamil, as he called himself, to be installed as ruler of Kurdistan.

I have, &c.,

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

F.O. 406/46, p. 70, No. 52.

No. 124

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *May 25, 1921.*
(Received May 31).

No. 523.
My Lord,

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 370 and 371 of the 23rd instant, relative to the change of Government at Angora, I have the honour to state that the newspapers of Nationalist sympathies in Constantinople have been at great pains to explain that recent events at Angora have nothing to do with foreign policy.

2. Much publicity has also been given within the last two or three days to the formation of a new party in the Grand National Assembly under the name of "Group for the Defence of the Rights of Anatolia and Roumelia". The title of the group recalls the autumn of 1919, when the programme of the Nationalist movement was definitely laid down by the Erzeroum Congress. The platform of the group is the National Pact, which has recently been the subject of correspondence with the Foreign Office. Mustapha Kemal Pasha has himself accepted the presidency, and the group claims to have already secured the adhesion of 170 members of the Assembly.

3. This would appear to indicate that, as a result of recent tension in political circles at Angora, Mustapha Kemal is mobilising as many ele-

ments as possible round his own person, on the basis of the National Pact and nothing but the National Pact.

4. It is further reported from Angora that an important sitting of the Grand National Assembly is to be held on the 26th May in order to consider future policy. According to some accounts, the Cabinet recently appointed is merely transitional, and further changes may be expected after the sitting of the 26th May. However that may be, I see no reason at present to alter the opinion expressed in the last paragraph of my telegram No. 370 of the 23rd May.

I have, &c.,

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

D.B.F.P., Ist. series. Vol. XVII, p. 195-196, No. 187.
F.O. 406/46, p. 70-71, No. 53.

No. 125

Report No. 242, *Issued by the British Secret Intelligence Service, Constantinople Branch.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, *26. 5. 1921.*

(Extracts)

THE BALKANS.

THE NATIONALIST AND ALBANIA.

It is reliably reported that an Albanian Mission, headed by Ismail Ditsa, a notable of El Bassan, arrived at Angora on the 3rd May. It proceeded in an Italian ship from Avlona direct to Ineboli.

On the 4th May Ismail Ditsa had a long interview with Mustapha Kemal, to whom he handed a letter from Colonel Selaheddin Bey, Commander of the Albanian forces. As a result of this interview, negotiations were initiated for the conclusion of an alliance between the Nationalists and the Albanians, and a special commission consisting of Ahmed Mukhtar Bey, Suad Bey and Staff Major Remzi Bey, was nominated by the Great National Assembly to work out the details.

NATIONALIST INTRIGUES IN THRACE.

According to information from a reliable source, the Turkish Nationalist scheme for the creation of revolutionary organisations in Thrace was ratified by the Council of Commissioners and submitted to the Great National Assembly on the 4th May, by whom it was also ratified. Owing

to objections regarding the supply of funds for these organisations, there was some delay in securing the approval of this scheme, as can be judged from the following extracts from a speech by Mustapha Kemal at a secret sitting of the National Assembly on the 20th April:—

> "Gentlemen, I am very pained to find that the matter should be so delayed. We have already undertaken the necessary measures with regard to this important question, both in Bulgaria and Thrace. Do you suppose that the Government would have submitted this scheme without having profoundly considered it? No, every detail was carefully weighed before the scheme was drawn up. I communicated to you lately the contents of letters received from our diplomatic representatives in Europe and from members of the Thracian Committee.
>
> "The Government knows what it ought to do. We all belong to Thrace heart and soul. As a military man I know the country inch by inch. The Minister of the Interior has drawn up this project in accordance with his duty, otherwise I also should have assisted the commission, which has had the advice of other specialists. We want this matter settled at once".

On the 5th May a Mission consisting of four members left Angora for Italy, via Adalia, for the purpose of meeting Thracian delegates in Italy. Two of these delegates were subsequently to proceed to Bulgaria to confer with the leaders of the Bulgarian-Thracian Committee.

It is further reported that Jami Bey, the Nationalist representative in Rome, recently received instructions from Angora to undertake an exchange of views with various Thracian representatives in Rome. Jami Bey, moreover, has been in communication, in this connection, with Jevad Abbas in Sofia, who was formerly Mustapha Kemal's A. D. C. and is at present Deputy in the Sobranje for Bolu. The latter is in close touch with the Bulgarian Moslem Deputies, Salim Agha and Dimitri Achkoff, an account of whom was given in the Appendix to Eastern Department Summary No. 120.

F.O. 371/6517.

No. 126

Report No.* 243, *Issued by the British Secret Intelligence Service, Constantinople Branch.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *27. 5. 21.*

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN ANATOLIA: FOREIGN POLICY OF THE NATIONALISTS.

The following is a summary of information obtained from various sources in Anatolia and Constantinople:—

On the 27th. April Bekir Sami Bey addressed the Great National Assembly for the first time after his return from Europe, and it was at once evident that, during his absence, the extremists had gained considerably in influence at the expense of the moderate party, of which Bekir Sami was, himself, one of the principal supporters. On this occasion the agreements with France and Italy were submitted to the Great National Assembly for ratification; but no discussion on the subject took place owing to a proposal by Mustapha Kemal that they should be referred to the Commissions for Foreign Affairs and Finance for examination.

These Commissions held a secret meeting on the same day, which Bekir Sami urged acceptance of the agreements on the grounds that they would secure important political and material advantages for Turkey; that the demands of Italy and France were exceedingly moderate as compared with those of Great Britain; that neither Italy nor France would support the extremist policy of the British, but would assist the Turks in every way to realise their legitimate aspirations. Bekir Sami also emphasised the fact that General Pellé had clearly given him to understand that the French Government would be willing to consider a revision of the agreement proposed in London.

Bekir Sami's views, however, met with no support. The Commissions recommended certain sweeping modifications in the agreements which would have completely changed their character, and Mustapha Kemal, himself, stated that it would be inadvisable to proceed to the ratification of the French agreement, owing to the fact that the Soviet Government had been asking for explanations as to its significance, and had intimated that its ratification might lead to the cessation of supplies from Russia. Finally, the Great National Assembly voted against the ratification of the agreements, even in the modified form as recommended by the Foreign Affairs and Finance Commissions, and also refused to permit the recommencement of any negotiations with the Allies generally, before Smyrna and Thrace had been actually evacuated.

Bekir Sami, forseeing that his entire policy would be definitely repudiated, preferred to resign without challenging a vote of confidence. It appears that opposition to him in extremist circles centred round a group under the leadership of Yonus Nadi Bey, Deputy for Aidin, and Beni Zade Hamdi and Shukri Bey's, Deputies for Trebizond.

Bekir Sami's resignation was communicated to the army in a long telegram signed by Fevzi Pasha, of which the following is a digest:—

"The Great National Assembly from the first moment of its existence has pursued the Nationalist ideal, and the Turkish Nation has consented to every sacrifice to realise that ideal. The Nation has never contemplated a renunciation of its ideals. Bekir Sami Bey has explained to the Great National Assembly the activities of the Mission which proceeded to Europe under his direction; but, as those explanations were not held to be satisfactory, his proposals were not accepted. For this reason Bekir Sami Bey has resigned, and his resignation has been accepted. The majority of the Assembly, that is to say, of the Nation, has not approved of the policy which he proposed to pursue for the future. The Commission for Foreign Affairs will be for the moment in my charge and the Government, well aware of its great responsibility, relies upon the assistance of the army".

A telegram couched in similar terms was circulated in the provinces, where considerable excitement and some confusion ensued.

In the debates on the Government's attitude towards the Western powers which led to the resignation of Bekir Sami, Mustapha Kemal had the support of about 140 deputies. Very few deputies holding moderate views took part in these debates; and those moderates who did participate were abused and insulted.

On the 15th. May, a private meeting of the party leaders of the Great National Assembly took place at which it was decided that the Administration should resign. Mustapha Kemal at this meeting expressed his agreement with the opinion of the majority of the Assembly concerning Bekir Sami Bey's direction of affairs in London, Paris and Rome, but stated that, in his opinion, it would be better under the existing circumstances to play for time, rather than definitely reject the agreements with France and Italy. It was therefore decided that announcements should be made through various channels that the resignation of Bekir Sami Bey did not involve any change in the foreign policy of the Angora Administration and that the resignation of the Cabinet should be brought about upon a non-political issue, when a stop-gap Administration would be formed in order to direct affairs until the dissolution of the Great National Assembly in June.

In the latter connection, it is generally believed in Nationalist circles in Constantinople that Fevzi Pasha's Cabinet is purely of a provisional

nature and will shortly be replaced by another administration of an unadulterated extremist character. There is no doubt, however, according to information from all sources, that the present Administration will pursue a strong pro-Bolshevik policy; for Yussuf Kemal Bey holds the view that only in this way can the moral support of the Bolsheviks be secured for the benefit of Turkish national aspirations.

As regards Mustapha Kemal's attitude, there is no doubt that, on the one hand, he is strongly opposed to Bolshevik doctrines, but that, on the other hand, one of the fundamental principles of his foreign policy is close co-operation with the Soviet Government. He is also opposed to Enver Pasha on personal grounds, but it does not appear that this hostility is extended to Unionist doctrines. It is difficult, in fact, to distinguish between the pan-Turanianism of the Committee of Union and Progress and the pan-Islamism of Mustapha Kemal and his supporters. The keynote, however, to Mustapha Kemal's attitude is his all-dominating ambition, through the influence of which his policy is based upon two main principles: one involving the adoption of an extreme Nationalist policy, completely in harmony with that of the majority of the members of the Great National Assembly, and the other involving consistent opposition to Communist doctrines, to which also the great mass of the Nation is equally hostile. By his espousal of extreme Nationalism, Mustapha Kemal Pasha secures the support of the extremists, including probably a considerable number of the Unionists, whilst by his opposition to Bolshevism he acquiries the confidence of the moderate party also. In this manner he has succeeded in maintaining himself in that position of domination which alone can satisfy his nature, and which renders unlikely any settlement either with the Central Government or with the Allies which would involve his relegation to a less prominent position.

The Nationalists And The Unionists.

The following information was obtained from a prominent member of the Nationalist organisation in Constantinople, who was also one of the original members of the Committee of Union and Progress. His views were given in good faith to an intimate friend:—

It is generally agreed among the Nationalists that the Unionists, and especially those who were recently liberated from Malta, are destined to play an important part in the political affairs of Turkey. The Unionists who are now numbered amongst the Nationalists consider that without the moral and material assistance of their organisations, Mustapha Kemal would never have been able to establish his present position. Moreover, sooner or later it is thought that Mustapha Kemal and Enver, in spite of personal differences, will bury the hatchet, especially as the latter is more popular in

Germany, Russia and in certain Moslem countries abroad than Mustapha Kemal himself; and Nationalist schemes depend to a very great extent for their success upon the co-operation of the countries in question. Javid Bey will probably be the forerunner of the reappearance of Unionist leaders in the Turkish political arena, and it is significant that the latter is on good terms with Mustapha Kemal, and has been endeavouring to prepare the ground for a frank and active collaboration between Unionists and Nationalists.

In the above connection, it is reported from other sources that the Unionist group in Anatolia endeavoured, but without success, to secure the nomination of Javid Bey and other notorious Unionists to vacancies in the new Angora administration. Though these attempts proved unsuccessful, however, there appears to be no doubt that Javid Bey is exercising an important influence on the financial and foreign policy of the Nationalists.

F.O. 371/6517.

No. 127

The Director of British Military Intelligence to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

28th May 1921.

1209 M. I. 2.

The Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and begs to forward herewith, for his information, a copy of a memorandum, No. C. R. 43084/2 "I" dated 16th May 1921, which has been received from General Headquarters, Constantinople, on the subject of the attitude of the Turkish Nationalist Government towards Great Britain.

F.O. 371/6515

Enclosure 1 in No. 127

General Harington, Constantinople, to the Director of Military Intelligence, London.

16th May, 1921.

C. R. 43084/2 - 'I'

The attached paper has been prepared in order to provide a dispassionate analysis of the true attitude of the Angora Government towards Great Britain.

It seems clear that until Great Britain can recreate her prestige in Anatolia by signs of power to enforce her own policy by her own means, little hope must be entertained of any satisfactory arrangement with the Turkish Nationalists.

(Sgd.) C. H. Harington.
Lieutenant-General,
Commanding-in-Chief,
British Army in Constantinople.

F.O. 371/6515

Enclosure 2 in No. 127

General Staff 'Intelligence', Constantinople.

No. C. R. 43084/2 'I'.
Secret.

Attitude of the Turkish Nationalist Government Towards Great Britain. (December 1920 to April 1921).

The feeling in Nationalist circles has since the inauguration of the movement been consistently hostile to Great Britain, but during the period under review has passed through certain phases which may be classified:—

(a) The period between the visit of the Mission from the Constantinople Government under Izzet Pasha on December 3rd and the Greek offensive against the Nationalists early in January.
(b) The Allied summons of Turkish and Greek representatives to a conference in London and the decisions which were arrived at during the London Conference.
(c) The second Greek offensive on 23rd March and return to Angora of delegates from Europe.

Period (a).

1. The fall of Venizelist power in Greece, the defeat of Wrangel in the Crimea and the complete success of the Turkish attack on Armenia had as a result a considerable increase of hope and confidence amongst the Nationalists, whose chiefs were convinced that in these new circumstances the Entente Powers could be approached with a view to obtaining a favourable reception of Turkish claims with regard to modifications in the Treaty of Sèvres. These negotiations could be entered into by the Central Government and in the event of success the Nationalist leaders appeared to be prepared to second the Entente Powers in an Eastern policy compatible with Turkish National domination.

2. MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha forwarded a letter to IZZET Pasha detailing the conditions decided on at a secret session of the Great National Assembly under which negotiations between the Central Government and the Great National Assembly could be entertained with a view to co-operation between them in the interests of Turkish national unity.

The Great National Assembly required proof that "the Entente Powers had decided to repair the injustice they had committed".

3. The Mission under IZZET Pasha left for Angora shortly after the discussion of this letter by the Constantinople Cabinet had taken place and hopes of a working agreement between the two parties were expected to mature. In a telegram from NIZAMI Pasha at Rome on 11th January to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, he says that advantage must be taken of the strained Anglo-Greek relations to obtain some modification of the Treaty, and again on 13th January he says that the Italian opinion was that the only way to influence the English Government was to present a firm demand that Ottoman sovereignty should be absolute in the Smyrna territory. Such a declaration presented in agreement by Constantinople and Anatolia would face England with the alternative of accepting their demands or risking a new world war.

4. The Greek reconnaissance in force last January and the subsequent retirement was looked upon by the Nationalists as a victory over not only the Greeks but also Great Britain, who has always been accepted as the directing power behind Greece.

Meanwhile silence as to results of the IZZET Pasha Mission was causing much uncertainty of policy to the Turkish representatives in Rome and Paris, as shown by their telegrams to Constantinople. At the same time these telegrams alluded to assurances of both Italian and French support at the Conference to which delegates from Turkey and Greece were summoned to sit by the Supreme Council at Paris on 25th January 1921. The Constantinople Government were also instructed to inform the Angora Government of the Allied desire that MUSTAPHA KEMAL or qualified delegates of the Angora Government should form part of the Ottoman delegation.

Period (b).

5. This summons coming immediately after the result of the Greek offensive, was looked upon as an admission by Great Britain that Greece was a broken reed and that a change of policy was necessary. In consequence the feeling towards Great Britain underwent an appreciable change and the distrust of Great Britain's wish to come to a settlement was not so marked.

6. On the 18th January the Constantinople Government informed its representative in LONDON that a copy of their views on the modifications

of the treaty had been forwarded to him but that they had not received the views of ANGORA. However, they believed that if these demands were accepted, Angora would be satisfied. This was followed by a telegram dated the 29th January from the Constantinople Government to the Angora Government stating that they were ready to adopt the Angora conditions in view of the fact that united co-operation was essential and urging Angora to name its delegates, in order that Turkey should be represented at the Conference; otherwise the Greeks would have no opponents to their claims, with regrettable results to Turkey.

7. It may be noted that the Journal des Debats published a telegram from Constantinople also dated the 29th January to the effect that MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha had notified the Constantinople Government that the Angora Government was the only actual Government in Turkey and that he awaited a direct invitation from the Allies.

8. On 31st January the Angora Government informed the Ministers for Foreign Affairs at LONDON, PARIS and ROME, that "In spite of the distrust inspired by the policy followed towards Turkey by the authors of the Treaty of Sèvres", they were sincerely disposed to contribute to the re-establishment of peace, and declared their readiness to send delegates to the conference as soon as a demand was issued to them direct.

9. On February 7th Angora informed the Constantinople Government that the National delegates were about to start for Europe. It was felt in Constantinople Government circles that two reasons had influenced Angora to send their delegates separately and not via Constantinople:—

(1) Bolshevik pressure which would disapprove of any understanding with Constantinople under Allied Control.

(2) Should the Anatolian delegates pass through Constantinople, their attitude would have to be defined to the Sultan, who was regarded with disfavour at Angora, and who considered that the subsequent raising of such a question might prejudice their Islamic position.

10. On February 19th, MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha gave certain explanations concerning Nationalist policy in the Great National Assembly. In the course of his speech MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha quoted a telegram from BEKIR SAMI Bey which had been received as a result of a congress of the two Turkish delegations in ROME, which had recommended the putting forward of the Turkish claims in a moderate form.

11. MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha stated that in principle he was not opposed to this point of view, as if no favourable result was obtained by moderate terms of speech, freedom of action still remained as in the past. He went on to say that BEKIR SAMI Bey had had an interview with Count

SFORZA, whose opinion with regard to the Turkish claims, in the case of Smyrna and Thrace, was that the Powers would propose an International enquiry. This should not be rejected but accepted on condition that it was carried out in an impartial manner.

12. The Angora Government decided to send BEKIR SAMI Bey the following telegram:—

> "The Government of the Nation's representatives, appreciating the legitimacy and excuse for the Anatolian delegates being invited to the LONDON Conference through the intermediary of the CONSTANTINOPLE Government, has decided to authorise the immediate departure of the delegation to LONDON. The delegation will consider as documentary the statements made on this matter by COUNT SFORZA. If, in conformity with the instructions given on your departure from here, you come into contact with the CONSTANTINOPLE delegation and assure unity in the principal points of defence you are presenting, it will be a matter of lively satisfaction to us. In this matter, however, you must not overstep the limits of the instructions given you. Nor must forget that the delegation of which you are president has alone the right of speaking in the name of the Turkish nation and if need be you should confirm this in the presence of the Conference".

13. "As to the other eventualities envisaged by Count SFORZA as likely to be proposed by the Conference:—

(i) The Great National Assembly, being convinced of the overwhelming Turkish and Moslem majority within the national boundaries which it claims, will not, oppose, if the Entente Powers think it necessary, an impartial international enquiry being held in the contested portions of these frontiers. For this purpose it will be necessary, however, to form an enquiry commission at which delegates of neutral states will be present who are not suspected of any partiality and who have not taken part in the general war.

(ii) The foreign occupation and administration of Turkish vilayets in dispute whose ethnographical situation is to be examined, must be suppressed before the entry of the Enquiry Commissions into office. The enquiry will take place under the direction of a militia force formed under the surveillance of an international commission of a proportional number of troops in accordance with the various nationalities and of a foreign force.

(iii) You may give assurances that in the event of these contested regions being freed from foreign occupation, the army of the Great National Assembly will remain in its present position until the Enquiry Commission

arrives at its decision and will await the result of the Great Powers' deliberations before launching any offensive in these regions.

(iv) In case of the present occupations being maintained as accomplished facts, the Great National Assembly regrets that it will be unable to accept the justice and validity of such an Enquiry Commission.

(v) The terms of the instructions given you over and above the preceding retain their validity".

14. The impression made by the Turkish representatives on the Allies at the Conference was regarded as excellent by themselves, and public opinion in England was regarded as becoming pro-Turk. BEKIR SAMI Bey telegraphed to ANGORA on 26th February that BRIAND and SFORZA had informed him that the situation was in favour of the Turks, and that he had accepted the appointment of an international commission to investigate the conditions in Smyrna and Thrace.

15. MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha forwarded the following instructions to BEKIR SAMI Bey on 28th February 1921:

(1) Once the Principles of the peace to be concluded absolutely define and guarantee our national aspirations, the title of the Treaty has no importance.

(2) This title can only be accepted after the definition of acceptable principles.

(3) The activity of the Commission of Investigation in Smyrna and Thrace only be considered on condition that these places are previously evacuated by Greek military and civil administration.

16. In another telegram of 26th February, BEKIR SAMI Bey stated that England was beginning to realise that the benefits that she had expected from the Greeks could not be realised and that statesmen like CHURCHILL and Lord DERBY were inclined to renew Palmerston's policy. BEKIR SAMI Bey points out to MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha in this despatch that it would be possible to conclude a firm and lasting agreement with England which would secure a peaceful era for Turkey, guaranteeing the progress and happiness of the nation by trying to obtain England's consent to the nominal preservation of the Treaty of Sèvres and to the modification of its contents in accordance with Turkish desires.

17. The answer which BEKIR SAMI Bey received from ANGORA on Ist March, however, showed that the Nationalists were by no means inclined to agree with his hopeful views, as the following extracts from the telegram in question will show:

(1) Our principles re the economical and financial questions are unalterable.

(2) Your approval in principle of the proposal to examine the question of the majority of the populations of Thrace and Smyrna is irreconcilable with our conviction and insistence that such action is unnecessary.

(3) You should take care not to be deceived by giving too much credit to England's amour propre, for we do not approve of your desire to grant some nominal privileges to the English for securing peace.

18. In connection with this attitude, it is of interest to note the attitude taken up by MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha with regard to the agreement drafted by M. BRIAND and BEKIR SAMI Bey at London in March 1921. In a telegram referring to this agreement sent on 16th March 1921 to BEKIR SAMI Bey, the following principles appear, which in his mind are presumably equally applicable to each of the Allies:

"The release of the prisoners of war and of the persons detained on account of the hostilities is natural. It is imperative that our own laws be enforced in the case of the civil offenders in the territories which will be evacuated".

"According to International Law an indefinite period can only be applied in the case of an Armistice. There is no precedent of any nation ever having fixed a time-limit to a peace treaty putting an end to hostilities. No prisoners of war nor detained persons, etc., could be returned if such time-limit were enforced".

"In order that a State be able to exercise its means of securing order and peace and to make use of its gendarmerie it must enjoy independence and sovereignty".

"As space will be opened ipso facto after the French forces withdraw there is no necessity for our own troops to withdraw. We can only agree to occupying these territories a day or two after they are evacuated".

"An amnesty is quite natural but the retention of the present Staff would mean the retention of the officials appointed by the French Government and therefore the continuation of French administration. The retention of these officials depends on the .... We cannot, be it for a short time, afford to entrust the fate of our nation to traitors for the sake of saving appearances".

"As this Article speaks of "the protection of racial minorities" instead of saying the "rights of the minorities", and as there are no minorities there worth mentioning save the Armenians, its object can only be to retain in the nature of a political (gang) the tens of thousands of Armenians whom the French have been collecting from here and there since the Armistice with the object of increasing the Armenian population of that region. It is, therefore, objectionable. As for equality of rights and service these have been settled by our internal laws".

"This Article is rejected inasmuch as it means the revival with all their tragedies of the old political relations which have hitherto left the nation's finances in a state of poverty. The object of the French in securing rights of priority as far as the Vilayets of Mamuret-el-Aziz, Diarbekir and Sivas is simply and solely to settle down in a zone of influence which is their objective. To accept this Article would be to accept the Treaty of Sèvres which contains a similar clause re zones of influence".

19. On 21st March Bekir Sami, in a telegram to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, which explains his mentality while drafting the Franco-Turkish agreement, says:

"That part of the agreement which deals with the mixed Gendarmerie is one of the clauses we shall change in two months' short space of time in such a manner as we may deem suitable and proper *once we get hold of the administration*".

20. The decisions of the London Conference were made known and it was realised that it had failed to find a solution to the situation in the Near East. In Nationalist circles in Constantinople it was stated that in the event of the Angora Government accepting the Allied proposals, a revolution in Anatolia was inevitable, and it was even stated that measures had already been taken in this connection.

21. The immediate results appear to have been to increase the anti-British feeling in Anatolia, and to decide the Angora Government to turn to Russia for help. According to Turkish opinion, the considerations which made it difficult for Turkey to rely on Great Britain were the loss of faith in British policy and prestige, this being mainly due to the following reasons:

(1) That the British, after disarming the Turkish army, let the Greeks loose at Smyrna in 1919.
(2) The atrocities committed by Greek troops under British command, which the British authorities appeared to wink at.
(3) That the concessions made at the London Conference are of little value as they do not remove the roots of the evil, which are the Greek military occupation of Smyrna and the presence of Greek troops within a few miles of Constantinople.

Period (c).

22. The preparation for a fresh Greek offensive merely accentuated this feeling, as England was stated in propaganda to be secretly assisting Greece. During the offensive which commenced on March 23rd, the presence of British officers with the various Greek Headquarters was represented in the Nationalist Press as the taking of an active part by Great Britain in the offensive. An official denial was published in the Constan-

tinople Press by the British Command and in official Greek communiqués, but the tone of the inspired Anatolian Press shows no belief in genuine British neutrality. The failure of the Greek offensive was regarded as a further blow to British policy.

23. At a meeting with certain members of the Nationalist Committee in Constantinople on April 14th, the following opinions were expressed:

"The sole reason why the London Conference failed to discover a solution for the Oriental programme was the hostility of the British towards the Turks".

"The Anatolian delegates were convinced that the Greeks would have tried to come to terms but that they were surreptitiously urged to continue hostilities by Lloyd George".

"The Nationalists believe that the British wish Turkey to remain in a state of weakness and disorganisation, as a strong and independent Turkey would have great influence over Moslem countries and would create difficulties for the British".

"It is believed that though the British maintain an appearance of complete agreement with France and Italy, in reality they are making every effort to persuade their Allies to change their point of view to Turkey, and have promised secretly to assist the Greeks".

24. During this interview, it was also stated that Count Sforza had informed Bekir Sami Bey that the successes obtained by the Turks in Anatolia would have a great effect upon the political situation; Italy was convinced that Greece was directly responsible for the renewal of hostilities, but that certain Powers for reasons of self-interest were displaying such sympathy towards Greece that they would take certain steps to prevent the Nationalists from profiting by their victory.

25. During the course of an audience with the Sultan on April 15th, Tewfik Pasha gave detailed explanations regarding the negotiations at the London Conference, in the course of which he said that the Powers attached great importance to a reconciliation between Constantinople and Angora and brought all their influence to bear to this end upon both Delegations, not only in London but also in Paris and Rome. The Italian Government had made special efforts to this end. In the course of an interview with Tewfik Pasha Count Sforza stated that he realised it was impossible for the Angora Administration, which practically dominated the situation, to be transferred under present circumstances to Constantinople, and to submit to the orders of the Central Government. On the other hand he criticised the non-compromising attitude of the Angora Administration towards the Sultan and the Imperial Government, and concluded by urging that it was indispensable to find some middle way to reconciling even provisionally the two conflicting points of view.

26. The extremist party of the Angora Government, led by AHMED MUKHTAR Bey and REMZI Pasha, has gained power and influence in comparison with *the moderate party led by* MUSTAFA KEMAL *Pasha* and BEKIR SAMI Bey. The result of this is an increase of hostility to Great Britain, who is now regarded as the sole stumbling block amongst the Entente Powers to Turkish national aspirations, and nothing at the present date can convince the Turk of Great Britain's neutrality with regard to the Greek operations in Anatolia.

27. It should be noted that the extremist party includes most of the prominent Unionists and representatives of the Salonica Jewish interests, who have succeeded in acquiring considerable influence in Anatolia during the last twelve months. It is this party that is mainly responsible for the intensive development of the propaganda against Great Britain and latterly against the Sultan. The only redeeming features in the situation appear to be that the Nationalists are not unwilling to exploit British capital and that they appear to avoid any of the subterfuges with Great Britain which they have employed with France and Italy. They at least pay Great Britain the compliment of treating her as an open and their most important enemy.

F.O. 371/6515.

No. 128

Lord Hardinge to Earl Curzon.

PARIS, *May* 28, *1921.*
(Received May 30).

No. 1573.
My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith an extract from the "Echo de Paris" giving the conditions imposed by the Angora Government before ratifying the Franco-Turkish Treaty concluded last March.

I enquired to-day of M. Berthelot whether the information was correct, and he stated that practically it was so. He added that the extremists at Angora appeared to have gained the upper hand, and consequently the French Government intend to do nothing further for the time being.

It was interesting to note the change in the views of the French Government, since he expressed his ardent hope that the Greeks would obtain a great victory over the Turks in the Smyrna region.

I have, &c.,

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.

F.O. 406/46, *p.* 61 - 62, *No.* 46

Enclosure in No. 128

Exract from the "Echo de Paris", May 27, 1921.

Les Conditions du Gouvernement d'Angora.

Aucune Négociation ne peut être engagée sur de pareilles Bases.

VOICI les conditions auxquelles le Guovernement d'Angora subordonne la ratification du Traité franco-turc conclu au mois de mars dernier:

1. Les hostilités pourront être reprises à tout moment: suppression du préavis d'un mois stipulé à Londres;

2. L'échange des prisonniers ne sera pas immédiat;

3. Pas de désarmement de la population;

4. L'évacuation par les troupes françaises des territoires attribués à la Turquie s'accomplira, suivant les régions, dans un délai de quinze jours et de huit jours, au lieu de deux mois et de un mois;

5. Il n'y aura que dix-huit jours d'intervalle entre le départ des troupes françaises et l'arrivée des troupes turques;

6. L'amnistie ne sera proclamée qu'à l'arrivée des troupes turques (c'est dire que pendant l'intervalle de quarante-huit heures toutes les représailles seront possibles);

7. Aucune communication n'est assurée entre Ourfa et Alexandrette;

8. Aucune garantie de sécurité n'est accordée aux populations;

9. Aucune garantie n'est accordée aux écoles françaises;

10. La France n'aura pas à intervenir dans l'organisation de la police en Cilicie;

11. Suppression de la zone économique attribuée à la France. Les avantages accordés à la France seront énumérés dans une lettre;

12. Aucune zone d'occupation intermédiaire n'existera entre la frontière turque et la Syrie;

13. Modification de frontière faisant entrer toute la ligne de Bagdad en territoire turc et mettant la limite turque à une portée de canon d'Alexandrette.

Le Gouvernement français n'accepte pas de négocier sur de pareilles bases, et Munir Bey, qui est venu apporter à Adana les propositions du Gouvernement d'Angora, en sera pour son voyage.

F.O. 406/46, p. 61-62, No. 46.

No. 129

Memorandum by Sir E. Crowe on the Hostilities between Turks and Greeks

FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 30, 1921.*

The Secretary of State for War in certain papers[1] circulated to the cabinet has called attention to the pressing dangers to which the conflict between Greece and the Angora Turks exposes the allied position at Constantinople. The dangers are described as so grave that the immediate withdrawal of all British troops from the Dardanelles as well as from the Bosphorus are advocated as the only alternative to a military disaster.

Although it is recognized in these papers that such a withdrawal would have an adverse effect on our political and commercial interests in the Middle East, and would mean a 'loss of prestige' and a 'blow to our trade', the effect of stating the case merely as a military problem obscures the magnitude of the issue involved, which is primarily political.

The Turk reestablished, as a result of military victory on his part, and the flight of the allies, means the loss of practically the whole fruits of our victorious campaign in which Turkey was completely defeated. The political consequences of such a consummation can hardly be overestimated.

Assuming, with our military authorities, the total collapse of Greece, and the disappearance of any forcible opposition to the Angora government, little short of the complete restoration of the Turkish Empire as it stood before the war must be reckoned with. We should have a Sultan with fully reestablished authority at Constantinople, commanding the Straits as before, his Christian subjects returning to the old regime of oppression and massacre, Turkish sovereignty restored in Western as well as Eastern Thrace. This would very soon be followed by the revival of some kind of connection with the Arabs, a perpetual threat to our position in Mesopotamia, in Palestine, and probably in Egypt. A reconstituted great Turkey, run after by France, Italy, and Germany, as it certainly would be, would intensify the pan-Islamic movement, which has for its object the destruction of our Indian Empire, and Constantinople would become again the centre of all anti-British intrigues all over the world. The present alliance between Angora and Moscow may not last. The elements of permancy [*sic*] are

[1] These papers, circulated prior to a meeting of the Cabinet on the morning of May 31, consisted of a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War, covering a Note by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and appreciations by the General Staff and by General Harington (who was in attendance) in regard to the military situation at Constantinople (C. P. 2981), and of a Memorandum, also by the Secretary of State for War, covering a Note by General Harington in regard to the organization of a Turkish gendarmerie for the Ismid Peninsula (C. P. 2991).

certainly lacking. But for the moment, and probably for some years to come, we must reckon with it as a fact. This alliance is kept alive by the common desire to bring down our Indian Empire. With the Russians overrunning Persia— which is by no means impossible—and having a footing in Afghanistan, and with a reconstituted strong Turkey holding Constantinople and the Straits, the danger to India is formidable.

This is the picture which rises to the mind when looking carefully at the War Office proposal modestly posing as the withdrawal of a few British battalions from an exposed position.

A measure fraught with consequences so subversive of all that our policy has hitherto aimed at, invites the most careful deliberation before it is agreed to. Should it, on examination, prove to be inevitable, it may at least be possible to take other action which would help us to counterbalance or migitate, if not avoid, some of the evil effects of an unconditional evacuation. In order to see more clearly what action is open to us, thought should be given to a number of points.

I. As regards the military situation:

A. Is a Greek collapse in present circumstances really inevitable, and must such collapse necessarily occur both at Smyrna and on the Ismid front? The difficulty in which the Greek forces find themselves must have been largely due *(a)* to the withdrawal of allied support, both financial and in respect of the supply of material, and *(b)* to the introduction of incompetent officers in the place of some of the more capable Venizelists. *Prima facie*, neither of these defects are [*sic*] entirely irremediable. The allies might facilitate, if not afford, financial assistance, and encourage, instead of stopping, the supply of arms, ammunition, and stores. Again, under the shadow of a probable total eclipse, King Constantine might either abdicate, or recall Venizelos, or at least allow the return of Venizelist officers to influential positions.

Our military authorities should be asked to give an opinion as to how the military situation would be affected if either or both those contingencies were realized.

B. Whether in connection with such remedial measures, or apart from them, a question of importance arises as regards the time which it would take the Turks to drive the Greeks from their positions in Anatolia.

C. Supposing the Greeks rallied with sufficient energy to make it probable that they could, by concentrating on Smyrna, succeed in holding it, what would be the chances of a Turkish attack on the allies at Constantinople? How long would it take for such an attack to mature? Or, again, if the Greeks were to abandon Smyrna, but would concentrate their forces to withstand any attack on Eastern Thrace, what time would

be at their, and possibly their allied friends' disposal, for organizing such defences? The importance of the time element lies in the possibility of giving scope to diplomatic action to intervene. This brings us to the consideration of

II. The political situation.

1. The central fact is the internal position of the Greek government and dynasty. There is some evidence that the extreme danger to which the country is exposed, is beginning to be realized, but whether, as one of the War Office papers suggests, the Greeks are actually contemplating a retirement from Anatolia altogether and the definite abandonment of Smyrna, must remain doubtful. It would be worth while to make an effort to secure reliable information on this point. It is conceivable that such a policy of scuttle would be impossible for King Constantine but that he might abdicate or otherwise allow Venizelos to become responsible for the national sacrifice. These are matters very difficult to ascertain. It may become a question of consulting Venizelos himself, or possibly of approaching King Constantine.

2. It should not be difficult, on the assumption that the view taken of the general situation by our military authorities is correct, to bring it home to the Greeks that unless they consent to some sacrifice, the withdrawal of the allied forces from Constantinople (which would then, owing to the menace from Angora, become inevitable) would expose them to the danger of being driven not only out of Smyrna but out of Thrace. If in these circumstances they see the wisdom of cutting off a limb in order to save the rest of the body, they might find help to achieve this by turning to Great Britain who has been their real friend during the whole course of their modern history.

3. The crux of the matter, supposing the situation to have developed so far, will be to devise the means by which, Smyrna being given up, we could hope to save Thrace for Greece and keep the Turks at Constantinople and in the Straits within bounds. This can presumably be hoped for only if we succeed in so strengthening the hands of Greece as to make Mustapha Kemal content to have recovered Smyrna and forego further territorial ambitions westward. It is a point to be carefully probed. The possibility of bringing Greek troops (or gendarmerie) into Constantinople and the zone of the Straits might have to be considered.

4. If the Greeks, refusing to look facts in the face, and, spurning help on the only condition on which they are likely to obtain it, land themselves in complete disaster, the fate of the Christians in Anatolia and especially in Smyrna will not be enviable. If, on the other hand, Great Britain intervenes to save what can be saved, she cannot rest without obtaining some guarantees from the Turks in the shape of some sort of special regime at Smyrna, however modest.

5. At the same time it will probably become necessary to devise fresh arrangements for the control of the *Straits*. With the delivery of Anatolia from Greeks, French, & Italians, the Angora government will dominate the Sultan and Constantinople. They will chafe at the narrow circuit of the Chatalja lines, and will not be tolerant of outside control of the Marmora. It is difficult to see how the allies, disposing of no force, can hope to keep in their hands the keys to the Straits. All the more important will it be to *strengthen the Greek position on the Thracian shore as much as possible. From this* point of view alone, *it would be unwise to allow any extension of Turkey in Europe beyond the Chatalja line.* No other line offers any advantages. Enos-Midia is a shibboleth, geographically it is unpractical. Besides, any change in that direction would almost certainly bring the Bulgarians into the arena, and [?unroll] the whole Balkan problem once more, which the allies have every interest not to raise afresh

The foregoing considerations tend to the conclusion that the first step towards a new *orientation of policy* is to *clear up the position of Greece.* To this end we must get into touch with the political factors which actually control Greece. We must ascertain what is behind the Greek government, how far they can, and are minded to, go in the direction of curtailing the national ambitions; and we must know the mind of King Constantine. The question is how to get at the real facts. It is doubtful whether our minister at Athens, placed as he is in official opposition to the Greek king and government, is in the best position to help us. The Greek Chargé d'Affaires here is unreliable. To approach Venizelos might have the effect of closing all avenues to the knowledge we seek. Admiral Mark Kerr [2] is not a man whom it is safe to trust. If I may throw out a suggestion which I owe to Sir W. Tyrrell it is that we might make use of Colonel Repington. We all know his faults and shortcomings. But no one doubts his ability or his genuine desire to help Greece. He has the ear of King Constantine, the Greek government consider him their friend. His connection with the Daily Telegraph would enable us to employ him without committing ourselves outwardly. I have little doubt that Lord Burnham [3] would co-operate. We could even trust Lord Burnham to obtain for us the benefit of Col. Repington's services without the latter knowing who[m] he is really working for.

Failing this channel, I am afraid we must fall back upon Lord Granville. Given clear and precise instructions, he could no doubt do much to obtain the desired information, but it will not be easy for him, and he may possibly fail, not necessarily by his own fault.

[2] An admirer of King Constantine: he had gone to Greece in October 1913 as Head of the British Naval Mission.

[3] Owner of the *Daily Telegraph.* Lord Burnham was President of the Empire Press Union and Chairman of the Newspaper Conference since 1914.

The next step must depend on what the Greek attitude is. If Greece is reasonable over Smyrna, we ought seriously to examine into ways and means to assist her in holding Thrace, and to enlist her co-operation in maintaining the freedom of the Straits. If with a Greek concentration in the European theatre an attack on Constantinople from the Anatolian Turks can be resisted, we ought to reconsider the question of withdrawing the British troops. The interests involved in not allowing the old Turkish Empire to be set up again, on a stronger basis than before, are so serious that it may be found as vital to the British Empire to maintain our forces at Constantinople as to employ them in Ireland.

In fact, so important does the Constantinople position appear that the question cannot be altogether evaded whether, even in the case of Greece obstinately refusing to make any concessions at Smyrna or to accept advice from Great Britain, we must not seek means to prevent Angora from swallowing Constantinople and capturing the Straits.

This search for means naturally suggests the question of what assistance we might hope to get in our policy from our allies. Italy may be ruled out. But what about France? It is to be feared that France may look with equanimity if not with satisfaction on the complete restoration of the Turkish Empire. Provided French politicians can continue to dip their fingers into the Turkish till, they are blind enough to contemplate without much misgiving the breaking up of our Indian empire, and the loss of Egypt. They are already embarking on a policy of Turkification in Syria and would not scruple to promote the return of some form of Turkish overlordship over Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Arabia. It is doubtful whether they would seriously bestir themselves in the cause of the freedom of the Straits. If they could pose as the friends of Turkey, as against Englands' hostility, they would hope, by such an attitude, and by financial influences which they masterfully direct, to remain in security themselves as regard pan-Islamic activities and enhance their own prestige in the Mahometan world at our expense.

It may perhaps be doubted whether our own support of the Greeks alone would suffice to maintain the position at Constantinople. French co-operation would become indispensable from the moment that we were left to face the Constantinople problem without even the Greeks acting in complete harmony with us. I see no way of obtaining French co-operation except at a price. If we want France to stand by us and support our policy in the East, I am afraid we must bargain and pay.

We come back to the general question of Anglo-French relations. I believe France would pay a high price for an alliance by which we gave security against a German attack on the *Rhine*. This question of Constantinople seems to call for a policy of close cooperation between the two

countries in the East, which can probably not be secured in any other way[4].

E. A. C.

D.B.F.P., Ist series, vol. XVII, p. 207-211, No. 201.

No. 130

Conclusions of a Meeting of The British Cabinet Held at 10, Downing Street, London, S. W., on Tuesday, 31st May, 1921 at 11,30 a. m.

Secret.

PRESENT:

THE PRIME MINISTER (IN THE CHAIR).

The Right Hon. A. Chamberlain, M. P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. E. Shortt, K. C., M. P., Secretary of State for Home Affairs.

The Right Hon. W. S. Churchill, M. P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. Sir L. Worthington-Evans, Bart., M. P., Secretary of State for War.

The Right Hon. S. Baldwin, M. P., President of the Board of Trade.

The Right Hon. H. A. L. Fisher, M. P., President of the Board of Education.

The Right Hon. Sir Eric Geddes, G. C. B., G. B. E., M. P., Minister of Transport.

The Right Hon. Sir Robert Horne, G. B. E., K. C., M. P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The Right Hon. The Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K. G., G. C. S. I., G. C. I. E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. E. S. Montagu, M. P., Secretary of State for India.

[4] This Memorandum was not initialled by Lord Curzon, but at the Cabinet meeting of May 31 he obviously used it as a brief. Mr. Churchill, Secreatry of State for the Colonies, supported Lord Curzon's view that withdrawal from Comstantinople would have dangerous reactions upon the British position in Mesopotamia and Palestine unless it were carried out as part of a general peace with Turkey. After prolonged discussions, the Cabinet agreed that the Staffs of the Admiralty, War Office, and Air Ministry, in concert, should draw up a Report to the Cabinet on the possibility of holding a position which would enable the Allies to secure the passage of the Dardanelles (thereby enabling them to exercise naval pressure at Constantinople), and on the minimum forces with which such a position could be maintained against Turkish attack. The Cabinet particularly desired to be informed whether the passage of the Straits by armoured ships could be safeguarded by holding a position on the European side of the Straits only.

The Right Hon. Lord Lee of Fareham, G. B. E., K. C. B., First Lord of the Admiralty.

The Right Hon. Sir Alfred Mend, Bart., M. P., Minister of Health.

The Right Hon. T. J. Macnamara, M. P., Minister of Labour.

The Right Hon. C. Addison, M. P.

The Right Hon. Sir Hamar Greenwood, Bart., K. C., M. P., Chief Secretary for Ireland.

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:—

Field - Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Bart., G. C. B., D. S. O., Chief of the Imperial General Staff. (For Conclusion 1).

Lt. General Sir C. H. Harington, K. C. B., D. S. O., General Officer Commanding - in - Chief British Army in Constantinople. (For Conclusion 1).

Sir Edward Grigg, K. C. M. G., C. V. O.

Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, G. C. B .... Secretary.

Mr. Thomas Jones .... Principal Assistant Secretary

Turkey. The military situationan at Constantinople

(1) With reference to Cabinet 17 (21), Conclusion 5, the Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War, covering a Note by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff with appreciations by the General Staff and by General Sir C. H. Harington in regard to the Military Situation in Constantinople (Paper O. P.—2931), as well as a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War covering a Note by General Harington in regard to the organisation of a Turkish gendarmerie for the Ismid Peninsula (Paper C. P.—2991).

General Harington made a statement in amplification of his two Memoranda.

The general effect of the above Memoranda and of General Harington's statement was that the position of the Greek Army in Asia Minor had so far deteriorated, and that of Mustapha Kemal had so far improved, that there was every prospect of the Greeks being driven back on Smyrna. Already the Greek Division now on the Ismid Peninsula was about to be withdrawn. If events took this course the Allied position at Constantinople would become uncovered, and, in the absence of strong reinforcements, they would be liable to defeat by Mustapha Kemal. The military authorities were unanimous that on military grounds the retention of our small force without hope of reinforcements was unsound and dangerous.

General Harington further explained that the weakness of the situation was increased by the refusal of the Allies to agree to a unified Command

under the British General Officer Commanding - in - Chief in the Constantinople area, in spite of the repeated efforts of the British Government.

General Harington also explained the difficult position he was placed in by the refusal of the French and Italian Governments to support their High Commissioners in their approval of the organisation of a Turkish gendarmerie under the instruction of a few British officers in the Ismid Peninsula.

In reply to various questions, General Harington explained the difficulties, in the event of a withdrawal from Constantinople, of holding a position to cover the Dardanelles, which would necessitate the occupation of both sides of the Straits and would require a considerable force. If such a policy were adopted the Allies could, in his opinion, scarcely do less than leave a nucleus of officers and men to organise an effective Turkish gendarmerie in Constantinople.

The Cabinet then considered the bearing on the problem of Constantinople of information of the concentration of Turkish Divisions in the Diabekr region, to the north of Mesopotamia (Paper C. P.—2992).

Having listened to a statement of the dangers of the position at Constantinople from a military point of view, the Cabinet then heard from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the objections, from a political point of view, to a policy of withdrawal, which, in his view, would be far-reaching and calamitous, involving the sacrifice of all the results of the Allied victory over Turkey. Whether Mustapha Kemal dealt first with Smyrna or Constantinople, he would before long be in control of the latter city if the Allies withdrew. Once he had driven the Greeks out of Smyrna he would have Thrace at his mercy. Thereafter would revive the old habit of massacre of Christians and minorities throughout Asia Minor. Mustapha Kemal, victorious and bitterly hostile, would have achieved a commanding position from he could not be ejected. Meanwhile, the French were currying favour with which the Turks by installing Turkish officials throughout Syria, and after the occupation of Constantinople by Mustapha Kemal it was not unlikely that the French and the Italians would be found at his side. In addition, there was increasing evidence of a connection between Mustapha Kemal and the Bolsheviks. These developments had very dangerous potentialities for the British position in the East. Lord Curzon ended by outlining a course of policy for meeting this situation.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies pointed out the dangerous reactions which a withdrawal from Constantinople would have on our position in Mesopotamia and Palestine unless it were carried out as part of a general peace with Turkey.

The Secretary of State for India urged that assuming Constantinople was to be evacuated, as had always been the Allied intention, it was most

desirable and to attempt to reach a peaceful agreement by means, not of a partial and niggling modification of the Treaty of Sèvres, but by means of a substantial modification which would make it acceptable and really operative.

After a further prolonged discussion, in the course of which the Prime Minister reviewed the arguments which had been advanced and the various proposals which had been made, the Cabinet agreed—

(a) To request the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in consultation with the Secretary to the Cabinet, to draft a summary of Conclusions for consideration at a further meeting of the Cabinet:

(b) That the Staffs of the Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry, in concert, should draw up a Report to the Cabinet on the possibility of holding a position which would enable the Allies to secure the passage of the Dardanelles (thereby enabling them to exercise naval pressure at Constantinople), and on the minimum forces with which such a position could be maintained against a Turkish attack. The Cabinet particularly desired a Report as to whether the passage of the Straits by armoured ships could be safeguarded by holding a position on the European side of the Straits only.

F.O. 371/6515 — CABINET 44 (21).

No. 131

Lord Granville (Athens) to Earl Curzon.

ATHENS, *June 3, 1921, 2 p.m.*
(Received June 4, 2.20 p.m.)

No. 298.
Telegraphic,

Constantinople telegrams 384 and 387.

I entirely agree with Mr. Rattigan and French High Commissioner that policy of 'wait and see' is very dangerous, and that allied Governments, and especially His Majesty's Government, should adopt a definite policy without delay. If we are to favour one side or other the arguments in favour of Greece appear to me infinitely the stronger; only argument of real weight in favour of Kemal is bad effect which our support of Greece would no doubt have on our Moslem fellow - subjects throughout the world, and I fully realize how important that argument is. But a Kemalist victory would mean very much more than a settlement of the Smyrna question:

Angora Government has already shown itself intractable and unwilling to accept any moderate solution (see their treatment of French agreement), they are evidently becoming more intractable and if they succeed in driving Greeks into the sea, will it be possible to keep them out of Constantinople and prevent them conquering Thrace? On the other hand if we support Greece and enable her to achieve a victory, we have far more means of exerting pressure on her than on Kemal, and it should not be difficult to insist on her accepting a moderate settlement, particularly as there is a considerable body of opinion in Greece which considers that in going to Asia Minor she bit off more than she can chew. If Kemal should win, is there any hope of securing any sort of protection for Christian populations? And would it not be a terrible blow to our prestige to leave those populations to their fate after all our declarations that Christian populations, once freed, can never be replaced under Turkish domination?

I am not competent to express an opinion on military matters, but I am not much impressed by low estimate of Greek fighting capacity expressed by French, which is certainly in any case prejudiced: during the last four years I have constantly heard such criticisms and sneers, but as a matter of fact I understand that Greeks have almost invariably acquitted themselves well; even the failure the other day at Eskishehr was, I believe, solely due to High Command, and I understand most of the troops at least behaved admirably. Nevertheless it is certain that if we maintain our strict neutrality, which does actually hurt the Greeks far more than the Turks, even if Greeks obtain some measure of success in forthcoming offensive, it cannot possibly last, and sooner or later they are bound to collapse from want of men, want of material, and, most of all, want of money.

Regarding the question from purely selfish British point of view it seems clear from all Constantinople reports that Kemalists are irreconcilably hostile to us, and that nothing we can do now will change that hostility; on the other hand our prestige and popularity in Greece are already infinitely higher than those of any other Power, even now when Government is in hands of men who were anyhow, whatever they may be now, strongly pro-German; we are hardly blamed at all for our attitude hitherto, as it is considered that we have been obliged to adopt it in order to maintain our alliance with France, the importance of which to us is quite understood, and even if France joins us in now supporting Greece we shall get the entire credit of having persuaded or forced her to do so, and our position here will be unassailable for many years to come.

Will it not lessen bad effect on Moslems of the Empire if we declare that we insist on a just and reasonable settlement, and that one of our objects at least is, as Mr. Rattigan suggests, to re-establish authority of Caliph, the legitimate ruler of Turkey?

Another objection to supporting Greece is of course that Greek victory will consolidate King Constantine's position and perhaps render him a permanency, but, as I have ventured to argue before, is his personality, however objectionable to us and however perfidious, sufficiently important to make us change our whole Near Eastern policy and go back on our many declarations? Many Veniselists maintain that recognition of Constantine, which I suppose must ensue from our support of Greeks, would mean annihilation of his political adversaries; personally I doubt this, and I presume we could impose conditions for recognition, one of which would be protection of those adversaries. I also believe that though victory in Asia Minor would render his position unassailable for the moment, if he cannot get a more efficient Government than the present one, his accession of strength would not be permanent.

With regard to ante-penultimate paragraph of Mr. Rattigan's telegram No. 384, Military Attaché* considers one of the chief Greek needs is for specialists such as veterinary officers, horse - masters, shoeing - smiths, ordnance artificers, and mechanics. Aeroplanes with their pilots and observers would certainly be most useful and so would probably be staff officers, but these should be nominally liaison officers, so as not to wound Greek (and French) susceptibilities. Is not the country too mountainous and difficult for tanks? A very valuable form of assistance would be use of British navy especially for blockading purposes; I think Greek Government would probably jump at a suggestion in present circumstances to put Greek fleet under our command.

Of course one of the most important forms of assistance would be financial.

Repeated to Constantinople.

D.B.F.P., Ist. series, Vol. XVII, p. 216-217, No. 207.

No. 132

Lord Allenby (Cairo) to Earl Curzon.

5th June, 1921, 8.5 p.m.
(Received 6th June, 11.30. a.m.)

Telegraphic Decypher.
No. 385.
Secret.

I have received following information from a well-informed but not very well balanced Egyptian of good standing and friendly sentiments.

* Colonel E. S. Hoare Nairne.

A Frenchman moving in inner French circles here asked him whether he knew any prominent Egyptians who were Kemalists: was Prince Omar Toussoun for example? Informant replied that he did not know the Prince's sentiments but what was the reason of the question?

This elicited reply to the following effect:

General Gouraud when recently in Egypt instructed French cavalry officer called de CARDES (spelling uncertain) to discover Egyptians of note and with keen proclivities who would go to Kemal and act as unofficial mediators between Kemal and the French, object being to divert former's attention from Cilicia to Mesopotamia both (? group omitted) he is now threatening. He has three divisions (3rd, 5th and 6th) on the Cilician front and is sending Bolshevik forces against Mesopotamia. Informant added that above named officer has given money to Al Azhar ostensibly for charity and that he is likely to be appointed Military Attaché at Constantinople. Informant may meet him personally and I will report if I hear anything more.

Addressed to Foreign Office, sent to Bagdad and Constantinople.

F.O. 371/6575/E. 6452.

No. 133

Sir H. Lamb (Smyrna) to Earl Curzon.

7th June, 1921, 1.30 p.m.
(Received 8th June, 11.45 a.m.)

Telegraphic
No. 47.
Decypher

Military Attaché Athens arrived Smyrna June 4th and visited Sterghiades and Greek army headquarters.

Colonel Palles gave present strength of Greek army in Asia Minor as 160,000 which will be raised to 175,000 by bringing 12th division and details from Thrace. Eleven divisions including 12th and 11th which is to be moved from Ismid to Brussa group will be available for next offensive which will probably begin about three weeks hence.

Actual fighting strength of each division is 7,500 which with army and corps troops will give total fighting strength of 100,000. Total of nationalist forces on Greek front is believed to be about 60,000. Greek general staff consider two regiments sufficient to protect southern line of communication and one regiment for northern line.

Colonel Saryannis is confident of success of Greek attack if it is carried out before Kemal can obtain great (? increase of) supplies, munitions and

transport but he is anxious for the future. Greeks are putting all their resources into next battle which will practically exhaust their artillery ammunition reserve. Saryannis believes Greek Government will be then able to arrange for further supplies. His anxiety is more concerned with Kemal's power to refit than with Greek supply difficulties. Already Kemal's artillery is as strong as Greeks and has more ammunition to fire.

If Kemal continues to obtain supplies as quickly as he recently has he will be able to arm more men, to reorganize his army after defeat and thus to render Greek victory fruitless. Saryannis urged view that Asia Minor is now only the theatre of operations, that Kemal's base is Russia whence munitions are transported across the Black Sea to Sinope, Inebole and Samsun, and that *effective blockade of Black Sea ports is essential factor which will decide eventual success or failure of Greek effort.* He *thinks that most valuable military aid Greece could receive wolud be support and assistance in carrying out this blockade.*

Sterghiades, like Greek general staff, expressed confidence in Greek success in coming operations.

He regretted wholesale removal of capable senior officers who had served under M. Veniselos but said that he had personally satisfied himself that morale of troops is still high.

General Leonardopoulos has been superseded in command of 10th division by General (?Mis)melas.

Military Attaché and British military representative left for Ushak June 6th.

Sent to Foreign Office, repeated to Athens and Constantinople.

F.O. 371/6516.

No. 134

Report No. 255, Issued by the British Secret Intelligence Service, Constantinople Branch.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *8. 6. 1921.*

NATIONALIST POLICY TOWARDS GREAT BRITAIN: ATTITUDE OF CONSTANTINOPLE.

According to information from a very sure source a Ministerial council was held at Constantinople on June 2nd, consisting of the Grand Vizier, Ali Riza Pasha, Sefa Bey and Mustapha Arif Bey, for the purpose of discussing a telegram which had just been received from the Turkish representative in London, Mustapha Reshid Pasha. This telegram dealt with

the extremist policy of the Angora Administration, towards Great Britain in particular, and the grave consequences which might ensue therefrom. Mustapha Reshid Pasha laid emphasis on the possibility of British policy undergoing a further change to the great detriment of Turkey, and urged that pressure should be brought to bear upon the Angora Administration to change its attitude. After long deliberations it was decided that Sefa Bey should send a confidential communication to Mustapha Kemal Pasha, in the name of the Central Government, to the following effect:—

"According to information received from various sources, the Great National Assembly of Angora has recently decided to take certain measures against the Entente Powers and Great Britain in particular; for instance, ships flying the British flag are not allowed to enter ports under the control of the Nationalist Government; certain privileges accorded to British subjects have been abolished; British subjects who should have been released are still detained as prisoners of war; certain individuals who are either British subjects or British protégés have been arrested and punished. In order to deliver national territory from Hellenic occupation Anatolia has undertaken a gigantic struggle, and success depends not only upon a military victory but to an equal extent upon political friendships and support. One of the essential rules of diplomacy is that to succed in matters of primary importance concessions should be made in regard to matters of secondary importance. It is regretted that for some time, however, the extreme gravity of the situation has not been fully realised in Angora. The members of the Angora Government, as a result of their somewhat isolated position, are unable to understand completely the general and political situation and are unable to realise the full effect of the policy which is being pursued. This effect will become apparent sooner or later, and the Angora authorities are morally obliged to take into consideration the effect which their policy may produce in regard to their Turkish and Moslem compatriots who exist under different conditions. According to very certain information, received by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the British Government is not indiferent to the attitude observed by the Angora Administration and may have recourse to certain measures of reprisal. As the British Government is in official communication with the Sublime Porte only, these measures will affect in the first place the Sublime Porte, and the effect will be felt in the capital and in those parts of the country beyond the control of the Nationalist Government. As the British Government, like other Allied Powers, has officially proclaimed its integrity in the struggle which Anatolia is waging today, the Angora Assembly has no grounds for justifying the application of such exceptional measures, even if documentary proof had been obtained showing that the British Government had not maintained strict neutrality. The Angora Administration, instead of taking

such measures, should first of all have produced those proofs and then have made representations both to the British and other Allied Governments. The policy of the Angora Government, however, affords the British Government an excellent excuse, if it is indeed sympathetic towards the Hellenes, to recover its liberty of action and to abandon its neutrality. It is beyond discussion that if the British officially abandon their neutrality, that is to say, if they assist the Hellenes, not only would a heavy blow be dealt at the Government but the Hellenes would regain their liberty of action in the zones hitherto considered as neutral i.e. the neighbourhood of Constantinople and the shores of the Black Sea. The misfortunes that might follow such developments would be immeasurable. The Angora Government must not lose sight of the difficult situation that exists in Constantinople today, and the painful position of our co-religionists in the territories occupied by the Hellenes. The Imperial Government therefore, in the name of the supreme interests of the nation, appeals to the patriotic and humanitarian sentiments of the leaders of the Great National Assembly and the Angora Government, and begs them to withdraw at once all extreme and illogical measures of the nature indicated, which not only cannot serve any useful purpose, but are on the contrary of a nature to provoke most grave and regrettable consequences, the entire responsibility for which will rest with the Angora authorities".

The communication was despatched to Angora on June 4th.

The Political Stuation in Anatolia, Unionist Opposition.

Reference was made on page 7 of Summary No. 243 to the unsuccessful attempt by the Unionist group in Anatolia to secure a number of vacancies in the new Administration.

According to information from various reliable sources, the attempt was of a very determined nature and took Mustapha Kemal completely by surprise, in so far, in fact, that he was suddenly made to realise that the majority of the Assembly was against him. He, however, with characteristic energy, immediately set to work to form a new party and by bringing to bear all the pressure at his disposal succeeded in securing the adherence of about 170 deputies. Of this number, however, the Unionists succeeded in suborning 42, which left Mustapha Kemal with only 128 votes upon which he could rely. The total number of deputies being 280, Mustapha Kemal's party - "The National Defence" - was thus in a minority. In this extremity Mustapha Kemal turned to Kiazim Kara Bekir. He had, in the meanwhile, appointed Sherif Bey, Deputy for Adrianople, Vice-President of the new party, probably with the express object of utilising the latter's influence

with Kiazim Karabekir, for the Deputy and the Commander of the Eastern Army are firm friends. Sherif Bey acted as Mustapha Kemal's intermediary in the matter, with the ultimate result that the twenty or thirty deputies from the Eastern Provinces, who take their instructions from Kiazim Kara Bekir rallied to the support of Mustapha Kemal's party, which once again gave Mustapha Kemal a majority in the Chamber. The Unionists, however, have by no means abandoned their struggle and are doing everything in their power to gain the allegiance of these Eastern deputies.

As soon as Mustapha Kemal realised the danger threatening him from the Unionist group, he took immediate steps to prevent the entry into Anatolia of those Unionists who had been released from detention in Malta, and whose arrival in Angora was eagerly awaited by their sympathisers at that place. It has been ascertained in this connection that Jami Bey, the Nationalist representative in Rome, on his own initiative paid the travelling expenses of the released prisoners. At the same time a report was sent to Angora by the Nationalist committee in Constantinople to the effect that, before releasing them, the British had secured a promise from the internees that they should work for the downfall of the Nationalist Administration, and in the event of success to establish an Administration which would be favourable to British interests.

Reference was made on page 4 of summary No. 243 to the possibility of Mustapha Kemal endeavouring to dissolve the existing Assembly before the end of June. It is reported, however, that Mustapha Kemal would find it extremely difficult to carry out such a measure, for, according to the fundamental law on which the existence of the Great National Assembly is based, the Assembly cannot be dissolved until the definite conclusion of peace. The view is, however, held in Nationalist circles, that a provisional law will be submitted to the Assembly to permit the holding of new elections, and that, in the event of such a measure being rejected, Mustapha Kemal will dissolve the Assembly by force.

It is further reported that the situation has become more complicated by a political movement amongst some 140 officers on the Western front, belonging principally to the Headquarter Staffs at Kutahya and Domle Punar, and acting under the direction of a certain Lieutenant Colonel Geurujeli Hakka Bey. The object of their activities is to prevent, by every possible means, the return to power of the adherents of the Committee of Union and Progress. On the 12th May this group of officers sent a long memorandum to Mustapha Kemal, of which the following were the principal points:—

(1) The National Assembly and council, although invested with full power in connection with administrative matters, had no right

to modify fundamental statutes in any manner, or the form of the Government.

(2) Those who were attempting to bring about a change in the form of Government and in the fundamental statutes should be dismissed from office.

The memorandum concluded with a veiled threat to the effect that serious consequences would result in the event of any attempt being made to alter the constitution of the Anatolian Administration.

No direct reply was sent to this memorandum, but, on the 17th May, Fevzi Pasha addressed a confidential circular to Army Corps Commanders, in which, after pointing out that recent incidents in the Great National Assembly had been misinterpreted by a section of the army, which had forgotten that its military duties precluded interference in politics, insisted on the following points being explained to all ranks of the army in an unequivocal manner:—

(a) The Great National Assembly and the Government had never for a moment lost sight of the supreme object of ensuring the military, political and economic independence of the Turkish nation within its national limits. The manner in which the Supreme Council had been reorganised recently was the best proof of this statement.

(b) Both the Assembly and the Government were determined to act upon the resolutions taken at the Congresses of Erzeroum and Sivas, and would never permit any organisation to undermine the authority of the nation.

(c) Whilst it could not be denied that certain persons at Angora had at one time been more or less connected with the Committee of Union and Progress, in view of the fact that the nation had need of the efforts of all its loyal sons, it must impossible to refuse sincere offers of co-operations on the part of those whose participation in the crimes of the Committee had not been proved, and whose connection with the Committee had been no closer than that of the majority of the nation at that time. Moreover, both the Government and the Assembly had shown the greatest vigilance, and all who has been guilty of intrigues for personal purposes had been punished irrespective of whatever party or association to which they might have belonged.

The communication terminated with a treat to punish very severely all officers who interfered in matters that did not concern them.

As was stated on page 5 of Summary No. 243, Mustapha Kemal, by his espousal of extreme Nationalism, secured the support of the Extremists including a number of Unionists, whilst by his opposition to Bolshevism, he secured the confidence of the Moderate elements. It will be seen from

the above that the group of officers on the Western front were apparently unable to appreciate the niceties of the situation, for, judging from Fevzi Pasha's circular quoted above, it is evident that Mustapha Kemal cannot possibly get rid of all the Unionists in the Great National Assembly without distinction, since a number of them are included amongst those upon whom he relies for support. Informants in close touch with the situation are of the opinion, however, that Mustapha Kemal would oppose to the utmost the return to power of the former Unionist leaders, who would endeavor to relegate him to a secondary position. It is difficult to say at present what measures are being taken by the Unionists to attain their objects; but there can be no doubt that they will not remain inactive, and that, unless party differences are set aside as the result of some common danger, there is every possibility of serious developments occuring in Anatolia in the near future over the action of the Unionists. There is no doubt that the latter are actively supported by the Bolsheviks and that their power in Anatolia is being increased by the extensive infiltration of Bolsheviks agents. A moderate Unionist group supporting Mustapha Kemal undoubtedly exists in Anatolia, but its strength is a matter of conjecture.

The Nationalists And The Kurds.

According to information from a Nationalist source in Constantinople, two Kurdish Sheikhs were hanged at the beginning of May for alleged complicity in the Kurdish rising at Dersim. As a consequence of this action on the part of the Nationalist authorities, a number of other Kurdish Sheikhs sent a communication to Mustapha Kemal declaring that the two victims in question were innocent, and uttering a warning to the effect that the Angora Government itself would be alone responsible for the serious consequences which would ensue.

Mustapha Kemal submitted this communication to the Great National Assembly, and proposed that the 12th Army Corps should be utilised for the repression of any outbreak. After some discussion this proposal was adopted. Reinforcements were sent thereupon from Sivas, and a proclamation was published in various centres in the disturbed area, as follows:—

(1) The military operations which took place as a result of the unfortunate occurrences at Umranie had for their object the arrest and punishment of the instigators thereof. It is untrue that any decision was taken to adopt severe measures against the Kochkiri Tribe and others associated with it, who might have been forced or duped into participating in the above mentioned acts of brigandage.

(2) It has come to our knowledge that those intriguers who deceived the Kochkiri, the originators of the revolt at Umranie who led the population to disaster, and those who, for the sake of bribes, served our foreign

enemies, are disseminating lying information and publishing forged documents.

(3) It has also been found that the measures taken by the Government to eradicate intrigues and brigandage at Umranie have been represented as an attempt to extirpate the Kurds. In the name of the Government these cowardly and malicious allegations are hereby categorically denied, together with all absurd rumours tending to create dissention.

(4) The measures taken or about to be taken by the Government have no other aim than that of restoring tranquillity and security. The Hellenes who are acting as our executioners on behalf of the enemy powers have committed the vilest and most tragical atrocities against our people. The fact that Greeks of the same race and religion are dwelling peacefully as Ottoman subjects in our country, freely exercising their civic and religious rights, is a sufficient proof that the National Government is imbued with feelings of solicitude and respect for the Moslem population.

(5) It is hereby declared that all who publish and propagate statements concerning the acts of the Government and military operations, propagandists who attempt to sow disunion amongst the people, will be brought before the Court Martial and severely punished. All who have knowledge of any such acts and fail to inform the proper authorities will also be held responsible.

According to information from another source the Kurdish movement is still a source of considerable danger for the Nationalists, and it is stated that an infantry contingent and an artillery battalion from the Eastern Army refused to obey orders in connection with certain operations against the Kurds in the Erzinjan area.

It is further reported that Kiazim Kara Bekir informed the Angora Administration about the middle of May that it was impossible for him to send volunteers and newly recruited troops, who had not yet been trained, against the Kurds. As a result of this, suspicions in Angora concerning the attitude of Kiazim Kara Bekir Pasha, were awakened and a Major Rushdi Bey was sent to the Eastern Provinces for the purpose of obtaining first hand knowledge of the situation.

Although Kiazim Kara Bekir refused to send troops against the Kurds, there is no reason to suppose that any change has occurred in the normal relations between the Nationalist Administration and the Commander of the Eastern Army, who, in spite of his somewhat independent attitude, continues to support Mustapha Kemal. On the other hand, some friction exists between Nihad Pasha, in command of the Turkish forces at Diar Bekir, and Mustapha Kemal.

F.O. 371/6492

No. 135

Mr. Rattigan (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *June 8, 1921.*
(Received June 13).

No. 570.
My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report that the following information has reached me from French sources regarding the situation at Angora:—

2. A conflict is said to be developing between the Kemalist and Unionist sections of the Nationalist groups. Both sections have certain points in common, *e.g.*, agressive chauvinism and dislike of Bolshevik principles. Both are at present determined to rely on Bolshevik aid in order to obtain a fulfilment of nationalist aspirations.

3. The Kemalists are, however, believed to be ready to drop the Bolsheviks, if they can obtain satisfaction from the *Entente*. Whereas the Unionists, knowing themselves to be irretrievably compromised with the Allies owing to their war record, desire a permanent alliance with the Bolsheviks. Enver and Djemal are regarded as hand in glove with the latter, and are in fact, considered to be practically Bolsheviks agents.

4. Enver is credited with the determination to supplant Mustapha Kemal as head of the Nationalist group. There are said to be at present at Angora a large and important band of his adherents, who are devoting their efforts to obtaining the direction of affairs on behalf of the Unionists.

5. In this connection there is a report that Bekir Sami's fall is really due to the fact that he was responsible for the arrangement with Great Britain for the exchange of prisoners, whereby an important group of Unionists were released and enable to return to Angora, where they have reinforced the Unionist movement to supplant Mustapha Kemal. The latter could not openly oppose the release of Turkish prisoners, but was incensed by the folly of Bekir Sami in thus effecting a reinforcement of his opponents, and therefore withdrew from him the support of the Kemalist Party.

6. I have the honour to annex a memorandum by Mr. Ryan giving his views on these questions.

I have, &c.,

FRANK RATTIGAN,
Acting High Commissioner.

D.B.F.P., Ist series, vol. XVII, p. 225-226, *No.* 218.
F.O. 406/46, p. 86-87, No. 61.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 135.

Memorandum by Mr. Ryan.

WHEN the recent crisis in Angora became known here it was generally supposed that it was due to a conflict between moderates of the Bekir Sami type and extremists whose extremism consists in a determination to reject any settlement with the Allies except on the basis of the complete realisation of the National programme as laid down at Erzeroum in September 1919 and in the National Pact subscribed by the Constantinople Deputies in January 1920.

2. For several days past reports have been current that the true inwardness of the crisis was quite different, and that it was the result of a definite attempt on the part of the Committee of Union and Progress to secure control of the National movement and to oust the present leaders, especially Mustapha Kemal. It is alleged that something in the nature of an unsuccessful *coup d'Etat* was organised by the adherents of Enver Pasha, including his uncle Halil Pasha and Kutchuk Talaat Bey. At the same time that these reports reached Mr Rattigan from French sources a similar version was published in the "Réveil" of the 6th June, a weekly paper published by an Armenian, who probably got his information from the same French sources. My French colleague told me that he personally believed this information, which had come through from Trebizond. I received on the 7th June more or less the same information from a possibly, but not necessarily, independent Turkish source.

3. We still have very little precise information as to what has passed in Angora. There is some little evidence to support the French account. There appears to be little doubt that the Angora Government has held up certain of the released Malta deportees. It is also stated, though this is less certain, that Halil Pasha and Kutchuk Talaat have recently left or been expelled from Angora.

4. It is perfectly certain that Enver has for a long time past been active on lines of his own, and that Mustapha Kemal and the soldiers most immediately associated with him have no desire to be superseded by Enver Pasha and his group. It is, moreover, probable that the Bolsheviks would prefer to see Enver in control of the Nationalist movement, firstly, because he has been much more in their pockets than Mustapha Kemal; secondly, because he is more compromised in the eyes of Europe; and, thirdly, because they probably suspect the Angora leaders of being at heart ready to come to some settlement with the Allies.

5. It would be a mistake, however, to attach undue importance, from our point of view, to the alleged struggle between Unionists and Kemalists. It amounts, so far as its effect on us is concerned, to little more than personal rivalry between two groups, both of which are equally hostile to Great Britain, equally anxious to stir up trouble for us in Mesopotamia, Egypt and India, equally xenophobe in their general attitude. If a struggle has really taken place, its result has been to leave in the ascendent, not Kemalists who are prepared to sacrifice anything of the National programme for the sake of a settlement with Europe, but Kemalists who stand for the whole of the National programme, and whose attitude towards the British Government is one of unmitigated hostility. They have shown signs, it is true, of being alarmed by the open dissatisfaction of the French Government at their recent counter-proposals, but they have shown no signs of being willing to give the French real satisfaction. They dislike Bolshevism and mistrust Bolsheviks, but they stand by the Bolshevik Alliance, and, unless I am mistaken, they mean to stand by it unless they can get from the Allies far more favourable terms than have so far been offered or even thought possible.

6. It is possible, though, I admit, not demonstrable, that the Kemalist leaders themselves are exaggerating any recent trouble between them and the old gang of Unionists in order to frighten the Allies with the spectre of an extremism more extreme and, above all, more Bolshevik than their own. The advantage of this would be to drive a wedge between us and the French and to counteract the tendency of recent events to throw the French completely into the arms of Great Britain and throw both together on to the side of the Greeks.

7. The Italians, having served their purpose, count for less and less in Anatolia. They no longer exert any authority, even in the districts temporarily occupied by them. On their own side, however, they are frightened of the situation as a whole, lest the bottom should fall completely out of their policy of securing a strong economic position in Turkey and posing as the one European Power which in Islamic questions is disinterested. To this I attribute the publicity recently given, through Italian channels, to statements that Angora is not really extreme, and that while determined to eject the Greeks, the Kemalist leaders have no desire to prolong the war a moment longer than is necessary for the realisation of reasonable and legitimate aspirations.

8. Nothing should distract our attention from what are to us the main features of the situation, namely, that the Angora leaders are united in bitter hostility towards Great Britain; that while anxious to play the French off against us, they have no intention of giving anything away to the French, and that if their own resources or with Bolshevik aid they defeat the Greeks,

their subsequent attitude towards the greater Allies will be one of extreme intransigence over such questions as controls capitulations, zones of influence and disarmament. It appears to me, personally, that unless we are prepared to yield to their present exigencies and to make the best of their eventual intransigence, it is inevitable that we should join issue with them. If military considerations render this impossible, we must make up our minds to the fact that we have been defeated by Turkish Nationalists. If on the other hand, we make up our minds to destroy Kemalism, we can only do so by coming to a close understanding with the French regarding common action. This should not be impossible if the French and the Kemalists both maintain their present attitude as regards the Briand-Bekir Sami Agreement. The Italians have committed themselves so much to the Kemalists as against the Allies that the sooner we can eliminate them the better we should co-operate with the Greeks, but we should make it clear that we are doing so with a view not to consolidate the Greek position in Asia Minor, or even in Eastern Thrace, but to liquidate the Greek occupation of these countries with a minimum of reaction unfavourable to ourselves. We should aim at getting rid of the Greeks without emboldening the Nationalists, and without sacrificing the minorities in the future Turkey. We should aim at destroying Kemalist chauvinism and creating under the Sultan, a tractable, but not too reduced, Turkey.

F.O. 406/46, p. 87 - 88, No. 61/1

No. 136

Mr. Rattigan (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *11th June, 1921 4.0. a.m.*

(Received 13th June, 1921, 9.0.p.m.)

No. 419. Telegraphic.

Decypher.

Minister for Foreign Affairs called on me this afternoon.

He informed me that though he was not empowered to speak on behalf of Angora he was indirectly authorized to tell me the Kemalists had ten British *prisoners* ready for delivery to us either at Adalia or Trebizond, and would release the remainder in return for the release of the remaining Malta deportees. (?group omitted) would be put on impartial trial at Angora for the offence of which they were accused, as had been agreed on in the case of the German war criminals.

I said that I would refer to my Government any proposals regarding the exchange of prisoners which His Excellency felt empowered to put forward on behalf of Angora. I felt it right to tell (?him omitted) that failure of the (?Kemalists) to (?keep) their engagement regarding prisoners was the culminating point in a long series of acts of violence and open hostility towards Great Britain. Kemalists appeared to have decided that with Bolsheviks behind them they could defy allies and show themselves absolutely intractable. British people were very patient but they necessarily coming to the conclusion that there was no hope in dealing with Kemalists.

Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that extremism of Kemalists had been greatly exaggerated and quoted certain incidents in support of his assertion. I said that Kemalists' acts spoke for themselves and recapitulated acts of hostility (?towards) (2 groups ?us ?of which undecypherable) Your Lordship is aware.

Sefa Bey replied that Kemalists had turned to Bolsheviks as the only quarter from which they could expect support for their just aspirations and said that if allies showed inclination to meet nationalist claims Bolsheviks would be thrown over fortwith. Kemalists are I believe somewhat frightened by reports that Great Britain intends to support Greeks against them and His Excellency conveyed to me caution that he had received a hint from Angora to sound me in this way.

I said we had maintained absolute neutrality; that we had no other wish than to effect a just settlement; and that it was Kemalists to prove their desire to replace their present arrogance and intractability by reason and moderation. They could begin by discarding their (?Bolshevik) (?friends) and revoking such acts of hostility as prohibition to British ships.

Full details of conversation follow by Bag.

Addressed to Foreign Office 419, Repeated to Athens No. 83.

F.O. 371/6471/E. 6796.

No. 137

Mr. Rattigan (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *June 11, 1921*
(Received June 20).

No. 579
Very confidential

My Lord,

I have the honour to report that the Minister for Foreign Affairs called on me this afternoon, after telephoning that he wished to speak to me a matter of urgent importance.

2. His Excellency began by saying that he was aware that I appreciated frank and open speaking. He, therefore, proposed to tell me exactly what was in his mind. He was in no sense an agent of the Angora Government, but he was to some extent in touch with them, and had just been discussing the situation with someone of importance who had arrived from Angora.

3. I had, as a matter of fact, reason to know that Sefa Bey had received an indirect request from Angora to inform me that the Kemalists had 10 British prisoners ready for delivery to us at Adalia or Trebizond. That they were, further, ready to deliver the remainder of the British prisoners in Anatolia in return for the release of the remainder of the deportees in Malta. Sefa Bey was to point out that the deportation of these political offenders to Malta was an act contrary to all the usages of International Law, and was a proof of Great Britain's particular animosity towards Turkey, as no such action had been taken against the Central Powers.

4. Sefa Bey faithfully delivered himself of the above. He then proceeded to go apparently further than the instructions conveyed to him. For, while protesting that he would, of course, make no official pronouncement on behalf of Angora, he said that he had the best grounds for believing that the Angora Government would guarantee to put on impartial trial all those whom we had deported to Malta on political grounds. He added that this procedure had already been agreed to in the case of Germany where such trials were actually taking place. As His Excellency's eloquence had not yet run out I made no attempt to interrupt him, and he then went on to speak of the unparalleled harshness with which Great Britain was treating Turkey. In spite of the treachery and unfaithfulness of the Greeks, we had allowed them to launch their recent offensive at the very moment negotiations were in progress regarding the solution put forward by the Allies for the ending of the Greco-Turkish conflict. In fact, though he himself believed in our neutrality, yet the vast majority of Turks, and everyone at Angora, believed with some justifications that we had encouraged the Greeks to launch this offensive in the hope that they would crush the Kemalists and thus cut the Gordian knot. It was even held that we had actually assisted the Greeks, and the Turkish forces had, in fact, captured several British machine guns from the Greek troops.

5. At this stage I succeeded in stopping the flow of Sefa Bey's eloquence. I said that if His Excellency was empovered to make any definite proposals on behalf of Angora regarding the Exchange of Prisoners I would at once submit it to my Government. I would follow his excellent example in speaking frankly and would tell him that the failure of the Angora Government to keep their agreement for the exchange of prisoners was the culminating point of a series of acts of flagrant and open hostility against

Great Britain. I would merely mention a few of these incidents, e.g. the 'Palitana' case, the prohibiton to British ships from entry into Turkish ports, the closing of British commercial enterprises, such as Abbott's Emery Mines — where only Turkish workmen were employed — the execution of Mustapha Saghir, and the arrest of various British subjects. All these acts of open hostility towards us were indulged in at a time when we had gone out of our way to maintain absolute neutrality. Mr. Lloyd George had declared at the outset of the Greek offensive that the Allied Powers had put forward what they considered to be a fair solution of the questions at issue between Greeks and Turks. If either side chose to take the matter into their own hands they must accept the full responsibility for such action. Great Britain would remain entirely neutral. We had, in fact, done nothing whatever to encourage, much less to assist, the Greeks.

6. Meanwhile it appeared to me that the Kemalists, inflated by the check they had inflicted on the Greeks, and possibly relying on the lavish promises of aid by the Bolsheviks, had come to the conclusion that they could openly defy us. They had consequently committed this series of unprovoked acts of hostility against us. The British people were very long suffering and patient but there was a limit to all things, and it could not be that our patience would be inexhaustible. We were only too anxious to put an end to the Greco-Turkish conflict by effecting a fair settlement, and we would welcome the establishment of a united Turkish Government composed of reasonable and moderate men, who appreciated the facts of the situation and showed themselves ready to accept a just settlement. But there seemed no hope of any such attitude on the part of Angora.

7. Sefa Bey replied that the extremism of Angora had been greatly exaggerated. He quoted in this connection the case of Ahmed Mukhtar, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, who had been forced to leave the Tribune of the Assembly on making a reference to Great Britain's 'unprincipled' policy.

8. I said I was glad to hear of this incident, but it was difficult to reconcile it with the acts of the Kemalists.

9. Sefa Bey maintained that Mustapha Kemal and his party were in reality moderate men, who had only been forced into contact with the Bolsheviks by our harshness towards Turkey. Bolshevik doctrines and ideas were utterly repugnant to them, and they had only accepted the aid proffered from this quarter because they had no one else to whom they could look to support their just aspirations, if Great Britain even now showed the slightest sign of wishing to meet them half way they would drop the Bolsheviks at once.

10. I said that I did not know how far Sefa Bey was empowered by Angora to speak in this sense. But it was for the Kemalists to show that

they intended to turn over a new leaf, by discarding their Bolshevik friends and by the immediate revocation of such acts as the prohibition to British ships. It might not even now be too late were they forthwith to substitute a policy of reason and conciliation for their present attitude of arrogant defiance.

11. In saying this I was actuated by the conviction that even the most arrogant Kemalists are reported to be somewhat frightened by the tardy realisation of the abyss to which their intemperance may leading them. I feel sure that Sefa had received a hint to hold out a tentative olive branch.

12. I went on to tell Sefa Bey that I hoped he was right as to the moderation of the Kemalists and their anxiety to come to terms. But my information led me to think that there were two camps at Angora. The first, composed of moderates such as Bekir Sami, with whom Kemal might, or might not, be really in agreement. The second, composed of firebrands from the Committee of Union and Progress and the more violent extremists amongst the Nationalists. The latter apparently enjoyed the confidence and support of the Bolsheviks and seemed, for the moment at least, to have taken charge of the situation. Mustapha Kemal still remained as Head of the Government, and it was, therefore, on the face of things, impossible to dissociate him from the Extremists

13. Sefa Bey replied that the Committee of Union and Progress had no influence at Angora. A group of members of this party had merely been welcomed there as sincere patriots, but they had no weight in the counsels of Mustapha Kemal. He went on to refer to the rumours in circulaton there as to the probability of Great Britain, and perhaps France, affording active assistance to the Greeks. He said that no doubt if the Allies assisted the Greeks with large forces they could lay the country waste, and even annihilate Turkey. But was that to the ultimate advantage of Great Britain?

14. I said that there had never been, and was never likely to be, the slightest intention on the part of Great Britain to annihilate Turkey. On the contrary we should be only too glad to see an end of the strife between Greek and Turk, and the re-establishment of Turkey as a healthy State, after a just solution had been arrived at. But I could only repeat that it was the arrogance and utter intractability of the Kemalists that prevented the attainment of this happy result.

15. Sefa Bey then took leave of me.

I have, &c.,

FRANK RATTIGAN

D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol. XVII, p. 233-235, No. 223.

No. 138

Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 1634).

My Lord,

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 13, 1921.*

THE French Ambassador, having asked to see me with a special message from his Government, called upon me at my private house yesterday, Sunday, morning.

His first point was with regard to the treatment of mandates at the forthcoming meeting of the Council of the League of Nations. His Government had, as I knew, in deference to the objections raised in Washington, proposed that the consideration of Mandates A should not be taken at the impending meeting of the Council. He now, however, desired to suggest that this reserve should not apply to Mandates B, which touched upon no particular American interest, and he hoped that the British Government would join with the French in representing to Washington that it was desirable to dispose of these mandates without delay.

His Excellency then commenced a discussion upon the Silesian question, reading to me a prolonged telegram from M. Briand, containing the latest French version of affairs, as reported from Silesia two days previously. The telegram contained the usual complaint against the attitude of the British, upon whom the French sought to place all responsibility for the delays and difficulties that had occured. It referred with particular asperity to the recent firing upon and imprisonment of French soldiers by a portion of the German bands. It threw upon His Majesty's Government the sole responsibility for the delay in setting up a neutral zone. In general, it implied that the situation in Silesia — which it may be remarked in passing was largely due in the first place to the deliberate inertia, and has since been aggravated by the concerted delays of the French — was exclusively due to the maleficent activities of the British Government and the British representatives.

I said at once that I resented this tone of insistent complaint and reproach from the French Government; that there was in fact not a word of justification for it; that the boot was entirely upon the other leg; and that courtesy alone induced me to desist from repeating the demonstration which I had previously offered of the complicity of French soldiers and commanders in the rising and of the procrastination of the French Government in dealing with the matter at this end. As to the incident of the French soldiers, I remarked that our information was that it had been due to a misunderstanding, and that it had been satisfactorily explained in Silesia.

I informed him that a British soldier of the Black Watch had been shot, presumably by one of the Polish insurgents, in a fracas the day before; but I had not at once approached the French Government with a complaint about this. Such incidents were liable to occur in a situation of so much complexity and conflict.

The Ambassador seemed to think that the British were specially responsible for having allowed the French soldiers to be detained for twenty-four hours.

I declined, however, to discuss the matter further, saying that much larger issues were at stake.

As regards the neutral zone and the situation in general, his remarks were, I said, to a certain extent rendered obsolete by the events of the past two days. I read to him the greater part of a lengthy telegram from Sir Harold Stuart, dated only the day before in which was explained the plan for a progressive withdrawal from the disputed area, by the insurgents on the one side and the Germans on the other; the inference being that the evacuated area would be occupied by the Allied Commission, using for the purpose the augmented Allied forces now at their disposal. The telegram reported that there was fair ground for believing that both sides would withdraw: the Germans to the left bank of the Oder, the insurgents to the eastern boundary of "Kreis". The whole object of the Allies should be to create this vacuum between the opposing forces, to get it effectively occupied by Allied troops and to re-establish the authority of the Allied Commission.

It seemed to me, I added, that the appointment of Sir Harold Stuart had already exercised a most beneficial effect upon the situation. Personally, I had always held—and here the Ambassador indicated his assent —that it was a great mistake to place the commission entirely in the hands of military men. If the French had followed, or were now able to follow, our example in sending a prominent civilian, I was certain that much better results would be obtained. I thought that the French attitude in supporting General Le Rond had been one of the main contributory causes of the trouble. Now, however, that the commission were functioning better, it seemed to me superfluous and unwise to complicate the matter by sending a fresh body of experts to over-ride them. We had accepted this proposal merely in order to make things easier for M. Briand, but we now thought that it was more than doubtful whether it possessed any merit. Much the best thing would surely be to get the commission, after establishing their position, to make another report to the Allies. The matter could then be brought before a meeting of the Supreme Council — and here I pointed out that the delay in summoning the latter, which we were ready to attend at any moment, was due exclusively to M. Briand — and, if the Supreme

Council wanted expert assistance, either in examining the report of the commission or in arriving at a decision themselves, they could doubtless procure it.

Inasmuch as I was about to send to Paris the important despatch inviting French discussion and co-operation in the settlement of the troublous affairs of Turkey and Greece, I thought it only right to acquaint the French Ambassador with the decisions of His Majesty's Government and the step I was on the eve of taking. Accordingly, I explained to him the exact sequence of events — not failing to point out the disastrous failure that had attended the attempt of the French Government to come to terms with Mustapha Kemal behind our backs. I indicated the dangers of the present position. I explained the policy which we had decided to recommend, namely: a mutual desistence from hostilities (unless the Greeks and Turks had already come to blows) with a view to negotiations to be undertaken by the Powers, these negotiations to involve certain very considerable concessions to the Turks, including a substantial modification as regards the future position of Smyrna; while as regards the Greeks, an enquiry would be made into the conditions under which, if the negotiations were either refused by the Turks or broke down, the existing embargo upon the Greek purchase of arms, ammunition, aeroplanes, &c., could be removed, and a blockade instituted in the Black Sea in order to prevent the Kemalist forces from obtaining Bolshevik supplies. I told the Ambassador that the despatch concluded with an offer on my part to go to Paris any day, in order to discuss matters with M. Briand.

His Excellency, accepting my general account of the situation, expressed unofficially warm sympathy with the object that I had in view, and did not think that it would meet with anything but assent from the French Government.

Incidentally, he was very curious to know why it was that M. Veniselos had been in this country, and what was the nature of the the consultations that had taken place with him. Obviously the Ambassador suspected that there had been some sort of plot between His Majesty's Government and that statesman.

I told him frankly that the very reverse was the case. I had seen M. Veniselos only with a view of ascertaining from him whether he thought it likely, in the present circumstances, that the Greek Government would accept such a suggestion as I had outlined, and whether had he himself been in power, he would have given it a warm or a cold welcome. I had been relieved to hear from M. Veniselos that, while he expressed no opinion upon the present position of the Greek forces in Asia Minor, or on the policy of King Constantine, he nevertheless agreed that an attempt should be made

to compose matters at the present juncture, upon lines in general accord with those that I had mentioned.

The Comte de Saint-Aulaire evidently regarded this information as of great value, and thought that it would make a material difference to the attitude of King Constantine and his advisers in pursuing reasonable policy if they had any idea that, in doing so, they were not liable to be assailed by M. Veniselos and his party for lack of patriotism of an abandonment of their country's interests.

I am, etc.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

F.O. 406/46, p. 204-205, No. 142.

No. 139

Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome).

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 13, 1921.*

(No. 501.)

Sir,

I SAW the Italian Ambassador by appointment yesterday, Sunday.

He had just returned from Rome, and he desired to bring me the latest expression of the policy of Count Sforza. The latter, without being definitely wedded to the scheme which he had put forward for the territorial solution of the Silesian frontier question, nevertheless hoped that it would provide a suitable basis for discussion, and that it would be supported by the British representatives. However that might be, Count Sforza had instructed the Ambassador to tell me that, whenever the Supreme Council assembled, he would be found in general support of the British attitude and policy; that the main of the Italian Government was to give a good chance to the new Government of Dr. Wirth; and that Italian policy was directed now, as it had been throughout, to the early re-establishment of peace in Europe.

I said that I was very glad to receive these assurances; but I could not help remembering that they preceded with almost mathematical regularity every Allied Conference which I had so far attended. I entirely believed that Count Sforza's general policy was on the same lines as our own; but I had usually found that, when a conference met, Count Sforza's sympathy either evaporated or at any rate was expressed only in formulas of a very general description; and that on many occasions, when we had expected his earnest and powerful support, this support had either been

given in a very half-hearted way or had been altogether withheld. I thought, if I might venture to say so, that the best service Count Sforza could render to the Allied cause would by taking a more definite attitude at the meetings of the Supreme Council on the points concerning which he was never tired of assuring us that his sympathies were entirely in accord with our own.

I then took advantage of the occasion to make a statement to the Ambassador, the need for which had long been in my mind, regarding the general policy pursued by the Italian Government in the Near and Middle East. We all of us knew, I said, that Italy was animated by a special feeling of regard for the Turks, and that she had throughout sought to build for herself a position of peculiar influence in Asia Minor. This had been particularly true of the Italian relations with Mustapha Kemal, whose delegation had been brought by Italians through Adalia to Europe, with whom they had kept up close relations, both in Rome and in Angora, and whom they were, rightly or wrongly, believed to have assisted in even more material ways. This did not, however, prevent me from regarding with considerable astonishment the secret treaty which Count Sforza had concluded with Bekir Sami Bey in London — an agreement concluded without our knowledge and behind our backs, and the contents of which we learnt only at a later date.

Here Signor de Martino interposed to state his impression that Count Sforza, while in London, had informed me of what he was doing.

I replied that I had no recollection of Count Sforza's having mentioned the matter to me at all, even in the most indirect or general way. Whether he had or not, he had most certainly not given me any idea of what the contents of the agreement turned out to be. It transpired that, although the Italians had no such excuse for hasty agreement as had the French, who were bent upon recovering their prisoners and extricating their stricken forces from a dangerous position in Cilicia, the Italians had sought to conclude an agreement with Angora which not only provided for their commercial position under the Tripartite Agreement, but also went so far as to promise future support to the Kemalist Party in pressing for the abandonment of the main clauses in the Treaty of Sèvres, as regards Symrna and otherwise, which they themselves — that is, the Italians — had signed. This, I thought, was a most extraordinary position. I did not understand what defence could possibly be offered for it. That a party to a treaty which it had signed, and the ratification of which it had urged, should, behind the backs of its Allies, agree to support the enemy in abrogating the main provisions of that treaty was to me quite inexplicable. Nor could I, I said, accept the defence of the Ambassador, which was somewhat diffidently offered, that there had been no concealment about

the sympathies of the Italian Government throughout, since they had never been in favour of those parts of the treaty to which I had referred. This contention enabled me to ask at once why, then, had they signed the treaty as it stood; why had they not taken the opportunity, repeatedly presented to them, of effecting amendments; why, above all, had they attempted to compass their ends in this clandestine and tortuous way?

I went on to give another illustration, if the reports that I had received were correct, of a similar attitude on the part of the Italian Foreign Minister. The British Government, who had for eighty years close relations with the State of Afghanistan, contiguous as it was to the frontiers of India, and who had throughout the greater part of that time subsidised and exercised complete control over the foreign policy of the Afghan rulers, had for some time been engaged in negotiating a new arrangement with the Afghan Government, which was on the verge of conclusion. Any day the British Government might hear that it was signed. Under it, the Ameer would once more receive a large subsidy from the British Government, and would thereby admit the superior and predominant political influence of Great Britain in his country. It was true that he was at the same time being assailed in Kabul by political missions and requests for treaties of alliance with the Soviet Government and with Turkey. Moreover, he had sent an Afghan mission of a somewhat suspicious character to Europe, and this mission was now travelling about from place to place. Great was my surprise when I heard that this mission had been in Rome, and that without a word of reference to us, it had concluded, or was alleged to have concluded, an agreement with the Italian Government, who were forthwith to despatch a representative and mission to Kabul.

Whatever might be said for or against the policy of such an agreement, that the Italian Government should have concluded it, if they had, without any reference to us, was a proceeding against which I felt that I had the right to utter a vehement protest. What would the Italian Government have thought if, in some region contiguous to their possessions in Africa or elsewhere, the British Government had, behind their backs and without any attempt to consult them or keep them informed, concluded a secret agreement with the powerful ruler of such a region? If this report was true — and, in view of what had been done with Angora, it seemed to me not incredible — I desired seriously to ask the Ambassador in what direction his Government intended to go? Did they hold themselves at liberty, while professing a warm and close alliance with ourselves, to conclude behind our backs these secret agreements, which might very well be in direct conflict with our interests?

If that was the view of Italian policy, it seemed to me that Count Sforza was moving deliberately in the direction of a rupture of the concord upon

which the peace of the world depended, and that I was justified in asking for some clear intimation from him as to what was his intention.

Signor de Martino declared that it was new to him that any such agreement had been concluded; but he remembered having either seen or heard in Rome of a delegation of Afghans, whom I think he said he had seen in picturesque costume on some official occasion. He was under the impression that your Excellency was aware both of their presence and of their object. He even believed that you must be acquainted with the agreement, if it had been concluded; and he was surprised that no communication on the subject had been received from you by the Foreign Office. He would at once enquire of his Government, as I undertook to do from your Excellency, what had happened in the matter.

His Excellency, who seemed to be very ill-acquainted with the history and position of Afghanistan, then went on to cross - examine me closely upon the degree of political independence enjoyed by that country.

I gave him a history of our relations with successive Afghan Ameers, and acknowledged that we no longer claimed to exercise that complete control over the foreign relations of Afghanistan which we had been in a position to do before the war. Had we still been in that position, an Afghan mission would not be wandering about Europe at the present time. But this fact did not alter the broad fact that Afghanistan, by virtue of its position and history, lay within the sphere of British political influence, and that, whether foreign Powers were or were not at liberty to conclude separate agreements with its Government, it was almost inconceivable that an Allied Government, fully acquainted with the situation, as it must be, and affecting to march at our side in close co - operation for the settlement of the East, should conclude such an arrangement without any reference to ourselves. I had been a warm supporter of the Italian Alliance throughout; British armies had fought in the war on Italian soil for the defence of Italian interests and Italian territory; our policy with regard to Germany had been substantially the same. It was, therefore, a matter of much surprise and distress to me that Italy should conceive herself at liberty — without any interests at all, or with only insignificant interests, in the parts of the world to which I had referred — to strike out a policy of her own, sometimes in divergence from us, anyhow without our knowlegde. I thought that the Ambassador could render a real service to his country, about the continued friendship of which with ourselves he had often spoken to me, by reporting frankly to his official superiors the doubts and apprehensions that were growing in my mind.

The Ambassador, who was a good deal concerned at what I had said, but who did not at any stage express dissent, undertook to do as I had asked.

I may add that, as regards the pro - Kemalist policy of his Government, I was able to point out with a certain amount of sardonic satisfaction that it had so far been a disastrous failure, inasmuch as, while Count Sforza's London Agreement had been repudiated in Angora, the Italians had found themselves in so perilous a position at Adalia that they had had to withdraw from that port. This failure would, I thought, render it easier for the Italian Government to adopt a different and more candid policy in the future.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

F.O. 406/46, P. 206-207, No. 143

No. 140

Lord Granville (Athens) to Earl Curzon.

No. 253.
My Lord,

ATHENS, *June 13th, 1921.*

With reference to my telegrams Nos. 331, 334, 336 and 340 of the 11th, 12th, and 13th instant, I have the honour to report that King Constantine left Phaleron on the afternoon of the 11th instant on board the Greek Battleship "Lemnos," escorted by two destroyers and a cruiser, on the way to Smyrna where he is reported to have arrived yesterday afternoon.

An official Service was held in the Cathedral at Athens on the morning of the 11th, attended by His Majesty, the members of the Royal Family, of the Government and all high officials, at which prayers were offered for the success of the Greek arms. On leaving the Church, His Majesty was greeted with cries of "To Constantinople".

His Majesty, who was accompanied on his voyage by the Crown Prince and by Princes Nicholas and Andrew, the President of the Council and the Ministers of War and Marine, had a most enthusiastic send off. All the newspapers, excepting of course the Venizelist ones, refer in warm terms to the departure of His Majesty's for Asia Minor and draw attention to the fact that the date coincides with the anniversary of the fall of Constantinople and the death of Constantine Palaeologos. They refer to the legend that another Constantine with a wife named Sophia, will one day retake Constantinople and to the universal belief which exists in Greece that the present king will one day fulfil this legend.

On the occasion of his departure, King Constantine issued a proclamation to his people which runs as follows:

"I am starting to place myself at the head of my army over there where Hellenism has been struggling for centuries. With the help of the Almighty, Victory will crown the struggles of the Race which is advancing impetuously to accomplish its mission. Our predominance, as formerly that of our ancestors, will today assure to us over there realisation of the highest ideals of Liberty, Equality and Justice. Our arms are guided by the entire past of our race. A past of glorious civilization, imposing upon us duties of whose gravity we are fully aware. We have the right to proclaim ourselves fully competent to fulfil these duties. It is the Greek people who give us the right thanks to their sacred union and to their unrivalled devotion.

"Trusting to Divine help, to the enthusiasm of my heroic army and to the moral and unshakable power of the Hellenic Vision, I am going there whither the supreme will of the Nation calls me".

I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Acting High Commissioner at Constantinople.

I have, &c

(Signed) GRANVILLE

F.O. 371/6519/E. 7185.

No. 141

Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 14, 1921.*

(No. 1638).

My Lord,

HIS Majesty's Government have followed with increasing anxiety the recent developments in the general political situation in the Middle East, culminating in the rejection by the Angora Government of the agreement with France on the subject of Cilicia, the withdrawal of the Italians from Adalia, the open hostility to all British interests proclaimed by the Kemalist Government, its growing intimacy with Moscow, and finally, the imminent reopening of active military operations on the Græco - Turkish front.

2. The situation calls for a fresh review of the political and military problems facing the Allied Governments, which they can only hope to solve satisfactorily by close co-operation between themselves. From such information as has reached His Majesty's Government, they gain the

impression that the French Government is equally alive to the dangers confronting the Allies. In these circumstances, they have carefully considered the most appropriate means of meeting the situation so as to form a comprehensive plan of action.

3. In order to gain greater certainty as to the actual numbers, condition and disposal of the Greek forces, the British military attaché at Athens, who is at present at Smyrna, has been directed to furnish a full report based on personal inspection and enquiries, whilst at the same time the Greek Government has been asked to extend special facilities to a British general whom His Majesty's Government propose to despatch from Constantinople direct to the Greek front, charged to make similar investigations for the purpose of furnishing an authoritative report on all relevant factors of the military situation with the minimum of delay.

4. In the interval of time available before those reports are received, it is important to decide on some definite line of policy.

5. Hitherto the attitude of the Allied Governments has been one of professed neutrality between the Greeks and the Kemalists, although we have evidence that the Greeks have not been entirely unsuccessful in drawing arms, ammunition and supplies in certain quantities from Italian, and to some extent even from French sources. As a result, it is probable that Angora, able freely to obtain arms, supplies and money from Russia, has been placed at a substantial advantage, which may have increased the confidence and truculent spirit of the Kemalist leaders.

6. His Majesty's Government have no desire to prejudge the prospects of the Greek army, and they are by no means persuaded that it may not still be capable of achieving some decided success. It seems to them unlikely, however, that in its present situation, without moral or material support from the Allies, that army can achieve sufficiently decisive results to impose any lasting peace; and they therefore consider it imperative that the Allies should take into account the alternative situations which may arise and their probable consequences. The alternatives appear to them to be, broadly, two. On the one hand, the Greek army without achieving decisive results, may win some inconclusive, though considerable, success. If this should occur, an opportunity would present itself for negotiating satisfactory terms of peace; but the effect of such a success would not be lasting; the opportunity, if not immediately grasped, would probably pass; and the strain of protracted and inconclusive campaigning would gradually tell upon the Greek troops. On the other hand, the Greek army might be defeated in the near future and driven back. His Majesty's Government see no immediate reason to apprehend such an event; but they are convinced that the Allies should consider the consequences for

themselves, should it unfortunately take place. The British military authorities at Constantinople are of opinion that, in the event of a Greek retirement, the Ismid Peninsula could not be held without strong Allied reinforcements against any serious Kemalist advance; that if the Ismid Peninsula were abandoned, Constantinople would be untenable; and that, if and when the Greeks fell back on Smyrna, the straits themselves could only be held temporarily pending a complete evacuation of the Allied troops. It is evident that so great a Turkish success as this would signally enhance Turkish prestige, would strengthen Turkish confidence in Russian support, and would render unattainable any satisfactory settlement in Asia Minor. Such a situation would endanger Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, compelling France and Great Britain either to strengthen their garrisons in these provinces or to abandon them. Thrace would probably become untenable. In other words, a Turkish success would jeopardise every Allied gain in the war and remove all prospects of peaceful reconstruction in the Middle East.

7. His Majesty's Government have arrived at the conclusion that some steps are immediately necessary in order to shut out all possibility of such a catastrophe. The solution which they would most desire would be some definitive settlement between the Greeks and the Turks which the Allies could approve and both those parties accept; and they are prepared to make suggestions as to the form which such a settlement might take. Their first aim is naturally towards a solution of that kind, because, while bound by honour and friendship to the Greeks, they desire to maintain a friendly and helpful relation, if that be possible, with the Turks. They are convinced, however, that no negotiations with the Turks can have much chance of success unless both Constantinople and Angora are led to see that the failure of the negotiations will be followed by consequences more serious to themselves than a mere return to the *status quo* of the present moment. With that object, they would wish to discuss at once such measures as may be practicable and desirable in the contingency for strengthening the Greek army with moral and material support; and they would from the outset of the negotiations make it clear to the Turks that the application of such measures of assistance to the Greeks will follow promptly on the failure of the negotiations or a refusal on the Turkish side to negotiate. They consider, moreover, that agreement on such measures is necessary, not only to give the negotiations a reasonable prospect of success, but also as an insurance against their failure and the disastrous consequences which might overtake all Allied interests in the East in the event of a Greek retreat.

8. They suggest therefore that the Allies should at once approach the Greek Government in this sense. They believe it by no means improbable that the Greek Government, when informed of the assurances of

help that the Allies would be prepared to give them in the event of the negotiations with the Turks being refused or breaking down, might be prepared to listen to a suggestion from the Allied Governments which would secure to Greece the maintenance of her rights under the Treaty of Sèvres in Europe and in other respects, in return for a solution of the Smyrna problem that would admit of a renewed approach to the Turks with the view of arriving at a pacific settlement of the existing *impasse*. Such a settlement might be on the lines of offering to Turkey the maximum modification, short of complete Turkish sovereignty, and consistent with the safety of the Greek population, of the arrangement respecting Smyrna proposed at the London Conference. This would allow for the creation of an autonomous Turkish province under the protection of the Powers, guarded by a locally recruited gendarmerie under a proportion of Allied officers. All Greek troops would be withdrawn as soon as the Allied Powers were satisfied that the new force was in a position to carry out its responsibilities, which should include the duty of repelling raids from without as well as maintaining order within.

9. To this proposal, which should go a long way to satisfy the Turkish claims with regard to Smyrna, might be added a number of additional concessions and alleviations, concerning which, if the principle of negotiation be admitted, we shall be prepared to enter into friendly discussions with the French Government and with our other Allies.

10. Further, we should be quite willing to accompany these concessions by a frank and sincere assurance to the Turkish Government that if they showed a reasonable spirit in meeting the Allied Powers the latter would make it a cardinal point of their future policy to assist Turkey in rebuilding the Ottoman State within its new frontier on a surer foundation.

11. If to an arrangement on these general lines the assent of the Greek Government can be obtained, His Majesty's Government would propose that communications should be entered into with as little delay as possible, in a form to be arranged between the Allied Governments, with the Sultan's Government at Constantinople and with Angora, with a view to an agreement on the lines suggested. The communication would have to be coupled, as already explained, with a clear intimation of the course which the Allied Governments would be compelled to adopt should the extremist party in Turkey refuse to come to terms.

12. The assistance to be offered to the Greeks might, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, take several forms short of actual participation as belligerents. They might, on the one hand, relax the existing restrictions on Greek liberty of action in matters of finance, facilitate the supply to the Greek army of arms, ammunition and supplies and perhaps

permit the enrolment of volunteers in the Allied countries. On the other hand, they might, by measures of blockade or otherwise, do their best to cut off supplies reaching the Kemalist forces across the Black Sea or by other maritime approaches.

13. At the same time it would be only just to declare that, should the Angora Government decline the proposed settlement, and should the Greeks, with Allied assistance, be victorious, the terms in regard to the future of Smyrna which they are asked to accept as a feature of the proposed accommodation would no longer be insisted upon by the Allies.

14. It is assumed by His Majesty's Government that, while these negotiations are proceeding, and still more in the event of their failure, the Allied Governments, while not receding from the decisions arrived at in London with regard to a final withdrawal of the Allied forces from Constantinople in favour of a friendly Turkish Government will regard it as essential to maintain their present military position there. A sudden withdrawal or a diminution of the forces required to safeguard the capital might precipitate the peril which it is desired to avoid and render the negotiations abortive from the start.

15. Such, in general outline, is the plan which suggests itself to His Majesty's Government as the best available means of extricating the Western Powers from the existing anxious position in Turkey and arriving at a settlement which will be honourable to all the parties concerned.

16. His Majesty's Government are particularly desirous to act in these respects in harmony with the French Government, whose broad interests in the East they conceive to be identical with their own, and in close co-operation with whom lies, in their opinion the best chance of success.

17. You should place yourself at once in communication with M. Briand, in order to acquaint him with the general purport of these proposals, to which you should invite his support. Should he desire a fuller and more intimate discussion of them than is possible either by telegram or despatch, I shall be happy to come to Paris myself, for the purpose of such a conversation, at the earliest date that may be found convenient.

I am, &c.,

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

F.O. 406/46, p. 89-91, No. 63.

No. 142

Mr. Rattigan (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *June 14, 1921, 1 p.m.*
(RECEIVED, *June 15, 4 p. m.*)

No. 425 Telegraphic

My telegrams Nos. 384 and 387.

There are abundant signs that Angora Government are very perturbed by outcry against them in England and France resulting from their attitude since Bekir Samy's return from London. Rumours of complete change of front at Angora have been assuming definite shape during last couple of days. According to one report from Nationalist source here Bekir who is again on his way to Europe [1] has been notified of various decisions tending to appease His Majesty's Government and French Government. These are summarized in my immediately following telegram [2].

So far however there is little definite evidence of readiness of Angora to give real satisfaction to Great Britain and France. We should be slow to accept at face value any efforts to placate us until we are certain that Angora means to give us something substantial. It must be remembered that they are still essentially hostile to the Allies and that we shall have no prospect of satisfactory peace until some legitimate Government which recognizes Sultan regains authority. Recent incidents which have justly outraged His Majesty's Government are merely symptoms of deep - seated disdain. Even if Angora now gives satisfaction as regards those incidents, disdain will not have been eradicated.

Obvious policy of Angora at present is to thrust Great Britain and France apart and to appease us both sufficiently to deter either from taking direct action against Kemalists or helping Greeks.

I have not seen French High Commissioner since latest developments but will meet him this evening. Up to a few days ago French High Commissioner continued to express extreme displeasure with Angora and spoke

[1] He arrived in Rome on June 18 and in Paris on June 27.

[2] No. 426 of June 14. This telegram stated that the leading Nationalist newspaper had published on the morning of June 14 the following decisions said to have been notified by the Angora Government to Bekir Sami Bey: '1. All British military and civilian prisoners to be liberated. 2. Dismissal of official immediately responsible for Palitana incident. 3. British ships to have access to all ports. 4. Suspension of hostilities in Mesopotamia. 5. Acceptance of London proposals, except as regards zones of influence. 6. Suspension of hostilities in Cilicia. 7. Application of Briand-Bekir Sami agreement under supervision of French and Turkish officers subject to reservation as regards gendarmerie. 8. Surrender of French prisoners to be evacuated via Adalia'.

as though French Government were determined to obtain full satisfaction in regard to Cilician agreement. At the same time they did not seem to favour policy of giving immediate support to Greeks and expressed preference for that of waiting result of next round in hostilities between Greeks (?and) Kemalists.

Strong influence are undoubtedly at work to influence French policy in the direction of composition with Angora. In this connection importance must be attached to the journey of Monsieur Franklin Bouillon, ex Chairman of Deputies Commission on Foreign Affairs, who came here some little time ago and arrived at Angora on June 9th. (? French) ...[3] line that he is entirely unofficial but they have been secretive about his movements. He is said to be (? personal) friend of Monsieur Briand's.

Monsieur Steeg Director General of Imperial Ottoman Bank is proceeding very shortly to Paris. He is strong advocate of composition with Kemal. He told two members of my staff some time ago that the only cure was to re - establish Constantinople as the real capital of Turkey; that Angora should be given only inducement which would suffice for this purpose, namely evacuation of Constantinople, and that once duality of Government had given place to single Government in Constantinople, diplomatic pressure aided by economic and (? financial strategy) would enable allies to get all that they wanted. This is in my opinion radically unsound, but it shows how far some French financiers are prepared to go.

I understand that Italians have definitely decided to evacute Adalia. They manifest in conversation resentment at cavalier treatment shown them by Kemal but there is no reason to suppose that they will reverse their whole policy by taking up attitude of antagonism towards the latter.... They will doubtless advertise the evacuation as being a demonstration of regard for legitimate Turkish susceptibilities, thus making virtue of necessity.

Reports have been circulated here that Kiazim Kara (- Bekir)[4] who commands (? Kemalist) forces on the Russian frontier had definitely broken with Mustapha Kemal and declared his loyalty to Sultan. Similar reports have been circulated in the past, but Kiazim Karabekir has never so far gone against Angora Government though he probaby does not see eye to eye with them on all points. Present rumours regarding his attitude should therefore be discounted pending definite confirmation. Any difference which exists is quite possibly being exploited with object of causing allies to hold back in hope that nationalist movement will disintegrate. (? There are no serious) signs of its doing so.

[3] The text is here uncertain.
[4] Kiazim Kara Bekir Pasha.

I have collected above facts and rumours in single telegram as they all have bearing on question of line of conduct which His Majesty's Government should adopt in immediate future.

Repeated to Athens No. 85.

D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol. XVII, p. 242 - 244, No. 228.

No. 143

Lord Granville (Athens) to Earl Curzon.

ATHENS, *June 15th, 1921.*

No. 259.

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 253 of the 13th instant, I have the honour to report that, according to the press, King Constantine reached Smyrna on the afternoon of the 12th instant and received a most enthusiastic welcome which the Constantinist newspapers describe as an apotheosis of the King by the people of Smyrna and by the army.

On arrival His Majesty addressed the following message to his troops:—

"Soldiers! the voice of the Country has again called upon me to assume the command over you. Receive the cordial salutations of your King. I am proud of the determination with which you are fighting in the war of liberation of the Nation. You are not oblivious of the noble ideas of which you are the champions. Upon this sacred territory you are fighting for the Hellenic idea which here in this very spot has given birth to the unrivalled civilization which has never ceased to elicit the admiration of the world. Your valour will guarantee the success of the war. Your virtues will guarantee that out of your sacrifices and your victories will flower again this unrivalled civilization of which you are the worthy regenerators. We will bequeath to our children a task worthy of your ancestors and of us. Soldiers! may you all be united in this task and may you be filled with love for our united and indivisible Greece and devoted to the great and eternal mission which she has entrusted to us and of which we are all the instruments. Advance! to the task. Your King is with you. He is leading you thither where the Country's orders call you. May the Almighty bless our just War".

I am forwarding a copy of this Despatch to His Majesty's Acting High Commissioner at Constantinople.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

F.O. 371/6519/E. 7186.

No. 144

Lord Granville (Athens) to Earl Curzon.

ATHENS, *June 16th 1921, 1.30 p.m.*
(Received June 17, 2.40 p.m.)

Telegraphic
No. 346.

Constantinople telegram No. 425.[1]

Kemal's alleged proposals are so obviously intended merely to throw dust in the eyes of the Allies that I hope they will not be taken too seriously. French High Commissioner's policy of awaiting result of Greek offensive was reflected in conversation yesterday by French Chargé d'Affaires who said that newspaper reports indicated that to be the intention of His Majesty's Government and that it seemed to him to be the sound policy to follow. Greek press continually publish quotations from British and French press to the same effect. I venture to urge that if we are thinking at all of giving Greece assistance we should give it at once when it is likely to make all the difference: if Greece is victorious without our help she will be infinitely less grateful for it afterwards, whereas if she is beaten our support will be of much less relative value to her and will be just as offensive to Kemal and the Moslem world in general. Compare France's belated assistance to Wrangel.

I quite see how desirable it is for His Majesty's Government, to have thoroughly reliable information as to morale, condition, and capabilities of Greek army before taking definite decision. I am not in a position to give that information but I hope that reports of my Military Attaché now in Asia Minor and General (group omitted) to be sent from Constantinople can be obtained very soon and will be really reliable. I cannot ascertain when offensive is to begin; there was a story that it was fixed for yesterday, but Italian Minister has reason to believe (I do not know from what source) that it will not take place for at least a week or ten days. Minister for Foreign Affairs is pressing to be informed of date of General's arrival at the front and it appears to me quite possible that Greek Government understand object of visit and will postpone offensive in the hope that his report will be sufficiently favourable to encourage His Majesty's Government to come in.

With regard to Monsieur Steeg's proposal to evacuate Constantinople so as to allow nationalists to take possession of it, besides numerous and obvious objections which were no doubt in Mr. Rattigan's mind I would

[1] Bkz. No. 142

suggest another. Greek papers are always talking about Constantinople and Serbian Minister had heard a suggestion that Greeks should abandon their Asia Minor campaign and make a dash for Constantinople whether allies liked it or not; we agreed that the idea was absurd as our fleet let alone our troops could easily prevent it - but would coup not be possible if we evacuate? It would certainly be very tempting for prestige of King Constantine if for nothing else.

Italian Minister yesterday explained evacuation of Adalia as being due to constant incidents and troubles with Turks, to counterbalance which Italy had not enough interests there; he added that there was absolutely no question of withdrawing troops from Meander.

Repeated to Constantinople.

F.O. 371/6471/E. 6976.

D.B.F.P., Ist. series, Vol. XVII, p. 253 - 254, No. 237.

No. 145

Extracts from "Islamic News" (London) of June 16, 1921, No. 33.

Britain's Plunge Into an Abyss.

Destroying Herself to Save Greece.

The week's news clearly shows that the so - called Greco - Turkish conflict is rapidly assuming the full proportions of an Anglo - Turkish war. The mask of "neutrality" which enabled the British for a time to do wire-pulling from behind is nearly off to - day. A large and powerful British Fleet is concentrating at Malta, and is due to arrive off Constantinople in a few days. General Harrington, officer in command of the British forces in Constantinople, who number over 60,000, and consist of a large number of Indian regiments, has already sent a frantic appeal to his Government either to be reinforced heavily, or be permitted to withdraw. Another powerful squadron has already arrived at Smyrna, where it is assisting the Greeks to transform this important Mediterranean gateway of Anatolia into a vast Greek base of operations for the coming offensive. It is alleged that important consignments of war materials have been regularly delivered by British ships from Egypt and other places, and if any doubt is still left in the mind of the reader of the exact intentions of the British Government, we trust it will be more than dissipated by the news that that famous cont-

roller of Britain's foreign policy — M. Venizelos — is already in London, "in order to take a complete rest" by rushing about the "Chequers" and the City. Here we have all the material which is necessary to start the Near Eastern conflagration for which some of the British statesmen have been assiduously preparing. Despite assurances to the contrary it is more than evident that the fear of resumption of active hostilities by the British against the Turks — entertained in certain quarters in the Commons — is being substantiated on all sides. It is being plainly hinted that the chief aim of those British preparations is to "guard against" the event of "ultimate Turkish victory over the Greeks". From statements such as these it is plainer than ever that it is not so much to safeguard any British interests in the Near East that the British Government is getting ready to embark on this new enterprise, as to shelter the Greeks from the consequences of their own acts.

What it Means to Britain.

It is natural to ask: Do the British people appreciate the full significance of this new venture? Have they complete confidence in the present Near Eastern policy of the stewards of their Government? Do they realise the amount of sacrifices which it would inevitably entail once it is launched forth. Have they the faintest notion of the results which it will bring about? From a knowledge which we have of the extent to which the taxpayers in this country are permitted to see what their Government does, we are of opinion that with hardly any exception there is none to - day who can look ahead and warn those gentlemen at Whitehall against the disastrous folly of the New War. Let us set down in as few words as possible the meaning of this step. It involves the oberburdened taxpayers to be responsible for another large bill which may run into any number of millions. It will call for the mobilisation of a large army, mostly British, who will have to fight and die — for what? For the Greeks, to enable them to carve out a neat little Empire by depriving the desperate Turks of their last refuge; in order to please the author of this Greek policy, Venizelos; in other words, for a mess of pottage. In view of the well-known hostility of both France and Italy to any scheme of Greek expansion in territories which are not Greek, would it be worth while for England to add yet another factor to the bewildering entanglement of her foreign affairs? Perhaps this may not appear of very great moment owing to the difficulties of France with Germany on the problem of Silesia; but there are other things which no sincere servant of the British State can ignore, and those things lie abroad. They do not lie in Ireland, where it is possible to apply the "right remedy" to them at a moment's notice; they lie in regions where a state of affairs of such anxiety already exists as to make any people, let alone the British, think twice before taking this fatal step.

Its Effect in Britain's Empire.

We refer, as will be known, to the effect of Britain's declaring war on Turkey, in India. Are there any English people who can deny that if there is any part under the Sun where the British can dig the grave of their political supremacy with the greatest success it is India? And why? Because it was to this country that a solemn pledge was given by Mr. Lloyd George and other responsible statesmen of England, and the Indians as well as these very statesmen know that that pledge has been violated. They were told that the aim of the English for which they solicited aid from non - English portions of the British Empire was to fight for the very principle of justice and freedom. They protested it was not a war in which religious or any other consideration entered. Besides, they set out in most unequivocal terms possible the resolve that the "Turks will be free to live in their historic homelands" without any let or hindrance.

These pledges were broken, and the whole mass of many millions of Muslims and their Indian fellow - countrymen protested frantically against this most atrocious breach of faith. Their protests were unheeded. Greeks, the most inveterate, and at the same time the most contemptible, the cruellest and the meanest of their foes, were let loose on the defenceless populations in the villages and towns of Asia Minor and Thrace. The latter rose, as any human beings would have done in the circumstances, and the British Government sitting in London now wants to declare war on them. We solemnly tell our fellow - citizens in this country that they are permitting their rulers to light a flame which, when it spreads, and it will inevitably spread, may or may not destroy the Greeks, but it will certainly and once for all destroy the very foundations of the British power. The confidence that India reposed in Britain's pledged word has already gone, and if England means seriously to shoulder the business of the Greeks, her material power will disappear too. History has proved that the very few Englishmen who control the destinies at home as well as abroad of the eight million dumb English voters are merely human beings. They are swayed in the present moment of their temporary triumph by sentiments of just ordinary men, likewise they are not immune from the evil consequences which follow all reckless acts. By declaring war on the Turks the British Cabinet is hurling the vital interests of the British Empire into an abyss, and is imperilling the very future of unborn generations of English people. Once India is enflamed, then no British army even ten times its present size will be able successfully to cope with that disaster. But the evil has not quite started. England can yet save herself by abandoning Greece to her own fate — to Venizelos.

But Britain May yet Choose Between War or Peace.

There are visible signs that in Angora renewed efforts are being made to effect a reconciliation with the Western Powers. The true facts as regards the exchange of prisoners were given in the Islamic News. People can judge themselves which of the two Governments, British or Angora, is to blame. The charge of bad faith could only be carried to Britain and *not* to Angora. Still we strongly advised Marshal Ghazi Mustapha Kemal Pasha to release the British prisoners and thus to leave England to redeem her debt of honour. The matter of release or non - release of a few prisoners of war in itself did not make much difference one way or the other, but it gave an opportunity to those people in this country who have lately been attacked, as an English daily said, by Angoramania, to distort facts and irritate the British public. They know that the British taxpayer is NOT prepared for another plunge into a war to help the brother-in-law of the Kaiser to increase the population of his kingdom by fifty per cent, and to satify the Utopian dreams of men like Venizelos of a large Hellenic Empire. The British public cannot afford to spend money either to prop up a decadent people in Athens or to find a "national home" in Palestine for the Jewish scum of all the countries in the world. But the political strategists in England desire to lure the British public by catchwords. We should try to deprive these unscrupulous strategists, who are playing with the life and blood of millions of people, of their opportunities as faras it be possible.

Once the British prisoners are released the cry of "bad faith of the Kemalists" will die a natural death. We are very glad to notice that our voice has not remained unheard in Angora and the British prisoners are being released. We hope all of them will be released soon, and if they have any sense of honour or any regard for truth they, when they come back to their country, will take steps to remove all those misunderstandings which are prevalent in this country as regards the condition of affairs in Anatolia. Each one of them should do what Mr. Streit of the "Philadelphia Ledger" has done so that men like Mr. Balfour should not talk of "barbarians" in Anatolia.

It is very good news that the well - known statesman Bekir Sami Bey, who headed the Angora Delegation to London is coming again to Europe on an official political mission, and he has made it public at the Rhodes that he is bringing hopes of an early reconciliation with the Western Powers. It is also a good sign that Mr. Franklin Brillion *(sic)* has arrived in Angora on a mission from France. Unfortunately there is no sign that Mr. Lloyd George or Lord Curzon have changed their angle of vision. These two statesmen by their Anglophobia are endangering the best interests of the British Empire.

THE VENIZELIST INTRIGUE.

It was fortunate not only for the British taxpayer but for the British Empire that the Venizelist intrigue at the Chequers was exposed early enough before Britain had committed herself to join hands with the Kaiser's brother-in-law in a fresh onslaught on a people who are fighting for their home, hearth and liberty. It is said that in spite of the efforts of Venizelos of Greece and Venizelos of England the Cabinet on Thursday last could not be prevailed upon to sanction an open support of Greece in her brigandage, but unless the British public is careful she might yet secretly be involved in the new war which is said to have already been opened by the bombardment of Turkish towns from the Sea of Marmora that is supposed to have been declared by the Allies to be neutral. We wish we could persuade the British Ministers to act in this critical moment without personal prejudices and proclivities. Venizelos might be a very amiable man to Mr. Lloyd George, but is it just to sacrifice the interests of the British Empire, to bleed the British Empire, and to perpetuate unrest in the world simply to please that amiable or clever man? Old Hellenic culture might have been worhty of the greatest admiration for Lord Curzon, but should the present-day degenerated Greeks be allowed to continue their butcheries and massacres of men, women and children, destroying sacred mosques and dynamiting even tombs and mausoleums? We claim to represent the Muslim world, and with that claim we announce that the whole of Islam will today follow the lead of Mustapha Kemal Pasha, and England must realise that a declaration of war against Angora will be tantamount to a declaration of war against Islam.

THE "IMPERIAL" CABINET.

For the last few years a farce is being enacted in London, and supposed Indian representatives are also invited wehn the responsible Ministers from British Colonies come to this country to meet in conference. This year two Indians have arrived to sit in the conference, one a prince, the other successor of a great public man and the head of a public patriotic institution founded by that great man. The selection has been made by the bureaucracy, NOT by the people. It has perhaps been only an accident that no Mussulman has ever been chosen to join the "Imperial" conference, although very pressing Muslim questions have been before the World — and before the British Empire. Fortunately the people of India have passed that stage when they cared to differentiate between an Indian and Indian because of his creed or race. Fortunately the Muslim question which is agitating the minds of the Indian Muslims has been unanimously upheld by the whole of India without ay distinction of creed or race. Even political

differences have been obliterated when dealing with the Muslim question, which, in fact, is as vital a political question for the whole of India as was the invasion of Belgium or France by Germany for the whole of England, or that Servia by Austria for Russia, that brought about the world war. Every Indian realises that there can never be internal peace in India if the 72 million Muslims of the country are discontented. Every Indian realises that there will always be a danger of invasion for India if England persist in her anti-Muslim policy and continues to employ Indian slaves and mercenaries to destory the liberty of the Muslim nations in Egypt, Mesopotamia, Palestine and Turkey.

Mr. Sastri, one of the Indian delegates to the "Imperial" Cabinet, has had to vote more than one half of the total Indian revenue for the military budget of India. This fact alone will make clear his position in the Indian politics. But we trust that even if he does not represent India he will not MISREPRESENT it. He should make it clear to the "Imperial" Cabinet or conference that if England commits the folly of supporting the Greeks in their war of self-aggrandisement against Turkey not even a military budget of double the amount will succeed in bringing internal peace or immunity from external danger for India. We trust he will describe the true state of affairs in India. How the Hindu and Muslim unity has been achieved and how the masses — 319 millions altogether, with but a few individual exceptions — have awakened to their position. All the people in India (Mr. Sastri is welcome to exclude the few "moderates" if he likes) are now determined that they shall no more allow themselves to be treated as slaves or nobodies. Britain has up till now ignored even their united voice. They have made it clear that if Britain persists in that policy, if she ignores the Indian demands in respect of the Khilafat and the Punjab, then India will retaliate by ignoring Britain. Perhaps there is yet time to save India from becoming an Ireland, but if Britain departs, secretly or openly, from her policy of neutrality in the Greek brigandage against Turkey, then the last hope will vanish. It is the duty of Mr. Sastri to make the matter clear.

INDIAN MUSLIM DELEGATION'S APPEAL TO THE VICEROY.

The following telegram has been sent to the Viceroy of India by the Indian Muslim Delegation:—

His Excellency, Viceroy, Simla.

Fateful critical decision pending before the Cabinet whether England should join Greece or remain neutral. We have put Indian point of view, but Your Excellency's direct representation to the Cabinet on behalf

of India necessary. If England joins Greece against Turkey all efforts for reconciliation in India will be in vain.

CHOTANI.
KIDWAI.

MR. MONTAGU'S TASK

There is no man in the British Empire whose task has been so onerous and trying and also thankless as that of the Rt. Hon. E. S. Montagu, the Secretary of State for India since the time that the great war ended, or at least supposed to have ended by the declaration of an armistice on all the fronts. The Turkish question drew the attention of the whole of India towards itself just as it became evident that Britain was won over by Venizelos to see more his interests than to that of the British Empire. It so happened that the old Gladstonians and old Salisburians coalesced together in their efforts to end the Turkish Empire not only in Europe but also in Asia. The Commission that was appointed at the request of Greece and the personnel of which consisted of not one muslim or even one pro - Turk Christian (yet Mr. Lloyd George thinks it was an" impartial commission") unhesitatingly and remorselessly decided that "the Turkish Empire must cease to exist". Not one responsible man in Great Britain except Mr. Montagu gave a thought to the consequences of this decision to the British Empire.

In the meanwhile ferment in India began to rise among the 72 million Muslims first, and then among the 294 million non - Muslims. The whole of India, without exception of any part or creed or race, urged against the policy of destroying the Turkish Empire. Many prominent and representative leaders of each party spoke to that effect at the almost - hearing distance from Westminster. But no notice was taken of that. Mr. Montagu alone was at his task to press the Muslim point of view. Then the questions of political reforms in India and the atrocities committed in the Punjab also became acute and increased Mr. Montagu's worries. In all these he fought, and fought single - handed, against extremely trying circumstances. We do not approve of the "Reforms" initiated by him: They were more or less spectacular, and have proved so in actual working. We also think that as long as men responsible for the Punjab atrocities remain unpunished, there will remain a slur on his political career, because he was the head of the Government under which those atrocities took place. Unfortunately even to - day the three burning questions in India remain: (1) Turkey; (2) Punjab; (3) self - government. Those who have any knowledge of the inner currents and the political circumstances in this country as well as in India have no doubt that Mr. Montagu has done all that could be expected from any Englishman to do to meet the wishes of India on all questions. His

task has been thankless because he has so far completely failed in all his efforts. Not until he succeeds in having the first question settled that there will be any chance of securing peace in India. Once this question is settled it will be possible to possess a calm atmosphere. He is not so very powerless in other matters, although, of course, he has his own limitations as in the Turkish question. The present-day intrigue of M. Venizelos has come at a very critical time. The situation was improving. The prospects were brightening. But all of a sudden this change took place. We again expect that Mr. Montagu will press the Islamic and Indian point of view in the Cabinet when the matter is put to it for the final decision. We are thankful to him that he did not give up his office, as some persons desired from him, on his failures. We cannot afford to lose friends. He is the most valuable friend Muslims possess in the British Cabinet. And this is a critical time we are passing through.

A Dream Come True.

The Middle-Asian League of Nations.

Our readers will recall a long note we were able to publish on the occasion of the signing of the Turko-Afghan Treaty last month. While commenting on the far-reaching effects of this alliance between Afghan and the Turks, the two most virile peoples of Asia, we were happy to remark:

> But the highest and most stupendous possibility which this alliance contains and which we prayerfully anticipate is that of a Mid-Asian League of Nations. We only await a word from Persia and this dream will become a reality. Once this grand and holy alliance comes into being, we are sanguine the future Peace of Asia will cease to be a problem. We are sanguine, not so much for the reason that it will draw all the nations of the Near and Middle East into bonds of brotherhood of which possession of a common faith is a guarantee, we are sanguine because it exists already in unwritten form. It will not be a pact inspired by self interest of a few commercial nations seeking protection in satisfying their land and oil hunger from the rivalry of others, equally ambitious. On the other hand, it will be an alliance of Brotherhood, devised to ensure immunity to participants from the menace of alien domination. We have reason to say that before long this noble dream of the peoples of Middle Asia will duly see the light of God's day. — Islamic News, May 12, 1921.

We rejoice to hear now that our dream of this Holy League of Nations has come true in every detail. We learn that an influential Persian Delegation from Tehran has arrived at Angora with the special object of opening negotiations for the formation of an alliance between Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan. We hear from reliable sources that the convention in which the negotiations will eventually culminate will not be a merely political agreement of the familiar type; it will be, on the contrary, an agreement which will lay securely the foundations of a new life — political, social,

and intellectual — of the communities of Islam throughout the world. It will for the nonce knit all the disintegrated elements of Muslim East and Muslim West into a strong belt of free, progressive and co - operating peoples who will be determined to resist any and every attempt of foreign domination of any kind or sort. We joyfully welcome the stirrings of this awakening in Persia, for where the Turks and Afghans constitute the hands and brains, the Persian participation in the work of Muslim Reconstruction will furnish the heart of the body - politic. It behoves, therefore, all members of our great family throughout Africa, in India, in Malaya, in China, and even in Arabia, to march forward to welcome this genuine League of Nations based upon aims of self - defence and self - improvement. We trust many millions of our fellow Muslims will join us in fervently praying for the success of this Alliance.

An Authoritative Denial.

It was reported in the columns of the "Daily Telegraph" a few days ago that the Turks had executed six Frenchmen in Anatolia. As no further details were furnished we were naturally anxious to know more about it. We are glad to say now that we have been especially desired by authoritative quarters to contradict this report. The item of news which is the subject of contradiction may be too small to merit detailed notice, but it effectively exposes the attempts made in the Press — always a willing instrument of such schemes — of this country to cast any and every odium on the Turks. After being victims of this kind of campaign of falsehood and slander for over two centuries in Europe, and particularly in England, is it to be wondered at that the taxpayers here should stupidly acquiesce in Mr. Lloyd George's advocacy of the cause of such people as the twentieth century Greeks?

What I Saw on The Front Commanded by Marshal Ismet Pasha.

Eye Witness Account of Anglo – Greek Excesses Near Eski - shakr.

By Mme. B. G. Gaulis.

Mme. Gaulis, on the following day of her arrival at Eski - Shèhir, was offered by Ismet Pasha facilities for a tour on the scene of the recent fighting and she says that if she had known what she would see there "she would not have had the courage to venture the expedition, which is sufficient to distract my conscience, and to give to conscience the heavy feeling of the collective responsibilities". She explains how Ismet Pasha inflicted on the Greeks the bloodiest defeat, just a few days previously. The ground tells

the tale of the terrible fight at the place where the Greeks renewed four times their assault. Machine - gun parties led by English officers — according to the statements made by Greek prisoners officers — stopped the fugitives, and threw them again forward. In spite of every thing the panic started, and the stream of fugitives continued ,leaving on the field for miles helmets, clothes, tinned food, medical supplies, staff papers, stretchers, small lorries, etc. The author adds: "After seeing what I did I refuse to wonder any more at the abundance of dum - dum bullets spread all over the ground".

On arriving in the neighbourhood of the battlefield of Ine Eunu, one party reached the skeleton of the town of Seud.

It is from Seud that the *Anglo - Greek* attack was launched; when the game was lost, and the evacuation became unavoidable, the destruction started, carried out by those special battalions who work behind the Greek front line with an implacable uniformity.

The ruins of Seud remind one in a striking manner what happened in the neighbourhood of Noyon at the time of the first German retreat. It is the same plan of systematic destruction, carried through in the same way. The dynamite had smashed to dust the stone buildings, and the incendiary lozenges and the explosive cartridges had made the rest. Battalions entrusted with this work have worked well everywhere. I found over and over again evidence of their savagery. Everywhere I heard either from the notables or from the Greek prisoner officers that English officers were leading in the orgies of destruction, and my uncomfortable feeling grew more and more. I am a European, and it is the Europe of the Allies who has permitted all *that*".

Further the author says: "Here and there strong groundworks show that the places were once factories, buildings, and schools. The enemy had determined to destroy everything of value. The great mosques were reduced to dust. Orchards and vineyards had been destroyed; all the trees in full bloom lay on the ground.

"The material lost is great indeed. The Greeks have taken everything away, but there is in it something worse than destroyed gardens and houses: these were outrages on women, old men and children".

The author explains that the Turkish population had been exasperated by the abominable outrages on the honour of the weaker sex of a sentimental nature than by the material ruins. To these evidences of Greek immorality and lust are added the horrors of the profanations perpetrated upon the shrines and graves of Islam. A mile or two from Seud was to be found the mausoleum of Ertogrul, a school and a convent. The wife of the Seldjucide, mother of the spouse of Osman, was "resting" close by. This, the inner yard and the trees, as old as the mausoleum, have been objects of

pilgrimage from all over the Islamic world. The grave looked as if it were defying the ravages of time. But dynamite succeeded in accomplishing everything. The granite bed of Ertogrul mausoleum is lying open. The Greek commander, who was operating at Seud, assembled here the Musulman population, and laying his foot on the head of the conqueror's tomb addressed (in a contemptible way) to him in these words: "Get up, you dog; give a reply to my insult". Three days after, on the neighbouring battlefield 30,000 Greeks were falling under the fire of the Turkish guns.

All these old trees have been burned down to ashes, the monumental grating is in atoms, the "türbe" is smashed. In consequence the exasperation of the religious feeling through these excesses, the exasperation of the national feeling through foreign intrigue in the country, are to-day the two facts dominating the actual struggle. In the eyes of the whole of Anatolia the Greeks are nothing but a contemptible enemy; the English Imperialistic party is, in fact, leading in this war.

After this reading, can one wonder that the people of Anatolia have found out that if the attitude of England can deceive the Europeans, they (the Turks) who are the real sufferers have nothing to expect from England but treachery and hate?

Some of the Greek prisoner officers denounce the policy of their country by saying, when questioned by the Turks about these barbarities, "*We did not want it — it is the English who order it*". Greek officers and notable Mussulmans assert that British liaison officers direct the destruction, and are to be found everywhere behind the front line. This I have heard at every halting-place. There is not a single person in the whole of Anatolia who is not convinced that England is seeking for the complete annihilation of Turkey.

The Ottoman Christians.

Intrigues of The Greek Archbishop to Detach Them from Their Allegiance.

It is well known that owing to the extreme tolerance displayed by successive Turkish Sultans from the time of Muhammad II to the present day, many millions of Christian subjects of the Sultan-Khalifa have, and are, enjoying full rights of Ottoman citizenship, some of which are denied or at least cannot be fully enjoyed by their Muslims compatriots. A large community of these Christians is that of the Karmanlis, who from ethnic, cultural and linguistic points of view are Turks in every respect. They are spread over a large part of Asia Minor, chiefly in the region of Smyrna littoral, in districts such as Scalanova, Kara-Bourun, Ak-Hissar,

Ala Shahar. They are also found in Adalia, Konièh, Nighote, Cesеariah, but are found in largest number in the district of Kara - Hissar. The origin of Karmanlis belongs to a remote period of early Asia Minor history. They are the aborigines of Central Asia plateau and of Caucasian regions, and found their way into Asia Minor through joining the Byzantine Armies in large numbers. Although they lived then in compact communities in places here and there, and never permitted themselves to be absorbed by the local populations, in order to avail themselves of the rights and privileges of the Byzantines theocracy they embraced Christianity. Although they thus became orthodox Greek Christians, yet they jealously guarded their language and their traditions and customs. They were affiliated for purposes of Church discipline to Phanar, but their services and other rituals were always conducted in Turkish language. This unique feature of Karmanlis Church, it is interesting to note, is still retained in all branches of their religious life.

Intrigues of The Greek Patriarch.

The Greek Patriarchs, Champions of Hellenism, however, who did not relish the idea of any Christian community maintaining any relationship of cordiality with their Muslim fellow citizens, for scores of years made frantic efforts to persuade these Turkish Christians to abandon their national language and distinctive features of their own Church. As their present social as well as religious constitution shows, the former miserably failed in these wicked efforts. The Nationalist Government of Turkey, for reasons of State, as well as in response to the appeals of their Christian Co - Nationals, have helped dignitaries of Turkish Christian Church in administering the affairs of their flock according to their own old customs and traditions. So this new movement to resist nefarious and vicious propaganda of the Greek chief priest, launched in reality to eventually destroy the existence of a rival Christian organisation, is remarkable in many ways. In the first place it is a spontaneous movement having behind it the full support and consent of the laity. It is, moreover a powerful demonstration of the existence of the racial solidarity throughout Asia Minor. And no wonder that it is so, for do not the Karmanlis speak the same language, have the same facial and other physical characteristics? Greeks of the present day who are themselves of mixed origin have tried to win over the Ottoman Christians by trying to show that they have racial and religious affinity with the latter. But Schlumberger's "Nicephare Phocas", Lambaud's "Histoire Byzantine", and Hammar's "Histoire de L'Empire Ottoman" incontestably proves the pure Turkish origin of the Turkish Christians.

It is perhaps known that the Bulgarians established a National Church of their own in 1872. After its successful revolt against Phanar, the Turkish Christians likewise desire to-day to throw off the unholy yoke of Greek Church tarnished by the vicious and un-Christians political intrigues of its officials, and to constitute themselves into an entirely new Church. A declaration to this effect was signed on May 13th by R. P. Jochim, R. P. Nicola, and R. P. Stamati, on behalf of the community of Sparte, by l'Eveque Adristars and Rev. Haralambos and other notables on behalf of the community of Havza, by Gumuch Haji-Keny, Rev. Petro, Rev. Demitri, and other representatives of Ceaseriah, and 2,747 other dignitaries of the same Church, and presented to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, in which the signatories emphatically pointed out:—

"That they constitute themselves into an independent National Church after repudiating their affiliation with the Orthodox Church of Greece. They were Turks ethnically, linguistically and culturally, and therefore they looked upon with extreme repugnance every attempt and every intrigue which was made by the Greek Archbishop of Constantinople, under the orders of the Church dignitaries of Greece, to cause racial and religious bitterness throughout the Near East in order to gain a vile and base political advantage".

The Recognised Church.

It is reassuring to learn that the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey has acceded to the anxious representations of the ministers of the National Church of Turkey, and has promised to extend to its existence the privilege of legal recognition. Our readers have already read of terms of correspondence which recently passed between Ghazi Mustapha Kemal Pasha and his Holiness the Pope of Rome. We were happy to say then that the Supreme Pontiff of the Catholic Faith had expressed his complete satisfaction at the way in which the Catholic Church had been treated by the Turks. This valuable recognition of Turkish Government's great tolerance towards members of other faiths, and their religious institutions, will, we are sure, be of much greater significance when it is known that a famous Papal pronouncement made, and afterwards preserved in the Archives of Paris, 29th May, 1854, contained the following statement:—

"The enemies of the Christian Church are not the Turks but our own so-called fellow-Christians, members of other Christian Churches in Turkey, who are introducing corruption in the system of Christianity, and are making it a means of their ignoble political ambitions. They have succeeded to-day, so to say, the ancient enemies of the Church who wanted to suppress the growth of Christianity".

After reading these statements is there any honest lover of truth in this country or elsewhere who is prepared to credit wild and baseless charges of Turkish intolerance towards members of their own race who profess Christianity?

F.O. 371/6526.

No. 146

Lord Granville (Athens) to Earl Curzon.

ATHENS, *June 18th, 1921.*
(Received June 19th, 1921).

No. 350.
Telegraphic

Minister for Foreign Affairs left last night for Symrna. Secretary-General only tells me President of the Council telegraphed for him as there were questions which it was difficult to discuss by telegraph and that he will return Monday or Tuesday.

Papers announce that Minister of War has gone from Smyrna to Constantinople. Secretary - General denies all knowledge of this. In newspaper announcement there is an erasure by Censor evidently saying that Minister of War was accompanied by somebody; as this person's name was worth censoring it appears possible that it is General Papoulas. There are several theories to explain this journey: 1. That there are negotiations with Kemal, 2. That Greeks hope to form a base at Constantinople. 3. That Minister of War wishes to negotiate direct with Veniselist officers. Latter appears to me the most probable as General Papoulas is said to be anxious to get their services and Government may think reconciliation with their officers would have good effect in Europe.

It appears to me certain that offensive is postponed: General staff say only for a few days; an officer in Ministry of War says they cannot be really ready for a month, and a usually well informed Veniselist officer says not before August.

General Gramat thinks the King is to make complete tour of front before offensive begins and that Greek Government want to learn definitely before beginning whether there is any hope of assistance from England and France. Serbian Minister thinks Greeks are terrified at allied intervention before offensive while Italian Minister thinks that they are praying for it. Italian Minister expressed to - day fervent hope for Greek success though he did not seem to expect it, as he fears that if Greeks are beaten Kemal will be impossible to deal with. General Gramat thinks Greeks

can take and hold line of railway Eskishehr Kutahia Afiun Karahissar, but fears that with their usual impetuosity they will be drawn on in pursuit of Turks and suffer severe débâcle eventually.

With President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of War and Minister of Marine all in Asia Minor it is even more than usually difficult to get reliable information here.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 350.
Sent to Paris for Lord Curzon.
Repeated to Constantinople.

F.O. 371/6518/E. 6996.

No. 147

Notes of meetings relating to Allied mediation in the Near East, held in Paris, June 18 - 19, 1921

[*E 7154/143/44*]

JUNE 18, 10,30. A. M.

At 10.30 Lord Curzon, accompanied by Sir Horace Rumbold, Mr. Vansittart and Mr. Osborne[1], met M. Briand and M. Berthelot[2] in the former's room at the Quai d'Orsay.

LORD CURZON reviewed the whole situation since the London Conference[3], giving M. Briand the most recent information in the possession of His Majesty's Government relative to conditions in Greece and Turkey, and examined the possibilities inherent in a resumption of hostilities.

He pointed out that the *moment was opportune for a renewal of Allied mediation* *, and then *discussed the terms* on which the Allies should base their proposals. These were briefly an *extension of the London proposals regarding Smyrna, demilitarisation of that part of Eastern Thrace* beyond the Chatalja line, possible further modification of financial control, a general assurance of support to a reconstituted Turkey, a possible suggestion to the Turks that the Allies would see no objection to Turkish expansion in the Caucasus, the abolition

[1] Respectively H.M. High Commissioner at Constantinople, Lord Curzon's Political Secretary, and a member of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office.

[2] Respectively French President of the Council, and Secretary-General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[3] i.e. the Third Conference of London.

* Satırların altı belgenin aslında çizilmiş değil. (BNŞ).

or modification of the tripartite agreement[4], and the other concessions contained in the London proposals[5].

With regard to *Smyrna*, he would propose an ***autonomous province*** under Turkish sovereignty, administered by a *Christian Governor* with the assistance of a mixed gendarmerie under European officers. *Greek troops to be withdrawn* as soon as the gendarmerie could ensure security in the province.

With regard to *Thrace*, he pointed out the obstacles to the Enos - Media line, and suggested, as alternative concessions to Turkish demands, the enforcement of the provisions regarding Adrianople contained in the Minorities Treaty between Greece and the Allies[6], and the demilitarisation of part of the Chatalja line.

His proposal would be to *submit a solution on these lines to the Greeks, and if they accepted it*, to *open negotiations on this basis at Constantinople and Angora.* Were the Greeks to refuse, the matter would of course be at an end. The communication of the Turks would be accompanied by an *intimation* that a refusal would involve the withdrawal of all the concessions contained in the present offer and in the London proposals, as well as possible assistance to the Greeks in the form of a relaxation of financial restrictions, a removal of the embargo on the export of munitions of war, and possibly a blockade of Black Sea and Mediterranean ports of Asia Minor.

He pointed out that *unity of action* among the Allies was an essential condition of success, but that, given loyal cooperation, the omens were favourable.

Finally, he asked that the French Government should agree to the assumption by General Harington of supreme command at Constantinople[7], a stipulation which would have considerable effect on the Turks.

June 18, 3 p. m.

Lord Hardinge[8] joined the Conference.

M. Briand thanked Lord Curzon for his very complete review of the situation, and expressed his entire *agreement in the proposals for mediation.*

French information was to the effect that the Greek army was better organised, but was tired of fighting, and that the Nationalists were apprehensive and anxious for a settlement. There was therefore *a tendency for peace on both sides*, and the moment for mediation was opportune. Failure

[4] This Agreement had been signed on Aug. 10, 1920, by representatives of Great Britain, France and Italy.

[5] See No. 78, Appendix

[6] Of Aug. 10, 1920; the text is printed in *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 113, pp. 471-9.

[7] Gen. Harington was G.O.C.-in-Chief, Army of the Black Sea.

[8] British Ambassador at Paris.

of Allied mediation would, however, render the situation worse than before.

As to Smyrna, he thought it possible to satisfy the Turks on the lines proposed. The port of Smyrna was suffering from military occupation, and therefore commercially of no great value in present conditions. This was realised in Greece, but Greek *amour - propre* had to be safeguarded. Though King Constantine might wish to, he could hardly leave Smyrna [9] while the offensive was pending, although his alleged ill - health was perhaps designed to meet this difficulty. There were also political difficulties at Athens, but acceptance by the Greeks would really depend on their confidence in impending hostilities.

As regards Thrace, M. Briand pointed out that it was the interest of the Allies to effect the transference of the Government from Angora to Constantinople, in which place the Turkish Government could be more readily controlled. But the Nationalists would refuse to come to Constantinople as long as the Greeks threatened its suburbs. The treaty solution of the question was both geographically and ethnically illogical [10]. He would therefore suggest the creation of an *international zone in Thrace* under an international gendarmerie. He was in favour of the early evacuation of Constantinople.

With regard to *finance*, in which French interests were paramount, he would be willing to seek a method of securing essential control that would not offend Nationalist susceptibilities.

The Turks, he said, regarded the 'zones of influence' of the tripartite agreement as the worst encroachment on Turkish sovereignty, but might be prepared to give freely all the concessions desired. M. Briand would be willing, on behalf of France, to *renounce the tripartite agreement*, and thought it might be possible to induce Italy to do the same once her economic interests were secured in some other manner.

He was opposed to accompanying the submission of the Allied proposals to the Turks by threats, as he feared this would endanger acceptance.

Lastly, he said, the French Government were in entire agreement with the general proposals of His Majesty's Government, and had in fact been about to make a similar proposal for mediation.

LORD CURZON welcomed this evidence of Franco - British unanimity, and hoped that Italian adherence could be obtained.

[9] *King Constantine*, accompanied by the Crown Prince, Prences Nicholas and Andrew, the President of the Council (M. Gounaris) and the Ministers of War and Marine, *had left Greece for Symrna on June* 11.

[10] The reference is to the Treaty of Sèvres (Aug. 10, 1920), the text is printed in *B.F.S.P.*, vol 113. pp. 652-776.

With regard to *Thrace*, any proposals to modify the treaty had lapsed when the scheme for a commission of enquiry was abandoned in London [11]. M. Briand had not referred to his own proposal, but had suggested instead an autonomous Thrace. This His Majesty's Government could not accept. Moreover, it would be useless to offer mediation at Athens on condition of the abandonment of Thrace as well as Smyrna.

With regard to threats, he pointed out that M. Briand was under a misapprehension if he thought it was proposed to threaten the Greeks in any way; so far from threatening them, it was intended to offer them help in the future should the Turks refuse our proposals. It would, however, be necessary, while offering *such great concessions to Turkey*, to have a threat in readiness in the event of refusal, and *he knew, from his experience of the East, that a stick behind the back was very useful in dealing with Orientals.*

With regard to procedure, M. Briand had suggested simultaneous action at Athens, *Constantinople and Angora.* He pointed out that it was essential to approach the Greeks first, for otherwise they would say that the Allies had trapped them.

With regard to finance, he welcomed M. Briand's offer of further modifications.

He strongly welcomed the generosity and statesmanship displayed by M. Briand in *assenting to the abrogation of the tripartite agreement*, and he counted on French co-operation at Rome. M. Briand had said nothing as to the plans for approaching the Turks, but he gratefully accepted his offer of united action in the proposed negotiations.

Further, M. Briand had said nothing in regard to the command at Constantinople; he must emphasise this point, as it was of the utmost importance as a demonstration of allied unity.

M. BRIAND in reply said that he agreed to offering mediation first at Athens and subsequently approaching the Turks. He was ready to endeavour to secure Italian aims under the tripartite agreement by other methods, as, for example, a Turkish offer of free concessions.

He enquired whether *His Majesty's Government could not, on their part, meet the Turkish demands in regard to Mesopotamia.*

LORD CURZON said that he was ignorant of these demands, and that he considered it *preferable not to raise the question* of mandated territories. There was a further difficulty, in that Mesopotamia was now dealt with by the Colonial Office and not by the Foreign Office. He would, however, be interested to know what it was that the Turks had asked.

[11] See D. B. F. P./I, Vol. XV, No. 34 for the Greek Government's rejection of this scheme.

M. BRIAND replied that he could not enlighten him on this point, as he had refused to discuss the matter with Bekir Sami[12].

With regard to the *tripartite agreement*, it was necessary to find *a new formula*, for the Italians would be ready to yield the letter but not the substance of the agreement.

With regard to the *Constantinople command*, he said that French opinion was insistent that the French position in Turkey should be safeguarded, but he had no doubt that the matter could be resolved at once.

M. BERTHELOT said that the *Italians would resist* unless some guarantees were provided, such as possibly an undertaking by Great Britain and France not to seek concessions in the Italian zone.

LORD CURZON said he understood M. Berthelot to propose replacing the Allied agreement by an undertaking as between gentlemen, a suggestion in which he concurred.

There followed some further discussion of the *question of command.*

Lord Curzon pointed out that the obligations of the Allies to *protect the Christian minorities* under the tripartite agreement could not be ignored, and that the advantages conferred thereby were inseparable from the responsibilities it imposed.

M. BRIAND agreed, but pointed out that it was *impossible to protect the Armenians everywhere.*

LORD CURZON reiterated the views of His Majesty's Government relative to the protection of minorities.

Further discussion ensued about the tripartite agreement. M. BRIAND pointed out that should this prove to be the sole obstacle to peace Italy's refusal could not be maintained.

LORD CURZON thought that the situation was rendered easier by the fact that the agreement had never been ratified.

He then asked whether M. Briand would examine his proposal relative to *Thrace*, since His Majesty's Government could not go beyond it.

M. BRIAND thought that it *would not satisfy the Turks*, and suggested a *return to the Commission of Enquiry originally suggested in London.*

LORD CURZON said this would ensure failure at Athens.

M. BRIAND thought the Greeks would accept if they really wanted peace, but agreed that the final form of the Thracian solution would only be arrived at when the negotiations had begun.

LORD CURZON asked what the French Government would say if the Greeks demanded the recognition of King Constantine as the price of their acceptance.

[12] Turkish Nationalist Minister for Foreign Affairs. Bekir Sami Bey had led the Nationalist delegation to the Third Conference of London.

M. Briand did not believe they would do so, but added that in no case could the French acknowledge King Constantine.

June 18, 5 p. m.

The Italian Ambassador[13], Signor Galli and M. Kammerer[14] were also present.

M. Briand explained the general proposals to the Italian Ambassador but suggested a revival of the plan for Commission of Enquiry for Thrace should Lord Curzon's proposal be refused.

The Italian Ambassador agreed to the proposal as regards Smyrna and to a commission for Thrace.

Lord Curzon supplemented M. Briand's explanation. He pointed out that if the Greeks refused at the start, nothing more could be done, and the responsibility would rest on them. His Majesty's Government could not, he said, go further than the demilitarisation of a zone beyond Chatalja. With regard to action at Athens he proposed drafting a preliminary invitation; the actual proposals would only be submitted at a further stage.

The Italian Ambassador explained that he was not empowered to accept anything, but would immediately *consult his Government*. He must, however, make the fullest reservations as to the abrogation or modification of the *tripartite agreement.*

M. Briand explained to him at some lenght that it was intended to safeguard all Italian rights under the agreement.

Lord Curzon pointed out that His Majesty's Government must insist on the maintenance of responsibility for the *Christian minorities.*

Lord Curzon then raised the question of procedure at Athens and Constantinople, and discussed how far the Allies should recognise the *duality* between Constantinople and Angora. *It might be found desirable for each of the Allies to sent a representative to the latter place*, but he emphasised the supreme importance of all three Governments acting together and conducting negotiations in *common* and he *referred to and condemned the French and Italian separate agreements with the Nationalists*[15]. *If an agreement were arrived at it*

[13] Presumably the Italian Ambassador at Paris, *Count Bonin.*

[14] Respectively Secretary of the Italian delegation, and Head of the Asia and Oceanic Section in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[15] The Franco-Turkish agreement of March 10, 1921. An agreement between the Italian and Turkish Nationalist Governments for Italian economic development in Anatolia had been signed in London on March 13. A French text of this agreement is printed in Count C. Sforza, *Diplomatic Europe since the Treaty of Versailles* (New Haven, 1928), pp. 104-5.

might be by the three Powers acting together and signing a single document, not by each Power seeking to obtain a separate agreement and special advantages for itself. He also insisted that the offer to Turkey should be accompanied by *an intimation of penalties for refusal.*

M. Briand did not agree, as he considered that the *Allied stick was not big enough to be effective and would only irritate the Turkish extremists.* If any threats were to be made, he would prefer to threaten both sides, but, in the circumstances, he would abstain from threatening either party at the beginning.

Lord Curzon repeated that there was no case for threatening the Greeks, but that the British Government feared that concessions to the Turks would be fruitless unless accompanied by a threat.

M. Briand said that the *French nation would not tolerate a conflict with the Turks by an anti - Turkish or pro - Greek geste.*

Lord Curzon said that British opinion was equally opposed to going to war. But if the Turks refused the concessions offered to them, these must automatically lapse.

M. Briand agreed. He added that the psychological moment had arrived for mediation, since both sides were in a difficult situation. It was the duty of the Allies to do what they could, and he personally believed they would succeed. He enquired whether His *Majesty's Government could not approach the Soviet Government with a view to cutting off this source of supply to the Turks. The treat involved in this procedure would have a great effect on Turkish extremists.*

Lord Curzon pointed out that the Nationalists had a treaty with Moscow [16] and were in closest possible touch with them. The object of the Allies was to detach the Turks from Moscow. His Majesty's Government were prepared to promise all possible assistance to the Turkey of the future if mediation were accepted. He doubted, however, whether it would be of the slightest use to approach the Soviets.

The Italian Ambassador was of like opinion.

The meeting then broke up.

June 19, 10.30 a. m.

Present: M. Briand, M. Berthelot, M. Kammerer, Lord Curzon, Lord Hardinge, Sir H. Rumbold, Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Osborne, Italian Ambassador, Signor Galli.

[16] Signed at Moscow on March 16, 1921. An english text is printed in *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 118, pp. 990-6.

LORD CURZON *read the draft telegram to Athens [Appendix 2]* which he had prepared, and gave a copy to M. Briand and the Italian Ambassador, both of whom expressed themselves as *delighted with its terms*. The latter undertook to submit it immediately to his Government.

M. BRIAND enquired whether the telegram should be despatched before the three Governments had agreed on the *exact terms* to be submitted to the Greeks and Turks.

LORD CURZON thought the *telegram should be sent at once*, but stated his readiness to proceed to the immediate settlement of the proposed terms of settlement.

M. BRIAND said that he could not accept all Lord Curzon's proposed terms without consulting his Government; *he agreed as to Smyrna, but not as to Thrace.*

LORD CURZON said he could not go beyond what he had suggested yesterday, i.e., the arrangement in regard to Adrianople, guarantees for the Moslems in Thrace, and demilitarisation. *But he was not prepared to accept either autonomy or a commission of enquiry; the latter had been refused by the Greeks, and we could not now impose it.*

M. BRIAND *said that the success of mediation depended on meeting the Turkish demands*. The commission of enquiry had, he added, been accepted in principle in London.

LORD CURZON replied that this was a question of fact. The proposal for the commissions had been refused and had therefore lapsed, and other proposals has been devised in its place. The Allies were in no way committed to a commission. *At this stage it was necessary to settle* not the ultimate basis of peace, but *the conditions on which Greece would commit her case to the Allies. She would refuse to give up Thrace.* If, at a later stage, the Turks raised the question of Thrace it could then be considered, but meanwhile we could wait until they did so.

M. BRIAND assented, as it was only a question of procedure.

THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR *said that it was very undesirable to give the Greeks the impression that they had Allied support on the question of Thrace.*

M. BERTHELOT pointed out that a settlement of Thrace might ultimately be arranged between the Greeks and the Turks, and the presentation of our proposals to the Turks did not prevent us from modifying or adding to our conditions at a later date.

LORD CURZON agreed. If the Greeks asked about Thrace we should refer them to our proposal for demilitarisation. If the Turks refused to accept our terms without the inclusion of Thrace we could discuss the matter further. *But let us open the first door before worrying about what might be behind the second.*

M. BRIAND *said that the question of Thrace was therefore reserved.*

Lord Curzon asked the Italian Ambassador whether it was necessary to await a reply to his first telegram to Rome before sending off the telegram to Athens. His Excellency replied that it was necessary to await the Italian agreement on principle, but he expected a reply this evening.

Lord Curzon read to the meeting a telegram from the commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, saying that the Greek offensive was suspended [17].

M. Briand observed; '*L'offensive est suspendue à nos lèvres*' [18].

Lord Curzon raised the question of Bekir Samy's [*sic*] visit to Rome and his alleged mission to the French and Italian Governments [19].

M. Briand said that the visit was entirely unofficial, and might be intended to delay final decision. But he looked to a union of the Constantinople Cabinet, under Izzet Pasha [20], with the Nationalist moderates, including Mustapha Kemal [21], a combination with which we could come to an agreement.

The question of the *Constantinople command* was then discussed, and M. Briand accepted the formula arrived at before the meeting [22].

The Italian Ambassador said he must obtain his Government's concurrence.

M. Berthelot said it would be easy to satisfy the Italians on the question of minor appointments.

M. Briand thought it would be desirable not to make a public advertisement of General *Harington's* assumption of command lest it should be interpreted as a threat, and so endanger the negotiations.

Further discussion followed as to the best means of securing to Italy the substance of her advantages under the *tripartite agreement*. The Italian Ambassador said it was of vital importance to Italy, *as it represented the sole Asiatic fruits of her victory*.

[17] Presumably telegram No. 323 of June 18 from Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to the Admiralty, which read: 'King of Greece remains at Cordelio about three miles North of Smyrna for the present. ?(Offensive) is expected to commence in about a ?(fortnight) after King's visit to the front...'

[18] M. Briand was here indulging in a play on words, the neatness of which it is impossible to convery in English. The literal translation of his phrase is: '*The offensive hangs on our lips*', i.e. '*depends on a word from us*'.

[19] Bekir Sami had arrived in Rome on June 18. He was expected to go *to Paris*, where he arrived on *June* 27.

[20] A former Grand Vizier, at this time Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Turkish government.

[21] Leader of the Turkish Nationalists.

[22] See Appendix 3 for the agreement reached.

M. Briand referred to the Turkish susceptibilities as to the encroachments on their sovereignty, and to their readiness to give the concessions involved. He added that the question was not an urgent one, and suggested that this concession be left until the Turks demand it.

The Italian Ambassador repeated his *reserves*.

M. Berthelot said that the assumption of command at Constantinople must not be too formal; the necessary orders would be sent to General Charpy[23].

Lord Curzon said that the important thing was that it should come into force at once.

Lord Curzon said that *we were telegraphing to Athens. What was the next step? The Greek Government would either refuse or ask what were our conditions. In the latter case we should have the conditions ready.* He therefore offered to prepare a draft reply to the Greek enquiry for later discussion with the two Governments.

M. Briand gladly agreed to this proposal.

Lord Curzon said there was no advantage in discussing the terms further at present, since no reply to the first telegram would in all probability be received from Athens for a week after its despatch, and *the terms of the second telegram must necessarily depend upon the answer to the first.*

The Italian Ambassador said it would be better to forward the second draft direct to Rome from London. Lord Curzon agreed.

Lord Curzon asked a further question as to the alleged missions of M. Franklin Bouillon and Signor Tuozzi to Angora[24]. M. Briand replied that M. Bouillon *had no mission from the French Government, but had gone as a French journalist to report upon the situation.* Count Bonin informed Lord Curzon that Signor *Tuozzi had been stopped by the Italian Government at Rhodes.*

[23] G. O. C. *French Forces* at Constantinople.

[24] M. Franklin - Bouillon, a former Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the French Chamber of Deputies, had arrived in Angora on June 9. Signor Tuozzi, an Italian consular officer, had been sent to Angora, according to a statement made by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs in a conversation with H. M. Ambassador at Rome (reported in Rome telegram No. 230 of June 15), 'to endeavour to induce Angora Government to adopt a moderate policy and to settle all outstanding questions in a conciliatory spirit'.

Appendix 1 to No. 147

Lord Hardinge to Sir E. Crowe[25] *(Received June 20 [9.40 a.m.]*[26]*).*
Unnumbered Telegraphic

Following from Lord Curzon:—

'Please inform the Prime Minister that I have found M. Briand very well - disposed towards *renewal of mediation*, for which he thinks psychological moment has arrived. I gave him all information in our possession and read to him Colonel Nairne's telegrams[27]. French information is to the effect that both Greeks and Nationalists will welcome a solution of their present difficulties which they can accept without loss of *amour - propre*.

'Following procedure has been adopted: A telegram drafted by me and accepted by M. Briand and by the Italian Ambassador, after consultation with his Government, is being despatched to Athens to-night instructing Allied representatives there to address a joint invitation to Greek Government to *accept mediation and* place themselves in our hands (see my telegram No. 389)[28].

'If they agree, we shall submit to the Greeks, and, in the event of Greek's acceptance, then to the Turks, the terms based on Chequers' programme[29], upon which, after prolonged discussion, we have found ourselves in general agreement here.

'I have also persuaded M. Briand to agree to suspend tripartite agreement in its present form though on this point we shall have more difficulty with Italians.

'*I have throughout insisted upon united action*, whether at Athens, Angora or Constantinople, and have deprecated *recourse to independent or clandestine* negotiations conducted by any of the Allies.

'Whether result be favourable or the reverse, at least the first step has thus been taken towards a possible reconciliation'.

[25] Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

[26] Times of receipt and despatch have been added from the filed copy of the telegram received in the Foreign Office.

[27] The reference appears to be to the detailed report on the state of the Greek army transmitted in Smyrna telegram No. 50 (in 4 parts) June 15-18, by *Col. Hoare-Nairne*, H. M. Military Attaché at Belgrade and Athens, temporarily at Smyrna.

[28] i.e. Appendix 2 below.

[29] The programme outlined by Lord Curzon on June 18 had been agreed by a Cabinet Committee on June 9 at 'Chequers', the country house in Buchinghamshire recently given to the nation for the use of British Prime Ministers,

Appendix 2 to No. 147

Lord Hardinge to Sir E. Crowe (Received June 20 [10 a.m.])

Paris, *June 19, 1921*[30].

No. 389 Telegraphic

Following from Lord Curzon:—

'The Allied Governments, after consultation together, have decided to offer their good offices with a view to averting a renewal of hostilities in the Near East and to securing an honourable and lasting peace. They are profoundly convinced that, whatever be the immediate result of renewal of conflict between Greek and Turkish forces in Asia Minor, there are not to be found therein the prospects either of any enduring pacification of the East or of a solution compatible with the real interests and ultimate capacities of either party. The belligerents themselves will possibly not dissent from Allied Governments in this definition of the objects which they should hold in view, and any result which fails to attain them, even if it brings a temporary advantage to one or other party, will be stamped with ultimate failure. In the circumstances, Allied Governments feel that they are only discarghing an international duty, as well as an obligation of friendship, if they inform Greek Government at this critical juncture, before hostilities are reopened, that, if Hellenic Government is disposed to place its interests in their hands, they are prepared to attempt task of conciliation. Should Greek Government decide that they are not prepared to accept outside intervention or advice, the Allied Powers cannot persevere in an action which would obviously be fruitless. In such a case the responsibility for consequences of renewed struggle will rest exclusively on Greeks themselves.

'On the other hand, should Hellenic Government decide, in its own interests, to accept intervention of the Powers, the latter will be prepared to state frankly to Greek Government the terms upon which their assistance will be proffered, and, in the event of these being accepted, to approach Turkish Government with a view to immediate suspension of hostilities and to negotiations for conclusion of peace.

'An identic telegram is being sent to your colleagues at Athens, and you should immediately join with them in making this proposal to Greek Government and in inviting from them a prompt reply'.

(Sent to Athens, No. 1; repeated to Foreign Office, Rome and Constantinople).

[30] This telegram was despacthed on June 20 at 3.13 a.m.

APPENDIX 3 TO No. 147

Lord Hardinge to Sir E. Crowe (Received June 19 [9 p.m.])

PARIS, *June 19, 1921 [6.20 p.m.]*

No. 386 Telegraphic

Following from Lord Curzon for Sir E. Crowe:—

'Agreement was reached this morning with French by which General Harington will assume immediate command of Allied troops in Constantinople, necessary instructions being sent by French Government to General Charpy.

'It was further agreed that military commission should supervise three sub - commissions—

'1. Sub - commission of control, presided over by an Italian officer.

'2. Sub - commission of gendarmerie, presided over by a French officer.

'3. Sub - commission of "special elements", presided over by a British officer.

'It also agreed that post of permanent secretary - general of financial commission should be attributed to a Frenchman and post of inspector-general of customs to a British offical; a third analogous post will probably be devised for an Italian in order to maintain the principle of equal distribution.

'The Italian Ambassador here was unable to accept above arrangement without instructions from Rome, but is submitting them immediately to his Government, and I do not apprehend any difficulty on their part.

'Please inform War Office'.

(Repeated to Rome and Constantinople).

F.O. 406/46, p. 96-102, No. 67.
D.B.F.P., Ist. series, vol. XV, p. 588 - 598, No. 88.

No. 148

Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome).

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 20, 1921.*

No. 515
Most confidential
Sir:—

I have to inform Your Excellency that Sir E. Crowea cting on my instructions, sent a message to the Italian Ambassador on the morning

of the 16th instant that he would be glad if His Excellency would call upon him the same afternoon. When the message reached the Italian Embassy the Ambassador had already left on his way to the Foreign Office, as he proposed to call upon Sir E. Crowe for the purpose of making some communications of his own.

2. Sir E. Crowe opened the conversation with Monsieur de Martino by taking up the subject of my projected visit to Paris, and began by confirming what His Excellency had previously been told as to the groundlessness of the reports in the papers that Mr. Vansittart was engaged upon confidential negotiations in Paris. Mr. Vansittart's visit was devoid of any official character: he had gone on leave to deal with entirely private affairs. It was, however, true as had already been explained to His Excellency the day before, that the *Greco - Turkish situation was causing grave anxiety to His Majesty's Government.* They had come to the conclusion that some further effort must be made without much more delay towards the re - establishment of peace in the Middle East. If the Supreme Council could have met now, an opportunity would have offered for, an exchange of views between the Allied Governments as to the line policy to be pursued in view of recent developments in Anatolia and at Constantinople; but so far we had not succeeded in bringing about an early meeting of the Supreme Council, and meanwhile the situation in the East was assuming a more and more menacing complexion. In these circumstances I had decided, with the authority of the British Government, to proceed to Paris in order to have a frank informal conversation with Monsieur Briand and to arrive if possible at a common understanding. I had proposed to Monsieur Briand to start on the 17th and to remain at his disposal the two following days, suggesting at the same time that the Italian representatives in Paris should be invited to take part in the conversations. Sir E. Crowe added that I was anxious to give the earliest intimation of my plan to the Italian Government, and begged Monsieur de Martino to telegraph to Count Sforza asking him to authorise Count Bonin to attend the proposed informal discussions in Paris. Monsieur de Martino expressed his warm thanks for this communication, which he promised to telegraph to Rome at once.

3. Sir E. Crowe then spoke to the Ambassador very frankly on the general subject of political co - operation between the British and Italian Governments. He went once more over the ground covered by me in my recent conversation with Monsieur de Martino, and laid stress on the difficulty experienced by me in reconciling the constant assurances of Count Sforza as to his desire for the closest friendly relations with us, with the series of transactions entered into by the Italian Government behind our backs with other Powers, either hostile, or standing in peculiar relations to us. He observed that if the discussions in Paris were, as we hoped, to

lead to a fresh effort to bring about an accommodation with the Angora Government, we had to apprehend that the Italian Government, supposed to be tied to us by an active alliance, would find themselves fettered by the agreement they had made with *Mustapha Kemal, under which they undertook to promote a policy diametrically opposed to that which the Allies, including Italy, had agreed upon among themselves and to which they had set their signatures in the Treaty of Sèvres.* When Monsieur de Martino tried to take exception to stating the case so frankly, Sir E. Crowe asked him to explain how the Italian Government were going to fulfil their engagements with Angora to give their full support to all the demands of the Angora Government in the discussions with the Allies. Monsieur de Martino admitted that this was a terrible dilemma, and he had no suggestion to offer as to how it could be met, except to suppose that the Italian Government would find a way to be true to the Allies. Sir E. Crowe said that his remark was merely intended as an illustration of the position in which His Majesty's Government found themselves placed owing to the secret arrangements entered into by Italy unbeknown to the Allies.

4. I myself, as Monsieur de Martino must have observed himself, took an equally grave, if not a graver, view of the conclusion by Count Sforza of an agreement with Afghanistan, again behind the back of His Majesty's Government. Coming after the Angora agreement, and after the protest which I had made with regard to that transaction, this repetition of the same objectionable procedure in an equally important matter had come as a great shock, and I was frankly at a loss to understand how the Italian Government could go on protesting their close friendship for, and desire to act with us, and at the same time do things of this sort. I on my part desired to be perfectly frank in the matter, and earnestly hoped that Monsieur de Martino would explain to Count Sforza as clearly as possible how serious was the view that I took of the situation so produced. I had always been willing to work with Italy, but this was made almost impossible if such things as we complained of, continued.

5. Monsieur de Martino made no attempt to defend Count Sforza on either count: he professed to disapprove altogether both the arrangement with Kemal and the Afghan agreement. He added that his own position in the matter was rendered a little difficult by the fact that he was suspected of working against Count Sforza; there was consequently a danger that what he reported from here might be considered at Rome to be coloured by a desire to exaggerate difficulties in order to do Count Sforza harm. For this reason Monsieur de Martino expressed the hope that I would also instruct you to express our views to the Consulta. He declared that he had faithfully reported all that I had told him on Sunday last. He would, after the conversation today, telegraph again in the sense of what had been said.

Meanwhile, Sir E. Crowe assured him we had not failed to send instructions to you and he told the Ambassador the substance of Count Sforza's reply to you which you had just telegraphed to us. Monsieur de Martino said he himself had been charged with a reply message, which he proceeded to read, and which was found to be more or less in accord with your message, except that it ended with the suggestion that whilst the Italian Government had no wish to do anything as regards Afghanistan, they hoped we should reciprocally act with them in regard to Albania. In answer to Sir E. Crowe's expression of surprise as to what this meant, Monsieur de Martino explained that there were syndicates of British business men busying themselves with concessions in Albania which filled the Italian Government with suspicions and apprehensions.

6. Sir E. Crowe was entirely unable to admit that there was the remotest analogy between the situation in the two countries, and Monsieur de Martino did not press the point.

7. Sir E. Crowe then raised the point of the alleged assurance received by the Italian Chargé d'Affaires at this Office concerning the attitude of disinterestedness, or rather detachment, which His Majesty's Government were assumed by Count Sforza to have adopted towards the affairs of Afghanistan. Monsieur de Martino said he did not remember at all the particular communication that might have been made to the Italian Chargé d'Affaires, but stated that what Count Sforza undoubtedly replied upon was a telegram which he, Monsieur de Martino, had sent to Rome on the receipt of a written communication from this Office [1], in reply to an enquiry on his part [2], enclosing a copy of a White Paper [3] and calling particular attention to a letter appearing in that paper in which Sir Hamilton Grant lays stress on the fact that Afghanistan is now an independent country and has entire freedom as regards both foreign and internal affairs.

8. Sir E. Crowe said that this was no doubt a correct description of the theoretical situation, but it was inconceivable that the Italian Government should not have known the Afghanistan stood in a peculiar relation to the Government of India, and the fact that Count Sforza entered into this agreement without any previous discussion with the British Government,

[1] Of June 10, not printed.

[2] In a Memorandum of May 30, the Italian Chargé d'Affaires had asked to be informed of British views respecting the international legal position of Afghanistan and whether His Majesty's Government considered the Anglo-Afghan Treaty (of 1905) to be abrogated.

[3] Cmd. 324 of 1919, *Papers regardings Hostilities with Afghanistan*, 1919, which includes the text of the Anglo-Afghan Peace Treaty of August 8, 1919. This treaty contemplated the conclusion of a treaty of friendship between the Governments of India and Afghanistan.

with whom he professes to be so anxious to co - operate on all matters—and, he added, without even informing us afterwards except when *we*, having become acquainted with the matter from other sources, remonstrated with him — seemed to make it clear that he had some reason in coming to this arrangement of which he preferred that we should know nothing.

9. Monsieur de Martino emphasized Count Sforza's categorical declaration that the agreement had no other object but to promote Italian commercial interests. Sir E. Crowe suggested to Monsieur de Martino that it would take a very powerful magnifying glass to discover the commercial interests of Italy in Afghanistan. Moreover, Count Sforza had admitted in his conversation with you [4] that the Mission would have duties not connected with commercial matters, namely to report on the activities of the Russians and Turks in Afghanistan, although this was described as only an incidental part of their functions. When Monsieur de Martino again assured him that the Mission would not be composed of diplomats but of the agents of Italian commercial houses and banks, Sir E. Crowe said that, if the Ambassador would not mind his making a very frank statement, he would call his attention to the fact, which had been mentioned to His Excellency on more than one occasion, that we had no reason to trust the proceedings of the agents of Italian banks in the East, whom unfortunately we found engaged everywhere in the most pernicious anti - British propaganda. He could only say that the idea of having the Banco di Roma and their agents established in Kabul was not a matter upon which British interests were to be congratulated.

10. Monsieur de Martino assured Sir E. Crowe that he was deeply impressed with the necessity of putting an end to the feeling which he could quite understand had been created here by these and other incidents. He was quite determined to do all in his power to get the relation of the two countries back on a footing of harmony and hearty co - operation. He asked what, as regards the Afghan treaty, had better be done. Sir E. Crowe replied that while he had not seen the text of the treaty, he gathered that one of its main features was the promise to send an Italian Mission to Kabul. He did not know whether anything was stipulated as to the date on which this Mission was to proceed; he thought the Italian Government would be wise if they prevented that Mission from starting. It ought not to be difficult, he thought, for them to find reasons, first for delay, and perhaps later, for the total abandonment of the Mission. In any case he thought His Majesty's Government would expect to be further consulted before that Mission actually proceeded on its way.

[4] This conversation was reported in Rome telegram No. 229 of June 14, not printed.

11. Monsieur de Martino took everything that was said in very good part and repeated his promise to make it clear how unfortunate was the impression created here by the Italian proceedings.

12. Sir E. Crowe then took the occassion to refer also to the visit of the Italian man - of - war to Alexandria [5]. On this subject Monsieur de Martino was ready with an explanation and handed him a short note, according to which the fault for this particular incident lay with the Italian representative at Cairo. According to a report now received from the latter, he had not understood from Lord Allenby [6] when he saw him, that there was any objection to the visit of an Italian ship and he had consequently not at the time made any report to Rome at all, so that the Italian naval authorities were in complete ignorance of the objection which had been raised by His Majesty's representative. Now that the Italian Government were aware of our views, they will be quite prepared, if we desire it, to recall the ship. Sir E. Crowe said they had better recall it at once, and Monsieur de Martino said he would immediately telegraph, but he had no doubt it would be done.

I am, &c.,

(For the Secretary of State)
LANCELOT OLIPHANT

D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol. XVII, p. 263 - 267, No. 249.

No. 149

General Harington (Constantinople) to War Office.

Handed in: 15.00 20. 6. 21.
Received : 17.30 20. 6. 21.

Paraphrase.
Clear the line.
Secret

454 cipher June 20th. *Ist of five parts.*

An incident of a very extraordinary nature has happened. As I stated in a recent report, Major Henry, a demobilized officer who did great work for us in command of Australian tunnelling company in the Ypres Salient,

[5] In Cairo telegram No. 390 of June 6, Lord Allenby had reported that the Italian cruiser, 'Nino Brixio', had entered Alexandria harbour on June 4. In his telegram No. 400 of June 10, he further reported an interwiev with the Italian Minister at Cairo, in which the Minister explained that the ship was on its way to Constantinople and that he had had no foreknowledge of its visit to Alexandria.

[6] British High Commissioner for Egypt.

left for Angora 10 days ago to prospect for mining business. I instructed him to get what information he could concerning our prisoners and Mustapha Kemal's military intentions. He got to Inebouli and was very well received. Arrangements were made by Mustapha Kemal for car to take him to Angora. Unfortunately very bad storms broke and road has been washed away. Mustapha then sent a wire to Rafet, one of his best Generals, to speak on his behalf. He wished me to be informed that our prisoners are quite all right and that he is willing to release them all. He also stated that Medlicott, who has been ill, is much better and that Rawlinson is at Erzerum. Message was also sent by Mustapha saying that he is anxious to get into touch with me.

2nd Part.

Although I have had two nibbles like this before I have never had a direct offer. I would like (group omitted) to come and meet me at Therapia or Inebouli but he would not be allowed to do this by what he calls the Senate of Extremists round him. Henry quite rightly made a point that Mustapha should come to Bosphorus if he wants to see me and the same applies to Rafet. Answer was that either would be quite willing to do so but they dare not. According to Rafet, Mustapha is practically confined to Angora by the Extremists. He therefore asks if I would meet Rafet at Inebouli. Rafet is authorised to act on his behalf and is in touch with him by private telegraph. He wishes to state his case to me personally and he guarantees my safety. Henry gives me to understand that Mustapha is very bitter against the Greeks and has no (group omitted) of their offensive and every confidence ?in his own army. Henry gives an excellent account of this.

3rd Part.

Mustapha Kemal is very bitter against French but is not at all bitter against us. Rafet's explanation of recent outburst of violent anti - British propaganda was that it is necessary to morale of Nationalist movement. Also that Greeks insinuations inspire this propaganda to a large extent. He is apparently prepared to agree to plebiscite for Smyrna and Thrace. He has no intention of attacking Greeks yet or of interfering with us. He says that he has plenty of money while Greeks will soon be bankrupt. He has no use for Bolsheviks except to help his object. Country is, from all accounts, rich and cultivated everywhere. Mustapha Kemal apparently wants to communicate his views to me as one soldier to another and he wants to make sure of his ground so as to throw over his Senate of Extremists as, according to his own statement, he is moderate himself.

4th Part.

It is a very curious coincidence that only today Izzet Pasha sent me a message asking if I would grant him an interview to which I replied I would only do so if High Commissioner approved. As you know I have kept myself entirely free of politics which are no concern of mine and have never seen a Turkish official. Personally, if His Majesty's Government approve, I am quite prepared to go to INEBOLI on a British warship and hear Mustapha Kemal's views from himself, and will report my interview verbatim for the information of His Majesty's Government. But I hold strongly the view that Mustapha Kemal should come in person and state his case. I should naturally only hear his story and should not commit myself in anyway.

Last Part.

I do feel, much as I dislike mixing myself up in matters which do not concern me, that the situation here is so difficult and exceptional that if Mustapha Kemal really wishes to state his case to me I should go and hear it but only if His Majesty's Government approve. I do not think I could do harm and I might do good, it should provide an acid test of whether Mustapha Kemal is a free agent or entirely in the hands of Moscow. I have shown this wire to Admiral de Robeck and Mr. Rattigan and your early instructions are now awaited by me. The only political questions I would propose to discuss would be those entrusted to me by Mr. Rattigan. I would propose to conduct a formal meeting at the conclusion of which I would produce a proces verbal to be signed by Mustapha Kemal and this, together with my own impressions, I would submit to His Majesty's Government.

F.O. 371/6471/E. 7174.

No. 150

Mr. Rattigan (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon.

20th June, 1921, 1,55 p.m.
(Received 21st June, 11.30, a.m.)

No. 443.
Decypher.
VERY URGENT.

General Harington has shown me the draft of his telegram to the War Office respecting message communicated to him from Angora through Major Henry.

I have discussed that matter fully with General Officer Commanding and Admiral de Robeck.

We are unanimously of the opinion that if General Harington is authorised by His Majesty's Government to enter into any kind of pourparlers with Mustapha Kemal, the latter should be told that if he has anything of importance to say, General Harington is prepared to hear it. But Mustapha Kemal must come in person to some point on the coast where the General could await him on a warship. Conversations could take place on board. We must in fact make it quite clear that we are not in any way running after Kemalists. Your Lordship's knowledge of the East will of course enable you to appreciate the importance of making sure that the whole proposal is not a mere device to gain prestige by giving us the appearance of sueing for their favour.

Mustapha Kemal's statement that he cannot leave Angora means one of two things. Either he is virtually a prisoner of extremists in which case his value is unimportant, or statement is merely a pretext which would appear to lend colour to possibility that whole proposal is a stratagem to gain prestige.

If he really does hold reins and seriously intends to make some reasonable offer then he should have no difficulty in meeting General Harington at some point on the coast.

If it was not for my entire confidence in General Harington's exceptional tact, caution and sound judgement, I would be inclided to advise against proposed meeting. But if the matter is in his hands, I do not apprehend that anything will be done to commit His Majesty's Government or to give appearance that we are courting Kemalists.

F.O. 371/6471/E. 7108.
D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol. XVII, p. 261 - 262, No. 247.

No. 151

Memorandum by Mr. Osborne.

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 21, 1921.*

E. 7174/1/44.

In view of the Secretary of State's insistence at Paris on loyal and united action by the Allies, I think it is clear that Gen. Harington cannot have this interview with Mustapha Kemal or Rafet alone, if at all. And as it is possible that suspicion may be aroused in Paris or Rome by Gen. Townsend's visit to Constantinople and his reported intention to proceed to Angora, it might have an excellent effect were we to communicate this offer to

the French and Italian Governments and possibly suggest to them that if the meeting does take place Gen. Harington should be accompanied by the French and Italian Generals or their representatives.

But I am very doubtful whether the invitation should be accepted, unless it be simply to discuss the prisoners question. It looks like further evidence of Nationalist nervousness of our intentions and this we do not want to allay. It is also probably an endeavour to engage us in separate negotiations and so still further to compromise Allied unity. This has proved successful with the French and Italians but a refusal on our part would have good results both at the Allied capitals and at Angora.

Moreover if Mustapha Kemal is at the mercy of the extremists (which I doubt) he is no longer qualified to speak for Angora and it is the extremists we shall have to deal with. This may, however, only be another method of confronting us with the Russian - pan - Islamic bogey.

I suppose we shall hear officially from the War Office about this but we need not wait to make our views known to them.

D. G. Osborne *21/6.*

F.O. 371/6471/E. 7174.

No. 152

Extracts from Conclusions of a Meeting of the British Cabinet held on 21st June, 1921, at 6. p.m.

(6) The attention of the Cabinet was invited to telegrams from General Sir J. Harington to the War Office, No. 454, dated June 20, 1921, and from Mr. Rattigan, at Constantinople, No. 443, dated June 20, 1921, reporting the receipt of a message from Moustapha Kemal, communicated through Major Henry, indicating a desire to meet General Harington.

In the course of the discussion a suggestion was strongly pressed that, with a view to countering the influence of the Bolsheviks at Angora and to preparing a favourable atmosphere at Angora for later negotiations, advantage should be taken of this overture to enter into relations with Moustapha Kemal. Stress was laid on the importance of this question from the point of view of the negotiations on the verge of completion at Kabul with Amir of Afghanistan. It was pointed out that, at the moment when the Allies were awaiting the reply of the Greek Government to their offer of mediation it might be premature to enter into any communication with Moustapha Kemal, and it was agreed that the French and Italian Governments would have to be informed in advance should we decide to proceed in the matter.

The Cabinet agreed to adjourn the discussion until the meeting of the Cabinet on the following day at 6 p.m.

P.R.O. — CAB./23 - 26 Cabinet 51 (21).
F.O. 371/6472.

No. 153

War Office to Foreign Office.

LONDON, S. W.
22nd. June 1921.

0152/5875 (M. I. 2).
Secret
Sir,

I am commanded by the Army Council to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of a telegram No. 454, dated 20th June 1921, received from the General Officer Commanding-in - Chief, the British Army in Constantinople, relative to a proposal received from Mustapha Kemal that Lieutenant - General Sir C. H. Harrington should meet him and hear his views on the situation.

I am to say that the Council hope that Earl Curzon of Kedleston will be disposed to give very early consideration to this telegram, and that they may be informed as to his views, so that they may be in a position to reply to General Harington with as little delay as possible.

I am to add that the Council concur in the opinion expressed by General Harington that if it is the wish of His Majesty's Government that a meeting should take place, it is most important that Mustapha Kemal should come in person. They are further of opinion that the meeting might conveniently take place at some point on the coast of Anatolia, where General Harington could await Mustapha Kemal on a British warship.

I am, Sir,

Your Obedient Servant,
For The Secretary

F.O. 371/6471/E. 7174.

No. 154

Extracts from Conclusions of a Meeting of the British Cabinet held on 22nd June, 1921, at 6 p.m.

(1) With reference to Cabinet 51 (21), Conclusion (6), the Cabinet continued their discussion on the desirability of making some response to Mustapha Kemal's expressed desire to meet General Harington.

The suggestion was made that a reply should be sent to General Harington to the following effect: —

> If Mustapha Kemal himself wishes to see you, His Majesty's Government think it would be useful that you should invite him to come to some place on the coast convenient to you and him and meet him. The time is not yet ripe for any definite offer or message to the Angora Government, but it would be most useful to get information as to the exact position of the Angora Government vis-a-vis the entente and the Bolsheviks, and to warn it that the Angora Turks will have to choose between the dangerous influences of the Bolsheviks and continued warfare on the one hand, and peace and restored good-fellowship with the entente on the other. In any case Henry's conversations are most useful. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is communicating your intentions to the French Government.

The above suggestion was supported on the ground that, to establish contact through an informal and unofficial line of communication might be very valuable as a preliminary to, and for purpose of preparing a suitable atmosphere for eventual official negotiations.

It was strongly urged, however, that the assent of France and Italy was an essential preliminary to any action of the kind proposed, that in dealing with orientals it was always a mistake to respond to overtures with too much alacrity; that it would be essential to insist on Mustapha Kemal coming himself to Constantinople; and that, if conversations took place, they should be conducted by an experienced diplomatist, who should be of rank corresponding to that of the Angora emissary.

The Prime Minister proposed that in any conversations which might take place General Harington should be accompanied by a diplomatist, such as Mr. Rattigan at Constantinople.

The Cabinet were very reluctant to miss an opportunity for a conversation with Mustapha Kemal himself which, it was generally felt, might prove useful, though they were not favourably inclined to conversations with secondary persons.

They agreed that:—

> As an essential preliminary to any action in Turkey in response to Mustapha Kemal's overtures the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should communicate the facts to the French and Italian Governments and ascertain their attitude towards the suggestion.

P.R.O. — CAB. 23/26/CABINET 52 (21).
F.O. 371/6471

No. 155

Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris) and Sir G. Buchanan (Rome).

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 22nd, 1921. 9.0. p.m.*

Cypher telegram.
No. 341.

Please inform French/Italian Government that an offer has been received through a reliable source from Mustapha Kemal to sent one of his general officers to converse with General Harington at the port of Ineboli on the Black Sea. General Harington holds strongly the view that Mustapha Kemal should come in person to state his case, and that preferably he should come to Constantinople. The intermediary, however, replied that Mustapha Kemal is practically confined to Angora by the extremists, and that neither he nor his representative dares go to Constantinople.

We are reluctant to throw away opportunity of conversation, although cannot be certain that overtures may not be intended, either to gain time or to cause disunion among the allies. Please tell French/Italian Government that with their concurrence we propose to reply that a British representative will be prepared to meet Mustapha Kemal himself on Black Sea and hear what he has to say. We are not favourably inclined to conversations with secondary persons. Kindly ascertain views of French/Italian Government on this suggestion which I make to them in spirit of community of action which I advocated so strongly at Paris.

Sent to Paris No. 341 and Rome. (No. 267).

F.O. 371/6471/E. 7108.

D.B.F.P. 1./XVII, p. 270 - 271, No. 253.

No. 156

Sir A. Peel (Sofia) to Earl Curzon.

SOFIA, *June 22, 1921.*
(Received June 24.)

No. 84.
Telegraphic. R.

My telegram No. 82 of 18th June.

The warning I gave the King that, if Kemal and Bolsheviks were carrying on intrigues with Macedonian and Thracian - Bulgarian commit-

tees, as would appear to be the case from information which had reached me, and that if, as a result, disturbances were to break out in Thrace, Bulgarian Government would not escape responsibility, appears to have thoroughly alarmed Prime Minister, as on his arrival yesterday in Sofia he came at once to see me.

After protesting that he looked to Great Britain as the only real friend and protector of Bulgaria, and that he could not be sufficiently grateful for action taken at the instance of His Majesty's Government during his illness in warning Serbia against proceeding to apply to Bulgaria a policy of sanctions, he asserted that, even if Thrace were to be handed over to this country by Greece, he would first request assent of His Majesty's Government.

He went on to deny that he had ever had any communication with Jevet Abbas, and promised that an investigation should be instituted by Ministry of the Interior into alleged negotiations with committees, and that if my information proved correct and any Kemalists were found they would be expelled and any member of committees discovered to be implicated in these proceedings would be superseded, and he offered to give me names of any Bulgarians if known to have left or who he heard intended to leave for Angora and bring them to see me on their return.

He said that a law was about to be passed whereby death penalty would be inflicted on all persons found guilty of being connected with acts of brigandage on the frontier.

He also denied that he had had any relations with Soviet Government, and declared that he had even requested Czechoslovak Government, who have a representative at Moscow, to look after interests of Bulgarian prisoners of war in order not to appear to be in contact with Soviet Government on any point.

He would take all necessary measures to stop traffic in arms between Varna and Bourgas and ports on Thracian coast, and send a commission to enquire into this matter.

F.O. 371/6519/E. 7224.

No. 157

Lord Hardinge (Paris) to Earl Curzon.

PARIS, *23rd June, 1921.*
(Received 24th June, 1921.)

Telegraphic.
No. 411. (D).

Your Lordship's telegram No. 341 yesterday*.

I have communicated to French Government contents of your telegram and reply that you suggested should be given to proposal of Mustapha Kemal.

M. Briand stated he, for his part, has no objection to a conversation and he agrees that it should be with Mustapha Kemal himself, unless his presence at meeting is a physical impossibility. But he fears a meeting before Greeks have accepted offer of mediation might anticipate moment when official discussions with Turks as agreed upon with you, must commence. When Greeks have accepted, it would then be desirable to make Mustapha Kemal or his envoy a similar offer of mediation so that possibility may be avoided of terms being stated at a preliminary meeting from which it might be difficult to get Turks later to recede.

M. Briand expressed his thanks for common action you are taking in this matter.

F.O. 371/6471/E. 7199.
D.B.F.P., Ist. Series Vol. XVII, p. 271 - 274, No. 256.

No. 158

Mr. Rattigan (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *June 23rd 1921, 6 p. m.*
(Received June 24th 1921, 11.40 a.m.)

Telegraphic.
No. 450.
Secret.

My telegram No. 449.

I am personally very averse to the idea of getting into any kind of secret negotiations with Angora Government. I doubt whether any good would result therefrom and Kemalists would be sure sooner or later to give out that we are intriguing with them behind backs of our allies. Our refusal

* Bkz. No. 155.

hitherto to stoop to this sort of thing has certainly enhanced Turkish respect for us while our allies have apparently gained little beyond contempt from their efforts in this direction.

Proposal of General Harington merely to listen to anything of importance Kemal may have to say is of course on a different footing. As I have said (? I would object) even to this were it not for my entire confidence in General Harington.

F.O. 371/6471/E. 7225.

No. 159

M. Rizo - Rangabé, Chargé d'Affaires of Greece, to Earl Curzon.

GREEK LEGATION, LONDON, *June 23, 1921.*

My Lord,

REFERRING to my letter of yesterday's date, I now have the honour, in conformity with the instructions of my Government, to submit to your Lordship herewith a memorandum, despatched to me from Smyrna on the 20th instant. The memorandum, drawn up by the Prime Minister, M. Gounaris, after a complete survey of the situation in the Near East, embodies, with the full concurrence of His Majesty the King, the definite conceptions arrived at by the Royal Government concerning the political and military aspects of this situation as it now presents itself.

I have, &c.,

A. RIZO - RANGABE.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 159.

Memorandum.

AT the moment of the resumption by Greece of military operations in Asia Minor, the Greek Government feels itself in duty bound to place before the British Government the fundemental causes of the struggle being undertaken by the Greek people. The Greek representatives at the London Conference did not fail confidentially to give proof to the British Government of their conciliatory spirit, which was prompted by their earnest desire to secure definite peace without further sacrifices. The Greek Government is convinced that the British Government was well aware that this attitude did not emanate from any doubt as to the ability of Greece to bring this conflict to a victorious issue. Unhappily, a similar spirit of conciliation did not prevail with Angora. Intoxicated as a result of the agree-

ments entered into with France and Italy, the Turkish representatives did not even consider worthy of answer the proposals made to them by the conference, notwithstanding that these proposals offered in their favour modifications of essential points in the Treaty of Sèvres.

It is well known that the hostile concentrations observed, and the fear of reinforcement of the Kemalist lines opposed to the Greek army by troops drawn from the Turkish forces in Cilicia, made it incumbent upon the Greek Government, on the ground that the security of the Greek army was menaced, to decide on the offensive which took place on the 23rd March.

The offensive revealed how well founded were the apprehensions of the Greek army command as to the enemy reinforcements, which made their appearance when the armies came into collusion, it being moreover demonstrated that they were in even greater number than had been anticipated. Notwithstanding complete success on the southern front, which resulted in the seizure of the railway from Ouchak to 50 kilom. beyond Kara - Hissar, on the northern front of Broussa the Greek army encountered before Eski - Sheir an unexpected enemy concentration which disposed not only of men greatly superior in number to those formerly present, but also of a far stronger artillery both in number of guns and heavier calibre, the latter, obviously, being available as the result of surreptitious raids on inter-Allied munition depots.

Fighting with incomparable gallantry, the Greek army occupied, one after the other, the very strongly fortified enemy defences; but, because of the losses sustained by the Greek forces owing to the sudden appearance of the heavy artillery, the general in command was compelled to order a postponement of the operations in order to resume them after fuller preparations. In the face of reports spread abroad in the European press, the Greek Government deems it necessary to emphasise the fact that, confronted with these conditions, the Greek army halted the attack on its own initiative. The enemy did not even dare to leave his trenches, and made not the slightest attempt to interfere with the return of the Greek troops to their original positions. And when, after the suspension of our operations on the northern front, the enemy attempted a supreme effort to achieve some kind of success, concentrating nearly all his available forces from Eski - Sheir and launching an attack near Toulou - Bounar against our southern army, he met with complete failure, being repulsed with heavy losses.

From the operations of March, however, one fact stood out clearly, and that was that the enemy had assumed a new character quite different from the one he had shown up to that time. Instead of undisciplined hordes fighting with indifferent war material, the Greek army now found itself

confronted with an organised military force possessed of efficient war material, including guns, even to weapons of heavy calibre.

This new phase of the war, revealed for the first time by the March operations, placed the Greek Government under the necessity of providing measures to reinforce and strengthen the Greek army in such a way as to allow no doubt as to its fighting superiority in every respect over the enemy as he now appeared.

The Greek Government did not hesitate for one moment to prosecute this course, in full consciousness that in doing so it was realising the irrevocable determination of the whole Greek people, unanimous that, with its own forces, its will should be imposed on the enemy in Asia Minor. This conception of the Government tallied absolutely with the facts; for the Greek people willingly and enthusiastically proffered themselves for the provision of men for the reinforcement of the army and of financial means necessary to carry out the struggle. The National Assembly unanimously voted a loan of 625,000,000 drachmae, the entire Greek people applauding this decision. The recruits of the seven classes called to the colours far exceeded in number those who had responded to any previous summons to the ranks. Of the three classes first called, it was forecast on the results of previous calls that the number who would present themselves would amount from 40,000 to 45,000, which estimate was communicated to the British Government last March. As a matter of fact, on this occasion 53,000 men came forward to join their units.

Of the four classes called up subsequently, two of which classes were of older men and consequently considerably reduced in number, 58,000 rallied to the colours instead of the 45,000 as had been estimated.

The above facts prove in a way beyond all doubts that the Greek Government has judged accurately when it based its action on the conviction that this its policy, serving the paramount and vital interests of Greece, justifying every sacrifice, responds to the deeply - rooted conscientiousness of the whole of the Greek people, a conscientiousness which has manifested itself in the most eloquent way by the willingness with which the entire nation has offered its blood and treasure to carry out the struggle. It was impossible for the Greek people to conceive this policy in a different light from that in which the Government viewed it.

In the most deeply cherished and sacred memories of the Greek nation an historical past, extending over many centuries, replete with glory and an unapproached civilisation, links the lands in which this conflict is being carried out to - day for the future of the Greek race, which for thirty centuries and more has preserved, and still preserves, its superiority in every respect over every race which has migrated from Asia. It needs but a glance

at the map to convince anyone and especially every Greek conscious of the destiny of his race, that Hellenism needs this naturally - formed geographical unit of the shores, European and Asiatic, of the Ægean Sea, with the islands therein, in which to thrive and develop freely so as to fulfil its mission — a mission to stand as a bulwark affording security to Europe against dangers from Asia, which dangers, owing to her geographical position, Greece is the first to sustain, and to form a bridge linking the two continents for the common benefit of a civilisation uniform on both shores.

Inspired by these convictions springing from the national soul, the Greek people accepts with an unshakable determination the policy which is being pursued to - day by the Greek Government, a policy which it does not regard as a chance episode in Greek history, nor as an accidental occurrence into which it was thrust by the circumstances of the world war, but as the fulfilment of an historical necessity in the direction towards which the Greek people has always felt an irresistible propulsion, arising both from the impressive memories of the past and the imperious necessities of the present and future. In pursuit of such a policy, which so plainly and so inalienably corresponds with eternal Greek interests — if the use of such a word as "eternal" is permissible when speaking of human affairs — the Greek Government is at the same time fully conscious that, representing on this point also the conviction of the people, this policy does not conflict with wider issues relevant to the new international status now being created. To the contrary, it contributes strongly to the realisation of aims which are of paramount importance to the said status, in which comes first and foremost the aim of establishing a real and lasting peace in the East, which is impossible without rescue of the territory concerned from the intolerable Turkish administration.

Moreover, the existence of important interests to Great Britain in the satisfactory settlement of the regions in question does not escape the attention of either the Greek Government or people, and as these interests coincide as regards their general direction and their particular bearing in these regions with the interests of civilisation in general, the Greek Government considers the policy it is pursuing with the assent of the Greek people is serving a purpose of general beneficent utility.

Since the establishment of the Greek Kingdom this concurrence of the wider British interests with their own has been recognised by the Greek people and their political leaders, and that is why Greece has always regarded England as the one Great Power which, not only for her sincere liberal spirit, but also because of this concatenation of interests, was the one called upon to proffer her support for the liberation of Hellenism from foreign domination. In each of the many instances when

this assistance has been forthcoming it has been recognised instinctively by the Greek national conscience as a fresh manifestation of this twofold motive of liberal spirit and common interest, encouraging the hope of co-operation with England. This is also one of the deep and fixed conceptions of the Greek people which all Hellenic Governments have followed. No less was this principle maintained by those Governments which were, nevertheless, represented by political opponents, for reasons of internal politics, as being in opposition to the will of the Greek people. The present Government is also permeated with this same policy.

Great Britain, being, as a matter of course, above all other great and small Powers interested in the security of the freedom of the Straits and the free use of the Eastern Mediterranean basin, cannot but recognise as the faithful and sincere guardian of this freedom Greece, who, also in her own interests, is determined to fulfil this mission, and is capable with her own resources to carry it out.

At this moment when Greece, with her whole heart and soul, enters the arena ready to sustain heavy sacrifices, the Greek Government deems itself in duty bound to manifest to the British nation the deep consciousness which inspires the Government and people, and the hope which the Greek people nurtures in its bosom that England also shares these views as set forth above — a hope that supports Greece in the struggle she is now undertaking.

At the last conference in London the Greek delegates made it clear to the British Government that they were inspired by these conceptions, freely and sincerely expounding in confidence to the British Government their thoughts and opinions, and listening willingly to any suggestions put forward by the British Government. And now when the resumption of the struggle in Asia Minor is imminent, assuming a new shape and with forces considerably increased, the Greek Government again deems itself in duty bound to interpret to the British Government these views common to the Greek people. The Government reiterates its willingness to hear and consider with the warmest interest any suggestion made by the British Government tending to adapt the situation, which will shape itself out of the struggle into which Greece is entering at the imperative dictates of the interests and rights of the Greek nation, to the policy expounded in this memorandum. Such is the policy guiding the Greek Government as the agent of the will of the Greek people in this struggle.

Smyrna, *June 20, 1921.*

F.O. 406/46, p. 103-105, No. 68.

No. 160

Mr D. G. Osborne, of Foreign Office, to Mrs Rawlinson, Barrybank, Ashton, Gourock.

Foreign Office, *June 25, 1921.*

Madame,

With reference to the letter from this Department No. E. 2469/748/44 of the 2nd March last, relative to the detention of Colonel Rawlinson in Anatolia, I am directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to inform you that Major Henry, a demobilized officer who landed about the 11th instant at Ineboli on the Turkish coast of the Black Sea, with a view to prospect for mines but was prevented by floods from continuing his journey up-country, received a telegraphic message from Mustafa Kemal regarding the British prisoners in the Nationalists' hands. Mustafa Kemal stated that all the British prisoners were safe and well and Colonel Rawlinson is now at Erzerum*.

I am, Madame, your most obedient humble servant,

(Signed) D. G. Osborne.

F.O. 371/6503/E. 7297.

No. 161

Earl Granville (Athens) to Earl Curzon.

Athens, *June 25, 1921*
(Received July 6.)

(No. 275).

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of the Greek Government's reply to the Allied proposals regarding the cessation of hostilities.

(Copy sent to Constantinople).

I have, &c.,

Granville.

* Ayni mektubun benzeri, ayni tarihle, Sheffield'de Rev. W. E. Medlicott'a da gönderilmiş ve sonunda John Medlicott'un iyi olduğu bildirilmiştir. "Mustafa Kemal stated that all the British prisoners were safe and well and that Mr. Medlicott, who had been ill, was now much better" denmiştir. *(Ibid).*

ENCLOSURE IN No. 161

Note from the Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

LE Gouvernement royal hellénique a pris en très sérieuse considération la proposition que les Puissances alliées ont bien voulu lui faire, et a l'honneur d'exprimer ses plus vifs remerciements de l'offre de leurs bons offices, en vue d'éviter le renouvellement des hostilités dans le Proche-Orient et d'assurer une paix honorable et durable.

Le Gouvernement royal apprécie hautement les sentiments d'humanité, conjoints au désir d'arriver dans un bref délai à la pacification, qui ont inspiré ses grands Alliés, dans leur démarche, et que le Gouvernement royal partage dans la plus large mesure.

D'ailleurs, la similitude des sentiments dont la Grèce est animée avec ceux de ses Alliés découle nécessairement de la communauté de vues, qui ont prévalu alors qu'on combattait en commun et qui sont applicables à la situation actuelle. Cette situation n'est pas un résultat accidentel d'un conflit isolé, mais bien la continuation du conflit mondial que la grande guerre a définitivement jugé partout ailleurs en laissant pendantes seulement dans le Proche-Orient les sanctions spécifiées et déterminées par un traité signé par toutes les Puissances alliées d'un côté et les Turcs de l'autre.

En défendant les aspirations séculaires de l'hellénisme et les droits que lui a reconnus le Traité de Sèvres, en compensation de ses sacrifices pendant la guerre, la Grèce a la conviction qu'elle défend à la fois les intérêts du monde civilisé dans le bassin oriental de la Méditerranée et les détroits. Et pénetrée de l'importance de sa double mission, elle est arrivée par une extrême tension de ses forces morales et matérielles à être sur le point d'imposer les décisions communes des Alliés, qui ont motivé préventivement son occupation en Asie Mineure et qui ne sont, en ce qui concerne les charges imposées à la Grèce, que l'émanation de la solidarité née de l'alliance, solidarité dont le traité a été une solennelle expression.

Cette conception de ses devoirs a amené la Grèce à souscrire à tous les sacrifices qu'on lui a demandés, jusqu'à la conclusion de la paix, et à accepter d'entreprendre par ses propres moyens, après la conclusion, une guerre nouvelle contre les Turcs qui essaient par des procédés diamétralement opposés à la bonne foi et aux obligations internationales de se soustraire à l'application du traité.

En s'adonnant tout entière et avec foi aux préparatifs et à l'action que les nécessités militaires lui imposaient, la Grèce se voit en face d'une situation dans laquelle seuls les intérêts militaires sont les guides de sa conduite et de ses décisions.

Pour ces raisons impératives, malgré son ardent désir de se conformer aux conseils de ses grands Alliés, le Gouvernement royal hellénique est dans l'impossibilité d'y accéder; car tout ajournement des opérations au delà de la limite indiquée par les chefs de l'armée, compromettra, au préjudice de la Grèce, la situation militaire et encouragera l'adversaire à opposer à l'injonction des Puissances une nouvelle résistance. II est donc évident que le mode de procédure proposé par les Alliés, qui entrainerait forcément la suspension des hostilités, est incompatible avec le but à atteindre.

Les sentiments d'amitié, dont les Puissances alliées sont animées à l'égard de la Grèce, sont une garantie pour le Gouvernement royal qu'elles voudront bien apprécier à leur juste valeur les considérations énoncées plus haut, et tenir compte d'autre part que la Grèce en continuant la lutte met entre leurs mains l'outil le plus efficace pour la réalisation de leur dessein de pacification du Proche - Orient. Car le seul espoir de voir la Turquie se soumettre aux suggestions des Puissances et respecter les droits sanctionnés par leur signature et les intérêts qu'elles considéreront dignes de leur appui pour la sauvegarde de la paix en Orient, ne peut être fondé que sur l'influence exercée et à exercer par une action militaire.

Dans ces conditions, le Gouvernement royal sera toujours prêt à écouter ses grands Alliés à n'importe quelle phase des opérations, et espère qu'ils voudront bien obtenir de la Turquie des propositions concrètes en vue de la réalisation des droits découlant des traités, et de la satisfaction des sacrifices subis par la Grèce et des intérêts que l'évolution des événements militaires et politiques rendra réalisables.

Le Gouvernement royal ne doute pas que les Alliés dans ce rôle de médiateurs, voudront bien tenir compte de la mission des armées helléniques, qui en se substituant aux forces alliées pour l'exécution d'une partie du programme commun, seront remplacées par toute la force morale de l'hellénisme quand elles déposeront les armes et lorsque le nouveau régime du Proche - Orient aura besoin d'appui et de sauvegarde. Et la Grèce saura tenir ce rôle avec honneur.

Car l'apparence de résistance que présentent les Turcs n'est due qu'aux cadres encore subsistant de l'ancien Empire ottoman et à l'inapplication des clauses de l'armistice relatives au désarmement. Mais le jour où les garanties stipulées seront rigoureusement appliquées et où l'expérience acquise imposera la prise de toutes les mesures que l'attitude des Turcs jusqu'ici a suffisamment indiquées, la Grèce montera aisément la garde pour le maintien du nouveau *statu quo* en Orient.

Athènes, *le 12/25 Juin 1921.*

F.O. 406/47, p. 2 - 3, No. 2.

No. 162

Sir G. Buchanan (Rome) to Earl Curzon.

ROME, *25th June, 1921, 10.35 a.m.*
(Received 27th, June, 10.40 a.m.)

No. 253. (D).
Telegraphic.

Your telegram No. 267.*

Minister for Foreign Affairs asks me to thank Your Lordship for communication made to him. He entirely agrees that conversations with secondary powers should be avoided and that Mustapha Kemal should be informed that he himself must attend meeting. He suggests that, in order not to afford Turkey any pretext for gaining time and in the interests of practical success of conversations, British representative should be accompanied by Italian and French representatives. If Your Lordship and Monsieur Briand concur to this proposal he will at once telegraph necessary instructions to Italian High Commissioner at Constantinople.

Addressed to Foreign Office, sent to Constantinople.

F.O. 371/6471/E. 7282.

No. 163

Lord Granville (Athens) to Earl Curzon.

ATHENS, *June 27, 1921.*
(Received July 11).

No. 281.
My Lord,

As soon as reports and rumours began to reach Athens on the subject of Your Lordship's conversations with Monsieur Briand at Paris, the Greek newspapers began to express, with quite remarkable unanimity, the *impossibility for Greece to accept any mediation which should entail the abandonment of the imminent offensive in Asia Minor*, unless indeed, a condition which they agreed was hardly conceivable, *the Allies regarded the situation from the point of view of an already victorious Greece and intended to* propose terms definitely confirming the rights given to Greece by the Treaty of Sèvres and even *extending them compensation for Greek efforts and* sacrifices since undertaken. The one and only discordant note was struck by the Socialist organ, '*Rizos-*

* Bkz. No. 155.

pastis', *which* urged that the opportunity should be seized to drop imperialism and *put an end to war and mobilization.*

When the three Representatives had communicated the Allied proposal to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the contents and form of the Note began to be known*, the papers were still unanimous in appreciating the gentle and courteous form and in demanding that the reply of the Greek Government should express Greek gratitude but courteously and firmly *refuse to accept madiation before the expected victory was won in Asia Minor.* The fact that the Allies had addressed themselves in the first place to Greece and had stated that they were moved by sentiments of friendship towards her was looked on as a proof that Your Lordship had been able to overcome the more hostile inclinations of the French and Italians, and, was pointed to as a *further proof of British friendliness.* A day or two later, some of the papers took the opposite line and argued that it was almost *a hostile action on the part of the Powers to have addressed themselves first to Greece*, as the result would be either to encourage and strengthen Kemal's intransigeance if Greece accepted, as the acceptance would be looked on as a sign of weakness, or, if Greece refused, as she must, earn for her the wrath of the Powers for her impertinence in not obeying their behests. One paper, 'Kathemerine', treated the Allied proposal with some contempt, and reminded its readers that the Great Powers always thought it necessary to intervene and try to prevent the lesser Powers from fighting, *and that the present intervention would be just as inefficacious as that which was attempted before the outbreak of the Balkan war.*

When the Allied Note and the Greek reply were published in full on the evening of the 25th instant, *the chorus of complete approval of the latter was again unanimous, with again the one exception* of 'Rizospastis' who remarked that it was just as well that the Government had described itself as the 'Royal Government' as otherwise it might have been thought that the reply had been written by the Venizelist Government.

The obvious, and I must confess to my mind weighty, arguments have been used throughout, that *Greece and her army are at the present moment the only bulwark of Europe against Panislamism and Bolshevism*, that Mustapha Kemal's arrogance, already insupportable, largely owing to the encouragement he has received from the French and Italians, would be increased beyond all bounds by concessions and by the weakness which Greece would apparently admit if she consented to an armistice, and that the *only possible*

* In his telegram No. 359 of June 22 to the Foreign Office, Lord Granville had reported: 'We agreed with Minister for Foreign Affairs that we would make no communication to the press beyond short statement which he drafted that we offered good offices of our Governments to bring about peace. *Nevertheless papers this morning published nearly ull and correct version of our declaration*'.

means of arriving at a pacification of the Near East is the crushing of the Nationalists by military force.

I think that there can be no doubt, judging not by the statements of the Government which can never be relied on, but by all their actions, and especially by their *sending the King to Asia Minor*, that they really are confident of achieving at least a great preliminary success; but I do not think that they have unlimited ambitions, nor unlimited confidence in the future. *If they can succeed in taking the line Afium Karahissar - Kutahia - Eskishehr*, I give them credit for sufficient wisdom not to make any attempt to go further and certainly not to follow the dream of an advance on Angora. When they have got that line, or even perhaps when they have got Kutahia alone, they will I feel sure be very grateful for a renewed offer of mediation by the Powers, *feeling that Kemal's arrogance and prestige will have received a sufficient blow to induce him to accept terms which the Greeks themselves can regard as reasonable.*

In an absolutely private conversation with my Italian colleague the other day, I was much surprised to find that, while he had no indication of the views of his Government, he entirely agreed with my personal opinion that *from the point of view of the Allies and of Europe* it was most desirable, nay essential, that the *Greeks should win a really decisive victory over Kemal**, as though they would no doubt in consequence become pretty presumptuous it was far easier to apply pressure on them than on the Turks.

I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Acting High Commissioner at Constantinople.

I have, &c.,

GRANVILLE

D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol. XVII, p. 280 - 282, No. 266.

No. 164

Lord Hardinge (Paris) to Earl Curzon.

PARIS, *30th June, 1921, 8.10 p.m.*
(Received Ist July, 1921)

No. 436. Telegraphic
Secret.

My telegram No. 411.

President of the Council said to me today that, in wiew of attitude of Greek Government, it is all the more necessary that projected interview between (? group omitted) Mustapha Kemal should take place.

F.O. 371/6471/E. 7502.

* Satırların altı belgenin aslında çizilmiş değil. (B. N. Ş.)

No. 165

Mr. Rattigan (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *July 1, 1921, Midnight.*
(Received July 3, 3.45 p.m.)

No. 475 Telegraphic

As reported in my telegram No. 473 before receiving your telegram No. 395 I had already requested Minister for Foreign Affairs to give strong warning to Kemal against entry into neutral zone.

Kemalist forces at present show no desire to violate neutral zone. On the contrary orders have been issued to Kemalist troops to retire immediately on coming within (? two) kilometres of British posts.

In these circumstances I submit that it would be inadvisable to send direct warning to Angora and will suspend action pending Your Lordship's further instructions.

D.B.F.P., Ist series Vol. XVII, p. 289, No. 275.

No. 166

Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 1, 1921.*

No. 1828.
My Lord,

THE French Ambassador came to the Foreign Office this afternoon in order to present a communication from M. Briand. The Greek Government having refused to accede to the suggestion made by the Powers that Greece should place herself in their hands, with a view to the suspension of hostilities in Asia Minor and the conclusion of peace with Turkey, M. Briand now proposed that a joint notification should be addressed to Athens, warning the Greeks of the dangers of the course they were pursuing, and throwing upon them the responsibility for the resumption of the war and the still further arrestation of the conclusion of peace in the East. M. Briand proposed, as a second step, that the facilities which had hitherto been given to Greek warships at Constantinople, and the use which Greece had been permitted to make of that place as a port of call and revictualling as well as the use which had been conceded to her of the Marmora, should, in accordance with strict neutrality, be withdrawn. Only by these means M. Briand was convinced, could matters be brought to an early head and hostilities, even at the eleventh hour, prevented.

I replied that I did not feel able to entertain either proposal. The first was superfluous, because weh ad already told the Greeks, in the telegram which I had drafted in Paris and which had been approved by the three Powers, that, if the Greek Government preferred to decline our mediation, the exclusive responsibility would rest upon themselves. I did not, therefore see any point in repeating the threat at the present moment, or stating again what was an obvious truism. It could have no effect either as a rebuke or as a menace. As regards the second suggestion, the advantages accorded to the Greeks had been recommended to us from Constantinople, where it could not be said that a very pro - Greek feeling prevailed, as entirely consistent with the strict neutrality which we, at any rate in this country, had pursued; and, as long as it was open to the Turks to obtain supplies of men, money and arms from Bolshevik Russia without fear of any interruption, it seemed to me a one - sided proposal to apply this particular form of coercion to the Greeks. In my view, the only safety lay in a continuation of the policy of strict impartiality to which the British Government, at least, had all along been faithful.

As regards the general situation, I acquainted the Ambassador with the information which we had lately received from our military experts, both in Constantinople and in Smyrna, which led us to from a more favourable view of the morale and equipment of the Greek army than we had previously been led to adopt; and I remarked that, if these accounts were true, it was not for a moment to be expected that the Greek army would decline to resume a conflict in which it appeared to expect an initial victory. In all probability, although what had happened at Ismid was an unfavourable omen, the Greeks might expect to obtain some such preliminary advantage. If they held this view of their own chances, it was out of the question to expect them, because of any representations that we were inclined to make to them, to desist; although it seemed to me extremely likely that, once the initial success had been obtained, they would, of their own accord, appeal to our good offices.

The situation, I admitted, would not be rendered any easier by such a development, because the kind of terms that we had considered when I was in Paris might be more difficult to obtain from the Greeks if victorious than if they had not fought at all. On the other hand, should the issue turn the other way and the Turks be victorious in the impending struggle, we should find them also more difficult to deal with than they might be before the fighting recommenced.

The prospect, therefore, was not, in my judgment, very encouraging either way; but, however that might be, it seemed to me a useless expedient to attempt to intervene at the present stage, and I could only hope that,

before long, whatever the result of the impending hostilities might be, a more favourable opportunity might occur.

I am, &c.,

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

F.O. 406/47, p. 1 - 2, No. 1.

No. 167

The Marquess Curzon[1] *of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 2, 1921, 3.20 p.m.*

No. 360 Telegraphic
Urgent

Your telegram No. 436[2] and 411[3].

As M. Briand has changed his views and thinks meeting with Mustapha Kemal should be arranged without delay, we are sending instructions to Constantinople authorising General Harington to invite Mustapha Kemal to meet him at Ineboli or elsewhere on Black Sea. Italian Government replied to our telegram identical with No. 341 to you agreeing to conversation with Mustapha Kemal himself, but not with secondary person, and proposing that French and Italian representatives should accompany British representative. This appears to us to be an entire misunderstanding of the proposal, which is not one for mediation or negotiation but merely to hear what Mustapha Kemal may have to say. General Harington will listen and not negotiate and will report fully to us what he hears for communication to our Allies. We are explaining this both at Rome and Constantinople. Repeated Rome No. 280 and Constantinople No. 405.

D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol. XVII, p. 291, - No. 277

[1] Lord Curzon had been elevated to a Marqiusate in the King's Birthday Honours list of June 4. He assumed the title of the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston on July 1.

[2] Bkz. No. 164.

[3] Bkz. No. 157.

No. 168

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Rattigan (Constantinople).

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 2, 1921, 3.20 p.m.*

No. 406 Telegraphic
Very urgent

My telegram No. 341 to Paris[1] about proposed meeting with Mustapha Kemal and Paris reply No. 411[2] and 436[3]; also Rome reply No. 253[4]. I am repeating to you telegram No. 360 sent today to Paris[5] in reply to M. Briand's latest proposal. You should arrange with General Harington, who will receive similar instructions from War Office, that he should reply to overtures from Mustapha Kemal that he is willing to meet latter in person on Black Sea and to hear what he has to say. In as much as conversations will be of a political rather than of a military character we think that you should accompany General Harington unless you see good reasons to the contrary.

D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol. XVII, p. 297, No. 278.

No. 169

War Office to General Harington (Constantinople).

WAR OFFICE, LONDON, *July 2nd, 1921, 18.45.*

SECRET
Paraphrase
89383 cipher (D. M. G.).

Reference your 454 cipher June 20th and 496 cipher of 26th June, also wire to Mr. Rattigan from Foreign Office of today's date. After consultation with Paris and Rome Foreign Office have ultimately wired Mr. Rattigan to the effect that you should meet Mustapha Kemal to hear what he has to say. Mr. Rattigan has been informed that he may accompany you. Whether Mr. Rattigan accompanies you or not you will invite Mustapha Kemal himself to meet you. Make arrangements accordingly. Your instructions are to receive any communication that Kemal may make and to make full report of what he has to say.

F.O. 371/6471/E. 7656 and E. 7681.

[1] No. 155.
[2] No. 157.
[3] No. 164.
[4] No. 162.
[5] No. 167.

No. 170

Report No. 273, issued by the British Secret Intelligence, Constantinople Branch.

Constantinople, *2. 7. 21.*

Extracts.

The Nationalists and the Allied Proposals.

According to information from reliable sources there are no indications of the slightest change in Kemalist policy as regards Smyrna and Thrace. As a preliminary to any negotiations the following conditions received the approval of Mustapha Kemal's party in course of a discussion on the 24th June on the Allied proposals regarding intervention:—

(i) The evacuation of Smyrna and Thrace must be complete.

(ii) The Kemalist forces must occupy the principal strategic points.

It was also agreed to attempt to conclude general peace while negotiating a settlement of the Smyrna and Thrace questions, but to reserve liberty of action regarding final results of any such negotiations.

Judging from information to hand it is doubtful whether the Kemalists would be able to maintain an attitude of undiluted hostility to Great Britain if Smyrna and Thrace were restored to Ottoman sovereignty. There is no doubt, however, that the Enverists, encouraged by the Bolsheviks, would make a still more determined effort to force the Kemalist administration to hold out for the evacuation of Constantinople and the Straits, the abolition of the capitulations, and freedom from control in questions of finance and armaments.

On the 13th June, however, an organ of Mustapha Kemal's party published an indictment of Enver Pasha, which, although its consequences are not as yet apparent, may be regarded as an indication of a crisis arising out of the rivalry between Kemalists and Enverists.

On the whole, it is probable that, if the Smyrna and Thrace questions are settled in accordance with Nationalist views, a fairly reasonable attitude will be observed by the Kemalists; but, if the proposed settlement of this problem is unfavourable, or long delayed, the Enverists and Bolsheviks will secure a dominating influence which will render a settlement with the Greeks impossible. All information tends to show that a Greek victory will further strengthen Enver's party.

F.O. 371/6521.

No. 171

General Harington (Constantinople) to War Office

Despatched:— 02. 35 3. 7. 21.
Received:— 10. 30 4. 7. 21.

Secret.
Paraphrase.
CLEAR THE LINE.
526 cipher 3/7. First part.

Your wire re proposed interview has been received and also Foreign Office wire. I propose to see Izzet tomorrow and send through a message to Mustapha Kemal saying that if he wishes to meet me I will be off Ineboli on a certain date on H. M. S. Ajax and prepared to listen to anything he wishes to say and his views will be reported to H. M. Government. I would suggest that I be given definite instructions by the Foreign Office on any points on which they wish me to obtain his views if occasion arises and I would ask you to send me any miliatry points on which you require information. I would propose that, after making it quite clear that I have condescended to come and hear what he has to say, the interview be carried out in a very dignified manner.

Last part.

Everything that is said will be recorded and before he leaves the ship summaries will be reproduced, 1? copy of which I will sign and hand to him and the other 6, which he will sign, will be forwarded to you for transmission to Government. I need hardly say I shall not commit anyone. The interview is only between one soldier and another. It is my opinion that I should be accompanied by as few as possible as, from what I gather, he will not commit ?himself ?to a ?large ?gathering but is likely to talk freely with me alone. I have not yet seen Mr. Rattigan but I shall suggest that representatives of both him and Navy be on board. I think it is necessary for meeting to be arranged forthwith, before the Greek offensive begins, as there is little ?chance of Mustapha Kemal's being able to leave Angora otherwise.*

F.O. 371/6471/E. 7656

* Bu telgraf üzerine İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığında şu yorumlar yapılmıştır:

"I think we might ask W. O. (War Office) to instruct Gen. (eral) Harington to put our point of view plainly before Mustapha Kemal when he sees him, stating that the attitude of Angora as regard delivery of prisoners.is utterly inexcusable.

I suppose we could not make the interview conditional upon Kemal's bringing and handing over the whole lot?

D. G. OSBORNE
4/7

No. 172

Mr. Rattigan (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *3rd July, 1921.*

No. 641.

My Lord,

With reference to my telegrams Nos. 443 and 450 of the 20th and 23rd of June respectively, regarding overtures made to General Harington by Refet Pasha on behalf of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a further report which has been communicated to me by the British Military Authorities.

2. This report emanates from a Mr. Stourton, a British subject, engaged in business in Constantinople, who took part in the recent conversations with Refet Pasha at Ineboli.

3. I have the honour further to enclose a memorandum by Mr. Ryan giving his observations on this document, in which I fully concur.

I have, & c.,

(Signed) FRANK RATTIGAN
Acting High Commissioner.

F.O. 371/6472/E. 7936.

"We might also suggest repeating the warning about crossing the neutral line at Ismid?"

"The W. O. tel. to Sir G. Harington does not specifically veto his negotiating, which was mentioned in Lord Curzon's tel. to Paris and in our letter to W.O.: but the instructions seem to meet the case.

L. OLIPHANT, JUL. 4"

"I think the W. O. instructions meet the case. But I dont believe Mustafa will go down to the coast.

R. C. L.
July 4.
(Curzon) 4/7"

Seen by Sir Eyre Crowe
5. VII. 1921.

ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 172

Ref. No. I. C. 3410.
27th June 1921.

Secret
Political

Proposals on behalf of the Angora Government made during recent conversations at Ineboli by REFET Pasha to the British.

(1) *Foreign policy of the Angora Government in the Near and Middle East.*

The Angora Government stands for autonomy within the boundaries of Turkey wherever a majority of Turkish inhabitants exists. To secure this end the Government and Country are prepared to fight to the last man. Their Army is well organised and numerous. Military equipment is now sufficient and more is required. Four munition factories are flourishing in Anatolia and since relations were started with Russia a total of 600 guns has been received in Anatolia. Agriculture is being fostered. The price of food is low. Discipline is good and the Angora Government are convinced that they will be able, when the opportune moment comes, to drive the Greeks out of Anatolia.

The Government is in favour of a confederation of autonomous Near Eastern States, including autonomy for Azerbaidjan, Georgia, etc., and including Mesopotamia (see below para. 4), and independence for the HEDJAZ and YEMEN. There is no intention whatever of imposing Turkish suzerainty upon the States mentioned above, and although the Arab States, particularly YEMEN and the HEDJAZ have repeatedly asked the Angora Government for their assistance, such assistance has been categorically refused in order that no departure should be made from the principle outlined above. As regards SMYRNA ant THRACE, the Government are willing to accept the decisions of a plebiscite because they are convinced that it would be favourable to Turkey. As regards WESTEN THRACE, should the plebiscite principle be applied, there is no doubt but that the strong Jewish and other anti - Greek elements in Salonica, etc., would cause the result of the plebiscite to be proponderately Turkish, not that the Angora Government has any idea that the Salonica Jews want Turkish rule for the beaux yeux of the Turks but because they can make more money out of Turks that out of Greeks. As regards the Thracian frontiers, they are prepared to accept the pre - war frontier.

(2) *Internal Policy.*

It has been definitely decided and accepted as part of the Constitution that Turkey shall be ruled by a Constitutional Monarch and that the monarch should also be kaliph. Some difficulty was experienced in persuading a few of the extremists to accept this policy that the most suitable would continue to be the Sultan of Turkey.

Complete freedom of religious belief and practice has also been accepted in the Constitution. It is firmly intended to exploit in the interests of the Nation the riches, agricultural and mineral, in Anatolia. A good start has been already made and in the immediate neighbourhood of Ineboli intense agricultural activity has been observed.

(3) *Relations with Russia.*

The understanding with the Moscow Government was a physical necessity caused by the military menace occasioned by the presence of the Greek Army in Anatolia. It has however recently been definitely decided to abandon the pro - Bolshevik policy. It is believed in Government circles that in Russia also the days of Bolshevism are numbered and all are determined to prevent by force the infiltration of Russia either Soviet or Imperialistic, into Anatolia and Constantinople.

(4) *Relations with Bulgaria.*

Bulgaria has recently approached the Angora Government with a view to concluding an alliance. The advantages of such an alliance would be the building up of a barrier in South Eastern Europe against the Roumano - Slav nations.

(5) *Relations with the French and Italians.*

The Angora Government regard both French and Italians with something approaching contempt. It has been pointed out to the French in conversations concerning Cilicia that the French have no object to gain other than the satisfaction of seeing the map coloured French in Cilicia. Extensive deserts will not enrich France and the grasping attitude displayed by the French has caused not a little amusement in Anatolia. No steps were taken to eject the French garrison from Zoungouldak because French troops had been there since a very early date and their removal was not thought to be of sufficient importance. However, the French recently tried to occupy Heraclea also; they were immediately informed that were French troops to move a step outside the zone they already occupied at Zoungouldak they would be attacked at Zoungouldak and driven into the

sea. They have therefore evacuated Zoungouldak. The Angora Government, feeling that nothing of value can be obtained from the French, is determined that the latter must leave Cilicia or be pushed out.

(6) *Relations with Great Britain.*

(a) The key - stone of the foreign policy contemplated by the Angora Government is close alliance with Great Britain, but Angora is not prepared to be placed with and insists that if an understanding be reached with Great Britain, that understanding must be solid and permanent. In order to secure such a permanent alliance, Angora is prepared to go a very long way. Speaking of MESOPOTAMIA and the expenses occasioned to the British in that zone, REFET Pasha stated that the Angora Government had no wish to re-occupy Mesopotamia and had no desire to send troops there but that in order to help the British in response to a genuine and permanent alliance they would place their Army at the disposal of the British High Command for repressing any movements against the British in Mesopotamia, and would exact no other recompense for such action. He pointed out that the interests of Great Britain in Mesopotamia were fully understood and she would thus be enabled to develop those interests without having to spend a penny on armaments in that country.

(b) As regards the STRAITS and the possibility of Nationalist artillery closing them once again, *REFET Pasha stated that the Angora Government was determined not to accept any interallied control of the Straits*; they had had sufficient experience of interallied control; they were however prepared to agree to a joint Turco - British Control of the Straits but they did not wish to have to deal with more than one Power.

(c) As regards Pan - Islamism being a threat to British power, REFET *Pasha stated that the Angora Government had no intention whatever of exploiting Pan - Islamism against the British or to interfere with the situation in India.* They felt that as the Moslem population of India formed but a small minority of the whole, it would therefore be impracticable for them to overset British influence in India by recourse to agitation in the Islamic World. They had no objection to British ruling many millions of Moslems in India because they had studied and appreciated British methods of dealing with Moslems. Bar religion, Indians and Turks have nothing in common. The result of British rule in India and Egypt has been to make those countries and Turkey now siehse (?) to be taken in hand by the same organiser and made the same as they have been made.

(d) Too much weight must not be placed upon the anti - British propoganda which has taken place recently in some parts of Anatolia. Whenever the situation on the Greek Front becomes slack, something has to be done for military purposes to heighten the moral, particularly in some

districts and anti - British propaganda has therefore been necessary. REFET Pasha categorically denied that the report of a speech alleged to have been made by Mustafa Kemal and which appeared in the "Excelsior" of the 16th May had any truth in it. This report described Mustafa Kemal as pronouncing a virulent anti - British oration in the B. M. M.

(e) The Angora Government fully realise the difficulty that Great Britain would meet with from the French were she to conclude an alliance with Turkey. REFET pasha expressed astonismhent that the British had clung so long to the French Entente: "What has France done for you? Nothing - it is you who are always having to help France. Why continually sacrifice your interests to those who cannot help you".

(f) *Exchange of prisoners.* When Bekir Sami Bey left London he spent some while in Paris and Rome. The Angora Government formed the impression that Bekir Sami Bey has thus seen too much attention of the French and Italians and was paying too much attention to the conclusion of agreements with them before the definite British policy was known. As soon as he returned to Angora, the Council of Ministers agreed at once to the exchange of prisoners with the British but refused to agree to the French and Italian Treaties, which they felt they could not ratify until the British views were known. The delay in sending the Turkish prisoners from Malta was also unfavourably commented on and the release of prisoners from Anatolia therefore postponed. As a proof of the Angora Government's good faith, REFET Pasha undertook that on receipt of even a private telegram from a Britisher at Constantinople to the effect that the balance of the Malta prisoners had been or would be released on a given date, immediate orders for the release of British prisoners in Anatolia and for their despatch to any point selected by the British would be issued. He ridiculed the notion that were the British to release their prisoners the Turks would not play the game.

(g) Refet Pasha pointed out that Mustafa Kemal Pasha's refusal to go immediately to Ineboli was only natural. He could not leave Angora for the coast without certainty that official negotiations would result. Were he to do so and his journey turn out a fiasco, his action would be merely playing into the hands of the opposition party in Angora. Although not definitely assured it appears morally certain that should an accredited British representative proceed to Ineboli, Mustafa Kemal would be obliged to leave Angora in order to meet him. Discussions between the two of them could then take place without delay at a middle point such as Kastamouni or at Ineboli itself.

(h) The most propitious moment for such a move on the part of Great Britain has arrived but if the opportunity be not quickly taken it may be lost for ever.

(i) A reply to the request from Constantinople that the Turkish Army should not infringe the neutral zone of the Ismidt Front has now been received. It is stated therein that the Nationalist High Command has no intention whatever of allowing any troops to enter that zone.

(7) *The Turks' part in the War.*

Refet Pasha sketched the circumstances which led Turkey into war briefly as follows: Turkey had realised the evil intentions of Russia as regards herself and about 6 months before the outbreak of hostilities, Djemal Pasha was sent to Paris with the request that the French Government would settle whether they were prepared to accept the co-operation of Turkey in the event of trouble. The French Government replied that Russia was their Ally and that as German menace was pressing she could not afford to take any action without the approval of that Ally. The Government added that this decision could not be departed from by England who was tied to the French by the Entente Cordial and that therefore it was useless for Djevad Pasha to repair to London. He was therefore advised to proceed to St. Petersburg. At St. Petersburg his advances were met with a flat refusal. Turkey therefore had no option but to accept the German offers which followed.

(8) *Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Jews.*

Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Refet Pasha have known one another since they were children. Mustafa Kemal is not a Jew and has no Jewish blood in his veins. By extraction he is a Nomad Turk. There are no Jews in the Council of Ministers and the only important Jew in the Nationalist world is Djavid Bey, former Minister of Finance. Djavid has however been a Moslem for many years.

Mustafa Kemal has always been a man of outstanding ability. Moreover, he is incorruptible and has made no money though holding many important posts.

F.O. 371/6472/E. 7936.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 172.

Memorandum by Mr. Ryan.

Very Confidential.

This paper illustrates the undesirability of having unauthorised persons floating about and talking high politics with any shadow of appearance of *being* authorised.

Anyone who knows the history of the Armistice must realised that most of what Refet Pasha says to Major Stourton is the ordinary claptrap which has been talked *ad nauseam* in and out of season. Unfortunately it is mixed up with dangerous suggestions having for their object:

(a) to make us believe that Mustafa Kemal and his associates are sweetly reasonable people, with a strong natural bias in favour of Great Britain;

(b) to induce us to swallow the Angora Government whole, and recognise it as the sole Government of Turkey;

(c) to drive us and the French apart.

I am now inclined to think that there is more than I at first believed in the struggle between Enverists and Kemalists for control of the Anatolian movement. I am prepared to believe that the Bolsheviks would prefer to see Enver in the saddle, and that they may be preparing a forward movement with a view to get the same clinch on Anatolia that they have established in the Caucasus Republics. I have thought all along that Mustafa Kemal, while prizing the Bolshevik alliance, had no intention whatsoever of seeing Anatolia bolshevized, or made an outwork of Bolshevik Russia. I see, however, no evidence that Mustafa Kemal is so frightened of the Bolshevists as to be ready to throw himself into the arms of the Allies or any one of them. So far as I can see he is still out for:

(a) The National Pact and nothing less than the national pact.

(b) The elimination of *all* foreign ascendancy in the internal affairs of Turkey.

(c) The establishment of a position, which will enable the future Turkey to re-establish political influence in the detached portions of the old Empire, in the Caucasus, and further afield; and to assure to Turkey the hegemony in a combine of Islamic states.

I should see no objection to an open and above - board conversation with Mustafa Kemal, provided it took place in conditions which made it clear:

(a) that we were not suing a victor for peace;

(b) that we were not going behind the back of the only legitimate Government with the Sultan at its head;

(c) that we are not to be taken in by claptrap and professions, and that, while anxious to give Turkey a reasonable future in a reasonable territory, we are not prepared to see her menace our interests in the East or to sacrifice our own interests or the minorities;

(d) that our relations with the French are our affair and, that we are not going to let Turkish intrigue drive a wedge between us.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, *30th June 1921.*

F.O. 371/6472/E. 7936.

No. 173

Mr. Rattigan (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *July 4, 1921, 6.45 p.m.*
(Received July 5, 11.25 a.m.)

No. 482 Telegraphic
Clear the Line
Your telegram No. 406.
Proposed interview with Mustapha Kemal.

I informed my allied colleagues of all that had passed up to the present, laying stress on Your Lordship's desire to do nothing behind the backs of our allies. Italian High Commissioner, who appears to have been kept informed by his Government, said that now that latter knew exact scope of proposed interview they withdrew their suggestion as to participation... Italian delegates. French High Commissioner said that though he was without instructions he cordially approved proposal. I remarked that Your Lordship thought it might be well for me to accompany General Harington. Both French and Italian High Commissioners expressed themselves as strongly in approval of my doing so. General Harington concurs. In these circumstances I shall arrange to accompany General Harington as suggested by Your Lordship if the interview takes place. I should be grateful

* Bu yazılar üzerine İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığı yetkilileri şu notları düşmüşlerdir:

Neither Gen. Harington nor Mr. Ryan think the Bolshevik - Enver element has yet entire control at Angora, and the former anticipates the possibility of Mustapha Kemal withstanding his preposterous conditions and the interview taking place after all.

It is evident that the Nationalists having squeezed the Italians are now relying on the French to defend them at the next Supreme Council meeting. Hence I suppose the offer of economic concessions and the gandarmerie

D. G. Osborne
L. Oliphant
13/7

There seems a chance of our hearing from Mustapha Kemal again.

RCL. *July 13*

if you would instruct me as to any special points to which you desire that I should give attention.

General Harington is asking Minister for Foreign Affairs to let Mustapha Kemal know he has received his suggestion, and is prepared to meet him at any convenient point on the coast in order to hear what he may have to say.

It may of course be difficult if Greek offensive has already started for Mustapha Kemal to come to the coast.

D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol. XVII, p. 293, No. 280.

No. 174

Foreign Office to War Office.

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 5th, 1921.*

No. E 7656/1/44.
Urgent.

Sir:—

With reference to General Harington's telegram to the War Office No. 526 of July 3rd, I am directed by Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to state that he would be grateful if General Harington might be instructed to inform Mustapha Kemal that the attitude of the Angora Government as regards the delivery of the British prisoners is utterly inexcusable.

I am. &c.,

(Signed) LANCELOT OLIPHANT

F.O. 371/6471/E. 7656.

No. 175

Mr. Rattigan (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, *July 5, 1921,7 p.m.*
(Received July 6, 12.30 p.m.)

No. 489 Telegraphic

Your telegram No. 406.

After consulting General Harington I sent Mr. Ryan to see Minister for Foreign Affairs on July 4th. He reminded Minister for Foreign Affairs of desire expressed by him to put British authorities here in contact with

persons authorised to speak for Angora and of wish which he had recently expressed to make acquaintance of General Harington. Independently of this General Harington had recently heard through British, though entirely unofficial, intermediary that Mustafa Kemal would welcome opportunity for stating his position to him, but could not leave Angora. His Majesty's Government having taken Allies fully into their confidence considered that meeting between General Harington and Mustafa Kemal would help to clear up the situation, and that meetings with subordinates would be useless. General Harington could not be expected to go to Angora but he would be willing to visit Anatolian port on stated date and receive Mustafa Kemal there, object being to hear frank statement of Mustapha Kemal's views; not to negotiate. Mr. Ryan said that neither I nor General Harington wished to go behind the back of Central Government and suggested that Minister for Foreign Affairs should undertake to make the necessary arrangements for the meeting.

General Harington paid private visit to Minister Foreign Affairs later on the same day and handed him message for transmission to Mustapha Kemal. My immediately following telegram gives final form of message in translation. Minister for Foreign Affairs (? assured) Hamid Bey who he said served practically as liaison with Kemalists and charged him with transmission of message. It was arranged that messenger bearing it and letter from Hamid Bey himself should be send to Zu[ng]uldak in a British destroyer. Messenger left in H. M. ship 'Speedy' at mid - night on July 4th. It is hoped that answer may be obtained within a couple of days.

If meeting comes off I propose to accompany General Harington as you suggest. I explained the whole business to my French and Italian colleagues on July 4th and find them quite in accord with proposed action.

I am taking steps to have the Sultan informed of the nature and scope of proposed action making it clear that His Majesty's Government do not in any way wish to put him and legitimate Government on one side but are striving on the contrary to bring all reasonable elements in the country into line with each other; to prevent extremists (whose attitude is equally dangerous to prospects of peace and to the interests of Turkey) from dominating the situation and in this way promote restoration of settled order of things, under Sultan's high authority.

D.B.F.P., Ist series, vol. XVII, p. 296-297, No. 284

No. 176

Mr. Rattigan (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

Telegraphic.
No. 490 (R).

CONSTANTINOPLE, *July 5th, 1921, 5 p.m.*
(Received July 6, 10.45. a.m.)

Following is translation of message from General Harington to Mustapha Kemal.

"I understand through Major Henry that Your Lordship desires to lay before me certain views as soldier speaking to another. If this is the case I am authorized by British Government to proceed in battleship "Ajax" to Ineboli or Ismid to meet you any day convenient to you and I am quite prepared to discuss situation openly and frankly if you so desire. I am authorized to listen to Your Lordship's views and to report them to British Government for their consideration. I am not empowered to negotiate or speak on behalf of British Government but I am authorized to hear any views which you may wish to express. Proposed interview should take place on board British battleship when Your Lordship will be received appropriately and enjoy full liberty until you land. If you are in agreement please telegraph date and hour which will suit you in order that necessary arrangements may be made".

F.O. 371/6471/E. 7690.

No. 177

Mr. Rattigan (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *July 5, 1921, 7 p.m.*
(Received July 6, 3 p.m.)

No. 491 Telegraphic

My telegram No. 489.

Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me last evening to receive Hamid Bey Vice President of Red Crescent and principal agent of Angora at Constantinople.

Hamid explained to me that Minister for Foreign Affairs had informed him that General Harington was prepared to meet Mustapha Kemal. He desired me to confirm this.

I replied that initiative had not come from us but from Angora.

Mustapha Kemal had caused a message to be given to General Harington to the effect that he would be glad to have opportunity to lay certain views before him. General Harington and I had consulted together and referred matter to His Majesty's Government who had now replied that they had no objection to General Harington proceeding to a point on Anatolian coast in order to listen to anything that Mustapha Kemal might have to say.

Hamid replied that he would at once inform Mustapha Kemal and was sure that he would arrange to meet General Harington unless Greek offensive prevented him from absenting himself.

He then went on to say that it was sincere wish of all Turks to come to a good understanding with Great Britain, the one real power in Europe. Mustapha Kemal and his partisans felt this very strongly but hitherto they had despaired of getting fair treatment from Great Britain.

I replied that Great Britain was equally desirous of effecting a just settlement and a good understanding with Turkey but that hitherto Kemalists (with the one possible exception of Bekir Sami) had shown themselves so uncompromising and truculent that there seemed little hope of arriving at a settlement. They appeared indeed to have such reliance on their Bolshevik friends that they thought they could openly defy the Allies.

I have conclusive evidence that Kemalists believe British people are so tired of war that no matter what the provocation they will not support any Government in taking action which might involve a military effort or increased taxation. I therefore said to Hamid Bey that as he was no doubt aware British people were averse from any such action until they had real proof that Kemalists were impossible to deal with, and that their demands implied surrender of vital British interests. If Kemalists therefore were so foolish as to afford this proof they would find *Great Britain united in determination to suppress them.* If they were wise they would limit their demands to what was strictly reasonable. If they did so I was sure they would find His Majesty's Government very ready to give them a fair hearing.

I said that if I were Kemal I would ask myself which was the best course:—

1. Rely on Bolsheviks to obtain full maximum of my demands in defiance of the Allies.
2. Attempt to arrive at settlement with the Allies on basis of acceptance of all that was reasonable.

To adopt former course I would have to be convinced of two things.

(a) That Bolsheviks really are strongest side.

(b) Accepting this very unlikely hypothesis, would I be able to free myself from Bolshevik domination once I had obtained what I wanted.

I could not believe that any reasonable man could answer both these questions in a favourable sense.

Therefore it seemed to me the only possible course was agreement with Allies.

Hamid Bey appeared considerably impressed but said feeling of patriotism was so intense in Anatolia that Angora Government could not modify their demands even if they themselves wished to do so.

I said that Government often took this view but that in practice desire for peace and normal conditions was so intense that any Government that could say to the people 'we can give you peace coupled with attainment of majority of our wishes' could count upon strong support and need not be in the least afraid of discontent at failure to obtain maximum*.

Hamid Bey then went on to explain how moderate and just Kemalist demands were. Briefly they are those of national pact. Hamid Bey talked as if he were able to speak for Angora. I will comment upon this part of our conversation in a further telegram.

D.B.F.P., Ist series, vol. XVII, p. 296-298, No. 285

No. 178

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Earl Curzon.

BERLIN, *July 5, 1921.*
(Received July 12.)

No. 902.

My Lord,

I LEARN from a reliable source that the departure of Enver Pasha from Berlin, which was reported in my despatch No. 765 of the 26th May last, was partly, if not entirely, due to a request conveyed to him by the German Government that he should leave German territory. My informant states that on the German Government becoming acquainted of the presence of Enver Pasha in Berlin an emissary was sent by Dr. Simons, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, to request him to leave this country. Enver was very

* In his telegram No. 247 of July 9 to Mr. Rattigan, Lord Curzon replied: 'Your language approved'.

indignant and appealed to the right of asylum, but was informed that the German Government were determined to tolerate nothing which could be made to appear as if intrigues were conducted on German territory against British interests; that they knew perfectly well that he, Enver Pasha, was in fact intriguing with German officers, and that he must therefore leave Germany of his own free will unless he wished to be expelled. Enver Pasha thereupon left, and is reported at present to be in Moscow.

Similar action has been taken in respect of other prominent Turks, who have all left Germany, including Nuri Bey, the envoy from Mustapha Kemal. Some of these Turks have, however, left of their own accord, as the result of the acquittal of the murderer of Talaat has been to make them fear for their own safety. Indeed the wife of Enver will shortly leave Berlin, if she has not already left, owing to the fact that she has discovered that an Armenian is living in the house adjacent to her own residence.

The German Minister for Foreign Affairs also despatched an emissary to Rome for the express purpose of warning the Turkish expert at the German Embassy there that he must keep clear of all intrigues with the Turks. This expert is apparently Dr. Diehl, who was formerly dragoman at the German Embassy in Constantinople. I am informed that Dr. Diehl has taken this advice to heart, and that there is no likelihood of any anti - British intrigue from this quarter.

My informant stated that, in his opinion and in the opinion of the German Government, the only policy for Germany was to keep clear of all complications of this nature, which could bring no useful result to this country, and to convince, by the absolute loyalty of their conduct, the British Government of their good intentions, and thus prepare the way for that which was coming to be considered as being the ultimate aim of Germany, namely, complete reconciliation and co-operation with Great Britain. My informant added that, in his opinion, mischief was undoubtedly brewing which had its headquarters in Kabul, where at the present time there was a mission of several Turkish officers headed by Djemal Pasha.

I have, &c.,

D'ABERNON.

F.O. 406/47, p. 10, No. 5

No. 179

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Rattigan (Constantinople).

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 6, 1921, 5 p.m.*

No. 418 Telegraphic
Urgent

Your telegram No. 482 (of 4th July).

The main object of impending interview being to hear what Mustafa Kemal desires to say and in no way to enter upon negotiations, no specific instructions appear called for.

Reason for your accompanying the General Officer Commanding is that in political conversations you will be more *au courant* than Sir C. Harington. But your role should be similar to his, viz., merely to hear what the Turks has to say.

You may, however, express indignation of His Majesty's Government at Angora Government's behaviour over prisoners.

D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol. XVII, p. 299 - 300, No. 287

No. 180

Mr. Rattigan (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *July 6, 1921.*
(Received July 11.)

No. 651.
My Lord,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 493 of to-day, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the secret memorandum sent to me on the 4th July by Izzet Pasha.

2. The eagerness which Izzet Pasha has recently shown to promote contact between the British authorities and the Angora Government, and the similarity between his memorandum and the verbal statement made to me the same day by Hamid Bey, give this document considerable importance.

3. As I have stated in my telegram under reference, Hamid Bey made no reference of any kind to the military clauses of the treaty, which are dealt with at length in Izzet Pasha's memorandum. The principal other discrepancy between the two presentations of the desiderata of the Kemalists

has to do with the Capitulations. Izzet Pasha's memorandum stipulates for the suppression of the economic Capitulations. Hamid Bey spoke of the suppression of the Capitulations as a whole, and in his conversation he laid great stress on the abuses to which judicial Capitulations gave rise in pre - war days. He admitted that we British had not abused them, but he said that other Powers had used them in such a way as to make it impossible for Turks to obtain any sort of justice in cases against the nationals of those Powers.

4. Izzet Pasha's memorandum, though in many respect unacceptable, would be more reassuring if there were any reason to suppose that it was intended to serve as a basis for modification of the Treaty of Sèvres, and indicated readiness on the part of the Kemalists to accept the stipulations of that treaty, except in so far as it might be necessary to modify it in order to satisfy the desiderata formulated in the memorandum. Unfortunately, I fear it is certain that the Kemalists take as their starting-point their own National Pact, and that the memorandum merely indicates the extent to which in their view the terms of the National Pact might be abated for the sake of a settlement with the Allies. If the questions of the territorial extension of Turkey and the Straits be put on one side, evertyhing turns on the word "independence". Even the most moderate Kemalists undoubtedly aim at a degree of independence which would do away with the Capitulations or any adequate substitude for them, would make any guarantees for the safety of the minorities illusory, and would permit of the development of Turkey as a military Power. On the other hand, they would perhaps reconcile themselves to an attenuated financial control, and there are probably many Kemalists who regard political pan - Islamism and pan - Turanianism as things to be eschewed, at any rate for the time being. They would probably welcome an understanding with the Allies, and especially Great Britain, if only they could secure their desiderata as formulated by men like Izzet Pasha and Bekir Samy Bey. In internal affairs they would probably set their faces against revolutionary ideas, and aim at developing Turkey as a constitutional monarchy, the sovereign of which would have little real power, but would retain the dignity of his two offices of Sultan and Caliph and the moral influence attaching to the latter.

I have, &c.,

FRANK RATTIGAN,
Acting High Commissioner.

F.O. 406/47, p. 8 - 9, No. 4

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 180

Izzet Pasha to Mr. Rattigan.

L'EUROPE avait promis une Turquie indépendante capable de vivre dans ses limites ethnographiques, avec Constantinople comme capitale.

La réalisation pratique de cette promesse est subordonnée aux conditions énumérées, ci-bas, dans leurs généralités.

L'application de ces conditions fera disparaître la dualité qui existe en Turquie ou, tout au moins, aura pour effet immédiat de rallier, dans ce but, tous les éléments honnêtes et patriotes du pays. Elle pourra seule assurer en Orient une paix durable.

Voici les conditions:

Attribution à la Turquie de l'Asie Mineure dans son intégralité, prenant en considération ses limites naturelles et sa majorité turque et kurde.

Constantinople a besoin pour sa sécurité à l'ouest d'un hinterland et d'une ligne de défense naturelle pouvant lui permettre d'empêcher non seulement une invasion ennemie, mais aussi l'incursion des bandes dont l'action a troublé et dévasté depuis un siècle la péninsule balkanique.

Cette linge naturelle est la ligne de la Maritza inférieure comprenant Andrinople, ville qui a, d'ailleurs, pour les Ottomans la plus grande importance au double point de vue historique et religieux.

La liberté des détroits est tout naturellement admise, à condition que la sécurité de Constantinople, capitale de l'Empire et siège du Khalifat, soit à l'abri de toute atteinte.

Les experts des deux parties pourraient arrêter les conditions nécessaires pour assurer cette sécurité.

Les dispositions du Traité de Sèvres concernant la protection des minorités sont de nature à porter atteinte à l'indépendance et à la souveraineté de l'Empire. Dans leur esprit et dans leur lettre, ces dispositions placent la majorité sous la domination de la minorité.

Il faudrait donc adopter, pour les minorités en Turquie, les stipulations insérées dans les Traités de Saint-Germain, de Neuilly ou de Trianon.

Suppression des Capitulations économiques. La Turquie doit avoir la faculté d'établir son budget. La Commission financière aura le droit de contrôler si les prévisions budgétaires vont à l'encontre des stipulations du traité en ce qui concerne le paiement de nos dettes.

Si toutes ces questions financières, dans leur ensemble, étaient étudiées par une commission composée d'éminents spécialistes de l'Europe qui ne

seraient pas imbus de l'idée du régime capitulaire, il serait plus facile de les régler d'une manière juste et équitable.

Le budget de l'Etat ne permettant pas le recrutement par voie de volontariat, l'armée et la moitié au moins de la gendarmerie doivent être, comme par le passé, soumises à la conscription. Augmentation judicieuse de l'effectif de l'armée en prenant en considération l'étendue des frontières ainsi que la conformation géographique et ethnographique du pays.

A l'ouest, la menace des Grecs, à l'est la propagande et les agissements des bolchevistes rendent la situation de la Turquie particulièrement délicate en ce qui concerne la limitation de ses forces armées.

Il serait de l'intérêt général de surseoir à cette limitation jusqu'au règlement de la question du désarmement général.

En échange, nous sommes disposés à prendre les engagements les plus formels vis - à - vis des Puissances mandataires de l'Arabie que nous ne poursuivrons aucun but contraire à leurs intérêts dans les pays limitrophes et que nous pouvons même leur assurer notre assistance morale et matérielle dans l'accomplissement de leurs missions, à condition pourtant que cette assistance n'aille pas à l'encontre des intérêts primordiaux de l'Islam et ne froisse pas l'amour - propre des musulmans.

F.O. 406/47, p. 9 - 10, No. 4/1.

No. 181

Moustafa Kemal Pacha à M. Le Général Harington.

ANGORA, *Le 6 Juillet 1921**

Télégraphique

A Son Excellence le Général Harington.

On a fait parvenir aujourd'hui à Angora la traduction de la lettre que vous aviez envoyée à Zongouldak stop Je suis obligé de relever dès maintenant le fait suivant pour éviter un malentendu dans les pourparlers qui vont être engagés entre nous stop Le treize juin dernier le major Henri et ses collègues étaient venus déclarer à Ineboli que Votre Excellence désirait avoir un entretien avec moi sur des bases qui ont été préposées par le major Henri à Refet Pacha stop Ces idées sont également exprimées dans la lettre que vous a adressée le Major Henri et dont il nous a remis une

* Telgrafın üzerinde tarih yoktur. Ama General Harington'a 6 Temmuz 1921 akşamı ulaşmış olduğuna bakarak Ankara'dan aynı gün çekilmiş olduğunu söylemek yanlış olmaz.

copie signée stop Tel est le point de départ de la correspondence directe qui vient s'engager entre nous stop Nos demandes nationales sont connues de Votre Excellence stop Je déclare que dans le cas où le principe de la libération complète de notre territoire national et celui de nôtre entière indépendance politique financière économique militaire juridique et culturelle à l'intérieur de nos frontières nationales seraient reconnus nous serons prêts à entrer en négociations stop Pour les raisons qui vous ont été exposées par le major Henri nous estimons que ces négociations devront avoir lieu à terre dans la ville d'Ineboli où le meilleur accueil vous sera reservé stop J'attends une réponse de votre part qui me fasse connaître s'il existe ou non entre nous une identité de vues sous ces rapports stop Si le désir de Votre Excellence est de procéder simplement à un échange de vues sur la situation nous pouvons charger de cette mission un de nos collègues stop.

MOUSTAFA KEMAL
Président de la Grande Assemblée
Nationale de Turquie

F.O. 371/6472/E. 8220.

No. 182

War Office to General Harington, Constantinople.

Despatched 1415 7/7/21.

Secret.

Paraphrase.

39416 cipher M. O. 1. 7th July,

The Foreign Office request that, at your meeting with Mustapha Kemal, you will inform him that His Majesty's Government regard as utterly inexcusable the attitude of the Angora Government concerning the delivery of British Prisoners.

F.O. 371/6472.

No. 183

General Harington (Constantinople) to War Office

CONSTANTINOPLE, *July 7, 1921, 15.10.*
(Received July 7, 16.45).

Secret.
Paraphrase.
CLEAR THE LINE.
543 cipher July 7th.

Last night reply was received from Mustapha Kemal which was not forwarded to you. Evidently that Major Henry ?probably to further his business interests, exceeded my instructions which were to find out about our prisoners and any information Mustapha Kemal would disclose of his intentions and to make it quite clear that Mustapha Kemal must come forward if he wanted to approach. Instead of this he appears to have given opposite impression. In his reply Mustapha Kemal lays down his terms, namely, complete liberation of Nationalist territory, complete independence political financial economic military juridicial. With this as base, he suggested I should land at Inebouli and enter into negotiations. Without this base he considers that a talk between us would be of no avail and could be carried out by subordinates. I have reported whole matter to the High Commissioner as the ? terms are entirely political and await your instructions pending which I shall take no further action.

F.O. 371/6471

No. 184.

Mr. Rattigan (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *July 7, 1921, 2.5 p.m.*
(Received July 7, 6.30 p.m.)

No. 495 Telegraphic.

Reply has now been received from Mustapha Kemal. Statement polite but uncompromising in tone and thoroughly unsatisfactory.

Mustapha Kemal begins by laying stress on alleged fact that it is General Harington who has taken the initiative in requesting an interview through Major Henry. Kemal accepts this 'invitation' to enter into *pourparlers* 'on basis proposed by Major Henry to Refet Pasha'. National demands are known to General Harington. They are complete liberation of national territory and entire independence, political, financial, economic, military,

juridical and educational. Provided that these claims are recognised Angora Government are prepared to enter into negotiations. They are of opinion that interview should take place on land at Ineboli.

Mustapha Kemal request reply which will inform him as to whether there exists or not reasonable identity of views between him and General Harington on these points. If General Harington's desire is merely to initiate exchange of views on situation, Mustapha Kemal will appoint one of his colleagues for this purpose.

It is clear that my apprehensions — which were shared by General Harington — as to Major Henry's having exceeded his instructions have been realised.

There had apparently been a previous case some weeks ago of a subordinate officer taking it upon himself to try and arrange meeting of this kind and he seems to have said that he was authorised by 'highest British authority' in Constantinople to speak in this sense. Neither I nor General Officer Commanding had the slightest knowledge of incident and have never authorised anyone to take action of this sort. General Officer Commanding is, I understand, dealing appropriately with officer in question.

In view of all this and unsatisfactory tone of reply, I propose to call on Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon and inform him that there is evidently complete misunderstanding: nobody has ever been authorised by myself or General Harington to ask for interview with Mustapha Kemal. We had been informed that latter wished to lay his views before General Harington and had agreed that General Harington should receive Mustapha Kemal on board British man-of-war for this purpose.

In any case such a recognition of principle as is demanded in Angora note is quite out of the question and we therefore regard incident as definitely closed. I shall take opportunity to repeat, in accepting what we believed to be invitation from Mustapha Kemal, that we were doing so quite openly and in no way behind the backs of our allies.

Owing to fact that what we particularly desired to avoid, viz., impression that we were courting Angora, has undoubtedly been created in Nationalist circles by action of unauthorised persons, I think that it is absolutely essential that we should lose no time in dispelling this illusion. I trust therefore that Your Lordship will approve of my giving an immediate reply to Minister for Foreign Affairs on lines proposed above without waiting for instructions.

D.B.F.P., Ist series, vol. XVII, p. 303-305, No. 291

No. 185

Earl Curzon to Mr. Rattigan (Constantinople).

FOREIGN OFFICE, *8th July, 1921. 5.00 p.m.*

No. 426. Telegraphic.

VERY URGENT.

Question raised by reply of Mustapha Kemal is really one for Cabinet decision and ought not to be prejudged by local action.

While approving of that part of your telegram No. 495 (of July 7th) which contemplated informing Minister for Foreign Affairs of complete misunderstanding that has occurred, I think it would have been well if your statement had been confined to that, and I should not like at this stage to commit His Majesty's Government definitely to pronouncement of policy with which you appear to have accompanied it. I would prefer that no reply be sent to Mustapha Kemal until further instructions have been received from me.

F.O. 371/6471/E. 7808.
D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol. XVII, p. 306, No. 293.

No. 186

Lord Granville (Athens) to the Marques Curzon of Kedleston.

ATHENS, *July 8th, 1921, 6.45 p. m.*
(Received, July 10th, 1921, 22 noon)

No. 388. Telegraphic.

I hear pretty frequent stories apparently from different sources but very likely really from the same Veniselist source to the effect that some sort of negotiations are going on or being attempted with Angora and this is given as reason of continued postponement of offensive and stay of President of the Council at Smyrna.

One story is that Greeks has succeeded in buying Turkish Commanders, which resulted in their being hastily changed and it is now whispered that they are trying to buy the new ones. Another story is that a Macedonian deputy who was formerly in Turkish Parliament is negotiating with Mahomedan deputies who report to Constantinople and that Monsieur Strators and General Strategos are supporting this.

I report these stories for what they may be worth, but have not much faith in them myself although a certain amount of confirmation is afforded

by an article in a Government paper yesterday which suggested that Greece might be prepared to please the Powers by making peace, if it were true Kemal had become more reasonable, had given up all claim to Thrace, and was prepared to accept compromise about Smyrna.

Repeated to Constantinople.

F.O. 371/6521/E. 7876.

No. 187

Mr. Rattigan (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, *July 8, 1921.*
(Received July 10, 12.35 p.m.)

No. 499 Telegraphic.

My telegram No. 495.

I called on Minister for Foreign Affairs last evening and delivered reply to message from Angora. Hamid Bey was present.

I pointed out in first place Angora was evidently under misapprehension as Mustapha Kemal went out of his way to give modified assent to an alleged request on our part for an interview. This was not a fact. We had received a message through Major Henry, that Mustapha Kemal wished to see General Harington. His Majesty's Government after informing allied Governments had decided to authorize General Harington to listen to what Mustapha Kemal might have to say.

Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that this point was of little importance. I observed that Mustapha Kemal did not appear to think so as he laid great stress on alleged invitation from us. However it was true that discussion of point was merely academic, as in view of preposterous demand that we should recognize in principle Turkish claims to complete independence within their national frontiers before entering into any *pourparlers* we could proceed no further in the matter. I added that Kemalists appeared to have taken leave of their senses formulating such a demand. Minister for Foreign Affairs turned to Hamid Bey with the remark 'you see I told you it was a piece of childish folly. How could a great Power accept such a thing'. I then observed that we had not in any case contemplated entering into *pourparlers*, but His Majesty's Government had merely authorized General Harington to hear what Mustapha Kemal might have to say.

Hamid Bey, after expressing his sincere regret that projected interview must now be regarded as abandoned, then withdrew.

Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me if I would authorize him to press Mustapha Kemal to reopen matters.

I said that as far as we were concerned incident must be regarded as closed. Apart from misunderstanding as to initiative in the matter, basis proposed was out of the question. If Kemal completely changed his attitude His Majesty's Government might reconsider the matter. But present reply could not have failed to make a very bad impression on them.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said he would exert all possible influence at Angora to make Mustapha Kemal understand folly of putting forward such preposterous demand. He added 'I am very discouraged but not yet in despair'.

I think that there can be no doubt that Enver and Committee of Union and Progress are gradually taking command of situation at Angora and that Kemalist Government must be (?regarded as) (?entirely) in the hands of Bolsheviks.

From extracts of secret report on Third International, sent by last bag, Your Lordship will see what are Bolshevik plans... Anatolia for furthering their designs against Great Britain.

D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol. XVII, p. 305-306, No. 292.

No. 188

General Harington (Constantinople) to War Office.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *July 8, 1921, 12.00*
(Received July 9. 1921, 1.00)

Secret
Paraphrase
CLEAR THE LINE.
557 cipher July 8th. *Ist of 3 parts.*

My 548 July 7th. I have just seen telegram No. 495 dated July 7th from acting High Commissioner. It seems necessary to point out that in his telegram the High Commissioner appears to accept statements of Hamid Bey at their face value without reference to version of the British officers referred to. Something of Hamid Bey's character is known to me and I have no reason to trust his ?veracious sincerity as opposed to that of officers concerned, who, as a matter of fact, are both temporary officers one of whom has been demobilized. Though Major Henry has no official position and may have been over keen in his conversation with Rafet, the 2nd officer referied to was? permitted to? obtain a check from Angora in order to

test? genuineness of Angora's desires? to converse. I have examined the officer in questions personally and I beleive his statement. I consider this to have been legitimate secret service check, made in order to avoid my being trapped into a false position. Check obtained which I consider to have been effective was conveyed in my telegram number 467 June 23rd. Copy of this was given to meeting of High Commissioner's staff at the same time and I took no action whatever upon it.

Second Part.

I am not sure upon reflection that Mustapha Kemal's telegram is quite so uncompromising and unsatisfactory as High Commissioner's telegram indicates. I am repeating it to you as it stands. It seems to me that Mustapha Kemal was making an attempt to obtain my own views regarding Nationalist pact rather than official view of British Government. I have not replied to this telegram and, as I stated in my cable 548, shall not do so until I receive further instructions. With reference to my cable 552 in which I indicated that Hamid, did not appear to relish my breaking off all further conversation out of hand, Black Jumbo information of the evening of my conversation with Hamid, i.e. the 6th, shows that he wired to Mustapha Kemal his version of what passed between us and takes care to inform Mustapha Kemal of the true situation as it should have been conveyed by Major Henry. He seems to me still to show a desire for Mustapha Kemal to send another message upon a clear understanding. Separate telegram 554 dated July 8th contains Hamid's message to Mustapha Kemal. It is interesting to note in this connection, that Hamid on the same date July 6th communicated 7 messages to Angora from Bekir - Sami Bey bearing signature Briand and transmitted to General Pelle so there is no doubt that Franklin - De - Bouillion is busy at Angora.

Last Part.

Hamid styles himself as the intermediary between Constantinople and Angora. I do not like look of him at all. His history shows him to be an expert in intrigue. My officer definitely denies that he made any such statement as is attributed to him and states that he said he had reason to believe on his own authority that should Mustapha Kemal have a desire to come forward and give a clear statement of the Nationalist claims high British authorities would listen to him personally. In my opinion they cleverly attempted to trap Henry at Ineboli and my officer here into committing us to a position of weakness in making overtures which is totally untrue. I had no knowledge whatever of the transactions but my opinion is that Mustapha Kemal still wants to talk and from Hamid's last wire

554 there is no possible doubt my conditions are now known to him and I should not be surprised at further developments. The fact that on the same afternoon as I got Mustapha Kemal's reply, Nationalists at Ismid sent in a flag of truce to my outpost to acknowledge the map of neutral line which I had sent, may possibly be significant. Bearer announced they had 14,000 troops in Ismid - Adabazar area and they were considering whether they would cross neutral line. Reconnaissances show no movement and there is no truth in it.

F.O. 371/6472.

No. 189

Mr. Rattigan (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *July 8, 1921, 8.30. p.m.*
(Received July 10, 2.30 p.m.)

No. 506. Telegraphic.

My telegram No. 499 and your telegram No. 423.

Admiral de Robeck informed me last night that, in view of tone of Angora reply, he was not now in favour of tightening our neutrality as against Greeks.

I requested Admiral de Robeck and General Harington to discuss this questions to - day. We have now examined the situation carefully and are unanimuosly of opinion that it would be inadvisable, in present circumstances, to put into force measures proposed against continued utilization of Constantinople by Greeks.

My chief reason for agreeing to military suggestion (reported in my telegram No. 483) for immediate enforcement of these measures was apprehension that continued use of port by Greeks might afford pretext to Kemalists for advance against Constantinople.

But General Officer Commanding is of opinion that Kemalist could not (?contemplate) such a move until they (?have dealt with) Greek offensive and that, pretext or no pretext, they will come for Constantinople as soon as they have nothing further to fear from Greeks.

Angora reply does reveal practically hopeless outlook as regards possibility of arriving at any settlement with Kemalists. I am not of opinion that this reply is either bluff or first step in Turkish bargaining. I believe it expresses definite determination of Kemalists to achieve their full demands. It further proves that extremists - whether C. U. P. or not - hold the reins.

This being so I do not believe anything short of complete capitulation by us will be considered by Angora. I place but little hope in the result of counsels of moderation which Minister for Foreign Affairs has promised to give Mustapha Kemal.

Admiral de Robeck anticipates transport of Russian troops into Anatolia across the Black Sea and holds that for this reason, if for no other, it is essential to allow Greek warships to continue where they are. General officer Commanding concurs in this.

In view of these military and naval representations consequent upon changed situation I propose to suspend taking action on your telegram No. 423 pending further instructions.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 506, repeated to Athens No. 101.

F.O. 371/6521/E. 7872.
D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol. XVII, p. 307 - 308, No. 294.

No. 190

British Commander - in - Chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

Cypher telegram *July 8, 1921.*
Secret.

374. Having (?seen) the reply from Angora concerning projected meeting of Generals Harington and Mustapha Kemal and in view of the unsatisfactory state of affairs with regard to British prisoners there seems to be no object in observing any longer scrupulous neutrality towards National Assembly which under influence of Soviet and extremists has no (?intention of) meeting Allies. Request that my message 335 re Greek vessels at Constantinople which was intended to emphasize such neutrality may therefore be cancelled. British High Commissioner and General concur. (1021/8).

F.O. 371/6521.

No. 191

Mr. Rattigan (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon.

No. 510 (D). Telegraphic.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *July 9th, 1921, 8.0 p.m.*
(Received July 10th, 1921, 2.45 p.m.)

I communicated reply of Mustapha Kemal to French and Italian High Commissioners and explained action I had felt obliged to take.

Latter said that he entirely approved not only on his own account but wished to convey to me official approval of his Government. French High Commissioner associated himself therewith.

Both said that they were convinced it was essential to show Angora that their demand was so preposterous that it should be refused out of hand.

F.O. 371/6472/E. 7874.

No. 192

General Harington (Constantinople) to War Office.

Despatched:— 16. 10 9. 7. 21.
Received:— 17. 45 9. 7. 21.

Secret,
Not paraphrased.
CLEAR THE LINE.

569 cipher July 9th. *Ist of 3 parts.*

Black Jumbo. A. With reference to acting High Commissioner's telegram to Foreign Office number 496 dated July 8th. I have ascertained that after Mr. Rattigan's interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs and Hamid Bey, latter wired as follows to Angora. To His Excellency Yusuf Kemal Bey, Vekil of Foreign Affairs, Angora. I have given suitable information to General Pellé re the manner in which the British applied (for negotiations not enciphered) and gave it up, and explained to him how following upon the reply which they received from Angora, they may pretend at the Premier's Congress, which is to meet on July 15th, that Anatolia is a foe to peace, and consequently I have requested General Pellé to draw the attention of Paris to matter. He told me that he was aware of the spirit of the case but he did not know the details, and that he would enlighten Paris in order to check the above arguments. Signed Hamid Stamboul.

2nd part.

Personally I think it is too early to assume that Angora is "entirely in the hands of the Bolsheviks". I will wire in fuller detail on this point. *It seems to me curious that Turkey should turn to the French.* In my 548 of July 7th I stated I should take no further (group undec.) in the matter pending further instructions from you which I still await.

C. The relevant portion of Mustapha Kemal's telegram to me reads as follows:—

"Nos demandes nationales sont connues de votre excellence. Je déclare que dans le cas (group undec.) le principe de la libération complète de notre territoire national et celui de notre entière indépendance politique, financière, économique, militaire, juridique et culturelle à l'intérieur de nos frontières nationales seraient reconnus nous serons prêts à entrer en négociations.

Last Part

Pour les raisons que vous ont été exposées par le Major Henri nous estimons que ces négociations devraient avoir lieu à terre dans la ville d'Ineboli où le meilleur accueil vous sera preservé. J'attends une réponse de votre part qui me fasse connaître qu'il existe ou non entre nous (Note the personal element) une identité de vues sous ces rapports. Si le désir de votre Excellency est de procéder simplement à un échange de vues sur la situation nous pouvons charger de cette mission un de nos collègues".

Personnally ?we would not think Mustapha Kemal could be expected to display his minimum demands immediately and be certainly did not attempt to attract me to Ineboli on a false errand.

F.O. 371/6472.

No. 193

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir M. Cheltham (Paris) and to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome).

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 9th, 1921.*

No. 383 (295).
Telegraphic

Please inform the Government to which you are accredited that reply has been received by General Harington from Mustapha Kemal.

He states with quite unfounded statement that initiative in requesting interview came from British side and accept "invitation" to enter into pourparlers on basis of national claims, which he defines as complete liberation of national territory and entire independence political, financial, economic, military, judicial and educational. Angora Government consider that interview should take place on land at Ineboli.

Mustafa Kemal asks whether reasonable identity of view exists between General Harington and himself on these points; if former's desire is merely

to initiate exchange of views he will appoint one of his colleagues for the purpose.

In view of unsatisfactory nature of this reply, Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs is being informed that it is evident that complete misunderstanding exists. No one was authorised to seek an interview with Mustapha Kemal; on the contrary General Harington was informed that Kemal wished to lay his views before him and accordingly offered to receive him on a British man-of-war for the purpose.

His Majesty's Government have not yet decided whether it is desirable to send a reply to Mustapha Kemal as to untenable character of his proposal, viewed as whole, and before doing so would like to consult French/Italian Governments. It may be that Mustapha Kemal is either playing for time, or trying it on, or seeking to produce discord between the Allies.

Addressed to Paris No. 382 and Rome No. 295. Repeated to Constantinople No. 428.

F.O. 371/6472.

No. 194

Mr. Rattigan (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, *July 9, 1921, 8 p.m.*
(Received July 10, 7 p.m.)

No. 511 Telegraphic

Your telegram No. 426[1].

Your Lordship will see from my telegram No. 499[2] that I confined myself to informing Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government could not possibly agree to basis proposed by Mustapha Kemal viz. previous recognition of principle of complete liberation of national territory and that of entire political, financial, economic, military, juridical, and educational independence.

I made no declaration of policy beyond this and assured Minister for Foreign Affairs that Great Britain was as anxious as ever to effect a fair settlement with Turkey.

I much regret if I went too far rejecting demand for such recognition of principle without waiting for instructions. I thought I might assume from previous declarations of policy by His Majesty's Government that they could

[1] No. 185.
[2] No. 187.

not possibly agree to it. But as Your Lordship will see I told Minister for Foreign Affairs that question might be re-opened if Kemal's attitude were changed.

I would add that I consulted Admiral de Robeck and General Harington and both agree that it was most advisable to reject at once what appeared to us to be a preposterous demand.

At the same time I informed Minister for Foreign Affairs that it was merely in order to save time in dispelling illusions that I had decided to inform him that demand in question was entirely unacceptable, without awaiting instructions from you[3].

D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol. 309, No. 296.

No. 195

General Harington (Constantinople) to War Office.

Despatched:— 21.00 9.7.21.
Received:— 12.00 10.7.21.

Secret.
Paraphrase.

571 cipher 9/7. *Ist of 2 parts.*

For your information. Text of note which I sent to acting High Commissioner is as follows:— It may be ?read in conjunction with my subsequent telegrams to your numbers 548, 552 and 557 in particular see also my 569 and 570 of today. I understand that text of my actual letter to Mustapha Kemal was telegraphed to Foreign Office by acting High Commissioner in his telegram 490 July 5th.

Your Excellency. 1. I have the honour to forward to you reply received from Mustapha Kemal in answer to my telegram. It was handed me by Izzet Pasha and Hamid Bey who visited me and disclosed a state of affairs of which I was totally unaware.

2. It is quite clear that, presumably for his own ends, Major Henry greatly exceeded his instructions and conveyed a meaning exactly opposite to what was intended, giving impression that we were anxious to meet Mustapha Kemal.

3. A paper setting out my action was given by me to Izzet Pasha. It ran as follows:—

[3] It would seem that no reply was sent by Lord Curzon to this communication.

A. General Harington asked Major Henry, if he had an opportunity of seeing Mustapha Kemal, to find out whereabouts and welfare of the British prisoners, also any military information of interest which Mustapha Kemal might be prepared to disclose.

Last part.

B. On his return Major Henry reported that Mustapha Kemal was desirous of meeting General Harington to discuss situation and suggested that General Harington should land at Inebouli and work through General Rafet Pasha as Mustapha Kemal could not leave Angora.

C. General Harington reported to his Government that he was prepared to go under the following conditions.

1. In a battleship to Inebouli.
2. It was imperative that Mustapha Kemal should come in person to the battleship to meet him.
3. General Harington would be prepared to hear anything Mustapha Kemal had to say and would report same to the British Government.
4. That interview was sought by Mustapha Kemal.
5. That everything must be open and above board.

4. General Harington has already maintained the line that the discussion of political matters is not within his province.

5. Letter received from Mustapha Kemal is concerned with political matters, which General Harington is unable to? answer. On this account General Harington will hand over letter to High Commissioner to be dealt with as he may think fit.

6. As to the last sentence of the letter, General Harington thinks that it would perhaps have helped the common cause if Mustapha Kemal had wished to speak as one soldier to anothor; but General Harington, not being competent to talk politics, hands over the despatch to the High Commissioner as described in preceding paragraphs.

F.O. 371/6472.

No. 196

General Harington (Constantinople) to War Office.

Secret.
Paraphrase.
Clear the Line.

Despatched 1900 10/7/21.
Received 1000 11/7/21.

579 cipher 10/7

Reference telegram from Foreign Office to High Commissioner No. 426. I have sent Mustapha Kemal no reply to the questions he asks me and until you instruct me shall not do so. My only local action was to report matter to High Commissioner. Personally I do not regard door as finally closed unless it is the wish of the Government that it should be closed.

F.O. 371/6472.

No. 197

Lord Granville (Athens) to Earl Curzon.

ATHENS, *July 11th, 1921, 9.0. p.m.*
(Received July 12th, 1921, 10.50 a.m.)

Telegraphic.
No. 394. (R)

Greek papers are jubilant over press accounts of abandonment of proposed meeting between General Harington and Kemal owing to latter's arrogance and they accept without hesitation statement that it was Turks and not British who proposed the meeting. They argue that any slight tendencies which British Government and British public opinion may have had under French influence to negotiate and come to terms with Kemal must now have been destroyed and British support may now be hoped for by Greeks. This incident, they say, is merely further proof how right Greek Government were to refuse mediation until a signal defeat has made Kemal more amenable.

Repeated to Constantinople.

F.O. 371/6522/E. 7972.

No. 198

Lord Granville (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

ATHENS, *July 11th, 1921 9.0 p.m.*
(Received July 12th, 1921, 10.50 a.m.)

No. 395 Telegraphic.

My telegram No. 394.

Reference to it in Constantinople telegram No. 506 is the first information I have received about proposed meeting between General Harington and Kemal of which I read in the newspapers.

I submit that my work would be (group omitted) ier if I might be kept informed of such things and in general of views and policy of His Majesty's Government as, for instance, they were set forth in your despatch No. 1638 to Paris which I only saw eventually in printed sections.

F.O. 371/6522/E. 7973.

No. 199

Mr. Rattigan to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, *July 11, 1921.*
(Received July 18.)

No. 661.
My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 401 of the 24th April, 1921, and previous correspondence relative to Turco - Afghan relations, I have the honour to state that the Angora paper "Hakimiet-i - Millié" of the 12th June, 1921, published an account of the ceremonial hoisting of the Afghan flag over the new Afghan Embassy or Legation there. The flag was hoisted by Mustafa Kemal Pasha. I enclose free translations of the speeches exchanged on the occasion as reported in the "Hakimiet-i - Millié".

2. Your Lordship will observe that, while strongly Islamic in tone, each speech refers to Soviet Russia as a member in a definite triple alliance, and that on the other hand there is no specific reference to any other Asiatic State. The whole performance is of interest in its bearing on the negotiations between Afghanistan and Great Britain on the one hand and Russia and Afghanistan on the other, which I, gather from printed correspondence, had reached a critical stage at the time when the ceremony in Angora took place. Communications between Kabul and Angora are

presumably so slow as to deprive the synchronising of the Angora ceremony with any particular stage of the Kabul negotiations of special importance, but it would nevertheless appear that His Majesty's Government should be somewhat slow to believe in any real willingness on the part of the Amir and his Government to break with either Moscow or Angora.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosures to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and to the Viceroy of India.

I have, &c.,

F.O. 406/47, p. 14, No. 8.

FRANK RATTIGAN,
Acting High Commissioner.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 199.

Extract from the "Hakimiet-i - Millie".

(Free Translation, slightly condensed, of Speeches exchanged at the Ceremony of Hoisting the Afghan Flag at the New Afghan Embassy in Angora on June 10, 1921).

(1.)

Afghan Ambassador's Speech.

I THANK all who attend this ceremony. The Afghan nation, which has at last achieved its wish and sent an official mission to the Turkish nation, always its guide and leader, has shown unending regard for the Turkish nation. This mission is happy to find itself among you as representative of 10,000,000 Afghans. Our religious ties are confirmed by the establishment of official relations, and the treaty between the two nations gives a great hope for the salvation of the Islamic world. The Imperialists of the West have stopped at no oppression of the Eastern or the Moslem world, and they have striven with all their might for the destruction of Moslems. Please God they will not attain their object of overrunning the Eastern world. The alliance of Turk, Afghan and Russian will break the hands of those who wish to overrun the East. We Moslems, ever exposed to the tyranny of the Imperialists, do not despair of the Koranic promise. The world of Islam has resolved to defend its rights against those who seek to destroy it. We are hopeful of the future. We may not possess means equal to those of the Westerns who seek to tyrannise over us, but we shall achieve independence by our religious purpose and faith. I am certain that hereafter united Islam will one day achieve its rights and exalt the glory of the crescent and star. Our mission is proud of its reception by the Grand National

Assembly on its arrival and its president. The hoisting of the Embassy flag was postponed until to day because of Ramazan. We consider it a happy augury that this ceremony should fall on Bairam and a Friday. I express my happiness that the president should have accepted my request to hoist the flag in person. I pray God for the progress and exaltation of the East and Islam.

(2.)

Mustafa Kemal Pasha's Speech.

I thank your Excellency for your invitation to assist at the hoisting of your flag, the symbol of your independence. I thank your Excellency in the name of the Grand National Assembly for this glorious day. Between Turkey and Afghanistan, as with the whole world of Islam, strong bonds existed in principle. As in Afghanistan, so in Turkey, the whole heart of the nation beats fraternally. Certain causes prevented the conversion of these bonds into concrete form. Until lately official relations could not be established. It is a matter of thanksgiving that we have achieved this in the course of Anatolia's struggle for independence. The arrival of your mission is a source of pride to all of us. The joint efforts of Turkey and Afghanistan, working hand in hand, are important enough to secure an important equilibrium in the political world. The result of these efforts will be seen in the future and will redound to the happiness of Islam. For centuries Turkey struggled single-handed for Islam. Henceforward it will have Afghanistan for a comrade. What the world of Islam desires is independence. It does not seek to destroy others. We shall be proud to see every Islamic Government free and independent like Afghanistan. For those who labour under the oppression in the Eastern world, the alliance of Turkey, Afghanistan and the Russian Soviet Republic is, as you finely say, a source of gladness. Please God this alliance will produce more abundant results. We see with gladness that every effort of your Excellency here is devoted to this object. The flag hoisted to-day, the symbol of the independence of Afghanistan, will wave here for the friendship of Afghanistan and Turkey. That the first flag should be hoisted in your time is the cause of congratulation not only for Afghanistan, but for Turkey. I thank you for my own account for the honour of hoisting the flag. An Embassy will shortly proceed to Afghanistan to strengthen still further the bonds between the two countries and this mission will give proof there of the same purpose and sincerity.

F.O. 406/47, p. 15, No. 8/1.

No. 200

Memorandum By The British Secretary of State For War To The Cabinet on The Position in Anatolia.

SECRET

C. P. 3124

I circulate the following appreciation of the position in Anatolia, in accordance with the request of the Committee on the future of Constantinople (3rd Conclusion, 4 *(a)* and *(b)*).

L. W. E.

11th July, 1921.

Secretary of State,

In accordance with the wishes of the Cabinet, I put up a ***short appreciation on the Greek Army*** and the chances of Greek successes in the coming operations. This appreciation is, to my mind, quite unsatisfactory, but it is the best we can do at the moment. ***It is unsatisfactory*** because we are ***unable to compare the two contending armies and therefore our forecast may be wholly misleading.*** I am sorry for this, but as I cannot send officers to report on the Turkish Army I can only do the best possible within the limited information at my disposal.

HENRY WILSON, *Field - Marshal,*
Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

7th July, 1921.

AN APPRECIATION OF THE VALUE OF THE GREEK ARMY.

1. The object of this paper is:—

(a) To appreciate the value of the Greek Army, on the hypothesis that it is fighting alone and unsupported, as is the case at the present time. *(See* paragraphis 2 - 8*)*.

(b) To appreciate the value of the Greek Army, on the hypothesis that it is fighting with Allied support in the form of munitions, war matériel and money. *(See* paragraphs 9 - 10*)*.

(c) To give particulars of the assistance in the form of munitions and war matériel which could be supplied, if His Majesty's Government decided to help Greece. *(See* paragraph 11*)*.

2. In order to obtain the latest information on the subject, two senior officers, *Major - General* T. O. *Marden* C. B., C.M.G., and *Colonel E. S.*

Hoare Nairne, C. B., C. M. G., *were ordered*, in accordance with the instructions of His Majesty's Government, to make independent reports, as the result of personal observation, on the present condition of the Greek Army in Anatolia. Their reports are attached as appendices to this paper, together with the observations on each by Lieut - General Sir C. H. Harington, K. C. B., D. S. O., Commanding - in - Chief, the British Army in Constantinople, as follows:—

Report by Colonel Nairne	Appendix	A. 1.
General Harington's comments	"	B. 1, 2 and 3
Report of General Marden	"	C. 1, 2 and 3
General Harington's comments	"	D.

3. It is evident from these reports that the *Greek Army must be regarded as well-trained, well - equipped*, and *eager for battle*. It would appear that the Greek General Staff have taken steps *to remedy the causes of recent failures*, and although certain weak points exist, it is probable that the Army, in so far as its size permits, *will give a good account of itself*, at any *rate in the initial stages of the operations which are about to commence*.

4. It is unfortunate that *we are unable to secure similar reports on the present condition of the Turkish Nationalist Army*, as it is only by comparing the condition of the opposing armies that we can predict the probable outcome of future operations. The evidence of recent operations, supplemented by reports from British, French, Italian and Greek sources, leaves no possibility of doubt that the *Nationalist Army has been greatly expanded during the past few months, and that its training has been methodical and efficient*. Furthermore, great quantities of arms, ammunition and military stores have been received from Russia, and there are indications that Russia is prepared to help with man - power also if the Russophil Government of Mustapha Kemal will accept it. Tchicherin's visit to Angora at this moment is of special interest in this connection.

5. The first paragraph of Appendix C 1, and the fifth paragraph of Appendix C 2, contain the *Greek estimate of the Turkish Nationalist forces*. This estimate agrees with our information as to Nationalist divisions in actual contact with the Greeks, but takes no account of Turkish forces in reserve. If Turkish divisions in close reserve are taken into account, as they should be, the relative superiority in infantry of three to two, which is claimed by the Greeks disappears altogether; while the relative supperiority in guns of more that two to one is not borne out by the information at our disposal, as will be seen from the following tables:—

(a) Greek Forces in Anatolia.

Front.	Formations.	Rifles.	Machine guns.	Mountain guns.	Field guns.	Heavy guns.	Remarks.
Northen front (Brusa).	Four divisions: 3rd, 7th, 10th, 11th.	18,000	288	64	36	8	Total ration strength is about 200.000
Southern front (Ushak).	Seven divisions, plus the cavalry division: Ist, 2nd, 4th, 5th, 9th, 12th, 13th.	33,500	504	104	68	46	
	Total available for operations.	51,500	792	168	104	54	
Lines of Communication area.	Two regiments Army Troops and Lines of Communication troops.	6,500	24	..	..	..	
	Grand total ..	58,000	816	168	104	54	

(b) British Estimate of Turkish Nationalist Forces.

Front.	Formations.	Rifles.	Machine guns.	Light guns.	Heavy guns.
Nothern front ..	Six divisions; one cavalry division.	23,000	167	73	18
Southern front ..	Ten divisions; two cavalry divisions.	25,000	146	48	18
West of Angora ..	Three divisions; one cavalry division*.	8,000	?	40	3
Total immediately available	..	56,000	313	161	39
Reported to be moving from Cilicia.	Two divisions* ..	5,000	32	13	..
Amasia (170 miles from Angora).	Three divisions; two cavalry divisions*.	7.500	?	?	?
Grand total	..	68,500	345	174	39

* The Greek estimates does not take these formations into considerations.

Even if we were to accept the Greek estimate that they have a superiority of three to two in infantry, we consider that this supperiority is altogether too small for the task in hand. It may be quoted as a fact that, during the Great War, even the British Army did not succeed in defeating the Turks in prepared positions, except when we had considerable numerical superiority. By skilful grouping of units within the battle area ,the Greeks may contrive to concentrate great superiority at certain points, and may thereby gain local successes but, *no possibility of a great victory* can be envisaged. If great local successes are to be gained when numbers are so nearly equal, superiority of leadership is necessary, *and we have no reason to believe that Turkish leadership is inferior to that of the Greeks.*

6. If we consider the *moral factor* in the opposing armies, we find *nothing to indicate an advantage on the side of the Greeks.* Both armies are convinced that their cause is just, both armies are eager for battle, both armies are inspired with a hatred of their opponents; but the Greek Army cannot have altogether outlived the depressing effect of their *failure in the April operations,* and this will be accentuated when the facts become known concerning their forced and undignified retirement from Ismid. Added to this, there is the under - current of *political intrigue* inherent in the Greek Army, which must have a bad effect on *morale.* The Turks, on the other hand, appear to be actuated by a single purpose and recent success will have heightened their *morale.*

7. Attention is specially drawn to the *latter half of Appendix C3,* in which General Marden gives his appreciation of the *value of the Greek Army* as a whole. The opinions therein expressed, except in so far as they give the Greek estimate of the Turkish Army, agree very closely with the opinion formed by the General Staff, as the result of reports received during the last few months.

The plan of operations which the Greeks are about to put into effect is one which demands intimate co - operation, and independent action by subordinates. These have hitherto been two of the weakest points in Greek tactics. As regards co - operation, General Marden considers that "means of communication between detached forces are not sufficient". As regards independent action by subordinates, he says: "The units themselves will probaby save the situation". The General Staff are of opinion that the *Greeks are leaving much to chance.*

8. *The General Staff* are, therefore, of opinion that, although it is possible that the Greek Army, fighting alone and unsupported, may obtain some initial success in the operations which are about to commence, *they see no prospect of any decisive victory being gained which would bring peace to Anatolia.*

9. *It must next be considered whether Allied support to Greece, in the form of munitions, war matériel and money, would enable her to bring about peace in the*

Near East. It is evident that without Allied support in munitions, war matériel and money, the Greek operations cannot be continued indefinitely. It is also evident that Allied support of this nature will be of no avail unless we are sure that the Greek Army is in all other respects capable of the task which it has been given by the Greek Government. *Fighting so far from their base, Smyrna, in a country where transport is extremely difficult, they are, according to their own figures, able to maintain on the battle front only 51,500 rifles, although they have about 200,000 men in the country. These numbers are insufficient to give them a sufficient margin of superiority to command success. It is, therefore, man-power that is their greatest need. If they* succeed in dislodging the Turks from their present positions, the *Turks will* almost certainly *retire and continue the war further east. It will then be necessary for the Greeks to fight with still longer and increasingly vulnerable lines of communication,* which will make a still greater demand on Greek man-power, a demand which, so far as we are informed, Greece is not in a position to meet.

10. *It would therefore, appear that no good purpose would be served in supplying Greece with munitions, war matériel and money unless we are in a position to prevent similar supplies being received by the Nationalist Turks from Russia.* If the Allies are prepared to munition the Greeks, and at the same time to prevent the Turks from obtaining munitions, a time may come when the Greeks, if they do not grow war weary, would be in a winning position. The General Staff, however, see no way of cutting off the supply of munitions to the Turks from Russia, and are, therefore, of opinion that *Greece's great need is man-power rather than munitions, war matériel and money, and that as the Allies are not prepared to render assistance to Greece in this form, no support in munitions, war matériel and money would enable the Greeks to win peace in Anatolia.*

11. As regards particulars of the assistance in munitions and war matériel which could be made available if His Majesty's Government were to decide to support the Greeks, the *Army Council have received no list of Greek requirements later than that dated August 1920, a copy of which is attached as Appendix E.* It is not known to what extent this list represents the present needs of the Greek Army, but it is known that many of the items mentioned such as horses, mechanical transport vehicles, clothing, &c., *have already been purchased in the open market.* As regards armament, we could supply the rifles, rifle ammunition, hand grenades and 60-pr. batteries. We could also supply a portion of the engineer matériel and technical material, and most of the medical matériel asked for; but it is impracticable to compile a table showing what is available until the Greek requirements are known.

General Staff, War Office, London. S. W.
6th July, 1921.

Appendix A.

Report on Greek Army by British Military Attache, Athens.

Telegram No. 93, dated 15th June, 1921.

In Ushak region British Military Representative and I stayed at Ist Army Corps and 2nd Division Headquarters and visited various troops of 2nd and 5th Divisions. We saw many details and spoke to officers at railway stations on the way. Bad weather limited opportunity, *but I saw quite enough to disprove pessimistic statements of French military mission and others in Athens.*

The following report is based on information given by Colonel Pallis, Chief of the General Staff, Asia Minor, heads of bureaux, and Ist Army Corps. and 2nd Division staffs, *checked by my own and British Military Representative's observations. There is probably some optimism but no serious exaggeration:* —

General Condition. — The Greek Army is now a more efficient fighting machine than I have ever seen it. Cessation of foreign supplies has enforced *careful administration.* The failure of last March taught folly of inadequate arrangements. Hard facts have *quenched antagonistic* (group undecipherable) and political bigotry, *hard work has created reliance.* Troops are *well clothed* and *shod,* camps neat (group undecipherable) *communication improved* though means are lacking, advanced units being systematically formed, transport reorganized and sufficient for immediate requirements. Troops are fairly well trained and staff work co-ordinated. Of those troops I have seen *morale and* discipline are excellent. Troops and staff are confident and keen to meet Nationalists. M*orale* of 3rd Army Corps declined after retirement last April but recovered, Chief of the General Staff says, when reinforcements arrived and is now good.

Present admirable morale throughout the Army is founded on confident hope of winning final settlement of Asia Minor strife. If these operations, however successful, do not bring about settlement and army has to remain another winter in the field, *morale* will be severely strained. The King by his presence or even influence, might be able to maintain it, but no one else could.

Command and staff. — General Papoulas seems to be a figurehead, but he supports his staff who serve him well and so he inspires confidence.

Colonel Pallis is a good Chief of General Staff, quiet and practical.

Colonel Saryannis, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, is *brilliant and* energetic and is the driving power at Army Headquarters.

First and artillerly bureaux are *well* run.

Second bureau weak and needs shaking up.

Head of third bureau does not impress me, but he has been recently appointed and British Military Representative says work has been well done hitherto.

Fourth bureau *excellent*. Its head, Colonel Spiridon, served under M. Venizelos and has energetic personality and adminsitrative talent. He has overcome great difficulties and is doing first - rate work.

Evidence here and at the front shows that the medical service has been considerably improved.

Seeing that the *morale* is maintained, I agree with Pallis that, balancing losses and gains the army has benefited on the whole by the last eight months' changes in the command. *New commanders of the 2nd and 3rd Army Corps are greatly superior to the old.* Removal of General Nider from the Ist Army Corps, and of Tsoroulis from the 7th Division is a great loss, but Pallis declares their health necessitated it. Perhaps Nider's successor is not brilliant, but he appears to be sound and reliable. General Valettas, commander of the 2nd Division, is said to be brilliant. He appears to me to be well above the average, and he showed courage and decision during the April operations. In the 3rd Army Corps, Tricoupis, of the 3rd Division, is a great asset; Platis, commander of 7th Division, is the weak horse in the coach. Leonardopoulos, late commander of 10th Division, is to supersede a Royalist commander of 9th Division, which Leonardopoulos formerly commanded under Venizelos. The other commanders of formations I have not met. Pallis says they are capable and have experience, except Colonel Dimaras, who is new to command of a division. *Prince Andrew is to command 12th Division.*

I have seen Army Headquarters, Ist Army Corps and 2nd Division staffs. British Military Representative knows the 3rd Army Corps and 3rd Division staffs. If their quality is maintained in the other formations the army is well staffed. Ist Army Corps staff is very good throughout; 2nd Division and 3rd Army Corps average; 3rd Division very good. Greek staff work hard, but need firm hand when things go wrong.

Commanders of units did well in last operations, but Royalist officers were naturally not so good at handling their men in action as those who had fought in Macedonia. Fortunatelly, large majority of junior Venizelist officers have remained, and Royalist officers with Balkan war experience now have had time to relearn their work. On the whole, I think command and staff of army and army itself considerably improved since last year, and, judged by Balkan standards, very efficient. I cannort imagine the Turks developing so good a machine without extensive foreign help.

Composition of Army. — Asia Minor army consists of 11 divisions in 3 army corps, 1 cavalry brigade, 2 regiments of army troops, and line of communication

troops, including 5 special battalions. For operations which begin about 3rd July, Army Headquarters of Ist Army Corps, with Ist, 2nd and 12th Divisions, 2nd Army Corps, with 5th and 13th Divisions, will be in Ushak area. 3rd Army Corps, with 3rd, 7th, 10th and 11th Divisions, will be in Brussa area. 4th and 9th Divisions will be in reserve.

Exclusive of sick *total strength in Asia Minor, June 14th, was 169,000. Add 11,000 for 12th Division and 20,000 for 1912 Class, still to come from Greece, then total before (?operations) will be 200,000.* After completing units there will be in army corps depôt in Asia Minor 17,000 available for replacement of casualties. Number of 20,000 still expected from Greece may be optimistic, but in any case total represents a far better result of recent mobilization than I estimated.

Infantry. — Rifle companies, 160 rifles, exclusive of light machine guns. Machine gun companies generally complete.

Cavalry brigade. — Useless horses have been excluded and replaced by requisition. General Staff estimate of 1,000 sabres plus machine guns probably correct. Nicolaides, a good officer, has been re-appointed to command. Divisional cavalry complete.

Artillery. — All divisions are complete or completing, except 4th, which will have only one group. Army corps complete, except 3rd, which has only seven batteries and a country cart ammunition column.

Arms and ammunitions. — All fighting troops armed with Mannlicher rifles, except 7th Division, which has Lebel. Light machine guns and St. Etien heavy machine guns take Lebel ammunition, other heavy machine guns take Mannlicher. Rounds now in Asia Minor per gun or rifle are: Mannlicher rifle 900; machine gun, 25,000; good further supply available from Athens factory. Lebel riflle, 400; light machine gun, 4,000; heavy, 25,000; no reserve in Greece, but *5,000,000 rounds are expected from France.*

Artillery. — Mountain 65-mm. — 120 guns, 1,700 rounds each. 75-mm. — 48 guns, 1,350 rounds each.

Field, 75-mm. — 104 guns, 2,200 rounds each. Heavy, 120-mm.— 36 guns, 750 rounds each. 6-inch — 12 howitzers, 360 rounds each. Skoda 105-mm. — 6 guns, 1,400 rounds each.

Arms are well kept. Many guns are very old, but are serviceable for some time to come. (One group undecipherable) French Mission report that carriages are steady, but there is a shortage of spare parts. Bores have no signs of coppering.

(?Transport). — Probably the greatest difficulty has been Ushak railway. With some additional engines from Greece sufficient trains are now running to feed the troops and to form advance depôts. For service beyond advance depôts there are at Ushak, lorries, heavy, 300; light, 75;

camels, 1,000; country carts, 2,500. At Brussa, lorries, heavy, 150; light, 45; camels, 1,000; carts, 2,500. Divisions are complete with pack transport. Animals are generally in good condition except pack ponies which contrast badly with pack mules. There is a reserve of 3,000 animals.

Aviation. — Not good and weather in forward areas had been impossible for the last month. Air photographs are indifferent and taken from about 10,000 feet, and staff is not very good at reading them. Staff officers complain bitterly of the last consignment of aeroplanes from France and think naval air service better equipped and trained.

Communication. — Good use made of existing means, but Greeks need more wireless sets. (?It appears that) English short range sets work well, but French sets are said to be unsatisfactory. Establishment of army headquarters at Ushak will facilitate communication with main operations, but will render co - ordination of the 3rd Army Corps' movement difficult. Existing long - range wireless is indifferent and good installation is badly needed.

Finally. — *Work shown on the few recent air photographs available does not suggest that Kemal means to accept decisive action at Kutahaia.* I have just seen *M. Sterghiados* whose information foretells *Kemal's retreat after delaying actions.* He contested my opinion that the Greek Army would resent being kept on another winter in the field, pointing out that this idea has constantly *recurred in the past and proved false. He declares that if Greece receives financial and political support the army will cheerfully keep the field for two more years if necessary.*

Reverse last March and April and subsequent isolation was probably the best thing that could have happened for the Greek Army. It has shaken them out of false security. They have set themselves to develop their own resources and effort has made them more efficient and capable of utilizing help if they deserve it.

Appendix B 1.

From General Harington, Constantinople, To War Office.

Telegram No. 451, cipher, 18th June, 1912.

Your No. 89260, M. I. 2. I have seen Parts 1 and 2 of Colonel *Nairne's report.* I can only express my opinion that *he is very optimistic.* The picture painted by Colonel Nairne, after a very short visit, is at variance with my personal impression of the *Greek troops who were under me and with reports received by me continuously for months past from four of my officers who have lived with and been present at actual fighting of the Greek troops.* If I have given you and

Cabinet wrong military opinion I shall be the first to admit it but I do not think I have. I said quite clearly that I was impressed by what I saw of the Greek troops, and if they had been properly taken in hand 6 months ago and their preparations made thorough, I have no doubt strength could have been obtained, but they were committed when ill - prepared as they say themselves for political reasons and the high command failed, *the troops and the Greek Army has steadily declined as an effective fighting machine, both, in my opinion and that of the French.*

There is a wave of optimism at the present moment and, I believe, Greek soldiers recover their *morale* quickly. I think the men themselves are good and are obedient, but after the last two attempts they have little faith in their leaders. I gave you picture and figures of both sides in my telegram No. 415, 10th June, and *only the actual fighting can determine result.* There is almost an indecent rush to gain our sympathy and support at every turn. I am sending General Mardon off to - morrow to form independent military opinion. He will spend 2 days on the Brusa front and 3 days on the Ushak front. I have every confidence, though time is short, in the opinion he will form though it is very difficult to judge real value of commanders, and unless they are seen actually handling the troops in action. *Many of the commanders are untried men and this applies to the staff.*

I have seen Major Strover, my liaison officer, from Brusa, to - day. He tells me soldiers are keen and have recovered better than he expected, but many commanders and staffs are weak, and in his opinion, operations may go through if things go well to start with, but if serious check is encountered, he does not trust ability of the higher command, and if another failure results he thinks it would be very serious to army. He tells me definitely that the *Brusa Corps in (is) not so good a fighting machine as it was last year.*

In order that I may see Colonel Nairne on arrival here on Monday I have postponed my visit to Chanak, and I will wire again my impressions. *I notice he makes no comments on value of artillery. I shall spare no efforts to get you correct picture, as I consider information you require is so vital.*

On relief by other Greek troops, 11th Division leaves Ismid to - morrow for Brusa, and my information points to offensive operations beginning 4 days after its arrival at Brusa. I have seen what I believe to be nature of operations contemplated.

Appendix B 2.

From General Headquarters, Constantinople, to War Office

Telegram No. 472, cipher, 23rd June, 1921.

Continuation my No. 451. 18th June.

1. The fighting strength available for front line appears to be the only total which matters. My estimate of this is given in my No. 415, dated 18th May. Nairne's estimate of 160 rifles per company approximates to my estimate of 1,500 rifles per regiment, and upon this important point we seem to agree.

A detailed estimate, No. 45445 I., of 16th June, of the Greek Army, which I had prepared before receipt of Colonel Nairne's report was sent you by bag yesterday. This explains estimate given in my telegram No. 415, if allowance is made for arrival of 12th Division, destination of which was not declared when No. 45445 I. was prepared.

It seems total of 60,000 rifles, which in my No. 415 I was prepared to accept for an approximate maximum, must be too high in any case, and that Colonel Nairne's figures agree that the actual number of rifles available for offensive operations will be more like 45,000 than the 55,000 indicated in my telegram No. 415 if the 6,500 rifles mentioned therein are to be retained as protective troops.

Number of front line rifles will not be affected by the 3,000 rifles mentioned in my telegram No. 445, dated 18th June.

2. As regards *ration strength I think* (?) figures may be between 190,000 and 200,000.

3. Estimate as regards artillery approximately agrees with Nairne's, but my *doubt regarding completeness of divisional artillery* appears to have been justified as 4th Divisional has only one group. Colonel Nairne's figures as regards artillery ammunition are (?) those provided by Greece.

I would (?) draw attention to my No. 471, dated 23rd June, in this connection, with which Colonel Nairne is in agreement. This does not point out liberal scale of ammunition for offensive operations. It will also be remembered that *Greek transport arrangements failed to fed front line effectively in the last offensive, and Turks have had ample time to obstruct communication* (?) *arrangements Greeks will* require for advance. General Gramat at Athens also reports unfavourably on Greek ammunition stocks though his report distrusted by Colonel Nairne.

4. In consequence of plan envisaged, separate columns and converging operations will call for close co - operation if they are to be effective. *Inter - communication between columns is weak point with regard to Greeks, and*

that arrangements are still deficient in this respect is indicated by Colonel Nairne's report.

5. As regards command. Nature of Greek plan will call for determined leading and acceptance of responsibility by column commanders. *There are many weak links in the chain, and whether the Greek commanders as a whole can rise to the occasion the fighting alone can show, but, from what I know of some of them, I am not confident. To my mind Turkish commanders must have advantage in continuity of purpose.* Their object is clear, but in the minds of many Greek commanders there must be uncertainty.

Appendix B 3.

Extract from General Harington's Telegram No. 461, Dated 21st June.

To-day I have had a long interview with Colonel Nairne. Generally his figures of Greeks agree with mine. *The Greek troops were considerably better than he had expected*, but he was shown the best corps and the best divisions. I have no wish to discount his report, which has been made in all good faith. *The fighting alone can tell.* He tells me that the *recent rain* has made the ground in Ushak area in dreadful state. It looks now as if *operations will take place between 3rd July and 10th July*; not before. I cannot see how either side can have a decisive successs. *Even if the Greeks gain preliminary objective(s) which they may, it will not lead them anywhere. The Turks may accept battle or withdraw and entice* (?) *Greeks into the blue.* I cannot foresee any (?) military Gallipoli for decision which help the future. I am off to - Chanak and Gallipoli for a couple of days, as the local situation is certainly much better.

Appendix C 1.

From General Mardon, Smyrna, to War Office.

Telegram No. T. M. 2, cipher, 21st June, 1921.

1. Have interviewed Colonel Pallis, Chief of Staff, Colonel Suryannis, Sub - Chief of Staff, and have also discussed details with bureaux of intelligence, personnel, artillery, aviation and engineering. It appears that *plan of operations, which aims at destruction of Turkish forces, is best* that can be devised in the circumstances. Present Greek distribution, exclusive of troops for lines of communication and troops for guarding southern front, *is 4 divisions Brusa front and 7 divisions and 1 cavalry brigade Ushak front available for operations.* According to Greek information, Turkish distribution is

1 division Adabazar, 6 Eskisehr front, 7 Kutahya front, 2 Karahissar front, with 1 cavalry division Eskishehr, 1 south of Kutahaya, 1 west of Karahissar. Greek divisions are considerably stronger than Turkish divisions. *Greek claim total superiority of 3 to 2 in infantry*, rather more *than 2 to 1 artillery, 4 to 1 in æroplanes*, and 3 to 1 in machine guns, while Greeks have automatic rifles and Turks have (?) none.

2. Superiority in infantry will, at the decisive point in operations, rise at the outset to 2 to 1, with other arms in proportion, but Turks will be on interior lines. *Greek plan aims at avoiding fighting Turks in prepared positions.* Their operations, therefore, depend on mobility and accurate information of Turkish dispositions. Owing to inexperience and want of organization of the Intelligence branch, which is under a young and inexperienced officer and owing to continuous bad flying weather on the front, *I am not satisfied that the Greek High Command has sufficient knowledge of Turkish dispositions or of possibility of their utilizing their interior positions (s). Plan involves certain detached operations, with accompanying necessity for good communication and initiative on the part of some divisional commanders.* Communications are a point, but the Greeks have done their best to remedy this defect, and for detached work have selected their experienced commanders. *Only three of the Divisional Generals*, and none of the Corps Commanders, have *had experience in the Great War.* General Headquarters seemed very confident, and, as far as can be judged at present, administrative arrangements appear to meet requirements. *Operations may be great success if all goes well, and if they fail, military position of Greeks will not be worse than at present*, since the Turks are reputed immobile. Am proceeding to - morrow to Ushak front.

Appendix C 2.

From Smyrna to War Office.

Telegram No. T. M. 3, cipher, dated 26th June, 1921.

1. During the course of my visit to Ushak front I have seen the following:—

Commanders and staffs of Ist and 2nd Corps, Ist, 2nd, 5th, 13th Divisions and Cavalry Brigade. Units of all arms and services in camps of Ist, 5th and 13th Divisions. Cavarly Brigade and 5th Infantry Regiment carrying out separate tactical schemes. Commanders of 4th and 9th Divisions. 25th Regiment of the 9th Division, 7th and 34th Regiments of the 2nd Division, together with mountain and heavy artillery in position on outpost lines. Field artillery at driving drill and on the march. Automatic rifles, rifle grenades section and several types of machine guns fired. Ammunition column and wireless section. Both naval and military air squad-

rons ærodromes, supply and transport depôts at Ushak and Banaz. Tactical schemes were carried out at short notice; programme was not previously arranged; and *I am safisfied* I saw average units.

Commanders and staff. Ist Corps. — Capabilities of General *Kondoulis* are difficult to gauge, as he does not speak English or French, but has very good staff who have been together for 3 years. He appears to have common sense and to trust them. During last operations he showed judgement, withdrawal of his corps being well carried out.

2. *2nd Corps.* — During last operations towards Eskishehr, General Vlachopoulos was in cammond of the 3rd Corps. He is a well educated officier, with good military knowledge but apt to be excitable. His corps headquarters have only just been reformed. Staff, which wants time to get together, appears average.

Commanders of 2nd, 5th, 9th, 13th Divisions, and Cavalry Brigade, all seem to be very capable soldiers and well up to their work.

Commanders of Ist and 4th are old, and have no recent war experience.

Staffs. — Ist Division entirely new; Chief of staff fairly average, but without experience. All three regimental commanders have lately taken over. They look old and soft, and have no recent war experience.

2nd Division. — Staff has remained on, and is good. Regimental commanders quite satisfactory. 5th Division good. Commander of 43rd Regiment appeared quite satisfactory. Shortly, divisions all new and without recent war experience. Commander of 25th Regiment appeared satisfactory. 13th Division good. An excellent impression was created by commander 5th Evzone Cavalry Regiment. Cavalry Brigade: brigade major and regimental commanders appeared well up to their work.

3. *The manoeuvres which* we saw carried out by cavalry, infantry and artillery were *all very well done.* Unit commanders and commanders of squadrons, batteries and companies up to their work, and had their men well in hand. Non - commissioned officers very good, and their sections were commanded by them in a very satisfactory manner. *Formations adopted were suitable to the ground and scheme.* In the contemplated operations cavalry brigade should be a very well useful weapon. Horse batteries, machine - gun groups and cavalry were well handled, and all worked well together. Turks have only mounted infantry. All camps that I inspected were admirably laid out and camouflaged with trees and branches, very clean, with horse lines very well looked after and animals in very good condition without exception. *Discipline evidently excellent*; men were cheerful and saluted extraordinarily well. They looked very hard, practically no sickness, and by training and games kept themselves in good health. In spite of adverse weather conditions *morale very high.* Men are perpetually asking when the

King, whose picture is very prominent everywhere, is coming to start the operations.

4. General impression existing outside that Greeks were defeated is not held by officers and men themselves who *in this section feel that they have always beaten the Turks* whenever met in spite of inferiority of numbers; this force has also had a great accession in strength, both in new formations and effectives. Among battalion commanders and junior regimental officers few changes have taken place, while 80 per cent.of the rank and file are trained old soldiers who have seen fighting; I consider *units themselves form an efficient fighting force*, their marching powers are of a high order, their equipment is serviceable but they have neither the same idea as to its maintenance nor the means thereof that we have. Great deal of the pack saddlery is new and generally in good order. Machine guns are very well kept and the Schwartzlose is an excellent weapon.

Artillery.—Batteries on the front are *well sited* and *camouflaged*. Heavy artillery have excellent platforms and emplacements. Appear *well trained* and commanded. Majority of corps, division and group commanders are unchanged and *with good war experience*. Against prepared positions, however, 65 millimetre mountain gun is a poor weapon. 120 millimetre long guns that were inspected were in good condition and good shooting results have lately been given by this gun. There are not enough tractors so a proportion are being bullock drawn.

5. Reference my remarks in my No. T. M. 2, 21st June, reference *intelligence work*. It is obvious that the *Ist Corps who* are holding this front have been entrusted with the task of obtaining *information* with *regard to Turkish positions. This is being very capably carried out by Major Phillipov* who was *trained by us in Salonika and has* been doing this work ever since. His information, which is probably correct, shows three divisions at Afiun Karahissar and five on Eskishehir front instead of as stated in my No. T. M. 2, Turks have evidently organized position(s) round Kutahia against attack, but there is little wire and there will still be possibility of outflanking. Around Afiun Karahissar they are showing renewed activity. It appears from aeroplane photographs they have not increased capacity of railheads at Kutahia and Chekurlar station.

To the lack of really good machines, difficulties of repairs, lack of spare engines and distance from heavy workshops, which are at Smyrna and Salonika, can be attributed the restricted use aeroplanes reconnaissance by Greeks. Commanders of naval and military air service state their airmen know the country intimately.

6. Colonel Nairne's figures appear to be correct regarding *ammunition reserve* supply and transport. I have gone into this ammunition expenditure by

mountain and field artillery with 2nd Division during last operations, and to judge from this there should be an ample supply of ammunition for the main operations, and, if matters came to a deadlock, sufficient to last 2 or 3 months. Except as regards 6 - inch howitzers, which are rather short, same remarks apply to heavy artillery. *Ammunition supply appears very well organized.* Ample supply centre now at Ushak, which Colonel Mangedlaris commands; his duties are really a combination of advanced base and lines of communication from advanced base to fighting troops; he is very capable and has been continuously engaged on this work since (?) 1912, has good organization and appears well served. The following are the *transport arrangements for* contemplated operations:—

(a.) Motor transport, 166 light F. I. A. T. lorries and 400 (3 - ton) lorries

(b). Two camel groups of about 600 each.

(c). Wheeled transport, 1 group of 1,000 (two wheeled) carts and, to be requisitionel, 1 group of trailer (?) bullock carts.

7. This appears adequate but only 60 per cent. of heavy lorries and 35 per cent. of light lorries have arrived at Ushak so far, whilst of two - wheeled carts there is a 30 per cent. shortage. It is understood that all these are available now at Smyrna. In general, lorries are not being used for the supply of troops but are parked awaiting operations. From first day of operations *delivering capacity of railway at Otourak* will be *600 tons per day. Excellent bread* is being turned out by the field bakeries at Ushak and, generally speaking, rations are very good. I estimate that administrative arrangements cannot be completed under another fortnight. *Medical arrangements appear fairly satisfactory*, hospitals being improvised as required, but are not on anything like same scale as ours. Inspected pack ambulance which was well equipped with medical strores and operating instruments. Greek have *two hospital ships and* a *hospital train.*

8. *Divisions have a strength of 11,000 — 12,000 rations, with a fighting strength of 7,300 and a rifle strength of about 4,500.* Last figure excludes automatic rifle and machine - gun men. *My general impression is that Turks expect attacks both at Kutaya and Afiun Karahissar and will make their stand at the former place and Eskishehir. Greek attacks cannot be surprise and* round Kutaya position I forecast heavy fighting. As far as formations I have seen are concerned, I consider southern group of the Greek Army to be quite efficient fighting machine, but higher command of Ist Division is very indifferent and staff of 2nd Corps and 9th Division are yet to be proved efficient. I have not seen 12th Division and 4th Division, but the 4th is likely to play a minor rôle.

9. Rank and file cannot understand why they do not move forward and are eager to commence operations. *They are confident they can beat the Turks and are anxious to finish the war and return to their homes, as they have been in the field so long.* All the above (one group undecipherable) the southern groups where fighting has been tactically successful and where very large reinforcement have arrived. To-morrow I leave Smyrna for Brusa, and expect to return to Constantinople on 30th June when I shall send (one group omitted) (?) report. Every courtesy has been shown us by commanders of 1st and 2nd Corps. We have been given all facilities for seeing what we wanted at shortest notice. *Our visit was marked by cheering for England, the National Anthem and displays of Union Jacks.*

APPENDIX C. 3.

FROM MAJOR - GENERAL MARDEN, CONSTANTINOPLE, TO WAR OFFICE.

Telegram No. T. M. 4, cipher, 30th June, 1921.

I have seen at *Brusa commanders* and staffs of 3rd Corps, 3rd and 7th Divisions and the majority of the regiments of (?) 1st Divisions. I was unable to visit 10th Division as it is undertaking operations towards Ismid, which 11th Division quitted yesterday. I have also seen supply dumps and ærodrome(s). I paid a visit to the front *line which is naturally very strong and is well wired with trenches excellently* (?group omitted). I saw a battalion in marching order also half squadron of divisional cavalry and field and mountain gunners doing gun drill on guns in position. Commanders and staff. — General *Polimenckos, commanding* corps, is an unknown quantity but has a (?group omitted) Chief of the Staff and 3rd Bureau. General *Tricoupis*, commanding 3rd Division, and a *first rate officer* well known to us and he has a good and experienced staff. 7th Division commander, *Colonel Palis* is either eccentric or nervous, but he has a *very good Chief of the Staff* and an average staff otherwise. *Regimental commanders* in the corps appear average with exception of two, who *are excellent.*

100 officers from 7th Division, who were in original national defence force division, have been transferred to other division in the corps. *Morale and discipline of troops appear much same as on Smyrna* front. The information regarding enemy is not very definite as there is such a long distance between Greek and Turkish outposts but he undoubtedly has his main force round Kutaiya. Polimenckos commands 7th and 10th Divisions, and Tricoupis 3rd and 11th Divisions during operations, both with separate missions. *There are only five aeroplanes* with only four pilots and four observes, no wireless apparatus. Situation reviewed *as a whole is that Greek Army is soundly*

organized on French lines, that proper preparations have been made for the task in view, that the troops are *fairly well-trained*, are practically equipped, and have very *good morale and discipline*. High command is weak and in many cases staff work wants co-ordinating. Capable staff are likely to be overworked. Means of communication between detached forces are not sufficient. Use of Intelligence branch is not fully appreciated and arrangements for distributing information are poor.

Men are handicapped in prolonged fighting by the fact that they do not carry entrenching tools, and by the absence of any water arrangements beyond water bottles. They have no means of getting through wire except wire cutters. *Turkish Army is, however, believed to be not well-organized or equipped*, and to have insufficient troops while desertions are frequent. *Odds are, therefore, in favour of Greeks*, who at the worst have strong position to which they can withdraw. *If it is decided to help the Greeks the order of importance is moral, financial and material assistance*. Staff officers, wireless sets, æroplanes and workshops, ammunition tanks, are the chief necessities for the army, but all *will be useless unless commands and staffs are reorganized*, and officers with war experience are utilized in their proper spheres. Officers who were already fairly senior in the Balkan wars and who lack all the experience gained by other officers during European war have been brought back to important commands after 5 years absence from military duties. Artillery Commanders are the exception. The units themselves will probably save the situation.

Appendix D.

From General Harington to War Office.

Telegram No. 509, cipher, 28th June, 1921.

General Marden's report on the Greek Army on Ushak front has been seen by me, and I have every confidence in what he says. (?) He is an officer of great (8 groups omitted). Since the last offensive it is evident that great strides have been made, *but I still am sceptic of the untried commanders and staff*. I do not think General Marden or Colonel Nairne will find the same high standard on the Brusa front. The first opinion I formed of the 11th Division has been justified by recent events. They simply threw away Ismid for no reason whatever. General Marden puts date of offensive as 6th or 8th July. *The real value can be determined only by fighting.*

Appendix E.

Supplies For Greeks.

A. — Supplies Department.

50.000	complete sets of winter clothing with spare change of linen underclothing, flannels and puttees.
50,000	pairs boots and winter trousers.
	A complete set of kitchen and general necessaries for 40,000 men.
50,000	sets of equipments with bivouac shelters and two blankets per man.
150	bell tents.
1,000	bugles.
15,000	complete grooming sets.

B. — Armaments.

50,000	rifles.
10,000	short rifles (cavalry).
750	Lewis guns.
300	machine guns with pack equipment and necessary transport (saddlery).
	For each rifle at least 600 rounds.
	For each Lewis gun 10,000 rounds.
	For each machine gun 30,000 rounds.
100,000	hand grenades.

C. — Horses.

800	riders with full saddlery.
8,000	pack horses or mules.
8,000	horse blankets

D. — Material for Engineers (R. E. Equipment).

4,000	combined pick and shovel.
500	round sholves or spades.
3,000	spades for infantry.
3,000	picks for infantry.
1,000	hand axes.
5,000	hand saws.
200	pliers
800	bill hooks.
100	carpenters' scoops

Engineering Park.

50 axes.
700 bill hooks.

Specialists' tools.

8 complete sets for 8 engineering companies, each set containing cases of explosives, mining tools, carpenters' tools, smiths' tools, builders' tools, bridgemakers' tools, stonemasons' tools, shoeing-smiths' tools, and topographical instruments.

20 portable cases of explosives for men.

50 portable cases for horses, each containing 75 kilograms of dynamite or other explosive in tubes or charges of 100 to 150 grammes.

1,000 metres time fuze.
2,000 meters instantaneous fuze
57,000 detonators.

E. — TELEGRAPHIC MATERIAL.

15 divisional wireless sets of 1,500 watts with two sets of spares, both for hand and horse transport.
3 wireless sets 3-k. w. with 2 sets of spares.
300 telephones.
6,000,000 meters of field telephone wire.
50,000 porcelain insulators with iron bracket (?support).
100.000 wooden insulators
200 kilos of waxed twine.
50 bags with implements for fixing the lines.
40 long distance optical telegraphs (heliographs).

F. — SANITARY MATERIAL.

9 mountain surgeries, each to be able to care for 30 wounded at the same time by transforming the stretchers into beds for horse transport.

3 hospital stations, each containing material for 70 beds to be transformed as above to beds for transport on 30 horses.

3 sections for transport of stretchers, each section able to transport 100 stretchers, material for collecting the wounded and giving first aid, transported on 90 horses.

A sanitary park containing reserves of sanitary material to supply three divisions, and also disinfectors to be transported on 70 two - wheeled carts.

G. — Material for Horses.

100 field forges for horse - shoes.
100 sets of implements for horse - shoes.
60 sets of pocket instruments for veterinary surgeons.
100 cases of field veterinary medicines.
150,000 horse - shoes of various dimensions and requisite nails.
150 horse clippers

H. — Material for Motor Cars.

60 transport motor lorries of 1½ tons.
30 light Ford cars (touring).
10 touring Vauxhall cars (6 cylinders).
24 motor cycles.
(The whole of the above with 2 sets of spare parts and tools).

I. — For Higher Formations than Divisions.

1,500 cavalry horses, with complete saddlery to organize a cavalry regiment and staffs.
1,000 equipments for cavalrymen, with complete armament.
2,000 heavy artillery horses, with complete harness for field artillery
6 armoured motor cars and
6 motor railway trolleys for protection of lines of communication.
3 batteries of heavy artillery complete, new type 60 - pr. shells with all implements, and 500 shells for each gun.

7th August, 1920.

F. O. 371/6522

No. 201

Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir M. Cheetham (Paris).

Foreign Office, *July 12, 1921.*

No. 391 Telegraphic: by bag

Your telegram No. 471.[1]

Our feeling about visit of Bekir Sami is mainly affected by disgraceful conduct of Angora Government in repudiating the agreement about

[1] Of July 10, not In this sir M. Cheetham reported that he had first-hand information that Bekir Sami was anxious to go to London.

exchange of prisoners concluded with him. We have no confidence that any similar fresh negotiations or agreements might not meet with a similar fate. Hostile and almost insolent attitude of Mustapha Kemal, in respect of meeting with General Harington in Black Sea, also renders us sceptical about advantage of meeting a representative of his, of the exact measure of whose authority we are completely uncertain, and who is probably not a representative at all. If you are sounded directly you might indicate these obstacles and thus give Bekir Sami Bey an opportunity of explanation.

F.O. 371/6472/E. 7888.

D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol. XVII, p. 315 - 316, No. 303

No. 202

Mr. Rattigan (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *July 12, 1921.*
(Received July 18).

No. 664. Secret.
My Lord.

WITH reference to previous correspondence relative to the policy of the Angora Government, I have the honour to forward herewith two documents of the greatest interest, the first of which has reached me from a very secret source whilst the second is the uncensored version of an article in the Constantinople "Journal d'Orient" of the 3rd July, taken, I understand, from the semi - official Angora Telegraph Agency

2. Your Lordship will not fail to be struck by the insistence of both Fevzi Pasha and Yussuf Kemal Bey in the determination of Angora to secure the whole of the programme embodied in the national pact, and by Fevzi Pasha's reaffirmation of the policy of collaborating with the Bolsheviks and building up an alliance of Islamic States.

3. It is possible to argue that such utterances are intended for home rather than for foreign consumption, and that Mustapha Kemal and his Minister, while anxious to show themselves not less zealous than the extremist group which looks to Enver Pasha, are in reality anxious to cut adrift from the Bolsheviks and to compromise with the Allies. This theory is so attractive that the Western observers are a little apt to be beguiled by its inherent charm. Personally, I am not prepared to accept it without more definite evidence than I at present have that Mustapha Kemal and his party are prepared to weaken on the essentials of the national pact, *i.e.*, armistice frontiers, and complete independence within the territory so defined.

4. I think the position at present might be roughly summed up as follows:—

(a). The Bolsheviks might prefer Enver to Mustapha Kemal, but they do value the alliance of Angora too highly to break with Mustapha Kemal so long as he does not rule the roast there.

(b). The Kemalists do not want Enver back, and they do not want either Bolshevism or Bolshevik ascendancy in Asia Minor, but they value an alliance with the Bolsheviks too highly to risk any rupture.

(c). Mustapha Kemal and his adherents have uphill work to maintain their ascendancy in the national movement, but they are still strong enough and idealistic enough not to contemplate any weakening on the essentials of the national pact for the sake of an easy settlement with the Allies.

5. I do not deny the possibility that the course of events may make it necessary to revise these three propositions later on. It is, for instance, possible that the Bolsheviks may endeavour, through Enver or otherwise, to establish a grip on Anatolia similar to their grip on the Caucasus republics. It is also possible, though, in my opinion,less probable, that Mustapha Kemal may be weakened to the point of seeking a compromise with the Allies rather than lose his power. I believe, however, that the above propositions accurately represent the situation to-day.

6. I have observed in the two Angora papers during June a rather marked absence of direct diatribes against Great Britain, except for the two onslaughts reproduced in my despatch No. 653 of the 8th instant and a leading article by Yunus Nadi in the "Yeni Gyun" of the 22nd June, which is entitled "The 'Times' and the Yeni Gyun", and which though not intemperate in expression, is generally hostile. This restraint is not without significance, but I see in it rather a desire to avoid new provocation of Great Britain than any indication of a real change of heart. Angora as a whole is "out for" the whole of the national pact, and, while, as I pointed out in my despatch No. 651 of the 6th July, there are doubtless many Nationalists who would like a settlement with Europe, if only the national pact (even with a modicum of financial control, perhaps) could be secured, the prevailing feeling is one of hostility to all foreign influence and of hope that sooner or later Turkey may find herself at the head of a combine of Islamic States.

7. The fundamental xenophobia to which I have just alluded is rather well illustrated by two articles in the "Yeni Gyun" of the 24th June and the "Hakimiet-i-Millié" of the same date. The first reproduces in a

mourning border, under the heading of "Two more Victims," an extract from the French paper "Stamboul", of Constantinople, relative to the execution of two Turks in Constantinople sentenced to death by a French court - martial for the murder of two French soldiers. The "Yeni Gyun" raises no question as to the truth or otherwise of the charge, but represents it as an intolerable situation that Turks should be "martyred" on Turkish soil under foreign law. The other article deals with the American missionaries, whom it attacks roundly on the ground that their charitable and educational activities cloak a desire to contaminate Islam by the spread of Christianity, and that they constitute both a religious and a political menace.

I have, &c.,

FRANK RATTIGAN.
Acting High Commissioner.

F.O. 406/47, p. 16-17, No. 10

ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 202.

Nationalist Policy.

Secret

ACCORDING to information obtained from a prominent member of the Nationalist Committee in Constantinople, secret sittings of the great Nationalist Assembly were held on the 24th and 27th June. On the first occasion, Mustapha Fevzi Pasha, in the course of his speech regarding the foreign policy of the Angora Government, stated that the Government still held to the national pact in its entirety. He referred to certain telegrams received from the national representatives in Europe concerning the Allied mediation proposals, and stated that, although the Government had taken no definite decision in the matter, its policy was well defined by the national pact. So long as the Powers gave no guarantees for the fulfilment of the claims defined in the national pact, the Government could not commence negotiations. No official communications concerning the Allied offer had been received, but that was no reason why the Government should not inform its representatives in Europe of the Government's point of view regarding the matter. Mustapha Fevzi then stated that the Government possessed positive information to the effect that the Greeks would agree to no intervention before resorting to force once again, but the Turkish army was quite prepared to undergo the test, and he added that if the Greeks believed the Angora Government would still confine itself, after having been obliged to make further heavy sacrifices in blood and material, to the demands formulated hitherto, they were making a profound mistake.

On the 27th June, Fevzi Pasha replied in the name of the Government, to a motion submitted by Veli Bey, Deputy for Burdur, to the following effect:—

"The widespread rumours which have reached even this Assembly, and according to which the Soviet Government on the one hand had failed to fulfil its obligations, and the Angora Government, on the other, has decided, in contravention of its Oriental policy as pursued since its creation, to cease to afford any further assistance to the Moslems of Syria and Mesopotamia, are nothing more nor less than the calumnious inventions of our interior and exterior enemies. The Government of Angora, following the necessity in the interests of the nation of shaping its general policy in accordance with the currents of European policy, has not hitherto regarded, and does not at present regard, it as advisable to publish an official denial of these rumours. As, however, the principle which we have practised requires this Assembly's being regularly informed of its true policy, certain explanations are necessary.

"The Soviet Government has fully honoured its engagements, and during the last two months has advanced to our Government £T. 1,200,000 gold. We have also received munitions for the heavy and light artillery transferred to the western front from Armenia and Georgia, more than 6,000,000 cartridges for rifles and machine guns, 3,700 chains for cavalry and artillery, material for torpedoes and mines, together with large quantities of clothing and other equipment obtained and sent to us in various ways. All these articles are either in our depots or in the hands of our troops at the present moment. Furthermore, a mixed military commission has received the support of the Soviet Government for the organisation of an army consisting of two infantry divisions, one cavalry division, several battalions of storm troops, together with aircraft and automobiles. Our General Staff has not, however, considered it to be necessary for the moment that this army should be summoned to our frontiers. Moreover, in Azerbaijan, Daghestan and in Transcaspia Turco - Russian military mission are actively organising recruiting centres. The new political and military mission which we recently sent to Moscow will make an effort to the end that this assistance may be still further increased. It will be seen from the figures I have given that the rumour upon which the motion is based is absolutely groundless.

"With reference to the alleged abandonment of the Government of its Oriental policy, I may say that in this regard also the Government will under no circumstances depart from the policy adopted with the consent of the Great National Assembly. It is true that, within

the limits of the powers accorded by the Government to the Assembly on previous occasions, we have attempted to harmonise our policy with the present necessities of the general political situation, but this does not by any means signify a departure from our true policy. As with Afghanistan, our Government is about to contract an alliance with the Persian nation, and thus to take another step in the direction of the ideal of an Islamic United States of the Orient. With greater attention than ever we are following the course of events in Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia, and we are proving our deep sympathy for our brethren in religion, who are striving to attain true independence. Evidence of this sympathy may be found in the circumstances of our having maintained upon the Mesopotamian front, in view of important events which may occur there, the troops which it had been proposed should be sent to the Western front.

"For various reasons connected with the higher interests of the nation we beg the Assembly to believe that at the present moment we cannot openly exercise a more efficacious activity; in due time we will give the Assembly further details on the subject.

"Our High Command is also very disappointed that, after the sacrifices made during the last three months, we cannot take the offensive immediately, although the combative spirit of the army has increased enormously. We know how much the Turkish nation has need of putting an end as soon as possible to this state of war in order that it may heal its wounds with the balm of peace, and we understand the impatience shown by certain deputies. We are not prevented from undertaking an offensive for military reasons, or out of fear that the offensive may fail, but for certain political reasons we are practically sure that the military success which we shall obtain when the Greek commence their offensive will serve our national cause still better; for if we undertake an offensive ourselves the slightest check that we may suffer, under no matter what circumstances, will be greatly to the advantage of our adversaries. This has been clearly pointed out to us by certain friendly circles, and under these circumstances we prefer to maintain a defensive attitude for a short time longer, and to awaid the Hellenic defensive (offensive?) which will probably not be long delayed".

Fevzi Pasha's speech was much longer than the summary given above, but all the essential points have been included.

At the close of the sitting the Assembly unanimously recorded a vote of confidence in the Government.

Note. — With regard to the passage in the above report referring to the recruiting of Moslems in Eastern Caucasia and the Transcaspian

areas, there is evidence from a very sure source that Mustapha Kemal is in communication with Jemal Pasha, and his attitude towards the latter is described as most friendly. It is also certain that Bedri Bey is in communication with the Nationalist leaders as well as with Ali Fuad Pasha, and that the latter is also in communication with Jemal Pasha. Under these circumstances it would appear that the recent attacks upon Enver in the Angora press were not all that they seemed on the surface. Further, with regard to the alleged attitude of the Nationalists towards the Arabs of Syria, Mesopotamia and Palestine, evidence has been obtained that preparations for the carrying out of a definite pan-Islamic campaign have been perfected by the Angora Administration, and that the Oriental policy to which reference is made in the above report is indeed an integral part of the Kemalist programme.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *July 6, 1921.*

F.O. 406/47, p. 18 - 19, No. 10/1

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 202.

Extract from the "Journal d'Orient" of July 3, 1921.

LA POLITIQUE ETRANGÈRE DU GOUVERNEMENT D'ANGORA.

YOUSSOUF KEMAL BEY, Ministre des Affaires étrangères du Gouvernement d'Angora, a fait à la séance du 27 juin de l'Assemblée nationale les déclarations suivantes:

"Je considère de mon devoir de fournir à votre haute Assemblée quelques renseignements généraux et succincts sur la politique extérieure de notre Gouvernement.

"Nous sommes sur le point de donner à nos relations politiques avec les Républiques du Caucase méridionale une forme plus précise et plus régulière. Nous espérons établir sous peu des relations régulières avec notre voisin l'Etat persan.

"Vous savez que les conventions qui ont été signées en Europe par mon honorable prédécesseur Bekir Sami Bey, chargé selon les pleins pouvoirs a lui remis, lors de son départ pour Londres, de défendre les droits du peuple turc et — comme cela a été clairement précisé dans lesdits pleins pouvoirs — autorisé à ce titre de signer la convention et traités qu'il jugerait nécessaire, ont été repoussées par votre haute Assemblée, les conventions ayant dépassé la compétence et les instructions qui lui avaient été remises.

"Notre Gouvernement, considérant cependant le fait en lui - même que le Gouvernement de la République française avait accepté de con-

clure une convention en vue de mettre fin à l'état de guerre existant, à un devoir de faire certaines propositions dans les bruits du serment national.

"Jusqu'à maintenant aucune réponse officielle ne nous est parvenue au sujet de l'acceptation ou du refus de ces propositions. Nous avons appris entre - temps que la plus grande partie des troupes françaises se trouvant à Zoungouldak ont été retirées. Au cours d'entretiens privés avec deux honorables personnalités françaises venues à Angora, nous avons cherché les moyens de supprimer l'état de guerre existant entre les deux peuples.

"Nous attendons aussi l'exécution des promesses qui nous ont été faites par l'Italie concernant le retrait de ses troupes se trouvant encore en territoire turc. Dans certains milieux on nous reproche de ne pas tenir notre parole.

"Le Turc musulman est essentiellement un homme de parole. Cette qualité est reconnue par le monde entier; amis ou ennemis s'accordent à lui rendre cet hommage. Mais pour qu'il soit valable il doit être pris dans les conditions requises. Nous ne pouvons être aucunement tenus par des paroles ou des faits qui ne sauraient nullement être attribués à notre Gouvernement et à notre Assemblée. Au cours de la séance du 30 mai, notre Président du Conseil avait exposé les lignes principales de notre politique étrangère. A mon tour je ne ferai que répéter ses paroles.

"La politique que nous suivons et que nous sommes fermement décidés à suivre à l'avenir ne peut pas s'écarter des principes posés par la Grande Assemblée nationale et en général par tout le peuple. Nôtre politique étrangère ne peut pas viser d'autre but que la reconnaissance de nos droits nationaux et de notre indépendance complète dans les limites de nos frontières, à notre souveraineté entière et notre libre développement à l'abri de toute intervention étrangère. Pour cette raison, nous nous ferons les amis de ceux qui reconnaissent officiellement et effectivement la légitimité de notre cause. Nous nous efforçons de défendre notre droit contre ceux qui veulent nous l'arracher par force.

"Nous sommes convaincus que les peuples qui connaissent la valeur de la liberté et de l'indépendance reconnaîtront ainsi, tôt ou tard, notre bon droit.

"Nous aussi nous voulons progresser dans le domaine de la civilisation.

"Mais le peuple turc désire être le maître sur le sol natal."

A l'issue de ces déclarations, Youssouf Kémal Bey a demandé à l'Assemblée un vote de confiance sans réserve ni conditions en faveur du Cabinet.

La motion a été acceptée à la majorité des voix.

ANGORA, *Le 28 juin 1921.*

F.O. 406/47, p. 19 - 20, No. 10/2

No. 203

Mr. Rattigan to (Constantinople) the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *12th July 1921.*

No. 669.

My Lord,

1. With reference to my telegram No. 491 of July 5th 1921, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of two letters dated July 6th and 7th 1921 which I have received from the General Officer Commanding in Chief, British Army in Constantinople, on the subject of a conversation between himself and Hamid Bey, who unofficially represents the Angora Government in Constantinople.

2. General Harington has subsequently informed me in conversation that he has enquired fully into the allegations made by Hamid Bey against Major Van Millingen, a British officer attached to the Commission of Control of the Ottoman War Office. He is now satisfied that these are at the least grossly exaggerated, if not entirely invented by Hamid Bey for his own purposes.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) FRANK RATTIGAN.
Acting High Commissioner

F.O. 371/6472/E. 8227.

ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 203.

General Harington to Mr. Rattigan.

Your Excellency,

1. I have the honour to forward you the reply received from Mustapha Kemal in answer to my telegram. It was given to me tonight by Izzet Pasha and Hamid Bey who visited me.

It discloses a state of affairs of which I was totally unaware.

2. It is quite clear that Major Henry, presumably for his own ends, greatly exceeded his instructions and conveyed the exact opposite meaning to what was intended and gave the impression that we were anxious to meet Mustapha Kemal.

3. I gave Izzet Pasha a paper setting out my action as follows:—

(a) General Harington asked Major Henry to find out the whereabouts and welfare of the British prisoners if he had an opportunity of seeing Mustapha Kemal, also any military information of interests which Mustapha Kemal might be prepared to disclose.

(b) Major Henry on his return reported that Mustapha Kemal was desirous of meeting General Harington to discuss the situation and said that Mustapha Kemal could not leave Angora but suggested that General Harington should land at Inebouli and work through General Rafet Pasha.

(c) General Harington reported to his Government that he was prepared to go under the following conditions:

(I) In a battleship to INEBOULI,

(II) Mustapha Kemal in person must come to the battleship to meet him,

(III) General Harington would be prepared to hear anything Mustapha Kemal had to say and report the same to the British Government,

(IV) That the interview was sought by Mustapha Kemal,

(V) That everything must be open and above board.

4. General Harington has always maintained the line that he is unable to discuss political affairs.

5. The letter received from Mustapha Kemal is concerned with political matters which General Harington is unable to answer.

General Harington will therefore hand over the letter to the High Commissioner to be dealt with as he may think fit.

6. As to the last sentence of the letter General Harington thinks that if Mustapha Kemal had wished to speak as one soldier to another perhaps it would have helped the common cause but General Harington not being competent to talk politics, he gives the despatch to the High Commissioner as described in the preceding paragraph.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *6th July 1921.* *(Signed) C. H. Harington,*
Lt.—General,
Allied Commander in Chief.

F.O. 371/6472/8227.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 203.

General Harington to Mr. Rattigan.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *7th July, 1921.*

Your Excellency,

I beg to report for your information that Hamid Bey informed me as follows yesterday.

1. That Major Van Millingen had stated to him about three weeks ago that he had the authority of the highest British Authority in Constantinople to say that the British Government wished for an immediate peace if the Angora Government was ready to enter into negotiations.

On that Hamid wired to the Foreign Minister at Angora and received the following reply:

"We are also ready to enter into negotiations. Please tell us where, with whom, we shall enter into these negotiations and will they be open or secret". This arrived in Turkish and was translated into French. Hamid communicated it to Major Van Millingen.

After two days Hamid met Major Van Millingen and the latter said that the matter was being considered and an exchange of views was being carried out between the British in Constantinople and London.

Needless to say I had no knowledge of this. Whatever took place was entirely without my authority and it is evident to me that certain subordinate officers have been mixing themselves up in affairs with which they are not concerned with the result that the impression has been given to Mustapha that we seek negotiations with him. On my part I have maintained throughout that if he wished to say anything he must come forward and say so.

His reply to my wire however discloses his political terms and I hand over the same to you for such action as you think fit.

(Signed) C. H. HARINGTON, Lt. Gen.
Allied C. in C.

F.O. 371/6472/E. 8227.

No. 204

Sir G. Buchanan (Rome) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

ROME, *July 13, 1921, 4.10 p.m.*
(Received July 14, 3.50 p.m.)

No. 289 Telegraphic

Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke to me last night on the subject of your telegram 295 of which I had communicated to him substance in private letter.

He commenced by saying that most of our difficulties had been occasioned by lack of solidarity between allies and by mistaken idea that individual interests could be best promoted by separate instead of collective action.

He was determined to put stop to this as far as Italy was concerned and to collaborate loyally with His Majesty's Government in East as well as the West.

There was however, one thing which he could not do. He could not renounce any of those economic rights which Italy had acquired under tripartite agreement and Mustapha Kemal ought therefore in his opinion to be given clearly to understand that his proposals were untenable and that it was impossible for allies to negotiate on any such basis.

He would leave question of procedure to His Majesty's Government whose interests in the East were so much superior to those of Italy; but as regards policy he must adhere to above standpoint. On my reminding him that it had been suggested that we all three might have to consent to some modification of tripartite agreement, he replied that it might be possible for France and Great Britain to make some such concession but that Italy could not. She had acquired no territorial rights, but economic privileges, which that agreement had conferred, were of such vital importance to them that for Government to renounce them would be tantamount to signing their own death warrant.

Tripartite agreement was a matter of secondary consideration and a modification of its terms would not placate Kemalists.

Our only hope of effecting pacification of Anatolia, which we all had so much at heart, was to discover some formula which would satisfy them as regards Smyrna and Thrace.

Repeated to Constantinople.

D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol. XVII, p. 316 - 317, No. 304

No. 205

General Harington (Constantinople) to War Office.

Despatched : 16.30 13.7. 21.
Received : 18.45 13.7. 21.

Secret.
Paraphrase.
Clear the Line.
593 cipher 13/7. *First of 3 parts.*

Please see my series of telegrams No. 489 to 494 dated June 26th. Also see Bagdad's X.2409 dated June 24th and X.2462 dated July 8th and my 590 dated July 12th, with reference to High Commission No. 499 of July 8th to Foreign Office and my connected telegram regarding situation at Angora. In spite of Jemal's mention of friendly letter from Mustapha Kemal, which occurs in Bagdad's X.2434 dated June 30th, there were indications that Jemal was anxious for his own position and was trimming

to the breeze. *There is no evidence here that Angora has definitely capitulated to Bolsheviks yet. Angora's desire is to get from Russia guns and ammunition with which to fight Greeks.* Russia *wishes to use this lever to impose her "protection" upon Angora.* Incidentally she does not want the guns turned against herself. Russia is a much afraid of the Mohammedan movement as genuine Mohammedans (as opposed to the place hunters like *Enver Pasha*, Jemal, Khalil and possibly Nuri) are afraid of Russia.

Part 2.

Excellent information of the activities and intrigues of the genuine Nationalist group, which I have here, all shows that *there is no tendency to co-operate with Bolsheviks although they will go to any lengths as against Greeks in Anatolia and Thrace. It is C. U. P. faction who desire Bolshevik co-operation for their own personal ends and it was undoubtedly part of their plan,* if it is not still, to secure Russian co-operation here to coincide with military pressure now being exercised on Angora by the *Bolshevik regrouping in Transcaucasia, which again coincides with Greek offensive. Nationalist* suspicions of Bolsheviks intentions towards Eastern villayets (Baghdad's X.2409) are compatible with above. According to reliable information, message from Chicherin Moscow to Ordjonoptidze Tiflis, dated June 2nd, expressed opinion Soviet might be drawn into struggle being waged round Turkey. As a consequence of this, revolutionary military council, in agreement with Commintern, had decided (a) cease transfer troops Transcaucasia to north. (b) Regroup Red troops Georgia and Armenia, *idea being to keep main force centred near Turkish frontier.*

Addendum. After sentence above ending "co - operate with Bolsheviks" "In this connection see my Black Jumbo B. 3369 forwarded to you by bag July 5th".

Last part.

It is stated by further unconfirmed information that message dated June 30th instructed Army Commanders Tiflis that "the 3 regiments were not to go beyond frontier". *It is obvious that position of Mustapha Kemal is most difficult. He is between 2 fires but cannot afford to shew sign of weakening.* Major Henry has shown me a letter from Rafet, which accompanied his reply to my message in which Rafet thanks Henry for his part and says that he is confident that reply of Mustapha Kemal will bring about amicable relations between England and Turkey. I consider Mustapha Kemal to be still in the saddle although he may not be able to write what he might be prepared to say. *Enver* is doubtless scheming to be the Deus ex Machina and *repeat his sensational performance of ?1913 when he re - entered Adrianople.*

Enver hopes to enter arena at the head of his Bolshevik reinforcements after Mustapha Kemal has taken strain of the Greek attack.

F.O. 371/6473/E. 8417.

No. 206

Lord Granville (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

ATHENS, *13th July, 1921, 1.30 p.m.*
(Received 14th July, 1.00 p.m.)

Telegraphic.
No. 404. (R).

My telegram No. 399.

Governmental and Veniselists papers all publish enthusiastic articles on the opening of long delayed offensive and declare their confidence in complete victory (1 group undec) them adding a reference to Constantinople as final objective. One Veniselist paper warns its readers against contempt for Kemal who it says is very strong, but it adds that this fact will only render unaided Greek victory more glorious. All the Veniselist papers declare absolute union of all Greeks in this national crisis.

Socialist organ says that all this optimism is absurd and that even victory will be useless and sterile as Greece has no money left, has incurred an enormous dept and must in a few days or weeks be bankrupt.

Repeated to Constantinople.

F.O. 371/6522/E. 8090

No. 207

Mr. Rattigan (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *July 13, 1921.*
(Received July 18.)

No. 670.
My Lord,

CONSIDERABLE prominence was given in the Constantinople press a few days ago to an account of the reception of the new Russian Ambassador in Angora by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, on the occasion of the presentation of his credentials on the 27th June.

2. I have now procured a copy of the "Hakimiet-i - Millié" of Angora of the 28th June, which gives the speeches exchanged on the occasion. They are not of sufficient importance to have translated *in extenso*, but a summary may interest your Lordship.

3. The Ambassador, Comrade Nachekanof, began by saluting the people of "Revolutionary Turkey" engaged in a triumphant struggle against the black and yellow internationals of capitalism. He emphasised the greater scale of the effort now imposed on nations desirous of freedom, as compared with the past, and the need for common action. The Moscow Treaty of the 16th March was a guarantee that neither Russia nor Turkey would endure bondage. They were the first to have raised the standard of revolution, and would be an example to other nations in the revolutionary struggle for the salvation of the world. Russia, having broken the chains of capitalism, had relinquished the blood - stained legacies of Tsarism, and put aside all treaties concluded by it. It had adopted the principle of freedom and self-determination for small peoples, and substituted for the old treaties pacts freely concluded between equals. It had become the natural ally of all nations fighting for freedom, first and foremost the eastern nations, and consequently of Turkey. It was not the Russian People but their despotic ruler and aristocracy desirous of world conquest who had sought to raise the cross on the domes of St. Sophia. The new treaty must be, and would be, the guiding star of the two peoples who were at last enable to know each other. Difficult stages on the road had still to be traversed.

4. The Ambassador, after some references of the usual kind to the struggle of the Russian people against their enemies at home and abroad, went on to call upon the Turkish nation to play its part and to defend its country against Western Europe. The Treaty of Sèvres sought to reduce Turkey to the level of a small Power. Its capital was to be taken from it. The Marmora basin was to be usurped. Two - thirds of Asia Minor was to pass into French and Italian spheres of influence. In the shred of territory to be left to it, it was to be condemned to perpetual slavery and indebtedness to the bankers of Western Europe. Turkey had already, by an admirable effort, broken a part of its chains. It needed but a little blow to shatter them completely, and the time was not far distant when, undefeated and proud, it would direct its new life as it pleased. That this should be so, the Ambassador concluded, was Russia's fervent wish, and he begged Mustafa Kemal Pasha to accept his expression thereof.

5. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, after welcoming the Ambassador, echoed his language as to the importance of the joint struggle for life and independence and the naturalness of the alliance between nations engaged therein. He commented with satisfsaction on the renunciation by Russia of the old

treaties, the blood - stained legacy of Tsarism, the establishment of a new basis for Turkey's international existence, and the treaty concluded at Moscow in March. He spoke of the difficulties of the past and the future, and expressed confidence that the latter would be surmounted like the former. An attempt had been made to reproduce the restrictions imposed on the old Turkish Empire in a death sentence, namely, the Treaty of Sèvres. The nation, realising the calamities which it had suffered before from not being master of its own destinies, and, perceiving that the Treaty of Sèvres aimed at re - creating the same state of affairs, had asserted its own sole sovereignty. It had set up a Government on this basis. It had assured and would retain control of its own destinies. The new form of administration was entirely suited to the needs and social conditions of the people. He concluded by thanking the Ambassador for what he had said, and expressed the hope that his efforts would strengthen the friendship between the two peoples.

6. The letters of credence contain nothing of particular interest.

7. It is significant that while echoing to the full the Ambassador's language as to co-operation between Russia and Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Pasha made no use of the words "revolution" and "capitalism' which occurred so frequently in the Ambassador's speech, much less did he refer to anything in the nature of world revolution. He made it perfectly plain that, so far as Turkey was concerned, the basis for the future must be a national basis. He several times mentioned the Ottoman Empire as a thing of the past, but rather as a victim of restrictions imposed by Europe than as a counter - part to the blood - stained Empire of the Tsars. His language throughout his speech was that of a conscious equal, not that of a grateful client. His reference to the suitability of the new Anatolian system to the needs and social conditions of the people was too pointed not to have been intended as a warning that Turkey was an ally, not a new pasture for communism. It is noteworthy that no mention was made on either side of Islam or of other Asiatic States, except for a very sketchy reference to the latter in the Ambassador's speech.

8. I venture to think that, so far as anything can be inferred from these public utterances, they bear out the theory of the present position as between Turkey and Russia which I have set out in my despatch No. 664 of the 12th instant*.

I have &.,

FRANK RATTIGAN.
Acting High Commissioner

F.O. 406/47, p. 21, No. 11.

* Bkz. No. 202

No. 208

General Harington (Constantinople) to War Office.

Despatched 0045 15/7/21.
Received 1000 13/7/21.

604 cipher 14/7.
Paraphrase.
Clear the line.
Secret.

First of three parts.

I should be glad if the Government would give me some guidance as situation has become more complicated. Secret telegrams I have? received the last two days point to separate peace being made by France. If there is any truth in this it will very seriously affect my military position as without the French it would be quite impossible to defend position which I ?am preparing. *I also do not understand our action as regards neutrality.* Observance by Nationalists of neutral line is vital to my military position at Ismid, and yet by allowing Greek ships and missions to remain here and use Constantinople as a base we break the neutrality ourselves and will end in irritating the Nationalists to attack us if and when Greek advance is checked.

Part 2.

Rattigan, who is not responsible, for safety of the troops, is averse to tightening neutrality because he thinks Mustapha Kemal is so far in hands of Bolsheviks that it would be ?unwise to ?impose restrictions on Greeks. I do not agree with Rattigan. My evidence does not show that Mustapha Kemal is past recall. Personally I think that to close the door so sharply was a mistake. I still think Mustapha Kemal would talk reasonably. French, Italians and Greeks were, I understand, delighted at the door being closed so quickly. Although the political side is no concern of mine, except that my plans have to be adjusted accordingly, yet I am bound to point out that my military position will certainly be made more difficult by this present arrangement of protesting neutrality to the Turks and at same time winking at the Greeks being here.

Last part.

If we back Greeks let us do so openly. If not let us avoid present arrangement by which we are on all sides accused of helping the Greeks. We protest openly that we are not doing so when in reality we are by allowing them to remain here. I regret

that I cannot see eye to eye with Rattigan on this point, and if His Majesty's Government would lay down what our relations with Greeks are to be it would help very much. While negotiations were going on over my meeting I agreed to a few days delay in tightening neutrality but now serious operations have commenced I think there *should be a clear definition of our line of action* *.

F.O. 371/6523.

No. 209

Lord Granville (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

ATHENS, *July 15th, 1921.*

No. 312.
My Lord,

With reference to my Telegram No. 408 of today's date, I have the honour to transmit to Your Lordship, herewith, summaries, extracted from the "Progrès", of the speeches made in the National Assembly yesterday on the Allied offer of mediation by Messrs. Gounaris, Stratos and Danglis. The speeches *were punctuated by loud applause from the deputies and also the galleries* *, and the Press, with the exception of the Socialist organ "Rizospastis," expresses unanimous and hearty approval of them.

Monsieur Stratos' reference to Greece's "mighty protectors" is worthy of attention as he has been one of the protagonists against admitting any rights to Great Britain and France as Protecting Powers.

I had the honour to report in my Telegram No. 404 of the 13th instant that *great enthusiasm was expressed in the Press at the opening of the long deferred offensive.* I adhere to my opinion that *this was so,* but I think it only right to inform Your Lordship that *the French Chargé d'Affaires does not agree with me and looks the newspaper comments as having been rather flat and wanting in enthusiasm. He also tells me that* he heard from Monsieur Typaldo Bassia, who is a moderate anti - Venizelist deputy and a brother - in - law of Monsieur Theotokis and of Monsieur Mavromichalis, *that the Government are far from being as optimistic as they pretend and are in fact very nervous. It appears to me* highly probable that *they may be really confident of the success of the offensive, provided Kemal stands, but they dread his possible retirement and a consequent indecisive and long drawn out struggle.* Their financial position too is undoubtedly most precarious to say the least of it, and I imagine that the satisfactory conclusion of this Armstrong loan in England is their one hope.

I have, &.

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

F.O. 371/6524/E. 8521

* Belgelerin asıllarında satırların altı çizilmiş değil. (B. N. Ş.)

Enclosure 1 in No. 209

Extract from, "Progrès d'Athènes". of July 15th, 1921.

Assemblée Nationale

Les Buts de Guerre de la Grèce

Le Discours de M. Stratos

(Suite de la séance du 1/14 juillet).

Après le discours de M. Gounaris la parole est donnée à *M. Stratos*, chef du parti réformiste qui fait les déclarations suivantes.

"En ce qui me concerne, *j'approuve la réponse du Gouvernement Hellénique à l'offre de médiation des Puissances Alliées.*

"Cette offre présentait des côtés vulnérables de caractère militaire que le gouvernement ne pouvait pas négliger.

"*Des négotiations en vue d'une médiation, au moment où l'Armée Grecque était prête à commencer les opérations n'auraient pu avoir d'autre résultat que l'immobilisation de cette armée, la perte des avantages que lui offre la saison actuelle* et la reprise, par les Turcs, de ces interminables négociations dont leur diplomatie a toujours usé avec l'Europe et la Grèce.

"Je suis surpris que la diplomatie de grands Etats ayant une telle expérience des attermoiments turcs, ait tenté pareille médiation qui en dépit de son caractère amical et allié, ne servait pratiquement que l'adversaire.

"La mediation modifiait d'autre part les positions respectives des belligérants. On demandait à la Grèce de confier sa cause aux Puissances alliées après avoir accepté les conditions auxquelles ces dernières consentaient à intervenir.

"Messieurs, de *telles démarches ne se font que par de grands protecteurs auprès de leurs amis vaincus.* Elles me rappellent la médiation de 1897, où la Grèce, militairement écrasée avait besoin de la défense, de ses interêts par ses grands protecteurs.

M. Baltazzis (ministre des Affaires Entrangères). *Il y a là une différence.* C'est qu'il ne s' agissait pas alors des "bons offices" offerts aujourd 'hui, mais d'une médiation. En parlant grec, il est facile de nous tromper, comme vous venez de l'être, et de croire à une intervention quand il ne s'agit guère de celà.

M. Stratos. Je ne me suis pas trompé. Je n'ai pas été peut-être compris. La médiation a deux phases: celle de l'invitation de la Grèce à accepter le projet de médiation et celle de l'abandon aux Alliés du soin des négociations en vue de la réconciliation. C'est pour celà que je crois ne pas avoir été compris.

M. Baltazzis. Je vous prie de m'excuser de vous avoir interrompu. Mais j'ai cru indispensable de le faire parce que j'ai entendu dire que les bons offices offerts étaient offerts à des vaincus. Celà n'est pas vrai. *Les bons offices peuvent être offerts aussi à des vainqueurs, à des amis en tous cas,* quand il s'agit d'éviter l'effusion de sang.

M. Stratos. — Je vous excuse volontiers d'autant plus, que cela vous a permis de faire une déclaration officielle dont vous aviez besoin. J'en suis bien aise.

L'acceptation par la Grèce de cette médiation aurait amoindri sa position dans la lutte. Dans cette lutte, la Grèce a été jusqu'ici victorieuse. Il ne faut pas oublier que la Turquie est la vaincue de la grande guerre obligée, conformément aux usages internationaux et en vertu des traités signés, à supporter toutes les charges de la défaite et à soumettre à toutes les clauses des traités.

Si la grande guerre a mis la Turquie dans cette position de vaincue, les évènements qui s'en suivirent, et qui obligèrent la Grèce à affronter l'organisation non officielle constituant en substance la Turquie, ont maintenu cette dernière dans cette même position.

Nous estimons, dans ces conditions, que la démarche des Puisances ne pouvait satisfaire ni l'amour - propre grec ni même les intentions de ceux qui souhaitent la pacification de l'Orient.

On parle de rétablissement de la paix. La Grèce souhaite certainement, après dix ans de lutte ininterrompue, le rétablissement de cette paix qui permettrait à sa population de quitter les armes pour reprendre ses occupations.

Mais aucune paix ne sera possible tant qu'une parcelle de territoire grec restera sous la domination étrangère.

On parle d'une paix durable et honorable. Je crois que cette paix ne pourra s'appuyer que sur l'honnête application des traités.

Nous avons vu nos droits consacrés par un traité *qui réaliserait le minimum de nos aspirations.*

Une organisation illégale s'est dressée contre ce traité et s'opposa à son exécution.

On devait s'attendre, en présence d'une pareille situation, à *l'octroi d'un mandat à la Grèce pour qu'elle imposât sa volonté aux insurgés.*

Au lieu de celà, on propose aujourd'hui des accords aux dépens des droits acquis. Dans ces conditions, il est impossible d'obtenir une paix durable et honorable.

L'Armée Grecque est appelée aujourd'hui à imposer, non seulement les clauses du traité, mais aussi la volonté de la Grèce telle qu'elle ressort de ce traité et qu'elle sera dictée par les questions que les évènements de guerre engendreront.

La Grèce après les immenses sacrifices consentis dans la lutte actuelle, ***ne peut plus se contenter du minimum de satisfaction que lui accorde le traité de Sèvres.***

Des questions de sécurité et de satisfaction économique naissent de ses nouveaux efforts.

Elle a le droit d'exiger des frontières pouvant la protéger contre un ennemi de mauvaise foi, et d'obtenir des compensations pour ses sacrifices de sang et d'argent.

Les compensations économiques ne peuvent s'entendre que par *l'extension de la frontière de la Grèce jusqu'aux points de l'Asie - Mineure doit le sol* peut garantir le rendement nécessaire, soit sous la forme *d'annexion*, soit sous celle, nouvellement inventée, *de mandats.*

La Grèce a le droit de dire aux Alliés: Vous vous imposez toujours, unis, aux vaincus de l'Europe Centrale, pour l'éxécution des traités. Vous ne voulez pas nous aider pour imposer le traité? *Laissez nous les mains libres pour que nous l'imposions nous - mêmes.* (Applaudissements de la salle et des tribunes).

La parole est ensuite donnée au général Danglis.

Mr. Danglis (vénisèliste) — Je suis tout particulièrement heureux, Messieurs les députés, de pouvoir aujourd'hui monter à la tribune pour approuver entièrement la réponse du Gouvernement aux Puissances Alliées. Je suis heureux que l'Armée d'Asie Mineure, qui est celle des luttes du passé, reste fidèle à sa tradition; elle *fera aujourd'hui comme autrefois son devoir.*

Je suis convaincu que le Gouvernement tâchera, par son action diplomatique, *non seulement d'empêcher l'affaiblissement du traité de Sèvres mais* aussi d'obtenir pour la Grèce de nouveaux avantages, proportionnels à ses sacrifices actuels de sang et d'argent.

Je n'ai aucun doute que le Gouvernement s'efforcera à ne rien perdre de ce que notre armée gagnera. C'est ainsi seulement que nous *serons débarrassés de notre ennemi séculaire et que la paix sera consolidée.*

Je crois superflu d'en dire davantage. Vous connaissez tous les sentiments des Liberaux qui seront toujours aux côtés du Gouvernement pour l'application de cette politique.

F.O. 371/6524

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 209

Extract from "Progrès d'Athènes" of July 16th, 1921

A L'ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE

LA MEDIATION ALLIEE

Déclarations de M. Gounaris

(Séance du 1/14 juillet)

La séance est ouverte à 6 h. 15, sous la présidence de M. Lombardos qui communique différentes pétitions.

La parole est ensuite donnée à M. Gounaris qui fait les déclarations suivantes.

M. Gounaris (Prés. du Cons.). Annonce à l'Assemblée la démarche des Alliés auprès du Gouvernement Grec et dépose le texte de la note offrant leurs bons offices, ainsi que celui de la réponse du Gouvernement.

"Je ne vais pas, dit-il, exposer à l'Assemblée les raisons qui nous ont dicté cette réponse. Ces raisons sont affirmées par les faits. Sûr d'interprêter aussi bien l'opinion de l'Assemblée Nationale que celle du Peuple Hellénique tout entier, le Gouvernement a cru de son devoir de se déclarer impuissant à adhérer à une proposition qui, d'une part, n'offrait aucune probabilité d'éclaircir la situation et qui, d'autre part, impliquait un retard de notre action militaire capable d'obstruer et même de compromettre son efficacité.

'Nous apprécions sincèrement les sentimets qui ont inspiré leur démarche aux Grandes Puissances Alliées. Nous partageons entièrement leur désir de voir la paix rétablie le plus tôt possible. Personne, plus que nous, ne peut souhaiter la pacification de ce Proche Orient si éprouvé par des guerres incessantes.

"Nous faisons partie de cet Orient, et nous avons de nos congenères, disséminés dans toute son étendue. Tous péripétie nous y effecte directement et à cause même de notre solidarité nationale avec ces populations. C'est ce qui constitue une des raisons pour lesquelles nous ne voyons de plus grand bien que le rétablissement d'une paix sûre et durable dans le Proche Orient.

'Mais de ces péripéties mêmes nous avons acquis l'expérience et l'entière conscience des causes permanentes qui troublent la paix orientale et même, très souvent, la paix générale.

'*Tant que les Turcs maintiennent leur tyrannie sur des populations étrangères, le rétablissement d'une paix sûre et durable est impossible* (applaudissements de la salle et des tribunes).

"Je ne veux pas prononcer en ce moment un réquisitoire contre la Turquie. Je la renvoie à son histoire, depuis que ce pays a commencé à subjuguer des éléments étragers. C'est une histoire de luttes ininterrompues, ouvertes ou latentes, ces populations tendant toujours à reconquérir leur liberté et les conquérants s'efforçant à les exterminer par tous les moyens. Il me suffit d'évoquer les populations grecques, leurs souffrances et leurs luttes.

'Hier encore, quand notre armée partait d'Izmid pour se rendre là où la nécessité l'appelait, trente mille hommes ont été obligés de s'embarquer et de faire leurs foyers pour éviter le massacre dont l'armée grecque les préservait.

"Nos sympathies pour ces malheureux n'est point atténuée par les actes criminels de quelques uns d'entre eux qui, profitant de l'éloignement des troupes aux prises avec les Turcs, et peut - être aussi provoqués par les musulmans qui lançaient des grenades de leurs fenêtres, se sont laissés aller à de déplorables excès.

"Nous avons tous regretté ces actes et nous sommes indignés contre leurs auteurs dont le châtiment sera sévère.

"Ces excès ne sont à la charge ni de l'armée ni de ces trente mille malheureux qui ont tout abandonné pour avoir la vie sauve.

"Il y a parmi ces trente mille réfugiés, entretenus à nos frais, des arméniens, des circassiens et même des Turcs. Puisqu'il y a aussi des Turcs qui craignent le couteau des hommes d'Angora autant que ces Chrétiens. Faut - il donner une preuve plus grande encore de l'impossibilité de rétablir la paix tant que les Turcs continueront à faire peser leur joug sur des populations étrangères? (vifs applaudissements).

"*Un traité international, portant les signatures de tous les grands Alliés et de la Turquie elle - même, a délivré de ce joug une partie de ces populations : les Grecs.*"

F.O. 371/6524

No. 210

Sir M. Cheetham (Paris) to Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

PARIS, *July 15th, 1921, 6.10 p.m.*
(Received July 15th, 1921, 11.20 p.m.)

No. 486. Telegraphic.

Your telegram No. 382.

Reply just received from M. Briand as follows:

"I beg you to thank Lord Curzon for his obliging communication. I had agreed to projected meeting between Kemal and General Harington, being of the opinion that it is well to seek all opportunities for making

peace in East and that it would be a political mistake to neglect any such opportunity. The preliminary conditions laid down by Kemal appear in their general lines to be very different from bases jointly contemplated by Allies in London and Paris and discussed with Turkish delegates, object of which was re-constitution of an independent Turkey in harmony with legitimate preoccupations of Allies as regards freedom of Straits, respect for financial engagements, administrative and military reorganization, etc. I think it would be well, in the event of contemplated conversations taking place to remind Kemal of these bases."*

Copy of note by bag to-night.

Repeated to Rome and Constantinople.

F.O. 371/6472/E. 8155.
D.B.F.P Ist. series, vol. XVII, p. 319, No. 307.

No. 211

Sir M. Cheetham (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

Immediate.
No.— 2035.
P. 1062

His Majesty's Minister at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of the undermentioned paper.

British Embassy, Paris.
July 15, 1921.

* Bu telgraf üzerine İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığında şunlar not edilmiştir:

"From what the French and Italians say I do not see that we need send any further reply to Mustapha Kemal. If, as General Harington thinks, the interview might still be arranged, it is clearly for Kemal to take the next step.

Qy. So inform Constantinople.

D. G. Osborne
L. Oliphant 16/7 (1921)"

"I agree. Angora is most anxious to enter into talk with us, and will be the more so if we say nothing.

R. C. L.
July 16."
C.(urzon)."

Seen by Sir Eyre Crowe
19 Jul. 1921.
F.O. 371/6472/E. 8155

Subject

Proposed meeting between General Harington and Mustapha Kemal. Views of French Government.

FO. 371/6472/E. 8162.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 211

M. Briand to Sir M. Cheetham.

PARIS, *le 14 juillet 1921.*

Monsieur le Chargé d'Affaires,

Vous avez bien voulu, par lettre du 10 juillet, me faire connaître la réponse de Mustapha Kemal au Général HARINGTON, indiquant les conditions turques pour accepter la rencontre d'Inéboli. En même temps, vous me faisait connaître le désir de Lord Curzon d'être informé des vues du Gouvernement français relativement à la réponse éventuelle à faire à Mustapha Kemal.

Je vous prie de remercier Lord Curzon de son obligeante communication. J'avais adhéré au projet de rencontre de Kemal et de Général Harington, étant d'avis qu'il y a lieu de rechercher toutes occasions de faire la paix en Orient et que ce serait une faute politique d'en négliger quelqu'une.

Les conditions préalables posées par Mustapha Kemal apparaissent dans leur généralité comme très différentes des bases que les Alliés avaient envisagées en commun à Londres et à Paris et discutées avec les Délégués turcs, pour la reconstitution d'une Turquie indépendante, se conciliant avec les légitimes préoccupations des Alliés touchant la liberté des Détroits, le respect des engagements financières, la réorganisation administrative et militaire, etc.....

J'estime qu'il y aurait lieu de les rappeler à Mustapha Kemal, dans l'éventualité des conversations envisagées ./.

Veuillez agréer, etc......

(Sé) A. BRIAND.

F.O. 371/6472/E. 8162

No. 212

United States High Commissioner to Mustapha Kemal.

July 18, 1921.

I AM informed that the Greek women, children and old men are to be transported from Samsoun to the interior. There is much evidence that when the *Greek men were recently transported many perished on the journey.* The transport to the interior of men of military age may be considered as a military measure, but the transport of old men, women and children does not seem justified by military necessity. This proposed transportation of about ten thousand people under the present conditions must subject these people to great suffering and privations; likewise there will be great danger of their personal safety in transit. Therefore I trust, for the sake of humanity, you will prevent this forced transportation from Samsoun of these women and children. The world at large is bound to consider that the killing of those transported for military reasons was a neglect of the humane laws of war. Any transportation of women and children with loss of life would certainly be viewed with consternation and create a most unfavourable impression against you and your people. I hope for the best interests of Turkey you will reconsider this decision, if it has been made. I would be pleased to receive from you an early and favourable answer which I could convey to my Government.

BRISTOL.

F.O. 406/47, p. 34, No. 21/1

No. 212 bis

Minister for Foreign Affairs, Angora Government, to United States High Commissioner.

[*Undated*].

I HAVE the honour to advise you of the following consideration in reply to your telegram to Mustapha (Kemal) Pasha: The information which you have received relative to the transport to the interior of women, children and old men of Greek race of Samsoun is completely in error. Absolutely no measure of this kind has been taken. This information may have had its origin from the fact that the *Greeks who were able to carry arms were transported to the interior as consequence of activities of secret Greek societies, and especially the society whose name is Pontos.* The inhabitants of certain villages which had hidden bandits in the pay of these societies, and which had aided them

in carrying out their misdeeds, have been treated in the same way. I can assure you categorically that only the measures which were urgently called for by a military necessity were taken, and that in no case on our side would we go further than justice or the obligation to guarantee the safety of the country demanded.

I take this occasion to ask you to be so kind as to interest yourself equally in the Mussulmans of all ages and of both sex at the mercy of the incredible acts on the part of the Greek army and Greek population in all parts of our country which are occupied by the enemy. What happened at the end of June at Ismidt, both known and seen by the representatives and the troops of the Western Powers, was only a pale reflection of the horrors which the Greeks have committed and are committing daily in the interior of Anatolia where very few outsiders can witness against them. The massacres and the devastation perpetrated by the Greeks, both on the coast and in the interior, have been verified by numerous American citizens, French and others, and the Occidental press, in spite of its prejudice against us, had also spoken of this at length.

Consequently my Government will be grateful to you if you will have the kindness to take effective steps with the Greek Government regarding the misdeeds of their army, which have been substantiated. The Turkish people, who defend their life and independence and who are fighting against all manner of aggression, will be grateful to all those who will endeavour, though without successs, to save some of the Turkish children and women whom our enemy is killing daily.

YOUSSOUF KEMAL.

F.O. 406/47, p. 34, No. 21/2

No. 213

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Rattigan (Constantinople).

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 19, 1921, 6 p.m.*

No. 442 Telegraphic.

My telegram No. 437 (of July 12th. Neutrality of Constantinople).

We assumed from your telegram No. 506 (of July 8th) that General Harington was in agreement with you in favouring further postponement of enforcement of strict neutrality.

It appears however from his telegrams Nos. 597[1] and 604[2] that this is not the case and War Office support him and urge that measures proposed for strengthening neutrality be enforced forthwith. Commander-in - Chief Mediterranean appears from latest advices to share your opinion.

In a matter like this we must necessarily be largely guided by the advice of our local political, military and naval authorities and when they are not agreed it is difficult to take a decision.

Will you therefore discuss the matter further with Admiral de Robeck and General Harington with a view to arriving at a unanimous conclusion. I understand allied representatives are all in favour of enforcement but I should be glad of confirmation.

Repeated to Athens No. 219

D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol. XVII, p. 322, No. 311.

No. 214

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Rattigan (Constantinople).

FOREIGN OFFICE, *20th July, 1921. 6.00 p.m.*

Cypher telegram.
No. 446.

My telegram No. 426 (of July 8th. Proposed interview with Mustapha Kemal).

After consulting French and Italian Governments, I do not think any further reply to Mustapha Kemal is needed. If he is still anxious for interview to take place it is for him to take the next step.

F.O. 371/6472

[1] This telegram of July 13 ran as follows: 'Our only line is to preseve absolute neutrality and to show our good faith. I think Greek ships and missions should now leave here. By this means alone can we prove our practical neutrality. I am to-night consulting de Robeck and Rattigan'.

[2] Bkz No. 208

No. 215

Lord Granville (Athens) to Earl Curzon.

ATHENS, *20th July, 1921, 8.15 p.m.*
(Received, 21st July, 3.00 p.m.)

No. 414. (R). Telegraphic.

News of the capture of Kutahia reached Athens late in the evening of July 18th and was announced by President of the Council in Assembly. Church bells were rung and crowds perambulated the streets most of the night, cheering and firing revolvers, etc. They twice visited His Majesty's Legation in early hours of the morning and cheered for Great Britain and Prime Minister. They did not visit other Legations. Yesterday morning a salute was fired of one hundred and one guns and there was official thanksgiving service in the Cathedral.

All the papers publish enthusiastic panegyrics of greatest victory Greece has ever known and some suggest that it will be known as one of the decisive battles of the world. They declared yesterday that it was final victory of campaign and stories were told of the varying numbers of prisoners up to fifty thousand. Today, as no details have yet been received, a little water is put in the wine and one paper at least points out that if Turks have been able to retire north and north - east there are very strong positions still to be taken.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me this morning that the Government had no details yet but that King had telegraphed President of the Council that victory is most satisfactory*.

Repeated to Constantinople.

F.O. 371/6524/E. 8397.

* Kütahya'nın zaptedilişi üzerine, *The Daily Telegraph* gazetesi, Atina muhabirinden aldığı aşağıdaki haberi yayınladı:

PREMATURE REJOICINGS.

FALSE REPORT OF VICTORY.

FROM A. BEAUMONT.

ATHENS, Monday (11.30 a.m.).

Athens is rejoicing this morning at news just published in a semi-official bulletin of the occupation of Kutahia. The newspapers issue specials and church bells are ringing. The war material captured is alleged to be considerable including two or three batteries of heavy guns, from fifteen to twenty batterie of field guns, numerous machine guns, and three depôts of ammunition. The larger part of the Turkish division which unable to escape is also said to have been captured.

No. 216

Lord d'Abernon (Berlin) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

BERLIN, *July 20, 1921.*
(*Received July 28*).

No. 949.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 372 of the 16th instant, I have the honour to report that Mr. Addison has received the following information from a reliable source:—

1. Nazim Bey and Behaeddin Schakir (the former of whom had been Ministre des Cultes) have both gone to Moscow, and Bedri has gone to Kabul viâ Moscow.

2. Practically all the other prominent Turks have now established themselves in Munich. This they have done because the German Government cannot get at them in Munich or order them to leave Bavaria, and also because they feel that, if one of their number were murdered, he would not be acquitted by a Bavarian jury — hence a greater feeling of security.

The centre of the Turkish conspiracy in Germany is therefore Munich, and among the members of the Munich Committee there are the following prominent Turks:—

Nedjmeddin Mollah, a former Minister of Justice.
Kemal Bey.
Fethy Bey, formerly Turkish Minister in Sofia.
Mahmud Mukthar Pasha, formerly Turkish Ambassador in Berlin.
Ahmed Ihsan Bey, a big publisher and printer in Constantinople.
Colonel Remsi Bey, formerly aide - de - camp to the Sultan.

3. During the last few days General Ismael Hakki Pasha has been living at the Eden Hotel in Berlin. With him is a Spanish Jew from Constantinople, called Cambri. The object of Hakki Pasha's visit is to obtain

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The Venizelist paper Elefteros Typos says the rumours that the Greek army will continue the campaign for months, following an evasive enemy far into the interior, are false. Such a programme would be folly. *It is at Stamboul that Greece must dictate peace.* M. Venizelos asked or the whole vilayet of Aidin, with Smyrna, a great of the vilayet of Brussa, an autonomous province at Trebizond, and international government at Constantinople and the Straits. *What Eskishehr shall have met the fate of Kutahia the Greek army will ignore the Grand Assembly at Angora, and the Government will turn its attention to Stamboul.* Recognition of Greek sovereignty in Asia Minor over the Hellenic zone and payment of an adequate indemnity will be demanded.

(The Daily Telegraph (London), 19, 7. 1921).

deliveries of material ordered under Turkish contracts made with the Germans. This material was paid for, but was not delivered owing to the conclusion of the armistice. Hakki Pasha has come from Switzerland and is charged by the Angora Government with the duty of getting this material out of Germany to the Nationalist Government. It is not known precisely to what these contracts refer, as Hakki's negotiations are with the industrial firms concerned. It is supposed that he will attempt to get deliveries sent to Angora viâ Italy.

4. The informant had a piece of information which is by far the most important and which he assured me he knew from personal knowledge to be quite accurate. He said that for some time an aide - de - camp of Mustapha Kemal, called Djemal Bey, has been residing secretly in Sofia and is negotiating with the Bulgarians for the supply of arms and ammunition from Bulgaria to the Turkish Nationalist Government. The informant asserted that most of the arms and ammunition which the Government of Mustapha Kemal had received, and were receiving, came from Bulgaria and proceeded from the stocks which the Bulgarian Government should have delivered, but which had been hidden. They are exported regularly from the Black Sea ports, from which it is easy to send small shipments at a time.

Djemal's chief job is to supervise and co - ordinate this traffic.

Further, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith, a report on the relations existing between the Russians, Turks and Afghans, which I have received from Major Breen.

I have, &c.,

D'ABERNON.

F.O. 406/47, p. 24 - 25 No. 14.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 216.

Report by Major Breen on Russian - Turkish - Afghan Relations

THE *Emir Chekkib Arslan*, president of the Oriental Club and leader of the Turkish Nationalists in Berlin since the death of Talaat, visited Moscow towards the end of June. After Enver's recent visit to Berlin the Emir informed me that Enver had invited him to visit Moscow, to make the acquaintance of the members of the Government and to discuss the Eastern situation generally with the envoys from Afghanistan and Angora. The Emir was not anxious to go to Mocsow, as he shares the prejudice of the late Talaat Pasha in the matter of Russian - Turkish co - operation and he did not wish to arouse the impression among his Turkish friends that he had

adopted Enver's policy unreservedly. In view of the value of first-hand reliable information from Moscow I urged him to go, on the ground that he could not affort to remain aloof in Berlin if important negotiations were taking place in Moscow. I met him yesterday in Berlin and learned that he had gone to Russia on the 18th June and returned here on the 4th July, having spent four days in Moscow. His reception in Russia was most flattering. A special railway car and good quarters in the Savoy Hotel, Moscow, were provided for him. Food was fairly good, his ration cards being those of a diplomatic representative of the first-class.

His visit coincided with the Congress of the Third International. Owing to the coming into force of the new Soviet regulation, permitting retail trade on certain conditions, shops were opening in Moscow and a slight revival of life was evident. The tram and train system still remains Socialist; no fares are paid.

He interviewed Trotsky and Chicherin, but Lenin was busy with the Third International and did not see him. Enver explained that Lenin was primarily an exponent of Communism and that, in view of the Emir's known dislike of the Soviet system, an interview might be embarrassing. Chicherin impressed him as a very able diplomat without any socialistic convictions. The Turkish and Afghan questions were treated from a purely Nationalist point of view and he was struck by the fact that there was little difference between the attitude of the Soviet Foreign Minister and his Tsarist predecessors when Turkish or Afghan relations were discussed.

The Emir had three interviews with Chicherin during his visit. He emphasised the need for futher financial help for Angora, as hitherto only small sums had been advanced in gold. Chicherin replied that his Bolshevik colleagues were loath to advance more money owing to the effect on Russian public opinion of the recent murders at Trebizond. (A clause in the Turkish-Russian Agreement forbade Bolshevik propaganda. Nevertheless, a certain Turk, Mustapha Subhei [?], who had adopted Russian nationality and Soviet principles, arrived at Trebizond from Moscow with twelve supporters and commenced propaganda. The local inhabitants murdered the whole party). Chicherin disclaimed official responsibility for this propaganda and stated that subordinate officials and political fanatics were violating the London and Angora Agreements and that the Government lacked the necessary information and authority to interfere. The Emir replied that Mustapha Kemal had been forced to obtain the recall of the Moscow representative at Angora as he also was engaged in propaganda. Chicherin admitted this, but stated that it was difficult to draw the line between propaganda and justifiable diplomatic activity.

Chicherin was not unfavourable to an agreement between the Allies and the Angora Government. The question of Thrace was most difficult. He understood that Mr. Lloyd George had personally guaranteed this territory to the Greeks, or rather, to Veniselos personally. The English could afford to ignore their promise to Veniselos. The Emir replied that any Turkish influence in Constantinople was a fiction as long as the Greeks remained at Chatalja. The question of Thrace could be solved by a referendum. The representative of Angora in Moscow, Fuad Ali Bey, stated that the Bulgarians had pledged their support to the Turks in this matter, provided part of Western Thrace was assigned to them. They would organise bands for whom the Bulgarian Government would deny responsibility.

In the course of conversation with Kemal's representative Fuad Ali Bey, who is a very able man possessing the entire confidence of the Angora Government, the Emir ascertained that the French had gained in popularity owing to the extraordinary disappointment which the acquittal of Talaat's assassin had aroused. Fuad and the Emir agreed that any friendly feeling which existed between Turkey and her former ally was gone for ever. Members of the German Extreme Right and German Foreign Office officials deplored the verdict, but this could not alter the political effect of the acquittal in Mahommedan countries.

Reports from Beirout and Damascus indicated that the French were continuing their policy of conciliation and amnesty and that Gouraud's troops will probably be withdrawn gradually. The difficulty was Alexandretta. The French Government had had difficulty in obtaining the 250,000,000 fr. necessary for the Syrian undertaking this year and the Senate only voted the money on condition that no money would be required next year.

I asked the Emir if it were true that the Afghan delegation which visited Berlin had recruited German officers or technical personnel. He answered that arrangements were made for recruiting some engineers and technical advisers, as Djemal had a staff of twenty Turkish officers only, who lacked the necessary technical qualifications. The Emir had discussed the question with the Afghan representative in Moscow, Mahommat Eli, who ridiculed the idea that an attack on India, either alone or with Russia, was ever contemplated. Afghanistan wished to organise her army and construct roads as a defence, whether against Great Britain or Russia. The only cause of quarrel with the British Government was the unjust occupation of Waziristan. It was incorrect to say that the British had withdrawn their mission from Kabul. The Emir pointed out in this connection that, at the time of the visit of the Afghan delegation to Berlin, Pillai and the

the other Indian leaders were at no pains to conceal their hostility to the Afghans.

The Emir drew Chicherin's attention during his last interview before leaving Moscow to the futility of Bolshevik propaganda in Mahommedan countries. Chicherin agreed, but complained that even the English would not desist from propaganda and intrigue, alleging that he had definite proof that the British had imported 70,000 rifles into Kashgar which could only be for use against Russia.

When leaving Moscow Enver gave the Emir the explanation of the coolness which had existed between himself and Talaat since the war. After Talaat fled to Germany he regarded the situation as hopeless for Turkey and wrote a memoir in which he set out the causes of the Turkish defeat, stating *inter alia* that Enver and Djemal had violated the principles of the Committee of Union and Progress by amassing wealth. Although all copies of the memoir have been subsequently destroyed, Enver retained one and never quite forgave Talaat

The Emir's general impression of Russia was not interesting, as his visit was too short. He considered that public opinion was in a state of evolution. Chicherin frankly expressed the view that the only bond between Turkey and Russia was that of mutual advantage by co - operation. Angora had obtained many advantages and Russia had obtained the Trade Agreement with Great Britain.

I asked the Emir if he foresaw difficulties with Russia in the event of the re-establishment of Turkish influence in Constantinople. He replied that Turkey would certainly be forced as before 1914 to act in concert with England or France to counteract Russian pressure.

July 14, 1921.

F.O. 406/47, p. 26, No. 14/1.

No. 217

War Office to Foreign Office.

WAR OFFICE, LONDON, *21st July, 1921.*

0152/5875 (M. I. 2)
Secret
Sir,

I am commanded by the Army Council to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copies of two telegrams, Nos.

579, dated 10th July 1921 *, and 625, dated 18th July 1921, received from General Headquarters, Constantinople.

It will be seen that in the last sentence of telegram No. 625, Lieutenant - General Sir C. H. Harington asks for instructions as to whether he is to reply to Mustapha Kemal's telegram, the contents of which are contained in Mr. Rattigan's telegram No. 495, dated 7th July 1921. *I am to say that the Council feel that they should reply to this request of General Harington's with as little delay as possible* and, in order to enable them to do so they would be glad to have an expression of the views of the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston on this subject, with special reference to General Harington's views as contained in telegram No. 579.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

F.O. 371/6473/E. 8403.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 217

General Headquarters (Constantinople) to War Office

Despatched 18/7/21.
Received 1000 19/7/21

Secret.
Paraphrase.
625 cipher 18/7

First of two parts.

To-day with the full approval of French and Italians whose flags I fly, I have established my allied headquarters. I held large Conference of Allied Commanders and staffs and Navy to co-ordinate our plans of defence for Maltepe - Chiboukli line. Everything amicably settled and thanks to help received from Navy 2/3rds of British Sector is now wired. I estimate that in case of serious threats from Ismid I could get troops across and above positions fully manned in 5 days. Marden and Charpy would command 2 main sectors and I should retain under my own hand one Indian, one French and one Italian battalion. *I should only have one British one French and one Italian battalion for keeping order in Constantinople and European side. Personally I think there would be trouble on both sides together. I do not know what reliance could be placed on gendarmerie. All the best Turks have evidently become Kemalists and those that have not expect little mercy unless they do something*

* Bkz. Belge No. 196

to assist Kemalists if they come here. This reason has compelled me to - day to disband Turkish cavarly squadron we were training and feeding. It was discovered that Turkish officers were plotting with enemy band to shoot the British officers in order to curry favour with Kemalists.

Last Part.

At a pinch the same might happen in gendarmerie but I hope not. Many thanks for your 89462 and 89464 C. I. G. S. *All is quiet now awaiting results of Greek offensive. I think Nationalists will not be slow in coming for Constantinople if Greek offensive is unsuccessful,* and it would be very unlikely that we should be allowed the 4 or 5 weeks you estimate for aeroplanes from Egypt and Medium Batteries from Malta and personnel and horses from England. It all comes back to the guidance which I want as to whether we are (a) to fight it out without hope of reinforcements. (b) likely to be reinforced, (c) likely to be ordered to Chanak when heavily committed as that would be very difficult task. I should like to know the wishes of the Allied Governments as, although I have no anxiety at the moment, things might develop quickly. I am still awaiting instructions as to whether I am to reply to Mustapa Kemal's telegram to me and if so what the reply shall be*.

F.O. 371/6473/E. 8403

No. 218

Mr. Rattigan (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *21st July, 1921, 12.30 a.m.*
(Received, July 24th, 10.45 a.m.)

No. 524. Telegraphic.

Your telegram 4 (?36).

My telegram 506 was despatched after consultation with Admiral de Robeck and General Harington. We were then in argeement and I was unaware that General Harington had since recommended that neutrality should be tightened. I will consult again with General Harington, but meanwhile my views, which are shared by Admiral de Robeck, are as follows:—

* Bu yazı üzerine İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığında şunlar not edilmiştir :
"We have sent War office copy of our telegram to Mr Rattigan saying that no further reply to Kemal called for and they notify Gen. Harington accordingly."
(FO. 371/6523/E. 8363).

If present conditions were to afford pretext to Kemalists to advance on Constantinople, I agree that it would be necessary to remove such a pretext by tightening neutrality. But military authorities concur in the opinion that the *Kemalists could not undertake such an advance whilst they have to deal with Greek offensive.* I am convinced and General Harington recently agreed, that pretext or no pretext *Kemalists are determined to advance on Constantinople if and when they have nothing further to fear from Greeks.* Mustapha Kemal's (? reply) affords an additional proof of the arrogance and self - confidence of Angora.

This being so, I think we have nothing to gain by the proposed tightening of our neutrality as against Greeks.

If we did so it would be merely put down to influence of French, and my experience of the latter leads me to think that they would do all they can to give this impression. *I do not therefore see what useful result we could obtain by the adoption of measures which must to some extent (?hamper) Greeks*.*

French High Commissioner is naturally anxious to tighten neutrality, but Italian High Commissioner now entirely agrees with my views and tells me he is telegraphing in this sense.

F.O. 371/6524.
D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol. XVII, p. 324, No. 314

No. 219

Lord Granville (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

ATHENS, *21st July, 1921, 8.40 p.m.*
(Received 23rd July, 1921, 1.15 p.m.)

No. 418. Telegraphic.

My telegram No. 414**.

News of the capture of Eskishia (Sic) was received at Athens last night and led to similar scenes as the fall of Kutahia. A very large crowd again came to His Majesty's Legation in the early hours and cheered for Great Britain, King and Prime Minister. There were again this morning church bells, salute of 101 guns and Te Deum.

Enthusiasm of Greek press is of course greater than ever and declare that decisions of the Treaty of Sèvres are no longer sufficient for Greece, who must now have a proper strategic frontier within which she can exploit fertile lands of Asia Minor and protect labour well - being and equality without distinction of race or religion. Several papers suggest that road from Eskishia leads not to Angora but to Constantinople. One Government

* Satırların altı belgenin aslında çizilmiş değil. (B. N. Ş.)
** Bkz. No. 215

paper argues that powers have chosen to declare that present hostilities are not continuation of the Great War and that they disinterest themselves in them and look on them as a matter between Greeks and Turks; well and good Greeks accept that view, regards them as final phase of war of independence which began hundred years ago and claims that peace which will soon be imposed is also matter between Greeks and Turks alone: at same time peace which Greece will impose will be equally in the interests of the whole of Europe.

Repeated to Constantinople.

F.O. 371/6524/E. 8464.

No. 220

Mr. Rizo - Rangabé, Greek Chargé d'Affaires in London, to Mr. G. V. Vansittart, Foreign Office.

LEGATION DE GRECE, *21st July, 1921.*

Dear Mr. Vansittart,

I beg to enclose herewith an official despatch from the Foreign Office in Athens announcing the *capture of Eskishehir*, and the Official Press Bulletin of July 20th, giving details of the operations up to that date, both of the above having been received by me this day.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Rizo - Rangabé.

F.O. 371/6523.

ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 220.

Mr. Baltazzi, Greek Foreign Minister, to Greek Foreign Office Official, London.

ATHENS, *July 21, 1921.*

Telegraphic.

I am happy to announce that we have just received the news that on Tuesday at 8.o. p.m. the X. Division, after a furious struggle, captured Eskishehir.

H. M. King to - day proceeded to Ouchak with the General Staff.

The Army continues its operations for the pursuit of the enemy with precision and rapidity.

The joy of the Christian population, as well as the Jews and even Moslems, who have been saved from the Kemalist hordes, is indescribable.

General Polymenakos issued, on his entry into Eskishehir a proclamation to the inhabitants that justice, liberty and equality, without distinction of race or religion, will reign hereafter in all regions captured by the Greeks.

BALTAZZI.

F.O. 371/6523.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 220.

Greek Press Bulletin of July 20, 1921.

ATHENS, *July 20.*

Press Bulletin,

Information from various well-informed sources presents the military situation as follows:—

Since the launching of the general offensive up to Sunday afternoon, the Greek troops have advanced from 100 to 120 kilometres, of which 80 to 100 were traversed while fighting all the time, sometimes in fierce hand-to-hand struggles, sometimes in important pitched battles.

A record of endurance characteristic of the Greek soldier has been made by the 9th Division, which threw itself into the struggle without taking any rest after a march of 35 kilometres under a burning sun, during which it was entirely deprived of water.

The Authorities reaffirm that the objective of the attack on Kutahia was not the occupation of the town, but to inflict on the enemy the greatest drain in men and material. Kutahia was defended by 55,000 men, and 80 kilometres of the most perfected system of entrenchments protected with barbed wire. It was impossible for the enemy to destroy all the material he was forced to abandon.

Prisoners have not yet been enumerated. Over 2,000 camels have fallen into our hands. Turkish prisoners relate that Kemal was at Kutahia on Saturday. His agitation was extreme. Kutahia was then being bombarded by Greek aeroplanes, one bomb exploding close in front of Kemal. Four officers and seven soldiers of his staff were killed and twenty wounded.

All attention is now being concentrated on the progress of operations against Eskishehir. Elements of the Southern sector are moving to the North by forced marches, while in the North columns and groups have occupied Ineghiol, Biledjik and Bazardjik.

According to trustworthy information, a battle around Eskishehir commenced on Monday. The Kemalists with feeble regular elements,

reinforced by irregulars, tried to make a diversion on the extreme right of the Greek general front by attacks against Tsivril and in the direction of Afion Karahissar, all of which were easily repulsed*.

F.O. 371/6523

* Kütahya ve Eskişehir'in Yunan ordusunca zaptedilmesi üzerine İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığında aşağıdaki yorumlar yapılmıştır:

Minutes (of Foreign Office):

The Greek forces have now attained their objectives although it is by no means clear yet to what extent they have succeeded in their main object of destroying the enemy forces. It seems clear that they have no intention of going beyond the railway line or of attempting to reach Angora. They cannot remain indefinitely where they are and, unless the Nationalist forces are completely broken up and incapable of counter-attack for some time, the Greeks will probably make an early attempt to liquidate the campaign. Mr. Beaumont is practically the mouthpiece of the official press agency and in his last two despatches he says that when Eskishehr has fallen the Greeks will turn their attention to Stamboul. And Gen. Harrington reports that the new Thracian Division is to be called the "Division of Constantinople". The question of defending the capital against the Nationalists, which has been raised by Gen. Harington, is therefore no more urgent than the question of keeping the Greeks out. It is also possible that we shall now receive an intimation from the Greeks that they are now ready to accept our mediation; but their demands will be increased while the Turkish demands will remain unchanged and neither King Constantine nor Mustapha Kemal can give way without endangering their position. Acceptance of the logical compromise of Greek evacuation of Smyrna and retention of Eastern Thrace seems more remote than ever.

The War Office have just told me that their information is that the Turkish retirement was in good order and that 6 out of their original 15 or 16 Divisions have not yet been engaged. Time is evidently on the Turkish side.

D. G. Osborne
21/7

The Allied command of the sea is alone enough to make the Greeks abandon the thought of any hostile action against Constantinople, against the Allies will.

Apart from that I agree with Mr. Osborne and fear that the next mediation is foredoomed to failure.

R. C. L.
July 21 (1921)

"*Lord Curzon*

The war Office are now decyphering a whole series of telegrams from Constantinoble.

We hear by telephone from them that, while the situation is obscure, the main Turkish forces is withrawing eastwards from Eskishehr. It is thus still in existence, though the W. (ar) O. (office) do not know yet to what extent it has been cut up. They understand that the Greeks are still in pursuit.

Seen by Sir Eyre Crowe
22 Jul. 1921

R. C. L.
July 21 (1921)
C. (urzon)

(*F.O. 371/6523*)

No. 221

Greek Press Bulletin of July 21, 1921.

ATHENS, *July 21, 1921.*

Press Bulletin, July 21.

The journals give the following details of the battle and capture of Eskishehr. The 10th and 7th Divisions which were the first to enter Eskishehr had come from Broussa. The Turks tried to resist to the North-West of Eskishehr. On the left wing the column from Broussa and Bilidjik reached the Eskishehr-Angora railway, while other columns were advancing at full speed from the South.

The Greek aviators bombarded without cessation the Kemalist lines of retreat and communications. The column from Adranos, composed of the 3rd and 11th Division, wheeling inwards, joined up with the column from Broussa and Bazardjik, North of Kutahia.

The disordered state of the Kemalist Army is extreme. The enemy has not had time to save his war material. Depots of munitions and provisions abandoned by him not yet counted.

The two defeats, Kutahia and Eskishehr, have placed the *Turkish Army hors de combat**.

The Government is informed that Turkish inhabitants of the occupied regions are throwing away or hiding their arms, and returning to their homes garbed as peasants. It is not yet known whether this is in disgust with military discipline or on the advice of Kemal and in accordance with a pre-established plan eventually to create mischief against the Greek Army. Naturally these men will be arrested as prisoners of war.

The pursuit continues along the road to Angora, along which the Turks are retreating, abandoning their arms and baggage.

The pursuit across the plains beyond Eskishehr is being carried on by cavalry, aeroplanes and tanks acting as advanced guard.

Orders seized upon prisoners confirm that Kutahia was to be defended at all costs.

The Turkish press had prophesied that Kutahia would be the tomb of the Greek Army, as the Dardanelles was that of the Allies.

The Turks attempted a fruitless effort at a diversion on the extreme right wing of the Greek general front, launching their irregulars against

* "Türk ordusunun savaş dışı edildiği" sözcüklerinin altı İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığında çizilmiş ve karşısına bir soru işareti konmuştur. (B. N. Ş).

Tsivril. *The stories of flying Turkish columns which are to attack the rear of the Greek Army are simply puerile inventions.*

F.O. 371/6524

No. 222

Memorandum by Mr. Osborne.

I saw this morning a Bulgarian named Kistchew, who brought the attached letter of introduction. He says he was the channel of communication to the Supreme Council at its sitting in January last of a message from Talaat giving his views on possible peace terms which were supposed to be endorsed by Mustapha Kemal.

Kistchew had come to London to notify the British Government that there was now at Geneva a Turk well known to His Majesty's Government who was commissioned to ascertain whether peace could be attained on the basis of:

1 Return of Smyrna.
2. Return or autonomy of E. Thrace.
3. Abolition of Tripartite "zones".

The Turk in question, whose name he refused to give me, was, he alleged, the emissary of Mustapha Kemal personally as distinct from the Nationalist Government. When I pointed out that the obvious method of approaching His Majesty's Government was through the British authorities at Constantinople rather than in this suspiciously roundabout manner, he explained the position of Kemal as follows. He no longer controlled the administration at Angora and in order to maintain his position he was obliged to defer to the extremists, *many of whose adherents were in Bolshevik pay, the majority of the moderates were either bribed or terrorized into similar acquiessence in the execution of the Bolshevik - Panislamic plans and policies.*

I pointed out that if Mustapha Kemal was no longer a free agent and head of the Nationalist Government, it was clearly useless to negotiate peace with him since any agreement arrived at would be repudiated by the extremists in power, whose guiding principle was, as he stated himself, no peace with Great Britain at any price. (This was the policy imposed from Moscow).

He replied that Mustapha Kemal's idea was that if the Allies agreed to peace on the basis of the three points specified above and at the same time promised him their support (financial, purchasing facilities, etc.) *he could at any moment bring off a successful coup d'état, arrest or shoot the leading extremists,*

announce the terms and make peace on those terms with the approval of the vast majority of the Nationalist Assembly and the Turkish nation. *In this event he anticipated a Russian invasion of E. Anatolia but he could deal with this if assured of Allied support.* This achieved he and a restored Turkey could do much for the Allies; he offered *to put an end to the Bolshevik and Panislamic propaganda in India and elsewhere,* liberate and unite the Caucasian states into an anti-Russian buffer, even overturn - did we desire it - the present Russian regime. Were there any difficulty about inducing the Greeks to evacuate Smyrna Mustapha Kemal was prepared at any moment to abandon his settled military policy of drawing the Greeks on as far as they would follow and instead to deal them a severe blow. Kistchew talked a good deal about these fantastic schemes and also about the position of Mustapha Kemal. What he had come to London for was to ascertain *whether His Majesty's Government would send someone to see the mysterious Turk or even allow him to come to London.* There was no time to go fully into Kisthew's own credentials, but he was given a British passport two years ago to enable him to go to England and he is still using it. I can find out more about him, if desired, when he comes tomorrow for a reply. He is an earnest and agreeable middle - aged man with an excellent command of English.

I would suggested that I be authorised to tell him that we are prepared to take *his word for Mustapha Kemal's difficulties but* that after our experiences with Bekir Sami, the authorized emissary of Angora, *we cannot consider the possibility of discussion with an anonymous and for all we know unauthorized emissary of Mustapha Kemal*; *that the proper channel for communication is Constantinople* and that there is no greater danger there than in Geneva of the discovery by the Bolsheviks of his communicating with us (in which case he apprehends that they would get rid of him)*; and finally that negotiation is useless until the idea of the return or autonomy of Thrace is abandoned.

On the other hand, since the story is a very plausible one, we might confine ourselves to saying that while it must be understood that we will not agree to a reopening of the question of Thrace, we are prepared to send someone from the Legation at Berne to interview the Turk at Geneva on the receipt of unimpeachable credentials.

(Signed) D. G. OSBORNE. *22. 7. 21.*
(Intld.) R. C. L. 22. 7. 21.

F.O. 371/6523.

* Lord Curzon, Muhtıranın bu bölümünü onaylamış, karşısına "I agree" diye not düşmüş; ondan sonraki öneriye ise katılmamıştır. Ertesi gün Mr Osborne bunları Kistchew'e söylemiştir. "I have told him" diye not düşmüştür. (B. N. Ş)

No. 223

Mr. Kennard (Rome) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

ROME, *22nd July, 1921, 9.25 p.m.*
(Received 24th July, 5.30 p.m.).

No. 311. Telegraphic

Press reports that Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday saw Fety Bey, representative of Kemal, who is about to proceed to Angora and had asked for facilities. Minister for Foreign Affairs while expressing readiness to grant facilities, requested Fety to convey to Mustapha Kemal painful impression of Italian Government at the hostile attitude shown by Turkish nationalists on evacuation of Adalia by the Italians. Italy in view of the regard she had shown to the nationalist interests had a right to expect more friendly attitude. Refusal of Mustapha Kemal to receive Tuozzi - my telegram No. 269 - and other incidents (? further) require explanation. Fety promised to bring the views of Minister for Foreign Affairs to the notice of Mustapha Kemal.

I enquired at Ministry for Foreign affairs this afternoon if this interview had taken place, I was informed that it had but that Minister for Foreign Affairs had only given Fety good advice.

F.O. 371/6524/E. 8469.

No. 224

Lord Granville (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

ATHENS, *23rd July, 1921, 5.30. p.m.*
(Received 25th July, 5.30. p.m.)

No. 424. Telegraphic
Secret.

Greek newspapes claim crushing and decisive victory over Mustapha Kemal. General Staff in Athens, while maintaining a more restrained attitude in the absence of definite details of captures, are confident that Nationalist Army has lost the greater part of its value as a fighting machine. They say that the Greek attack and pursuit, following the unsuccessful Nationalist counter - attack of July 21st, has cut Kemal's army in two and has (1 group undec) driven the two parts away from Angora railway line, one part to north - east and the other to south - east.

General Staff at Athens say that future movements of Greek army will be directed against the enemy's forces rather than on any geographical point such as Angora. 11th Division now at Lefke will probably be used to clear Ismid and Geive area.

In the last few days troop - ships have left Piraeus for Thrace with men for the new "Division of Constantinople".

Italian Minister who has I believe many sources of information in Asia Minor learns that Greeks have captured practically no material or artillery and comparatively few prisoners; that Kemal had begun his retirement two months ago and effected it brilliantly, carrying off all his material including all work - shops at Eskishehr. He also hears of a Turkish counter - attack at Afiun Qarahisar "which had successes". This is absolutely denied by Greek General Staff.

Can Commander-in-Chief, Constantinople give an estimate of the true extent of Greek success and Turkish demoralisation?

Repeated to Constantinople.

F.O. 371/6524/E. 8513.

No. 225

Greek Press Bulletin of July 23, 1921.

ATHENS, *July 23, 1921.*

Press Bulletin.

A large number of war correspondents of the Greek and Foreign press, *having been presented to General Papoulas to offer him their congratulations on the success of the campaign and on the conquest of the impregnable Eskishehr as this was called in the address,* the *General,* after thanking them, *said.*

"The *Greek Army is reaping today the fruits of an intense labour of seven months' duration.* The General staff, in two-and-a-half months, has organised a new army in the face of difficulties which appeared insurmountable. We have the right to be prouder of this work of preparation than even of our victories themselves.

"During the period of preparation it was necessary to follow with unerring vigilance every operation in detail over a front of greater extent than the Western front in France at any time during the war, with far longer communications. It was imperative to protect without cessation the railways and telegraphic communications against raids and to guard the rear of the armies against incursions by irregular bands. Our elements

were in continuous movement to go to the help of the civilian populations, while our administration had on its hands the care of thousands of refugees, Greeks, Armenians and Kurds. The medical service had to fight step by step against the possibilities of outbreaks of infectious and contageous diseases and our cartographers and survey services had frequently to abandon their indispensable labours to take to their rifles.

"And while without a moments relaxation this enormous work was being carried on in obscurity, our General Staff was elaborating the plan which has brought us in eight days to Afion Karahissar and to Eskishehr, and which has proved once again to *our friends as well as to our enemies the might of the Greek Army.*

"On the eve of the offensive the presence of the King at Smyrna redoubled the strength of the Army. After careful consideration of it, the King approved the plan which had been prepared to its final most minute detail.

"You have followed the execution of this plan" continued the General to the press representatives, "It is not for me to sing the praises of my officers and soldiers. You have seen them cover *fifty - five kilometres a day under* a torrid heat, and to accomplish that for fifteen days without one day of rest in between.

"*The paths through Asia Minor* are familiar to the Greeks, who for thousands of years have struggled to protect civilisation - that is why, whatever may be the ultimate goal of our operations, it can never be said that they bear the character of an invasion".

F.O. 371/6524.

No. 226

Mr. Rattigan (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *24th July, 1921, 5.0 p.m.*
(Received 25th July, 3.20 p.m.)

No. 532 Telegraphic

Greek High Commissioner called last night to inform me as to the Greek victories. *He said that the success was complete and Kemalist resistance a thing of the past. Next step would be anti - Kemalist revolution in Anatolia**. I said that I was afraid that this view was somewhat optimistic. *If Kemalist defeat was indeed decisive there would very likely be an anti - Kemalist movement in Anatolia, but I feared it might result in a Bolshevik - Enver combination with the object of*

* Satırların altı belgenin aslında çizilmiş değil. (B. N. Ş.)

continuing the war to the bitter end. If the Greeks wished to make it easier for the moderate elements in Angora to take charge and conclude peace, they, on their side, would be wise to show moderation. *Any attempt to exploit their victories unduly would consolidate whole of Turkish people against them and struggle would be prolonged indefinitely with disastrous results to both sides.*

I am informed by reliable journalist that late Minister for Foreign Affairs told him yesterday that *Angora Government had now asked for the despatch of Bolshevik troops to their assistance.* If true this would point to my fears as described above being realized.

Greek High Commissioner informed me that prisoners all expressed satisfaction at being out of the war and say that the whole population is for peace at any (?price omitted). Though this is probably exaggerated, I have always felt that Anatolian peasants are tired of the war and would support any moderate Government that brought them peace. But their support weighs little in the scale as against Bolshevik support of extremists. *The one hope in my opinion is that united strong (?moderate) Government may establish itself enjoying the sympathy of the allies round which peaceful population would be able to rally.* To bring about such an end we should have to compel the Greeks to abstain from excessive pretentions as a result of their victories.

I took an opportunity of impressing both on Greek High Commissioner and on Acting Patriarch urgent necessity to prevent Greeks in Constantinople from demonstrations of exultation which would inevitably provoke wrath of Turkish population and *lead to violent disorders.* I added that I had requested General Officer Commanding to suppress at once any attempts at excessive demonstrations.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 532. Repeated to Athens No. 105.

F.O. 371/6524/E. 8527

No. 227

Lord Granville (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

ATHENS, *25th July, 1921, 3.00 p.m.*
(Received 26th July, 10.45 a.m.)

No. 426. Telegraphic
No distribution.

Your telegram No. 224.

Military Attaché will send a daily telegram to War Office giving all the information he can obtain here. *But please explain to War Office that no information whatever, which is obtainable here, can be regarded as reliable.* Greeks

have so far only mentioned officially the capture of a "good many" prisoners and 40 guns, which seems to show care in not claiming too much by definite numbers, but they talk, even officially, of the completeness of the victory and the censor allows Press messages to pass mentioning 168 guns and estimates of prisoners varying from 15,000 to 40,000.

It was owing to the difficulty of obtaining reliable information here that I had hoped Military Attaché would have been allowed to go to the front; would there be the same objection to his assisting officer going? Obviously the best place would be with the King and Minister of War but this is of course impossible in view of the non-recognition of the King.

Repeated to Constantinople for Commander-in-Chief.

F.O. 371/6524/E. 8501.

No. 228

Lord Granville (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

ATHENS, *July 25, 1921, 6 p.m.*
(Received July 26, 3.30 p.m.)

No. 427 Telegraphic.

Constantinople telegram No. 532*.

I concur entirely in principle with Mr. Rattigan's desideratum of model [*sic*] Turkish Government, institution of which would have to be assisted by preventing Greeks exploiting their victories too much. But however badly Kemal may be beaten, apart from possible Bolshevik aid he will presumably be able to leave any amount of hands to carry on guerrilla warfare. It must, I suppose, take considerable time before the proposed model [*sic*] Government can be in a position to take over and keep order in the territories occupied or to be occupied by Greeks. Greeks must therefore presumably be asked to withdraw only very gradually, as new Turkish Government are ready to take over each district in turn, Greeks already argue, with some, if not complete, justification that the whole of this warfare and their sacrifices are due to our original mandate and to the necessity of enforcing the Treaty of Sèvres. If therefore they consent to withdraw and yet to continue to hold the districts until someone else can take them over they will certainly, and with justice, expect compensation of some sort even if only financial.

Repeated to Constantinople.

D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol XVII, p. 326, No. 316.

* No. 226.

No. 229

Mr. Rattigan (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, *July 26, 1921.*
(Received July 27.)

No. 535.
Telegraphic.

ITALIAN High Commissioner informs me that Minister for Foreign Affairs has approached him with proposal to negotiate settlement between himself and Allied High Commissioners. Minister for Foreign Affairs states that he can guarantee support of 65 per cent. of army in Anatolia and 65 per cent. of National Assembly.

Italian High Commissioner asked for my views on proposal.

He himself, at first sight, was in favour of it, as there was nothing to lose by it, and he thought it might be a means of effecting a settlement.

I replied that it seemed to me that best course was for Central Government to come to a preliminary agreement with Angora.

Italian High Commissioner agreed, but said that Minister for Foreign Affairs had, on this being pointed out, replied that there was nothing to be done with Angora Government. If, however, he could arrive at fair basis of settlement with Allied High Commissioners, he believed he could carry with him the whole of Anatolian population and majority of army and National Assembly.

Italian High Commissioner said that he was going on to consult French High Commissioner, and if latter approved, he would propose that we should submit matter to our Governments.

I observed that it was not quite true to say that we had nothing to lose by adopting proposal, as we should thereby be disclosing our hand without any real guarantee that basis arrived at would be accepted by Anatolia.

Italian High Commissioner agreed, but said that he considered Minister for Foreign Affairs a man of weight and calm judgement. He was therefore inclined to believe his assertion. Anyhow, proposal seemed only possible chance of settlement.

He did not think there was any real danger of settlement being prevented by Bolshevik armed intervention on the side of extremists, as there was no means of transport for Russian troops and supplies.

If I could feel sure that Minister for Foreign Affairs is justified in claiming support of majority of army and National Assembly, I would be strongly in favour of proposal, but I fear he is somewhat optimistic.

There is, of course, risk that proposal may have been inspired by Mustapha Kemal with a view to ascertaining limit to which Allied Governments are prepared to go. But I do not believe this.

I would add that an official of Sublime Porte informed Mr. Matthews yesterday that Kiazim Karabekir had telegraphed to Sultan message of devotion and loyalty. This is significant in view of repeated rumours as to Karabekir's antagonism to extremists.

F.O. 406/47, p. 23 - 24, No. 13.
D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol. XVII, p. 326 - 327, No. 317.

No. 230

Earl Granville (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

ATHENS, *July 26, 1921.*
(Received August 8.)

No. 325.

My Lord,

IT is a curious fact that the Greeks are universally convinced — not, I suppose, the Government, but the man in the street — that they enjoy the full sympathy and moral support at least of Great Britain, and I think most of them believe that His Majesty's Government are actually helping them — I do not know how. Individual acquaintances frequently express to me their gratitude for England's attitude, which I find somewhat embarrassing, and my deprecating murmurs that we are doing nothing are simply brushed aside.

In the very early hours of the morning after the receipt of the news, first of the fall of Kutahia and then of that of Eskishehr, large crowds came to His Majesty's Legation (I was, perhaps fortunately, sleeping, out of Athens) and cheered vociferously for England, the King and the Prime Minister, and sang "God save the King". His Majesty's consular officers at Salonica and Volo report similar demonstrations at the consulate - general and vice - consulate.

Ever since the first good news came in the streets are full of flags, among which the Union Jack is almost as prominent as the Greek flag; there are a considerable number of Roumanian flags, and, at the most, three or four French ones.

The papers make constant statements regarding the extremely friendly and helpful attitude of the British High Commission and military and naval authorities at Constantinople.

It seems hardly conceivable, but I think that the possibility should be reckoned with of an attempted *coup de main* to size Constantinople. The Greeks are very impulsive, and very prone to believe what they wish to believe. They are already suffering from "swollen head" owing to their successes against Kemal, and they are really almost capable of believing that Great Britain would be glad — or at least not averse — to see them in possession of Constantinople. Hardly a paper appears without some reference to Constantinople as the next and final objective, and the offer which the Greek Chargé d'Affaires was instructed to make to your Lordship (see my telegram No. 397 of the 11th instant) of a Greek division in Thrace, to be placed under the orders of General Harington, may possibly be an indication that the Government themselves are not strangers to such an idea. The "Constantinople division" is common talk in Athens.

I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to his Majesty's Acting High Commissioner at Constantinople.

I have, &c.,

GRANVILLE.

F.O. 406/47, p. 27, No. 15.

No. 231

Earl Granville (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

ATHENS, *July 26, 1921.*
(Received August 8.)

No. 326.

My Lord,

IT is impossible to obtain here any really reliable news regarding events in Asia Minor. The General Staff — or, rather, its representatives at Athens — speak apparently quite freely and frankly to the military attaché to His Majesty's Legation, but, if they do, they receive singularly little detailed information from the front; the French Military Mission, from which we could in M. Veniselos's time often obtain details and corrections of the information given by the Greeks, are now worse than useless for that purpose, as the present Greek authorities thoroughly distrust them owing to France's pro - Kemalist policy and tell them nothing, and the natural result is that General Gramat always takes the blackest possible view of Greek operations and prospects; members of the Government, such as the Minister for Foreign Affairs, tell one that the Greek victories are complete and overwhelming, but that they have received no details whatever.

It appears to be certain that the Greek advance has been uniformly successful and has been carried out with quite extraordinary rapidity, but, putting two and two together, it looks as if the Turks had always intended to retire before the Greeks and that only rear-guard actions have been fought to protect the retirement. There must have been time by now to have made a pretty accurate estimate at least of the numbers of prisoners, guns &c., captured, and the fact that no such estimate has been officially published — except a reference to forty guns, which may refer to total captures or only to those captured during the Turkish counter-attack north of Eski-Shehr — seems to indicate plainly that the captures have not been great. I gather, in fine, that the captures of Afium-Karahissar, Kutahia and Eski-Shehr were great moral successes, as they must have had a great effect, in opposite senses, on the *moral* of the Greeks and Turks, but that they were not important military victories. On the other hand, if the Greek official account of the Turkish counter-offensive on Eski-Shehr on the 21st July and its conversion into a rout is true — and I do not think we have the right to doubt it — that would seem to be a great military victory.

The Greek press and Greek public opinion, here in Athens at all events, have accepted these successes without hesitation as forming an absolutely complete victory, which may be regarded as one of the decisive victories of the world and as having already put an end to the Nationalist movement and secured the Greek position in Asia Minor. It is in the Greek nature to exaggerate and always to speak in superlatives, but I think they really are convinced that all this is at least very nearly true. This leads of course to very extravagant articles in the papers. One paper declares, "The Near East is ours; we are there alone, and in future our will alone will count in Eastern affairs. The districts which we have watered with our blood, and which are bound to us by the traditions of centuries, are ours and will remain ours". Another says, "All the nations have bent under the burden of the great war; only the Greek people has kept its moral force intact". Almost all the papers suggest, with varying directness, that the road for the Greek army from Eski-Shehr leads to Constantinople rather than to Angora, and one at least loudly declares the necessity for Greece, in these new circumstances, to include the rich valley of the Meander in her Asiatic annexations. Even the Veniselist papers admit that their great leader was hampered by international complications and was not able to secure for Greece those full rights which she must now, after her glorious victories, claim and vindicate; but they insist with truth on the fact that it was Veniselos who opened the door of Asia Minor for them and to whom the greatest credit is due for all they may achieve.

I enclose a French summary of an article in the "Politeia" of the 21st instant, which is a very good example of the prevailing train of thought.

The Royalist papers are especially concerned to prove that the victories are chiefly, if not entirely, due to King Constantine. They refer to him as the true soldier, sharing the dangers and discomforts of his men at the front (he remained in his villa at Smyrna till after the capture of Kutahia, and then went only as far as Ushak; the papers say that he is now at Kutahia). They argue that the Greek soldier has a superstitious devotion to King Constantine, which leads them to imagine that they see him among them dressed as a subordinate officer or a corporal or even a common soldier, and that it is this which gives them the strength and valour before which no Turk can stand. They maintain that the plan of campaign was prepared no doubt by the General Staff, but received the final touches which made it perfect from the King himself. Finally, they declare that it is only thanks to his insistence on maintaining neutrality during the first three years of the war that Greece is able to play her part to-day.

I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Acting High Commissioner at Constantinople.

I have, &c.,

GRANVILLE.

F.O. 406/47, p. 27-28, No. 16.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 231.

Extract from the "Politeia" of July 21, 1921.

REVUE DE LA PRESSE ATHENIENNE. — LES REVENDICATIONS HELLENIQUES.

EN même temps que les premières nouvelles des victoires helléniques, la presse européenne a commencé à exprimer des craintes sur nos exigences. Ces craintes ne sont pas tout à fait injustifiées. Certainement, nous ne combattons pas pour le Roi de Prusse. Nous avons été laissés, sans aucun appui, à mener à bout une dure lutte, qui est et devait être considérée une continuation de la guerre européenne. La Turquie avait signé un armistice et un traité. Cependant, elle n'a pas déposé les armes, mais elle a continué la guerre. Ce mouvement fut qualifié au début comme une rébellion contre les décisions des Puissances, contre la volonté des vainqueurs. Mais, petit à petit, la politique européenne l'appela un mouvement nationaliste et a fini par le considérer comme une question concernant les Turcs et les Grecs.

Après de longues luttes, nous pourrions invoquer nos droits sur la solidarité Alliée; nous ne l'avons pas fait. D'ailleurs, des malentendus

ayant trait à nos questions intérieures, qui n'ont aucune influence sur notre politique extérieure, ont été considérés comme de justes causes pour des points de vue opposés à ceux que dictait la lutte commune. Nous combattons donc seuls aujourd'hui et cette guerre qui se poursuit, sans la participation mais avec la tolérance des Puissances, est une affaire purement gréco-turque. Par conséquent, le traité aussi sera une affaire purement gréco-turque. Ce qui doit être seulement particulièrement relevé, c'est que nous prenons en considération les grands intérêts mondiaux; non, certes, les intérêts de chaque Puissance, ce qui est impossible, étant donné qu'ils s'opposent les uns aux autres sur de nombreux points, mais les intérêts de tous les peuples, les intérêts de la paix et surtout de la paix en Orient.

Si la guerre en Asie Mineure n'est pas considérée par les Puissances comme une continuation de la guerre européenne, nous la considérons avec raison comme la dernière phase de la lutte d'indépendance commencée il y a 100 ans. Nous ne comprenons pas ce que la presse européenne entend par exigences exagérées. Nos exigences sont depuis un siècle les mêmes. Les pères des Européens d'aujurd'hui les considéraient alors très justes et, s'enthousiasmaient de nos idéaux. Si leurs descendants, aujourd'hui transformés en matérialistes, ne s'enthousiasment plus, ce n'est pas de notre faute. Pour prouver combien ces idéaux sont grands et élevés, il suffit de considérer qu'ils ébranlent un peuple de 10,000,000 et qu'ils concentrent une armée de 300,000 hommes accomplissant des miracles de vaillance, d'endurance et d'impétuosité. Ces idéaux ne seront réalisés que quand le dernier Grec et le moindre pouce de territoire hellénique seront libérés, quand la Grèce comme Etat s'étendra jusqu'à ses frontières nationales.

F.O. 406/47, p. 28-29, No. 16/1.

No. 232

Foreign Office to War Office.

July 26th, 1921.

No. E. 8403/1/44.

Sir,

With reference to your secret letter No. 0152/5875 of the 21st July, relative to the proposed meeting between General Harington and Mustapha Kemal Pasha, I am directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to state that his views regarding a possible further reply to Mustapha Kemal

will be found in the attached telegram to Mr. Rattigan, No. 446 of July 20th.*

I am, &c.,

(Signed) LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

F.O. 371/6473/E. 8403.

No. 233

Extract from the "Daily Telegraph" of July 26, 1921.

TURCO - GREEK WAR.

M. GOUNARIS AND THE KING.

DIPLOMATIC PROBLEMS.

FROM A. BEAUMONT.

SMYRNA, Sunday.

M. Gounaris arrived at Smyrna at five o'clock this morning, and left immediately for Kutahia, to confer with King Constantine. It is well understood that the object of his journey is the important ***diplomatic negotiations*** which are afoot or about to be begun. I have no special information as regards the immediate subject to be discussed, but I know from previous conversations with M. Gounaris that his desire is to direct his policy and that of Greece as rapidly as possible towards a *pacific solution. He told me once, in a very serious discussion I had with him, that the most rapid way to bring about peace was to settle the question of Constantinople.*

It is Constantinople that the real centre of Turkish intrigue exists. It is from there that young Turk officers flocked in thousands to Kemal's army. It is from there he received important aid and contraband of war. As long as Constantinople remains an open question it will be a pretext for Moslem and pro - Turkish agitation. I also knew that as soon as the Greek army had achieved a signal victory, such as the taking of Eskishehr and the occupation of the Baghdad railway line, the Government *contemplated presenting the question of Constantinople to the Allied Powers, and insisting on its permanent settlement.* There was then no intention of pursuing the Kemalists into the far interior of Anatolia, or engaging in an endless warfare with guerilla bands. *The military leaders, on the contrary, seem disposed to continue the pursuit at least as far as Angora, in the hope of further demolishing whatever organised forces Kemal may have and compelling him to come to terms.*

* Bkz. No. 214

Another question to be settled is that of relations with Italy. The Press of both countries has contributed with ardour to maintaining strained relations. Italian papers have treated Greece with supreme contempt, and the papers of Athens replied with almost daily insults to Italy. There was never any reason for this extraordinary antagonism. At least there could be none from the day Italy renounced her claims to Smyrna. Speaking one day with King Constantine, he asked me, "What does Italy want? I cannot understand her attitude". I replied that it was well known that Italy desired a free hand in her zone in Asia Minor, and had her eyes especially on the region of Heraclea, on account of its coal mines. "I know", I said, "that Italy, being without coal herself, longs to have the coal mines of Heraclea, as the nearest to their shores".

King Constantine replied, "By all means let her have them. Greece has not the slightest objection. On the contrary, we are even willing to help her to obtain them. Moreover. If we can be of any help to Italy to maintain her influence in her zone in Asia Minor we would be only too glad to be so".

Italy And Greece.

Another day, speaking with M. Stratos, he pointed out to me that the Greek army, by penetrating further into the interior, was clearing a great part of the zone of influence claimed by Italy. He said "In fact, we are fighting for Italy in that part of the world. We do not intend to occupy any region claimed by Italy for ourselves, and as soon as Italy wishes to come and take it we are willing to cede our place".

It seems, therefore, that if diplomacy set reasonably to work, and if the heated newspaper controversies on both sides were stopped, there would be no difficulty in coming to an understanding between Italy and Greece on the questions of Asia Minor.

General Papoulas has established his headquarters at Eskishehr. He estimates that the Kemalist forces which had been concentrated around Eskishehr amounted to 70,000 men. Although a comparatively small number have been taken prisoners, he believes, nevertheless that more than half of this army is dispered, and that the remainder is completely demoralised. The exact losses cannot be stated, but the Greek army has indications that the Turks lost in killed around Eskishehr about 1,500 men.

The pursuit up the valley of the River Boursac, along the Angora railway line, continues. Only reports of isolated actions and skirmishes of the pursuing army are received. These indicate that the advance towards Angora is being vigorously pushed. An officer just from the front who has seen the

march from the beginning has given me a vivid description of the eagerness of the troops to advance and get into contact with the enemy. An American who was for some time with one division tells me that he watched the Greeks with admiration at the way they attacked. They never hesitated to rush forward. There is no doubt that the Greeks want to fight the Turk. As soon as the enemy's batteries open fire on the advancing columns the Greeks rush headlong to attack, regardless of danger. In this way the column that attacked Ourzak Bokas captured all the Turkish guns.

F.O. 371/6524.

No. 234

British Military Attaché (Athens) to War Office.

Despatched *14 00 27/7/21.*
Received 10 00 28/7/21.

Secret.
Paraphrase.

S. M. 69 cipher 27/7.

No new information of dispositions is contained in *official bulletin of military situation on July 23rd.* It *says that after occupying Afiun Karahissar, Kutahya, Eskishehr and Bilejik, Greek Army effected tactical unity in one front in contrast with now separated enemy.* That Turks have lost ?1/4 of their forces in killed and wounded, deserters and guns is claimed, *but no figures are given except that 21 field guns and heavy guns have been taken by the 12th Division. Bulletin for July 24th* published to-day states 700 Turks who attacked at Chivril July 20th were repulsed and were pursued and a successful Greek raid S. E. of Afiun Karahissar; it says there have been minor movements of Greek troops in an easterly direction east of line Seidighazi Eskishehir, and that 6 more guns and more ammunition and prisoners have been captured; that the *Greek aeroplanes report enemy still retreating eastwards* and on their way are burning parks and depots. In discussing this information with the *General Staff I find they have no check on news of the present dispositions or formations*; but believe cavalry and detachments are now carrying out pursuit of the Turks, and that the main Greek Army is on line Akin - Uchserai - Musalar - Jaghlan - Eskishehir - Ineunu - Bozeuyuk and distributed from right to left S. W. of Seidighazi 13th and 5th Divisions, S of Eskishehir 12 th, 2nd and Ist Divisions, N of Eskishehir 58 (1 group undec) and? part of 9th Division, Ineunu and Bozeuyuk 3rd Division. Bulletin seems to *indicate that the Greek troops here not kept touch with enemy except by*

aeroplane and that eastern part of Angora railway was regained by part of Mustapha Kemal's army at any rate. The King and his staff with Minister for War and Prime Minister are at Kutaya and Greek H. Q. are in Eskishehir.

FO. 371/6524.

No. 235

General Harington (Constantinople) to War Office.

Despatched 23 00 28/7/21.
Received 10 00 29/7/21.

Clear line.
Secret
Paraphrase.

678 cipher 28/7.

There is now, in my opinion little doubt that the *Nationalist Army* is in a bad way and *incapable of much further resistance or offensive.* Intercepted correspondence shows that the H. Q. is still falling back and *they will not stand in Sivri Hissar position. The Constantinople Government is evidently very seriously concerned. Ali Kemal, Chief of gendarmerie came to see me to-day on* gendarmerie matters, and it was obvious that he was inspired to tell me that *they must make terms,* and to ask me the *minimum terms which British Government would accept.* My reply was that I was unable to say as I was not concerned with the matter, but that if he brought me a document stating the *views of the Constantinople Government and asking the views of the British Government I would forward it at once to the acting High Commissioner and to War Office.* He stated Great Britain is the only power they can look to for help, and said he hoped to bring me this document to-morrow. I made it quite clear that information of the kind should be sought from the High Commissioner and not from me; but it is evident that *they are frightened and in a hurry and* will not *wait for Sir Horace Rumbold's return on Sunday. They want to send Salih Pasha,* who was with Izzet at Angora last winter, *to London. He is pro - British and Anti - Nationalist.* In my opinion his visit would be a good thing.

F.O. 371/6524

No. 236

Foreign Office to War Office.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S. W. 1.
July 28th, 1921.

E. 8462/143/44.
Confidential.

Sir:—

I am directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 0152/5840/M. I. 2 of July 15th, relative to the proposed measures for strengthening Allied *neutrality at Constantinople*, and to transmit herewith, for the information of the Army Council, copies of telegrams Nos. 524 and 525 from Constantinople, from which it appears that *General Harington is no longer in favour of their enforcement.*

2. I am to add that in view of the unanimous objection of the British political, militaryand naval authorities at Constantinople *further action is indefinitely postponed.*

I am, &c.,

(Signed) D. G. OSBORNE

F.O. 371/6524/E. 8462.

No. 237

War Office to Foreign Office.

WAR OFFICE, *28th July 1921.*

M. I. 2. (b).
Secret.

The Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and begs to enclose copies of the following documents received from the G. O. C - in - C. Allied Forces at Constantinople:—

(i) A proclamation published by Mustapha Kemal regarding the execution of Mustapha Saghir,

(ii) A dementi by the Agence d'Anatolie denying the authenticity of certain proclamations said to have been published by the Press in Constantinople and Paris.

Major - General Sir William Thwaites trusts that the above will be of interest to Sir Eyre Crowe.

Copies have also been sent to the Under Secretary of State for India.

F.O. 371/6473/E 8696.

ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 237.

Proclamation by Mustafa Kemal published on the 7th April 1921 regarding Mustafa Saghir.

Secret.

MUSTAFA SAGHIR who came to Angora under cover of membership in the "KHILAFET" Committee of India to spy for the English and supply them with information regarding our political and military organisations, was condemned to death by the ISTIKLAL Court and hung at Angora in the squarre known as KARA - OGHLAN TCHARCHE.

Following the execution of SAGHIR, the British Government, seeing that its national prestige was badly hit by the secrets thus divulged, wanted to take advantage of the occasion by spreading the rumour that the Angora Government, in executing an Indian, had committed an act of treason against the Indian Mussulmans and were responsible to the Mussulman Indians for their perfidy. In this way the British wanted to anger our co - religionists of India against the Great National Assembly of Turkey which is working in defence of its independence. The British Secret Service has increased so enormously that a minister has been appointed in London solely to deal with the question of espionage. The Great National Assembly at Angora, having knowledge of these matters, warns the Mussulmans of India by this proclamation, to be cautious and far - sighted.

Among the documents and memories, my dear brethren, written by the spy Mustafa Saghir, and which were given to us by SAGHIR himself, were found orders given him by the Foreign Minister, which proves that this vile man was completely in their hands and had ceased to belong to Islam.

For many years the British Government, who holds us under her sway, has sent 10 Indian children, aged about 5 years, to London every year and these poor children, separated from their country and deprived of national sentiment, are taught ways and means capable of entirely upsetting the sovereignty and independence of a nation. After such an education these children become docile instruments in the hands of England and are ready to execute her commands like a slave and thus become her spies.

From these confessions it appears that MUSTAFA SAGHIR received, at the expense of the British, instruction in these matters and from the age of 25 years, he has been spying for the British.

The tasks accomplished and the repugnant ends aimed at by SAGHIR are so numerous that the Great National Assembly of Angora proposes within the near future to draw them to the attention of the civilised world

truthfully and supported by documentary evidence. England will then have to render an account to the World and to the League of Nations for having employed so vile an intermediary, which is quite incompatible with the prestige of an honourable government.

At a time when Angora Government is occupied in fighting for its existence, this vile creature comes to Anatolia by order of the Foreign Minister in London to learn our military secrets, but the Nation, which will suffer no obstacle to stand in its way, has succeeded in proving that this man is nothing but a spy. The Government of the Great National Assembly has condemned to capital punishment this spy as would have done any other civilised government.

The Government of the Great National Assembly, denies all the rumours spread about regarding the subject of MUSTAFA SAGHIR, and places before the Mussulman population of India an exact account of the matter, recommending the Mussulman population to be always farsighted and cautious.

For the GREAT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF TURKEY.
MUSTAFA KEMAL.
PRESIDENT.

F.O. 371/6473/E. 8696.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 237

DENIAL OF PRESS ARTICLES - ANGORA TELEGRAM.

ANGORA, 4 JUILLET 1921.

"Dementi stop Il nous revient qu'on vient de publier à Constantinople deux Proclamations fausses portant la signature de S. E. Mustafa Kemal Pasha stop Une relative à l'execution de Mustafa Saghir et l'autre disant que le Gouvernement d'Angora s'addresserait à la Société des Nations pour protester contre le réseau d'espionnage Anglais mis à jour par les révélations de Mustafa Saghir et relatant également quelques revendications de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie stop Nous tenons à déclarer formellement que ces proclamations ainsi que celle publiée dans le numero du 16 Juin de Temps de Paris sont inventées à dessin par nos ennemis dans le but de corrompre l'opinion publique et embrouiller les relations extérieures du Gouvernement d'Anatolie stop Nous sommes autorisés à déclarer que S. E. Mustafa Kemal Pasha n'a publié aucune

proclamation dans ce sens et à refuter et démentir catégoriquement ces viles machinations stop..."

AGENCE D'ANATOLIE.

Issued by:— General Staff "Intelligence" British Army in Constantinople. *7th July 1921.*

F.O. 371/6473/E. 8696.

No. 238

Mr Rattigan (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *July 29, 1921, 8 p.m.*
(Received July 30, 12.45 p.m.)

No. 544. Telegraphic.

Minister for Foreign Affairs called on me this afternoon. He...[1] by asking me if Greek success had caused His Majesty's Government to change their policy. I replied that I was not empowered to speak for His Majesty's Government, but I felt sure that their policy was still the same in so far as they desired to arrive at a just settlement with Turkey, an end to the present conflict, and re-establishment of peace.

Minister for Foreign Affairs then asked me whether His Majesty's Government had pronounced on terms submitted in his secret memorandum (see my telegram No. 493). I said I had merely sent these home for your information but it was not for His Majesty's Government to pronounce upon any terms other than those o[f]ficially put forwards by Angora Government. It was out of the question to discuss terms acceptance of which by Angora was not assured. Minister for Foreign Affairs assented.

He then hinted that it would help him greatly if he could be told what were the terms of the Allied Governments.

I replied that he could form a very fair impression from recent conferences and from declarations by Allied statesmen as to the terms which were considered just.

His Excellency said that he would not beat about the bush: he had come out here to ask my advice. What did I think that he should do? He had a certain influence with the reasonable elements at Angora and with some of the army leaders. But if we could not give him basis on which to work what was he to do? Difficulties were very great as Extremists were very powerful

[1] The text is here uncertain.

at Angora and Mustapha Kemal was an exceedingly ambitious man who was afraid that agreement of Allies on any other basis than that of national...[1] positively mean his political eclipse.

I replied that I could only give Minister for Foreign Affairs my personal advice. If I were in his place I would attempt, in the first place, to open the eyes of Kemal as to where the policy of alliance with the Bolsheviks would lead him and his country. He no doubt know that Bolsheviks distrusted him and would discard... [1] for Enver at first opportunity. Mustapha Kemal should be made to see that a just settlement with Allies, instead of meaning his eclipse would open the door to a brilliant future for himself as one of the principal leaders of a reconstructed Turkey.

Once Mustapha Kemal was won over it would not be difficult to establish 'bloc' composed of all reasonable elements in Angora, and relying on support of majority of army, which was tired of war, unite with Central Government to put forward proposals for a just settlement.

His Excellency after some reflection, said that he thought this might be done, but difficulty was that army leaders feared demoralisation resulting from opening of negotiations, and, unless they felt assured that these negotiations would lead to some result, they would be disinclined to run the risk.

I replied that speaking for myself I considered it was merely a question of what moderate Nationalists held to be just basis of settlement. If this basis were really reasonable, I, personally, felt convinced that there was every prospect of speedy settlement with allied Governments. But of course if Nationalists were to maintain their present demands there seemed to me little hope of an agreement.

Minister for Foreign Affairs thanked me very warmly, and said he would at once despatch emissaries to Angora to work on these lines. He mentioned Ismet Pasha's brother as one of the emissaries.

Before leaving His Excellency repeated that all reasonable Turks were convinced that the one hope for future of Turkey lay in a thorough understanding with Great Britain[2].

Repeated to Athens No. 190.

D.B.F.P., Ist series Vol., XVII, p. 334 - 335, No. 324.

[2] In his telegram No. 67 of August 2, Lord Curzon replied: 'Your language approved'.

No. 239

Lord Granville (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

ATHENS, *30th July, 1921, 9.00*
(Received 31 July, 9.30 p.m.)

Telegraphic
No. 433. (R).

Papers publish interview with Colonel Pallis, Commander of General Staff of army Asia Minor. After declaring that present campaign is continuation *of age-long struggle of Hellenism to open Asia Minor to civilisation, and comparing Greek army to that of Alexander the Great,* he said that campaign had progressed in excellent manner both as regards conception and execution; besides heavy lossess to enemy, occupation of line Afiun Karahissar - Eskishehir, real *junction of the two Greek groups,* and formation of single front, while Turkish connections between Angora and Konia are cut; Greek task is not finished and *second phase is beginning.* As regards final result he said that Greece had acquired *right to establish herself in whole country she had occupied, and to be recognised as guardian of freedom of Straits, and this right her army meant to insist on and was strong enough to do so.**

Repeated to Constantinople.

F.O. 371/6524/E. 8758.

No. 240

Report Issued by the British Secret Intelligence Service, Constantinople Branch.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *30. 7. 1921.*

No. 303.

A Bulgarian General and Angora.

Information has been received from a reliable source that *General Markov,* who recently left Constantinople in the company of the Bulgarian Deputy Grosskov, obtained *permission from Mustapha Kemal to visit Angora.* It is believed that his proposed visit to Angora was connected with the discussion of plans for promoting *revolutionary activities in Thrace under the* auspices of the Alexandroff - Protoguerov group. Owing, however, to the critical military situation in Anatolia and Stambolisky's urgent telegram to Grosskov to return, *Markov's mission failed in its object.*

F.O. 371/6473.

* Belgenin aslında satırların altı çizilmiş değil (B. N. Ş.)

No. 241

Extract from the "Daily Telegraph" of July 30, 1921.

GREECE AND CONSTANTINOPLE.

ATHENS, Thursday.

Certain utterances reported to have been made by M. Gounaris to the correspondent of *The Daily Telegraph* at Smyrna, in the course of which the Prime Minister was represented as emphasising the importance of *settling the Constantinople question in the interests of peace, have been reproduced here, and are today the subject of considerable comment in the Press.*

The *Chronika* says: "The maintenance of the Turks in Constantinople was based on the condition that they would accept and carry out the Treaty of Sèvres. In London, however, the Turkey of Constantinople solidarised itself officially with the Turkey of Angora. The Treaty of Sèvres is, consequently, in abeyance, and Greece has a full right to raise the question of Constantinople. Constantinople belongs to us ethnologically, historically, and geographically. It belongs to us because the Turks are incapable of defending it and maintaining order in it. Greece will accordingly, raise the question of Constantinople".

The *Protevousa* repeats and endorses what M. Gounaris is reported to have said: "We shall not make peace with the Turks without the question of Constantinople being settled, because there are not two Turkeys; there is only one — that of Constantinople".

The *Hestia*, the Veniselist organ, says: "It is the Government's duty to insist on the liberated Christian populations no longer being under the Turkish yoke. To that end the Government can adduce the admission of the Turkish populations, the Kurdish insurrection, and the close co-operation of the Circassians at Nicomedia". — *Reuter.*

The statement of M. Gounaris alluded to above appeared in *The Daily Telegraph of July 26.**

F.O. 371/6524.

No. 242

Memorandum by Mr. Osborne on the Near Eastern Situation.

FOREIGN OFFICE, *August 1, 1921.*

[E. *8834/143/44*].

The present position is that the Allies, or at least H. M. G., who have not attempted separate settlements with the Turks, stand on the Treaty of Sèvres as modified by the London proposals.

* Bkz. No. 233

Neither Greeks nor Nationalists accepted this solution. The latter demanded in addition the unconditional return of Smyrna and Thrace and other minor concessions, notably the abrogation of the Tripartite Agreement. The former tacitly refused the London solution of the Smyrna question and now, as the result of a victorious campaign or at least of a preliminary and partial victory over the Nationalists, demand compensation for their sacrifices. It is beginning to appear that this demand for compensation is likely to include Constantinople, an extension of the Smyrna area and perhaps the Pontus.

Turkish stock being at the moment low and Greek stock high, the Turks find it politic to abandon the loud pedal of Angora truculence for the soft pedal of Constantinople amenability and sweet reasonableness. We have seen these changes of tone before, but always the tune remains the same: the National Pact of Angora is practically identical with the declaration of the late Constantinople Assembly. We are therefore being appealed to by the moderates at Constantinople for a statement of the Allied terms which it is hoped to impose on the crumbling authority of Mustapha Kemal; this arrangement is intended to rehabilitate the Constantinople Government, to secure their triumph over Kemal and the extremists and to commit the Allies to a policy of no compensation for Greece for her further sacrifices.

But I think we must avoid falling into this trap for it is by no means certain that we can now disregard the Greek demands and impose the settlement contemplated at Paris (restitution of Smyrna and retention of Thrace by Greece and substitution of a formula for the Tripartite Agreement) on the, temporarily at any rate, triumphant Greeks.

Both Nationalists and Greeks have flouted us and insisted on seeking a solution by arms. Outwardly at all events the Constantinople Government are not responsible for this policy, but now that the Angora method has failed to attain the full Turkish demands we cannot by negotiating with Constantinople as the representative Government of Turkey condone the past arrogance of Angora and neutralize the results of its policy.

The present moment seems therefore hardly suitable for intervention on the part of the allies. The continuance of hostilities may induce the Greeks to reconsider their anticipated demands for compensation.

Would it not be logical to take up the attitude that the Greeks and Nationalists insisted against our wishes on continuing hostilites and that we do not propose to attempt to mediate until the fighting has ceased; that both parties are equally responsible for the resultant delay in the settlement of the Eastern Question which, however, cannot be dependent on the result of the present hostilities, the more so as the Constantinople

Government has not been involved. As soon as one or the other belligerent approaches us with a request for our intervention or mediation we might be prepared to use our good offices in an attempt to terminate hostilities and, that accomplished, to invite Representatives of both Greece and Turkey to a conference with the Allies to discuss a final settlement based on previous Allied proposals. Pending this meeting, however, it would be useless to discuss the ultimate terms of settlement with either party to the present hostilities or with the Government of Constantinople.

A reply on these lines could be addressed equally to Athens, Constantinople and Angora.

D. G. OSBORNE.

D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol. XVII, p. 337 - 338, No. 327.

No.243

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *August 2, 1921, 4 p.m.*
(Received August 3, 9,30 p.m.)

No. 549. Telegraphic.

Minister for Foreign Affairs accompanied by Hamid Bey of Turkish Red Crescent called on me this afternoon. Latter is slippery and dangerous individual who was formerly German agent and is now stated to be French agent.

Former said that Constantinople Government were most anxious that present hostilities in Asia Minor should cease as soon as possible. As I gathered that there was some hope at the back of his mind that His Majesty's Government might take some action calculated to put a stop to the war I replied that while sympathizing with his desire for peace it was not sufficient for Turks to express that desire but to consider what practical steps could be taken to achieve end in view. Was Minister for Foreign Affairs speaking for Angora Government?

Izzet Pasha then asked for some indication of maximum concessions which allies would be prepared to make to Turks. I reminded him of conference in London early this year and of recent discussions in Paris. Neither of these conferences had resulted in anything, but the first would give him an indication of views of allied Governments. Allies had throughout been inspired by desire for peace. They had made advantageous proposals to

Turkish delegation in London but these had at once been rejected by Angora Government whilst more (?recently) still Greeks had refused to entertain proposals for mediation. It seemed to me therefore, that Treaty of Sèvres was at present, basis of relations between allies and Turks.

As language of Minister for Foreign Affairs and his companion was very vague I said that Turks both at Constantinople and at Angora (?should) in first place face situation brought about by recent Greek successes. Constantinople and Angora Governments ought then to agree about their *desiderata*. (?It was) (?no) good making general statements of their desire for peace. Was Angora prepared to make peace on terms which might be called reasonable? Moreover in view of the way in which Bekir Sami had been thrown over by Angora Government allies would probably wish to be convinced beforehand of good-faith of that Government in the event of any future dealings with them. Hitherto national assembly had taken its stand on national pact. I enquired whether my visitors considered this programme was still feasible in view of recent Greek successes. Hamid Bey replied he thought that Angora would certainly stick to that programme. I told him he was not looking facts in the face.

Izzet Pasha then said that he would reflect over our conversation and resume it the day after tomorrow. He seemed very depressed and I hear on all sides that Turks are very down in the mouth.

Your Lordship will perceive that above conversation did not amount to much. It is merely an indication that Constantinople Government are groping about for a policy to meet present situation. I cannot say for certain whether they are acting at the request of Angora or not, but there is no doubt that the two Governments are in close contact. I hear from a good source that a change of Government at Constantinople is expected. It is believed that Mustapha Kemal has informed Izzet that nationalists want peace and that if Izzet becomes Grand Vizier they will fall into line and obey him. Izzet is said to have informed Sultan (?of this) (?but it is) (?necessary) to bear in mind that Izzet would be tempted to pose as the man to save the situation.

Repeated to Athens No. 112.

D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol. XVII, p. 339-340, No. 328.

No. 244

War Office to G. O. C. Cairo and to C. G. S. India.

Despatched:— 11.00 2. 8. 1921.

Paraphrase.
Secret.

89559 cipher M. I. 2.

The following is summary of Turco - Greek operations to 29th July—

1. *Before the commencement of operations Greek Army was grouped into two portions* (a) Brusa Front Third Corps of four divisions (b) Ushak front First Corps 3 Divisions and Cavalry Brigade, Second Corps 4 Divisions.

2. The Turkish Army was grouped in similar manner except that Turks had large force at Kutaya in central position facing gap between Greek Northern and Southern Armies.

It is believed Turks had on battle front sixteen divisions and three Cavalry divisions and in Reserve West of Angora three divisions and one Cavalry division.

Note: Average strength of Greek division is 4,500 rifles as opposed to only 3,000 in Turkish division.

Advantages of central position and interior lines were afforded Turks by the possession of Kutaya and capture of this place was first essential.

3. *Greek plan was to attack Kutaya from North West and South East to roll up from flanks Turkish positions covering Kutaya which faced South and South West.*

4. In order to retain as many Turks as possible in Bilejik area two divisions 3rd and 11th attacked due East from Brusa.

Two divisions 7th and 10th advanced South East from Brusa on Kutaya via Adranos.

Three divisions 2nd, 4th, 12th and Cavalry Brigade moved on Afiun Kara Hissar. 9th Division moved on Gediz to make a demonstration and lead Turks to suppose that main attack would be from this direction.

Remaining divisions (Ist, 5th, 13th) advanced via Altuntash (30 miles North West of Afiun Kara Hissar) on Kutaya from South East.

5. *On 13th July Afium Kara Hissar was captured* and 4th Division was left there. 2nd and 12th Divisions and Cavalry Brigade then swung North and advanced with Ist, 5th and 13th astride Afium Kara Hissar - Kutaya railway while Gediz was captured by 9th Division.

6. 3rd and 11th Divisions reached line Bilejik - Bazarjik on 13th July.

7. Main attack from south had reached point 5 miles North of Altuntash by evening of 15th and in this neighbourhood heavy fighting occurred.

8. 10th Division on 17th July entered Kutaya from North West and Southern attack had captured positions south of town. *Evacuation of Kutaya was apparently part of Turkish plan and captured orders tend to show that they avoided decisive battle here.*

9. *Turks retired to a position about 18 miles East of Eski Shehr and on July 20th the town was occupied* by the Greeks.

10. *Turks appear to have given battle on their new position and in the fighting here on 21st July at least 11 Turkish Divisions took part.* Turks *were however compelled to retire* and now occupy a position from Sivri Hissar (55 miles Ese of Eski Shehr) to Muhalich (30 miles North of Sivri Hissar).

11. *On 23rd Greek main front was 30 miles West of this line and Greek troops were halting to reorganise and rest.*

12. *Latest information indicates that Turks may not stand on Sivri Hissar position and it is already reported that one group of four divisions is East of Sakaria river.*

13. Greeks have repulsed Turkish threats against their Southern communications in Ushak area, where they hold Chivril, and in North where they hold Bilejik and Ineunu (20 miles N. W. of Eski Shehr).

14. *No reliable news as to Turkish losses. Greek casualties reported to be about 10,000.* Greeks claim 10,000 prisoners.

15. Reports show that supply and transport arrangements of Greek Army are functioning satisfactorily.

F.O. 371/6525.

No. 245

G.O.C. Allied Forces, Constantinople, to War Office.
(Repeated Baghdad, India and Egypt).

Despatched 2215 5/8/21.
Received 1000 6/8/21.

Secret.
Paraphrase.
Clear the line.

719 cipher 5/8.
Continuation my 717 5/8.

First of 4 parts.

(1) *When between July 19th and July 21st news of first Turkish withdrawal arrived Angora public morale became low and all except Mustapha Kemal, Fevzi*

and General Staff began to clamour for return of Enver with Bolshevik reinforcements. The refusal of Turks to believe in possibility of Greek effort on such a scale without British assistance only served to accentuate this demand. Nazarov *(sic)* * *Bolshevik representative at Angora seized opportunity to impress Mustapha Kemal that unless Russian treaty was ratified? and Angora fell* (sic) * *it could not have same value in Moscow.* This led *to immediate ratification of treaty.*

Comment. Reference my telegram of July 30th No. 689 ratification seems to have been subsequent to July 18th (Ends).

(2). Also acquainted *July 20th Kiazim - Karabekir was approached by Red Commander in Trans - Caucasia who said that he was prepared to offer Nationalist help of his Army in view of the fact that British were supporting Greeks.*

Part 2.

Kiazim - Karabekir was instructed after discussion by secret session of National Assembly, *to reply as follows: "Nationalist Assembly thanks G.O.C. Red Army Trans - Caucasia. Turkey however does not at present feel herself to be in need of assistance profered.* Should such aid become necessary Turkey will avail herself of valuable aid of G.O.C. Red Army". There is no truth in report of Brussilov's presence in Angora although above reply leaves door open for Russian intervention.

(3) As long as integrity of Nationalist Army can be preserved *Mustapha Kemal has no intention of abandoning "National pact".* On the other hand he has no delusions regarding Bolsheviks and is reported as saying "You have not realized what Bolsheviks are and Bolshevism is. From the day on which Anatolia is entered by Bolsheviks what happiness we had will be sucked away to Moscow and we shall be left a naked people. Look at example of Azerbaijan".

Part 3.

Idea of Bolshevik co-operation will continue to be resisted by Mustapha Kemal's party. (Comments. But see my telegram No. 717 August 5th regarding continuance of Bolshevik? intervention). Nouri Pasha, accompanied by Enver Pasha's brother - in - law Kazim, reached Ineboli from Batum in French steamer "Circassie" on July 28th. French destroyer "Tonqinoisque" convoyed "Circassie" at a distance and maintained wireless communication with "Circassie" off Ineboli and warned her of approach of British destroyers.

(4) Informant now states that Bekir Sami left for Europe with plenary powers to come to agreement with French and that good impression

* Occurs in original

has been made by Franklin Bouillon in Angora. He says that Bulgarian delegate Groskov is a personal friend of ?Stampsisky and has really been sent by Bulgarian? Nationalists and that Bulgarian Government, though refusing official military aid to Turkey, is really a party to organization of Thracian bands to worry Greeks. See my telegram No. 631 July 20th.

Last part.

(5). *About 19/20th July Trebizond was bombarded by Greek cruiser and destroyer "Panther" which were, however, driven off by coastal defence guns* recently brought from Russia. *Sinope was bombarded on July 22nd* but when Greeks proposed to bombard Samsoun Americans intervened. *Above Greek action, combined with atrocities round Gulf of Ismid,* has led to deportation of Greek males into Central Anatolia.

(6) Informant will be questioned regarding routes and supplies between Caucasus and Anatolia but it is not expected he will be able to supply reliable information of this nature. He says that.

(a) 800 tons of military stores reached Samsoun recently from Russia and that other stores are reaching Trebizond,

(b) From *Ardahan, Kars area a force of 15,000 cavalry is being recruited. These are not to be confounded with Bolshevik Troops.*

F.O. 371/6525.

No. 246

General Harington (Constantinople) to War Office.

Despatched 2353 5/8/21.
Received 1000 6/8/21.

Paraphrase.
Clear the line.
Secret.

729 cipher August 5th.

Ist of 2 parts.

I have to-day had an interview with a Major Brown a Canadian who had recently returned from Angora and Black Sea ports. He is a man of 50 and very interesting. *I think he is travelling in American oil.* He left on Sunday for? London and if possible C. I. G. S. or D. H. I. should see him. *He was? much impressed by Mustapha and men of his Government. He is quite sure that Mustapha is the controlling factor. He says loss of territory does not alarm them, and that their intention is to preserve their Army intact until Greeks exhaust themselves.* He says they will be content with nothing less than Anatolia for the Turks

and will not rest without Smyrna. *They do not display much interest in Constantinople.* They want the Government established at Angora and to recognize Sultan as figure head. *Bolshevik aid, he* states emphatically, *they do not want and will only* call for? it as very last resort but will go whole hog if forced to accept it. He is certain that as yet no terms been made with Bolsheviks though *Bolshevik? agents are very active everywhere* with that object in view.

Last part.

Greek bombardment of Black Sea ports he says is lamentable. Gains are of no military advantage and it ensures retaliation by Turks on Greek inhabitants after departure of ships. He was on board American destroyer which bombarded Samsoun. Major Brown talked of our prisoners with Mustapha and gained impression he would release. *All my information now points to fact that Greeks did not get anything like the success they expected or claimed and are in a fix as to what to do next as it is quite evident that the Turks will go back and drag them on.* I shall know to-morrow whether the Greeks have decided to go on to Angora.

F.O. 371/6525.

No. 247

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *August 6, 1921.*
(Received August 15.)

No. 734.
My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, a copy of a note, dated the 16th July, from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Angora Government, and addressed to the foreign representatives at Constantinople.

2. A verbal protest has been made to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the Porte against the entirely false statements made in the concluding sentence of the penultimate paragraph.

I have, &c.,

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

F.O. 406/47, p. 29, No. 17.

Enclosure in No. 247

Minister for Foreign Affairs to Foreign Representatives at Constantinople.

A Son Excellence M. le Haut - Commissaire de France, M. le Haut - Commissaire d'Angleterre, M. le Haut - Commissaire d'Italie, M. le Haut - Commissaire du Japon, M. le Haut - Commissaire des Etats - Unis, M. le Ministre des Pays - Bas; à son Eminence Mgr. Dolci (délégué apostolique), M. le Ministre de Suède, M. le Ministre de Danemark, à Constantinople:

Le complot ourdi par les ennemis du peuple turc en vue de l'anéantir se développe avec une rigueur implacable : d'un côté, l'armée grecque fait le désert dans toutes les régions qu'elle occupe et massacre la population sans distinction d'âge ni de sexe; d'autre part, les sociétés secrètes grecques et, entre autres, la fameuse société dénommée "Pontus", dans le but de constituer sur les rives de la mer Noire un Etat hellénique où une petite minorité grecque dominerait comme à Smyrne la majorité musulmane turque, sont en pleine activité.

Ces sociétés ont provoqué, il y a quelques semaines, des soulèvements armés dans la province de Samsoun afin d'attirer loin du théâtre principal de la guerre le plus de forces turques possible et de faciliter ainsi l'offensive du Roi Constantin. Les bandes, de leur côté, ont copieusement ravitaillé en armes et en munitions les villages grecs, où de nombreux dépôts clandestins avaient été constitués au lendemain de l'armistice de 1918, ravageant le pays et massacrant tous les villageois musulmans qui leur tombent sous les mains.

Si l'on rapproche de ces événements le fait que le "Journal officiel" du Gouvernement grec a publié le Ier juillet dernier, l'ordre de mobilisation de toutes les personnes de la race grecque, y compris les Grecs qui sont citoyens turcs vivant en Anatolie et appartenant aux classes 1920 - 21 incluses, on peut se rendre compte que les sociétés grecques secrètes en provoquant les soulèvements précités ne font qu'obéir aux ordres d'Athènes et attaque par derrière notre armée, que l'armée grecque attaque d'autre part par devant. De plus, les autoriés britanniques de Constantinople dans a prétendue zone neutre qu'ils ont fait déclarer autour de cette ville, arment des bandes grecques et arméniennes avec l'intention de faire massacrer la paisible population musulmane de la capitable.

Devant ces attentats contre sa vie et contre son indépendance, l'exaspération du peuple turc a atteint son paroxysme. Le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie constate le degré de sur - excitation extraordinaire où se trouve le pays, déclare que toute la responsabilité

de représailles qui pourrait être exercé par le peuple turc retomberait entièrement sur les Grecs dont les crimes ont comblé toutes les mesures. A tous ces crimes nous pouvons opposer avec fierté la parfaite discipline dont font constamment preuve nos troupes et l'humanité dont témoigne à toutes occasions notre peuple. Nous ne voulons pour preuve que le témoignage et les déclarations des représentants même de l'Entente et, entre autres, celles des members du comité d'enquête venu dernièrement à Ismid et dont faisait partie le Général anglais Franks, le Colonel italien Vitale et le Capitaine français Lucas.

Angora, le 16 juillet 1921.

Youssouf Kemal.
Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

F.O. 406/47, p. 29 - 30, No. 17/1.

No. 248

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

Constantinople, *August 6, 1921.*
(Received August 15.)

No. 739.
My Lord,

I Returned to Constantinople on the 31st ultimo and was immediately informed that Marshal Izzet Pasha, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, wished to see me the next day.

2. The Marshal came accordingly, accompanied by Hamid Bey, President of the Ottoman Red Crescent. I have reported in my telegram No. 549 of the Ist instant the substance of what passed at this interview, and I would only propose in the present despatch to amplify that telegram in one or two particulars.

3. In view of the fact that this was the first occasion on which I had received Izzet Pasha in his capacity as Minister for Foreign Affairs, I considered it strange that he should have been accompanied by an unofficial person such as Hamid Bey, whom we have every reason to suspect is a French agent. It is alleged, in fact, that in that capacity he is concerned to prevent as far as possible any rapprochement between the British and Turkish authorities, and all the more, a settlement of the Turkish question partly through the good offices of His Majesty's Government.

4. Both Izzet Pasha and Hamid Bey seemed depressed, though not to the point of making any concrete proposal for mediation. It was obvious

that they were merely throwing out feelers as to whether intervention at this stage be considered by His Majesty's Government. They themselves had no concrete policy to propose, so I confined myself to telling them that the first step would be to bring Angora into line with the Constantinople Government, and above all, to face the facts of the situation and decide what it might be possible to obtain from the Allies and the Greeks. From the fact that Hamid Bey declared that the Nationalist Government still took its stand on the Nationalist pact and that Izzet Pasha said that Constantinople must have more elbow-room *i.e.*, an extension of territory in Thrace, I inferred that the Turks have not yet put any water in their wine.

5. I took the opportunity at this interview to remind Izzet Pasha and Hamid Bey that the attitude of the Angora Government in connection with the Prisoners Agreement had caused great irritation in England and was bad policy on the part of the Nationalists.

6. I saw the Grand Vizier on the 3rd instant, on which occasion his Highness informed me that he meant to get into touch with the Angora Government and ascertain the terms on which they would be willing, on their part, to put an end to the present war. Tewfik Pasha distinctly stated that if, in the opinion of his Government, these terms had a chance of being accepted by the Allied Powers and the Greeks, he would address the three Allied Powers with a formal demand for intervention. He stated that he did not believe in the Bolshevik bogey with which the Nationalists were trying to frighten the Allied Powers. On the other hand, he maintained that the Greeks had not accomplished what they had set out to do *i.e.*, the destruction of the Nationalist army.

7. The Grand Vizier further informed me that the Sultan had shown an interest in my movements and wished to see me. I am to be received in private audience by His Majesty this afternoon.

8. On leaving the Grand Vizier I proceeded to return the visit paid me by Izzet Pasha to whom I reported what had passed between Tewfik Pasha and myself. Izzet Pasha was much more vague in his statements. He said that he had sent Fethi Bey to Angora to sound the Angora Government. He also thought of sending some other person, but I derived the impression that he is really only temporising in the expectation that the Greeks will have shot their bolt in perhaps a month from now, and that the situation will by then have turned to the advantage of the Nationalists.

9. It is evident that the Grand Vizier and Izzet Pasha are recovering from the dismay caused by the initial Greek successes.

10. I impressed on Izzet Pasha that the Nationalists would be well advised to show moderation, and that after the experience the Allied

Governments had had of the Angora Government in connection with the London Conference of March last, they would have to be convinced of the good faith of that Government in any future dealings with it. I said that the Angora Government could give proof of their good intentions by immediately releasing the British prisoners of war still detained by them.

11. Izzet Pasha replied that an all-for-all exchange might be effected, as we were still detaining a certain number of Turks at Malta. I pointed out that several of these Turks were definitely accused of atrocities against the Armenians and ill-treatment of British prisoners of war and would be tried eventually. Izzet Pasha stated that we were detaining one Mustapha Abdul Khalik Bey, whom he described as a "saint", incapable of doing any wrong. I subsequently looked up the record of this alleged "saint", and find that he was Vali of Bitlis in 1914 - 15 and Under - Secretary of State at the Ministry of the Interior. He was a brother - in - law of Talaat and was implicated in massacres.

12. Speaking of the conference in Paris in June Izzet Pasha maintained that the Greeks had been warned by the Allies that they would not be allowed to benefit by any successes they might obtain. I said that this was an incorrect statement. The Greeks had been warned that if they decided that they were not prepared to accept outside advice the Allied Powers would not persevere in an action which would be useless. The responsibility for the consequences of the resumption of hostilities would in that case rest exclusively on the Greeks themselves. Finally, Izzet Pasha apologised for bringing Hamid Bey to see me on the Ist instant, I admitted that I was sorry that he done so.

13. The Grand Vizier and Izzet Pasha called on me yesterday afternoon. The fact that Izzet Pasha accompanied the Grand Vizier led me to suppose that the two wished to pursue the conversations which had taken place on the Ist and 3rd instant, but although I tried to lead the conversation in the direction which I believed they wished it to take; they made no reference to the war in Anatolia. This confirmed my belief that, in spite of their statement that they could not sit with folded hands and watch the further progress of the struggle, they are not seriously thinking of an immediate appeal for intervention.

14. It may be that the Sultan has been bringing pressure to bear on his Ministers to take some steps to try and bring the war to an end, and that the Ministers, consider that they have done all that is necessary in holding the language which they have held, first to Mr. Rattigan and then to my self.

I have, &c.,

HORACE RUMBOLD.
High Commissioner.

F.O. 406/47, p. 30 - 31, No. 18.

No. 249

War Office to Foreign Office.

WAR OFFICE, *8th August, 1921.*

M. I. 2. (b). Misc.

The Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and begs to forward herewith, for the information of Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, copies of the undermentioned papers which have been received from Lieutenant J. R. Bowring, M. C., of the Royal Field Artillery, who was recently released from captivity in Anatolia.

I. Answers to Foreign Office questions - 3 copies.

II. Answers to War Office questions - 1 copy.

F.O. 371/6473/E. 9074.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 249

Answers to Foreign Office Questions by J. B. Bowring.

1. *Can you add to or amend the list of British prisoners given in the Agreement?*
   No.

2. *Who are the Turks whom Mustapha Kemal particularly wishes to obtain from Malta?*

The two Turks sent by him to Sèvres to protest against the signing of the Treaty by Damad Ferid Pasha and who were then sent to Malta. Also Ali Isan Pasha and a certain colonel who was his representative in Constantinople and was arrested at the time of the occupation. I think his name is Kassim Bey or something similar but I am not certain.

3. *Can you suggest as to how the release of British prisoners might be secured?*

(a) By threats. We have declared ourselves neutral in the Greco - Turkish war. We could inform the Kemalists, that in the event of our prisoners not being released and a definite peace arrangement not being made, we will assist the Greeks with supplies, information, perhaps with men and at the same time our fleet will take offensive action. The Turks might refuse to listen but I am certain that the moment they saw that preparations were being made to enforce our demands they would give in. They are convinced the British public would allow us to take offensive action. Turkish staff officers have told me that they will disregard our demands until we make a demonstration. They also think that we dare not act against them on account of Indian dissatisfaction with such a course.

(b) By asking Kemal privately what he wants for the prisoners, through a prominent Turk. I should suggest that a wealthy merchant or perhaps Bekir Sami Bey be approached the relatives of the prisoners. In this case they (the relatives) would inform the Turks that the British Government do not intend to allow their prisoners to be exploited but at the same time if only it were known what Kemal wants steps would be taken to force the British Government to meet any reasonable demands.

(c) Captain Campbell was when I left Caesarea in a barracks several miles from the town and was not closely guarded. He was in such a position that in the event of this escape at least twenty - four hours and perhaps four or five days would elapse before his escape was discovered. A clever agent well supplied with money should be able to get in touch with him and help him to escape. They could gallop to a certain point on the coast or make their way with a caravan into Armenia and thence to the coast. This, of course, would depend on circumstances.

Such a procedure is dangerous but is quite likely to be successfull provided the agent employed is a brave and resourceful man. Interpreter Serko of G. H. Q. Constantinople would find such a man.

4. *Was any explanation given to you as to why you were among those selected for release?*

No. I can only presume that I was released because I was the junior officer prisoner. To the Turks I have always tried to appear unimportant, brainless and pro - Turkish.

5. *How are the British prisoners treated as compared with French or any others?*

During the first six months of my captivity we were treated worse than the French largely due to the effects of an anti - British propoganda. Last April it was hoped that an arrangement would be made with the Allies: French and British were then comparatively well treated. Greek prisoners are always badly treated and lucky if they are not massacred after they surrender. The French are at the moment very badly treated.

The Angora Government have issued orders relative to the treatment of prisoners which if applied make life an absolute misery. Some Turkish commandants of P. O. W. camps enforce these regulations: others do not. Some show their political tendencies by ill - treating the prisoners of any particular nationality which they happen to dislike.

6. *Can you throw any light on the situation at Angora? Relations of Mustapha Kemal with extremist party in the Assembly and of both with the Bolsheviks: chances of a Bolshevik supported coup d'état at Angora for the purpose of replacing Kemal by Enver?*

Kemal is perhaps the most honest and sincere man at Angora. He wishes to secure for Anatolia an efficient, just and constitutional government. He is hampered by his subordinates and by the fact that the country is not ready for such a government.

Owing to the abysmal ignorance of the people it is hardly possible to elect deputies. What actually happens is that any prominent man goes to Angora and nominates himself deputy for his particular town or village. The result of this system is that most of the deputies are either wealthy influential men but quite illiterate or they are poor, clever and entirely unscrupulous. Many deputies are absolutely fanatical believers in Pan-Islam and have not a sound idea in their heads.

Until the beginning of this year Kemal was absolute ruler of the country; then he allowed the Assembly to assume great powers. Largely, I think, to take some of the responsibility from his own shoulders in the events of defeat. Lately seeing that Kemal was weakening in his original plans of resisting the Allies to the end a very strong War party was formed under Fevzi Pasha. This party declares that it will fight the Greeks until there is not a man left in Turkey. It demands Smyrna, Cilicia, Adalia, Thrace and Constantinople but it is willing to allow an Allied military control of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus. At the same time this party caused the resignation of Raefet Pasha by refusing to grant money to carry on the war. Raefet Pasha demanded a vote of credit which though not enormous was immediately thrown out by all parties.

I think that Kemal still has enough power to overthrow the War Party should he care to exert it, but the struggle would be great and he seems inclined to let matters take their course and to abide by the decision.

A year ago there was a danger that the country would become Bolshevik but now the Turks have seen that the principles of Bolshevism produce ruin. Moreover, Bolshevism abolishes rank and private property not to mention the nationalization of women; anything more repugnant to a Turkish officer or statesman cannot be imagined. As the peasant who is the Turkish "working man" is entirely ignorant, very docile, easily led and possesses a great gear and respect for the people in power a spread of Bolshevik is most improbable.

The Russians insist that they will have no relations with the Nationalists unless the country is made Bolshevik; this nominally has been carried out.

Members of the Assembly are now called "commissars" etc.. The Caucasus forms a bone of contention and neither party is willing to cede. The question of Batoum is being continually brought up and both sides declare that they will fight for it.

The prestige of Enver is nil: there is a certain amount of respect for him but he is blamed for the result of the war. He knows that he is a marked man and as soon as he appears in public the Armenians will try to murder him. In addition, the whole Turkish nation is pro - Kemal rather than pro - Enver: the latter would have to cope with a large number of bitter enemies. That the Bolsheviks would try to replace Kemal by Fewzi Pasha is much more likely than they would support Enver who is at the moment without power. That they will attempt a coup d'état is probable; that they will succeed is unlikely.

7. *Have you any idea as to the minimum terms of Kemal particularly as regards Thrace? Will he insist on the National pact?*

Kemal would accept the loss of Thrace if he could get Smyrna. I think if that were suggested to him he would accept readily. He is perfectly willing to give enormous concessions to the Allies and wishes for nothing more than that the Allies should sink capital in the country. But, he insists that the Turkish flag must fly over the whole of Anatolia, that the French must evacuate Cilicia, the Italian Adalia and that Constantinople should be nominally Turkish and a free port; that his rule is nominal is quite immaterial to the Turk.

The judicious use of money and promise of loans is the key to the whole situation.

I do not know what is meant by the National pact.

8. *Strength of Nationalist military and financial organisation.*

The Nationalist can mobilise a very large army; their difficulty is to arm it and to keep it supplied.

Every peasant has his rifle and a few hundred rounds of ammunition. Guns, rifles and ammunition now come from Russia. I have seen many convoys of arms, marching towards the railway, between Caesarea and Ulakuslar. The Italians also sell arms and I have seen them between Ak Sher and Adalia.

The transport question is very difficult but they seem to make the existing arrangements work quite well. The Turkish soldier requires very little food and that need not be good.

The whole country is under a government of a rigid military type and very similar to any previous government save that the capital is at Angora. Officers abound and all have seen service. Their methods are not our own but seem to be suitable for the material with which they deal. However, owing to the system of education I cannot conceive how the higher staff officers can compete with complicated military questions. Divisions are usually commanded by lieut - colonels with captains as chief of staff and army corps are commanded by colonels. That these formations are skilfully handled I cannot believe. I have known four divisional commanders: only one appeared to me to be a good soldier.

Lack of supplies has so far hampered the Turkish Army in the field. Thanks to the Russians and Italians that question now seems largely solved. I see no reason why the Nationalist army should not be a good fighting force provided the financial question does not become more acute.

Enormous taxes are levied on the peasants and it is certain that there is far less corruption than under the Sultan: though needless to say it still exists. Nobody will work for the Government unless paid first. Any contractor who is foolish enough to do work before he is paid has great difficulty in getting his money. A bank Manager at Caesarea told me that the financial position was so acute that the whole Nationalist system of government would break down: this I think to be an exaggerated view of the situation. Turkish officers often get their pay several months in arrear and the soldiers are very rarely paid; this indicates inefficiency rather than financial strain.

9. *What do you expect to be the outcome of the present hostilities?*

I expect the that Nationalist army in the field will be heavily defeated: a guerilla war will then ensue with heavy losses on the part of the Greeks. Then the retirement of the latter to an area which they can control effectively and defend by a continuous front. Both sides will be then have realized the futility of the struggle and will come to terms.

10. *Situation of Christians in Anatolia.*

The situation of Christians in Anatolia is desperate. All men of military age between about sixteen and sixty, both Greek and Armenian, are being concentrated at Sivas and Erzerum. Their families are left behind unprotected: these latter will be robbed, killed and outraged. The men will die in large numbers from starvation, disease and neglect, if they are not actually murdered.

11. *Nationalist attitude towards the Sultan and the Constantinople Government.*

The Nationalists leave the Constantinople Government out of consideration. The Constantinople Government is, to them, very small, unimportant and ruled by the Allies. They have sworn to kill Damad Ferid Pasha but nevertheless hope for a definite understanding with Tewfik Pasha. Their idea being that with a Government favourable to them at Constantinople they will have a spy in the enemy lines to say nothing of a medium for obtaining supplies, information, etc. Even now Nationalist officers enter Constantinople without very much difficulty.

The Sultan, the Nationalists are willing to accept as the head of the Church. However, they say that he must govern as a constitutional monarch with very limited powers, that he must change his mode of life, marry legitimately and with a women of equal rank, and be educated for his position.

F.O. 371/6473/E. 9074.

No. 250

G. O. C. in C., Allied Forces, Constantinople, to War Office.
Repeated:— Mesopotamia and India, and Egypt.

Despatched:— 20.35 8. 8. 21.
Received:— 10.00 9. 8. 21.

741 cipher 8/8. First of 3 parts.

Lieut. Chaytor, who left Eskisher August 6th, after conferring with Majors Johnson and Strover report following of his arrival here.

A. *Turkish casualties, including deserters,* for whole of recent operations estimated *at about 13,000,*

B. *Greek casualties 9,500 including about 3,000 sick.*

C. *25 guns and 5,000 prisoners captured by Greeks.*

D. Turkish prisoners rank and file and peasants display loyalty to Sultan whom they consider Mustapha Kemal has slighted. Officers on the contrary are loyal to Mustapha Kemal.

Comments. Colonel Beckwith at Ottoman War office reports ***animosity to present Sultan on account of his*** support to Damad - Ferid's anti - Nationalist policy. However it is not against the constitutional position of the Sultan that this animosity is directed.

E. *Supreme Command has been taken over from Papoulos by the King.* Papoulos *will command group of 1st and 2nd Corps.*

F. 11th Greek Division has left Keupri - Hissar for Give. Orders have been given Greek cavalry brigades to move from Eskisher to Bilejik.

Part 2.

Prince Andrew now commands 3rd Corps which will move towards Geive at once. 9th Division is moving to Afiun Karahissar where General Tricoupis will command 4th and 9th together with force on Mendres and Ushak. 18th Regiment, 1 battalion 49th Regiment and Ist Garrison Regiment now hold Mendres front and 2 battalions 49th Regiment and Railway Guard Regiment hold Ushak.

G. By August 8th there will be 8 days (?group omitted) for the Greek Army between Kara - Keui and Eskisher.

H. *Greeks will advance to Angora early* (Comment. On August 7th Major Johnson wired to effect that the Greek advance would commence within one week but that preliminary moves would commence about August 10th) Endeavours will be made to turn Turkish right by roads converging from Nalli Khan and Muhalich to Bey Bazar.

Last part.

It is believed that advance will be in three columns.

1. 2nd Corps (less 9th Division) Seidighazi - Sivrihissar - Kawu (?un)i - Yaila.

2. Ist Corps along railway, its left will assist 3rd Corps.

3. 3rd Corps and Cavalry Brigade along main Geive - Angora Road. *Greeks wish to avoid Sakharia River* as they have only 2 pontoon sections. *Greek troops will cheerfully advance as far as Angora. But great disappointment will be caused in Greek ranks if capture of Angora does not end matter.*

I. *Theotokis, Minister of War, who is with King at Kutahia is jealous of Papoulos who in a special communique has denied that the operations were being conducted by Athens Staff.* Athens Press have retorted by accusing Sariyanis of selling Greek plans to Turks thus accounting for Turkish Army's escape.

F.O. 371/6525.

No. 251

Mr. Aneurin Williams to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Foreign Office.

CHELSEA, *8th August, 1921.*

Confidential.

Dear Lord Curzon,

I think it would interest you to know that two members of the British Armenia Committee have recently been to Rome for the express purpose

of laying the case of Armenia before the Pope. They were very sympathetically received by Cardinal Gasparri, Secretary of State and they found that he had already made representations to *Mustapha Kemal* - in fact he had telegraphed to Mustapha - who had replied at length giving assurances as to the attitude of the Angora Government towards Eastern Christians. The Vatican had also been in communication with the French Government as to Cilicia, and had got an assurance that the French would not evacuate Cilicia without taking guarantees for the safety of the Christian population, but there was no explanation as to what "guarantees" might mean. The Vatican seemed willing to press this point with the French Government, but felt that the intervention of the British Government would be desirable.

I think it is possible that the Pope may issue a general appeal to the conscience of the Christian world with regard to Armenia: at any rate we know that our Envoys have been most sympathetically received, and that the way is open to us to make any representations to the Vatican on this matter at any future time. I wonder if you think you could help in the way suggested as to Cilicia.

Hoping this may be of some interest to you.

I am, My Lord,

Yours very truly,

(Signed) ANEURIN WILLIAMS.

Excuse my marking this confidential but our envoy wish me to do so.

A. W.

F.O. 371/6557/E. 9407.

No. 252

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, *August 9, 1921,*
(Received August 15.)

No. 742.
My Lord.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Sultan received me in private audience on Saturday, the 6th instant. His Majesty began by enquiring whether I had suffered from the heat during the journey out here. I replied that the heat wave in England had been very prolonged and had apparently extended to France. His Majesty then said that Turkey was so burnt up morally and materially that nobody in this part of the world troubled himself about the temperature.

2. I then delivered to the Sultan a message which the King had authorised me to give him to the effect that His Majesty hoped that the

Sultan would soon reign over a united Turkey at peace with her neighbours. The Sultan expressed great gratification at the King's message and enquired after His Majesty's health, saying that Sovereigns took a natural interest in each other. He also said that he knew that the King and his Ministers had a sympathetic understanding of the Near Eastern question.

3. The Sultan went on to say that those who were responsible for the present distress of Turkey amounted to only 10 per cent of the total population.

4. The Sultan asked why England had not intervened to stop the present hostilities once and for all. I said that I failed to perceive what practical means the Allies had of stopping the war in Asia Minor or of ordering either the Greeks or the Nationalists. The Allies were heartily tired of war and disorder, and desired peace above all things.

5. The Sultan said that he was not a diplomatist, but convinced that the despatch of a couple of warships to Smyrna and of one or two other ships to the Ægean and Black Sea would be sufficient to bring the parties at present in conflict to reason.

6. His Majesty asked how it was that Germany, a nation of 60,000,000, obey the injunctions of the Allies, whilst a small country like Greece appeared able to defy them. I pointed out that Germany was a former enemy and was now disarmed, whereas Greece had fought on our side towards the end of the war and possessed a considerable army.

7. The Sultan then enquired whether he was to infer that the present hostilities were to continue indefinitely. If so, Anatolia would be completely destroyed and the whole country ruined. I said that I did not think that the war would continue indefinitely, but that the moment for intervention did not seem to me to have come. I drew His Majesty's attention to a telegram which had appeared in the press a day or two previously, reporting a statement of Mr. Chamberlains' in the House of Commons to the effect that the Allies were awaiting the proper moment for intervention. The Sultan received this information with considerable satisfaction.

8. He then said that his Government had tried every means of getting into contact with the authorities at Angora and had failed. The Constantinople Government were now as a last resort sending Salih Pasha to France and Italy to get into contact with Kemalist agents in those places. This statement has been confirmed to me from other sources.

9. The Sultan showed me marked friendliness and courtesy throughout the interview. He excused himself for having mentioned the distress of his country to me, and then said that he was a Turk of the old school. I

replied that anything connected with His Majesty's Empire and person was naturally of the greatest interest to myself.

I have, &c.,

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

F.O. 406/47, p. 32, No. 19.

No. 253

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTANTINOPLE, *August 10, 1921, 5 p.m.*
(Received August 10, 10.15, p.m.)

No. 565 Telegraphic.

Your despatch No. 806 of July 28th.

I am concerting with my colleagues for despatch of joint telegram to Angora respecting Christian deportations and massacres on line indicated. I had already taken opportunity of a semi - official Reuter telegram of August 5th from London on this subject, to address a private letter to Grand Vizier drawing attention to lamentable effect on public opinion in England of these deportations and suggesting desirability of conveying a suitable warning to Angora Government.

Grand Vizier has now replied that removal of all men capable of bearing arms was necessitated by Greek bombardment of Black Sea coast town and insurrectionary movement in Pontus. His Highness adds that enquiries are being made of Mustapha Kemal as to some of the allegations made and that he will communicate result to me.

United States High Commissioner on his own initiative has already made strong representations at Angora by telegraph in regard to deportations etc. Mustapha Kemal in his reply denies deportation on any persons except those capable of bearing arms.

Copies of telegrams exchanged between United States High Commissioner and Mustapha Kemal are being sent you by bag to - day.

Repeated to Paris No. 10.

D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol. XVII, p. 348-349, No. 340.

No. 254

Lord Granville (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

ATHENS, *10th August, 1921.*

Telegraphic
No. 447 (R).

Minister of War told press with reference to rumours that Kemal is seeking allied mediation, that it must be distinctly understood that Greek Government *would not "repeated fault made in 1918 when allies concluded armistice with Turkey at Mudros.* We shall demand and obtain such guarantees as shall make it impossible for the enemy to perjure themselves again. We shall also insure liberated people against a return of tyranny".

Repeated to Constantinople.

F.O. 371/6526/E. 9158.

No. 255

Earl Granville (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

ATHENS, *August 10, 1921.*
(Received August 22.)

No. 347.
My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report that the president of the Council of Ministers returned to Athens from Smyrna early on the 7th instant. The same day a Council of Ministers was held at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Afterwards the president addressed some representatives of the press in the following sense:—

The operations in Asia Minor would, he said, be continued until the complete annihilation of the Turkish army. This was the objective of the new operations. If, in order to realise this objective, it should be necessary to go to Angora, the army would advance to that town and even further. "But", he continued, "the occupation of Angora is not the objective of the operations. If the annihilation of the enemy can be accomplished before that, there will perhaps be not need to advance as far as that town".

M. Gounaris is further reported to have expressed his entire confidence in the ultimate success of the Greeks operations, but he could not

foresee when the struggle would be brought to a conclusion. He advised the press to be careful to check the information which they were about to publish as the publication of uncontrolled news might injure national interests in view of the present "very delicate situation".

In connection with the above statement, I have the honour to draw your Lordship's attention to my telegram No. 444 of the 8th instant reporting that M. Gounaris used the words "very critical and delicate" in regard to the present position of Greece. These words were, a member of my staff was told by a press representative present, actually used by the president of the Council, but, in view of their pessimistic tone, it was decided to water them down before publication. It appears to me quite possible and even probable that in using these words M. Gounaris was referring to the diplomatic and financial, rather than to the military situation.

This is, as I had the honour to point out, the first time that I have heard of the president of the Council having admitted anything but optimism and these pessimistic words should be contrasted with the language used by the Minister of War to the military attaché to His Majesty's Legation, reported in my telegram No. 445 of to-day's date. Both statements, however, agree as to the destruction of Mustapha Kemal's army, wherever it may be, being the Greek objective, and the possibility of an advance to Angora or beyond would seem to have been provided for.

Although the press has been full of reports of an advance on Constantinople as being the ultimate goal of Greek aspirations and great disappointment was shown when it was made clear that Great Britain would object to this (see my telegrams Nos. 435 and 440 of the 3rd and 6th instant), it appears to me quite possible that the Greek Government did not really contemplate such a step, but hoped by encouraging such reports to obtain the twofold end of keeping up Greek spirits and *moral* and at the same time of deceiving Kemal as to their real intentions and the direction in which they would eventually advance.

Now, however, that the true position has been made quite clear to the Greek people by the two Reuter telegrams and the statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to in my telegram No. 446 of the 10th instant, the President of the Council is reported to have authorised Mr. Beaumont, correspondent of the "Daily Telegraph", to state that Greece never thought of marching against Constantinople against the wishes of the Allies. In the so-called second Reuter communiqué (my telegram No. 446), which I have ascertained was sent in a telegram from the Greek Legation in London, it is stated that the *démarche* must not be considered as containing any hostile intentions towards Greece. "Patris" (Veniselist), commenting on this, demands that Great Britain shall cease to protect the

Sultan and his Government, and shall permit the Greek army to capture them. England, it says, is intervening between the belligerents to save Greece's enemy. Greece was England's ally during the war whereas Turkey was the enemy of the Powers. England, the article continues forgets all this in order to maintain the solidarity with her Allies. She avows that it is impossible for her to obtain anything favourable for Greece without the consent of France. This shows that it will be necessary for M. Gounaris to conciliate France since otherwise British friendship will not be able to favour Greece.

"Politia" (M. Stratos's organ) refers to be the *démarche* by Great Britain as having been necessary in order to show harmony amongst the Allies. It adds that nothing excludes the discussion of the question of Constantinople by Greece provided she exhibits clearly by diplomatic means her national claims and the necessity for her to occupy Constantinople.

"Chronos" (Government) declares that in acting thus independently of her allies England poses as championing the principle of respect for treaties. She has thus gained a moral victory over her allies which will give her a predominant position and entail the realisation of Greek national aspirations.

In this connection I may mention that, in answer to a question on the subject, the Minister for Foreign Affairs denied to the press representatives that any similar *démarche* had been made by the French Chargé d'Affaires. As your Lordship is already aware, I have informed my French and Italian colleagues of the action which I have taken.

I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople.

I have, &c.,

GRANVILLE.

F.O. 406/47, p. 38-39, No. 26.

No. 256

Note by the Acting Secretary to the British Cabinet.

SUPPLY OF WAR MATERIAL TO THE GREEKS

Secret.

C. P. 3210.

The appended telegram from the Prime Minister is circulated to the Cabinet on the instructions of the Lord Privy Seal. The necessary administrative steps are being taken.

(Sgd). T. JONES.
Acting Secretary, Cabinet.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S. W.,
11th August, 1921.

TELEGRAM

Decypher Lord Hardinge (Paris) 10th August, 1921.

D. 9.30 p.m. *10th August, 1921.*
R. 9.25 a.m. *11th August, 1921.*

No. 589.

Following from Prime Minister for Mr. A. Chamberlain.

Begins.

Following resolution was taken by Supreme Council this morning in regard to suply of war material to Greeks: it was agreed to continue an attitude of strict neutrality in war between the Turks and Greeks, that is to say, the Governments agree not to intervene in the struggle with assistance of any kind, whether in form of troops, arms or credit, it being understood that above suggestion in no way infringes rights of private firms to freedom of trade.

Ends.

Please take all administrative steps required to remove existing embargo on supply of war material to Greeks by private firms and arrange that leading armament firms may be informed of this.

Ends.

F.O. 371/6526.

No. 257

*Lord Granville (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of **Kedleston.***

ATHENS, *12th August, 1921.*
(Received August 13th, 12 noon).

Decypher.
No. 451.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Minister of War admitted some savagery on field of battle and hinted at killing of prisoners but he assured me that everywhere in occupied territory conditions were absolutely quiet and normal: there was no persecution of Turks or hostility between Turkish and Greek inhabitants and Turks declared their hatred of Kemal.

He thought result of enquiries into Ismid and Yalova atrocities were almost ready for publication.

Repeated to Constantinople.

F.O. 371/6526/E. 9240.

No. 258

General Harington (Constantinople) to War Office.

Desp. 2230 12. 8. 21.
Recd. 1000 13. 8. 21.

Paraphrase.
Secret.

783 cipher August 12th.

Have to-day seen General Koutsis who has just returned from visit to the King and Greek front. He confirmed that Greeks will shortly advance to Angora but before doing so have more administrative arrangements to complete. *They think Mustapha Kemal will be forced to disband his army if Angora is captured; why I cannot imagine.*

He tells me Minister of War told him that money was available to keep Greek Army in the field. I gathered that large demands in excess of Smyrna and Thrace will be made by Greeks as, pointing to Smyrna enclave on the map, he said "*Why! would we now be content with that little bit*". *As regards Constantinople,* I did not draw much from him except that

they have always wanted it but there is no danger of a coup. They have no idea of landing troops on Anatolian coast and, unless we help them with material to repair Anatolian railway between Adabazar and Geive, I do not think they will reoccupy Ismid.

Koutsis says Greeks have 80,000 rifles on their front. His general view was dicededly optimistic and, as he has been travelling with King's Staff, this probably reflects their attitude.

F.O. 371/6526.

No. 259

Extract from British Prime Minister's speech of August 16, 1921.

Asia Minor.

I Come now to another very difficult problem, that is the problem of Asia Minor. I would like first to give a short summary of the events which led up to the present position. The basis of the Treaty of Sèvres was that the parts of the Turkish Empire that were Turkish should remain Turkish, those that were Arab should be Arab, those that were Armenian should be Armenian, and those that were Greek should be Greek. I will not deal with the Armenian or the Arab question, because they do not arise at the present moment, but I will refer first to the question of the dispute with Greece. Commissioners were appointed by the Allies to investigate questions of frontiers, questions of population, and, to a certain extent, to go into the history of these countries. The Commissioner appointed by Great Britain was Sir Robert Borden, the Prime Minister of Canada. There could not have been an abler, more impartial, or more judicial Commissioner. He represented the British Empire on the Commission to investigate these three questions. By his report, and the reports of the various experts assisting him, Smyrna and Thrace were assigned to Greece. This was accepted by the Supreme Council. The French experts came to exactly the same conclusion. There was danger of anarchy and its consequences in these various areas. So France occupied Cilicia, with a view largely to protect the Armenian population; the Italians occupied Southern Anatolia, from Adalia up to Scala Nuova, for the same purpose; and the Greeks were invited by the Supreme Council to occupy Smyrna and Thrace. If any part of those territories had been assigned to us for protection it would have cost us scores of millions.

Then came the Treaty of Sèvres, followed by the Nationalist insurrection. The Greeks were anxious to deal with it immediately, but were

held back by the Allies. What has happened since shows that Veniselos was quite justified in the view which he took that he could have disposed of that insurrection without the slightest difficulty, because since then the Nationalists have gathered their forces, and in spite of that the Greeks have not encountered up to the present any serious difficulty. The Allies attempted mediation, but unfortunately the Sultan and his Government have lost control and authority. And when we made certain proposals with a view to compromise, unfortunately both parties refused to accept them. I want to put to the House the dilemma with which the Allies were faced. The Greeks and Turks refused the compromise suggested by the Allies.

There were two alternatives before us. The first was to compel both, because you could not compel the one without compelling the other. Two questions came before us at once. How? Whom? How are you to compel, and whom are you to compel? You might say you would compel the Greeks by threatening to bombard their towns; but what about the Turks? Is there anyone who would have suggested that we should have sent an army up to the mountainous areas of Asia Minor to quell the Turkish insurrection, and to force the Turks to come to terms, to chase them from Eskishehr to Angora, from Angora onward, wherever it might be? It was an utterly impossible proposition. Therefore the first alternative, compulsion, was ruled out. There is only one other alternative, and that is to leave both of them to fight it out. Some say we might have referred the matter to the League of Nations. What would have been the use of that? That would have been an unkindness to the League of Nations. How could they have dealth with it? They had only the means which the Allies could have placed at their disposal, and there was no Allied Power which would have sent an army for the purpose of enforcing a decision. Therefore you had to leave both of them to fight it out.

There is not a single gun, rifle or shell which has been supplied to either side, not one. These battles have been fought without any assistance from us either way. I am sorry to say that not only do I think that that was be only course, but I am afraid is the best course. I will tell the House quite frankly why I think so. One is a reason that applies to the Turks and the other a reason that applies to the Greeks. I will take the Turks first. The Mustapha Kemal Turks undoubtedly had an exaggerated idea of their own prowess. They conquered Asia Minor very easily. They gained some very easy victories in Cilicia, and they had a very exaggerated view of their own prowess and a contemptuous estimate of the Greeks military capacity. Their realisation that they were wrong in both those instances will make them none the worse neighbours for Greeks or Frenchmen or British. The Turk accepts a fact in the end when it is really driven into his mind.

I come now to the Greeks. There are Greek enthusiasts, on the other hand, who I have no doubt, will realise soon that there are limits to what Greek resource and Greek valour and Greek skill can accomplish in the fastnesses of Asia Minor. War has one merit, in that it does in the end teach a respect for facts. I think both these races will be easier to deal with when their own limitations have been brought thoroughly clearly to their minds. That is what is being done. The time for mediation has not arrived; when it does, I have no doubt that the Treaty of Sèvres will have to be reconsidered. You cannot expect a country which has waged a successful war to be satisfied with the same terms as a country which is prepared to forgo its full claim in order to avert the terrors and risks of war. May I say this, as one who has never in the least concealed the fact that at any rate he was not hostile to the Greeks? I sincerely trust that the Greeks will not make the mistake which Bulgaria made in 1913, when after a series of very brilliant victories, which dazzled her people and blinded the vision of some her statesmen, she insisted upon exaggareted terms and put forward extravagant claims which raised for her a host of enemies, antagonised old friends, and ended in her downfall.

As a sincere friend of Greece, I trust that Greek statesmanship will not repeat that error. If it does, I am certain it will end in disaster to Greece. Moderation in victory is not less important than victory itself. I go beyond that. I think moderation in victory is more important to a nation even than victory itself, for there are so many tragedies written across the page of history which have arisen from victory turned to a bad use, a victory immoderately used, and it would have been better for those nations had they never won that victory. I therefore almost entreat Greek statesmanship not to put its claims too high, but to show its quality by displaying a temperance in victory which will win a greater respect for them and for their country, greater renown for their native land as well as for them, and greater security for the country itself, than the most dazzling victory which they could win.

F.O. 406/47, p. 35-36, No. 22.

No. 260

Greek Press Bulletin of August 17, 1921.

ATHENS, *August 17th, 1921.*

Press Bulletin. The Military Government has been established in Asia Minor with the object of ensuring the security of the country and of the ways and

means of communication. The brigandage organised by Kemal has been rampant throughout these regions and it is necessary to restore peace and render justice to all inhabitants without distinction of race or creed. The Military administration will *have jurisdiction over all the occupied parts of Asia Minor* acting in concert with the Civil Administration of the High Commissioner.

The Correspondent of the "*Politia*" telegraphs that from well informed sources it is reported *that the Turks are evacuating Angora*. The war material is being transported by a Decauville railway. It is unknown if the Turks have had time to construct a normal railway line to save their railway stock and automobiles concentrated at Angora.

Excavations at Sicyone have brought to light the foundations and architectural details of a great temple in the Doric style destroyed during the Roman epoch. The temple which is probably that of Artemis the Leonine is of great importance for the typography of Sicyone.

Press Bulletin August 17th.

Although the *statements made by Mr Lloyd George in* the House of Commons on the Greco - Turk conflict are as yet imperfectly known, *all the evening papers comment on that portion which was clearly transmitted in which the British Premier expressed his hope that* Greece would not repeated the mistake committed by Bulgaria in 1913.

The Government organ "Protevoussa" writes that it must be declared here that even after the last great sacrifices we shall not allow ourselves to become intoxicated with victory, and we shall not render difficult by excessive demands the position of those who alone recognise our right to live and breathe under the sun.

Bulgaria pursued an unjust hegemony in the Balkans; *but what is Greece asking today?*

The severance from Turkey of those regions not inhabited by Turks, regions which Turkey by massacres, cruelty, devastations and deportations has shown herself incapable of administering.

The article concludes: "*When the hour comes we shall exact nothing more than belongs to us*; for the present, the war continues and the moment for formulating our demands has not arrived".

The "Chronike", another Government organ, writes - *The advice of Mr. Lloyd George will not cause any uneasiness in Greece. Greece will never ask for more than belongs to her.* Her moderation to the contrary is the reason why today still purely Greek populations find themselves under foreign domination. She will seek *to put an end to the Near Eastern question, but* does

not wish to force subjection upon masses of Turkish populations. "Athenaiki", the Opposition organ, says that Mr Lloyd George's suspicions are born perhaps of negotiations which public opinion ignores.

The comparison with the mad demands made by the Bulgars in 1913 proves that among the British authorities who regard the Greek affairs with more goodwill than all others, there exists still some bias against Greece. Whatever may be the demands presented by the rulers of Greece, their comparison with those presented by Bulgaria in 1913 is not justified either from political or ethnological point of view.

"Hestia" (Venizelist) says; the Bulgarian pretensions of 1913 were truly exaggerated and unjust. But such is not the case with Greece. Greece had accepted the decision of the Powers and asked for nothing further. Her adversaires did not accept the Treaty of Sèvres forced Greece to fresh sacrificcs for a year giving her therefore the right to make new demands which are also not excessive.

"Ethnos" (Venizelist) says - The Greek people find that these recommendations are not justified by facts. Greece has no imperialist aims. Besides which *Lloyd George himself declared on June 8th, 1920, in the House of Commons that Greece is the destined heir of the Ottoman Empire.* Why then these counsels of moderation today?

F.O. 371/6527.

No. 261

Greek Press Bulletin of August 18, 1921.

ATHENS, *August 18th, 1921.*

Correspondents with the Army state that the Greek troops are advancing on a front of 85 kilometres and that progress is developing to the north. From the start the new advance up to to-day has covered 100 kilometres in depth. *The majority of the villages occupied were found deserted, the inhabitants of Sivri-Hissar in particular having followed the Kemalist army.*

Greek aviators are harassing the retreating Turks night and day. There are positive indications *that Kemal was surprised by the rapid resumption of the offensive,* which he did not expect before six weeks. But communications were restored much more quickly than he deemed possible.

Since the new advance the work of reparation of the roads has gone on actively. The railway to Ankioprou is already workable.

Up till now it is difficult to forecast where the Kemalists will decide to accept battle.

The state of health of Mr Rhallis, the former Greek Prime Minister, laves no room for hope.

F.O. 371/6527.

No. 262

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris)

FOREIGN OFFICE, *August 19, 1921.*

No. 2275.
My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 2665 of the 5th August, 1920, and to other correspondence relative to the application of the Arms Traffic Convention, and in particular of article 6 (2) thereof, whereby the importation of arms and ammunition into certain territories, including pre-war Asiatic Turkey, is prohibited, I have to draw your Excellency's attention to the resolution taken by the Allied Governments at Paris on the 10th instant to the effect that the Allied attitude of strict neutrality in the war between Turkey and Greece in no way infringes the rights of private firms to freedom of trade (see your telegram No. 587 of the 10th August).

2. His Majesty's Government have decided that this resolution must be taken to override the agreement between His Majesty's Government and the French, Italian, Japanese and Belgian Governments to apply the terms of the Arms Traffic Convention so far as the importation of arms, &c., into Asia Minor is concerned, and they therefore intend to issue licences for the export to Greece or to the Kemalists of all arms, ammunition and similar goods enumerated in the prohibition export list which was published in the "Board of Trade Journal" of the 31th March last. His Majesty's Government do not, however, intend to grant any licences for the export of poison gas shells to either belligerent.

3. To avoid all possibility of misunderstanding, I shall be glad if you will inform the French Government of the attitude adopted by His Majesty's Government, which appears to be the only possible one if the principle of neutrality is not to be infringed.

4. A similar despatch is being addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome and Brussels, and His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokyo is being similarly instructed by telegraph.

I am, &c.,

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

F.O. 406/47, p. 36-37, No. 24.
D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol. XVII, p. 363-364, No. 356.

No. 263

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir C. Eliot (Tokyo).

FOREIGN OFFICE, *August 19, 1921.*

No. 172.
Telegraphic. R.

MY telegram No. 269 of 1920: Arms Traffic Convention.

Supreme Council decided at Paris on 10th August that attitude of strict neutrality in present hostilities between Greeks and Kemalist Turks should not infringe rights of private firms to freedom of trade with either belligerent. His Majesty's Government regard this decision as overriding provisional application of article 6 (2) of Arms Traffic Convention so far as Asia Minor is concerned, and they therefore intend to issue licences for export to either belligerent of arms and ammunition, &c., except poison-gas shells. Any other attitude would amount to breach of principle of neutrality, since Greeks and not Kemalists would be able to secure arms.

French, Italian and Belgian Governments are being informed of our view. Please inform Japanese Government.

F.O. 406/48, p. 36 No. 23.

No. 264

Foreign Office to Board of Trade.

FOREIGN OFFICE, *August 20, 1921.*

Sir,

WITH reference to the letter from this Department of the 11th August, 1920, and subsequent correspondance relative to the application of the Arms Traffic Convention, and, in particular, of article 6 (2) theroef, whereby

the importation of arms and ammunition into certain territories, including the pre-war Asiatic possessions of Turkey, is prohibited, I am directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to invite the attention of the Board of Trade to the resolution taken by the Allied Governments at Paris on the 10th instant to the effect that the Allied attitude of strict neutrality in the war between Kemalist Turkey and Greece in no way infringes the rights of private firms to freedom of trade.

2. It has been decided that this resolution must be regarded as overriding the agreement between His Majesty's Government and the French Government, the Italian Government, the Japanese Government and Belgian Government to apply the Arms Traffic Convention so far as the importation of arms into Asia Minor is concerned. Any other attitude would in principle amount to an infringement of neutrality, as the Greeks, but not the Kemalist Turks, would be enabled to obtain arms, &c., from private traders in the Allied countries. There is, therefore, no objection to the issue of licences for the export to Greece or to the Kemalist Turks of all articles enumerated in the prohibition export list which was published in the "Board of Trade Journal" of the 31st March last other than poison-gas shells, for the export of which to either belligerent it has been decided to grant no licences (see the Prime Minister's reply to Commander Kenworthy's question in the House of Commons, No. 19 of the 15th August, and Mr. Austen Chamberlain's reply to Commander Kenworthy's question, No. 53 of the 16th August, on this subject).

3. I am to request that the Board of Trade will cause measures to be taken in order to carry this policy into effect.

4. The French, Belgian, Italian and Japanese Governments are being informed of the attitude adopted by His Majesty's Government in this matter and copies of this letter have been sent to the Cabinet Office, Admiralty, War Office, Air Ministry, Treasury, Home Office and Board of Customs.

I am, etc.

E. G. Forbes-Adam.

F.O. 406/47, p. 37, No. 25.

No. 265

Earl Granville (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

ATHENS, *August 22, 1921.*
(Received September 5).

No. 371.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 370 of to-day's date, I have the honour to report that several papers to-day quote an article in the "Daily Telegraph" which apparently described M. Gounaris's moderation as expressed "in private conversation" in terms closely resembling my telegram No. 456 of the 17th instant. They express complete concurrence with M. Gounaris's alleged remarks and declare that Greece has no imperialistic desires of aggrandisement, but will be fully satisfied with the narrowest frontiers which will ensure the liberation of all Greeks from the Turkish yoke. Constantinople, for once, is not mentioned. An interview is also published which M. Theotokis is said to have given to a journalist, and in which he also expressed similar moderate views. At the end of the report of the interview it is stated that M. Theotokis refused to answer any questions with regard to Constantinople.

During the last few days the press has been full of references to the Prime Minister's speech in the House of Commons, and enthusiastic eulogies of the Philhellenic attitude of the "noble Welshmen". One paper observes that Greece is sick of the romantic "Philhellenes", who lose their Philhellenism as soon as Greece is in any difficulty, and that what she wants and delights to see is the type of Philhellens exemplified by Mr. Lloyd George, who recognises her inherited worth and greatness and sees in her a useful and valuable friend and ally. One or two of the Government papers distort the meaning of the Prime Minister's words and used them as the basis for a violent attack on M. Veniselos, who they say, showed his weakness and incapacity by failing to exploit wonderful influence which his friends declared he exercised over the Allies in order to insist on Greece being allowed to crush Kemal a year ago when the task would have been so much easier.

I have, &c.,

GRANVILLE.

F.O. 406/47, p. 47, Np. 33.

No. 266

Said Molla, President of the Friends of England Association, to the British High Commissioner.

Excellence,

Ayant pris la décision de Vous soumettre, à titre privé, à l'avenir, sans avoir la prétention d'en attendre la réponse, mes impressions et reflexions sur les évènements en Turquie, j'ai l'honneur de Vous donner par la présente, quelques renseignements sur les courants du panislamisme et du touranisme dans ce pays.

Le panislamisme a pris ici un caractère politique nuancé d'anglophobie, sous le règne d'Abdul Hamid. Le régime *impérialiste actuel* en Turquie et les personnes qui représentent ce régime ne peuvent jamais abandonner l'idée du panislamisme dont ils se servent comme une force dans leurs mains, tandis que le plus grand succès des gens qui poursuivent cette idée est de pousser par une propagande active contre les Anglais les Mahométans ignorants de certains pays, de mettre ainsi en péril la vie de ces derniers et de créer enfin des sujets d'ennuis à l'Angleterre. Je puis Vous affirmer, cependant, qu'en réalité le panislamisme n'a pas le caractère d'importance qu'on semble lui accorder dans certains milieux. En effet, pour qu'il puisse avoir de la portée, il faudrait qu'il possédât la même force morale et matérielle que les institutions morales, sociales et politiques de l'Angleterre, chose qui est, qui restera peut - être éternellement, dans le domaine des impossibilités absolues. Au reste, en admettant que les Musulmans des différents pays placés sous l'influence de l'Angleterre auraient acquis un jour le degré d'instruction et de force égale à celui des Anglais, leur arrivée même à un tel perfectionnement moral les amènerait à abandonner d'eux - mêmes toute idée de panislamisme et à se livrer à des recherches des profits concrets en rapport avec les nécessités de l'époque, plutôt que de poursuivre des buts religieux, nullement compatibles avec les exigences de la civilisation moderne. Je suis donc convaincu qu'un panislamisme redouté par la Grande - Bretagne ne peut être qu'une utopie irréalisable.

C'est pourquoi les Jeunes - Turcs, voyant que le panislamisme était un moyen insuffisant entre leurs mains pour assouvir leur haine implacable de l'Angleterre, ont créé en Turquie un autre courant en vue d'attaquer les intérêts anglais en Asie. Ce courant fut le Touranisme. Ils se sont approprié de ce nouvel instrument de propagande d'autant plus volontiers qu'ils avaient la certitute qu'il ne ferait du tort qu'aux Anglais, et que même de plus, ils pourraient obtenir, dans leurs entreprises, l'aide et l'appui

des puissances rivales de l'Angleterre. Malheureusement, à cette époque, la politique anglaise se trouvait dans un état de torpeur imperturbable et Kiamil pacha, ancien grand - vézir et ses quelques rares amis, comme mon oncle, l'ancien Cheikh-ul - Islam, Djemaleddin Effendi, mort en Egypte après l'armistice, qui étaient opposés aux courants du panislamisme et du touranisme n'ont malheureusement reçu aucun appui de la part des autorités anglaises, exactement comme les ententistes d'aujourd'hui. Par contre, les Jeunes - Turcs reçoivent tout l'appui de la France et de l'Italie, comme ils recevaient, durant et avant la guerre, celui des Allemands et des Autrichiens, et parfois des Italiens. Il nous est difficile de concevoir l'attitude passive adoptée par les agents anglais en Turquie dans des questions qui paraissent peu importantes au début, mais qui sont lourdes de conséquences.

Ceux qui ont inventé le pantouranisme ont espéré en tirer plus de profit que du panislamisme. Aussi ont - ils commencé par le fortifier. C'est dans ce but qu'ils ont introduit dans le pays le dogme de la france - maçonnerie sous une forme bizarre. Ils y ont même inscrit leur Cheikh-ul - Islam, chef suprême de la religion. Ils ont maintenu en même temps le panislamisme, afin de tirer parti de l'ignorance des musulmans et des anciens hommes d'Etat turcs à mentalité impérialiste.

On voit par là que le panislamisme n'est pas une émanation de sentiments religieux. Bien au contraire, le panislamisme, s'il existe chez les musulmans pieux, garde un caractère moral sans passer sur le terrain politique. L'Uléma Yahia Réchid Effendi, qui remplissait les fonctions de cadi au Caire, du temps de Lord Cromer, en est, un exemple vivant. Celui - ci dans ses mémoires, fait l'éloge de ce savant magistrat musulman.

Pour être partisan du panislamisme, il suffit de nourrir des sentiments anglophobes. A Constantinople, on peut en citer des exemples: l'ancien Sultan Abdul Hamid, *l'heritier du trône actuel Medjid effendi*, certains fils d'Abdul Hamid, Djémil Molla, ancien espion d'Abdul Hamid, celui qui a inculqué pour la première fois à Abdul Hamid l'idée du panislamisme.

Ces personnages ont une telle haine de l'Angleterre que même après la mort d'Abdul Hamid, ils ont continué à poursuivre le panislamisme et malgré que l'Islam réfute toute idée de nationalisme parmi ses adhérents, ils n'ont pas pu s'empêcher d'adopter eux - mêmes le pantouranisme des jeunes-turcs.

Si le Gouvernement Britannique voulait bien jeter un coup d'oeil sur les évènements qui se sont déroulés en Turquie après l'armistice, il verrait que même Damad Férid pacha qui passe pour le moins impérialiste des personnages qui ont cette mentalité, n'a pu résister aux injonctions de ses sentiments. C'est lui qui a envoyé en Anatolie Moustafa Kémal

avec *ordre d'y créer une organisation nationaliste** C'est encore lui qui, après avoir déclaré, avant son départ pour la Conférence à M. Ryan qu'il allait réclamer le mandat anglais pour la Turquie, a élevé, devant la Conférence, des prétentions qui ont démontré ses idées impérialistes et cela en s'appuyant sur l'organisation nationaliste d'Angora. Si plus tard Férid pacha a pris une position hostile à Moustafa Kémal c'est parceque celui - ci lâchant le gouvernement de Constantinople, a voulu agir en toute liberté.

Quant à *Izzet et Tevfik pacha,* ces deux personnages possèdent la même mentalité que Férid. Aussi dès qu'ils virent que celui - ci complètement rompu avec Moustafa Kémal et qu'il n'y avait pas moyen pour eux de faire adopter par le cabinet les vues de ce dernier, ils se retirèrent du cabinet dont ils faisaient partie. Déjà, à ce moment là, ils avaient présenté au Sultan des rapports en faveur du chef nationaliste.

Pour ce qui est *d'Ali Riza pacha* et de *Salih pacha* il n'y a aucun doute qu'ils poursuivent la même politique que les précédents. Durant leur ministère ils n'ont fait que raffermir les kemalistes par tous les moyens.

Tous ces personnages sont donc loin de comprendre la situation réelle de la Turquie. Malheureusement le Sultan a toujours confié le pouvoir entre les mains des gens de cette mentalité.

Conclusion: les rapports qui existent aujourd'hui entre Angora et le gouvernement de Constantinople proviennent de la communauté de vues et d'intérêts entre le panislamisme et le pantouranisme, ce qui *profite* à l'heure actuelle aux puissances rivales de l'Angleterre.

Voilà en substance le caractère des courants panislamiques ou pantouraniques en Turquie. Heureusement que ces idées utopiques n'ont pu réunir autour d'elles qu'un nombre restreint de personnes parmi les Turcs. La presque totalité du peuple répugne à ces idées d'aventures. (Prière instante de lire le mémoire addressé il y huit mois à Sir Rumbold par M. Ryan).

La guerre qui se déroule actuellement en Anatolie ne peut être considérée que comme l'assaut du panislamisme et du pantouranisme pour franchir les frontières de l'Asie. Si les gens d'Angora d'accord avec les dirigeants actuels du gouvernement de Constantinople y réussissent, il faut s'attendre sous peu à des manifestations d'anglophobie dans ce continent. On se trouvera, par exemple, devant des actes de boycottage de marchandises anglaises, ce qui ne manquera pas d'ébranler sérieusement les intérêts anglais dans les nombreux centres commerciaux.

* "Mustafa Kemal'in milliyetçi bir teşkilat kurmak üzere Anadolu'ya yollandığı" cümlesinin altı Foreign Office'de çizilmiş ve karşısına bir soru işareti konmuştur. (B.N.Ş.)

En ce qui concerne la politique que moi et mes amis sommes décidés à pratiquer en Turquie, elle se résume ainsi:

1) Avoir une forme de gouvernement en rapport avec le niveau réel d'éducation et d'instruction du peuple;

2) profiter de toute façon de la civilisation anglaise;

3) anéantir les courants panislamiques et pantouraniques qui ne servent qu'à porter préjudice à notre pays.

Cette politique, nous la trouvons également conforme aux intérêts de l'Angleterre qu'à ceux de la Turquie.

J'aime donc à espérer que Votre Excellence voudra bien prendre en sérieuse considération ce qui précède et y donner la suite qu'elle jugera nécessaire.

de Votre Excellence
le très dévoué
(Signé) SAID MOLLA
Le Président de l'Association des amis des Anglais en Turquie et Ex Sous - Secrétaire d'Etat au Ministère de la Justice.

F.O. 371/6576/E. 9738.

NOTE I

Situation de Constantinople après l'armistice

La ville de Constantinople est devenue un des plus importants foyers d'intrigues du monde.

D'un part les banques qui agissent pour le compte et au nom de l'Italie, d'autre part les fonds accumulés par les unionistes durant les années de guerre et en troisième lieu les concessions de mines promises à certaines personnes ont créé à Constantinople une situation digne d'appeler l'attention. Aussi estimons - nous que les hommes d'état européens doivent se rappeler cette situation de Constantinople, chaque fois qu'ils ont à examiner les affaires d'orient. Si par exemple, l'on venait à présenter des Touranistes et des deunmés de Salonique (juifs convertis à l'islamisme) et de personnes impérialistes qui se sont montrés incapables de réprimer ces courants, les ministres anglais compétents devraient en rechercher les causes, afin de ne pas tomber dans l'erreur.

Les dissidences introduites dans les différents partis anglophiles en Turquie, l'empêchement systématique de l'arrivée au pouvoir de vrais turcs anglophiles, l'interdiction ou l'interruption des journaux turcs ang-

lophiles sont autant de faits dus uniquement à l'influence de trois éléments précités. Il est surprenant que certains financiers anglais de Constantinople tels que sir Adam Block, se soient mêlés dans ces intrigues contre les intérêts anglais. Il est un fait connu de tout le monde que c'est ce même personnage qui a ravitaillé et qui ravitaille encore certains unionistes détenus à Malte, tel que Djahid, le porte - étendard des unionistes, et des plus dangereux pour l'Angleterre et par les moyens en son pouvoir.

Il est à noter que ce parsonnage est un ami plus devoué de Djavid, le fameux ministre des finances des unionistes, et qui est un juif converti à l'islam de Salonique. Sir Adam Block, lui - même, appartient par sa naissance à la race sémitique et cela constitue une raison de plus pour son attachement à Djavid. Par cette même occasion, je me permettrai de vous informer que les unionistes se sont appuyés toujours sur l'appui matériel et moral des juifs convertis en Turquie, qui, à leur tour étaient soutenus par des personnages étrangers appartenant à leur race.

Ces personnages sont: Sir Block (anglais), Monsieur Weyl, Dr - Gl de la Régie des tabacs (français) et Monsieur Salem, avocat et homme d'affaires (italien). La (sic) mal que ces trois personnes ont fait à la cause anglaise en Turquie, en appuyant les efforts des unionistes par l'intermédiaire de Djavid est incommensurable. J'estime donc d'une importance capitale pour la politique anglaise en Turquie que d'éloigner de Constantinople ces trois personnes.

Précédemment, j'ai eu l'honneur de vous exposer qu'en Turquie, pour qu'un parti ou une association politique puisse vivre, il faut qu'il possède l'appui d'un gouvernement étranger. Les partis politiques anglophiles qui s'y formés n'ont reçu aucune aide de la part des autorités anglaises, ils ont été par contre en butte aux différents obstacles créés par les forces contraires que je viens de citer. L'existence de ces partis, malgré maintes difficultés constitue un succès pour eux.

Note II

En dehors des personnages Turcs dont j'ai mentionné les noms dans mon mémoire, je dois en citer une autre catégorie, c'est celle qui représente les subventionnés de la France. Ceux - ci ne possèdent aucun caractère ni principe. Tout ce qu'ils disent, c'est pour tromper les gens. Parmi eux, on peut citer Réchid Bey, ancien Ministre de l'Intérieur et le Prince Sabaheddin bey. Ce sont simplement d'aventuriers qui cherchent fortune dans les fonds que leur fournit la France. La conduite trop équivoque de Réchid Bey, durant sa mission avec Damad - Férid, auprès de la Conférence de Paris et les pourparlers qu'il a eus alors avec les représentants indiens contre l'Angleterre, prouvent suffisamment qu'il est à la solde de la France. Réchid est une créature du palais d'Abdul Hamid. Il est un des partisans

acharnés du panislamisme hamidien. C'est à ce titre qu'il a été, dans le temps, nommé gouverneur de Jérusalem, afin d'y détruire les intérêts chrétiens.

Quant à Sabaheddin Bey, le geste qu'il a fait dernièrement vis-à-vis de Moustafa Kemal en lui adressant de Constantinople une dépêche ouverte, me dispense de tout commentaire sur son caractère.

Il est donc un fait avéré qu'aucun des personnages politiques turcs qui se sont enfuis, avant comme après la Constitution, en France, ne sont pas aptes concevoir la situation réelle de la Turquie et par conséquent de diriger la gouvernement à l'heure présente.

F.O. 371/6576/E. 9738

No. 267

Consul Palmer (Damascus) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

DAMASCUS, *August 23rd, 1921.*

My Lord,

1. I have the honour to report that the Alif Ba of yesterday states that the Sheikh Senousi is at Mardin.

He made a speech in the Mosque there, during which he stated that Sultan Wahideddin was in complete accord with Mustafa Kemal, though obliged to dissemble his feelings.

He added that the Sultan had despatched the speaker to Anatolia to proclaim a Jehad against the Greeks.

2. Mustafa Kemal has ordered all Moslem refugees from Van, Bitlis, Erzeroum, Bayazid and Azerbeijan to return to their original dwelling place.

They are to start within a month under severe penalties.

3. Many Turkish soldiers are reported to be deserting to us at Sinjar.

4. The Angora Government is reported to have sent a circular telegram ordering that the lives and property of Non - Moslems be respected.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) C. E. S. PALMER.
Consul

F.O. 371/6528/E. 10102.

No. 269

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *August 24, 1921.*
(Received August 29).

No. 785.
My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report that I paid the Minister for Foreign Affairs a visit on the 20th instant in order to discuss two important questions with him, and to ascertain his frame of mind with regard to the position in Anatolia.

2. I began by alluding to the resignation of three members of the Turkish Cabinet, which had followed on the resignation of the Minister of Finance. Izzet Pasha stated that no political significance attached to these resignations. The out-going Ministers merely resigned owing to a feeling of solidarity with their colleague. The latter had shown that he had not possessed sufficient knowledge for the exercise of his functions, and the new Minister of Finance was much more conversant with financial problems. Izzet Pasha dismissed these changes in the Cabinet somewhat lightly. The public, however, has taken them seriously. I do not personally believe that they amount to much, as the leading spirits in the Government remain in office.

3. I then said to Izzet Pasha that the post of Finance Minister was an ungrateful one in every country. It was particularly arduous, for instance, in England at the present moment, where the necessity for the dismissal of superfluous officials, and the cutting down of expenditure generally had been recognised as imperative. I said that the Turkish Minister of Finance was confronted with the same problem, and I enquired whether the Turkish Government meant to carry out the recommendations submitted to them by the Provisional Financial Commission.

4. Izzet Pasha replied that the Turkish Government were certainly contemplating measures for reducing the number of their officials. I reminded his Highness that the commission in question had estimated that the Turkish Government could effect a saving of as much as £ T. 300,000 a month by getting rid of superfluous officials, and putting others on the pension list. Izzet Pasha said that he did not think it possible to effect economies under the above heading to the extent anticipated, but economies would be effective. Thus he said that he could reduce the expenditure in his own department by £ T. 6,000 a month.

5. I then pointed out that the Turkish Government must avail themselves of every opportunity of increasing their resources. A lot of time had been wasted in wranling over the return to the 11 per cent. *ad valorem* tariff. A return to the *ad valorem* tariff was indispensable. Izzet Pasha alluded to a suggestion which he has made to the High Commissioners in an official note, and which had also been pressed upon my colleagues and myself by the American High Commissioner, that the *ad valorem* tariff should be increased to 15 per cent. I pointed out the practical reasons which made it impossible to agree to this suggestion. Izzet Pasha then said that the Turkish Government would be quite willing to re-establish the 11 per cent. *ad valorem* tariff if they could be assured of the maintenance of the consumption taxes. I replied that the Allied Powers were quite ready to maintain consumption taxes. The difficulty lay with the Americans. Your Lordship will therefore see that it is of importance to overcome the objections of the Americans to the maintenance of the consumption taxes. I shall shortly have the honour of addressing your Lordship by telegraph in reply to your telegram No. 480 of the 10th August on this subject.

6. I said that the Turkish Government had hitherto been able to carry on owing to the receipt of various windfalls. No more windfalls were to be expected and the Turkish Government would be thrown back on their ordinary sources of revenue, which were quite inadequate to meet their expenditure. The position was therefore a gloomy one, but it had to be faced. Izzet Pasha admitted this, and made a general statement as to the desire of the Turkish Government to improve their financial position.

7. I then spoke to Izzet Pasha about the continued detention of Ottoman Christians on the ground of the theft and pillage of Moslem property in the Yalova and Gemlik districts, &c. Izzet Pasha admitted that it was difficult to obtain evidence against the persons who had been imprisoned. I said that in that case they should be released. His Highness observed that certain Turks had been in prison since the armistice on the charge of excesses against Armenians. No evidence had been obtainable against these Turks. They should also, he thought, be released, as the cases were parallel. As Izzet Pasha appeared to be suggesting something in the nature of a bargain, I replied that I must reflect over his statement. I propose to inform his Highness that I cannot agree to connect the two categories of individuals, and that I must maintain my demand for the release of those Ottoman christians against whom there is no evidence.

8. Finally, I asked Izzet Pasha whether he had any news from Anatolia. He replied in the negative, and it was evident that he was much pre-occupied by the absence of information about the battle for Angora, which is known to have begun. I said that every patriotic Turk, whether

Nationalist or not, must be asking himself what was the best course to pursue in order to extricate Turkey from her difficulties. I asked Izzet Pasha what he thought Mustapha Kemal ought to do in present circumstances. He replied, "Address himself to you", meaning His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.,

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

F.O. 406/47, p. 43-44, No. 30.
D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol. XVII, p. 369 - 371, No. 361.

No. 269

Extract from a Report issued by S. I. S. Constantinople Branch

Very secret *Ref. No. I. C. 3706*
Local security. *24th August 1921.*

PRESİDENCY OF THE GRAND NATİONAL ASSEMBLY, ANGORA,
TO THE PRESİDENT OF "KHALAS-İ-VATAN JEMİETİ".

A. 6847.
H. 9001.

For the last two years we have been fighting with our enemies who are firmly resolved to subject the Ottoman Empire to destruction by placing the Moslem world under their yoke of slavery and by crushing the beloved Fatherland of Turkey under their accursed feet. In this way we have shown once more the bravery and gallantry of the Turkish race.

The rumours spread by certain traitors about the retreat of the National forces, and about the insignificant rebellions that occurred in some villages, are entirely without foundation. Up to now such regrettable incidents have not occurred in Anatolia. The Army, the Commander-in - Chief and his men, are all working with unshaken resolution to defeat the enemy, and they will not grudge their lives in maintaining the National Pact.

Do not attach importance to such rumours, which are spread about with English money. Do not believe them. Do not be persuaded by these

rumours. They are spread by certain traitors bought by enemy money. Such persons will, very soon, receive their punishment.

The units in Anatolia are now equipped and armed better than they were in the past. The morale of our soldiers is excellent. The campaign is being waged at the front with the bravery and the tenacity which are the special characteristics of the Turks. 50,000 enemy prisoners have fallen into our hands, including 680 officers; and great quantities of guns, machine guns and war material have been captured.

Rest assured of the future and await events calmly.

(Signed) MUSTAFA KEMAL

President of the Grand National Assembly.

Dated 17. 8. 21.

"KHALAS-I - VATAN JEMIETI",
No. 247.

To the President of the Constantinople Branch.

Above is a copy of the proclamation issued by H. E. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the President of the Grand National Assembly, in order to be printed in Constantinople and distributed to the population there in a suitable manner. You are requested to take the necessary steps.

(Signed)
Seal of the Society.

Dated 18. 8. 21.

F.O. 371/6474/E. 10328.

No. 270

B. M. A., Athens, to War Office, repeated to G. O. C. Allied Forces, Constantinople.

Desp. 1945 26. 8. 21.
Recd. 1030 27. 8. 21.

Secret

S. M. 81 cipher August 26th.

It is stated by Greek General Staff that east of Sakharia River a battle is in progress and that the Turks apparently intend to stand and fight. Mustapha Kemal is said to have moved his headquarters to Kirshehr 130 kilometres south east of Angora.

On August 19th 1,000 Turks supported by artillery attacked Tonlupunar and after being repulsed renewed the attack on Ausugt 21st in greater strength. Greeks claim the Turks were back both at Tonlupunar and in a similar attack near Azize on August 21st with great losses.

F.O. 371/6527.

No. 271

Lord Granville (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

ATHENS, 27th August, 1921.
(*Received.* 28th August, 1921.)

No. 471. Telegraphic
My telegram No. 445.

Greek paper publishes telegram from London quoting "Daily Telegraph" (?report) stating that *Minister of War invited Military Attaché to meet him at Angora, September 5th.*

This information did not reach "Daily Telegraph" from H. M. Legation, it appears to me very unlikely that Minister of War would have told correspondent. If obviously secret information regarding Greek Military plans or expectations has been repeated to journalist in Foreign Office or War Office, my and Military Attaché's sources of information will naturally be closed to us*.

F.O. 371/6527/E. 9752.

* Bu telgraf üzerine *Daily Telegraph* gazetesi yetkilisi Lord Curzon'a şu mektubu yazıp özür dilemiştir:

Lord Curzon

Till I saw Lord Granville's Telegram no. 471 I was not aware that the *Daily Telegraph* had stated that the Greek Minister for War had invited our Military Attaché to meet him at Angora on Sept. 5th (It had somehow escaped my notice). I at once sent for Professor Gerothwohl and strongly objected to what he had done.

Nearly three weeks ago I had very confidentially told Prof. Gerothwohl that the Greeks seemed very confident of getting to Angora on Sept. 5th and that the Greek Minister for war had so informed our Military Attaché. He asked whether he might use this information. I replied "Certainly not". Accordingly he did not use it at the time but some days ago proceeded to without asking my permission.

I pointed out yesterday to Prof. Gerothwohl that he had committed a serious breach of confidence. He apologised repeatedly and explained in self-defence that he had only used the information so long after I had given it to him that he thought it was quite safe

No. 272

Memorandum By The British Secretary of State for War to The Cabinet

THE TURCO - GREEK OPERATIONS IN ANATOLIA, JULY AND AUGUST, 1921.

I circulate herewith a memorandum by the General Staff on the Turco - Greek operations in Anatolia, July and August, 1921.

L. W. E.

THE WAR OFFICE, *29th August, 1921.*

1. Situation before the commencement of the Greek advance.

The situation on 9th July, 1921, immediately prior to the present operations may be summarized as follows:—

The Greek Army was divided into two main groups, a Northern Group round Brusa and a Southern Group in the Ushak area. The composition of these armies, exclusive of line of communication troops, was as follows:—

Northern Front (Brusa area)	IIIrd Corps:—3rd, 7th, 10th and 11th Divisions (18,000 rifles).	
Southern Front (Ushak area)	Ist Corps:—Cavalry Brigade, Ist, 2nd and 12th Divisions. IInd Corps:—4th, 5th, 9th and 13th Divisions.	33,500 rifles.

The Turkish Nationalist Army was similarly subdivided into two main groups, the principal differences being:—

(a) That the Turks had concentrated a large force in the Kutaya—Eskishehr area, a central position, facing the gap between the Greek Northern and Southern Fronts.

(b) That a part of the Turkish force was in the Ismid — Adabazar area, which had previously been evacuated by the Greeks.

to do so. I told him that he had nothing to do with the matter and that he had no right to divulge information given him in confidence without my permission. He again apologised, pleaded that it was the first time he had ever done so (which is true), promised it would not occur again.

I much regret the incident. It is the first time any journalist has let us down in this way, to my knowledge Prof. Gerothwohl, in particular, is a very careful and intelligent person and the *Daily Telegraph* almost uniformly reliable, I am sure Prof. Gerothwohl will not offend again.

F.O. 371/6527

A. W. A. Leeper

The Turkish Nationalist forces immediately available were believed to be distributed as follows:—

Northern front ... ... (Sea to Eskishehr, exclusive).	Six divisions. One cavalry division. (23,000 rifles).
Southern front ... ... (South of Eskishehr, inclusive).	Ten divisions. Two cavalry divisions. (25,000 rifles).
West of Angora	Three divisions. One cavalry division. (8,000 rifles).

In addition, it was considered that the following divisions might be made available later:—

From Cilicia	Two divisions (5,000 rifles).
From Amasia area (170 miles East of Angora).	Three divisions. Two cavalry divisions. (6,500 rifles and sabres).

Note. — In comparing Greek and Turkish divisions it must be remembered that Greek divisions are considerably stronger, averaging 4,500 rifles, as compared with an average strength of less that 3,000 rifles in a Turkish division.

2. The Greek plan of operations.

The Greek plan of operations is given in Appendix A. It is shown graphically on Map A.

It will be seen from the map that, so long as the Greek Army continued to operate on two fronts (Brusa and Ushak), the central position of the Turkish forces about Kutaya gave the Turks all the advantages of being able to operate on interior lines. *The capture of Kutaya was, therefore, the first main objective of these operations.* As the results of aeroplane reconnaissances had shown that the Turkish positions covering Kutaya were facing south and south - west, the Greeks decided to attack from north - west and south-east so as to roll up these positions from the flanks.

In order to facilitate this operation three preliminary operations were planned: —

(a.) Two divisions of the Greek IIIrd Corps were ordered to attack due east from Brusa, starting three days before the main operation, with a view to retaining as many Turkish divisions as possible in the Bilejik — Seugud — Kovalija area.

(b.) The other two divisions of the Greek IIIrd Corps were ordered to advance south - east on Harmanjik, *en route* for Kutaya, starting three days before the main operation.

(c.) *Three divisions*, with the Greek Cavalry Brigade attached, *were entrusted with the capture of Afium Karahissar.*

3. Narrative of the Main Operations.

The operations in the south commenced on 12th July. Afium Karahissar was captured on the following day, and one division, the 4th, was left to hold the town against attack from the east.

The main operation against Kutaya was immediately commenced with five Greek divisions moving astride the Afium Karahissar — Eskishehr railway.

On 13th July the situation was as follows:—

(a.) The main Greek attack continued its advance along the railway, meeting with little opposition.

(b.) The 9th Greek Division, advancing north - east from Ushak, remained at Gediz.

(c.) The 7th and 10th Greek Divisions from Brusa continued their advance on Kutaya.

(d.) The 3rd and 11th Greek divisions reached the line Bazarjik—Bilejik.

By the evening of 15th July, the Greek main attack had reached the line of the stream at Point 1020, north of Altuntash (see Map A*). In this neighbourhood, the heaviest fighting, so far reported, took place.* The Turks counter - attacked the Greek 5th Division, but were eventually repulsed, and the advance continued.

On the 17th July, the main Greek attack reached Kutaya. The 10th Greek Division, from Brusa, entered the town from the north - west and the 9th Division entered from the south.

The Turks retreated north - east on Eskishehr. Captured Turkish orders tend to show that they avoided a decisive battle and that the retirement was carried out methodically and well. Cavalry were left behind to cover it. The Greeks claim to have captured many prisoners and guns.

The Greeks lost no time in following up their success. Five divisions were directed to follow the line of the railway to Eskishehr, while two other divisions, the 5th and 13th, were moved to the right flank and directed, *via* Seidi Ghazi, on the enemy's line of retreat east of Eskishehr. The Greek 12th Division was ordered to advance between these two columns in order to maintain touch.

By 19th July, the Greek main attack, advancing with remarkable speed, was nearing Eskishehr. It was then learnt that the main Turkish position lay east of the town. Several minor encounters with Turkish rearguards had taken place. On the night of 19th/20th July, the 5th and 13th Greek Divisions were held up south of Seidi Ghazi, but this check appears to have been only temporary.

On 20th July, the Greek main attack occupied Eskishehr, and it appeared probable that the Turks intended to give battle in their position east of the town. The Greek Army was directed on to the line Hamidie — Ak Punar.

On 21st July the Turkish Army attacked the Greeks north, east and south of Eskishehr. The Greeks responded with a decisive counter - attack and the Turkish Army was repulsed all along the line.

At least 11 Turkish divisions took part in this attack and the Turks evidently made a determined attempt to hold up the Greek advance.

On *22nd July* the Greek Army was ordered to the line Kemikli Maden— Kishmet Keui with the Ist Corps to Seidi Ghazi.

The Greeks took up this line, and the Turks occupied the line Sivri— Hissar — Muhalich.

Since this date the Greek troops have remained more or less stationary.

A report dated 29th July states that the front line runs as shown on Map B.

The Greek Headquarters are at Kutaya and the Turkish Headquarters were at Sheikh Ali, 5 miles E.S.E. of Polatli, on 26th July. The Turkish 12th Group is reported to have moved to the Yildiz area on 27th July from the Sivri — Hissar area. This and other information points to the possibility that the Turks will abandon the Sivri — Hissar — Muhalich line. It is reported by the British liaison officer that the Greeks do not intended to resume the offensive before 13th August.

4. Narrative of Subsidiary Operations.

(a.) In the north, a certain amount of indecisive fighting took place in the Yenisehr — Bilejik area. The Greek *11*th Division appears to have been driven back at one period, while the Greek 3rd Division defeated two Turkish Divisions and two Turkish cavalry regiments on another occasion. The Greek 3rd Division has now established itself on the railway at In Eunu, and the 11th Division is in the Bilejik area.

(b.) Int he south the Turkish Xth group was reported to be threatening the Greek southern lines of communication. On 20th July Turks were reported at Serai Keui (*vide* south - west corner of Map A). Captured

Turkish documents indicated that part of this group, which was believed to consist of a Turkish cavalry division and an infantry division, plus irregulars, was in the neighbourhood of Chivril, and that these troops had received orders to attack the Greek communications between Ortakdje (*see* south - west corner of Map A) and Ushak on 21st July. These troops were opposed by portions of the 9th Greek Division and the 18th Independent Regiment. They appear to have driven back the Turks and to have restored the safety of the southern communications. The Greek 4th Division at Afiun Karahissar is in touch with portions of the Xth Turkish group in that area.

5. **The Greek Supply and Transport Situation** has been greatly facilitated by the presence of large quantities of local supplies. The Kutaya bakeries are already turning out 35,000 bread rations daily. The railway workshops at Eskishehr appear to have been left undamaged.

It is understood that the Greeks intend to re - occupy Ismid in order to open up a railway to Eskishehr and thus shorten their lines of communication by basing themselves on Ismid. It is estimated that in view of the damage done to the railway bridges and tunnels between Arifie (junction 6 miles south of Adabazar) and Bilejik, some months must elapse before the line will be in good working order.

In the meantime, they have an auxiliary base at Mudania with a light railway running forward from Brusa as far as Kestel. From this latter place to Bilejik is only 40 miles by a reasonably good road, fit for mechanical transport. The railway from Bilejik to Eskishehr is already reported to be in working order.

The Greeks hope that the line Eskishehr — Alpi Keui and Eskishehr— Kutaya will be working by the 13th August. The estimate regarding the latter is considered optimistic.

The Greek supply arrangements appear to be working satisfactorily and their army is now served by three lines as follows:—

(a.) From Brusa to Kara Keui by road, thence by rail to Eski-shehr. This section of railway is reported to be in good working order.

(b.) From Ushak to Kutaya *viâ* Gedis by road.

(c.) From Ushak to Kutaya *viâ* Altun Tash by rail and road.

6. Moral.

Liaison officers report that the Greek moral is good and that the Greek troops have shown splendid powers of endurance.

The British Military Representative at Greek headquarters reports that the Turkish moral is now low.

7. Casualties.

Reports on this subject are conflicting and it is difficult to arrive at any exact estimate. It is known that the Greek 5th, 7th and 12th Divisions suffered fairly severely.

The French Military Authorities estimate the casualties at 10,000 killed and wounded on each side.

The British liaison officer with the Greeks says that the total Greek casualties are about 6,000.

He estimates the Turkish losses at—

Killed...	2,000
Wounded	6,000
Prisoners	4,000

It is known that the 3rd Caucasus, the 23rd and the 41st Divisions have suffered very heavily.

8. Higher Command.

It is reported that King Constantine has taken over command of the Army from General Papoulas and that he is now at General Headquarters, Kutaya.

He visited Eskishehr on 22nd July.

9. Comments on the situation from reports received up to 5th August, 1921.

(a.) It is still difficult to estimate accurately the present condition of the Nationalist Army, but the following factors must be considered:—

(1.) That the Turks permitted the Greeks to make a long advance over difficult country.

(2.) That although the Turks were content to evacuate Kutaya without forcing a decisive action, their attack east of Eskishehr on 21st July, 1921, shows that they wished to hold up the Greek advance there, and were unable to do so.

(3.) That 11 divisions took part in heavy fighting on 21st July and were defeated all along the line.

From the above it appears obvious that the Turks have suffered a defeat and have been forced back further and faster than they desired. This cannot fail to have had an adverse effect on their moral.

Whether the lull in the operations will give the Nationalist Army time to recover its moral and reorganize remains to be seen.

Recent reports show that the Nationalist Army is still in being and that the Greeks expect heavy fighting when they move forward.

An estimate of the present strength of the Nationalist troops is given in Appendix B.

(b.) The Greek Army, on the other hand, has carried out a difficult operation successfully and has disposed of the counter attacks which the Turks put up to stop it. Its lines supply are sufficiently secure. It may, therefore, be considered that the moral of the Greek Army is high and that after resting and refitting they will be capable of resuming the offensive.

(c.) The courses open to the Turks are —

(1.) To seek a decisive encounter with the Greeks.

(2.) To hold a series of rear guard position and continue their retirement, taking the offensive later.

(3.) To break up the army and pass to guerilla warfare.

(d.) The object of the Greek Army must be to bring the Turks to battle and obtain a decisive decision as early as possible. If they cannot do this they may be faced with a long campaign of guerilla warfare, continuing into the winter, with a possibility of Russian troops arriving against them. *(See* Appendix C.).

5th August, 1921.

ADDENDUM.

10. Narrative of main operations (continued from 3). **2nd Phase, from 29th July to 17th August.**

Between 29th July and 12th August both the Greek and Turk armies were engaged in reorganizing. On the 12th August the main Greek Army was concentrated between Alpi Keui and Ihsanie (27 miles south of Alpi Keui) in readiness for a further advance, which was to be made in accordance with a plan as detailed in Appendix D, to turn the Polatli — Germesh Dagh from the south and then to occupy Angora. This plan is being put into operation, and the advance commenced in the morning of 14th August and reached the line Beylik Akhor — Kaimaz that day. The disposition of the Greek and Turk forces on 12th August, together with the proposed lines of advance of the Greek Army, are shown on Map B attached, which also shows the extent of the Greek advance up to the 15th August. A revised estimate of the Greek forces is given in Appendix E and of the Nationalist forces in Appendix F.

On 17th August the Turkish III. and V. Groups were reported to be falling back on Polatlı, the former astride of the Angora railway. The II. Group is now reported to be about 20 miles south of Polatli.

11. Russian intervention.

In continuation of Appendix C it has been reported that on 20th July the Red Commander in Trans-Caucasia offered the help of the Army to the Nationalists on the grounds that the British were supporting the Greeks. The Turkish Grand National Assembly is reported to have thanked the Red Commander for his offer, but to have stated that, at present, Turkey does not feel herself to be in need of the assistance proffered, of which Turkey would avail herself should such aid become necessary. It is considered that unless they move at once, so as to reach Sivas before snow closes the passes, troops coming overland from the Caucasus will not be able to render effective assistance this year.

12. Comments on the situation from reports received up to 17th August, 1921.

It is reported that part of the Nationalist Government has already moved from Angora to Kaiseriya, and that the remainder is prepared to go there when necessary.

Reports received to date indicate that the Nationalists intend to avoid a decisive battle, and will hold a series of rearguard positions with the intention of wearing down the Greeks. It appears that the Nationalists are prepared to give up a considerable extend of territory if necessary to carry out this plan.

17th August, 1921.

C.P. 3266

F.O. 371/6528

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX A.

PLAN OF GREEK OPERATIONS. (Ist PHASE).

Brusa Front.

1. Commencing on (G — 3) day, the III Corps (Brusa) will advance in two groups. The first group under General Tricoupis will be composed of the 3rd and 11th Divisions (less 1 regiments). The function of this force will be to advance against the Avghan - Kovalija positions with the object of retaining as may Turkish divisions as possible in this area. Under cover of this, the second group of 7th and 10th Divisions will move south from Brusa, *via* Adranos and should reach Harmanjik in time to advance from there on Kutaya on G. day simultaneously with the advance of the I and II Corps from Ushak.

Ushak front.

2. On G. day the 2nd, 4th and 12th Divisions and Cavalry Brigade will commence to operate against Afium Karahissar. The 2nd Division and Cavalry Brigade will advance north - east in order to cut off the retreat to Kutaya. The Cavalry Brigade is charged with demolishing the railway at Kazli Geul Hamman. The 12th Division will advance parallel and south of the railway on the Bal Mahmud position.

The 4th Division will move parallel to the 12th Division and to the south of it in order to cut off retreat towards Konia by an encircling move.

After the capture of Afium (on G+1 day), the line there will be held by one regiment if the Turks have retired North, or by one division (the 4th) if the Turks have retired towards Konia; the rest of the force advancing on Kutaya by the Afium — Kutaya road.

3. The 9th Division (less four battalions holding the Meander and Chivril fronts) will make a demostration against Kutaya along the Gediz road, commencing on G day.

4. The remaining divisions (Ist, 5th and 13th) will advance *via* Altuntash against the Kutaya positions on G. day, being joined by the 2nd and 12th after the capture of Afium (*See* para 2 above).

Appendix B.

Estimate of Nationalist Forces.

1. From reports received to date it is believed that the following Turkish Nationalist formations have been engaged against the Greeks:—

Kodja Illi Group (Geive):—

33rd Cavalry Regiment and Irregulars.
5th (Kandra) Division.
61st Division.
Ist Composite Division.

Ist Group:—

Ist Division.
11th "
3rd Cavalry Division.
4th " "
14th " "

IIIrd Group:—

4th Division.
23rd "

5th (Caucasus) Division.
15th " "

?Vth Group:—

5th Division.
7th Caucasus Division.
3rd " "

XIIth Group:—

7th Division.
8th "
57th "
2nd Cavalry Division.

4th Group (composition uncertain):—

?24th Division.
?41st Division.

Xth Group:—

6th Division (attached).
1 Composite Division.
?1 Cavalry Division.
?Irregulars.

This makes a total of 19 Divisions.
5 Cavalry Divisions.

2. When operations started it was estimated that the Nationalist troops were distributed as follows:—

(a.) On battle front:—

16 Divisions.
3 Cavalry Divisions.

(b.) In reserve West of Angora:—

3 Divisions.
1 Cavalry Divisions

(c.) In addition it was considered that the following Divisions might be available later:—

From Cilicia ... ... 2 Divisions.
From Amasia Area ... ... ?3 Divisions.
2 Cavalry Divisions.

(d). There is no confirmation of the move of any troops from Cilicia or Mesopotamia. The two divisions included in *(c)* above may therefore be omitted.

The total nomber of divisions available is therefore — 22 Divisions.
6 Cavalry Divisions.

Paragraph 1 shows that the following have been engaged — 19 Divisions
5 Cavalry Divisions

The Turks have therefore, the following available, which have not yet been engaged 3 Divisions
1 Cavalry Divisions.

These are probably the Guards, 19th and Samsun Divisions, and the 6th Cavalry Division.

3. The original estimate of the strength of the 22 Turkish Divisions and 6 Cavalry Divisions was 62,500 rifles and sabres, of which 56,000 have been engaged.

Assuming that the Turks have retained 70 per cent. of the troops engaged they should have available—

	39,200	who took part in the fighting.
	6,500	reserves not engaged.
	9,000	reinforcements which were available at Angora.
Total ...	54,700	rifles and sabres.

4. From reports on the Greek Army before the operations it is understood that the Greeks have sufficient men available to bring army up to its original strength, viz., 51,500.

Appendix C.

Comment on the Possibility of Russian Troops Helping The Nationalists.

1. *Troops available.*

The Russian troops near the Eastern Turkish frontier are distributed as following:—

Kutais	33rd Division.
Batum	12th Cavalry Divisions.
Gori	18th Division.
Ardahan	31st Division.
Tiflis	9th Division. 1st Cavalry Division Headquarters, XIth Army (Gekker).

Erivan Area	28th Division
	20th Division.
Kavaklis	18th Cavalry Division.
Nakhichevan Area	42nd Division.

The total number of Russian troops in the Caucasus is 129,400 rifles and sabres.

Note. — The strenght of a Russian Division is about 5,500 rifles and sabres and of a Cavalry Division, 2,000 sabres.

2. According to the report of a speech made by Fevzi Pasha (Nationalist Minister of Defence) on the 27th June, the Russian Force contemplated for use with the Turks was:—

Two Infantry Divisions.

One Cavalry Division.

Several Battalions of Storm Troops.

Aircraft.

Automobiles.

3. The location of the Infantry and Cavalry Divisions which might made available is given in paragraph 1.

In addition there is a possibility of troops being brought by sea from Russia itself.

As regards the "Several battalions of Storm troops", these would probably be raised locally, or special Communist detachments might be sent from the interior. Troops from the IIIrd "International" Army might also be employed for this purpose.

The aircraft might be made available from units in the Crimea, Odessa or the Caucasus. In this area there are about 40 serviceable machines and a number under repair. It is considered that some of the latter might be patched up. The maximum number which the Russians could spare is about 15.

The automobiles might come from detachments of armoured cars, lorries and cars in Trans-Caucasia. It is not considered that the Russians would be able to spare many.

4. *Routes by which Russian Troops could be sent to Anatolia.*

(a.) By sea from Russia or the Caucasus to a port on the North Coast of Anatolia. The ports available are:—

(i). Trebizond.
(ii). Kerasund.
(iii). Samsun.
(iv). Sinope.
(v). Ineboli

These ports have been used by the Turks and Russians for some time. It is for consideration whether the Greeks will be able to prevent the Russians from using all or any of these ports. They should certainly be able to prevent the Russians from going to Ineboli, and the Admiralty consider that they should also be able to prevent Russian troops being landed in any numbers at any of these ports, though they could not prevent an occasional ship reaching one of them. If this is so, the dangers attending the move of troups to one of these ports would not make it worth while for the Russians to attempt it.

Trebizond is the place where the Russians are most likely to land troops. There is deep water close in shore and ship carrying 1,000 troops could go alongside the breakwater east of the town.

All the guns of the old defences have been rendered unserviceable. Efforts have been made to improve the trenches, and mountings have been prepared for two Russian 10 - inch guns.

Routes from Trebizond to the Angora front are—

(i). *Viâ* Erzingan to the main Kars — Angora road.

The distance from Trebizond to Angora by this route is 617 miles. The road is good so it might be assumed that troops going this way would take not less than 41 day's marching and 6 days' halt — say 47 days.

(ii). *Viâ* Shabin Kara - Hissar: the distance is shorter, being 565 miles, which would take not less than 38 day's marching and 5 day's halt — say 43 day's. This route leaves raute (i.) above at Keusse and joins it again at Yusaf Bey Chifluk, 10 miles east of Enderes.

(*b*). Overland from the Caucasus.

An estimate of the required to move troops by overland routes from the Caucasus to Anatolia is given below:—

From.	To.	Route.	Miles.	Time taken to move a division of 3,000 men with guns but without transport animals.
Alexandropol	Sarikamish	Railway, 5 feet	80	2 days, including entraining and detraining.
Sarikamish	Erzerum*	Railway, 2 feet 6 inches.	98	4 days, including entraining and detraining.
Erzerum*	Sivas	Road	230	25 days includes 3 days halt.
Sivas	Angora	" ..	257	28 days, includes 4 days' halt.
Angora	Eskishehr	Railway. 4 feet 8 ½ inches.	157	3 days, includes entraining and detraining.
		Total	822	62 days.

* The railway may be available as far as Mama Khatun, 50 miles west of Erzerum.

Appendix D.

Greek Plan of Operations (2nd Phase).

(1). III *A.C.* *(a.)* 11th Div., less 1 Regt., is to mask the Turkish Koja Illi Group in the vicinity of Keupri Hissar.

(b.) 3rd Div., 16th Regt. (11th Div.), and 1 group Field Arty. (12 guns) is to attack Muhalich and proceed thence *viâ* Beybazar road towards Angora in order to make good this line of communication.

(c.) Another Division of the III A. C. (?7th) plus 1 Group Heavy Artillery (12 — 120 mm. guns) is to entrench and hold the line Karahan-Koltan — Dinek (15 miles N.E. to 7 miles S. W. of Sivri — Hissar).

(d). The remainder of the III A.C., *i.e.*, 10th Division with 8 — 120-mm. guns and 1 Group 105 - mm. guns and 2 Groups F.A., is to cross the Sakaria river at Feth Oghlu Keupri (S.S.W. of Sivri Hissar).

(2). *I A. C.* Ist, 2nd 13th Divs., 1 Group H. A. and 1 Regt. (3 Groups) F. A., will also cross the Sakaria river at Feth Oghlu Keupri.

(3). *II A. C.* 5th, 12th Divs., 2 Groups H. A. will move south of Sakaria river from Seidi Ghazi *viâ* Azizie.

(4). *The Cavalry Brigade* will move with the II A.C.

(5). (I.d) (2),(3) and (4) will attack the Turks at Polatli from the south and then proceed to Angora.

(6). The 4th Div., plus 4 independent regiments and 1 battery H. A., with hold the line Afium Kara Hissar — Ushak — Chevril — Nazilli opposite the Turkish Menderez Group.

(7). Five independent regiments are on the lines of communication west of Eskishehr.

Except for (5), which is supplied from Smyrna — Ushak, the whole army is now supplied from Mudania. (N.N.W. of Brusa) *viâ* Eskishehr.

F.O. 371/6528
C.P. 3266

No. 273

Greek Press Bulletin of September 2, 1921.

ATHENS, *September 2, 1921.*

Military Official situation on August 30 and 31.

Our troops continue to advance fighting beyond Gordium to Boladji, having occupied successively these fortified positions. More to the South our troops have occupied the fortified massif of Yildiz Dag, constructed of strong positions and redoubts, and are advancing to the North.

To the East, after occupation of the strongly organised line of Toumbouroglou where a hand to hand struggle with grenades took place night and day, our troops with incomparable heroism advanced in a Northern direction towards Mount Ardiz.

M. Baltazzi, Minister for Foreign Affairs, had addressed a radio - telegram to Tchitcherin, drawing his attention to the critical situation of the Greeks of Tangarog and Rostov, among whom are some consular agents, and proposing to send a Greek steamer to Tangarog to transport them to Greece.

The health of the King is entirely restored, nevertheless on the advice of his physicians, *his Majesty is leaving Eskishehr for Broussa, to remain there until the conclusion of operations.*

The "Protevoussa" learns from a reliable source that General Ali Riza has arrived in Albania, charged with a special mission by Mustapha

Kemal. An active member of the Kemalist General Staff, Ali Riza was Chief of Staff of the troops which in 1908 entered Constantinople to dethrone Abdul Hamid. He is an officer highly esteemed by his comrades, and the powers invested in him are very extensive, both as regards individuals and programme of action. It would seem that the Turkish and Albanian agents have not been giving all desirable satisfaction. Ali Riza's mission is to enquire into the situation and take measures in accordance.

F.O. 371/6529.

No. 274

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 2, 1921.*
(Received September 12.)

No. 812.
My Lord,

ON the occasion of the Courban - Bairam festival I followed the usual procedure in sending the first dragoman to the palace and also to the Heir Apparent to convey my respects.

2. The Heir Apparent sent me a message in return to say that he would be pleased if I would take tea with him. I had not previously made the acquaintance of His Imperial Highness, though I had heard that his relations with the Sultan were not cordial, and that he was strongly Nationalist in sympathy. I did not feel that I could disregard the Heir Apparent's message and, I therefore asked him to appoint a day for an audience, at the same time causing the Sultan to be informed of the circumstances leading up to the audience, as I wished His Majesty to be cognisant of the matter.

3. I was received by the Heir Apparent on the 31st ultimo at the Dolma Bagtché Palace, a portion of which is assigned to him as a residence. The Prince appears to be a man getting on for 60 years of age, rather stout, of pleasing appearance and extremely well dressed. He might pass for a well - bred Frenchman if he did not wear a fez.

4. After he had made some preliminary remarks regarding his former intimacy with Sir Gerard Lowther, we passed to the discussion of the political situation. The Heir Apparent implied that the Sultan had been badly advised by Damad Ferid Pasha, and as much as said that His Majesty had been foolish in the confidence he had reposed in that personage.

As his reference to the Sultan was somewhat disparaging, I interrupted and led the conversation on to the subject of Mustapha Kemal. The Heir Apparent said that he did not know Mustafa Kemal personally, and that Damad Ferid Pasha had been responsible for sending him to Anatolia. In fact, he attributed the present misfortunes of Turkey largely to the action of Damad Ferid Pasha when he was Grand Vizier.

5. The Heir Apparent said that the British Government and nation did not understand the Turks and their mentality. I replied that it was part of my business to attempt faithfully to report events here and Turkish public opinion to your Lordship. The Heir Apparent then asked why we made no attempt to get into direct touch with the Nationalists. I said that for one thing we had never received any encouragement to do so. The Nationalists had always held us up as their principal enemies; their press was openly hostile to us and they had behaved very badly in the matter of our prisoners of war. I reminded the Heir Apparent that Bekir Sami Bey had been well received in London, and that modifications of the Treaty of Sèvres, advantageous to Turkey, had been agreed to by the Allies at the London Conference in March. These modifications were mainly due to the initiative of the British delegates at the conference. But the Angora Government had apparently summarily rejected them, thereby losing an excellent chance of effecting a satisfactory settlement.

6. The Heir Apparent pointed out that the French had established contact with the Nationalists through M. Franklin - Bouillon, who, he understood, was negotiating some sort of an agreement with them. Why could we not do the same? I said that the French authorities at Constantinople had always denied that M. Franklin - Bouillion had gone to Angora in any official capacity; and that we took the view that our Allies should not negotiate agreements with the Nationalists behind our back.

7. His Imperial Highness admitted that the Nationalists had been foolish in their political conduct, but said that they were only soldiers fighting with their backs to the wall. They were short of arms and ammunition. The Greeks were committing grave excesses, and were conducting the campaign with great ferocity.

8. As it had been suggested to me that the Nationalist movement was in reality being directed from Constantinople, though I do not believe that this is the case, I asked the Heir Apparent whether, in his view, the centre of gravity was at Angora or at Constantinople. He replied without hesitation that it was at Angora, and that the Constantinople Government had no control over the Angora authorities. He then developed at great length the theme that England and Turkey must eventually work together for their mutual advantage.

9. Finally the Heir Apparent alluded to the Armenian massacres, and said that he had personally intervened during the war to prevent excesses. He held letters from the Armenian Patriarch thanking him for his action. This led him to speak disparagingly of the Committee of Union and Progress, which he compared to a young and inexperienced surgeon too anxious to perform an operation on a person of advanced age who was not a proper subject for such an operation.

10. The conversation took place in a room looking across the Bosphorus to Scutari. As we were talking a tender towing two barges full of Greek sailors passed the Palace proceeding towards the Greek battleship. His Highness had back to the window and did not see this tender, otherwise the sight of the Greek sailors might have inspired some additional remarks about the Greeks.

I have, &c.,

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

F.O. 406/47, p. 49-50, No. 35.

No. 275

G. O. C. in C., Allied Forces, Constantinople, to War Office.

Despatched:— *22.50 3. 9. 21.*
Received:— *10.00 4. 9. 21.*

Ist of 3 parts.
910 cipher 3/9.

1. Reference my telegram 899 and paragraph 8 B of my 900, *it is shown from information from secret sources received up to 0500 hours on September 3rd* that *Yussuf Izzet Pasha on September Ist was holding the line covering Heimana with 2nd Group* under his orders as an urgent temporary measure in addition to his own 3rd Group. 2nd Group Headquarters were five miles southeast of Haimana. Early this morning *the front of 3rd Group was still of greatest importance.*

2. Reference paragraph 2 of my 899, wireless station of 4th Group was at 22.00 hours on September Ist at Basrikoui (north of Polatli). *Orders were given 4th Group at 15.00 hours on September 2nd to operate against Greeks who were directed against Chaldagh.*

Comments. Presumably this was to assist 3rd Group by flank attack against Greeks. The 4th Group was instructed that adequate artillery support must be offered.

Part 2.

3. *At 18.00 hours on September 2nd 4th Group were informed by Ismet that a Greek force*, estimated at 1 regiment, had advanced beyond Chaldagh further portion of which Greeks, who were continuing attack, had occupied. 4th Group were asked whether they could resist force (3rd Group) on Chaldagh.

4. With reference to Ist Group's report at 21 hours on September Ist,? given in my telegram 899, *it appears that the Western Army H. Q's. attempts to obtain communication with this group through Der Ekkeui*, 8 miles north east of Heimana, had been unsuccessful and so they had asked for a ?unit to be sent there. At 13. 45 hours on *September 2nd*, it was reported by Ist Group that *Greeks*, under cover of intermittent gun fire, were digging *themselves in on front of 41st Turkish Division*. Two hours previously 300 (*sic*)* Greek Cavalry crossed front of 41st Turkish Division from east to west. Ist Group reported at 00.30 hours on September 3rd no change in dispositions but that front held by the 5th and 7th Divisions 2nd Group had been taken over by it. *On the previous evening a Greek Division had been seen withdrawing.*

Last part.

5. At 02.00 *hours September 3rd, an order to all Group Commanders was issued by Mustapha Kemal* pointing out that regrettable consequences would ensue? from their turning their attention to their fronts only thus rendering general measures of army inoperative. Order added that Army had ordered 23rd Division and 47th Regiment to Yapan Hamman in view of considered *importance of 3rd Group* front.

6. *Comments.* It is considered that seriousness of Turkish situation is indicated by issue of above order personally *by Mustapha Kemal this morning and reinforcement of 3rd by 2nd and 4th Groups.* Turkish centre is obviously standing up with difficulty against continued Greek attacks which may be assumed to be delivered by bulk of Greek Army in view of comparative inactivity on fronts of Ist, 12th and 15th ?Turkish Groups. According to Turkish report of September 2nd, received from secret source, Greek officer prisoners had stated companies in 3rd Division were each only 40 strong.

F.O. 371/6528.

* Occure in original.

No. 276

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

CONSTONTINOPLE, *5th September, 1921, 1.20 p.m.*
(Received 6th September, 3.00 p.m.)

Decypher.
No. 597. Telegraphic

Confidential.

Battle of Sakiaria river has now been in progress for ten or eleven days. It is certain that losses on both sides have been heavy. Turks were at one time in a critical position but skilfully extricated themselves from it.

Although Greek army has got beyond Sakiaria river, it would seem that for the moment Turks have got a breathing space which may enable them to reorganize. Their army is by no means out of action.

Principal result of battle so far appears to be attrition of both forces which, if continued, *should result in mutual exhaustion.*

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 597, repeated to Athens No. 118.

F.O. 371/6528/E. 10089.

No. 277

Greek Press Bulletin of September 5, 1921.

ATHENS, *5th September, 1921.*

Following our previous telegram giving details upon the combined *Turco - Bulgar action we* have now further information to give which appeared in this morning's issue of the "Eleftheros Typos" in a letter from the correspondent at Athens. He says that the plan elaborated at Constantinople by which attacks were to be made particularly against the barracks, bridges, railways, tunnels and "blockhaus" was evidently inspired by the Bulgarians.

The object of these attacks was to compromise the situation in Thrace and create difficulties for the Greek Civil and Military Authorities so as to keep a large force of Greeks out of action in Thrace and Macedonia.

Fouad Bey, an officer of the regular Turkish Army, who submitted this plan to Mustapha Kemal's approval, was entrusted with its execution. He left Angora for Sofia to negotiate with the Bulgarian Government or

with the Macedo - Bulgarian organisations. The plan was to be carried out simultaneously with the Greek offensive in Asia Minor, but was postponed owing to the delay in the negotiations.

This information is, at any rate, confirmed by three recent attacks on railway bridges in Thrace.

F.O. 371/6529.

No. 278

Extract from the "Daily Telegraph" (London), Tuesday, September 6, 1921,

King Constantine.

Interview at Eskishehr.

From A. Beaumont.

Eskishehr, Thursday, *Aug. 25* (*via* Constantinople, *Aug. 30*). *(delayed).*

The Minister for War, M. Theotokis, is expected at Eskishehr on Friday. *The day after my arrival here I was received by King Constantine,* with whom I had a long conversation on the general situation. The King resides in a house which in a civilised country would be called a whitewashed barn. Before I called, his Majesty had received a British officer, Colonel Gorf (?), who had been on an official mission for the League of Nations at Adrianople, and had taken advantage of the occasion to visit the territory occupied by the Greek army. He had been at Smyrna and Brussa, and intended to visit the districts round here. He was received and treated most cordially by the Greek authorities everywhere, and was given every facility. The King seems to have been very pleased with the colonel's call.

The house that has been occupied by his Majesty for the last six weeks belongs to a wealthy Turk of Eskishehr, who has removed with his harem to another of his many flimsy, barrack - like buildings close by. He is the owner of nearly the whole residential quarter round about, and is reputed to be a Turkish millionaire. The situation of the houses, though slightly higher than the centre of the town, is most unhealthy. One of the King's aides - de - camp, Colonel Metaxas, is already in hospital with typhoid fever, and yesterday King Constantine himself broke down and fainted at lunch time, causing great alarm. But afterwards he recovered, and the attack seemed over. He had complained to me of the difficulty of getting proper food, of the heat, which had been great for some time, and of the

insects. He would, by far, have preferred roughing it with his soldiers at the front.

One enters his house by a little postern door in a whitewashed garden wall, and tall men like King Constantine and his brother, Prince Nicholas, have to bend down before entering. Inside there is an apology for a garden, about twenty yards long and ten yards wide, the size of the backyard of any London boarding-house. One of the King's aides-de-camp stands at the door of the whitewashed barn, now ironically called a Royel palace, and smiles apologetically. Walking up three wooden steps one comes into a vast, barn-like room, with a low ceiling. I was immediately ushered up another set of creaking wooden stairs to a similar large room, where the King was sitting at a little wooden table. *His Majesty* smilingly rose to receive me, *and said:*

You see what a wretched place I am living in. I have been here more than one month, and it is enough to drive one crazy. The Turkish houses are all like this. Look at this big room with low ceiling, hardly any light, and no furniture. When the Turks build a house they forget to put furniture inside it. We found absolutely nothing here. All they do is to spread immense carpets on the floor, to cover the divans along the walls with gaudy cloth, and squat about. It is impossible to find a chair or a table anywhere. We had to bring them all here. *The Turks do not know how to plan a town or to build houses.* The owner of this place is one of the richest Turks in Eskishehr, yet look what he lives in.

Will your Majesty regret leaving Eskishehr?

Oh, never, I suppose I shall have to go to Brussa. *How is it there?*

Nothing very extraordinary, but infinitely better than Eskishehr. *I think you will find it cooler and healthier.*

His Majesty replied "That is what I want. This place is not healthy. I have not been very well, and one of my officers is in hospital".

"*How is the military situation?*" I asked. King Constantine replied:

I think very good. I have excellent information from the front. *If Mustapha Kemal accepts battle this time we shall destroy his army or take most of it prisoner.* I am convinced that he has not more than 50,000 men. Our army is fully capable of dealing with that number, although we are very far from our base. *We expect to enter Angora,* but only for a few days. We do not intend to stay there, and as soon as we have destroyed the military depôts and taken what railway rolling stock there may be we shall retire.

And turn your attention to Constantinople (I said playfully)?

The King smiled, and then looked serious. He continued:

There can be no question of Constantinople, at present. The Greek army could, of course, be of immense assistance there and bring about the

definite pacification and settlement of the vexed Oriental question. But the Powers do not want us there. It is their decision, and I do not want to increase their difficulties. Don't you think our army is admirable and that the courage of our soldiers under privations and hardships deserves praise? They have enough to do where they are.

F.O. 371/6529.

No. 279

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 7, 1921.*
(Received September 12).

No. 827.
My Lord,

THERE have been no developments in the political situation at Constantinople since I last had the honour of addressing your Lordship. The attention of the Turkish Government and of the European community here has been engrossed by the progress of the struggle in Anatolia. The public have had to rely on the communiqués issued by both sides. These communiqués do not show any particular regard for the truth. On one or two days the Greek commaander-in-chief did not issue any communiqué at all, and his silence was significant as indicating that nothing decisive had occurred.

2. The main object of the Greeks seems to have been to outflank the left wing of the Turkish army and cause that wing so to bend back as to endanger the whole of the Nationalist forces. In order to perform this operation the Greek column had to advance through a waterless tract of country, where it suffered greatly from thirst. The Turks were at one time in a critical position, but skilfully extricated themselves from it, and the struggle still continues beyond the Sakaria river. I do not believe that the Greeks can have expected such a determined resistance on the part of the Kemalist army as they have encountered. Fighting has been proceeding for twelve days, and it is known that the losses have been heavy on both sides. Although it is dangerous to prophecy, there is a likelihood of the present operations ending in a stalemate, both sides being too exhausted to be able to press any advantage. Such a state of things might form a favourable moment for intervention. On the one hand, the Greeks cannot view the prospect of a winter campaign with much equanimity, especially after the exhausting nature of the effort they have just made. Their financial

embarrassments should come home to them with greater force when they reflect that they have not been able to crush the Kemalist army. The wiping out of that army could alone lead to a termination of the struggle.

3. The Kemalists, on their side, will be no less exhausted. They have to face dissatisfaction at Konia, wilst they will be unable to raise revenue from a large part of Anatolia. It is doubtful whether their Bolshevik friends can help them very much, and it is known that they are very short of arms and ammunition.

4. Constantinople presents a curious spectacle these days. The Greek fleet is very much *en évidence*, and everybody realises that the passage of Greek warship through the Bosphorus into the Black Sea portends the seizure of some Turkish steamer. The action of the Greek ships in removing from Turkish ships articles such as carperts and jewellery, which cannot be classed as even conditional contraband, and of imprisoning old men and children taken off ships so searched, does not fail to add to the bitterness of the Mohammedan population.

5. The following incidents throw an instructive light on Greek mentality:—

When the hostilities were at their height, I received a request from the Association of Greek Boy Scouts for permission to hold a flag-day in Constantinople in aid of the Greek war-orphans. This request was naturally refused.

An imaginative picture, portraying in most lurid colours the battle of Eski-Shehr and the slaughter of panic-stricken Turks, was put into circulation by a Greek artist. By General Harington's orders all copies which could be traced were seized and destroyed.

During the battle of Eski-Shehr a large portrait of King Constantine, surrounded by the words "He is coming", was posted on the wall of the Greek Military Mission in the main street of Pera. General Harington caused this also to be removed.

Finally, I notice in a recent letter from the *locum tenens* of the Œcumenical Patriarchate that his Beatitude now refers to the Ottoman Greeks as "our nation".

I have, &c.,

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

F.O. 406/47, p. 52-53, No. 38.

No. 280

Lord Granville (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

ATHENS, *September 12th, 1921, 8.0 p.m.*
(Received September 15, 3.0 p.m.)

No. 489. Telegraphic

General Stratigos is in Athens to discuss military policy in Asia Minor with the Greek Government. He told the Military Attaché to-day that no definite decisions have yet been made, firstly whether the army is to advance from its present positions to Angora or (?secondly) (?regarding) line to be occupied by Greek army after ceasing offensive operations, but that the essential requirement in selecting this line is the security of the Bagdad railway.

First question depends on whether the advantages of occupying Angora are considered worth the probable losses. *Greek casualties between (?August 23rd) and September 7th were 15,000*, of which Military Attaché learns from other sources about 2,500 were killed. General Stratigos thinks this not excessive considering the fierceness of the fighting and he believes that the Turk losses were great. He said that no considerable reserves existed in Greece to replace casualties but the independent division recently transferred from Thrace to Asia Minor has been sent to Eskishehr and will be used for operations if necessary. He called it a good division.

Military Attaché gathered the impression that General Stratigos himself favours cessation of offensive operations and establishment of a protective line along Eastern loop of Sakharia as the left bank is easily defensible and the river unfordable and line could be extended northwards to the sea by a few (?post) - s and the desert is to the South. But Military Attaché points out that occupation of this line from Greek present positions would depend on Turks being incapable of concentration manoeuvre and attack.

General Stratigos estimates Turkish forces on the Sakharia front at 14 divisions from Eskishehr area, two from Cilicia, and two newly formed, total 18 plus cavalry.

He doubts that Turks are now (group undec.) or included to make a general counter - attack but he emphasized difficulty of gaining information where inhabitants are hostile and prisoners will say, anything to curry favour. Greek Air Service does well but there is much which aeroplanes cannot find out. During the later stages of the recent battle Turks economized ammunition and only counter - attacked at night. Prisoners say that there is a shortage but it is possible that Turks are saving ammunition for general counter attack.

Repeated to Constantinople.

F.O. 371/6529/E. 10394.

No. 281

G. O. C. Allied Forces, Constantinople, to War Office.

Despatched 2200 13/9/21.
Received 1000 14/9/21.

Secret.
Paraphrase.
Clear the line.

978 cipher September 13th.

Ist of 3 parts.

A. Following from reports up to *September 10th just* received from British officers.

1. On September 10th locations were as follows. Army H. Q. *Kawunji Keupri.* 2nd Corps H. Q. unlocated. 5th Division Sherekli. 13th Division Kizil Keui. Cavalry Brigade dismounted Guzelje Kale Keui. Ist Corps H. Q. Wvli Fakili. Ist Division Ardijdagh. 12th Division north slope of Ardijdagh. 2nd Division last H of Chaldagh. 3rd Corps H. Q. and 3rd Division Chanakji. 10th Division Chaldagh. 9th Division immediately south west of Kursakli. 7th Division 3 kilometres west of Baiburt - Mentesh Yaila - Yazi Euyuk. Independent Division Eskishehir en route to front and is now nombered 15th.

Part 2.

2. *From August 13th to September 10th Greek losses, including* 2,000 killed and a few prisoners, *totalled 18,000.* It is estimated that *Turkish losses during same period were 12,000* plus 1500 prisoners. Greek reinforcements, one regiment 4th and one lines of communication regiment, en route from Afiun Karahissar for front. 7th and other Divisions have also been reinforced by drafts. Fresh supply of gun ammunition has arrived at railhead but was again wasted. (Railhead now withdrawn to Saghziler on account of shell fire at Beylik Keupri). On September 9th all lorries were reserved for ammunition and regimental transport of 3rd Corps had to go to railhead for rations.

3. *On September 9th and September 10th, local attack on Ist and 2nd Corps fronts was carried out by Turks* with moderate heavy artillery bombardment at several points.

Following is summary of conversations held between Colonel Pallis and Major Johnson on September 10th.

(1) Main reasons for advance had been to destroy Kemalist military resources. It was now realized by Greeks that only railway material would be taken in capture of Angora.

3rd and last part.

Greek General Staff have definitely abandoned offensive and will not attempt to take Angora, in view of cost of lives, unless forced to do so by Government for political reasons. Doubtful whether line of Sakaria will be held on account of length of lines of communication along which all fuel forage and rations must be carried during rigorous winter as there are no local supplies or villages for billets. *Greek General Staff consider it advantageous to withdraw to line Eskishehir - Kutaya - Afiun Karahissar after systematically destroying railways although gravity of political effect of withdrawal and strategic value of Sakaria position is fully appreciated.* He considered that Nationalists would only be able to follow with Cavalry and two Divisions of Infantry: therefore, during winter Greeks could hold line by "Centres of resistance".

(2) Present position of Greek Army was safe and he was of opinion that *Nationalists could not attack with any hope of success.* During period August 25th to August 28th they could however have done so. However he (Colonel Pallis) realized, that on account of absence of any good roads 48 hours rain would be disastrous for his forward L of C.

F.O. 371/6529.

No. 282

G. O. C. Allied Forces, Constantinople, to War Office.

Despatched 1125 14/9/21.
Received 1000 15/9/21.

Secret.
Paraphrase.
Clear the line.

991 cipher September 14th.

Following obtained from Black Jumbo source. *Turkish official Communique dated 1133 hours September 13th claims that Greeks have commenced general retreat pursued by Turks accompanied by aircraft.* It is stated that two Greek Divisions who attempted to hold bridgehead east of Beylikkeupri were ejected. Further telegram will contain details.

F.O. 371/6529.

No. 283

Leading Article of "The Times" (London) of September 14, 1921.

GREECE AND TURKEY

The Greeks have definitely failed to reach Angora, and are now retiring westward, as our Constantinople Correspondent informed us yesterday. *The great battle that lasted for ten days on the heights that flank the northward course of the Sakaria and protect the approaches to the capital of Angora has ended*, our Correspondent says, in a stalemate. There were moments when the Greeks seemed to be within reach of their objective. The southern Turkish flank was bent, the centre receded, and the Greek forces were actually within thirty miles of Angora. The way to the Nationalist capital seemed to be open with the seizure of Chaldagh, but a few days ago we were told that the Turks were still holding the village of Harinane on the north - eastern slope of the mountain; and, though Greek aeroplanes were bombarding the capital, the furious resistance of the Turks to the north of the railway seems to have thwarted all the efforts of the Greek Command. The prize so long sought after was almost within reach, but it had to be relinquished. *After losing 18,000 men in the basin of the Sakaria, the home of the ancient Phrygian Kings, the Army of King Constantine was compelled to retire.* Fleet - footed rumour, interpreting hope and anticipating achievement, had already announced the capture of Angora. But the effort of the Greeks fell short of achievement. The difficulties of communications in the wild heart of Asia Minor mocked at the enterprise, the sacrifices, and the strategical resources of the invaders, and the fierce tenacity of the Turks in their own homeland turned the Greek tide backwards. We do not know how far the Greeks will go in these sad days of autumn. They may have the intention of settling down in winter quarters along the railway that passes though Eskishehir and ensures them tolerable communications. The Turkish Army appears to have been exhausted by the fierce struggle, and it is possible that it will not immediately undertake a serious pursuit or attempt outflanking operations. After such a battle as that which has been fought out on the Sakaria, both sides will require time to recuperate. We have no doubt that both Greeks and Turks have fought well. Technically the battle has ended in a draw. Psychologically it will be regarded in the East as a victory for the Turks. The Greek Command aimed at a goal which it has failed to reach, and the Greek Army, whether because of the growing danger of Turkish attack or the exhaustion of its ammunition owing to the bad roads and the feeble carrying capacity of a solitary railway, has been compelled to retire. *In the revulsion from the dread of the capture of a key position such as Angora is the retirement of the Greeks will be regarded throughout the East as a victory for Mustafa Kemal, and* will reaffirm his shaken prestige. *What the effect of the reverse*

will be on the position of King Constantine it is difficult to judge. The Greek Army, after such high hopes, such a struggle, and such losses, will hardly be in a cheerful mood as it makes its Anabasis through the grim Anatolian mountains towards the sunlit coast. And in the Hellenic peninsula and the islands of the Aegean there must be many who are thinking as they count up the cost in blood and treasure: To what purpose was this far thrust into the terrible unknown? Better have been content with small achievements nearer home than risk great adventures in the dark land of the Mother of the Gods, now for centuries the home of the Turk whose one hereditary calling is war.

The disappointment of the Greeks will be bitter, and it may be that in this moment of disillusionment they will realize that they have been swept off into this vast and impracticable enterprise by the ambition of their own leaders, not by any mandate from the European Powers. They have tried, under an impulse of far - reaching Hellenic nationalism, and they have failed. *The army of Mustapha Kemal, though bleeding, is still unsubdued, and will be able during the winter to recruit its forces. The prestige of the Turkish Nationalist leader is strengthened in the East as a result of the Greek failure. These are the cold facts with which the Allies have to reckon.* An attitude of mere aloofness and indifference will soon cease to be possible. The decision which Turks and Greeks, for all their long fighting and for all the outpouring of the blood of obscure thousands, have been unable to achieve is now forced upon the Allies. The ancient river Sangarios, of which HOMER speaks, has refused to answer the riddle, for which some solution must be found in Paris or London. It is a pitiful dilemma with which the Allies are now faced. All this bloodshed has been in vain; the Greek advance has ended as it might have been expected to end if it was pushed forward too far into a primitive region where communications hardly existed and the Turk felt most intimately that he was defending his home. Formal neutrality, covering secret hopes in one direction or another, was a poor and evasive policy in view of such a situation as this. The errors and the procrastination of the past are making themselves felt now. *At any rate the moment has come for the Allies to formulate a clear policy in relation to the Near East.* They can no longer wait upon the changing fortunes of a war that never showed any promise of being decisive and has only resulted in a fruitless loss of life. It may be that one or other of the combatants will appeal, in the moment of exhaustion, to the Allies for mediation. But before that time comes the Allies should have their policy ready, and it *certainly seems to us that one element of that policy should be that the Greeks should no longer be encouraged to undertake burdens that,* with all their courage and all their enterprise *they are totally unable to bear.* It will be a matter for thankfulness if this thrust into the heart of Asia Minor does not end in disaster.

F.O. 371/6530.

No. 284

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 15, 1921.*
(Received September 26).

No. 852.
My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the text of a communication which has been addressed by Youssouf Kemal, the Nationalist Foreign Minister, to the Allied High Commissioners, the American and Japanese High Commissioners and to the Spanish Minister. As this communication deals with the alleged unneutral proceedings of two British torpedo-boat destroyers, as well as to the British unneutral attitude generally towards the Nationalist Government, I referred Youssouf Kemal's communication to Admiral de Robeck for his observations.

2. A copy of Admiral de Robeck's letter of the 12th instant is enclosed herewith. Your Lordship will observe that he entirely disposes of Youssouf Kemal's allegations regarding the proceedings of the British destroyers. I would suggest that I should be authorised to refute that portion of Youssouf Kemal's communication which deals with the incident in question without reference to any action which the other Allied High Commissioners may wish to take on Youssouf Kemal's communication.

3. The remainder of Youssouf Kemal's letter raises the question of the use by Greek warships of Constantinople as a base for operation in the Black Sea. I am of opinion that if your Lordship authorises me to reply to Youssouf Kemal, as proposed above, it would be preferable to ignore the latter part of his communication.

I have, &c.,

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

F.O. 406/47, p. 59-60, No. 43.

ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 284

Youssouf Kemal to Allied High Commissioners.

LE 27 août dernier, deux torpilleurs anglais pénétrèrent dans le port de Samsoun et arrêtèrent, pour visiter, le navire à moteur d'Ali Reiss, originaire de Rizé. Une embarcation britannique montée par dix hommes armés se détacha de l'un des torpilleurs, accosta le moteur, et tous les

marins anglais qui se trouvaient dans l'embarcation fouillèrent de fond en comble le navire turc, et interrogèrent l'équipage pour savoir si le navire transportait des armes et des munitions. N'ayant trouvé, au bout de leurs recherches, qu'un seul revolver, les marins anglais quittèrent le moteur et rentrèrent à bord de leurs navires de guerre.

Or, le 10 août, le communiqué officiel du Conseil suprême annonçait que les grandes Puissances avaient décidé de persévérer dans leur politique de stricte neutralité vis- à -vis de chacun des deux belligérants; d'autre part, Mr. Lloyd George, dans son discours du 16 août aux Communes, affirmait que l'Angleterre n'aidait en aucune façon aucun des deux adversaires. La perquisition effectuée par les torpilleurs anglais à bord du moteur turc pour chercher des armes et des munitions vient de montrer encore une fois au peuple turc la façon dont on remplit à son égard les promesses les plus solennellement faites. Nous ne pouvons nous empêcher de rappeler à cette occasion que c'est précisément après la proclamation toute aussi solennellement faite de la stricte neutralité de la zone de Constantinople et du Bosphore que les navires helléniques ont commencé à utiliser ce port comme base de leurs raids dans la mer Noire.

Je crois devoir ajouter que, même strictement appliquée, nous ne saurions considérer comme bien sincère la neutralité de ceux qui, après avoir mis la main sur notre flotte de combat, déclarent que les deux parties belligérantes sont libres de s'approvisionner comme ils l'entendent en matériel de guerre. Il est évident pour tout le monde que la Grèce, ayant conservée sa marine militaire, est seule appelée à profiter de cette liberté.

Au nom de mon Gouvernement, je proteste de la façon la plus énergique contre tous ces faits par lesquels on tâche, d'un côté, de calmer les appréhensions du monde musulman, inquiet de voir atteinte à l'indépendance de la Turquie, et, de l'autre côté, d'aider dans la mesure du possible la Grèce dans sa lutte contre nous.

Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères.
Youssouf Kemal.

Angora, *Le 4 Septembre 1921.*

F.O. 406/47, p. 60, No. 43/1

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 284.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Sir H. Rumbold.

"Iron Duke" at Constantinople, September 12, 1921.

Your Excellency,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith my observations on your letter of the 10th September. The facts are as follows:—

2. On the date named, viz., the 27th August, a caïque under sail was met outside the port of Samsoun by two British destroyers. One of these lowered a boat and proceeded alongside for the purpose of obtaining news. No search of the cargo took place — merely some conversation carried on with the aid of an interpreter. The English boat's crew was naturally armed, as it has been reported more than once recently that many caïques are used by armed brigands. The orders given to the British destroyer were, *inter alia*, to acquire news of what was going on on the coast, and, as all information was denied them by the Turkish authorities at the ports visited, recourse had to be had to interrogating passing vessels. The British officer behaved perfectly correctly and courteously, and his visit lasted less than five minutes.

It is perhaps worth mentioning that the next Turkish caïque visited (in the neighbourhood of Bender Erekli) had a sick man on board, who received medical attention and was given a supply of quinine.

I do not know whether your Excellency intends to answer this communication from Youssouf Kemal, or in view of its tone, to ignore it, but I welcome the opportunity of restating the naval point of view.

3. Under the terms of the armistice with Turkey, I maintain that His Majesty's ships have a perfect right to detain and search any Turkish vessels, and that right will continue until a peace with Turkey has been ratified. In order not do complicate further an already difficult situation, this right has not been exercised since Great Britain's declaration of neutrality as between Greeks and Kemalists, but the right exists, and it would have to be shown that its exercise operated unfavourably against the Kemalists in their conflict with Greece before a charge of breach of neutrality could be preferred with justice. Special care had been, and will continue to be taken to ensure that no grounds for such a charge will be furnished through the action of any of His Majesty's ships.

4. To describe the trivial incident cited by the writer as a disregard of "promises most solemnly made" of strict neutrality is merely playing with words. Does Angora not think that a reciprocal neutrality is incumbent

on them? Touching matters within my knowledge as naval Commander-in-chief, why are not the usual courtesies and facilities accorded to His Majesty's ships in Nationalist ports? Why is British trade boycotted? Why has no redress been made for the forced entry and brutal murder on board a British ship at Adalia, and in regard to matters of common knowledge, but outside my official sphere, why are British prisoners still held by the Nationalists?

It ill becomes this "Minister" to talk of neutrality when every action of his Government bespeaks hostility.

5. As regards the complaint that Greek ships continue to use Constantinople as a base for their raids in the Black Sea, this is, of course, outside my province to justify or explain.

The ships are there, however, with the consent of all the Allies, not that of the British only. As far as I am aware, no "waters" have been proclaimed neutral, and therefore exception cannot be taken to Greek ships using Constantinople and the Bosphorus on the ground that the neutrality of these zones "solemnly proclaimed", has been infringed. The writer chooses to forget that, as a result of the great war in which Turkey ranged herself on the side of the enemies of Great Britain and her Allies, Constantinople to-day is in the military occupation of those Allies, and the fleets of Allies — of which Greece was one — can scarcely be excluded from its waters.

6. Finally, with regard to the penultimate paragraph of the letter under reply, no one knows better than the writer how little the fact of possessing or not possessing a navy has affected the supply of arms and munitions to the Kemalist forces. It is not a fact that Greece, by virtue of her navy has alone been able to reap the advantage of unrestricted imports of war material.

I have, &c.,

J. M. DE ROBECK, *Admiral,*
Commander - in - chief.

F.O. 406/47, p. 60 - 61, No. 43/2.

No. 285

General Harington, Constantinople, to War Office.

Despatched 2110 16/9/21.
Received 1000 17/9/21.

Secret.
Paraphrase.
Clear line.

1004 cipher September 16th.

First of two parts.

I have just had an interview with General Coutsis who has handed me appreciation from General Papoulos according to whom there are opposed to Greeks 16 Turkish Divisions strength about 25000 and 5 Cavalry Divisions. He also states they are stronger and better equipped in guns than his own troops. He has accordingly been forced *to withdraw Greek Army west of Sakaria river. He* claims this has been done without any molestation and to have found it necessary owing to difficulties of supply. He puts losses of Greek troops east of Sakaria as 15,000 and losses in previous fighting as 1000. Composite Division which was at Gemlik has been moved to Eskishehir and from new classes Greeks count upon 40,000 reinforcements. Coutsis consideres that Greeks will hold on to Sivri Hissar position until it is determined whether they will return to Eskishehir line for the winter or will carry out another offensive which must be costly.

Last part.

They admit their offensive failed and never anticipated such loss or such resistance. Personally I think they have failed like *Deniken* and others by not understanding back arrangements of an Army and I think their staff work has failed them in a crisis as *I always anticipated it would do.* It would appear from information in my possession that the Turks are pressing them severely and are working round their flanks north of Muhalich and south of Sivrihissar, and I anticipate general retirement to Eskishehir line at no slow pace. I have information that steps are being taken to recruit in Adabazar district which means that we must keep our eyes in Ismid district. *There is no doubt that the Nationalists have swung the pendulum in a most remarkable manner.*

F.O. 371/6529.

No. 286

Letter from Mr. Forbes Adam to the Under Secretary of State, India Office

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 19, 1921.*

Urgent and secret

Sir,

I am directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to acknowledge the receipt of your letter P. 4157 of September 5th[1] regarding the collection of funds in India for the purchase of arms, probably in this country, for export to the Kemalist Turks.

2. This Department have no information regarding the floating of any loan in this country for the purchase of arms for the Kemalist forces and it is understood from the Board of Trade[2] that no application has yet been made to the Board for a licen[c]e to export any consignment of arms and ammunition to those forces. In view, however, of the Supreme Council's decision of August 10th regarding freedom of private trade in arms and of the interpretation given to this decision in the answer given by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on August 15th[3], the Board would not refuse an application to a licen[c]e to export arms etc. genuinely destined for the Kemalist forces. The legal position of His Majesty's Government with regard to the situation in Turkey is of course anomalous but it is based on the distinction that the Allies are technically at war with the Turkish Government at Constantinople but that an armistice has been concluded with that Government since 1918 while, without formally recognising as a separate Government Mustapha Kemal and the Grand National Assembly at Angora, the Allied Governments regard themselves as neutral towards the hostilities between the Greeks and the Kemalists. Their decisions as to neutrality and as to the consequent freedom of private trade in arms must therefore be held in practice to over-ride the application to the area in Kemalist occupation of any of the terms of the armistice concluded with the Constantinople Government, which are found to conflict with these decisions. Subject to any views which may be held by Mr. Secretary Short[4] to whom a copy of your letter was sent direct, Lord Curzon considers that in the circumstances while any private trader supplying arms to the Kemalists from this country would be liable to have those arms seized by the Greeks

[1] Not printed.
[2] This information was given verbally.
[3] See 146 *H.C. Deb* 5 *s.*, cols. 937-8.
[4] H.M. Principal Secretary of State for Home Affairs.

in transit under the exercise of the customary rights of a belligerent, he would not, in view of the above - mentioned decisions, be liable to prosecution in this country for trading with the enemy nor would His Majesty's Government in consequence be entitled (even if they were able) to prevent private traders raising loans in the London market for the purchase of arms for shipment to the Kemalists.

3. Lord Curzon, while not presuming to advise whether the information in the possession of your Department or in that of the Government of India as to the activities of the Angora authorities against British rule in India is such as to justify the Indian Government from departing from the attitude adopted by His Majesty's Government in this matter and taking any steps open to them to stop the raising of a proposed loan in India, desires to draw Mr. Secretary Montagu's attention to the documents seized by General Harington recently at Constantinople, in connection with an apparent Kemalist plot there, and forwarded to the War Office who are being asked to send copies to your Department.

4. A copy of this correspondence is being sent to the War Office, Admiralty, Home Office and Board of Trade.

I am, &c.,

E. G. FORBES ADAM.

D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol. XVII, p. 391 - 392, No. 384.

No. 287

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 20, 1921.*
(Received September 26.)

No. 868.
My Lord,

SINCE the retreat of the Greek army from beyond the Sakaria River my colleagues and I have exchanged views regarding the psychological moment for any action which the Allied Powers may wish to take in the direction of mediation or intervention in the Greco - Turkish conflict.

2. I find that my colleagues share my impression that the Nationalists would be glad to make peace, as they realise their exhausted state. But I personally do not believe that they would be satisfied with less than the solution contemplated at Paris in June last with regard to Smyrna. On

the other hand, my colleagues and I have no information to show that the Greeks would welcome mediation at this stage, and we are of opinion that it will *be necessary to await the effect on Greek public opinion of the inevitable disappointment caused by the failure of the Greek army* after their great effort to reach Angora and to crush Mustapha Kemal's army. A report in the press states that the Greeks have failed to obtain a loan abroad and that they will have to recource to an internal loan, which presumably means the printing of more notes.

3. Looking at the situation from here, it would seem that *we must await the further development of the military operations* and see whether the Greeks will be able to carry out their programme of destroying the railway between Eskishehr and Angora and creating a kind of desert between themselves and the Nationalists without hindrance from the latter. A few weeks should be sufficient to judge of the effect on the internal situation in Greece of the serious check which the Greeks have received. We therefore think that towards *the end of October the Allies may find the moment favourable* for action.

I have, &c.,

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

F.O. 406/47, p. 62, No. 45.

No. 288

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 20, 1921.*
(Received September 26).

No. 869. *Confidential.*
My Lord,

M. FRANKLIN - BOUILLON arrived at Constantinople from Paris a few days ago and left for Ineboli on the 15th instant in a French destroyer.

2. I learn confidentially in the above connection that a certain person called on one of the chiefs of the French Military Intelligence Service and asked the latter if he could give him any information about the convention between M. Franklin - Bouillon and the Nationalists. The French officer, who thought that his visitor had called on behalf of the American Associated Press, asked him not to press the point, as any statement he might make might have an injurious effect on Anglo - French relations.

3. My informant infers that there is a secret military clause attached to the convention by which the French undertake, on evacuating Cilicia, to leave to the Kemalists military stores, equipment and munitions sufficient for two divisions. It is also believed that the French would consent to allow the Kemalists the use of their railway line, *i.e.*, the section of the Bagdad Railway in the French sphere running east through Biredjik and Ourfa towards Mosul, in the event of hostilities between the Kemalists and King Feisal.

4. It is difficult to check the accuracy of the foregoing information. There is little doubt in my mind that M. Franklin - Bouillon's negotiations cover a wider ground than the exchange of prisoners. My French colleague, who must be perfectly well aware of what is going on, spontaneously informed me a few days ago with a shrug of his shoulders that M. Franklin-Bouillon had passed through Constantinople on his way to Angora. He knew quite well that I had no doubt already heard about M. Franklin Bouillon's movements and it is evident to me that he wished to convey the impression that he is in no way associated with that gentleman's activities.

I have, &c.,

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

F.O. 406/47, p. 62 - 63, No. 46.

No. 289

Foreign Office to the Law Officers of the Crown.

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 21, 1921.*

Gentlemen,

I HAVE the honour, by the direction of the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, to request you to favour him with your early opinion on certain questions raised by the apparent intention of the Russian Soviet Government to deliver warships to the Kemalist Turkish Government of Angora.

2. With a view to explain the somewhat complex issue of international law involved, it seems necessary to call attention to the following facts:—

3. His Majesty's Government concluded on the 16th March last a trade agreement with the Russian Soviet Government, a copy of which is transmitted herewith for convenience of reference, together with a copy of the

letter addressed by Sir Robert Horne to M. Krassin at the time of its signature explaining the point of view of His Majesty's Government on certain provisions of the agreement. It will be seen that by sub-paragraph (*a*) of article 1 of the agreement the Russian Soviet Government and His Majesty's Government reciprocally oblige themselves "to refrain from any attempt by military or diplomatic action or propaganda to encourage any of the people of Asia in any form of hostile action against British interests or the British Empire". This agreement is still in force, but His Majesty's Government have recently instructed the British Trade Commissioner in Moscow, in a despatch a copy of which is enclosed herein, to draw the attention of the Russian Soviet Government to certain apparent breaches of the agreement. It should be mentioned that on the day of the signature of the Anglo - Russian Agreement the Russian Soviet Government signed an agreement with the Turkish Kemalist Government, the constitution and history of which is briefly explained below. A paper giving the substance of the agreement, as known to His Majesty's Government, is also enclosed herein.

4. The principal Allies concluded an armistice with the Turkish Government at Constantinople in October 1918. Certain parts of Turkey were occupied by the principal Allies, and this occupation was extended in March 1920 to Constantinople. On the 10th August, 1920, a Treaty of Peace was signed at Sèvres with the Turkish Government. This treaty has not yet been ratified either by the Turkish Government or by any of the principal Allies.

5. Meanwhile a separate Government in that part of Asia Minor not occupied by the Allies had been constituted in 1920 by a certain Mustapha Kemal. This Government subsequently styled itself the Grand National Assembly. The seat of the Government is at Angora. This Government while not formally renouncing allegiance to the Sultan of Turkey, regards itself as the sovereign Government of Turkey, in distinction to the Government of Constantinople, with which however, it does, in fact, for political purposes remain in close and friendly relations. One of the main objects of the Angora Government was to prevent entry into force and execution of the Treaty of Sèvres, and, in particular, to drive back the Greek forces who had been sent to occupy the Smyrna area of Asia Minor by the Supreme Council in 1919, an occupation which was subsequently extended in July 1920 in order to drive back the Kemalist forces from the area of the Straits, and force the Turkish Government to sign the Treaty of Sèvres.

6. In the autumn of 1920 the Government of Veniselos fell in Greece, and the succeeding Government ordered a plebiscite, resulting in the return of King Constantine. For political reasons His Majesty's Government and

the French Government have not officially recognised the King, but have continued in informal relations with his Government. Partly owing to this change of attitude towards Greece, but principally in order to put a stop to the intermittent warfare between the Kemalist forces and the Greeks, the Supreme Council invited the Greek Government and the Turkish Government at Constantinople to sent representatives to a conference in London in February 1921, with a view to agree upon modifications of the Treaty of Sèvres acceptable to both parties. In the hope that the Turkish Government at Constantinople would eventually merge into a united Turkish Government to include the Kemalist Government at Angora, the Supreme Council did not desire to recognise formally the latter, but they invited the Constantinople Government to include in their delegation representatives of the Kemalist Government. It was with such a united delegation that Supreme Council subsequently negotiated. At the London conference certain proposals were put before both the Greek and Turkish Governments, and it was made clear to both Governments that if hostilities were resumed in Asia Minor the Supreme Council rejected all responsibility. Before final answers to the Supreme Council's proposals were returned, hostilities were resumed in Asia Minor between the Greeks and Kemalist Turks, and towards these hostilities the Supreme Council decided to adopt an attitude of neutrality.

7. Since this renewal of hostilities had taken place in quasi - defiance of the Supreme Council, and while the questions at issue were still *sub judice* by the Supreme Council, the Principal Allied Governments originally decided to interpret their neutrality in such a way as to prevent any export of arms from the countries of the Principal Allies even by private traders to either combatant and at the same time to deny either side the ordinary rights of a belligerent in the matter of the visit and search of the Principal Allies at sea. By this decision as to neutrality it was assumed that a certain *de facto* recognition had been given to the Kemalist Government at Angora, as a Government separate from the Turkish Government at Constantinople, with whom His Majesty's Government were still technically in a state of war, suspended by the armistice of 1918. His Majesty's Government have had, hovewer, no direct official relations with the Kemalist Government. Warfare between the Greeks and the Kemalists has continued since the London conference, the Greek Government rejecting an offer of mediation made to them only in June 1921. At a meeting of the Supreme Council in August 1921, it was decided to supersede the policy described in the earlier part of this paragraph by adopting the customary rules of neutrality towards the belligerents, so far as private trade in arms between either belligerent and the countries of the Principal Allies is concerned.

8. The Kemalist Government have, since its constitution, adopted a somewhat hostile attitude towards Great Britain, without, however going to the length of a declaration of war. Although His Majesty's Government had, after the London conference of March 1921, made plain their neutrality towards the Græco - Turkish hostilities, the Kemalist Government have preferred to regard His Majesty's Governments's attitude of neutrality as hypocritical. Some hostile measures, such as the refusal to allow British vessels to call at Turkish ports in the Kemalist areas, have not been permanently applied, but modified according to the changing political situation; but the Kemalist Government have seized and still detain more than twenty British subjects as prisoners and have rejected an agreement made by their representative at the London conference in March 1921 for an exchange with Turkish prisoners detained by His Majesty's Government at Malta — an agreement which, on their side, His Majesty's Government had begun to carry out.

9. Without burdening the Law Officers of the Crown with further details, Lord Curzon is satisfied that upon the facts a good case could be made out in support of the thesis that the Kemalist Government has been guilty of some "form of hostile action against British interests or the British Empire", but he is doubtful whether action under the Anglo - Russian Trade Agreement based upon that case would be consistent with the maintenance of a policy of neutrality towards the Kemalists as belligerents and in harmony with the international practice governing the relations of neutrals towards belligerents.

10. His Lordship would, therefore, be glad to receive your opinion on the following questions:—

(1.) In the light of the above explanation of the relations of His Majesty's Government with the Turkish Kemalist Government, would His Majesty's Government in view of their declared attitude of neutrality towards the Græco - Kemalist hostilities, be entitled to regard certain acts of the Kemalist Government as "hostile action" within the meaning of sub - paragraph *(a)*, article I, of the Anglo - Russian Agreement?

(2.) If the answer to the above question is in the affirmative, would His Majesty's Government, knowing that certain vessels of war belonging to the Russian Government were being delivered to the Kemalist Government, be entitled *(a)* to protest against such delivery as a breach of the Anglo - Russian Trade Agreement, *(b)* to enforce such protest forthwith, in order to prevent an imminent breach of the agreement, by

sinking or seizing these vessels, or *(c)* to make a diplomatic protest to the Russian Soviet Government?

(3.) Generally.

11. It will be appreciated that, if any action is to be taken in the matter of the delivery of these vessels, it may have to be taken quickly, and Lord Curzon would therefore, request that he may be favoured with your opinion at your earliest possible convenience.

I have, &c.,

LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

List or Papers.

(A.) Trade Agreement with Russian Soviet Government, March 16, 1921. [Cmd. 1207].

(B.) Sir R. Horne to M. Krassian, March 16, 1921. (N 3438/5/38/1921)

(C.) Foreign Office to British Trade Commissioner, Moscow, No. 64, September 7, 1921. (N 10221/5/38/1921).

(D.) Summary of agreement between the Russian Soviet and Turkish Kemalist Governments, March 16, 1921. (E 9905/143/44/1921.)

Report.

1. In our opinion, in view of the declared attitude of neutrality towards the Græco - Kemalist hostilities, His Majesty's Government are not entitled to regard acts of the Kemalist Government as "hostile action" within the meaning of article 1 *(a)* of the Anglo - Russian Agreement. To put forward a case of breach of the agreement on that basis would, in our opinion, be inconsistent with a policy of neutrality towards the Kemalists.

2. In this view this questions does not arise.

GORDON HEWART.
ERNEST M. POLLOCK.

LAW OFFICERS' DEPARTMENT,
October 18, 1921.

F.O. 371/6533/E. 11600.
F.O. 406/47, p. 56 - 59, No. 41.

No. 290

Lord Granville (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

ATHENS, *September 21st, 1921.*
(Received Sep. 22nd 11.00 a.m.)

Telegraphic
No. 501. *(R).*

My telegram No. 497.

President of the Council who did not appear at all cheerful assured me this morning that decision to retire had been taken because further advance, though it would have been useful, was not essential and would have been very costly and also because rains were about to begin and would make communication difficult; *army was retiring gradually, removing everything and leaving desert;* final line was not definitely settled but would probably be just to east of Eskishehr.

As campaign was over King would probably return to Athens next week.

I asked whether they meant to take first step towards negotiations with Kemal and he said no, they would hold line decided on and see what happened. He made no allusion to mediation.

Repeated to Constantinople.

F.O. 371/6530/E. 10602.

No. 291

Earl Granville (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

ATHENS, *September 23, 1921.*
(Received October 3).

No. 442.
My Lord,

In the telegrams which I have the honour to address to your Lordship I can but report the various and contradictory versions which reach me regarding the Greek retirement in Asia Minor, and I have unfortunately no really reliable source of information to enable me to judge of the relative values of these versions. The Turks apparently say that they have won a great victory and that the Greeks fled across the Sakharia in disorder with very heavy losses in men and material, and Sir Horace Rumbold's

telegram No. 620 of the 18th instant suggested that the Turks were preparing a great encircling movement which might lead to a complete Greek disaster. On the other hand, members of the Greek General Staff at Athens assure the military attaché to His Majesty's Legation, in apparently frank conversations, that the decision to retire was taken when it was seen that a further advance and the capture of Angora, though feasible, would entail losses greater than the object was worth; that the retirement across the river was carried out with practically no interference from the Turks and with hardly any loss of men or material; that, though the Turkish army was admittedly not crushed, the *moral* of the Turks had sunk very low and they are not capable of taking a serious offensive, and that the retirement has continued in perfect order, according to plan, every rail of the line being systematically removed or destroyed. The official communiqué to-day states that the Greek army have now taken up their position on the line decided on some 50 kilom. to the east of Eskishehr. The General Staff also assured Colonel Nairne that the *moral* of the troops is still excellent, and that it is only here in Athens that the *moral* has fallen and depression and pessimism exist. I imagine that both sides are lying; that the Greek retirement was not quite so easy and successful as the Greeks make out, but that the Turks are certainly not justified in claiming a great victory.

It is undoubtedly the case that Athens is thoroughly depressed and inclined to be very pessimistic, and this is not to be wondered at, even if the official version of events can be relied on, considering the ridiculous way the Government have allowed and encouraged the press to feed the public with the idea that the war was to all intents over and the Turks completely defeated; in fact "Kathemerine" still keeps this up. It is known that the losses during the Sakharia battle were very heavy — M. Baltazzi assured me that they were below 14,000, but I believe it is really admitted that they were 18 to 20,000 — and the wounded who are streaming in tell terrible tales of their sufferings owing to bad hospitals and bad transport arrangements, &c. Stories are told of mutinies at or near the front, or at least of violent dissatisfaction against the military authorities and the Government. The last time I saw M. Gounaris, two days ago, he spoke as calmly and cheerily as ever, but he looked to me worn out with anxiety and depression.

I have already reported in a previous despatch my surprise at hearing my Italian colleague agree most strongly with my own conviction that a Greek victory is eminently desirable from the Allied point of view, and he has since constantly repeated this expression of his personal opinion. But I was much more surprised to hear that M. Taigny, the French delegate on the International Financial Commission, who has hitherto always

been most violently anti - Greek and who has just returned from leave, volunteered the remark to Mr. Bentinck last night that it would be a very serious matter for the *Entente* if Greece were to be defeated. I am convinced that this is true even for France and Italy, but it appears to me much more important for Great Britain. Our position, prestige and popularity here in Greece have been far superior to those of any other Power, and I venture to urge once more upon your Lordship how eminently desirable it is for British interests that a friendly country like Greece should win rather than an undoubtedly hostile Turkey. So strongly do I feel this that I would go so far as to urge His Majesty's Government, if there should be any apparent probability of the Kemalist forces being able seriously to threaten the new Greek line to render moral and material assistance to the Greeks rather than to allow them to be crushed (see my telegram No. 298 of the 3rd June).

I have advisedly said above that our position "has been" pre - eminent; I think and hope that it still is so, but we have already lost a good deal by our surrender to Italy on the Albanian question, and one reads in the papers a good many bitter suggestions that we have forgotten our principles of protection of small nations, &c., and are prepared to look on them simply as pawns to be sacrificied when desirable for the sake of more important pieces on the board.

I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople.

I have, &c.,

GRANVILLE.

F.O. 406/48, p. 4 - 5, No. 3.

No. 292

Memorandum by Mr. W. S. Churchill, Secretrary of State for the Colonies, to the British Cabinet

GREECE AND TURKEY.

C. P. 3328.
Secret.

THE serious reverse which the Greeks have sustained in their attempt to take Angora should add another to the long series of opportunities which have occurred for making a good settlement in the East. It will indeed be disgraceful if we do not make a real effort now to secure such a settle-

ment. The waste and ruin by which the whole of this part of the East is ravaged and its reaction upon the general impoverishment of the world is in itself a sufficient reason. But we have also a much more particular one. As the Greek Army retires they will no doubt destroy the railway behind them, and if they are able to continue in the possession of the junctions which they took in the earlier battles the Turks should find it very difficult to come forward and menace them with active operations. The war is therefore likely to come into a condition of stalemate so far as the Mediterranean side is concerned. Mustapha Kemal, if he is wise, will not attempt to attack the Greeks once their retreat is complete, but will rather be content with forcing them to keep a very considerable army indefinitely in the field. This is bound to produce in the long run most disastrous reactions in Greece. But what will happen to us during this indefinite and possibly lengthy interval? Mustapha Kemal, unable to develop any strong offensive towards the West, will have only one outlet for any forces at his disposal, namely, Mosul. Here, for the very smallest expense of troops and ammunition he can cause us enormous embarrassment. We are steadily and swiftly withdrawing our troops from Mesopotamia, and only in this way can the abatement of the cost be obtained. The arrangements which are contemplated after the troops are gone make no provisions at all for the defence of the country against external attack, but are only devised to maintain internal order on the basis of a political system agreeable to the great majority of the people. A few thousand Turkish troops sent into the Mosul Vilayet will compel us to choose between stopping the evacuation of the Army or even bringing back new troops and embarking on field operations at the cost of at least 5 or 6 millions on the one hand, or giving up the Mosul Vilayet altogether on the other. The Arab Army and the levies are not yet to take any effective part in a defence against external attack. I have never been an enthusiast for Mesopotamia, still less for Mosul; but I should be sorry if just when things are beginning to go well internally in these regions we were forced to throw aside all our work and admit failure. Those who have supported on the one hand the retention of Mosul, and on the other a forward policy on the part of the Greeks, ought really to explain how these policies can be reconciled.

Is it not, therefore, the very moment now for decided intervention to secure a settlement, whether for the sake of Greece or for the sake of Turkey? It may well be that this further spell of bloody and disappointing fighting may have induced the wish for peace on both sides. Mustapha Kemal may no longer be in the unreasonable mood in which the Bekir Sami negotiations were conducted, and the Greeks must be getting nearer to bankruptcy and revolution. Now is the time to address ourselves

to both sides in the mood which we had reached before the Greek resumption of the offensive. No doubt the terms proposed would have to be remodelled. But having decided ourselves what we think is reasonable, we ought to press upon both sides to the utmost limit of our force, not excluding a blockade of the Piræus if Greece is unreasonable, or direct assistance in money and supplies to her if Turkey is unreasonable. We seem to have done absolutely nothing during the last three months but watch the progress of this disastrous conflict, and if we continue in this attitude we shall certainly find ourselves formidably disturbed in Mesopotamia.

I ask that this matter should be considered by the Cabinet at an early date.

W. S. C.

Colonial Office, *September 26*, 1921.

F.O. 371/6531/E. 11175.

No. 293

Extract from "The Morning Post" (London) of September 28, 1921.

Kemal Pasha The
"Victorious".

Angora Peace Feelers.

Nationalist Aims Restated.

(From Our Correspondent).
Constantinople, *Sept. 26.*

The Angora Parliament has solemnly conferred upon Mustapha Kemal the title of Marshal and has added the epithet "victorious" so that he will now be known as Marshal Mustapha Kemal Pasha the Victorious. This has been done to confirm Turkish public in the belief that the Greeks have been definitively defeated. Kemal, in thanking Parliament, made an important speech, in which he defended his government for its new policy of repression against the Christian elements and in which he also pleaded for peace. Kemal in his speech said:

"Our sole demand is to live as a free and independent country within our national frontiers. We will never consent to allow our rights to be infringed. Owing to the defeat of the Central Powers to which we had adhered we had to cede Syria and Mesopotamia. We have been forced

to hand over vast territories to the administration of others, leaving their lot to be settled by the victorious Powers. No conquered country lost territories so wider, or so rich as did Turkey. All the accusation brought against us and our administrations, made with the object of getting those territories out of our hands, are false. It is false that our Government and nation have behaved badly to the Christian elements. Our religion and tradition impose benevolent and just treatment towards those elements. Proof that Christians have been equitably treated by us is that they are to be found in the smallest Turkish villages enjoying full security of person and property, which would not be case if we exercised a tyrannical policy towards them, as is pretended. This sufficiently refutes accusation".

Kemal then proceeded to justify the present repressive action towards the Christian elements which his "courts of independence" are vigorously pursuing.

Fate of Christians.

"It is, however, a matter of necessity for us to put an end to the intrigues of those Christians elements which, while living in security amongst us, are conspiring against the existence of the State. None has a right to make this an accusation against our Government. Nowadays the greatest nations and the strongest Governments are faced with such a situation and take even more rigorous and implacable measures than we. But let everyone know that all loyal Ottoman subjects are tranquilly pursuing their avocations, and will continue in the full enjoyment of their rights".

Kemal then went on to say that the other pretexts of Turkey's enemies were equally false, especially the Greek claim that the Turkish territories they now occupy are inhabited by a Greek majority. He continued solemnly:

"The Almightly helped us, and the Greek army has been beaten by the Parliament's army. It is true we cannot lay down our arms till we have assured our rights, but it is not to be inferred that we are bellicose. Such a belief would do us great injustice. On the contrary, the Turkish nation is very pacifically disposed. We tried every pacific means for assuring our rights, but despite our sincere intentions we were treated by the civilised Powers as a primitive people and threatened like children. But let all know that the nation, the Government, and the National Parliament of Turkey cannot consent to be treated as if they were servile. We shall persevere in our resolve to get our rights of existence, liberty, and independence recognised like that of every civilised nation. That is our whole claim. We are not bellicose, but pacifist, and ardently desire to see peace established and to work for that end. We are friendly with Russia because Russia

was the first to recognise our national rights. This being so, Russia may be sure of Turkey's friendship, and similarly, as soon as the Entente Powers recognise our existence and national independence, all differences will automatically cease between us, and we will immediately enter into relations with them. As President of the Parliament I say before you openly that we do not want war; we want peace,and we are ready to make peace. My own opinion is that there is not any obstacle to such an aim. If the Greek army supposes it will make us give up our legitimate rights it is mistaken.

INTERVENTION.

"Mr. Lloyd George on August 16, in the British House of Commons, indicated intervention in favour of the winner of the war. It is Turkey who has now won, and I am hopeful that Mr. Lloyd George will not go back on his word. It is altogether natural that we are defending our country's existence by arms against attemtps to wipe out our nationhood. There can, indeed, be no more reasonable nor justifiable attitude than this.

"Gentlemen, I assure you that we will continue our offensive pressure on the Greek army till not a single enemy soldier is left in our country".

It is interesting to note that included in the ordinary business of the Nationalist Parliament was confirmation of the numerous death sentences passed on Moslem and non - Moslem Ottoman subjects for high treason by Kemal's new courts of repression. It was agreed that the courts should have the power of executing all their sentences except capital sentences, which must be submitted for sanction to Parliament. Side by side with this definitely repressive spirit now animating the Kemalist Government is one showing a spirit of puritan austerity, and one motion passed at same session was an absolute prohibition of gambling and lotteries, the only exception being lotteries organised by the State. One Deputy hoped that the measure would be as beneficial as has been the prohibition on alcohol which is now drastically enforced throughout Anatolia. Meanwhile the propaganda against Great Britain has not diminished, and one paper writes:

"The British, who are making an attempt on the existence of Turkey and desire to stamp out the Nationalist movement, have crept into the Imperial palace and have got the Sultan under their thumb".

F.O. 371/6530.

No. 294

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 28, 1921.*
(Received October 3).

No. 897.
My Lord,

ACCORDING to reports which have reached Constantinople from Anatolia, the Grand *National Assembly conferred the rank of mushir (field-marshal) and the title of Ghazi (the "Victorious") on Mustapha Kemal Pasha,* on his return to Angora from the front some ten days ago. In a speech which, according to the "Anatolian Agency" he made to the Assembly on the 19th instant, Mustapha Kemal Pasha is reported to have declared *inter alia* that the claim that the Greeks formed a majority of the population in the territories occupied by them was not correct. When it was proposed at the Conference of London to hold an enquiry in the war zones on this subject, the Turkish delegates accepted, but the Greeks, realising that the result would be unfavourable to their pretensions, opposed the holding of such an enquiry. He expressed the hope that Mr. Lloyd George would not go back on his speech of the 15th August in the Houses of Commons, when he declared himself in favour of supporting the country that gained a military success, now that that country was Turkey. Mustapha Kemal Pasha stated in conclusion that *the army would not lay down its arms while a single Greek soldier remained within the national frontiers.*

2. In this connection I would mention that since the Greek intention to occupy Angora was given up the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs has on two occasions stated in conversation that the success obtained by the Kemalists would render them more docile and disposed to treat for peace. However that may be, neither Izzet Pasha nor, indeed, any member of Tewfik Pasha's Cabinet with whom I have had conversations has put forward any reasonable or practical suggestion as to the terms on which the present conflict might be ended. They have one and all expressed the opinion that Smyrna with the neighbouring district and Thrace should be restored to Turkey, and have spoken of economic independence and the abolition of the Capitulations as being essential. The Opposition groups also hold the view that the region of Smyrna and Thrace should be restored to Turkey. Reshid Bey, a former Minister of the Interior, who is at present in opposition, went farther than any Turk with whom I am in touch when he stated that Thrace might be made an autonomous province under the

suzerainty of the Sultan, but he maintained that the Smyrna region must be restored completely to Turkey.

3. Foreign opinion here inclines to the view that the *terms of peace will have to be imposed on both belligerents by the Great Powers*, either by direct intervention or by mediation after a conference of the representatives of both parties has reached a deadlock. In the interests of humanity it is greatly to be desired that hostilities may cease before winter sets in.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I have, &c.,

HORACE RUMBOLD.

F.O. 406/48, p. 7, No. 5.
D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol. XVII, p. 406 - 407, No. 396.

No. 295

Paraphrase Telegram from the High Commissioner, Iraq, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

28th September, 1921.

(Received Colonial Office 10. 26 p.m. 29th September, 1921)

No. 534 dated 28th September.

The following seem to be the salient features of existing external situation.

(1) *By brilliant strategy and grand tactics Mustapha Kemal has crushed Greek offensive.* We may therefore assume that he entirely overshadows Enver Pasha at the moment and that predominant note in Anatolian politics is pan - Turanian and (?therefore) anti - Bolshevik. At the same time we know that Kemalists fear the Bolshevik troops massed on their borders and have retained in command of their Eastern troops their trusted anti - Bolshevik generals. The strengthening of Erzeroum and demolition of Kars are obviously directed against possible Bolshevik menace. The pan - Turanian policy of Mustapha does not contemplate a Turkification of Arab provinces but he himself is persuaded that strength of Greeks has been due to British and accordingly he has done his best to damage British interests here. His objection is not to Arab independence but to British run(ning) Iraq. As I understand situation it is not point of British policy to fall foul of Mustapha unless he falls foul of us, I have no knowledge of secret support alleged to have been accorded by us to Greeks. But I assume

it is still intention of His Majesty's Government to secure if possible friendly (1 group) on borders of Iraq. At the present moment when Bolshevik influence in Anatolian politics must be at its (?weak)est, when fear of Bolshevik agression is nevertheless ever present, when moreover the rapid spreading influence of Russia in Persian politics must be a disquieting factor to Turks, *time appears to be ripe for a further attempt at negotiations with Feisal to endeavour to open informal negotiations.* I am alive to risk attendant on attempt which Mustapha will inevitably make to turn Feisal against British but so satisfied do I feel of Feisal's loyalty to us that I am convinced *it is a risk we can well afford to run.* It is impossible to escape the strong suspicion that Mustapha's negotiations with French will have resulted in a further poisoning of his mind against us and should negotiations with Feisal be successfully initiated would serve as a useful antidote. Further should Feisal prove successful in suggested attempt his prestige will be enormously increased and his throne secured beyond all expectations, for not only would he remove danger but he would convert it into a source of strength.

I am unaware if His Majesty's Government have other and better means of access to Mustapha, if not I venture to suggest I discuss problem with Feisal and convey him assurance His Majesty's Government would welcome his taking steps to initiate negotiations with Mustapha with a view to formulation of an agreement. That the present moment is one not to be lost I feel very strongly and beg favour of early reply.*

F.O. 371/6353/E. 10936

No. 296

Extract from the Record of a Conversation between Sir E. Crowe and the French Ambassador on September 29, 1921.

In the course of a general conversation which followed, *Count - Saint Aulaire* touched upon the Greco - Turkish situation. *He was anxious to know whether we had any information to indicate the probability of the Greeks now being ready to accept the mediation of the Powers.*

I said we had nothing very decisive on this point; but there seemed to be clearly much uneasiness at Athens at the existing state of affairs. Whether this feeling was so pronounced as to induce either this, or a future, Greek Government to approach the Powers and to express readiness for a compromise, was a question on which I could not express an opinion.

* Koloniler Bakanı Churchill bu telgrafı 7. 10. 1921 günü İngiliz Kabinesine sunmuştur. (B.N.Ş.)

Count Saint - Aulaire asked what truth was there in a *report that we invited M. Gounaris to come here, and* when was he expected? I explained to him that what happened was that a good many weeks ago M. Gounaris has suggested paying a visit to London, and we had intimated to him that the moment was not then a suitable one for such a visit, and M. Gounaris had accepted the hint. So far as I knew, nothing further had been done in this connection; it was most probable that M. *Gounaris still cherished the hope of coming to London*, and I ventured to think that if the Greek Government were really inclined to come to the *Powers for advice and help* in their present dilemma, M. Gounaris's visit might prove useful. I had no doubt that if, and when, such a visit were definitely decided upon, the allied governments would be informed; *but, I said, it is not only the attitude of Greece that is important —it is equally essential to know the frame of mind prevailing at Angora:* about this we were in equal uncertainty, and I asked Count Saint - Aulaire whether his government could throw any light upon this side of the question. I observed that they had the advantage of having an agent at Angora in the person of M. Franklin - Bouillon, who, according to all our reports was exceedingly active and in the closest touch with Mustapha Kemal. I presumed, therefore, that the French Government were in a position to form a fairly reliable opinion of the intentions of the Kemalist Government, and I said His Majesty's Government would welcome any information which might be available from this source.

Count Saint - Aulaire said he was unfortunately in entire ignorance: he did not know how far Paris was informed, but he himself had been told nothing, and no particulars of M. Franklin - Bouillon's proceedings had been communicated to him. He promised, however, that any information of interest derived from Angora by the French Government would be placed at our disposal.

F.O. 371/6531/E. 10977.
F.O. 406/47, p. 70 - 71, No. 49.

No. 297

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 30, 1921.*

No. 2567. Urgent.
My Lord,

WITH reference to Sir M. Cheetham's despatch No. 2047 of the 16th July and my despatch No. 1987 of the 20th July, I transmit to your Excel-

F. 43

lency the accompanying copy of a despatch from His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople regarding M. Franklin-Bouillon's present visit to Angora.

2. I should be glad if you would take an early opportunity of obtaining from M. Briand some information regarding the purpose of M. Franklin-Bouillon's visit. You might remind him that at my meeting with him and the Italian Ambassador at Paris on the 19th June last M. Briand stated, in reply to an enquiry of mine, that M. Bouillon had no mission from the French Government, but had gone as a French journalist to report upon the situation. In view of information which has appeared in the press and has reached His Majesty's Government from other sources, I should be glad to know whether M. Bouillon is still without any mandate from the French Government and, if not, to learn generally the nature of his mission and the scope of the negotiations, if any, which he is conducting. You should remind M. Briand at the same time of the resolution adopted by the Supreme Council on the 10th August (see your telegram No. 587 of that date) "to use such informal means as may be available to them to ascertain the real intention of the belligerents and to interchange information on the subject."

3. In so speaking to M. Briand you should bear in mind the assurance given to me in the last paragraph of M. Briand's note of the 14th July (see Sir M. Cheetham's above-mentioned despatch) in connection with Bekir Sami's negotiations in Paris, that no general engagement would be entered into by the French Government with the Kemalists without a close agreement with the Allies, and especially with His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.,

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

F.O. 406/47, p. 73, No. 50.

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